A lightning offensive led by Hei’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an Islamist rebel group, has ended the Assad dynasty’s brutal 54-year rule and a decade of bloody civil war, seeding cautious hope among Syrians for a better future. HTS has largely adopted the right tone in its statements, acknowledging Syria’s religious, political and cultural diversity and pledging that its caretaker cabinet will work to bring about a more inclusive transitional government. 

Yet the new leadership in Damascus faces formidable challenges in a country recovering from civil war, especially in areas outside the capital. Less disciplined armed factions and unaffiliated gunmen have started exploiting gaps in HTS policing to loot and sow fear. In central and western Syria, these groups have targeted individuals whom they associate with the deposed regime, particularly Alawites and members of other minorities, which has fuelled perceptions within these communities that they are under attack. Left unchecked, this activity could generate renewed cycles of retaliatory violence reminiscent of the civil war. Tensions are also high in the north east, where the U.S.-backed Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have held sway for the past decade. Turkish-backed armed groups have driven the SDF out of several towns, displacing hundreds. More fighting could uproot thousands more, putting further strain on the post-Assad transition. In addition, the SDF’s weakening could allow ISIS – which is already reorganising in Syria’s eastern desert – to resurge. Hanging over this tableau are the international sanctions imposed in the Assad era, including terrorism designations placed on the leadership now in charge of the country, which continue to obstruct Syria’s economic recovery and hinder effective governance.

To promote a peaceful transition in Syria, the EU and its member states should: 

• Continue to use exchanges with the new authorities in Damascus to stress the importance of reflecting Syria’s rich political, ethnic, religious and cultural diversity in the caretaker government and within the security forces, and through active political participation by all parts of society. 

• Work with the U.S. to support negotiations between the Damascus leadership and the SDF to reach a stable solution in the north east that also addresses Türkiye’s security concerns, including through high-level engagement with Ankara. 

• Emphasise the importance of preserving the international anti-ISIS coalition, with the Syrian government’s cooperation, to prevent ISIS and other jihadists from regrouping in Syria. 

• Continue to repatriate European citizens affiliated with ISIS who remain stranded in detention facilities in north-eastern Syria. 

• Clarify the terms of the roadmap announced on 27 January and define specific criteria that Syria’s authorities must meet to secure further sanctions easing and/or to avoid snapback.

Political and Security Challenges

Many rebel groups participated in the eleven-day blitz that ousted the Assad regime, but HTS was the clear leader. Weeks after marching into Damascus, HTS established a caretaker government made up of figures who had occupied similar positions in its self-titled Salvation Government in the north-western enclave of Idlib, where the group had for years carved out a de facto autonomous zone. It has also announced plans to hold a national dialogue conference in the coming weeks to launch a broader political transition. The interim authorities continue to enjoy public support, for the most part, though security challenges and concerns about ideological overreach by some among the new leadership have begun to emerge.

HTS acknowledges that the interim cabinet draws on a fairly narrow cultural and ideological base, rooted in conservative Islamists from Idlib, although its cadres argue that appointing officials who are familiar with one another allows for faster, more effective decision-making at a critical juncture for the country. Syrians across the ideological spectrum, and particularly the more liberal voices, are nonetheless wary of HTS’s conservative Islamist leanings and of the caretaker government’s limited diversity. Some, including an HTS spokesperson, have advocated restricting women’s political role; he said women lack the authority to serve as judges. While HTS quickly replaced him, such comments could harm the new leadership’s credibility with Syrians who have yet to be won over by its talk of inclusion. Another figure whose appointment has affected public confidence is the interim justice minister, who in 2015 presided over the execution of two women in Idlib on charges of “prostitution”. 

HTS has promised that the caretaker government will be in charge only until 1 March, but uncertainty about what may come next has jangled nerves. Fostering greater trust and a more diverse set of political and social relationships will be essential for the interim leadership as it seeks to rebuild Syria and address the country’s many challenges. 

