Overview
“Mit rund drei Millionen Einwohnern ist es die mit Abstand größte kaukasische Teilrepublik, und wegen seiner Lage am Kaspischen Meer bildet es für Russland einen strategisch wichtigen Teil dieser Region. Zugleich leben hier auf einem Territorium von der Größe Bayerns drei Dutzend autochthone Nationalitäten. Damit ist Dagestan das Gebiet mit der größten ethnischen Vielfalt nicht nur im Kaukasus, sondern im gesamten postsowjetischen Raum.“ (
SWP, April 2015, p. 5-6)
[i]
“Dagestan is now considered both Russia’s most ethnically diverse republic and the region where Islam is most deeply rooted. More than 90 percent of the population is Muslim – 97 percent are Sunni and 3 percent are Shia. Sufism, which emphasizes the mystical dimension of Islam has long been practiced in the North Caucasus and is deeply entwined with Dagestani identity.” (
HRW, 18 June 2015, p. 14)
[ii]
Religious conflict
“Значительное влияние на разные стороны общественной жизни Дагестана оказывает ислам. […] Традиционно население здесь исповедовало различные тарикаты (‚пути‘) суфийского направления в исламе. До сих пор большинство верующих в республике придерживаются именно этого направления. […] С 90-х годов прошлого века в республике начало активно распространяться новое для Кавказа религиозное течение – салафизм, или фундаменталистский ислам.” (
Memorial, 4 September 2012, p. 8)
[iii]
“Islam is the majority’s religion, especially in Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia, where the internal factors of the umma (Islamic community) have an increasingly profound impact on society. Most of the region’s Muslims follow a form of Islam perceived as ‘traditional’ in the region because it is deeply interwoven with local customs, practices and beliefs. The east has a strong tradition of Sufism, whose brotherhoods (tariqas) have been in conflict with the Salafis for over a decade. […] Traditional Muslims are more successfully integrated into the Russian secular system and recognise its institutions and law; their religious boards have become semi-government institutions.” (
ICG, 19 October 2012, p. 2)
[iv]
“Салафиты, которых часто неточно называют ваххабитами, не признают святых и учителей, считая их наличие нарушением принципа единобожия в исламе. Они не признают вкраплений в религиозную практику народных традиций, выступают за упрощение обрядности и буквальное толкование Корана. […] В Дагестане, в отличие от Чечни, где конфликт начинался как сепаратистский, раскол был изначально как политическим, так и религиозным. […] В 90-х годах XX века конфликт, тогда еще не вооруженный, происходил как внутри исламских общин в населенных пунктах, так и между представителями духовенства: Духовного управления мусульман Республики Дагестан с одной стороны и лидерами салафитов – с другой. Одновременно нарастало давление на салафитов со стороны государственных силовых структур.” (
Memorial, 4 September 2012, p. 8-9)
“Towards the end of the decade, the Salafi movement began to spread throughout Dagestan, bringing religious conflict between Sufis and Salafis. By late 1996, the official religious establishment, dominated by Sufi leaders, grew openly hostile to Salafi adherents. Said Muhammad Haji Abubakarov, then head of the pro-government, official Muslim Spiritual Board, made a speech in which he said that ‘any Muslim who kills a Wahhabi will enter Paradise.’” (
HRW, 18 June 2015, p. 15)
“On August 7, 1999, fighters closely linked to Magomedov invaded Dagestan with a group of 1,500-2,000 armed Arab, Chechen, and Dagestani fighters […] In September 1999, federal authorities began to pursue individuals suspected of involvement in or supporting the August 1999 incursion from Chechnya. This marked the beginning of a concerted, multi-year campaign in which the net was cast widely to include suspected Islamist extremists.” (
HRW, 18 June 2015, p. 16)
“После событий 1999 года государство стало привлекать к уголовной ответственности участников и пособников нападения на Дагестан. Тогда же Народное Собрание РД приняло закон ‘О запрете ваххабистской и иной экстремистской деятельности на территории Республики Дагестан‘. Внятного определения ‘ваххабизма‘, да и ‘экстремизма‘, в этом законе нет. В правовом смысле его последствия ничтожны. Однако этот закон создал предпосылки для репрессий: фактически каждый, кто по субъективной оценке сотрудника правоохранительных органов мог быть причислен к приверженцам ‚ваххабизима‘, становился жертвой милицейского произвола. Произошло смешение уголовно-правового и религиозного понятий: борьба с терроризмом фактически превратилась в борьбу с приверженцами ‚ваххабизма‘ как религиозного течения.” (
Memorial, 4 September 2012, p. 9-10)
“For almost a decade after the second Chechen war began, Dagestan authorities made no distinction between moderate and radical, violence-oriented Salafis, which contributed to radicalisation of the entire community.” (
ICG, 19 October 2012, p. 9)
“A survey in Dagestan has found that 20 percent of the republic’s youth consider themselves moderate Salafis. Only 10 percent of the respondents referred to themselves as Sufis – traditionally the main Muslim branch in Dagestan. The most educated among those who identified themselves as moderate Salafis said they were in favor of mimicking the experience of such countries as Brunei, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman in bringing norms of sharia into governance in Dagestan. The survey also found that 12 percent of the respondents favor the radical methods of struggle adopted by the North Caucasus militants. It is especially striking that young people openly stated support for rebels in the republic. According to a Dagestani expert on Islam, Ruslan Gereyev, the survey was conducted only in cities, and support for the rebels would have been even higher had the interviews been conducted in rural areas of the republic (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, December 9).” (
