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Overview

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“Dagestan has clearly become the most violent republic in the North Caucasus. This is partly because Dagestan is the largest republic in the region, with a population of about 3 million.“ (Jamestown Foundation, 31 October 2012)

 

“Russian authorities are trying to dramatically change the situation in Dagestan. The strategically important North Caucasian republic has a 150-kilometer (93-mile) long border with Georgia and a 315-km (196-mile) long border with Azerbaijan. The republic also has 530 km (329 miles) of coastline on the Caspian Sea.“ (Jamestown Foundation, 28 June 2012)

 

“A region of high mountains, lowlands and steppes, the North Caucasus has a small, diverse population of 9.86 million. […] The most homogeneous republics are Chechnya and Ingushetia, the most diverse region is Dagestan, with over 30 distinct ethnic groups.” (ICG, 19 October 2012a, p. 3)

 

Religious conflict

 

“Значительное влияние на разные стороны общественной жизни Дагестана оказывает ислам. […] Традиционно население здесь исповедовало различные тарикаты (‚пути‘) суфийского направления в исламе. До сих пор большинство верующих в республике придерживаются именно этого направления. […] С 90-х годов прошлого века в республике начало активно распространяться новое для Кавказа религиозное течение – салафизм, или фундаменталистский ислам.“ (Memorial, 4 September 2012, p. 8)

 

“Islam is the majority’s religion, especially in Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia, where the internal factors of the umma (Islamic community) have an increasingly profound impact on society. Most of the region’s Muslims follow a form of Islam perceived as ‘traditional’ in the region because it is deeply interwoven with local customs, practices and beliefs. The east has a strong tradition of Sufism, whose brotherhoods (tariqas) have been in conflict with the Salafis for over a decade. […] Traditional Muslims are more successfully integrated into the Russian secular system and recognise its institutions and law; their religious boards have become semi-government institutions.” (ICG, 19. October 2012b, p. 2)

 

“Салафиты, которых часто неточно называют ваххабитами, не признают святых и учителей, считая их наличие нарушением принципа единобожия в исламе. Они не признают вкраплений в религиозную практику народных традиций, выступают за упрощение обрядности и буквальное толкование Корана. […] В Дагестане, в отличие от Чечни, где конфликт начинался как сепаратистский, раскол был изначально как политическим, так и религиозным. […] В 90-х годах XX века конфликт, тогда еще не вооруженный, происходил как внутри исламских общин в населенных пунктах, так и между представителями духовенства: Духовного управления мусульман Республики Дагестан с одной стороны и лидерами салафитов – с другой. Одновременно нарастало давление на салафитов со стороны государственных силовых структур.” (Memorial, 4 September 2012, p. 8-9)

 

“The state generally supported traditional Muslims and in effect banned Salafism, deepening the sectarian schism. It saw the ‘hunt for Wahhabis’ as part of an anti-terrorist struggle, especially after the August 1999 incursion of Chechen insurgents into Dagestan.” (ICG, 19. October 2012b, p. 4)

 

“В августе и сентябре 1999 года из Чечни в Дагестан под лозунгом ‚помощи братьям по вере‘ вторгались крупные вооруженные отряды под командованием Шамиля Басаева. Вторжение было отбито, неподконтрольные республиканским властям анклавы ликвидированы в ходе серьезных боев. […] После событий 1999 года государство стало привлекать к уголовной ответственности участников и пособников нападения на Дагестан. Тогда же Народное Собрание РД приняло закон ‘О запрете ваххабистской и иной экстремистской деятельности на территории Республики Дагестан‘. Внятного определения ‘ваххабизма‘, да и ‘экстремизма‘, в этом законе нет. В правовом смысле его последствия ничтожны. Однако этот закон создал предпосылки для репрессий: фактически каждый, кто по субъективной оценке сотрудника правоохранительных органов мог быть причислен к приверженцам ‚ваххабизима‘, становился жертвой милицейского произвола. Произошло смешение уголовно-правового и религиозного понятий: борьба с терроризмом фактически превратилась в борьбу с приверженцами ‚ваххабизма‘ как религиозного течения.” (Memorial, 4 September 2012, p. 9-10)

