a-5600 (ACC-IRQ-5600)
Nach einer Recherche in unserer Länderdokumentation und im Internet können wir Ihnen zu oben genannter Fragestellung Materialien zur Verfügung stellen, die unter anderem folgende Informationen enthalten:
Bedeutung, Aufgaben, Struktur der PUK
Das US Department of State (USDOS) erwähnt in seinem Menschenrechtsbericht vom März 2007, dass die kurdische Regionalregierung (KRG) eigene Sicherheitskräfte unterhalte und mit zwei Innenministerien funktioniere, die auf den Parteien basierten. Die Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) kontrolliere das für Sulaimaniya zuständige Ministerium:
“The KRG maintained its own security forces as set forth in the constitution. The KRG functioned with two party-based ministries of interior. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) party controlled the ministry with oversight of the province of Sulaymaniyah, and the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) controlled the ministry with oversight of the provinces of Irbil and Dohuk. The KRG also maintained two separate army forces and two separate internal security units. All four of these security forces detained and held suspects in custody.” (USDOS, 6. März 2007, Section 1.d)
Laut USDOS-Bericht würden die internen Sicherheitskräfte (Asayish) neben den Streitkräften und den Geheimdiensten illegale Polizeioperationen außerhalb der KRG-Grenzen durchführen, dabei komme es zu Entführungen und zum Festhalten von Menschen in inoffiziellen und geheimen Hafteinrichtungen in der KRG.
“Kurdish security forces, including the armed forces (Peshmerga), internal security forces (Asayish) and intelligence services (Parastin/Zanyari), reportedly conducted illegal police operations outside KRG boundaries in the provinces of Ninawa and of Tameen, whose capital is Kirkuk. These operations abducted individuals and detained them in unofficial and undisclosed detention facilities in the KRG.” (USDOS, 6. März 2007, Section 1.b)
Der USDOS-Bericht erwähnt die PUK neben anderen Parteien als eine der vorherrschenden politischen Kräfte im Irak. Berichten zufolge würden KDP und PUK die Anstellung von Bürgern, die nicht Parteimitglieder seien, verhindern:
“The country's political parties, as a general rule, tended to be organized along either religious or ethnic lines--sometimes both. Shi'a Islamist parties, such as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya Party, as well as such Kurdish nationalist parties as the KDP and PUK, were predominant political forces. Other political players included the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party and other ethnic minority parties, such as the Assyrian Democratic Movement. Membership in some political parties conferred special privileges and advantages in employment. There were some reports that the KDP and PUK prevented the employment of nonparty citizens and that KRG courts favored party members.” (USDOS, 6. März 2007, Section 3)
Die meisten der kurdischen NGOs seien eng mit den politischen Parteien PUK und KDP verbunden:
“The Kurdish areas, which have largely been autonomous since 1991, were able to develop a stronger NGO community, although almost all Kurdish NGOs were closely linked to the PUK and KDP political parties. The KRG and Kurdish political parties generally supported humanitarian NGO activities and programs.” (USDOS, 6. März 2007, Section 4)
Die PUK beschreibt sich auf ihrer Website ohne Datumsangabe als moderne, strukturierte politische Partei mit einem Führungsgremium von 32 Mitgliedern, einem Generalsekretär und einem 11köpfigen Politbüro. Ursprünglich sei die PUK eine Dachorganisation von verschiedenen Strömungen in der kurdischen politischen Bewegung im Irak gewesen. 1992 seien Gruppen innerhalb der PUK in einer vereinheitlichten politischen Bewegung aufgegangen. Die PUK habe Teilorganisationen in allen großen Städten Kurdistans, die Mitgliederzahl habe 1998 rund 147.000 betragen.
„The PUK is a modern, structured political party. Its decision-making body is an elected Leadership Council of 32 members. The Leadership Council elects the Secretary General and the 11 member Political Bureau, which is in charge of the day-to-day management of the organization and implementation of the Leadership Council’s resolutions and decisions.
The PUK was originally formed as an umbrella organization unifying various trends within the Kurdish political movement in Iraq. In 1992, the constituent groupings within the PUK merged into a unified political movement that affirmed its social-democratic identity and affiliation.