Jamestown Foundation, 14 December 2011)
[v]
“Весной и летом 2012 года начался диалог и между находившимися в конфликте суфиями и салафитами.” (
Memorial, 4 September 2012, p. 5)
“The most thorough attempt, after years of violence, to bring Salafis into a dialogue with the state and Sufi leaders, is in Dagestan. The insurgency itself is not interested in dialogue and seeks to undermine it with new terrorist attacks, while the security services also disrupt the process by further heavy-handed measures. […] The dialogue may have come close to its end with the killing of Sheikh Said Afandi, the most influential sheikh in the North Caucasus, by a newly converted Islamist in his home on 28 August 2012. […] When the moderate Salafi organisation condemned the killing and called for continuation of dialogue, insurgents threatened its leaders. The leader of the Caucasus Emirate (Imarat Kavkaz), Doku Umarov, made a video asserting that Sufis who do not cooperate with the authorities are ‘brothers in Islam’ and invited them to join jihad.” (
ICG, 19 October 2012, p. 3-12)
“Unter Abdulatipow ist der unter seinem Vorgänger Magomedsalam Magomedow erfolgreich installierte Dialog zwischen traditionellen Sunniten und einem gemäßigten Flügel der Salafisten zum Erliegen gekommen. Stattdessen nimmt die staatliche Repression zu.” (
AI, October 2013)
[vi]
“With the 2014 Sochi Olympic Games fast approaching, in late 2013 the authorities opted for more ‘heavy-handed security policies in the North Caucasus.’ Law enforcement agencies in Dagestan boosted their efforts to control Salafi communities. Police started rounding up, photographing, fingerprinting, and questioning Salafis, and placing them on ‘extremist’ watch lists, a process colloquially known as ‘Wahhabi registration [uchet vakhabitov or vakh-uchet].’” (
HRW, 18 June 2015, p. 42)
“Over the past few months most Salafi civic activity in Dagestan has been pushed underground. Moderate leaders have been harassed; some have fled the republic and their projects been closed. The Salafi human rights group ‘Pravozashchita’, which publicised abuses, was targeted, its leaders detained or placed under surveillance and an activist’s home searched. Its outspoken representative in Buynaksk was arrested and, human rights groups said, a criminal case fabricated against her. Since late 2013, the police have been detaining Salafis en masse from cafés, mosques, and homes. […] Arrests of men with beards or women wearing a hijab have become routine. They are usually released after their documents have been checked and they have been interrogated and fingerprinted. Such practices have visibly radicalised previously moderate believers. […] Abdulatipov has encouraged the creation of militias to combat extremism. In some cases these are made up of Sufis and have reportedly been involved in inter-confessional violence.” (
ICG, 30 January 2014, p. 7-8)
“Mass arrests of Muslims in mosques have become a hallmark of the Dagestani head Ramazan Abdulatipov’s policies. […] However, some experts say the mass arrests are part of a campaign of harassment against some categories of Muslims in Dagestan and a step backward in the dialogue between religious groups. […] According to Akhmet Yarlykapov, a Moscow-based expert of Dagestani origin, up to 50 percent of the republic’s Muslims do not subordinate to the official Spiritual Board of Muslims of Dagestan, which is dominated by the Sufi branch of Islam. According to Yarlykapov, government policies against the Salafis could drive them to become an underground movement, which would not be a positive development even though the Salafis would not necessarily turn to violence.” (
Jamestown Foundation, 19 May 2015)
“Against the backdrop of multiple killings of young members of the jamaats, Salafi ideology will attract more young people who regard the teaching as the only way of resisting the local authorities who work under Moscow’s auspices. Salafism in contemporary Dagestan has become a serious counterweight to official Sufism, as the latter has undermined its authority by close cooperation with the government. Sufism’s loss of authority is directly linked to the young people’s drift toward joining the ranks of the jihadists.” (
Jamestown Foundation, 10 January 2013)
Insurgency in Dagestan
Development of the insurgency
“Islamist militancy in Dagestan rose in the mid-1990’s, when links developed between Chechen separatist warlords and Dagestan’s Salafi religious community. Ideas of jihad, or holy war, in Dagestan can be traced to 1992, when Bagautdin Magomedov (Kebedov), who came to be known as ‘the father of the Dagestani jihad,’ established a Quranic school in Kizilyurt, a town in Dagestan. By 1996, he explicitly called for holy war against the ‘infidels.’ […] In the period between the two Chechen wars, from 1997 to 1999, Islamists shuttled between the two republics. On August 7, 1999, fighters closely linked to Magomedov invaded Dagestan with a group of 1,500-2,000 armed Arab, Chechen, and Dagestani fighters, supposedly to support Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi, two self-declared ‘Sharia [Islamic law] mini-states’ influenced by Magomedov’s teachings. Russian troops eventually drove out the militant forces and a month later launched large-scale military operations in Chechnya, which became the second Chechen war. The Republic of Dagestan remained a volatile site of insurgency thereafter. […] In September 1999, federal authorities began to pursue individuals suspected of involvement in or supporting the August 1999 incursion from Chechnya. This marked the beginning of a concerted, multi-year campaign in which the net was cast widely to include suspected Islamist extremists. Hundreds were arrested. According to the Russian human rights organization Memorial Human Rights Center, the authorities tortured numerous detainees held in this campaign. Abduction-style detentions also became widespread. The majority of those abducted were Salafis.” (
