19. April 2018

 

Die folgenden Ausschnitte aus ausgewählten Quellen enthalten Informationen zu oben genannter Fragestellung (Zugriff auf alle Quellen am 19. April 2018):

Bitte beachten Sie, dass die in dieser Anfragebeantwortung enthaltenen Übersetzungen aus dem Norwegischen unter Verwendung von technischen Übersetzungshilfen erstellt wurden. Es besteht daher ein erhöhtes Risiko, dass diese Arbeitsübersetzungen Ungenauigkeiten enthalten.

 

·      McGee, Thomas: Statelessness Displaced: Update on Syria´s Stateless Kurds. Statelessness Working Paper Series No. 2016/02, Juni 2016
http://www.institutesi.org/WP2016_02.pdf

„Firstly, in April 2011 Syrian president Bashar al-Assad issued Legislative Decree No. 49 as a concessionary measure intended to reduce participation of the historically restive Kurdish population in the anti-government protest movement growing in momentum across the country. The decree ’grants Syrian Arab nationality to those registered as ajanib [‘foreigners’] of Hassaka [governorate in north-eastern Syria]’ and as a result a considerable number of Kurds from Syria were able to acquire nationality for the first time. It, however, makes no mention of the second category of stateless Kurds: some 150,000 maktumeen [meaning ‘concealed’] who were excluded from its provisions. Further analysis of the decree from the perspective of reducing statelessness – as well as its limitations in law and implementation – is provided in a 2013 report issued by Tilburg University Statelessness Program.” (McGee, Juni 2016, S. 1)

„While the government’s implementation of the 2011 Decree did result in reducing the number of stateless persons, a significant part of Syria’s remaining statelessness problem has now been ‘exported’ to new geographic and legal contexts with the displacement of affected persons out of the country. Indeed, the majority of research participants confirmed that within the Kurdish community still living in Syria there are only a very few ajanib who have not yet acquired Syrian nationality. These are mostly exceptional cases where those affected are unable, apprehensive or unwilling to approach the national authorities to submit their claim. Concerning the maktumeen who were officially excluded from Decree No. 49, it is estimated that only between 4,800 and 5,000 remain across the Hassaka Governorate in Syria, as a result of considerable numbers leaving the region.” (McGee, Juni 2016, S. 2)

·      Tilburg University Statelessness Program: The Stateless Syrians (Autor: Zahra Albarazi), Mai 2013
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/52a983124.pdf

„A fourth, greater challenge is that this naturalization decree restricted to the category of ‘foreigners‘ (ajanib). It did not extend to the second category of stateless Kurds, the maktoumeen, who had been left out entirely from the original registries. However, this research has found that in some exceptional cases, when the individual concerned is familiar with the authorities, it had been possible for maktoumeen to become naturalized through their ajnabi fathers who became nationals. One example we found was Ibrahim Amr who testified that he had been able to obtain citizenship for his two maktumeen children following his own naturalization (from ajnabi). He added that the procedure was simple for his daughter since she was 14 years old, which is the normal age to apply for a national ID card in Syria. The process was lenghtier for his son who was 17 at the time, but was eventually successful.” (Tilburg University Statelessness Program, Mai 2013, S. 20)

·      McGee, Thomas: The Stateless Kurds of Syria. Ethnic Identity and National I.D. In: Tilburg Law Review, 19, S. 171-181, 2014
https://www.academia.edu/5677728/The_Stateless_Kurds_of_Syria_Ethnic_Identity_and_National_I.D