 

“For almost a decade after the second Chechen war began, Dagestan authorities made no distinction between moderate and radical, violence-oriented Salafis, which contributed to radicalisation of the entire community.” (ICG, 19. October 2012b, p. 9)

 

“Весной и летом 2012 года начался диалог и между находившимися в конфликте суфиями и салафитами.” (Memorial, 4 September 2012, p. 5)

 

“The most thorough attempt, after years of violence, to bring Salafis into a dialogue with the state and Sufi leaders, is in Dagestan. The insurgency itself is not interested in dialogue and seeks to undermine it with new terrorist attacks, while the security services also disrupt the process by further heavy-handed measures. […] The dialogue may have come close to its end with the killing of Sheikh Said Afandi, the most influential sheikh in the North Caucasus, by a newly converted Islamist in his home on 28 August 2012. […] When the moderate Salafi organisation condemned the killing and called for continuation of dialogue, insurgents threatened its leaders. The leader of the Caucasus Emirate (Imarat Kavkaz), Doku Umarov, made a video asserting that Sufis who do not cooperate with the authorities are ‘brothers in Islam’ and invited them to join jihad.” (ICG, 19. October 2012b, p. 3-12)

 

 

 

North Caucasus Conflict

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Development of the insurgency in Dagestan

 

“First, since ‘Islamist terrorism’ was widely recognized as a primary threat to national security in 1999-2001, thousands of mostly young Dagestanis, accused of terrorism and ‘Wahhabism’, have been taken into custody by local authorities where they were often subjected to Soviet-style interrogation. Deep religiosity has been considered especially suspicious by the authorities, which have been waging full-scale war against real and alleged ‘Wahhabis’ and their sympathizers. […] As authorities have lacked enough evidence to put alleged ‘Wahhabis’ in jail, these were eventually set free following a few months of torture. Many of them never made peace with what was done to them in prisons, and have turned to violence to retaliate the humiliation. In case someone’s relative was killed or seriously wounded, their brothers, sons or cousins have pledged oaths to take revenge for the sake of family honor. As it is difficult for individuals to combat authorities on their own, many young Dagestanis have joined the insurgent movement in the mountains, where there were exposed to the basics of Salafism. […] Likewise, many Dagestanis have joined the insurgency in protest of the societal sins, be it corruption, erosion of traditional values, inability to realize themselves professionally or in search for a better, Islamic, future for their homeland.“ (CACI, 29 September 2010)

 

“Chechen separatism is the most prominent case of mobilisation based on memories of grievances, suppressed by the Soviet regime and channelled by nationalist leaders into demands for full independence. The resulting conflict has had a profound effect on the entire North Caucasus, particularly on Ingushetia and Dagestan where there was a direct spillover of displaced persons, combat and security operations. The secessionist conflict has now largely been superseded by an Islamist insurgency that continues in Chechnya and has spread to its neighbours.” (ICG, 19 October 2012a, p. 9)

 

“The Republic of Dagestan has become the principal scene of all the North Caucasian resistance movement in the past two years. Not only does the republic have the largest number of jamaats operating on its territory in the North Caucasus, but it also boasts of having the largest group of people there who are literate in Islamic theology and adhere to the ideas of an all-out jihadism in the region.“ (Jamestown Foundation, 17 May 2012)

 

“Diese ehemals in Tschetschenien aktiven Gruppen hätten sich, so hieß es, überwiegend nach Dagestan, Inguschetien und Kabardino-Balkarien zurückgezogen.“ (Universität Bremen, 20 May 2011, p. 3)

 

