• In 2020, the pandemic policies of the Czech government were vigorously contested by the opposition and civil society. The official response to the COVID-19 crisis was chaotic and poorly communicated to the public. However, with the exception of the first state of emergency in March, approvals for subsequent states of emergency were thoroughly debated in Parliament.8
• Regional and Senate elections (for one third of seats in Parliament’s upper chamber) were both held in October 2020. The election results exposed the low coalition potential of ANO (Action of Dissatisfied Citizens), Prime Minister Andrej Babiš’s party, and weakened the Social Democrats (ČSSD). In the regional elections, ANO increased its mandate from 176 to 178 seats. However, the party lost two regional governors due in part to the successful coalition-building among smaller liberal and conservative parties that excluded ANO in most regions.9
• ČSSD, a party staple of Czech politics since the 1990s, fought for its survival during the year. In the 2020 elections, the Social Democrats lost 4 regional governors and 88 mandates (winning only 37 mandates). In public opinion polls at year’s end, the party’s support was hovering around the 5-percent electoral threshold.10 Overall, the regional and Senate elections strengthened anti-establishment parties.
• In the run-up to the fall elections, the government loosened pandemic mitigation measures in order to boost its popularity. As a result, the second wave of coronavirus brought a massive surge in cases and deaths. By mid-October, the Czech Republic had recorded more new cases per million people than any other major country in the world.11
• The COVID-19 crisis exposed the reality that the Czech state had been hollowed out over the years and was being poorly and weakly governed. The state, in fact, failed to properly track coronavirus cases or to prepare for the second wave of the pandemic.
• In 2020, the European Union (EU) confirmed that the Agrofert holding’s “blind trust,” which PM Babiš had established to avoid conflicts of interest, did not achieve this purpose. Consequently, the EU announced that it would not reimburse Czech projects funded within the EU structural funds scheme to boost small and medium-size enterprises. The Czech government, however, made no effort to extract the related subsidies from Agrofert.12
• Instead, the government attempted to alleviate the prime minister’s conflicts of interest by proposing an amendment in June that would decrease transparency in company ownership. The change would obfuscate the fact that Babiš indirectly controls and benefits from Agrofert and its subsidiaries. In its review of the amendment, Parliament removed the section on trust funds that would have benefited the prime minister.13
• The biggest infringement on civil liberties during the year was a travel ban instituted early in the spring. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the government forbade Czech citizens from leaving the country, a measure reminiscent of the Iron Curtain era. The ban lasted several weeks but was eventually eliminated following judicial review.14