HRW, 18. Juni 2015, p. 15-16)
“The Republic of Dagestan has become the principal scene of all the North Caucasian resistance movement in the past two years. Not only does the republic have the largest number of jamaats operating on its territory in the North Caucasus, but it also boasts of having the largest group of people there who are literate in Islamic theology and adhere to the ideas of an all-out jihadism in the region.” (
Jamestown Foundation, 17 May 2012)
“With the Kremlin’s appointment of Magomedsalam Magomedov as president of Dagestan in February 2010, the republic’s leadership launched a new, diversified effort to stabilize the republic. Magomedov spoke of the need for political change and pledged to modernize Dagestan’s economy, fight corruption, and encourage outside investment. He also promised a fresh approach toward tackling the insurgency, by stressing the importance of dialogue and guaranteeing the safety of militants who wished to return to ‘normal human life.’” (
HRW, 18 June 2015, p. 19)
“In mid-March, a massive redeployment of military personnel from Chechnya to Dagestan took place. According to unofficial sources from Dagestan, up to 20,000-25,000 troops were moved to the neighboring republic. A military column including large amounts of armored fighting vehicles set out from Khankala, a military base to the east of Grozny, to the Karabudakhkent district of Dagestan on the outskirts of the capital city of Makhachkala.” (
CACI, 4 April 2012)
[vii]
“Starting in early October, troops of the Russian Ministry of Defense are again participating in the counterinsurgency campaign in the North Caucasus. […] In fact, Moscow is actively strengthening its military presence in the region, with a particular focus on Dagestan. In the spring months of 2012, it deployed up to 25,000 MVD police units to Dagestan, the majority of which had previously been stationed in Chechnya. The recent decision to deploy army units to Dagestan seems to have been made in August or September and confirms that the success of the MVD troops has been limited. Indeed, the police units recruited from all over the Russian Federation and deployed to Dagestan for only a few months have proven incapable of grasping the peculiarities of local counterinsurgency warfare. In addition, the death toll on MVD troops deployed in the Dagestan campaign has increased steadily in recent months.” (
CACI, 14 November 2012)
“In January 2013, Putin replaced Magomedov by appointing Ramazan Abdulatipov as Dagestan’s leader. A clear toughening of counterinsurgency strategy largely coincided with the June 2013 call by Caucasus Emirate leader Doku Umarov for ‘maximum force’ to attempt to prevent the 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi did from taking place. The Dagestani presidential administration ceased efforts to foster ties with and integrate non-militant Salafis and instead presided over a crackdown on Salafi communities.” (
HRW, 18 June 2015, p. 21)
“Hopes for improvement of the security situation in Dagestan gradually dissipate as attacks intensify in the republic. In spite of an anti-corruption campaign introduced by Dagestan’s new acting president, harsher government tactics appear to be matched by more exasperated attacks by the militants, while new anti-insurgency jamaats are formed to avenge the casualties of terrorist attacks.” (
CACI, 26 June 2013)
“On October 22, government forces deployed in Dagestan’s mountains were significantly reinforced when at least 500 servicemen arrived in the district of Untsukul. Government forces will reportedly also be sent to other districts in Dagestan’s mountainous region to improve the deteriorating security situation in the area.” (
Jamestown Foundation, 28 October 2013)
“Dagestan remained the epicentre of insurgent violence in 2013, with a long list of violent confrontations, improvised explosive device (IED) incidents, killings of officials and attacks on shops selling alcohol. It also was subject to a significant number of alleged abuses by security officials. These included illegal detentions, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, falsified criminal cases and torture.” (
ICG, 30 January 2014, p. 21)
“In 2013, the total number of victims of the armed conflict in Northern Caucasus decreased as compared to 2012 by 239 people, or by 19.5%. The death toll went down from 700 in 2012 to 529 in 2013, i.e., by 24.4%; the number of wounded persons – from 525 to 457 (by 13%). However losses among civilians went up. […] In 2013, the highest count of victims was recorded in Dagestan – 641 persons, including 341 people killed and 300 others wounded.” (
Caucasian Knot, 31 January 2014)
[viii]
“Nearly 70 percent of all militant attacks and victims of such attacks in the North Caucasus take place in the Republic of Dagestan. The center of the region’s political struggle also moved to Dagestan last year, which was connected to the fact that a Dagestani emir, Abu Muhammad (Aliaskhab Kebekov), replaced the deceased Doku Umarov as leader of the Caucasus Emirate. The new Caucasus Emirate emir endorsed the head of al-Qaeda, Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri (Hunafa.com, June 23, 2014). By supporting al-Zawahiri, Abu Muhammad collided with the leadership of the IS and those North Caucasians fighting under the flag of its leader, Sheikh Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.” (