“In Dagestan, meanwhile, the insurgents are closely linked to both political clans and mafia groups, in a bewildering three-way war between Islamists, local politicians and Russian troops.“ (IWPR, 25 October 2010)

 

“Die höchste Gewaltdichte wurde in der größten Teilrepublik Dagestan registriert. Maßgebende Faktoren regionaler Instabilität sind terroristische Gewalt, Spannungen zwischen Volksgruppen, der Zustand der Rechtsschutzorgane und sozialökonomische Probleme wie hohe Jugendarbeitslosigkeit.“ (SWP, June 2012, p. 3)

 

“But if the ensuing counterterrorism operation in Gimry was meant to combat such extremism by identifying militants among the locals, it did the opposite. Residents say that in addition to daily house-to-house searches, thousands of troops bristling with weapons cut down farmers' trees, killed livestock, and stole whatever they could from the very poor people who live here. Magomedov says they also shot villagers in what he calls a reign of terror. ‘So many people were killed, and no one punished for it,’ he says. […] Some villagers in Gimry say they're protesting by refusing to observe Russian law. They say they live under Shari'a law instead, or at least their understanding of it, which includes blood feuds and other forms of centuries-old traditional law.“ (RFE/RL, 4 November 2011)

 

“A survey in Dagestan has found that 20 percent of the republic’s youth consider themselves moderate Salafis. Only 10 percent of the respondents referred to themselves as Sufis – traditionally the main Muslim branch in Dagestan. The most educated among those who identified themselves as moderate Salafis said they were in favor of mimicking the experience of such countries as Brunei, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman in bringing norms of sharia into governance in Dagestan. The survey also found that 12 percent of the respondents favor the radical methods of struggle adopted by the North Caucasus militants. It is especially striking that young people openly stated support for rebels in the republic. According to a Dagestani expert on Islam, Ruslan Gereyev, the survey was conducted only in cities, and support for the rebels would have been even higher had the interviews been conducted in rural areas of the republic (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, December 9).“ (Jamestown Foundation, 14 December 2011)

 

“Violence continued in the North Caucasus republics, driven by separatism, interethnic conflict, jihadist movements, vendettas, criminality, and excesses by security forces. Dagestan continued to be the most violent area in the North Caucasus.“ (USDOS, 19 April 2013, Section 1g)

 

“In mid-March, a massive redeployment of military personnel from Chechnya to Dagestan took place. According to unofficial sources from Dagestan, up to 20,000-25,000 troops were moved to the neighboring republic. A military column including large amounts of armored fighting vehicles set out from Khankala, a military base to the east of Grozny, to the Karabudakhkent district of Dagestan on the outskirts of the capital city of Makhachkala. Rationalized by the authorities as another move to improve the deteriorating situation in the Caspian republic, the move has caused serious concern both within and outside Dagestan.“ (CACI, 4 April 2012)

 

“Starting in early October, troops of the Russian Ministry of Defense are again participating in the counterinsurgency campaign in the North Caucasus. […] In fact, Moscow is actively strengthening its military presence in the region, with a particular focus on Dagestan. In the spring months of 2012, it deployed up to 25,000 MVD police units to Dagestan, the majority of which had previously been stationed in Chechnya. The recent decision to deploy army units to Dagestan seems to have been made in August or September and confirms that the success of the MVD troops has been limited. Indeed, the police units recruited from all over the Russian Federation and deployed to Dagestan for only a few months have proven incapable of grasping the peculiarities of local counterinsurgency warfare. In addition, the death toll on MVD troops deployed in the Dagestan campaign has increased steadily in recent months.“ (CACI, 14 November 2012)

 

“Against the backdrop of multiple killings of young members of the jamaats, Salafi ideology will attract more young people who regard the teaching as the only way of resisting the local authorities who work under Moscow’s auspices. Salafism in contemporary Dagestan has become a serious counterweight to official Sufism, as the latter has undermined its authority by close cooperation with the government. Sufism’s loss of authority is directly linked to the young people’s drift toward joining the ranks of the jihadists.“ (Jamestown Foundation, 10 January 2013)

