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 Last update: 3 May 2013

 

1 - Overview of the security situation in Afghanistan

INTRODUCTION

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“Afghanistan is an Islamic republic; population estimates range from 24 to 33 million.” (USDOS, 8 April 2011, Introduction)

“Over three decades of armed violence has caused the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians, and millions have emigrated.” (IRIN, 15 July 2010)

“The overall results of the 2004 presidential election and delayed 2005 parliamentary elections were broadly accepted by Afghans and the international community, despite allegations of intimidation by militias and insurgent groups, partisanship within the electoral administration, and other irregularities. However, the 2009 presidential and 2010 parliamentary elections were critically undermined by fraud and other problems, and state institutions have failed to provide effective governance or transparency. Afghanistan’s district council elections, which were scheduled to take place in 2010, were canceled.” (FH, March 2012).” (FH, March 2012)

 

STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS

Afghan Government

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“The large number of attacks by AGEs continued to limit the capability of the central government to protect human rights in many districts, especially in the south.” (USDOS, 19 April 2013, Section 1g)

“Lingering doubts about the Karzai administration’s legitimacy, combined with the continued deterioration in security, posed a major challenge to the central and provincial governments as they struggled to control areas under their jurisdiction, deliver basic services, and engage in vital reconstruction efforts.“ (FH, March 2012)

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

“The UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which had been managed by NATO since August 2003, completed the expansion of its security and reconstruction mission from Kabul to the rest of the country in 2006. Despite tens of thousands of additional U.S. and allied troops, and the ongoing development of the Afghan army, Afghanistan largely remained under the sway of local military commanders, tribal leaders, warlords, drug traffickers, and petty bandits. Meanwhile, the resurgent Taliban increased their attacks on the government and international forces, and steadily extended their influence over vast swaths of territory, particularly in the southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand, but also in previously quiet areas of the north and west.” (FH, March 2012)

“The key opponent of the various insurgent groups has ceased to be US or ISAF, and become the mix of Afghan government and ANSF capabilities that will exist after 2014. The most practical and rational primary objective for insurgents during the period before 2014 has become the ability to undercut the Afghan government and ANSF, and restore and expand political influence in the field, and the means are a combination of selective military and political warfare – not taking pointless losses by directly attacking superior foreign forces.” (CSIS, 9 May 2012, pp. 10-11)

“[...] the Obama Administration asserted that it was pursuing a [...] military-civilian strategy intended to pave the way for a gradual transition to Afghan leadership from July 2011 until the end of 2014. [...] The transition to Afghan leadership began, as planned, in July 2011 in the first wave of areas, [...]” (CRS, 22 September 2011, Summary)

 

“The formal process of transition of lead security responsibilities from international military forces to Afghan security forces begins in July 2011 in three provinces (Bamyan, Panjshir, Kabul (minus Sarobi district)) and four municipalities (Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat, Mehtarlam, Lashkar Gah).” (UNAMA, July 2011, p. 20)

 

“The areas to be transitioned in the second phase (with transition to occur from the end of 2011 until the spring of 2012) were announced on November 27, 2011 [...].” (CRS, 21 December 2011, p. 27)

   

“This second wave of transition means that half of Afghanistan is due to be controlled by its own forces. [...] Among the provinces to be handed over is Balkh, in the north, where the Taliban are active in many of its districts, the BBC's Bilal Sarway reports from Kabul. Takhar province in north-eastern Afghanistan, also being handed over, has also seen recent attacks - including the assassination of three senior Afghan officials in the last year alone. Among the cities named is Jalalabad in the east and the volatile Ghazni, where only last month a mother and daughter were stoned and then shot by the Taliban just a few hundred metres from the local governor's office, our correspondent adds.” (BBC, 27 November 2011)

 

“We have been expecting the list of areas for the third tranche of transition to be announced several weeks ago. The announcement was finally made by President Karzai on Monday 14 May, [...].
The official announcement [...] was rather vague as to which areas were to be ‘transitioned’, only mentioning that three provinces - Parwan, Kapisa and Uruzgan - were to be completely transferred to the ANSF, along with 122 districts, and that once this was completed - a process that would take up to six months – the security for 260 administrative units, in which 75 per cent of the Afghan population lives, would be under the responsibility of the ANSF. [...]
Another point made in the announcement, and this is possibly the biggest surprise enteqal has presented so far, was that the third tranche would include all the provincial capitals which had not already been transitioned (20 out of 34).” (Foschini, 16 May 2012)
 
“Transition of the first of five ‘tranches’ was announced by President Karzai in March 2011, followed by the second in November 2011, the third in May 2012, and the fourth in December 2012. The full transfer in each tranche other than the fifth is supposed to last some 12-18 months. […] By the end of the fourth tranche, the ANSF will take the security lead in areas where 87% of the Afghan population lives, and 23 of the 34 Afghan provinces will be transferred or in the transition process.” (CSIS, 28 March 2013, p. 40)

 

[…] widespread doubts that Afghan governance and security institutions will be strong enough to protect themselves by the end of 2014, [...].” (CRS, 22 September 2011, Summary)

 

Insurgent Groups

“The core of the insurgency remains the Taliban movement loyal, for the most part, to Mullah Umar, who led the Taliban regime during 1996-2001. He and many of his top advisers reportedly operate from Pakistan […].” (CRS, 4 April 2012, p. 13)

 

“[…] faction of former mujahedin party leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar (Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, HIG). He has been allied with Al Qaeda and Taliban insurgents although his faction has sometimes competed with and clashed with Taliban elements. […] Hikmatyar’s faction […] is now active against U.S. and Afghan forces in Kunar, Nuristan, Kapisa, and Nangarhar provinces, north and east of Kabul.“ (CRS, 4 April 2012, p. 15)

 