• The COVID-19 pandemic dominated Czechia’s Senate and regional elections in October. Opposition parties criticized Prime Minister Babiš and ANO for the sharp increase in coronavirus cases in the fall and the government’s weak coordination and lack of transparency that undermined the pandemic response. In their electoral campaigns, the opposition also criticized the misuse of EU funds by PM Babiš’s Agrofert holding and advocated for “change” and new leadership; their primary objective was to weaken ANO and Babiš.15
• There were no significant election irregularities reported, but voting processes had to be adjusted because of the pandemic. The government initially planned to prohibit COVID-positive and quarantining citizens from voting. The opposition pushed back, and the government was forced to prepare legislation that, among other things, allowed drive-through voting and provided for a special mobile electoral commissions to visit quarantining voters.16
• The Senate elections filled one third of seats in Parliament’s upper chamber. The ruling ANO party won only a single seat out of those 27. The largest winner, STAN (Starostové a nezávislí, or Mayors and Independents), took the most seats, and the Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL) won 3 seats. None of the illiberal anti-establishment parties, such as the Communist Party (KSCM) or the far right, were able to win a Senate seat. Most seats were won by opposition candidates under a variety of coalition arrangements.17
• In the regional elections, held at the same time, ANO was much more successful. It received 21.82 percent of the vote, which led to an increase in mandates from 176 to 178. However, ANO lost two regional governorships as democratic opposition parties formed strategic coalitions to successfully compete. ANO’s coalition partner, the Social Democrats (ČSSD), continued its political decline. ČSSD won only 4.92 percent of the vote, which signals it might not be able to cross the 5-percent electoral threshold in the 2021 fall elections. ČSSD lost four regional governors and 88 mandates.18
• Similar to the Senate elections, STAN was strengthened by the regional results. A liberal political movement, STAN’s leadership draws on mayors as well as regional and community-level leaders. The party advocates for decentralization, budgetary prudence, and civic engagement in politics. STAN received 6.4 percent of the vote, which translated into 31 new mandates and 3 regional governors. The Czech Pirate Party (Česká pirátská strana, or Piráti), the biggest challenger to ANO’s dominance, won 12.02 percent of the vote. The party dramatically increased its number of mandates from 5 to 99. STAN and Pirates joined most regional coalition governments.19
• Support for Czechia’s extremist and anti-system parties remained stable during the year. The far-right party Freedom and Direct Democracy (Svoboda a přímá demokracie, SPD) won 6.13 percent of the vote in the regional elections. A new far-right party, Tricolor (Trikolóra), received 2.49 percent of the vote. The Communist Party (KSCM), which tacitly supported the ANO-ČSSD governing coalition, received 4.75 percent of the vote. The support for anti-system parties came mainly from socially and economically disadvantaged regions, but the strength of citizen-party linkages has significantly weakened since 2013.20
• Czech political parties are obliged to publish financial reports, and party funding and campaign financing are overseen by the Office for Economic Supervision of Political Parties and Political Movements (ÚDHPSPH).21 After reviewing the Senate and regional elections, ÚDHPSPH found only a few irregularities. Seventeen regional parties and 23 Senate candidates did not publish their financial reports within the required 90-day window and were issued fines.22
• At the same time, according to Transparency International (TI), almost all political parties were not fully transparent, failing to either itemize their campaign spending or fully disclose their donors. Pirates received the best marks from TI,23 whose findings, it should be noted, do not imply that parties violated the law.

• The Czech civic sector vigorously organized to compensate for the state’s failures during the COVID-19 pandemic. In the spring, civic groups organized the production and distribution of do-it-yourself masks and donations of personal protective equipment (PPE) to hospitals and frontline workers. The nongovernmental organization Watchdog pressured the government to increase its transparency about pandemic mitigation measures and access to medical data, such as the number of ICU beds and healthcare data at the regional level. The sector pushed for a data-driven approach to the crisis and pressured the government for greater transparency into its policymaking process. Civil society actors also called for transparency in the awarding of procurement contracts during the pandemic.24
• Czechia’s first protest against the government’s COVID-19 response was called by the movement Million Moments for Democracy on June 9, 2020, in Old Town Square in Prague and 166 other cities. The police signaled that they were prepared to protect citizens’ right to assembly; meanwhile, Health Minster Adam Vojtěch waited until only a few hours before the demonstration to announce that the organizers were exempt from the ban on public gatherings over 500 people. The protests in Prague and elsewhere were orderly. Protesters wore masks and were socially distanced. The protesters questioned the government’s procurement contracts during the pandemic and criticized ANO’s effort to take over advisory boards that oversee public media, as well as PM Babiš’s conflicts of interest.25 It is estimated that several thousand people protested on June 9.26
• Additionally, Million Moments for Democracy organized anti-government protests calling for greater transparency and clarity in the government’s pandemic measures, some events occurring virtually.27 During the pandemic, the number of protest participants was limited, and social distancing and masks were required. Most rules were followed during the civil protests, but there were also more disorderly anti-mask protests.28 However, most demonstrations were peaceful, and police generally did not engage with protesters. Overall, the pandemic did not undermine freedoms of expression and assembly in the Czech Republic.
• The Roma minority faces unequal access to education and employment. Consumer debt affects the Roma community as well, (8–10 percent of Czechs cannot pay their debts).29 The 2020 “Lex Covid” restricted insolvency proceedings during the pandemic, which helped Roma and others among the most vulnerable populations in the country.
• The Czech Republic is highly secular, and the separation of the state from churches will be concluded by 2042.30 By that year, the state has agreed to pay full financial settlements for properties confiscated by the state under the communist regime that no longer can be returned (under a 2012 law on the compensation of churches). All religious groups depend on the state budget.
• While its impact is marginal, in 2020, the Catholic Church intensified its pro-life and anti-LGBT+ activism. The group March for Life (Hnutí Pro život ČR) organized monthly processions that ended with a Catholic Mass. Another organization, Movement for Life, offered cash payments and monthly stipends to women who considered abortion during the pandemic in order to sway their decision. The offer was denied to women with multiple children, which excluded many Roma women.31
• In 2020, Czechia postponed ratification of the Council of Europe’s 2016 Istanbul Convention, which condemns violence against women. Conservative parties and the Catholic Church were the main opponents of the ratification.32