Jamestown Foundation, 9 January 2015)
“In 2014, Northern Caucasus saw a dramatic reduction of the number of victims of the armed conflict. […] The statistics for Dagestan, which remained the leader in the number of victims among the regions of Northern Caucasus, shows that the republic preserved its leadership in 2014, except for Quarter 4, when Chechnya had more victims than Dagestan. However, in Dagestan, in 2014, the number of killed and wounded persons went down by 54.3%. The total number of victims of the conflict decreased from 641 people (of which 341 people were killed and at least 300 wounded) in 2013 down to 293 people, including 208 killed and 85 wounded. The number of victims of terror acts dropped 9.9-fold as compared with 2013.” (
Caucasian Knot, 31 January 2015)
“Judging by the actions of the militants in Dagestan in February and the beginning of March 2015, a major regrouping in the ranks of the Dagestani jamaat has been completed. After the rebels in Dagestan resolved the issues of command and subordination, they have resumed attacking government forces as in the past.” (
Jamestown Foundation, 13 March 2015)
“On April 19, 2015, the Caucasus Emirate’s leader Aliaskhab Kebekov, nom de guerre Ali Abu Mukhammad, was killed in a special operation carried out by Russian elite forces in Dagestan’s Buynaksk district. His death came at a time of profound decline of the North Caucasian jihadists, coupled with the ongoing split in their ranks as an increasing number of fighters and insurgent leaders turn to the Islamic State (IS). (
CACI, 29 April 2015)
“Magomed Suleimanov (Abu Usman of Gimry), a Sharia militants' judge and the leader of the armed underground in Dagestan, has been appointed the new leader of the ‘Imarat Kavkaz’ recognized in Russia as a terrorist organization.” (
Caucasian Knot, 28 May 2015)
“The leader of the North-Caucasian branch of the ‘Islamic State’ (IS), which has been recognized as a terrorist organization, is the Dagestani commander Abu Mukhammad (Rustam Asilderov). […] The ‘Caucasian Knot’ has reported that on June 21 a message was posted on the YouTube that militants of four vilayets of the so-called ‘Imarat Kavkaz’, which is regarded in Russia as a terrorist organization, swore their allegiance to Abu-Bakr al Baghdadi, the leader of the above IS (earlier named as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – ISIL). The IS has taken the oath of North-Caucasian militants and announced the establishment of its branch in the region.” (
Caucasian Knot, 25 June 2015)
“While observers focused on the shift from the Caucasus Emirate to the Islamic State in the North Caucasus, the news that a single amir from the team of the slain CE leader took an oath of allegiance to the CE went almost unnoticed. The rebel leader who remained loyal to the CE is Said Abu Muhammad Arakinsky, the group’s amir of Dagestan (Kavkazsky Uzel, December 29, 2014).” (
Jamestown Foundation, 9 July 2015)
“Despite these setbacks, the CE tried to survive and started to form new military structures in Dagestan (see EDM, August 6). An impression emerged that the two rebel organizations, the CE and the IS, would compete with each other for the right to represent the armed Islamic resistance movement in the region. However, what happened in recent days may change everything: the CE did not simply suffer another round of losses, but lost three of its top commanders, including the leader of the organization. […] Among the rebels killed was new CE leader Abu Usman Gimrinsky (Magomed Suleimanov), an Untsukul district native. Two other well-known commanders were reportedly also killed—Said Arakansky (Kamil Saidov), amir of the Dagestani Velayat, and Abu Dujan (Abdulla Abdullaev), amir of the Mountainous Sector of the Dagestani Velayat, (Kavpolit.com, August 11). Thus, practically all the top leaders of the Caucasus Emirate were wiped out. Within hours of the incident, the websites that represent the CE confirmed the death of the group’s leadership (Kavkazcenter.com, August 11).” (
Jamestown Foundation, 14 August 2015)
“While the governor of Dagestan, Ramazan Abdulatipov, has boasted of a drastic reduction in the number of attacks by insurgents in the republic, the Russian authorities’ statistics indicate that attacks in Dagestan are, in fact, increasing. At a recent meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, in Moscow, Abdulatipov claimed that ‘2014 was the first year that we lived through without terrorist attacks.’ He said Dagestan today is 3.2 times safer than the national average in the country: […] Dagestani experts point to a number of irregularities in Abdulatipov’s blissful reports. First, they say that the general level of crime in Dagestan has always been quite low. At the same time, the statistics provided by the Russian prosecutor general’s office indicate that the number of terrorism-related crimes have steadily grown in Dagestan over the past several years, and the republic has been at the top of the list in this regard in Russia at least since 2011. In 2011, prosecutors recorded 220 such crimes in the republic; in 2012, the number grew to 295; in 2013, the number of terrorism-related crimes reached 365; in 2014, that number hit 472. In the first six months of 2015, 352 terrorism-related crimes were already recorded (Kavkazskaya Politika, September 4).” (
Jamestown Foundation, 16 September 2015)