“Another militant faction […] is the ‘Haqqani Network.‘ It is led by Jalaludin Haqqani […]. Press reports indicate that the few Al Qaeda fighters that are in Afghnistan are mostly embedded with Haqqani fighters. On the other hand, the faction is believed primarily interested in earning illicit monies and in controlling parts of Khost Province than in imposing an extreme Islamic ideology throughout Afghanistan. […] the faction is increasingly targeting key locations in Kabul and elesewhere.“ (CRS, 4 April 2012, pp. 15-16)

 

SECURITY SITUATION

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Overview

2001 to 2010
“During 2001-mid-2006, U.S. forces and Afghan troops fought relatively low levels of insurgent violence. [… ] violence increased significantly in mid-2006, particularly in the east and the south, where ethnic Pashtuns predominate. Reasons for the deterioration include […] Afghan government corruption; the absence of governance or security forces in many rural areas [...] civilian casualties caused by NATO and U.S. military operations” (CRS, 15 April 2011, p. 22)

“[…] continued attacks by the Taliban-led insurgency, their expansion into previously stable areas, such as northern and western Afghanistan, as well as increased counter-insurgency operations by Afghan National Security Forces and international military forces. Incursions of foreign fighters and the deteriorating security situation along the border area with Pakistan also contributed to increased insecurity.” (UN Security Council, 3 February 2011, p. 2)

2011
“As the conflict intensified in the traditional fighting areas of the south and southeast and moved to districts in the west and north, civilians experienced a downward spiral in protection. At the same time, non-State armed groups or Anti-Government Elements (AGEs) [...] undertook unlawful means of warfare including increased use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) [...] targeted killings of high profile civilians, and attacks on protected places such as hospitals.” (UNAMA, July 2011 p. 1)

“Violence is at its worst since US-backed Afghan forces toppled the Taliban government in late 2001, with high levels of foreign troop deaths and record civilian casualties.” (Guardian, 14 September 2011)

“Complex suicide attacks made up a greater proportion of the total number of suicide attacks. On average, three such attacks have been carried out per month in 2011, a 50 per cent increase compared with the same period in 2010.” (UNGA, 21 September 2011, p.2)
 
“[...] there appears to have been a spike in attacks in the north since last month's assassination of government peace broker Burhanuddin Rabbani, a former president and key leader in the ethnic Tajik and Uzbek Northern Alliance.” (AFP, 26 October 2011)
 
“Throughout the war in Afghanistan, insurgents have modified their tactics to adapt to the changing battlefield. In the past year [2011], fighters have disguised themselves in burqas, hidden bombs in turbans, and increasingly turned to children to carry out [suicide] attacks.” (Voice of America, 30 December 2011)
 
“[…] by the end of November, the average monthly number of security-related events for 2011 was 1,995, up 21 per cent compared to the first 11 months of 2010. […] The focus for military and insurgent activities shifted from the south to the south-east of the country […]. In part this was owing to disruption to insurgent activity in Helmand Province; it also partially reflected locally based insurgent initiatives in border areas.” (UNGA, 13 December 2011, p.3)
 
“AOG [armed opposition groups] initiated attacks grew by 14 % over last year […]. The tactical portfolio remained consistent with 2010, with close range engagements […] making up the bulk of operations (55%) and IED/IDF [improvised explosive device/indirect fire] operations at 44%. Suicide attacks remained at just 1% of the total yet caused close to 70% more fatalities this year […].” (ANSO, January 2012, p.9)
 

2012

"Markedly fewer security incidents were reported in the period from 1 February to 30 April 2012 than over the same time frame in 2011. The figures were more comparable to 2010. In April, 1,412 security incidents were recorded, a 28 per cent decrease compared with April 2011 (1,969 incidents); in March, 1,099 incidents were recorded, compared with 1,964 in March 2011; and in February, 1,032 incidents were recorded, down from 1,394 in February 2011. This decrease in incidents is assessed as the result of a number of factors, including poor weather conditions, successful efforts by Afghan and international forces, such as increased arrests and cache finds, the more political posture adopted by some Taliban leaders and the uncertainty of fighters over reports of peace talks and the upcoming international military drawdown. [...] The southern, south-eastern and eastern provinces accounted for over 70 per cent of incidents, of which armed clashes and improvised explosive devices were responsible for the majority. Suicide attacks were fewer than in the previous year, in part due to Afghan and international security operations, leading to a number of seizures of suicide devices and explosives. [...]

On 2 May, the Taliban announced the start of their spring offensive, named Al Farooq. The statement urged fighters to avoid civilian casualties as a “top priority”, although it then listed targets, including high-ranking Government officials and members of the National Assembly and the High Peace Council, considered non-combatants under international law." (UNGA, 20 June 2012, pp. 4-5)
 
“By the end of June, AOG initiated attacks had decreased by 38% compared to the first six months of 2011, ANSF-IMF activity levels had decreased collectively by 25%, and the total number of NGO security incidents had fallen by 17%. 

Alongside the regression of AOG attacks country-wide, the East has absorbed roughly an equal number of AOG incidents as the South, the weighted difference in opposition activity levels being only 2% in favour of the South, and the two regions now form a contiguous battle space.” (ANSO, Juli 2012, S. 1)
 
“We assess that the current AOG de-escalation is primarily a tactical reaction to the IMF disengagement and does not reflect any loss of actual operational capacity.” (ANSO, Juli 2012, S. 6)
 
“Overall, recorded security incidents have continued at a lower level than in 2011, with the figures being more comparable to 2010 levels. From 1 May to 31 July, the traditional summer fighting season, 5,190 incidents were recorded, representing a 30 per cent decrease compared to the same period in 2011 (7,470 incidents). This is assessed to be the result of several trends, including interdiction by Afghan and international security forces of insurgents, arms shipments and funding, together with the redeployment of international forces, reducing the likelihood of direct armed clashes. Of all incidents from 1 May to 31 July, 69 per cent took place in the south, south-east and east, mostly in Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, Khost, Kunar and Nangarhar Provinces.