• Concentration of private ownership in Czechia’s media sphere has skewed the country’s political competition. The Mafra media group, a subsidiary of the Agrofert holding, continued to advocate on behalf of the prime minister and his ANO party in 2020,33 while PM Babiš used the pandemic to solidify his grip on the media market. This process started in 2013 when Babiš purchased Mafra.
• During the pandemic, it was revealed that the state had propped up the Mafra media group. State-owned companies, such as Czech Railways, de facto subsidized Mafra through paid advertising.34 The large media group dominates the daily print market and is estimated to have 2.4 million readers, with an online audience of around 3.4 million daily users.35 Furthermore, state aid for cultural institutions to alleviate the negative impacts of the pandemic disproportionately benefitted Mafra compared to other media groups.36
• PM Babiš also used the pandemic to stack the council of the public broadcaster, Czech Television (ČT), installing a loyalist chair, Pavel Matocha, and two members uncommitted to liberal pluralism, Hana Lipovská and Xaver Veselý.37 The ČT Council, the public body overseeing the television, dismissed its five-member supervisory board in November, raising questions about the legality of the move. PM Babiš made attempts during the year to undermine ČT’s current director, who may be dismissed by the council.38
• ČT’s wide national reach gives a significant platform to voices critical of the government,39 and the public broadcaster is the most-trusted media source in the Czech Republic.40 In November, protests organized by Million Moments for Democracy, conducted in cars in front of the ČT premises, called out PM Babiš’s efforts to weaken the public broadcaster and curb its independence.41

• The COVID-19 pandemic exposed weaknesses, shortcomings, and lack of capacity in the Czech central government. Similarly, regional governments (including regional public health agencies, hygiena) lacked the capability to coordinate a pandemic response.
• There are 14 hygiene stations in the Czech Republic, one in each of the country’s 14 regions.42 These authorities are responsible for public health issues, such as monitoring the spread of infectious diseases, data collection, and tracing. Yet these hygienas are understaffed and underpaid, as well as lack resources. During the crisis, they conducted coronavirus tracing using pen and paper. The average age of doctors working in these agencies is 60 years old.43 All 14 stations were overwhelmed during the pandemic. Former chief of the hygienas, Eva Gottvaldová, was sacked on March 12 for lacking medical expertise to deal with the pandemic.
• In December, the government passed a new income tax law,44 which will reduce state budget revenue as well as the income of regions and municipalities. Since regional governments are tasked with responding to COVID-19, this action will further reduce their ability to combat the pandemic.