The PUK has branches in all of the major cities and towns of Iraqi Kurdistan and draws membership from a broad cross-section of Kurdish society. The membership of the PUK, based on statistics compiled in September 1998, stands at 147,280 members and associates.” (PUK Website, ohne Datum)
Zur organisatorischen Struktur der Partei gehören laut Angaben auf der Website der PUK unter anderem ein Organisationsbüro, ein Ausbildungszentrum und ein Informationsbüro, das verschiedene Medien (TV, Radio, Tages- und Wochenzeitung) betreibe. Weiters gebe es Büros für Kultur, Finanzen, Menschenrechte, Soziales, Kriegsveteranen und Internationale Beziehungen, sowie Auslandsbüros und einen Think Tank:
“PUK’s organizational structure includes:
Bureau for Organization: Manages PUK’s organizations throughout the region, as well as producing and disseminating educational and informational materials for distribution to the membership. The bureau also supervises the electoral process within the organization and ensures that the party adheres to its bylaws. The Bureau of Organization reports to the Political Bureau and the Leadership Council on the status of PUK’s membership and advises on ways to enhance the organization’s standing within the population.
The bureau manages the training center in which PUK’s cadres are educated and trained in the party’s legal, intellectual and political framework and methods of operation. This training prepares party members for active participation in party activities, administrative positions within the party, and/or positions within the regional authority.
Bureau for Information: Supervises and manages PUK media operations. Currently, the PUK operates several outlets:
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The People of Kurdistan TV (based in Sulaimani), the main television station, and other smaller TV stations in the towns and districts of the region;
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The Voice of the People of Kurdistan, a radio station that broadcasts in Kurdish and Arabic. The transmission is received throughout the Middle East and Europe.
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Kurdistan-i-Nwe, a daily Kurdish newspaper, the Al-Itihad weekly in Arabic, and The Moniter, a daily bulletin in Kurdish and Arabic, which monitors international broadcasts on matters relating to Kurdish and Iraqi affairs;
Bureau for Culture and Democratic Organization: Acts as a liaison with professional and cultural organizations such as the Students’ Union of Kurdistan, Women’s’ League of Kurdistan, and the Writer’s Association.
Bureau of Finance and Management: Manages the financial affairs and administrative staff of the organization. The Leadership Council, through an independent Auditing Commission, supervises the activities of this bureau.
Bureau for Human Rights: The bureau was instituted to monitor the human rights situation in Iraqi Kurdistan – with primary emphasis on the conduct of PUK members and leadership. The bureau acts as a liaison with local human rights organizations and engages in a wide range of educational campaigns with regard to human rights principles, the rule of law, and democracy and to ensure PUK’s adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The bureau reports directly to the PUK Secretary General.
Bureau for Social Affairs: In conjunction with the regional authorities, the bureau facilitates settlement of social disputes, particularly with regard to land and tribal matters.
Bureau for Martyr’s and Veteran Affairs: The bureau is tasked with assisting the families and dependants of victims of the war in Kurdistan and the veteran community.
Bureau for International Relations: The bureau of international relations coordinates the activities of PUK representatives abroad and reports to PUK’s political leadership on relations with foreign government and institutions. The bureau provides individual PUK representatives with guidance and information needed for their activities.
Today, PUK has permanent offices in Washington, London, Paris, Berlin, Moscow, Rome, Stockholm and Brussels, the seat of the European Parliament. In the Middle East, the PUK has offices in Tehran, Ankara, Syria and Egypt.
The Center for Strategic Studies: Originally setup by, but independent of, the PUK, the Center is a think-tank affiliated with the University of Sulaimani. The Center’s academics write on strategic issues and offer analysis on current affairs. The Center produces original and translated (into Kurdish) works on strategic and political issues pertaining to the Middle East and produces a widely respected periodical entitled “International Policy.” (PUK Website, ohne Datum)
In den ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehenden Quellen konnten im Rahmen der zeitlich begrenzten Recherche keine Informationen dazu gefunden werden, ob die PUK über eine Art Zellenstruktur verfügt hat oder verfügt.