[…] Armed clashes and improvised explosive devices constituted the vast majority of events. Suicide attacks slightly decreased, with 32 taking place between 1 May and 31 July, compared to 37 in 2011.“ (UNGA, 13 September 2012, p. 5)
 
“The number of AOG [Armed Opposition Groups] kinetic attacks has decreased by 32% on Q3 last year […] and the average daily attack rate (all/270) has dropped from 42 to 30 attacks/day. Despite this lower input, AOG activity has followed the established seasonal pattern - building up during late spring/early summer, peaking in mid-summer and adopting a downward trend afterwards […]. The consistency of this approach reinforces the conclusion that the de-escalation on AOG side is an organized and controlled decision, eventually matched to counter-balance the input from AOG opponents […].

However, AOG targeting patterns denote a significant shift from IMF [International Military Forces] to ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] targets with the percentage share of ANSF targets increasing from 45% to 71% and the share of IMF falling both in absolute numbers and in percentage share (46% to 16%, […]). […] AOG attacks on GOA-affiliated civilian targets (premises, members of perceived/actual supporters) also disproportionately increased from 9% to 13%, indicating that the shaping operations maintain an important place in the current AOG war efforts.

The tactical composition of AOG attacks remained consistent with approximately 59% being close-range assaults (SAF, RPG) mostly in small unit ambushes, 40% being IED or stand-off attacks (mortars, rockets) and the rest being special operations including suicide vectors […].” (ANSO, October 2012, p. 12) 
 
“From 1 August to 31 October, 4,801 security incidents were recorded, a 14 per cent decrease compared to the same period in 2011 (5,582 incidents). The reduction is partly the result of successful interdiction by Afghan and international security forces of insurgent personnel, arms shipments and funding. It has not, however, necessarily resulted in public perceptions of improved security. The population suffers from the actions of illegal armed groups, tribal clashes and disputes over natural resources, while an insurgent campaign of intimidation and targeted killings of influential political, religious or tribal figures and community and women’s activists continues unabated.

The south and east of the country continued to experience the vast majority of security incidents — 70 per cent from 1 August to 31 October — with an increasing insurgent focus seen on infiltration routes towards Kabul. [...] Armed clashes and improvised explosive devices constituted the majority of incidents. The sustained efforts by insurgents to conduct spectacular events notwithstanding, suicide bombings remained fewer in number than in 2011, with 22 recorded from 1 August to 31 October, compared to 39 during the same quarter in 2011.” (UNGA, 6 December 2012, p. 5) 
 
“After six years of sustained growth, the conflict entered a de-escalation phase with the annual incident volume (all authors) falling by 24% this year on that of 2011 […]. This reduction has been driven by diminishing rates of AOG and IMF activity (25% and 57% respectively […]). We assess that the on-going IMF disengagement has been the primary cause of this change. We have noted during the year that – despite the lower incident volume – the conflict has remained intensive and consistently followed established seasonal patterns […], whereas the activity input was evenly shared between the opposition (49%) and the security forces (33% ANSF, 11% IMF). This proves that the structure of the conflict has not changed and that the current reduction is a controlled process rather than an imposition on either side. We conclude that the reduction of AOG activity is a deliberate and reversible choice in response to the IMF withdrawal. In contrast, the stagnating ANSF volumes (+2% increase on 2011) indicate that ANSF are not filling the ‚gap‘ opened by the IMF departure yet – and will need to step up their game in 2013 in ordert o adjust for increasing IMF departures and AOG efforts.” (ANSO, January 2013, p. 12) 
 
2013
“From 16 November to 15 February, 3,783 incidents were recorded, representing a 4 per cent decrease compared with the same period in 2011/12, when 3,940 incidents were recorded. Since the beginning of 2013 to 15 February, there has been a 6 per cent increase compared with the corresponding period in 2012. […] Provinces in the south, south-east and east continued to account for most security incidents, with the largest number recorded in Nangarhar Province, in the east.” (UNGA, 5 March 2013, p. 5)
 
“AOG initiated attacks have soared this quarter, up by 47% from Q1 last year, with the incident total also surpassing the volumes recorded in 2010 by 30% (2331 this year vs. 1794 in 2010, above). Given the stability of the seasonal conflict pattern each year so far (a winter low and summer spike), we assess that the current re-escalation trend will be preserved throughout the entire season and that 2013 is set to become the second most violent year after 2011. The incident volumes also confirm that the downturn noted last year was not reflective of a permanently degraded AOG capability, but rather linked to the opposition adopting an operational pause – perhaps linked to the harsh 2011-2012 winter – which has since come to an end. What has been maintained in the AOG campaign this year, however, is the conscious shift from IMF to Afghan targets, as the conflict adopts an increasingly domestic shape. As of this quarter, 73% of all incidents caused by AOG (incl. armed attacks and non-kinetic activity) targeted the expanding ANSF whereas an additional 10% involved civilians associated, or perceived to be associated, with the Government […].” (ANSO, April 2013, p. 9)
 

Civilian Casualties

2010
“In 2010, women and children made up a greater proportion of those killed and injured than in 2009, with child casualties increased by 55 per cent from the same period in 2009. Three quarters of all civilian casualties were linked to armed opposition groups, an increase of 53 per cent from 2009.” (UN Security Council, 3 February 2011, p. 2)

“Suicide attacks and IEDs accounted for 55 percent of all civilian deaths caused by antigovernment forces during the year. [...] The number of civilians assassinated or executed by armed groups surged by more than 95 per cent, including public executions of children. The victims were accused of “supporting” the government or “spying” for the international forces.” (AI, 13 May 2011)
 
2011
“The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) documented 3,021 civilian deaths in 2011, an increase of eight percent over 2010 (2,790 civilian deaths) and a 25 percent increase from 2009 (2,412 civilian deaths). [...] 77 percent of all conflict-related civilian deaths in 2011 were attributed to Anti-Government Elements. [...] 14 percent of all conflict-related civilian deaths were attributed to Pro-Government Forces in 2011. [...] nine percent of the total, could not be attributed to a particular party to the conflict. […] Anti-Government Elements used improvised explosive devices more frequently and more widely across the country, conducted deadlier suicide attacks yielding greater numbers of victims, and increased the unlawful and targeted killing of civilians. Civilian deaths from aerial attacks by Pro-Government Forces increased in 2011 [...]. At the same time, the geographic distribution of civilian casualties shifted significantly particularly in the second half of 2011. As the armed conflict lessened in severity in the south and intensified in provinces in the southeast, east and north of the country, rising numbers of Afghan civilians in these areas were killed and injured, accounting for an increasing proportion of all civilian casualties nationally. […] In 2011, women and children again increasingly bore the brunt of the armed conflict.” (UNAMA, February 2012, pp. 1-2, 5) 

