Police have primary internal security responsibilities for most of the country. By law control of local police falls under the Ministry of Interior. The Rangers are a paramilitary organization under the authority of the Ministry of Interior, with branches in Sindh and Punjab. The armed forces are responsible for external security. At times during the year they also were assigned domestic security responsibilities.

The Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) provide the framework for law and order in FATA. The FCR has long been criticized for several harsh and inhuman provisions, some of which were mitigated when President Zardari amended the FCR on August 12. Major changes in the FCR related to banning the collective responsibility of a tribe, restricting the arbitrary nature of the powers of political agents or district coordination officers, and granting citizens the right to challenge the decisions of political agents in courts.

The FCR is implemented through a political agent who reports to the president through the KP governor. In lieu of police, multiple law enforcement entities operated in FATA. These included the paramilitary Frontier Scouts, which report to the Ministry of Interior in peacetime and the army in times of conflict; the Frontier Constabulary, which patrols the area between FATA and KP; levies, which operate in FATA and report to the political agent; khassadars (hereditary tribal police), which help the political agent maintain order; and lashkars (tribal militias), which are convened by tribal leaders to deal with temporary law and order disturbances.

Police effectiveness varied greatly by district, ranging from reasonably good to ineffective. Some members of the police committed human rights abuses or were responsive to political interests.

Frequent failure to punish abuses contributed to a climate of impunity. Police and prison officials frequently used the threat of abuse to extort money from prisoners and their families. The inspectors general, district police officers, district nazims (chief elected officials of local governments), provincial interior or chief ministers, federal interior minister, prime minister, or courts can order internal investigations into abuses and order administrative sanctions. Executive branch and police officials can recommend, and the courts can order, criminal prosecution. These mechanisms sometimes were used.

The court system remained the only means available to investigate abuses by security forces.

Police often failed to protect members of religious minorities, including Christians, Ahmadis, and Shia Muslims, from attacks.

There were improvements in police professionalism during the year. As in previous years, the Punjab provincial government conducted regular training and retraining in technical skills and protection of human rights for police at all levels.

A First Information Report (FIR) is the legal basis for any arrest. Police ability to initiate an FIR is limited, but for certain crimes the police may initiate an FIR. Often a different party must file the FIR, depending on the type of crime, not whether there is reasonable proof of a crime. An FIR allows police to detain a suspect for 24 hours, after which a magistrate can order detention for an additional 14 days if police show that the detention is material to their investigation. In practice some authorities did not observe these limits on detention. There were reports that authorities filed FIRs without supporting evidence to harass or intimidate detainees or did not file them when adequate evidence was provided unless the complainant paid a bribe.

Individuals frequently had to pay bribes to visit a prisoner. Foreign diplomats could meet with prisoners when they appeared in court and could usually meet with citizens of their countries in prison, although government officials sometimes delayed access.

Arbitrary Arrest: There were reports that some police detained individuals arbitrarily without charge or on false charges to extort bribes for their release. There were reports that some police also detained relatives of wanted individuals to compel suspects to surrender (also see section 1.f.).

Pretrial Detention: Police routinely did not seek a magistrate’s approval for investigative detention and often held detainees without charge until a court challenged the detention. When requested, magistrates approved investigative detention without requiring further justification. In cases of insufficient evidence, police and magistrates sometimes colluded to issue new FIRs, thereby extending detention beyond the 14-day period.

The district coordination officer may recommend preventive detention for as long as 90 days to the provincial home department and, with the approval of the Home Department, can extend it for an additional 90 days. The law stipulates that detainees must be brought to trial within 30 days of their arrest.

The law defines bailable and nonbailable offenses. On April 18, President Zardari signed the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Bill, 2011, which grants statutory bail to prisoners undergoing trial and to convicts whose trials and appeals are pending over a prescribed time limit. Under the law prisoners undergoing trial are entitled to statutory bail if charged with any offense not punishable by death and if they have been detained for one year. In the case of an offense punishable by death, the accused is eligible for statutory bail if the trial has not been concluded in two years.

Judges sometimes denied bail at the request of police or the community, or upon payment of bribes. In some cases trials did not start until six months after the FIR, and in some cases individuals remained in pretrial detention for periods longer than the maximum sentence for the crime with which they were charged. SHARP estimated that in 2010 approximately 55 percent of the prison population was awaiting trial. This situation remained unchanged due to a lack of change in the judicial system. The high number of inmates awaiting trial remained a large burden on the country’s jails. In some cases detainees were informed promptly of charges brought against them.

NGOs reported that bail sometimes was denied in blasphemy cases under the premise that, because defendants faced the death penalty, they were likely to flee.