Security, meanwhile, stands out as an immediate concern. Damascus remains largely safe, but beyond the capital conditions are more alarming. Reports of instances of violence, looting and harassment are surfacing, as unruly armed factions and unaffiliated gunmen are taking advantage of the power vacuum for economic gain and to take revenge on wartime foes. 

In areas with substantial minority populations, such as the Homs, Hama, Tartous and Latakia provinces, these incidents have a particularly destabilising impact, especially where Sunni and Alawite villages and neighbourhoods sit side by side. The Assad regime disproportionately recruited from the Alawite community to staff its security forces and military, especially at senior levels, and individuals have been targeted in retribution for alleged complicity in the deposed government’s crimes. Local armed groups outside HTS control have been implicated in several killings and kidnappings. Witnesses usually cannot say who committed these crimes, as distinguishing among the various factions is difficult. Compounding pre-existing sectarian tensions, these incidents have fuelled perceptions that entire communities are under attack.

While HTS has acted to improve security, its forces appear to be stretched thin. In many cases, the Damascus authorities have reined in violent factions, arresting perpetrators, but their efforts are often reactive. HTS’s forces, which number approximately 30,000 fighters, are in urgent need of more personnel and resources. HTS has announced plans to dissolve former rebel factions and integrate them into a national army, which would represent an important advance. Meanwhile, HTS is enrolling new police officers in most provinces, but recruiting and training staff will take time. 

Engaging local communities in security provision could address personnel shortages while also promoting more inclusive and representative law enforcement. In Druze-majority Suwayda province, where factions have mostly supported the HTS-led offensive, the caretaker government has delegated security provision to local forces; Suwayda residents told Crisis Group that security in the area has improved following Assad’s fall. But in the absence of trusted partners, HTS has yet to engage local communities in central and western Syria in efforts to improve security in their areas. Community leaders in these regions have nevertheless expressed willingness to cooperate, and they could provide essential knowledge and intelligence to curb current levels of insecurity. 

Handling Potential Spoilers

Former regime members have tried to exploit the weak ties between HTS and Alawite communities, though with mixed results. In Tartous, HTS attempted to apprehend the former head of the notorious Sednaya prison – the Assad regime’s main jail for political prisoners, which HTS liberated – leading to clashes that killed fourteen of its members. Without prior communication between HTS and locals, former regime members managed to spread claims that HTS was coming to attack the village, rallying local supporters to join in its defence. In other cases, where HTS coordinated with local representatives, such operations proved more successful. In the countryside west of Homs, for example, HTS arrested a regime-affiliated former gang leader and members without putting the civilian population at risk. Local villagers did not cooperate with the gang, instead providing HTS with intelligence to ensure their capture. The contrast highlights the importance of effective cooperation with locals to restore order. Without urgent corrective measures, fears of violence and exclusion from the new political and social order could even encourage minorities to form armed self-defence groups. 

Another threat to security comes from the thousands of members of the ousted regime’s army, who are now unemployed but many still armed, while some of them have access to weapons circulating in the country. Under current conditions, many former soldiers report being unwilling to lay down their guns; some even say they are acquiring new ones to protect themselves. In a country just emerging from over a decade of sectarian civil war, the road from self-defence to insurgency could be short and disastrous. 

Endemic instability could also encourage external actors to capitalise. Iran and Hizbollah, which maintain ties with prominent Assad-era figures, could try to undermine Syria’s transition. Israel could also aggravate instability. Driven by its security concerns after Assad’s fall, Israel launched a sweeping bombing campaign, destroying Syrian military assets and chemical weapons production facilities. Its forces also invaded southern Syria to occupy a buffer zone beyond that established by the 1974 disengagement agreement on the Golan Heights. Within this area, Israel has seized strategic positions, carried out disarmament efforts and even targeted HTS forces sent to a village to de-escalate local clashes. These actions risk further destabilising an already fragile region and complicating efforts by Damascus to consolidate power. 