“The country task forces on monitoring and reporting documented that a total number of 1,325 children were killed or injured during the reporting period. Thirty per cent of child casualties were caused by improvised explosive devices placed by armed groups, killing 123 children and injuring 262. [...]
The number of child casualties attributed to airstrikes conducted by pro-Government forces, including the Afghan National Security Forces and the International Military Forces, doubled compared with the last reporting period, with 110 children killed and 68 injured in 2011.” (UNGA, 26 April 2012, p. 3)
 
“Continuing internal conflict resulted in civilian deaths, abductions, prisoner abuse, property damage, and the displacement of residents. [...] The large number of attacks by AGEs limited the capability of the central government to protect human rights in many districts, especially in the South.” (USDOS, 24 May 2012, Section 1g)
 
“Targeted killings of Afghan civilians, including government officials and tribal elders, working for or allegedly supporting the government or international organizations increased.” (AI, 24 May 2012)
 
2012
“The United Nations says the number of civilians killed in Afghanistan during the first four months of this year as a result of the war has dropped by 21 percent compared to the same period in 2011. Jan Kubis, the UN special representative for Afghanistan, also said that about eight out of 10 civilian deaths in Afghanistan were caused by Taliban militants or their antigovernment allies. He says fewer than one out of 10 civilian deaths were caused by Afghan government forces or the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The rest were unattributed.” (RFE/RL, 30 May 2012)

“In the first six months of 2012, the armed conflict in Afghanistan continued to take a devastating toll on civilians. Between 1 January and 30 June 2012, conflict-related violence resulted in 3,099 civilian casualties or 1,145 civilians killed and 1,954 others injured, a 15 percent decrease in overall civilian casualties compared with the same period in 2011 when UNAMA documented 3,654 civilian casualties (1,510 killed and 2,144 injured). This reduction of civilian casualties reverses the trend in which civilian casualties had increased steadily over the previous five years. UNAMA remains concerned, however, that the number of civilian deaths and injuries remains at a high level, comparable with 2010, when UNAMA documented 3,268 (1,271 civilian deaths and 1,997 civilian injuries) civilian casualties. 

Between 1 January and 30 June 2012, UNAMA documented a total of 925 women and children killed or wounded, representing 30 percent of all civilian casualties. This represents a one percent increase in the ratio of women and children civilians killed or injured in comparison to the same period of 2011.21 Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) remained the leading cause of conflict-related deaths of women and children followed by ground engagements. [...] 

Anti-Government Elements were responsible for 80 percent of all civilian casualties, while 10 percent were attributed to Pro-Government Forces. UNAMA was unable to attribute responsibility to any party to the conflict in 10 percent of cases.“ (UNAMA, Juli 2012, pp. 1-2)
 
“A total of 374 civilians were killed and 581 injured in August as a result of the war in Afghanistan, making it the second deadliest month for civilians since 2007, the United Nations said Friday.“ (AFP, 21 September 2012)
 
“The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) said in a statement on October 20 that improvised explosive devices (IEDs) ‘killed 340 civilians and injured a further 599 over the past nine months, an increase of almost 30 per cent compared to the same period last year.’ It added that ‘IEDs are by far the biggest killer of civilians in Afghanistan's armed conflict.’” (RFE/RL, 21 October 2012)
 
“The data show that the overall 24% decrease of conflict activity has resulted in a relatively smaller reduction – 14% - of civilians collaterally killed in the conflict […]. A total of 2,038 people died in the conflict this year, with 90% being killed during attacks initiated by the opposition and 10% in operations led by IMF. Roadside IEDs were the leading cause with 806 people dying this way […]. This reflects the continued reliance of AOG on ‚victim-operated‘ devices (such as pressure-plate bombs) as the combatants seek to utilize stand-off strike capability against overwhelming IMF/ANSF numbers and technology. That the large majority of fatalities occurred in the South (46% […]) where IED activity was the most intensive (Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan) provides an indication as to where the conflict impacts the most urban centres and key access routes. The East hosted the second largest proportion of the fatalities (19%), followed by North (13%), Central (12%) and West (10%).” (ANSO, January 2013, p. 12)
 
“The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) documented 7,559 civilian casualties (2,754 civilian deaths and 4,805 injuries) from armed conflict in 2012. While these numbers reflect a 12 percent reduction in civilian deaths and a minimal increase in civilians injured compared to 2011 they underscore the continuing high human cost of armed conflict in Afghanistan - which demands even greater commitment and redoubled efforts by all parties to reduce civilian casualties and improve protection of civilians in 2013. Over the past six years, 14, 728 Afghan civilians have lost their lives in the armed conflict. Anti - Government Elements increasingly targeted civilians throughout the country and carried out attacks without regard for human life. UNAMA documented 6,131 civilian casualties (2,179 civilian deaths and 3,952 injuries) by Anti - Government Elements in 2012, an increase of nine percent compared to 2011. 81 percent of the total civilian casualties in 2012 were attributed to Anti -Government Elements. Of the 6,131 civilian casualties caused by Anti - Government Elements, UNAMA recorded a 108 percent increase in civilian casualties from targeted killings and a rise in casualties from the indiscriminate use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), particularly illegal pressure plate IEDs which are victim - activated. Eight percent of all civilian casualties or 587 civilian casualties (316 deaths and 271 injuries) were attributed to Pro - Government Forces in 2012, a 46 percent decrease in total civilian casualties (39 percent drop in civilian deaths and 53 percent decline in injuries) from 2011. Civilian casualties from the actions of Afghan National Security Forces in 2012 were consistent with numbers documented 2011 with 96 civilian casualties (33 civilian deaths and 63 injuries), the majority occurring during ground engagements. The remaining 841 civilian casualties (259 deaths and 582 injured) could not be attributed and occurred in crossfire incidents during ground engagements, cross - border shelling or from explosive remnants of war.” (UNAMA, 19 February 2013, pp. 1-3)