 

Attacks and violations of human rights

 

“Похищения и насильственные исчезновения людей по-прежнему остаются одной из распространенных форм грубейших нарушений прав человека в Дагестане. За годы сложилась целая система незаконного насилия, включающая в себя неотъемлемые элементы – похищение людей, применение к ним пыток и осуществление внесудебных казней части похищенных. В Дагестане объектом похищений обычно становятся люди, исповедующие фундаменталистское направление ислама (салафизм), именно их силовики подозревают в пособничестве или причастности к вооруженному подполью. В Дагестане, как и в других республиках Северного Кавказа, нередко похищают и впоследствии убивают идеологов этого течения, тех, кому сложно предъявить официальные обвинения, но кого силовики считают ‘опасными’. Впрочем, среди похищенных есть люди, не принадлежащие к салафитскому течению.“ (Memorial, 4 September 2012, p. 48-49)

 

“Government personnel, rebels, and criminal elements continued to engage in abductions in the North Caucasus. […] Security forces in Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetiya frequently abducted or detained individuals for several days without immediate explanation or charge. Human rights groups believed the numbers of abductions were underreported because victims’ relatives were reluctant to complain to authorities due to fear of reprisal. Generally, there was no accountability for government security personnel involved in abductions. Criminal groups in the region, possibly with links to rebel forces, frequently resorted to kidnapping for ransom.“ (USDOS, 24 May 2012, Section 1g)

 

“Across town in an outlying, concrete-block neighborhood, Svetlana Isayeva runs the group Mothers of Daghestan for Human Rights from a tiny ground-floor office. She started the organization after her 25-year-old son disappeared from the street outside her home three years ago. A stoic, dark-haired woman, Isayeva says many young men like him are detained by security forces, especially those who attend mosques and show other signs of religious piousness. She says they're forced to confess to terrorism and often killed. ‘Lately it's become common among law enforcers to burn people alive in their cars,’ she says. ‘Then they're accused of blowing themselves up by accident.“ (RFE/RL, 4 November 2011)

 

“Armed groups continued to attack security officials, members of local administrations and prominent members of the public, including mullahs preaching traditional Islam. Law enforcement operations gave rise to numerous allegations of enforced disappearances, extrajudicial executions and torture.“ (AI, 24 May 2012)

 

“Die beinahe täglichen Überfälle auf Sicherheitskräfte, welche vor allem in Dagestan und Inguschetien weiter zugenommen haben, weisen dieselben Tendenzen auf: Einerseits finden sie immer häufiger an stark bevölkerten Orten statt, was auch zivile Opfer fordert. Andererseits werden vermehrt ‘prestigeträchtige‘ Ziele anvisiert, das heisst hohe Sicherheitsbeamte.“ (SFH, 12 September 2011, p. 5-6)

 

 

Timeline of attacks in Dagestan

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Please note: Although a lot of information on the Russian Federation is available in Russian language only, currently only selected Russian documents are available on ecoi.net. No Russian language publisher is currently among the sources regularly covered by ecoi.net. The following timeline therefore does not purport to be an exhaustive list of attacks in Dagestan, but shall serve as an overview and introduction to the subject. 

 

2012

 