“Abdurashid Magomedov, Minister of Internal Affairs of Dagestan, has reported that a lot of natives of Dagestan left for Syria with their family members and children. According to the Minister, all of the men who left for Syria are put on the federal wanted list. […]The Minister has also noted that there are serious hotbeds of tension in the territory of the republic. ‘At present, the main hotbeds of tension are located in the mountainous districts of southern Dagestan, including the Shamil, Khunzakh, Gunib, Tsumada, and Tsuntin Districts,’ the Minister has emphasized.” (
Caucasian Knot, 10 December 2015)
“Auch in Dagestan, der Hauptkrisenregion des Nordkaukasus, sanken die Zahlen: 2014 mindestens 208 Getötete, 2013 noch 271 und im Jahr zuvor 410. Dieser Trend hielt im Jahr 2015 an: Laut der russischen Internetzeitung Caucasian Knot wurden im Nordkaukasus mindestens 209 Menschen – davon rund 135 in Dagestan – getötet. Ursache für den erheblichen Rückgang dürfte sein, dass sich seit 2015 vermehrt Kämpfer aus dem Nordkaukasus dem IS in Syrien und im Irak angeschlossen haben.” (
BAMF, 25 January 2016, p.4)
[ix]
“In 2015, Russia changed its assessment of threats, shifting its focus from the Caucasus Emirate to members of the so-called Islamic State (IS). The Russian government’s concern is not so much about the numbers of people who went to Syria and may return, but rather the possible influence the ideas of the IS might have among Russia’s 20 million Muslims. The activities of the IS in the North Caucasus also should be evaluated in the context of the armed Islamic underground movement and those Salafists who sympathize with it. According to Dagestan’s governor, Ramazan Abdulatipov, only 643 residents of the republic are fighting in the ranks of the IS. Dagestani Interior Minister Abdurashid Magomedov estimated the number of Dagestani IS recruits at 900 as of December 2015 (Kavkazsky Uzel, December 10, 2015). Abdulatipov must have meant only those individuals who went to Syria and whose involvement in insurgent activities has been confirmed. The Russian Ministry of Interior claims that jointly with the Federal Security Service (FSB), it is monitoring over 2,800 Russian citizens who went to fight in Syria and Iraq. In addition, the interior ministry launched criminal investigations into 889 militants who returned from the Middle East.” (
Jamestown Foundation, 8 January 2016)
“In an attempt to decrease tensions in the North Caucasus, the Russian authorities set out to register all potential extremists who might carry out a terrorist attack, in the opinion of the police and the Federal Security Service (FSB). Since the start of 2016, reports started to emerge detailing the number of extremists and their locations. In Dagestan alone, the authorities reportedly registered 14,000 people as potential extremists (Riadagestan.ru, March 3). According to the Prosecutor General’s Office of Dagestan, the authorities registered at least 15,000 potential extremists (Chernovik.net, March 1). A member of the Council for Human Rights under the President of Russia, Maksim Shevchenko, says the Dagestani authorities registered about 100,000 people as potentially unreliable (Echo.msk.ru, February 25). The estimates of extremists in Dagestan are quite high, especially given that there are about 21,000 police officers in the republic.” (
Jamestown Foundation, 24 March 2016)
Attacks and violations of human rights
“Across town in an outlying, concrete-block neighborhood, Svetlana Isayeva runs the group Mothers of Daghestan for Human Rights from a tiny ground-floor office. She started the organization after her 25-year-old son disappeared from the street outside her home three years ago. A stoic, dark-haired woman, Isayeva says many young men like him are detained by security forces, especially those who attend mosques and show other signs of religious piousness. She says they're forced to confess to terrorism and often killed. ‘Lately it's become common among law enforcers to burn people alive in their cars,’ she says. ‘Then they're accused of blowing themselves up by accident.” (
RFE/RL, 4 November 2011)
[x]
“Похищения и насильственные исчезновения людей по-прежнему остаются одной из распространенных форм грубейших нарушений прав человека в Дагестане. За годы сложилась целая система незаконного насилия, включающая в себя неотъемлемые элементы – похищение людей, применение к ним пыток и осуществление внесудебных казней части похищенных. В Дагестане объектом похищений обычно становятся люди, исповедующие фундаменталистское направление ислама (салафизм), именно их силовики подозревают в пособничестве или причастности к вооруженному подполью. В Дагестане, как и в других республиках Северного Кавказа, нередко похищают и впоследствии убивают идеологов этого течения, тех, кому сложно предъявить официальные обвинения, но кого силовики считают ‘опасными’. Впрочем, среди похищенных есть люди, не принадлежащие к салафитскому течению.” (
Memorial, 4 September 2012, p. 48-49)
“Die Dagestan-Spezialistin Ekaterina Sokiryanskaya berichtet von illegalen Verhaftungen und Misshandlungen von Personen, denen religiöser Extremismus vorgeworfen wird. Häuser von Angehörigen der Aufständischen seien in Brand gesetzt worden, so Sokiryanskaya. Staatlich geduldete Bürgerwehren würden die Bewohner einschüchtern. Tatsächlich treibe man mit diesen Methoden einen Teil der Opposition in die Hände der Aufständischen.” (
AI, October 2013)
“In March, the security services in Dagestan revived an environmentally dangerous tactical tool for fighting the regional insurgency—arson attacks on forests. Multiple media outlets and Internet social media confirmed reports of forest fires in several districts in the republic.” (
Jamestown Foundation, 1 April 2014)
“Few Russians, however, are interested in the rising number of kidnappings by government forces in Dagestan. Kidnappings are a way of putting pressure on the relatives of the militants or on their sympathizers—or, more generally, on Salafis.” (