 

2 – Security Situation in Kabul

“Security is relatively good in the city; while insurgent attacks may disrupt daily life from time to time, in general people carry out their day-to-day business unhindered by security concerns.” (AREU, May 2011, p. 15)

“Kabul continued to be a key terrorist target during the year, although violence occurred in many parts of the country.” (USDOS, 8 April 2011, Section 1a)

“Kabul residents say they have little faith in the ability of the Afghan security services to protect them after dramatic attacks hit the city this week. A number of key locations in the capital were targeted, with dozens of militants firing on the Afghan parliament, the national army academy and the Sherpur district, home to senior government officials and diplomats. Foreign embassies also came under fire in the onslaught, which began at noon on April 15 and was only brought to a halt the following morning.” (IWPR, 17 April 2012) 

“Until now, the Taleban have not focussed all their resources on attacks in the capital and, apart from sporadic rocket attacks on the city, a tactic that the Taleban borrowed from the mujahedin, their major focus has been to strike as close as possible to the heart of power, whatever the target and whatever the civilian casualties might be. Their preference, therefore, has been to launch sporadic, high-profile attacks which create the perception of instability and of a vulnerable city. […] Their [The Taliban’s] motivation, […], appears not to be concern about hurting the relatively powerless, but reserving their fighters for high visibility targets in the nation’s capital.” (Foschini, 21 January 2013)

 

Timeline of Attacks in Kabul since 2011

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JANUARY 2011

Bomb attack near bridge kills one policeman and injures 3 civilians (RFE/RL, 4 January 2011).

At least 4 people were killed and 29 wounded in a suicide motorcycle blast that was claimed by the Taliban, who said it targeted a minibus carrying Afghan spy agency employees (AFP, 12 January 2011).

Journalist Razaq Mamoon who was sprayed with acid while walking home; according to the victim his book on Iranian intelligence activities has made him a target (BBC, 19. January 2011).

“[…] suicide attack on a supermarket in Kabul's upmarket embassy district on Friday killed at least nine people, three of them foreign women, in the first major Taliban assault on civilians in the capital for nearly a year.” (Reuters, 28. January 2011) 

FEBRUARY 2011 

According to authorities, a suicide attack on a hotel killed at least 2 people and injured 2 others; the Taliban have claimed responsibility for the attack (Reuters, 14 February 2011).

APRIL 2011 

Suicide bombers wearing burqas have attacked a NATO base, lightly injuring 3 soldiers (RFE/RL, 2 April 2011)

“[…] there was an abduction of a business man from District 8 in Kabul City, a persistent issue from within the capital, a crime that falls under the purview of various abduction syndicates operating kidnap for ransom rings. [...] this latest incident was perpetrated by a group wearing ANSF uniforms, an unfortunately common enough element in such incidents.” (ANSO, 2 May 2011, p. 2)

“[…] suicide attacker entered the Afghan Defence Ministry in Kabul, shot dead two Afghan soldiers and wounded seven others […] the bomber was shot dead before he could set off the explosives attached to his body […]” (AlertNet, 18 April 2011)

“Eight US troops and a US contractor have been killed by an Afghan air force pilot at Kabul airport in an apparent argument […]. The pilot was also killed in the exchange. [...] The Taliban claimed responsibility for the incident in a text sent to AP but the authorities have not confirmed any insurgent activity.” (BBC, 27 April 2011)

MAY 2011 

“At least six people have been killed and 23 wounded in a suicide bomb attack on a military hospital […] Taliban spokesman claimed responsibility for the attack at the Mohammad Daud Khan military hospital […]” (Guardian, 21 May 2011)

JUNE 2011 

“Three suicide bombers dressed in army uniform attacked a police compound in the old city in Kabul, where they killed nine people including three policemen and five civilians” (AlertNet, 18 June 2011)

“A commando squad of at least five Taliban suicide bombers attacked a famous Kabul hotel where senior Afghan officials were staying [...]

The BBC reported that 10 people had been killed, although it was not possible to confirm that figure with Afghan authorities.” (Guardian, 28 June 2011)

JULY 2011 

“Afghan officials say a senior aide to President Hamid Karzai has been killed in an attack on his home in the Afghan capital.
More than three hours after the attack began at 8:30 p.m., sporadic shots still rang through the dark streets [...]“ (RFE/RL, 17 July 2011)

AUGUST 2011 

“At least 12 killed amid invasion of base used for education and helping Afghanistan's civil society groups” (Guardian, 19 August 2011)

“[...] suicide bombers targeted the British Council headquarters in mid-August, killing nine people.“ (Guardian, 14 September 2011)

SEPTEMBER 2011 

“The Taliban has claimed responsibility for a series of violent, coordinated attacks in Kabul on the U.S. Embassy, NATO headquarters, and several other buildings. Six people are dead and 12 wounded [...]” (RFE/RL, 13 September 2011)

“An assault by Taliban insurgents on the heart of Kabul's diplomatic and military enclave ended after 20 hours when security forces killed the last of six attackers, a spokesman for the ministry of the interior has said.“ (Guardian, 14 September 2011)

“At least 25 people died in Kabul during Tuesday's 20-hour-long attack by insurgents on the US embassy, Nato headquarters and police buildings. [...] The dead included 11 civilians, among them children, along with at least four police and 10 insurgents. [...] Tuesday's attack, the most complex in Kabul to date, comes as US and other foreign forces begin to withdraw their troops.“ (BBC, 14 September 2011)