• Czech courts are independent, but the country’s justice system worked slowly in 2020 due to the pandemic.45 During the state of emergency, the government attempted to restrict civil rights. The most egregious action was the ban on travel for Czech citizens instituted in March, a measure reminiscent of the Iron Curtain era. The travel ban was abolished by the Prague Municipal Court in April.
• The judiciary was instrumental in pushing back against executive overreach during the year. In addition to blocking the travel ban, the Prague Municipal Court ruled on April 23 that four emergency measures imposed by the government did not comply with law.46 Among the measures were limits on freedom of movement and closure of large shops. The government complied with the court’s ruling by modifying some measures and dropping the travel ban. The Senate had threatened to bring the travel ban to the Constitutional Court, which increased pressure on the government to scrap the measure.
• The Constitutional Court continued to consider two important cases in 2020. The first related to the timing of the announcement of the 2021 general election (for all 200 members of Parliament’s Chamber of Deputies). A group of senators claimed that President Zeman had called the election early in order to boost the prime minister. The second case, submitted in 2017 by a group of senators, challenges the electoral law. The decision is expected in early 2021 and will significantly influence the 2021 legislative election.
• The rights of prisoners are largely respected in Czechia, and inmates may participate in national elections. During the pandemic, the country’s prison population decreased by 5.6 percent.47 However, there were more than 200 people jailed for petty thefts committed during the lockdown.48
• The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) dealt with 349 applications concerning the Czech Republic in 2020, of which 348 were declared inadmissible or thrown out. The ECtHR delivered a judgment on one application that found at least one violation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), in the case of Tempel v. the Czech Republic concerning repeated first-instance and appeal proceedings over a decade on a charge of murder.49
• Czech police only loosely enforced pandemic restrictions during the year, rarely issuing steep fines or assertively dispersing public gatherings. No significant instances of police brutality occurred in relation to the pandemic response.

• In 2020, the European Union (EU) confirmed that the “blind trust” that Prime Minister Babiš had established for his Agrofert holding did not alleviate his conflicts of interest. Consequently, the EU announced that it would not reimburse Czech projects funded within the EU structural funds scheme to boost small and medium-size enterprises. The Czech government, however, made no effort to extract the related subsidies from Agrofert coffers.50
• Instead, the government tried to remove Babiš’s conflicts of interest by proposing an amendment that would merely decrease transparency in company ownership. A provision in the amendment would have obfuscated the fact that Babiš indirectly controls and benefits from Agrofert and its subsidiaries. The government withdrew the amendment upon evidence revealing the companies’ real owners, and under criticism from the opposition and Transparency International.51 In June, the amendment was reintroduced,52 but the Chamber of Deputies later removed the offending provision.
• Political corruption and lack of transparency in public procurement are common in Czechia. In 2020, the police investigated high-profile political corruption that involved the presidency, looking into irregularities in contracts of the Lány Forestry Administration, which falls under the Office of the President.53
• Another highly publicized case was the investigation into public procurement in the Brno city district, which led to the dissolution of the ANO party organization in Brno. The main defendant, Jiří Švachula, is a prominent ANO politician and a former deputy mayor of the city district. This large-scale investigation, nicknamed “The Gutter,” is a probe into past public procurement contracts and may suggest that all public contracts awarded in the Brno city district have involved bribing public officials.54
• A scandal erupted in October when Bečva River was severely contaminated. An investigation looked into whether a chemical factory in PM Babiš’s Agrofert holding may have played a role in poisoning the river,55 the largest environmental catastrophe since 1989. The contamination killed all fish and other organisms along many kilometers of the Bečva. The investigation was stalled at year’s end.56
• The government’s public procurement processes during the state of emergency were marred with chaos, lack of transparency, and corruption. In the Supreme Audit Office’s review of the government’s COVID-19 response, it criticized the state’s lack of preparedness and a weak pandemic plan, which was last updated in 2011. The state audit office also criticized discrepancies found in the purchases of PPE and medical equipment between the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Interior. Furthermore, the PPE purchased was of poor quality and the transporting of equipment from abroad was poorly coordinated. The state audit office ultimately concluded that the procurement contracts were disadvantageous to the state.57

Author: Dr. Lenka Buštíková is Associate Professor in the School of Politics and Global Studies at Arizona State University. Her research focuses on party politics, voting behavior, clientelism, and state capacity, with special emphasis on Eastern Europe. Her book Extreme Reactions: Radical Right Mobilization in Eastern Europe (Cambridge University Press), exploring how far-right parties mobilize against politically ascendant minorities, received the Davis Center Book Prize in political and social studies (2020). She is currently serving as an editor of the journal East European Politics.