Special rules apply to cases brought to court by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), which under the law established courts for corruption cases. Suspects may be detained for 15 days without charge (renewable with judicial concurrence) and, prior to being charged, may be deprived of access to counsel. During the year the NAB rarely exercised this power. All offenses under the NAB are nonbailable, and only the NAB chairman has the power to decide whether to release detainees.’

Antiterrorism courts had the discretion not to grant bail for some charges if the court had reasonable grounds to believe the accused was guilty.

Under the FCR in FATA, political agents had legal authority to detain individuals preventively, and require “bonds” to prevent undesired activity. In August the FCR was amended to exempt women over age 65 and children below age 16 from collective punishment. Collective punishment is applied incrementally, starting with the first immediate male family members, followed by the subtribe, and continuing outward. Although this reduces its scope, the FCR still assigns collective punishment without regard to individual rights. Human rights NGOs expressed concern about the concept of collective responsibility, as authorities used it as a pretext to detain members of fugitives’ tribes, demolish their homes, confiscate or destroy their property, or lay siege to a fugitive’s village pending his surrender or punishment by his own tribe in accordance with local tradition.

Under the amended FCR, indefinite detention is not allowed, and appeals can be made before the FCR tribunal. If wrongfully punished, prisoners have the right to compensation. Cases must be decided within a specified period of time, and arrested persons can be released on bail. Prisoners must be brought before the FCR authorities within 24 hours of detention, curtailing the arbitrary right of political agents to arrest and hold persons for up to three years. The accused have the right of appeal via a two-tiered system, which starts with an appellate authority composed of a commissioner and an additional judicial commissioner.

Under the FCR in FATA and the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA), security forces may restrict the activities of terrorism suspects, seize their assets for up to 48 hours, and detain them for as long as one year without charges. Human rights and international organizations reported that an unknown number of individuals allegedly affiliated with terrorist organizations were held indefinitely in preventive detention, tortured, and abused. In many cases these prisoners were held incommunicado and were not allowed prompt access to a lawyer of their choice; family members often were not allowed prompt access to detainees.

The Actions in Aid of Civil Power Regulation 2011, which came into force on June 23, grants wide powers to the military. The regulation allegedly responded to the need for a permanent federal statute to regulate the armed forces when called upon in aid of civil power in order to give them legal authority to handle detainees under civilian supervision. Retroactive to 2008, the regulation empowers the KP governor in the FATA, and the KP government in the PATA, to direct the armed forces to intern suspected terrorists. Critics said that the regulation violated the country’s constitution because, among other things, it empowers the armed forces to occupy property, makes statements or depositions by military officers sufficient to convict an accused, and makes all evidence collected, received, or prepared by the interning authority both admissible and dispositive of guilt. Others noted that the regulation establishes a legal framework where none previously existed, prohibits the abuse or misuse of force by the military, and allows for more transparent treatment of detainees by requiring registration upon apprehension and providing a legal process for transfer of detainees from military to civilian authorities for prosecution. It also creates an appeals process for detainees and their relatives and, importantly, limits the powers of the armed forces in administering the regulation. Reports in November and December indicated that transfers of detainees had begun.

Amnesty: On November 25, the Supreme Court dismissed the government’s review petition against its ruling declaring the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) illegal. The petition was heard by a 17-judge full court headed by Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry. In 2007 then president Musharraf promulgated the NRO to provide an amnesty mechanism for public officeholders who were accused but not convicted of corruption, embezzlement, money laundering, murder, and terrorism between January 1, 1986, and October 2, 1999. The Supreme Court struck down the NRO in 2009.

The government does not have laws to protect IDPs but implemented policies to assist them, meeting the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Registration of women continued to be a problem. In more conservative regions of the country, particularly rural areas, authorities did not uphold or enforce a woman’s right to be registered.

At the end of 2010 approximately 1.2 million persons, mostly originating from FATA, remained displaced in KP. During the year the number of IDPs fluctuated due to militant activity, military operations, and ongoing IDP returns to KP and FATA. As of November more than 853,000 persons remained displaced in the northwest.

The majority of conflict-affected IDPs resided with host families, in rented accommodations, or, to a lesser extent, in camps. The government continued to consolidate and close IDP camps during the year. Of the three remaining, Jalozai camp in Nowshera District of KP hosted the largest in-camp conflict-affected IDP population, with 32,499 residents as of December, mostly from Bajaur Agency.