“Rabbani, who had been serving as head of an official council trying to negotiate a political settlement to the Afghan war, was killed by a suicide bomber on September 20 at his home in the Afghan capital. [...] A senior Afghan government official [...] told RFE/RL's Radio Free Afghanistan that it was a top Taliban commander who had requested a meeting with Rabbani, who then blew himself up in the peace negotiator's presence. However, in an e-mail message on September 21 to RFE/RL, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid rejected reports that the Taliban had claimed responsibility for the attack. [...] Rabbani, an ethnic Tajik described as around 70 years old, was president of the Afghan government from 1992-96, preceding Taliban rule, and had been a member of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. Masoom Stanekzai, a senior adviser to Afghan President Hamid Karzai, was reportedly badly injured in the attack. Several others were wounded in the explosion.” (RFE/RL, 21 September 2011)

“A U.S. citizen was killed and another wounded when an Afghan employee of the U.S. government opened fire inside a CIA office in Kabul on Sunday [25 September], U.S. and Afghan officials said.” (AlertNet, 26 September 2011)

OCTOBER 2011

“A Taliban suicide bomber has rammed an explosives-laden car into a bus carrying members of the International Security Assistance Force in the Afghan capital, Kabul, killing 17 people. The US said initially that the Isaf personnel - eight civilians and five soldiers - were all American. But Canada later said one of its soldiers had died, and on Sunday the UK said two of its personnel perished. Three Afghan civilians and a police officer also died in the blast. Correspondents say it was one of the worst ground attacks against foreign troops since 2001, [...].” (BBC, 29 October 2011)

NOVEMBER 2011

“Two rockets fired towards an area where tribal elders are meeting in the Afghan capital, Kabul, missed their target, officials say. It is unclear who fired the rockets but one civilian was injured.” Three days earlier, “a suicide bomber was shot dead in an attempted attack on the tented site in Kabul where 2,000 people were to meet” (BBC, 17 November 2011)

DECEMBER 2011

“Dozens of people have been killed when a suicide bomber attacked a packed shrine in Kabul […]. Witnesses said the bomber carried a backpack full of explosives into the crowd of worshippers outside the Abul Fazl shrine before detonating the device on Tuesday [6 December]. The shrine was packed with Shia worshippers who had gathered for Ashura, […]. Kabul police said 48 people had died and more than 100 were wounded in the attack.” (Guardian, 6 December 2011)

“A spokesman for an obscure Pakistani extremist group called Lashkar-e-Jhangvi al Almi claimed responsibility [for the attack] […].”  (Guardian, 6 December 2011)

 

FEBRUARY 2012

“Reporters Without Borders condemns the acid attack on Parviz Safi, a cameramen for the state-owned English-language television station Press TV, by three unidentified men on 6 February in the Afghan capital, Kabul. […] The journalist suffered second-degree burns to his face but it missed his eyes and his life is not in danger.” (RSF, 14 February 2012) 

 

“At least six people have been killed and dozens injured in Afghanistan after protests spread over the burning of copies of the Koran at a US airbase [at Bagram]. […] Riot police used water cannon to disperse protesters, some of whom were blocking the road leading to Jalalabad, one of the main trade routes into the capital. Witnesses said security guards were firing into the air. There were also reports of people chanting pro-Taliban slogans. One protester in Kabul was killed and 10 wounded.” (BBC, 22 February 2012)

 

“Thousands of enraged Afghans have taken to the streets for a fourth day, after US soldiers inadvertently set fire to copies of the Koran. […] In Kabul, hundreds of people poured on to the streets to take part in several rallies after Friday prayers; police said a protester was shot and killed accidentally when other demonstrators opened fire” (BBC, 24 February 2012)

 

“Nato has withdrawn all its personnel from Afghan ministries after two senior US officers were shot dead in the interior ministry building in Kabul. […] The shootings come amid five days of deadly protests over the burning of copies of the Koran by US soldiers. […] Local media reports said the gunman was an Afghan policeman but this has not been confirmed. […] The Taliban said in a website statement that it carried out the attack in response to the Koran burnings.” (BBC, 25 February 2012)

 

MARCH 2012

“The Afghan authorities have arrested 18 people in Kabul after foiling plans for an apparent mass suicide attack, intelligence officials say. They told the BBC that 11 suicide jackets had been seized inside the ministry of defence. The officials say the attacks would have caused significant loss of life. Some of those arrested are reported to Afghan National Army soldiers. […] It appears the jackets were intended to be detonated on buses transporting staff to and from work.” (BBC, 27 March 2012)

 

APRIL 2012

“Afghan security officials say they have foiled a huge attack in the capital Kabul, as they gave details of the seizure of 10 tonnes of explosives.  The explosives were found in a truck seized along with five militants in an operation last Sunday [15 April], a National Directorate of Security spokesman said. The group was planning to attack crowded areas in the capital, he said. […]
The five suspects had confessed that the planned attack was co-ordinated by two Taliban commanders with links to Pakistan's main intelligence organisation the Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI), according to the spokesman. […]
In a separate operation, security forces detained a group of fighters - including suicide bombers belonging to the Pakistan-based Haqqani network - planning to assassinate Afghanistan's second Vice-President, Mohammed Khalili, Mr Tahiri said.” (BBC, 21 April 2012)

 

“In a brazen demonstration of its ability to hit some of the best defended targets in Kabul, the Taliban mounted its largest ever co-ordinated attack in 11 years of resistance to Afghanistan's post-2001 rulers.” (Guardian, 15 April 2012)

 

“Fighting in the Afghan capital Kabul has finally ended - about 18 hours after the Taliban launched their assault, local officials have said. [...] The officials said 36 gunmen and eight members of Afghan security forces died. Three civilians were also killed, Afghan Interior Minister Besmillah Mohammadi told reporters on Monday. He added that about 65 people - including 25 civilians - were injured. [...] In Kabul, foreign embassies, Nato's headquarters and the Afghan parliament were hit in the first major attack on the city in more than six months. [...] There were also reports that militants from the Haqqani group took part in the assault.” (BBC, 16 April 2012)