“The official figures from 2012 suggest that the Republic of Dagestan today is the primary base of the armed resistance in the North Caucasus: 262 terrorism-related crimes were committed in Dagestan during the first eleven months of 2012, 42 more than in the entire year of 2011 (http://news.mail.ru/inregions/caucasus/5/society/11483342/). […] According to an analysis of open sources, 232 insurgents were killed in Dagestan out of a total of 379 insurgents killed in the North Caucasus in 2012. In comparison, 171 militants were killed in Dagestan in 2011. About 200 suspected militants were arrested and 21 people who helped the rebels voluntarily surrendered to the authorities in 2012 (www.riadagestan.ru/news/2012/12/30/148860). […] At the same time, 211 servicemen, including 149 police officers, were killed in the ongoing conflict with the militants in the North Caucasus (www.yuga.ru/news/282753/). Of those, 130 servicemen were killed in Dagestan, and approximately as many servicemen in the republic were injured. Thus, judging by open source data, the number of deaths in insurgent violence in Dagestan in 2012 accounted for two-thirds of the total number of deaths in insurgent violence in the North Caucasus.“ (Jamestown Foundation, 10 January 2013)

 
2013

 
January

 

“Security forces have reportedly killed a suspected militant in an operation in Russia's North Caucasus region of Daghestan. Russian news agencies are reporting that the raid in which a member of the security forces was also killed, took place in Novy Khushet, a village near the regional capital of Makhachkala.“ (RFE/RL, 12 January 2013)

 

“A gunman has killed a senior judge in Daghestan in Russia's restive North Caucasus region. A spokesman for the local Interior Ministry said Magomed Magomedov, a judge on Daghestan's Supreme Court, was killed in a shooting attack in the center of the capital Makhachkala on January 15. […] The 55-year-old judge worked on high-profile cases involving terrorists and Islamic insurgents. Police say Magomedov may have been killed in retaliation for convictions he has recently handed down.“ (RFE/RL, 16 January 2013)

 

“At the same time, government forces carried out special operations in the mountainous part of Dagestan, where some rebels were killed and some people disappeared (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/73122/).“ (Jamestown Foundation, 24 January 2013)

 

February

 

“On the evening of February 1, unidentified armed people attacked a car near a gas station on the Kavkaz federal highway. When the attackers found out that the driver of the car was a Chechen police officer from the village of Shelkovskaya, they snatched him along with his car (www.riadagestan.ru/news/2013/2/1/150230/). The 31-year-old Chechen police officer was found dead the following day on the outskirts of the village of Bammatyurt in Dagestan’s Khasavyurt district.“ (Jamestown Foundation, 7 February 2013)

 

“Russian police have shot dead a North Caucasus man believed to be the last suspect still wanted for involvement in a 2010 suicide bombing in Moscow. […] Gusen Magomedov was killed in a security raid in the Sergokali region of Dagestan early on Wednesday. Magomedov was shot dead after resisting arrest, officials said.“ (BBC News, 6 February 2013)

 

“A police officer has been killed by unknown assailants in Russia's North Caucasus Republic of Daghestan. Local authorities say Captain Yakub Alimirzuyev was shot dead near his house in the village of Kahdzhalmakhi on the night of February 7.“ (RFE/RL, 8 February 2013)

 

“Security forces in Russia's North Caucasus Republic of Daghestan have reportedly killed five suspected militants. Russia's National Antiterrorism Committee said on February 12 that the suspects were shot dead in a special operation in Daghestan's Derbent district. Committee officials said the dead men have been identified as individuals wanted by Daghestani authorities for involvement in extremist and terrorist groups.“ (RFE/RL, 12 February 2013)

 

“13.– 14.02.2013 - Bei der Explosion eines Sprengsatzes bei einem Polizeiposten vor Chasawjurt (Dagestan) werden vier Polizisten getötet und fünf weitere verletzt. Während der folgenden Spezialoperation werden sechs Untergrundkämpfer und ein Soldat getötet.“ (Universität Bremen, 22 February 2013, p. 25)

 

“Security officers have reportedly shot dead three militants in Russia's North Caucasus republic of Daghestan. Local media reported on February 17 that the militants were hiding in a wood and opened fire on security officers searching the area in the early hours of the day. The Interfax news agency quoted the investigative department of the Investigative Committee for Daghestan as identifying the leader of the three as Daniyal Zargalov, known as the emir of the Northern Sector.“ (RFE/RL, 17 February 2013)