Escalating Conflict in the North East

Syria’s north east, controlled by the Kurdish-led SDF, has become another fount of instability. After HTS launched its offensive, the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) advanced into SDF-held areas, capturing several towns from the SDF, displacing thousands of civilians. The SDF, in turn, announced a counter-offensive to recapture lost areas in late December 2024. Ankara views the SDF as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which it (along with the EU and the U.S.) labels a terrorist organisation and has fought for decades. Ankara sees the group’s presence in north-eastern Syria as a threat to Turkish national security. Continued escalation between the SNA and the SDF risks compelling tens of thousands more civilians to flee their homes.

The SDF’s critical role in containing ISIS adds to the stakes. The SDF is responsible for guarding facilities housing detained ISIS militants and their families, including some 50,000 people in al-Hol, a camp near the Iraqi border which also hosts thousands of European citizens. A weakening of the SDF could enable prison breaks and create conditions for an ISIS resurgence. Already, the jihadist group is exploiting the power vacuum to reorganise and bolster its forces from hideouts in the eastern desert. The U.S. and France, which have garrisons in the north east as part of the anti-ISIS coalition and strongly back the SDF, have stepped up airstrikes on suspected ISIS targets. 

The Assad regime’s fall presents an opportunity to reunify Syrian territory. The new rulers in Damascus have announced their intention to do so, under a single government, with all armed factions integrated into a single national army. So far, the SDF appears open to this project in principle, but hesitant in practice. It has made clear that its decision on integration will depend on what governance model the new rulers adopt and what sort of guarantees Damascus offers for protecting Kurdish rights. In any case, reconnecting the north east with the central government will require extensive negotiations with support from Washington and Brussels. 

Sanctions: A Barrier to Recovery

Syria’s new leaders face the monumental task of rebuilding an economy in ruins after over a decade of conflict and mismanagement. While the Assad regime’s demise has created an opportunity for renewal, the legacy of sanctions imposed by the EU, the U.S. and others remains a major obstacle. The EU’s Syria sanctions regime is currently the bloc’s second-largest, after the one imposed on Russia, consisting of a wide range of sectoral sanctions, from the financial sector to aviation, telecommunications and petrol. These measures now risk starving the new government in Damascus of the resources it needs to shore up national institutions. Without adjustments, sanctions could stifle efforts to consolidate government authority and deliver critical state services. On 27 January, the EU announced an agreement on a roadmap to ease sanctions on Syria – a welcome first step. Yet the roadmap lacks clarity as to the scope of restrictions to be relaxed and the timeline for doing so, as well as clear benchmarks for Syria’s new leaders to meet in order to avoid reinstatement of the sanctions.

The U.S., EU and UN list HTS as a terrorist organisation, which adds a layer of complexity to the problem. The group has long since distanced itself from ISIS and al-Qaeda, its former ties with which caused the sanctions to be imposed, and actively fought these groups in Idlib. Nonetheless, the terrorist designations remain. The U.S. designation of HTS as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) is particularly onerous because it bars providing assistance and advice as well as funding to the group. The penalties for violations are also especially severe. That an FTO-listed group is now acting as Syria’s de facto government complicates foreign companies’ and aid workers’ dealings in the country, adding legal risks and administrative burdens. The EU’s terrorist designation of HTS has less sweeping implications, but it still has an impact, as it prohibits making funds available to those listed, either directly or indirectly, and contributes to the broader chilling effect on interactions in the country. It is unclear whether the EU’s roadmap will include concrete steps HTS could take to be delisted.

Without adjustments, sanctions risk blocking the country’s economic recovery and keeping it overly reliant on contraband. Many Syrians turned to smuggling after the imposition of sanctions in 2011, and illicit industries have been among the country’s few sources of profit ever since. The Assad regime was particularly dependent on trade in the amphetamine Captagon to stay afloat. Drug smuggling networks have weakened following their patron’s ouster, but they might regain strength if Syria remains cut off from international markets. Enduring isolation would not only perpetuate illicit activity but also create opportunities for foreign and extremist groups to recruit.