 

MAY 2012

 

“At least seven people have been killed in Kabul in an attack by Taliban militants, shortly after a surprise visit to Afghanistan by U.S. President Barack Obama. The Taliban said the attack on May 2 was launched in response to Obama's visit. Officials said gunmen dressed in burqas assaulted the high-security "Green Village," a guesthouse used by international organizations, after detonating a suicide car bomb. Two security guards and five Afghan civilians were killed in the blast and gunfight, and 17 Afghans were injured. Afghan forces said they killed the attackers.” (RFE/RL, 2 May 2012)

 

“A senior Afghan peace negotiator has been shot dead in Kabul, officials say. Arsala Rahmani was a key member of Afghanistan's High Peace Council, which leads Afghan efforts to make peace with the Taliban. […] Police say that Mr Rahmani was shot dead on Sunday morning by an unidentified gunman while on his way to work in western Kabul, in what was described as a carefully planned attack. […] The Taliban have denied involvement in the killing of Mr Rahmani. […] Mr Rahmani was responsible for the committee within the peace council that considers the release of Taliban prisoners from Bagram and other Afghan prisons. He served as minister of higher education in the Taliban administration that ruled Afghanistan for five years until the US drove them from power in 2001.” (BBC, 13 May 2012)

 

“Until recently, little was heard of the Mullah Dadullah Front, an extremist militant group that operates mainly out of southern Afghanistan. [...] The Dadullah Front also claimed responsibility for the assassination, on May 14, of Arsala Rahmani, a former Taliban official who had become an influential member of the Afghan High Peace Council.” (RFE/RL, 22 May 2012)

 

JUNE 2012

 

"On Thursday night [21 June], armed Taleban fighters stormed the Spozhmay Hotel in the Lake Qargha area near the capital, taking dozens of hotel guests and staff hostage. In the ensuing siege that lasted almost 12 hours, a fierce gun battle broke out between Taleban fighters and NATO and Afghan troops, resulting in the deaths of at least 20 people – including 15 civilians." (AI, 22 June 2012)

  

"Afghan security forces have ended a 12-hour attack by Taliban militants on a hotel outside Kabul, in which at least 20 people died, officials say. Insurgents attacked the Spozhmai Hotel in the Lake Qargha area on Thursday night [21 June], taking many hostages. Kabul's police chief said 15 civilians, including hotel guests, died. All five insurgents were killed. The Taliban claimed the attack, saying the hotel was used by wealthy Afghans and foreigners for "wild parties". Lake Qargha is on the outskirts of Kabul and is favoured by residents of the Afghan capital for day trips and family outings." (BBC, 22 June 2012)

 

AUGUST 2012

 

“Afghan officials say five insurgents believed to have been planning attacks in central Kabul have been killed in a gun battle. Security personnel raided a house in the east of the city and fighting broke out in the early hours of Thursday. The battle continued for six hours. Dozens of homes were evacuated and vehicles containing explosives were also found at the scene. [...] The Taliban has denied that its fighters were involved in the battle.” (BBC, 2. August 2012)

 

“Afghan officials said Thursday that five insurgents linked to the Haqqani network were killed in a pre-dawn gunbattle, claiming to have foiled a major attack on an area of Kabul home to Western embassies. [...] The scale of the preparations and the targets, as unveiled by Afghan officials, suggest an attempt at an assault along the lines of the biggest coordinated attack on the capital in 10 years of war, which occurred on April 15 this year.” (AFP, 2. August 2012)

 

SEPTEMBER 2012

 

“A teenage suicide bomber has killed at least six people near the headquarter of the Nato-led international coalition (Isaf) in Kabul. A number of children are among the dead. There were no reports of casualties among Isaf troops. The police said the attacker was a boy, 14, on a motorbike, who detonated a bomb near an entrance to the HQ. [...] The Taliban have claimed they were behind the attack, but say it was carried out by a man in his 20s, targeting a building used by the CIA to train Afghan spies. But the BBC Jonathan Beale, in Kabul, says there is also speculation that it could have been the work of another insurgent group - the Haqqani network - which carried out a series of coordinated attacks in the city earlier this year.” (BBC, 8 September 2012)

 

“Afghan militants have claimed responsibility for a suicide car-bomb attack near the international airport in Kabul that killed 12 people, including at least eight foreigners. The Hizb-e Islami insurgent group said the bombing was in retaliation for a privately made U.S. film mocking the Prophet Muhammad that has ignited angry protests across the Muslim world. The suicide bomber, who Hizb-e Islami said was a 22-year-old woman, rammed a car packed with explosives into a minivan carrying foreign aviation workers. [...] Another 11 Afghan civilians were reportedly wounded.” (RFE/RL, 18 September 2012)

 

NOVEMBER 2012

 

“Rockets struck near Kabul's presidential palace and international airport Tuesday on the 11th anniversary of the Taliban withdrawal from the Afghan capital, killing one and wounding three, police said. The hardline Islamists, ousted by US-led forces following the 9/11 attacks on the United States, claimed responsibility for the attack. Police said four rockets were fired from a vineyard northeast of Kabul, with two landing ‘near’ Kabul international airport without causing any casualties. Airport sources said one of the rockets exploded in a car park at the airport and another landed near a police checkpost where passengers are searched but failed to detonate. A third rocket hit the compound of the privately run Shamshad TV station without causing casualties. ‘But unfortunately, the fourth one landed in District 9 (near the presidential palace) and hit a car, wounding three civilians and killing one,’ Kabul police said in a statement.” (AFP, 13 November 2012)
 
“Two Afghan security guards have been killed and three wounded in a suicide attack in a heavily-guarded area of Kabul home to foreign embassies and Nato HQ, police say. Two other people were injured in the blast in the Wazir Akbar Khan neighbourhood. Police told the BBC that the attacker detonated his explosives near one of the entrances to a US military base. The Taliban said that they were behind the attack.” (BBC, 21 November 2012)
 