„Firstly, the access to citizenship will be assessed in light of Decree 49 from April 2011, which introduces the naturalization process [Fußnote 14: Article 1 of presidential Decree 49 issued on April 7 2011 ‘grants Syrian Arab citizenship to registered “foreigners” in Hassaka.’ The decree contains no criteria for how the process would be carried out.]. Since a more extensive analysis of this specific measure is available elsewhere, present focus will be limited to a consideration of the number of its ‘beneficiaries.’ Based on survey questions asked of Syrian Kurdish refugees in Domiz camp (Kurdistan Region) by UNHCR Iraq during 2013, 92 percent of those claiming to have ever been registered as ajanib were now Syrian nationals. [Fußnote 16: […] This data was collected through a mobile survey conducted by UNHCR partners with 1974 individual Syrian Kurds over a period of 5 days. Of these, 579 individuals had at some point been registered as ajanib (29% of the sample). Only 51 of these still held ajnabi status at the point of questioning.] 94 percent of ajanib had attempted to benefit from the provisions of Decree 49, with an impressive success rate of 98 percent. There was much lower incidence of maktumin, only 7 percent of those surveyed, and of these, 77 percent considered themselves still to hold no Syrian or other nationality. [Fußnote 17: Of the 1974 individuals surveyed, only 132 responded to having ever been maktumin, of which 101 remained so by the time the survey was implemented.] A priori there is no reason to assume that statelessness would be more or less prevalent among Syrian Kurds outside the camp in the rest of the Kurdistan Region. This implies that while most maktumin (though surprisingly few in number were surveyed) [Fußnote 18: The figure is surprisingly low given previous estimates for the prevalence of maktumin in Kurdish society in Syria […]] continue to be excluded, Syrian nationality for ajanib had become remarkably accessible. Nonetheless, it is necessary also to consider the impact Decree 49 and its related naturalization have on perceptions of national identity for Syrian (stateless) Kurds, and to evaluate newly acquired citizenship within the present Syrian context of civil war.” (McGee, 2014, S. 175)

·      Landinfo – Norwegian Country of Origin Information Centre: Syria: Statsløse kurdere, 12. Februar 2018 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1425892/1788_1520259202_1202.pdf

„Det finnes ingen sikre anslag over hvor mange som fremdeles er statsløse etter implementeringen av Dekret nr. 49. Ifølge representanter for Sivilstatusavdelingen i Damaskus hadde 105 000 fått innvilget statsborgerskap per 2015. Samme tall ble oppgitt da spørsmålet igjen ble reist av Landinfo i 2017 (Sivilstatusavdelingen, møte september 2015 og mai 2017).“

[Übersetzung aus dem Norwegischen: Es gibt keine verlässlichen Schätzungen darüber, wie viele Staatenlose es nach der Umsetzung des Dekrets Nr. 49 noch gibt. Nach Angaben der Beamten des Zivilstandesamt in Damaskus hätten bis 2015 105.000 Menschen die Staatsbürgerschaft erhalten. Dieselbe Zahl wurde angegeben, als die Frage 2017 erneut von Landinfo gestellt wurde.] (Landinfo, 12. Februar 2018, S. 13)

„Ifølge representanter for Sivilstatus-avdelingen i Damaskus omfattet dekretet totalt 120 000 statsløse kurdere. Av disse hadde 105 000 fått innvilget statsborgerskap per 2015.“

[Übersetzung aus dem Norwegischen: Laut Vertretern des Zivilstandesamtes in Damaskus umfasste das Dekret insgesamt 120.000 staatenlose Kurden. Von diesen hätten 105.000 bis 2015 die Staatsbürgerschaft erhalten.] (Landinfo, 12. Februar 2018, S. 12)

„Ifølge Sivilstatusavdelingen ble søknader om statsborgerskap fra og med 2011 behandlet av en egen komité i Damaskus. De som søkte måtte befinne seg i Syria. Det var ikke mulig å søke fra utlandet.“

[Übersetzung aus dem Norwegischen: Laut dem Zivilstandesamt wurden Anträge auf Staatsbürgerschaft ab 2011 von einem separaten Ausschuss in Damaskus behandelt. Wer sich beworben hat, musste in Syrien sein. Eine Bewerbung aus dem Ausland war nicht möglich.] (Landinfo, 12. Februar 2018, S. 12-13)