Lastly, if the new leadership cannot revive the economy, hardship could again push Syrians to look for better life chances abroad. Significant emigration would not only strain neighbouring and European countries, some of which already host large Syrian refugee populations, but also prevent many Syrians in the diaspora from returning to their homeland.

What the EU and Its Member States Can Do

Europe has an important role to play in giving the post-Assad transition its best chance at success. In engaging with the new authorities in Damascus, the EU should emphasise the importance of inclusion. Defining and assessing the inclusiveness of Syria’s interim governing authorities will undoubtedly be a challenging task for outsiders. But Syrians have developed an impressive range of civil society organisations, both within and outside the country. Civil society is immersed in debates about governance and is already pushing back against certain steps taken by the HTS. The EU should provide financial support to civil society and opposition voices, enabling them to keep playing a vital role in Syria’s transition and future. It could also offer additional technical assistance to build Syrian state capacity. The EU should stress the need to respond to public concern about the new leadership’s approach to women’s rights, including by urging the authorities to keep appointing women to leadership roles and to widen their engagement with women’s movements. 

As for local security, police forces under the former regime used to have a reputation for petty corruption and inefficiency, but otherwise they were mostly uninvolved in the central government’s misdeeds. The EU could encourage authorities to organise joint patrols made up of HTS general security personnel and vetted former regime police as a way to get enough boots on the ground at this critical time for the country’s transition, while preserving discipline and accountability.

In the north east, the EU and member states that belong to the anti-ISIS coalition should promote the SDF’s integration into central government institutions, starting with the army. The EU should support negotiations between the Damascus leadership and the SDF, working with the U.S. to nudge them toward a stable solution in the north east that also addresses Türkiye’s security concerns, including through further high-level engagement with Ankara. The SDF, under pressure from Türkiye and the SNA factions it sponsors, is more willing than before to negotiate. Likewise, the central government, which is not strong enough to dictate terms, may adopt a conciliatory approach. The threat of an ISIS resurgence, for now at least, means that international coalition troops should stay in north-eastern Syria. EU member states should consider repatriating their citizens from ISIS detention camps like al-Hol to reduce the strain on the SDF and contribute to regional stability. 

The EU should also take immediate steps to alleviate the ill effects of sanctions on Syria’s economy. First, the bloc should lift sectoral sanctions, as EU diplomats have hinted that they plan to do, which obstruct Syrian economic regeneration and were imposed in response to the Assad regime’s atrocities. The EU should ensure that the timeline for review or snapback is not too short, so that humanitarian and commercial activity can start in earnest. Secondly, for the sanctions that remain in place, it should put a standing humanitarian waiver in place. This waiver would ideally extend to the private sector so as to kickstart the commercial activity needed to staunch Syria’s humanitarian crisis. Thirdly, the EU should clarify the terms of the roadmap announced on 27 January and define specific criteria that Syria’s authorities can meet for further sanctions easing and/or to avoid a snapback. These criteria should above all make it costly for Syria’s new authorities to resort to autocratic and repressive rule. 

With the UN estimating that 33 million Syrians both inside the country and in places of refuge in neighbouring countries will require assistance in 2025 due to the civil war and its aftermath, it will be crucial to scale up humanitarian aid for the foreseeable future. While foreign aid may provide short-term relief, it cannot sustain an entire country. Syria urgently needs not only emergency supplies but also support for economic recovery. The private sector, wary of continued instability and punishment for inadvertently breaking sanctions, needs active encouragement from major powers in order to regain the confidence to invest in Syria. Meanwhile, European governments should remain realistic about the prospects of refugee return. To make return safe, the current security challenges have to be addressed; to make it viable, basic services need to be restored and the prospect of economic recovery needs to be credible.