Sicherheitskräfte der PUK (Asayish)
Die Schweizerische Flüchtlingshilfe (SFH) erwähnt in ihrem Update vom Mai 2007 die Asayish als Polizeidienste der PUK und der KDP:
„Die kurdischen Sicherheitskräfte, welche durch die Verfassung "legitimiert" sind, wurden zum Teil in die neuen irakischen Sicherheitskräfte integriert. Die kurdischen Peshmerga umfassen etwa 160'000 Kämpfer. Die kurdischen Parteien KDP und PUK unterhalten neben den Peshmerga, eigene Polizei- (Asayish) und Geheimdienste (Parastin/Zanyari). Kurdische Sicherheitsdienste führten illegale Polizeioperationen und Entführungen ausserhalb Kurdistan-Irak durch. Entführte Personen werden an unbekannten Orten festgehalten.“ (SFH, 22. Mai 2007)
Die UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) erwähnt in ihrem Human Rights Report vom März 2007, dass es kein faires Verfahren für hunderte Gefangene der Asayish gebe, die der Beteiligung an terroristischen Akten oder anderer schwerer Verbrechen verdächtigt würden:
“7. During this reporting period, UNAMI further expanded its monitoring and reporting activities in the three northern governorates under the authority of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), where the security situation remained stable. Infringements to freedom of expression, including press and media freedoms, were of serious concern. Equally serious was the lack of due process with regard to detainees held by Kurdish security forces (Asayish), the majority on suspicion of involvement in acts of terrorism and other serious crimes. Hundreds have been held for prolonged periods without referral to an investigative judge or charges brought against them.” (UNAMI, März 2007, S. 4)
Die meisten Verhaftungen von Journalisten würden laut UNAMI-Bericht von den Asayish durchgeführt, die vom Gesetz her die Zuständigkeit für Wirtschaftskriminalität und politische Verbrechen hätten. Der Journalist Muhammad Siyasi Ashkanayi sei wegen angeblicher Spionage für die KDP ohne Anklage in Haft:
“35. Most arrests of journalists recorded by UNAMI were carried out by the KRG’s Asayish (Security) forces, which by law have jurisdiction over economic crimes, such as smuggling, and political crimes, including espionage and acts of sabotage and terrorism. On 26 January, the Asayish forces of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) arrested freelance journalist Muhammad Siyasi Ashkanayi, ostensibly for espionage on behalf of Parastin, the intelligence agency of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). In late February, Asayish officials in Sulaimaniya told UNAMI that Ashkanayi was still undergoing interrogation in their custody. He had not been charged with an offence nor referred to an investigative judge, and was still in detention at the end of March.” (UNAMI, März 2007, S. 13)
Im Falle der von Mitgliedern der Asayish Gishti (Allgemeiner Sicherheitsdienst) verhafteten Journalisten Shaho Khalid und Dilaman Salah seien die Beamten disziplinarrechtlich bestraft und vom Dienst suspendiert worden, so der UNAMI-Bericht weiter:
“38. In its November-December 2006 Human Rights Report, UNAMI reported the arrest of journalists Shaho Khalid and Dilaman Salah by the Asayish Gishti (General Security) and had raised this and other similar cases with KRG Minister of Region for the Interior, Karim Sinjari. UNAMI welcomed the Minister’s assistance and has since learned that the Asayish officials who arrested and allegedly mistreated the journalists have since been disciplined and discharged from duty.” (UNAMI, März 2007, S. 14)
UNAMI erwähnt auch, dass laut Beamten viele der von den Asayish festgehaltenen Personen angebliche Unterstützer von islamistischen Gruppen seien. Manche Personen seien für mehrere Jahre ohne Anklage festgehalten worden. Auch Beschwerden über Folter und Misshandlung von Gefangenen der Asayish habe UNAMI weiterhin erhalten. Im April 2004 sei ein Mann in der Haft der Asayish in Sulaimaniya durch Folter gestorben, die Täter seien laut Wissensstand von UNAMI nie verurteilt worden:
“72. UNAMI remained concerned about the practice of administrative detention of persons held in the custody of the Asayish (security) forces in the Kurdistan region, the majority having been arrested on suspicion of involvement in acts of terrorism and other serious crimes. Many are said by officials to be members or supporters of proscribed Islamist groups. Hundreds of detainees have been held for prolonged periods, some for several years, without referral to an investigative judge or charges brought against them. In some cases, detainees were arrested without judicial warrant and all are routinely denied the opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of their detention.
