Country Report on Terrorism 2015 - Chapter 2 - Somalia

Overview: Security and counterterrorism efforts in Somalia continued to progress in 2015 through a combination of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) offensives, U.S. military strikes against al-Shabaab operatives, law enforcement assistance, and countering violent extremism initiatives. However, despite significant security gains, including liberating key sections of rural areas in south-central Somalia, AMISOM, the Somali National Army (SNA), and other associated militias were unable to degrade effectively al-Shabaab’s ability to plan and execute attacks. Al-Shabaab leveraged clan politics and disputes to encourage distrust and noncooperation among local communities toward security forces operating in these areas. Al-Shabaab also exploited poor economic conditions to recruit new fighters. These vulnerabilities helped to undermine territorial gains that AMISOM and the SNA have achieved in the past few years.

An increasing division within the leadership of al-Shabaab was reported as some members sought to affiliate with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Despite internal divisions and increasing numbers of defections towards the end of 2015, al-Shabaab continued to conduct asymmetric attacks throughout Somalia and showed no indications of decreased operational capability. Al-Shabaab also exhibited the capacity to execute attacks against harder targets in Mogadishu, including the Mogadishu International Airport, Villa Somalia Presidential Compound, and popular hotels, and conducted a greater number of assassinations of government and security officials. Federal, local, and regional security authorities lacked sufficient capacity to prevent most al-Shabaab attacks. Somalia remained a terrorist safe haven, where members of al-Shabaab continued to plan and mount operations within Somalia and in neighboring countries, particularly in Kenya.

Somalia was an active supporter of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. Specifically, Somalia participated in the Foreign Terrorist Fighters Working Group and the Stabilization Support Working Groups. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud also attended the Leader’s Summit on Countering ISIL and Violent Extremism hosted by President Obama in New York on the margins of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in New York.

2015 Terrorist Incidents: Al-Shabaab conducted complex suicide attacks, remote-controlled roadside bombings, ambushes, and assassinations of government personnel and military forces, security officials, and civil society leaders throughout Somalia. It also executed complex attacks in Mogadishu in a targeted campaign against Somali security forces and other government officials, government and foreign buildings, convoys, and popular gathering places for government officials, the Somali diaspora, and foreigners. Notable incidents in 2015 included:

  • In March, al-Shabaab terrorists launched a complex attack against the Hotel Maka al-Mukaram in Mogadishu, detonating a vehicle-borne IED (VBIED), followed by a ground assault using small weapons and grenades. Al-Shabaab controlled the hotel for at least four hours until security agents from the National Intelligence and Security Agency's (NISA) elite paramilitary unit “Gaashaan” regained control. At least 13 people were killed, while approximately 20 others sustained injuries, according to NISA officials.
  • In May, al-Shabaab terrorists launched a complex attack against the Somali Parliament compound in Mogadishu using a VBIED and a ground assault team of about seven to eight attackers armed with AK-47s. Two members of Parliament reportedly sustained injuries when the terrorists detonated the VBIED at the main gate. Security forces reportedly killed all the terrorists during the attack. Casualties included around 12 security officials from AMISOM, NISA, SNA, and the Somali Police Force (SPF). In addition, about 24 security officials and civilians sustained injuries.
  • In June, al-Shabaab executed a complex attack on the popular Sahafi Hotel in Mogadishu, detonating two VBIEDs and executing a ground assault by a small group of attackers. Up to 15 individuals were reportedly killed.
  • In September, al-Shabaab attacked a Ugandan AMISOM forward-operating base in Janale, Lower Shabelle region, killing between 20 and 50 Ugandan AMISOM soldiers. After breaching the gate with a VBIED and bombing a bridge to cut off a potential escape route and AMISOM reinforcements, al-Shabaab was able to enter and take over the base for a limited amount of time until AMISOM troops retook the area.
  • Also in September, al-Shabaab attacked a UN convoy as it was exiting the Somali Presidential Palace in Mogadishu, killing approximately 11 people, including two soldiers and the bomber, in addition to injuring several other victims. Nobody in the UN delegation was harmed in the attack, according to the Ministry of Internal Security.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) continued efforts to improve security in Mogadishu. It conducted security operations targeting known locations of weapons caches in private homes and businesses, but lacked counterterrorism laws and possessed limited investigative and enforcement capacity to prosecute terrorists successfully. Somalia followed an outdated penal code, last updated in 1962. Ministries responsible for drafting and submitting legislation to Parliament lacked the capacity to draft comprehensive counterterrorism laws. Due to the lack of civil judiciary capacity, the FGS tried all terrorism cases in a military court system.