Jamestown Foundation, 15 May 2014)
“Media and local human rights groups have also reported on more than a dozen cases in 2013 and 2014 in which law enforcement and security forces blew up homes belonging to people whose relatives are suspected insurgents.” (
HRW, 18 June 2015, p. 28)
“Young men who are abducted by government forces in Dagestan are frequently found dead at the scene of a special operation (Chernovik.net, May 29). The government then declares them to have been rebels.” (
Jamestown Foundation, 5 June 2015)
“The manner in which law enforcement and security personnel commonly detain suspects is one of the most distinctive abuses in the counterinsurgency campaign in Dagestan. Often these personnel do not identify themselves, show warrants, inform the detainee or their relatives where they are taking them, or the grounds for the detention, or provide timely access to a lawyer of one’s own choosing. In some cases, detentions are part of a highly visible operation in which security officers, backed by police, take suspects into custody without explanation or showing warrants. In other cases, the person is ambushed by men who sometimes wear masks and bundle detainees into a car and drive them to unknown destinations. These circumstances have led families and Russian human rights groups to refer to this pattern as abductions. Those targeted are typically young men who are suspected of having some link to the insurgency through family or other ties, are Salafis, or went to mosques frequented by Salafis. In some cases, the detainees may never be seen or heard from again: they are victims of enforced disappearances. In others, they may be initially forcibly disappeared but do show up within a few days in a detention facility, tortured, or threatened into signing confessions without the presence and advice of a lawyer.” (
HRW, 18 June 2015, p. 48)
“Attacks on police in the streets or on their offices are among the most frequent tactics used by insurgents in their assault on the authorities. Non-police victims are common and in some cases, the assailants attempted to magnify the killings by detonating a small bomb first and then a larger one when police rescue workers and sometimes civilians have gathered.” (
HRW, 18 June 2015, p. 84)
“As part of their counterinsurgency efforts, law enforcement and security in Dagestan largely equated Salafi Muslims with insurgents or their collaborators. Police put Salafis on special watch lists, repeatedly detaining, questioning, photographing, and fingerprinting them -often without grounds - and in some cases carried out forced DNA sampling. Police also raided Salafi mosques across Dagestan and conducted numerous, abusive special operations using excessive force in detaining suspects and holding them incommunicado in undisclosed locations.” (
HRW, 27 January 2016)
Timeline of attacks in Dagestan
Please note: The following timeline therefore does not purport to be an exhaustive list of attacks in Dagestan, but shall serve as an overview and introduction to the subject.
Please also see the archived versions of this featured topic for a timeline for previous years:
For 2011, see
http://www.ecoi.net/en/document/220655
For 2012, see
http://www.ecoi.net/en/document/242518
For 2013, see
http://www.ecoi.net/en/document/270091
For 2014, see
http://www.ecoi.net/en/document/293185
For 2015, see
http://www.ecoi.net/en/document/323719
2016
April
“The regional Investigative Committee said on April 29 that unknown attackers shot the former chief of police in Daghestan's Shamil District overnight. The slain officer, whose name was not released, retired in 2015.” (
RFE/RL, 29 April 2016)
“В селении Согратль Гунибского района Дагестана при оказании сопротивления убит находившийся в федеральном розыске боевик, сообщили в силовых структурах.” (
Caucasian Knot, 14 April 2016b)
“Как писал ‘Кавказский узел’, 13 апреля один из въездов в поселок Ленинкент был перекрыт бронетехникой. Правоохранители начали здесь адресные проверки в поисках боевиков и их пособников. Впоследствии в поселке был введен режим контртеррористической операции (КТО), заблокирован дом, где были убиты трое предполагаемых боевиков.” (
Caucasian Knot, 14 April 2016a)
March
“A car exploded in Russia's North Caucasus region of Daghestan on March 30, killing one police officer and wounding another. Local law enforcement officials say the car detonated with police in pursuit in Daghestan's southern Tabasaran district.” (
RFE/RL, 30 March 2016)
“The ‘Caucasian Knot’ has reported that at 8:30 p.m. Moscow time of March 29, two police vehicles with law enforcers sent from Krasnoyarsk for mission were blown up on the section of the federal highway ‘Kavkaz’ in the area of the ‘Uytash’ Airport and the village of Novy Khushet. The responsibility for the bombing was taken by the ‘Islamic State’ (IS), recognized as a terrorist organization and banned in Russia. Earlier, the Dagestani MIA has reported that one person was killed and two others were injured as a result of the explosion.” (
Caucasian Knot, 30 March 2016)
“Last night, in Dagestan, an explosion occurred in the vicinity of the village of Mutsalaul of the Khasavyurt District. As a result, a man was killed. The police believe that he was a militant, blown up by his own bomb, reports a source from the law enforcement bodies.” (
Caucasian Knot, 22 March 2016)
“Two members of the armed underground have been killed during the special operation carried out in the Khunzakh District, and law enforcers are searching for their accomplices. This was reported by the National Antiterrorist Committee (NAC).” (
