a-6441 (ACC-RUS-6441)

Nach einer Recherche in unserer Länderdokumentation und im Internet können wir Ihnen zu oben genannter Fragestellung Materialien zur Verfügung stellen, die unter anderem folgende Informationen enthalten: 
„Obwohl ursprünglich vermutlich nur als Umschlagplatz gedacht, ist Russland heute besonders als großer Abnehmer mit mehren Millionen Heroinkonsumenten wichtig für die weltweite Heroinwirtschaft. Viele dieser Konsumenten sind Jugendliche und Armeeangehörige, die früher an den Grenzen Zentralasiens oder im Tschetschenienkonflikt eingesetzt waren. Die Akteure in diesem illegalen Geschäft reichen von russischen Militärs über Polizei und gewöhnlichen Kriminelle bis hin zu ethnischen Gruppen aus anderen Ländern der Ex-Sowjetunion und illegalen Einwanderern aus asiatischen Ländern. Korruptionsbeziehungen zwischen Drogenhändlern und lokalen oder regionalen Amtsträgern erlauben es den Gruppen, in ganz Russland zu operieren, selbst in der Hauptstadt. Zudem sind auch kriminelle Gruppen aus vielen anderen Ländern in Russland aktiv. Darunter sind nicht nur solche aus den benachbarten ehemaligen Sowjetstaaten, sondern auch ostmitteleuropäische, japanische, chinesische, koreanische und vietnamesische Gruppierungen, ebenso wie lateinamerikanische. Russische Frauen werden auch von kriminellen Organisationen aus Nigeria als Kuriere eingesetzt.“
“There have been some significant prosecutions of corrupt police officers. For example, prosecutors continue to pursue the "Werewolves in Uniform," a case involving police officers within the Ministry of Internal Affairs who used their official positions to engage in criminal activity. In 2006 the leader of the group and six other officers were convicted of charges that included extortion, bribery, and trafficking in drugs and weapons. They were sentenced to terms ranging from 15 to 20 years. Four other members of the group were still being tried.”
“The Linkage between Drug Business and Terrorism in Russia
It is primarily core groups of the second type, terrorist organizations combining nationalist and religious overtones and financed mainly by criminal/shadow economic activities, that pose the most direct terrorist threat to Russia’s security. For Russia, therefore, the link between terrorism and crime may be a greater problem than for some other states. The North Caucasian, particularly Chechen, separatist groups that actively use terrorist means, along with other militant tactics, are well known for their deep involvement in criminal and shadow economic activities. But while illicit drug business is one of the forms of these activities, it is hardly the main one for North Caucasian terrorist groups. The vast and deep-rooted shadow economy in Chechnya, and in the North Caucasus as a whole, is based primarily on large-scale illicit oil production and trade in oil products. In fact, more than narcotics, oil products, alcohol, and tobacco products are the main illicit goods smuggled through Russia’s borders with other Caucasian states. Chechen criminal groups are more closely involved in selling drugs on Russian territory, particularly in certain regions (such as the northwest). Still, the greater share of the national market is controlled by various groups of Central Asian origin, as well as other ethnic groups, often acting in cooperation with and under the protection of Slavic or multiethnic criminal organizations. Some Chechen criminal groups that are involved in illicit drug sales in Russia may rechannel some of their profits for the needs of Chechen separatists (mainly on the basis of clan/patronage ties and networks rather than religious or other ideological reasons). However, the main interest of North Caucasian and other organized criminal groups (that is, material profit) is not necessarily identical or compatible with the political goals of armed separatists carrying out largescale terrorist attacks in Russia. Among other things, heightened security and prophylactic measures undertaken by the authorities in the aftermath of each major terrorist attack are not the most favorable environment for Chechen illegal (and legal) business in Russia.” 
“According to various sources there is a clear link between terrorism and drug trafficking in Chechnya. There are many reports that argue that Chechen war lords have opium plantations. For example, the Russian newspaper Kommersant reports that Russian authorities have found a narcotics lab in Grosni which belonged to the Chechen terrorist leader Shamil Basaev (4 Mar. 2000). Shamil Basaev smuggles the drugs into Russia by private airplanes (4 Mar. 2000). Grosni, the Vedeno district, and Serzhen – Yurto are reported as being the three key points of drug production in Chechnya. The profits made from drug trafficking are used for operational costs and the accumulation of arms. The scale of opium/heroin smuggling is suspected to be large - although oil smuggling remains the predominant means to acquire money for ‘terrorist’ activity.“
“There are few things that the Russian authorities and the rebel movement in the North Caucasus can claim to agree on. But they are united on one point: their mutual concern about the increased pervasiveness of narcotics in the region. This apprehension is shared by the vast majority of ordinary people in the North Caucasus. It follows, therefore, that there is much political capital to be accrued through adopting a tough stance against drugs – a point that has not gone unnoticed by the rebels or their nemeses within the local pro-Moscow political structures.
BACKGROUND: Over the past several years, rebel Jamaats throughout the North Caucasus have carried out several punitive operations against drug dealers and gambling establishments. In February 2006, for example, North Ossetia’s Jamaat “Kataib al-Khoul” bombed three separate gambling establishments in Vladikavkaz. […]
In neighbouring Kabardino-Balkaria, the republic’s rebel organisation has consistently presented itself as a staunch opponent of the local drug trade. As far back as December 2004, Kabardino-Balkaria’s “Yarmuk” Jamaat attacked the local branch of the Federal Drug Control Agency in Nalchik. Yarmuk had accused this agency of complicity in the local drug trade.”
Diese Informationen beruhen auf einer zeitlich begrenzten Recherche in öffentlich zugänglichen Dokumenten, die ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehen. Diese Antwort stellt keine Meinung zum Inhalt eines bestimmten Ansuchens um Asyl oder anderen internationalen Schutz dar. Wir empfehlen, die verwendeten Materialien zur Gänze durchzusehen.