 

“Just a day later, on February 17, three more militants were killed, two of whom were identified as Emir Seifullah’s accomplices—25-year-old Kalimulla Sapigullaev of the village of Novosasitli in Khasavyurt district, and 29-year-old Ruslan Tembiev of the village of Leninaul in Kazbekovsky district. Tembiev reportedly was a disciple (a.k.a. naib) of Khalid, the Emir of Khasavyurt.“ (Jamestown Foundation, 28 February 2013)

 

March

 

“Unknown assailants have shot dead a teacher at an Islamic school in Russia's North Caucasus Republic of Daghestan. Daghestan's Interior Ministry said on March 4 that Magomed Biyarslanov was found dead with several gunshots in his chest inside his house in the village of Gubden late on March 3.“ (RFE/RL, 4 March 2013)

 

“On March 9, four people were killed in three different parts of Dagestan. One incident took place in Khasavyurt district, which is predominantly populated by Chechens, Avars and Kumyks. Another incident happened in the town of Izberbash south of Makhachkala, which is mostly populated by Dargins. The third incident took place in the village of Kurakh in southern Dagestan, which has a majority Lezgin population. The four victims had diverse social backgrounds: the man killed in Izerbash was a federal judge, while a school teacher was killed in Kurakh and two young people suspected of being members of the insurgency were killed in Khasavyurt district.“ (Jamestown Foundation, 14 March 2013)

 

“Several suspected militants have been killed in Russia's North Caucasus region of Daghestan. Regional Interior Ministry officials say one security officer was killed and two wounded late on March 20 in the special operation that lasted for several hours on the outskirts of Daghestan's capital, Makhachkala. One security officer is missing. Officials say police and security troops stormed a house after suspected militants inside refused to surrender. Investigators are currently at the scene and the exact number killed is not clear.“ (RFE/RL, 21 March 2013)
 
April
 
“On April 11, government forces launched a large-scale counter-terrorism operation in the village of Gimry in Dagestan. […] Sources in the village told the Kavpolit.ru website that government forces were caught in the crossfire between the militants inside the village and the militants in the surrounding forests. […] Officials identified three militants who were killed in the special operation in Gimry—35-year-old Shamil Abdullaev, 34-year-old Ilyas Kamilov and 28-year-old Abdula Zaguliev. The locals said that Gajidadaev, the notorious leader of the militants in the village, was alive and fighting government forces involved in the attack.“ (Jamestown Foundation, 15 April 2013)

 

“At least one person has been killed and two more wounded in a continuing security operation in Russia's North Caucasus republic of Daghestan. Interior Ministry officials say the operation was launched on April 11 when security forces in Daghestan's central Untsukul district surrounded a group of suspected militants. The suspects opened fire at the security forces, sparking a gunfight that left one suspected militant dead and a second injured. A security officer was wounded in continued fighting on April 12 after a second group of militants attacked the security forces from behind. In a separate incident, two guards at a former military base in a neighboring district were shot dead by unknown attackers late on April 11.“ (RFE/RL, 12 April 2013a)

 

“An explosion near a school in the Daghestani city of Buinaksk has killed at least one policeman and wounded three others in the latest incident during two days of violence in Russia’s North Caucasus republic of Daghestan. The explosion late on April 12 came after a two-day gun battle in Daghestan's Untsukul district.“ (RFE/RL, 12 April 2013b)

 

“Russia’s says the leader of a militant group in the North Caucasus republic of Daghestan has been killed in an overnight gunbattle with police. The National Antiterrorist Committee said that Bagir Agabayev, the head of the Khiva armed group, was killed when militants in a car he was traveling in opened fire on police attempting to stop them for a documents check. Agabayev’s aide, Albert Yarov, was also killed in the gunbattle, together with a third militant.“ (RFE/RL, 27 April 2013)

 

 

SOURCES: (all links accessed at 6 May 2013)

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