Dokument #2035817
Freedom House (Autor)
Democracy Percentage | 47.02 / 100 |
Democracy Score | 3.82 / 7 |
By Gjergji Vurmo
Democracy in Albania deteriorated in 2019, thus materializing longstanding fears of rising authoritarianism and a dysfunctional system of mechanisms to check and balance government powers. Recurring political crises reared up once again as a result of the 2008 constitutional amendments that provided for powerful executive and party leaders, decaying integrity of political representation, and a weakened Parliament. During the year, Albania witnessed not only the “next” political crisis but also the emergence of institutional conflicts and the revelation that the current system of checks and balances is ineffective in preventing them. In this heightened political climate, worrying trends were observed in the areas of national democratic governance, electoral processes, media independence, and corruption.
Following a year marked by citizen protests, parliamentary boycotts, and a contentious political climate, in February 2019, the opposition parties undertook the unprecedented move of resigning en bloc from Parliament. The opposition accused the ruling majority of widespread corruption and use of criminal networks to manipulate elections,1 thus calling for early elections under a technical government.2 As the ruling majority ignored the political crisis, with no serious efforts made by the government and opposition to overcome the deadlock, the first half of 2019 was marked by opposition rallies, some of which turned violent.3
This radicalized political climate further deteriorated with the opposition’s boycott of the June 30 local elections. The situation initiated institutional conflicts between the president, Parliament, and the Central Election Commission (CEC). As the opposition repeatedly threatened to block the local elections,4 President Ilir Meta issued a questionable decree postponing the elections till October, which was subsequently ignored by the CEC without a legal basis to do so.5 The president’s decree to postpone local elections prompted the ruling majority to launch an impeachment procedure, which is still in process in Parliament.
Local elections were ultimately held on June 30 amidst an opposition boycott, which allowed the ruling majority to extend absolute control over nearly all of Albania’s 61 municipalities. The ODIHR election observation mission’s statement of preliminary findings and conclusions stated that “voters did not have a meaningful choice between political options.”6 As a result, electoral processes in Albania noted a setback in 2019 due to stalled electoral reform and the opposition boycott, while the election results raise fears over the accountability and integrity of local governance bodies that will lack opposition voices for the next four years.
The second half of 2019 was dominated by disagreements between the president and the Socialist Party (SP) parliamentary majority, which further intensified in November over the election of Constitutional Court judges.7 Conflicting readings of constitutional provisions for the election and appointment of members of the Constitutional Court by President Meta, the chair of the Justice Appointment Council (JAC), Ardian Dvorani, and the SP parliamentary majority triggered an institutional conflict over the president’s court nominee, Marsida Xhaferllari, and the JAC’s first-ranked candidate, Arta Vorpsi. While the Constitutional Court indirectly recognized President Meta’s candidate, the conflict escalated with accusations leveled at the JAC chair, Prime Minister Edi Rama, and also at foreign ambassadors who advised Albanian institutions to bring the case to the Venice Commission.8
Justice reform progressed incrementally in 2019 with the election of new members to the Constitutional Court by the president and Parliament, the election of a General Prosecutor by Parliament,9 appointment of eight prosecutors to the Special Prosecution Against Corruption and Organized Crime (SPAK),10 preparations for the establishment of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), and the continuing evaluation of judges and prosecutors by vetting commissions. However, the Constitutional and High Courts remained dysfunctional as a result of unfilled judgeships and absence of a quorum.11 This precluded opportunities for accountability, as several laws and government actions could not be challenged in the Constitutional Court. Hence, public hopes to end the impunity of high-level corruption received yet another blow from the worrying and unchallengeable legislative practice of shielding government concessions and public-private partnerships (PPPs), thus disregarding public interests, expert feedback, and warnings from independent institutions.
Corruption also remained troubling in 2019, as modest achievements in fighting petty corruption were overshadowed by serious concerns of impunity and state capture threatening the legislative process.12 Parliament approved several suspicious concession and PPP contracts via special laws. The government and Tirana municipality moved forward with a bidding procedure13 for the national theater.14 While protests by the artistic community15 opposing the project continued daily, the government failed to disclose information on the bidding companies or the contract winner even after the 30-day deadline had expired.16
At the same time, impunity of high-level officials remained unchallenged in 2019. The prosecution failed to swiftly investigate allegations voiced by the Democratic Party (DP) and media over the role of organized crime in vote buying during the 2016 early mayoral elections in Dibër and 2017 general elections in Durrës county.17
The year was also challenging for independent media, which were under threat from both an anti-defamation legislative package adopted by Parliament and ongoing government crackdowns on online media.18 The legislative package was adopted in December19 (though not yet in force by year’s end) despite concerns from Albanian media and international organizations.20 The government, as well as businesses and criminal groups, attempted to gain outside influence over the media, while media owners regularly used their outlets to favor their business or political interests.21 PM Rama and other SP representatives continued to criticize the Albanian media as a “trash bin” and threatened journalists with defamation charges.22
Civil sector responses to key developments in the country in 2019 were either weak—especially regarding the political crisis and corruption allegations over concession and PPP projects—or completely ignored by political actors, including on issues related to the anti-defamation legislative package and improving public consultation in draft laws and policies. However, civil society organizations (CSOs) proved highly organized and efficient in engaging volunteers and offering relief to citizens affected by the devastating earthquake that hit the counties of Durrës, Tirana, and Lezhë on November 26.23
The European Union twice postponed a decision to open accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia, thus undermining its credibility and seriously jeopardizing reform achievements in both countries.
Considers the democratic character of the governmental system; and the independence, effectiveness, and accountability of the legislative and executive branches. | 3.25 / 7.00 |
Examines national executive and legislative elections, the electoral framework, the functioning of multiparty systems, and popular participation in the political process. | 4.25 / 7.00 |
Assesses the organizational capacity and financial sustainability of the civic sector; the legal and political environment in which it operates; the functioning of trade unions; interest group participation in the policy process; and the threat posed by antidemocratic extremist groups. | 5.00 / 7.00 |
Examines the current state of press freedom, including libel laws, harassment of journalists, and editorial independence; the operation of a financially viable and independent private press; and the functioning of the public media. | 3.75 / 7.00 |
Considers the decentralization of power; the responsibilities, election, and capacity of local governmental bodies; and the transparency and accountability of local authorities. | 4.50 / 7.00 |
Assesses constitutional and human rights protections, judicial independence, the status of ethnic minority rights, guarantees of equality before the law, treatment of suspects and prisoners, and compliance with judicial decisions. | 3.25 / 7.00 |
Looks at public perceptions of corruption, the business interests of top policymakers, laws on financial disclosure and conflict of interest, and the efficacy of anticorruption initiatives. | 2.75 / 7.00 |
Author: Gjergji Vurmo is Program Director and Senior Researcher on governance and EU integration at the Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM) in Tirana. He has over 20 years’ experience with civil society networks and think tanks in the Western Balkans region working on good governance, EU enlargement, civic space, and security matters. Vurmo is author of several research studies and has reported on Albania for such global reports as the Open Government Partnership (2013–18), USAID’s CSO Sustainability Index (2010–13), and Open Parliaments 2012 report. He has served as Steering Board member of various networks of research institutes in the SEE region (PASOS, BCSDN) and is a contributor on the WB region for various think tanks.
NOTE: The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this report. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s). The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 1 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. The Democracy Percentage, introduced in 2020, is a translation of the Democracy Score to the 0–100 scale, where 0 equals least democratic and 100 equals most democratic.