Military operations in Mohmand Agency early in the year and in Kurram Agency in the summer contributed to the total number of conflict IDPs in the country. In Mohmand the combined number of IDPs registered in the two camps (Danish Kohl and Nahqi) established to host families displaced by the conflict exceeded 35,000 at its peak. As of December both camps were closed with the remaining displaced (624 families with 3,758 individuals) moved to Jalozai camp in Nowshera District. More than 13,000 displaced families were registered as displaced in Kurram, with 3,000 families housed in the New Durrani camp and the remainder with host families or in government buildings.

The government continued to facilitate voluntary returns to multiple agencies with support from the international humanitarian community. As of December the government reported that nearly 23,000 families returned to Orakzai, 68,000 families returned to Bajaur, 41,600 families returned to Mohmand, and 6,500families returned to South Waziristan.

The government required humanitarian organizations assisting civilians displaced by military operations to request nonobjection certificates (NOCs) to access Mohmand and Kurram agencies in FATA. The requirement to obtain NOCs delayed by approximately one to two weeks the delivery of UN assistance to Mohmand and Kurram beneficiaries. The government established IDP camps inside the agencies where the military operations took place, despite the access and security concerns raised by humanitarian agencies. Humanitarian agencies providing assistance in the camps were exposed to the danger of travelling to and within FATA. There were no security incidents in the camps by year’s end. UN agencies had access to the camps, and there were no reports of involuntary returns.

The government coordinated with the UNHCR the voluntary and safe return of IDPs. For IDPs who were not ready to return, the government coordinated support with the UNHCR and other international organizations. The World Food Program distributed food rations to IDPs displaced by conflict.

Heavy rainfall during the monsoon season affected more than five million persons, destroyed crops, and severely damaged thousands of homes in Sindh Province. An estimated 1.8 million persons were displaced to some 6,000 informal settlements during the height of the disaster. The Provincial Disaster Management Authority-Sindh led the relief efforts, with assistance from the National Disaster Management Authority, the Pakistani Red Crescent, and the armed forces. In contrast to the 2010 floods, the government initially believed that the Sindh monsoon floods, which started in early August, were within its capabilities. However, by September the government acknowledged that the disaster exceeded its capabilities and requested international assistance. On September 17, the UN and the government jointly released a Rapid Response Plan, requesting $357 million to address flood-related relief needs until March 2012. The government and the international humanitarian community, including the UN, continued to discuss the development of a 12-month Early Recovery Framework. According to the Sindh Provincial Disaster Management Authority, as of December, 91 percent of displaced persons had returned to their areas of origin.

The country is a party to neither the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees nor its 1967 Protocol.

Access to Asylum: No legislation provides for asylum or refugee status. The country lacks a legal and regulatory framework for the management of refugees and migration. Although there is no legislation excluding asylum seekers and refugees from the provisions of the law regarding illegal entry and stay or conferring legal status, the government in most cases provided protection against the expulsion or involuntary return of registered refugees to countries where their lives or freedom would be threatened. The country cooperated with the UNHCR in protecting, assisting, and voluntarily repatriating Afghan refugees.

Since 1979 the government provided temporary protection to millions of refugees from Afghanistan. According to the UNHCR, at year’s end an estimated 1.7 million registered Afghan refugees remained in the country, while another 52,096 voluntarily repatriated to Afghanistan between March 1 and December 31. The government and the UNHCR agreed to continue voluntary repatriation throughout the year (voluntary repatriation season usually ends in November and restarts in March) and remained in discussions about opening two additional Voluntary Repatriation Centers in KP, for a total of four in the country. There were no credible estimates of how many Afghans were undocumented or unregistered, but estimates put the number at more than one million. The law states that anyone born in the country is a citizen. However, the courts’ interpretation of this law was that the principle of birth in the country could not be read in isolation and independently of the other sections of the act concerning citizenship by descent in the case of the children of Afghan refugees. The courts decided that given the “temporary” nature of Afghans’ presence in the country, the law would not be applied to the Afghan population, and Afghan children therefore were not granted Pakistani citizenship. Under the Secure Card for Afghan Citizens project, the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) issued birth certificates to 776, 683 Afghan children below the age of 18, identifying them as Afghan citizens.