73. UNAMI also continues to receive allegations of the torture or ill-treatment of detainees in Asayish detention facilities. In one heavily-publicized case, Ismail Ahmad Hassan, aged thirty-five, died while in the custody of Asayish officials in Sulaimaniya three days after his arrest on 22 April 2004. A Special Investigation Committee comprising three judges with wide judicial powers and headed by Judge Rizgar Amin, concluded that he had died as a result of torture. In 2004, the Committee ordered the arrest of three Asayish officers on manslaughter charges in connection with this case, but to UNAMI’s knowledge none have been brought to justice to date. [...]
75. UNAMI continued to urge government officials to implement the provisions of Iraq’s Code of Criminal Procedure with regard to detainees held in Asayish custody. In this regard, UNAMI held a series of meetings in February with officials of the Ministry of Interior and the Asayish Directorates requesting, among other things, that such cases be reviewed as a matter of priority. UNAMI welcomed the willingness of KRG officials to give consideration to adopting measures to process these long-standing cases. Officials stated that a review of detainee cases was ongoing, and provided UNAMI with a list of names of 76 detainees held in KDP custody, and 22 others in PUK custody, who they said had been released in recent months following a review of their cases. UNAMI also discussed with officials its concerns regarding the lack of effective mechanisms to bring to justice officials accused or suspected of abusing detainees.” (UNAMI, März 2007, S. 25)
Die deutsche Tageszeitung (taz) berichtet im Juli 2007 von der Kritik von Human Rights Watch (HRW) an der Praxis der Asayish. Erwähnt wird auch, dass viele Gefangene der Asayish angebliche Verbindungen zu radikalen Islamistengruppen hätten:
„Die Menschenrechtsorganisation Human Rights Watch kritisiert Folter und Misshandlungen in kurdischen Gefängnissen im Nordirak. VON INGA ROGG
Einen Spezialisten für Gefängnisse nennt sich Amer Ahmed mit bitterem Unterton. Er war in Iran und der Türkei in Haft, aber auch im irakischen Kurdistan. "Wirklich verbrecherisch ist, was uns unsere eigenen Leute antun." Tagelang sei er vom Asaisch, einer Art Staatsschutz, in seiner Heimatstadt Suleimania in einer kleinen Zelle in Einzelhaft festgehalten worden, sagt Ahmed. "Es war ein Loch ohne Fenster und Licht, in dem ich mich nicht mal zum Schlafen ausstrecken konnte." Was ihm die Sicherheitskräfte vorwarfen, erfuhr er nicht. Der 30-jährige Familienvater hatte gewissermaßen Glück. Einflussreiche Verwandte im Ausland intervenierten und drohten, Ahmeds Schicksal öffentlich zu machen. Nach zehn Tagen kam er frei.
Ahmeds Haft liegt schon eine Weile zurück. Doch die Zustände in den Gefängnissen im kurdischen Gebiet im Nordirak sind offenbar weiterhin katastrophal. Am Dienstag legte die Menschenrechtsorganisation Human Rights Watch (HRW) einen Bericht vor, in dem sie den beiden großen kurdischen Parteien, die die Region regieren, eine ganze Reihe von Rechtsverstößen zur Last legt. Gefangene würden von Sicherheitskräften routinemäßig gefoltert und misshandelt, sagte Sarah Leah Whitson, die Leiterin der Nahostabteilung von HRW, auf einer Pressekonferenz in der kurdischen Hauptstadt Erbil. "Wir sind überrascht, dass die Kurden, die unter Saddam selbst Opfer von Folter wurden, solche Rechtsverstöße begehen", sagte sie.