There was some movement toward addressing these issues. The U.S.-trained SPF Joint Investigative Team (JIT) exhibited operational capacity to secure tactically and exploit counterterrorism-related crime scenes, as well as develop counterterrorism cases to launch prosecutions. The Attorney General’s office, with support from the UK and the United States, increased the number of prosecutors to 28, eight of whom possessed specific counterterrorism case training. Puntland lacked regional counterterrorism legislation and tried all terrorism cases using its state military court.

Somali law enforcement requires additional training to build basic police investigation skills, capacity to conduct cordon and search operations, and effective police coordination with the judiciary. The United States made considerable contributions towards the development and capacity building of the law enforcement sector. The U.S.-funded SPF JIT responded to multiple terrorist incidents, during which they secured the scene, collected evidence, maintained the integrity of the evidence by following chain of custody protocols, and ensured a safe hand-over of the evidentiary materials to the Criminal Investigative Division (CID) for further processing. NISA, Somalia’s lead counterterrorism organization, also began coordinating with the JIT during responses to critical incidents. While the SPF made measurable gains to manage terrorist incidents, the judicial system remained weak and underdeveloped, suffering from minimal interagency coordination and a lack of capacity and technical expertise.

Somalia has porous borders, and most countries do not recognize Somali identity documents, leaving Somalia with little to no travel document security. Somalia does not have a central or shared terrorist screening watchlist, nor does it possess biographic and biometric screening capabilities at ports of entry. There was minimal law enforcement cooperation between the federal and regional governments and U.S. law enforcement to investigate suspected terrorists, kidnappings, and other incidents of terror committed inside and outside of Somalia.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Somalia has observer status in the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body, but in 2015 had no laws criminalizing money laundering and terrorism financing. The Central Bank of Somalia drafted a comprehensive anti-money laundering/combatting the financing of terrorism law with assistance from the World Bank. At year’s end, the bill was approved by the Council of Ministers (Cabinet) and passed by the Parliament. Somalia continued efforts to formalize its nascent financial sector, and develop the Central Bank’s capacity to supervise and regulate this sector, including hawalas (money service businesses). In 2015, Somalia did not have laws or procedures requiring the collection of data for money transfers or suspicious transaction reports, nor did it distribute the UN sanctions lists to financial services. Somalia lacks the funding and capacity to investigate and prosecute incidents of terrorism financing. The supervisory and examining section of the Central Bank began limited on- and off-site inspections and instituted procedures governing the licensing of commercial banks. However, federal authorities responsible for monitoring and regulating the financial sector suffered from limited staffing, funding, and technical expertise.

For additional information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2016 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INSCR), Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Countering Violent Extremism: The Somali government improved its al-Shabaab counter-messaging efforts. It established a new position within the Ministry of Internal Security to develop and implement countering violent extremism (CVE) strategies and promote greater community involvement to counter al-Shabaab’s messaging and influence. Working with international partners, clan elders, and media experts, the Ministry began building greater awareness among communities of the destructive nature of violent extremism. The Ministry also solicited recommendations from populations with experience with al-Shabaab to help guide the design of CVE programs. The Ministry of Interior and Federal Affairs completed its Wadajir (or “A Joint Project”) Framework on local governance, which outlines for international partners future local governance initiatives intended to complement ongoing stabilization efforts in newly-recovered areas. The Framework also empowers local community groups and government by providing local control over planning and contracting decisions.

Radio Mogadishu and state-owned TV stations broadcast counter-messaging programming. The Islamic Lecture Series (ILS), an hour-long, call-in radio talk show designed to promote a moderate form of Islam, helped undercut al-Shabaab’s message of violent extremism. The Ministry of Information aired the ILS on radio stations in Abudwaq, Baidoa, Beledweyne, Bossasso, Bulo Burte, Cadaado, Galkayo, Garowe, and Mogadishu.

International and Regional Cooperation: Somalia is a member of the AU, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism, League of Arab States, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. The Federal Government of Somalia expressed greater interest in increasing intelligence sharing and conducting joint operations against al-Shabaab with its Horn of Africa neighbors.