The government cooperated with the UNHCR to conduct a Population Profiling Verification and Response (PPVR) exercise and an Afghan Citizens’ Contribution to Economy study for Afghans in the country. The PPVR, completed in December, was intended to provide the government and the UNHCR detailed information about the socioeconomic conditions and needs of Afghans in the country. In March 2010 the cabinet approved the Management and Repatriation Strategy for Afghans in Pakistan 2010-12, which along with voluntary repatriation contemplated the possibility of legal alternative stay solutions for refugees, including such measures as the following: issuing 150,000 work permits to registered Afghans for students, businessmen or investors, and skilled laborers; granting permanent residency to Afghan refugees’ female-headed households; issuing business permits to refugees who have invested more than 5 million rupees ($55,500); and encouraging Afghan students to continue or complete their studies in Pakistan. In March 2010 Prime Minister Gilani extended Proof of Registration (PoR, the official documents held by registered refugees that allow them to legally remain in Pakistan) status through December 2012. The government implemented some of the measures that the 2010-12 strategy contemplated, such as conducting a population profile, but had not implemented residency measures or issued work permits for Afghan refugees. The Ministry of States and Frontier Regions approved a pilot project for issuance of 1,000 visas to Afghan refugees during the year under four categories, (students, businessmen, skilled/unskilled workers, and female-headed households). However, at year’s end the rights attached to these visas were under negotiation.

The government generally abstained from forcibly returning Afghans with PoR cards, although from January to early September it deported 17 PoR cardholders. Refugees’ PoR was due to expire in December 2012. There also were credible allegations that the government deported between 50 and 60 unregistered Afghans per week.

According to the UNHCR, fewer than half of registered Afghan refugees lived in 83 refugee villages in KP (71), Balochistan (11), and Punjab (one). Nearly 60 percent of registered Afghans lived in urban areas. More than half of this population came from five provinces in Afghanistan: Nangarhar, Kabul, Kunduz, Logar, and Paktya.

Refugee Abuse: Refugees faced societal discrimination and abuse from local communities, who resented economic competition and blamed refugees for high crime rates and terrorism. Single women, female-led households, and children working on the streets were particularly vulnerable to abuse and trafficking.

Police in many cases demanded bribes from refugees. There were credible reports that members of the intelligence services also harassed refugees. There were also many reports of extortion of refugees who participated in the UNHCR’s voluntary repatriation process, since such refugees were known to receive repatriation grants ($150 in cash assistance per family member upon return to Afghanistan).

Employment: Refugees were not allowed to work legally, but many worked as day laborers or in informal markets. Refugees often were exploited in the informal labor market. Refugee women and children were particularly vulnerable, accepting underpaid and undesirable positions in workplaces.

The government did not authorize the former residents of Azakhel, an Afghan refugee village in KP destroyed by the 2010 floods, to return to their destroyed village to rebuild it. The village stands on valuable land that land speculators sought to seize for development following the floods. By mid-July nearly 23,000 Afghans still were displaced from Azakhel, living in tents near the village or staying with relatives or in rented rooms. The UNHCR was assisting these families until the government authorized them to return to the village. The refugees did not regard alternative camp sites offered to them as viable for earning livelihoods.

Access to Basic Services: Afghan refugees could avail themselves of the services of the police and courts, but some, particularly the poor, were afraid to do so. Any refugee registered with both the UNHCR and the government-run Commissionerate of Afghan Refugees is, in theory, able to obtain admission to public education facilities after filing the proper paperwork. In practice most registered Afghans attended private Afghan schools or schools sponsored by the international community. There were no reports of refugees being denied access to health facilities on the basis on nationality.

In many instances local governments or even individuals determined which rights and services Afghan refugees could use. For example, the governor of the State Bank decided that Afghans could not have bank accounts, but NADRA regularly verified for banks the identity of refugees who wished to open accounts.

Although there is no legislation specifically permitting Afghans to obtain a driver’s license, Afghans drove a large percentage of the trucks in KP. Although there were a number of Afghan schools funded by foreign assistance, Afghan children usually had no problem attending the country’s primary schools. For older students, particularly in cities, access was harder. Even Afghans who grew up in the country needed a student visa to attend the country’s universities, but they qualified for student visas on the basis of their PoR cards.

Durable Solutions: For the mainstreaming of refugee programs in the development and annual programs of UN agencies, the UNHCR signed memoranda of understanding with UNESCO, the World Health Organization, UNICEF, and the UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women to strengthen partnerships in finding durable solutions for Afghan refugees. Under the Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas (RAHA) initiative, a joint initiative among the government, UN, and implementing partners under the framework of UN reforms in Pakistan, more than 575 projects had been completed since the RAHA initiative’s launch in 2009, mainly in the provinces of Balochistan and KP, which were both home to high concentrations of Afghan refugees.

The government did not accept refugees for resettlement from other countries or facilitate local integration. While the government did not have a system to confer refugee status or asylum, it generally abstained from forcibly returning other foreigners with asylum certificates or refugee cards granted by the UNHCR, which had the responsibility of determining refugee status in the absence of government procedures.

Statelessness continued to be an issue during the year. There is no national legislation on statelessness. International and national agencies estimated there were possibly thousands of stateless persons deriving from the breakup of India and Pakistan, and of Pakistan and Bangladesh.