Zwischen April und Oktober 2006 besuchten Mitarbeiter von HRW zehn Haftanstalten in den drei Provinzen Dohuk, Erbil und Suleimania, die unter der Kontrolle der kurdischen Regionalregierung stehen. Dabei sprachen sie mit mehr als 150 Gefangenen, von denen die meisten wegen ihrer angeblichen Verbindungen zu radikalen Islamistengruppen unter Terrorismusverdacht festgehalten wurden. Nur vereinzelt erhoben die Sicherheitskräfte allerdings konkrete Tatvorwürfe.
Von einigen Ausnahmen abgesehen seien die Gefängnisse völlig überbelegt, wobei oft 50 bis 60 Häftlinge in einer Zelle festgehalten würden, heißt es in dem Bericht. Gefangene hätten von systematischen Misshandlungen und Folter berichtet, sagte Whitson. Schläge mit Metall- und Holzstäben, Kabeln, aber auch Elektroschocks seien weit verbreitet. Zudem hätten Gefangene beklagt, dass sie zum Teil über Tage mit verbundenen Augen und gefesselten Händen festgehalten worden seien.
Die überwiegende Mehrheit der Häftlinge sind irakische Kurden. Daneben sitzen einige irakische Araber und Turkmenen ein, aber auch mutmaßliche Drogenschmuggler und Dschihadkämpfer aus Iran, Afghanistan, Sudan, Saudi-Arabien, Tunesien und Jordanien. Auch halten die Kurden Araber aus den sunnitischen Unruheprovinzen, aus Bagdad sowie den umstrittenen Gebieten Kirkuk, Mossul und Dijala fest. Laut den Kurden agieren sie dabei im Auftrag der USA, was diese allerdings in Abrede stellen.
In dem Bericht hebt HRW die Kooperationsbereitschaft der Kurden im Gegensatz zur Regierung in Bagdad und teilweise auch den alliierten Streitkräften hervor. Um die Missstände zu beheben, sei jedoch eine umfängliche Reform des Justiz- und Sicherheitswesens nötig, heißt es. Trotz der gemeinsamen Regierung in Erbil befindet sich der Sicherheitsapparat weiterhin unter der Kontrolle der Demokratischen Partei Kurdistans (KDP) oder der Patriotischen Union Kurdistans (PUK) von Staatspräsident Dschalal Talabani. Ihren Parteichefs und nicht dem jeweiligen Ministerium oder gar der Kontrolle des Parlaments unterstehen besonders der Asaisch sowie die Parteigeheimdienste. Nicht viel besser sieht es bislang im kurdischen Justizwesen aus.“ (taz, 3. Juli 2007)
Der von der taz zitierte vollständige Bericht von Human Rights Watch ist im Quellenverzeichnis zu finden (HRW, 3. Juli 2007)
In den ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehenden Quellen konnten im Rahmen der zeitlich begrenzten Recherche keine Informationen zu den Asayish in den Jahren 1999 und 2000 gefunden werden. Eine Erwähnung der Asayish findet sich im World Report von Human Rights Watch (HRW) aus dem Jänner 2003: Demnach seien angebliche Sympathisanten islamistischer Gruppen willkürlicher Verhaftung und Haft ohne Gerichtsverfahren ausgesetzt. Es werden auch Sabotageakte und Anschläge von Islamisten in den Jahren 2001 und 2002 erwähnt:
“During a mission to Iraqi Kurdistan in September, Human Rights Watch found that the overall human rights situation in the region had markedly improved relative to previous years. Both the KDP and PUK administrations promulgated laws and adopted decisions aimed at the protection of fundamental civil and political rights, including freedom of expression and of association. However, representatives of several Islamist and Turkman political parties told Human Rights Watch that political activity by their members and supporters remained curtailed. Perceived sympathizers of Islamist groups, in particular, were said to be liable to arbitrary arrest and detention without trial.