Caucasian Knot, 11 March 2016)
February
“In the Suleiman-Stalsky District of Dagestan, policemen are engaged in identification of a driver of a passenger car. They shot and killed him when he opened fire on them. This was reported by a source from the law enforcement agencies. According to the source, the incident occurred near the village of Kasumkent at night on February 26.” (
Caucasian Knot, 26 February 2016)
“In Suleiman-Stalsky District, an armed clash broke out between power agents and two militants, who were shot dead in the shootout, the Russian National Antiterrorist Committee (NAC) has reported.” (
Caucasian Knot, 17 February 2016)
“Bei einem mutmaßlichen Selbstmordanschlag in der russischen Nordkaukasusrepublik Dagestan sind am 15.02.16 zwei Polizisten getötet und mindestens zwölf Personen zum Teil schwer verletzt worden. Polizisten hätten ein Auto an einem Kontrollpunkt nahe der Ortschaft Jemikent im Süden Dagestans angehalten, als das Fahrzeug explodiert sei, teilten die Sicherheitsbehörden mit. Man gehe von einem Selbstmordattentäter aus. Zu der Tat bekannte sich die Terrormiliz IS im Namen der Provinz Kaukasus. Die Moskauer Sicherheitsbehörden schätzen, dass sich mehr als 2.000 russische Staatsbürger dem IS in Syrien und im Irak angeschlossen haben und befürchten weitere Terroranschläge durch Rückkehrer.” (
BAMF, 22 February 2016, p.7)
“The spokesman of the Dagestani Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) has reported that on the highway Kizilyurt-Makhachkala a man, who opened fire on policemen, was killed during a shootout.” (
Caucasian Knot, 4 February 2016)
January
“The ‘Caucasian Knot’ has reported that on January 25, the counterterrorist operation (CTO) legal regime was introduced in the village of Andi of the Botlikh District. In the evening, law enforcers blocked a private house in the village, where, according to their information, three militants were hiding. During an armed clash, the house was heavily damaged, and after the completion of the active phase of the special operation, the law enforcers began to clear the ruins of the house. This morning, a body of a killed militant was found at the site of the special operation.” (
Caucasian Knot, 26 January 2016)
“The ‘Caucasian Knot’ has reported that today, in the village of Kvanada, at 4:00 a.m. Moscow time, counterterrorist operation (CTO) legal regime has been introduced in the village of Kvanada of the Tsumada District. A shootout between suspected militants and law enforcers occurred there, and as a result, one man was killed. According to sources from the law enforcement bodies, he has been identified as Magomed Abdulkhalikov, who was on the wanted list since 2014. According to the NAC, Magomed Abdulkhalikov, born in 1986, was the leader of the Tsumada militant grouping.” (
Caucasian Knot, 11 January 2016)
SOURCES: (all links accessed at 10 May 2016)
- AI – Amnesty International: Hinter den Bergen, October 2013
http://www.amnesty.de/journal/2013/oktober/hinter-den-bergen
- BAMF - Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Germany): Briefing Notes vom 22.02.2016, 22 February 2016 (available at ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/4765_1456148840_deutschland-bundesamt-fuer-migration-und-fluechtlinge-briefing-notes-22-02-2016-deutsch.pdf
- BAMF - Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Germany): Briefing Notes vom 25.01.2016, 25 January 2016 (available at ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/4765_1453884195_deutschland-bundesamt-fuer-migration-und-fluechtlinge-briefing-notes-25-01-2016-deutsch.pdf
- CACI – Central Asia Caucasus Institute: Chechen Troops in Dagestan: A Step Toward "Kadyrovization", 4 April 2012
http://cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5749
- CACI – Central Asia Caucasus Institute: Russia Redeploys Army To Dagestan, 14 November 2012
http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5878
- CACI – Central Asia Caucasus Institute: What Does Amirov's Arrest Imply For Dagestan?, 26 June 2013
http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/12756-attacks-in-dagestan-suggest-inefficiency-of-administrative-changes.html
- CACI – Central Asia Caucasus Institute: Caucasus Emirate Faces Further Decline after the Death of Its Leader, 29 April 2015
http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13188-caucasus-emirate-faces-further-decline-after-the-death-of-its-leader.html
- Caucasian Knot: 2013 totals by "Caucasian Knot" for Northern Caucasus: count of victims of armed conflict on decline, 31 January 2014
http://www.kabardinobalk.eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/27145/
- Caucasian Knot: "Caucasian Knot" sums up armed conflict outcomes in NCFD in 2014, 31 January 2015
http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/30680/
- Caucasian Knot: Geidar Djemal: Magomed Suleimanov is new leader of "Imarat Kavkaz", 28 May 2015
http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/31861/
- Caucasian Knot: Dagestani militant Asilderov is IS leader in Northern Caucasus, 25 June 2015
http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/32152/
- Caucasian Knot: MIA: in Syria, about 900 natives of Dagestan fight for militants, 10 December 2015
http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/33926/
- Caucasian Knot: One person wounded in special operation in Dagestan, 11 January 2016
http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/34242/
- Caucasian Knot: In Dagestan, body of killed man found at place of special operation, 26 January 2016
http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/34392/
- Caucasian Knot: A man killed in shootout in Dagestan, 4 February 2016
http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/34504/