“Afghanistan has closed down three major public universities in the capital Kabul for more than a week after sectarian clashes left one student dead and nearly 30 others wounded, an official said Sunday. The clashes erupted on Saturday after a ritual marking the Shiite Muslim festival of Ashura was interrupted by Sunni students. One student was killed and 28 others were wounded as students attacked each other with sticks and rocks, according to interior ministry spokesman Sediq Sediqqi.” (AFP, 25 November 2012)

 

DECEMBER 2012

 
“The head of Afghanistan's intelligence service has been wounded in a bomb attack in Kabul. A senior Afghan official told RFE/RL on December 6 that Asadullah Khalid had been targeted in a suicide bombing. […] Reports say Khalid was wounded while receiving a visitor in the afternoon at a guesthouse run by the Afghan intelligence service. […] Journalists later received an e-mail, said to be from the Taliban, claiming responsibility for the attack. In August, Khalid was nominated by Karzai to head the NDS. The Afghan parliament confirmed the appointment in September.” (RFE/RL, 6 December 2012)
 
“Meanwhile at least one person has been killed in an explosion on the outskirts of the capital, Kabul. Several more were injured in the blast, which took place on the Jalalabad road, home to many Nato bases and compounds housing international staff. Police said the explosion happened near the offices of an international construction company, but it is unclear what the target was. The Taliban say they carried the attack, adding that a suicide bomber drove into the compound of a US-based engineering and construction company.” (BBC, 17 December 2012)

 

“An Afghan female police officer has shot dead a US adviser in police headquarters in Kabul, the first attack on foreigners by a woman serving in the national security forces. ‘Today at 10am a female police constable opened fire on an American adviser with a pistol,’ Daoud Amin, deputy provincial police chief for Kabul said on Monday. ‘He was seriously wounded, they took him to hospital and he passed away there.’ The woman has been arrested, and Amin said police were investigating the shooting, the latest in a string of insider attacks on foreign troops by Afghan police and soldiers that they mentor and fight alongside.” (Guardian, 24 December 2012)

 

JANUARY 2013

“Suicide bombers have attacked Afghanistan's National Directorate of Security building in the capital. The Interior Ministry said there were six suicide bombers involved in the attack. ‘One of [the suicide bombers] committed suicide and five others were killed by the Afghan security forces,’ said the head of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Kabul Police Department, General Muhammad Zahir. ‘So far, 30 wounded civilians have been registered for treatment in Kabul hospitals. Now, the situation is completely calmed and Kabul police have full control over the situation.’ […] Two guards at the gate of the compound were killed when the car bomb exploded. […] Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid claimed his group was responsible for the assault.” (RFE/RL, 16 January 2013)

 

“A shoot-out with insurgents at Kabul's traffic-police headquarters has come to an end. Afghan authorities told RFE/RL that five insurgents were involved in the deadly attack. The fighting followed a coordinated assault involving a suicide car bombing and insurgents with suicide-bombing vests. Afghan Deputy Interior Minister Abdurrahman Rahman said three insurgents entered the building, destroyed stairs leading to upper floors, and gained access to a weapons storeroom. After hours of fighting, security forces killed the militants barricaded inside the building. Rahman told reporters that three traffic-police officers were killed and 18 people were wounded. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack in a text message to the media.” (RFE/RL, 21 January 2013)

 

FEBRUARY 2013

 

“Afghan police say they have arrested six men whom they accuse of planning to carry out suicide bombing attacks. The Kabul deputy police chief, General Mohammad Daoud Amin, told RFE/RL's Radio Free Afghanistan that police seized six vests that could be used for suicide bombings, as well as some 50 grenades and guns, when the suspects were arrested in a raid in the capital Kabul on February 3. Amin said investigators have not yet learned what targets the suspects may have been planning to attack.” (RFE/RL, 4 February 2013)
 
“Afghan security forces in Kabul have shot dead a suicide bomber before he was able to blow himself up outside the headquarters of Afghanistan's National Directorate of Security (NDS) on Sunday morning, during which there were three further attacks across the country. Security officials said a soldier guarding the entrance to the NDS headquarters shot the man after he refused to get out of his car near the heavily fortified Wazir Akbar Khan area of the capital.” (Guardian, 24 February 2013)

 

“A suicide bomber in Kabul has detonated his explosives near a bus carrying Afghan army personnel. Kabul police say the attack wounded at least six soldiers and four civilians. […] AP [Associated Press] received a text message from Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid claiming responsibility for the attack.” (RFE/RL, 27 February 2013)

 

MARCH 2013

 

“A suicide bomb attack on the Afghan defence ministry in Kabul has killed at least nine people, as the new US Pentagon chief visited the city. A further 20 people were wounded by the bomber, who was on a bicycle, security officials told BBC News. Taliban insurgents said they were behind the attack.” (BBC, 9 March 2013)

 

“Afghanistan's intelligence agency says security forces in Kabul have defused a massive truck bomb with nearly eight tons of explosives. Shafiqullah Tahiri, a spokesman for the National Directorate of Security (NDS), told a news conference on March 15 that the attack could have caused massive destruction in the capital. […] Tahiri added that the attack was planned by the Al-Qaeda-linked Haqqani network and the Pakistani-based Taliban leadership. He offered no concrete evidence of the plot. […] Tahiri said security forces discovered the explosives during a night raid earlier this week. The explosives were hidden in cement bags in a truck in eastern Kabul. According to Tahiri, security forces killed five suspected plotters and arrested two others. He said the militants had been planning to target a military facility in the capital.” (RFE/RL, 15 March 2013)

 
APRIL 2013
 

“In the capital Kabul on Wednesday, a bomb planted in a rubbish bin near parliament caused panic among citizens but police said there were no casualties.” (AFP, 17 April 2013)

 

 

 

 

SOURCES: (all links accessed 2 May 2013)

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This featured topic was prepared after researching solely on ecoi.net and within time constraints. It is meant to offer an overview on an issue and is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status, asylum or other form of international protection. Every quotation comes from a document available on ecoi.net and is referred to via an ID-search.

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