Both the PUK and the KDP continued to grant access to its prisons to representatives of the ICRC, who reported that in the first half of the year they had visited almost five hundred detainees in twenty-three different places of detention. As of early September, the ICRC had registered an estimated total of 2,700 detainees held by all sides in Iraqi Kurdistan. Hygiene, services, and overall treatment of detainees in the prisons improved. However, a number of political suspects held by both the PUK and the KDP told Human Rights Watch in September that interrogators routinely beat or otherwise mistreated them during questioning. At the Asayish (security) prison in Sulaimaniya, several detainees accused of complicity in acts of sabotage endured prolonged solitary confinement, in one case for some six months. Detainees also experienced long pre-trial detention and inordinate delays in trial proceedings. At the Asayish prison in Arbil, for example, several suspects charged with theft upon their arrest in September 1996 still had not been convicted or acquitted six years later.
The security situation in Iraqi Kurdistan remained precarious. PUK and KDP officials said that Iraqi government agents and members of Kurdish Islamist groups carried out acts of sabotage. Between November 2001 and October 2002, there were at least five bomb attacks targeting public places, such as restaurants, parks, and summer resorts in Arbil, Sulaimaniya, and elsewhere. Several people were injured when assailants threw two hand grenades at a crowd celebrating the New Year on December 31, 2001, in Sulaimaniya. PUK officials later announced the arrest of three suspects in connection with the attack. In a June 26 incident, an explosive device detonated at a restaurant in Brusk Park in Arbil, injuring nineteen and killing an eight-year-old boy. No group claimed responsibility for the attacks on civilian targets, but PUK and KDP officials attributed most to Ansar al-Islam (Supporters of Islam--see below), along with several incidents involving actual or attempted suicide bombings and actual or attempted assassinations. The latter included the attempted killing on April 2 of PUK Prime Minister Barham Saleh outside his home in Sulaimaniya. Five of his bodyguards, as well as two gunmen, were killed in the attack. In a statement issued by its Shura Council on April 3, Ansar al-Islam denied involvement in the incident, but the PUK later released the name of three suspects it had apprehended, saying evidence linked them to the Islamist group.
In December 2001, the Islamist group Jund al-Islam (Soldiers of Islam) was dissolved and reconstituted under a new name, Ansar al-Islam. Its armed fighters remained in control of the villages of Biyara and Tawela, and their vicinity, near the border with Iran. Armed clashes between their forces and those of the PUK continued into November 2001 (see Human Rights Watch World Report 2002), but in mid-December Ansar al-Islam announced a ceasefire. Peace talks between the two sides took place between December and March, but were suspended in April following the attempted assassination of the PUK prime minister. (See above.) No major armed clashes ensued, but relations between the two sides remained tense.
On May 4, the leader of Ansar al-Islam, Mullah Fateh Krekar, issued an amnesty for PUK fighters. In the areas under its control, Ansar al-Islam continued to perpetrate human rights abuses, notably the arbitrary arrest and detention of suspected PUK sympathizers and others accused of contravening the strict Islamic code imposed by the group. In September, Human Rights Watch interviewed a number of former detainees held and tortured by Ansar al-Islam. They suffered beatings, burning of the skin with acid, and prolonged suspension from the limbs. Most were eventually released after their families paid sums of money. By September, at least forty families had fled the villages of Biyara and Tawela to the nearby town of Halabja as a consequence.” (HRW, 14. Jänner 2003)
In den ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehenden Quellen konnten im Rahmen der zeitlich begrenzten Recherche außer dem in der Anfrage erwähnten Bericht von Human Rights Watch (HRW, 3. Juli 2007) keine weiteren Informationen zu Saifeddin gefunden werden.
Diese Informationen beruhen auf einer zeitlich begrenzten Recherche in öffentlich zugänglichen Dokumenten, die ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehen. Diese Antwort stellt keine Meinung zum Inhalt eines bestimmten Ansuchens um Asyl oder anderen internationalen Schutz dar. Wir empfehlen, die verwendeten Materialien zur Gänze durchzusehen.
Quellen:
Bedeutung, Aufgaben, Struktur der PUK
Sicherheitskräfte der PUK (Asayish)