- Caucasian Knot: Two militants killed in Dagestan, 17 February 2016
http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/34639/
- Caucasian Knot: In Dagestan, driver of foreign-made car killed in shootout with law enforcers, 26 February 2016
http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/34737/
- Caucasian Knot: Two militants killed in Dagestan, NAC confirms, 11 March 2016
http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/34888/
- Caucasian Knot: In Dagestan, a man killed in bomb explosion, 22 March 2016
http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/34994/
- Caucasian Knot: For fourth time in seven months, IS takes responsibility for terror acts in Dagestan, 30 March 2016
http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/35083/
- Caucasian Knot НАК: убитые в Ленинкенте причастны к подрыву автоколонны, 14 April 2016a
http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/280898/
- Caucasian Knot: Один человек убит в перестрелке в Дагестане, 14 April 2016b
http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/280880/
- HRW - Human Rights Watch: “Invisible War”; Russia’s Abusive Response to the Dagestan Insurgency, 18 June 2015 (available at ecoi.net)
https://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1788_1434622560_russia0615-forupload.pdf
- HRW - Human Rights Watch: World Report 2016 - Russia, 27 January 2016 (available at ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/318397/443577_en.html
- ICG - International Crisis Group: The North Caucasus: The Challenges of Integration (II), Islam, the Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency, 19 October 2012 (available at ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1350914169_221-the-north-caucasus-the-challenges-of-integration-ii-islam-the-insurgency-and-counter-insurgency.pdf
- ICG - International Crisis Group: Too Far, Too Fast: Sochi, Tourism and Conflict in the Caucasus, 30 January 2014 (available at ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1002_1391196745_228-too-far-too-fast-sochi-tourism-and-conflict-in-the-caucasus.pdf
- Jamestown Foundation: Support for Salafists Among Dagestani Youth Reaches Record Level, North Caucasus Analysis Volume: 13 Issue: 1, 14 December 2011 (available at ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/216670/323187_en.html
- Jamestown Foundation: Instability in Southern Dagestan widens despite deaths of militant leaders, North Caucasus Analysis Volume: 13 Issue: 10, 17 May 2012 (available at ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/221940/329319_en.html
- Jamestown Foundation: Violence in Dagestan Accelerated in 2012; Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 10 Issue: 4, 10 January 2013 (available at ecoi.net)
https://www.ecoi.net/local_link/235015/343907_en.html
- Jamestown Foundation: Government Forces Ramp Up Activities in Dagestan after Volgograd Attack; Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 10 Issue: 192, 28 October 2013 (available at ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/261412/374640_en.html
- Jamestown Foundation: Security Services Set Dagestani Forests on Fire to 'Smoke Out' Local Insurgents, 1 April 2014 (available at ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/272924/388550_en.html
- Jamestown Foundation: Police Violence in Dagestan Continues as Republic Drifts Toward Collapse From Within; Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 11 Issue: 91, 15 May 2014 (available at ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/276494/392606_en.html
- Jamestown Foundation: The Year in Review; Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 12 Issue: 5, 9 January 2015 (available at ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/294158/414991_en.html
- Jamestown Foundation: Insurgent Attacks in Dagestan Increase Despite Government Counter-Insurgency Operations; Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 12 Issue: 47, 13 March 2015 (available at ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/298712/421197_en.html
- Jamestown Foundation: Pressure on Salafists in Dagestan Could Have Unpredictable Results; Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 12 Issue: 93, 19 May 2015 (available at ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/303012/426017_en.html
- Jamestown Foundation: Dagestan Begins to Reverse Its Relatively Tolerant Policy Toward Salafism; Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 12 Issue: 105, 5 June 2015 (available at ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/304481/427712_en.html
- Jamestown Foundation: Divisions Between Caucasus Emirate and Islamic State Militants Have No Impact on the Ground; Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 12 Issue: 128, 9 July 2015 (available at ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/307313/430938_en.html
- Jamestown Foundation: After Loss of Three Senior Commanders, Is the Caucasus Emirate on the Ropes? Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 12 Issue: 154, 14 August 2015 (available at ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/310753/434763_en.html
- Jamestown Foundation: Russian Prosecutors Claim Terrorism in Dagestan Is Increasing, Governor Says It Is Declining; Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 12 Issue: 166, 16 September 2015 (available at ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/311790/435952_en.html
- Jamestown Foundation: Growing Islamic State Influence in North Caucasus Casts Shadow on Local Salafists; Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 13 Issue: 5, 8 January 2016 (available at ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/317552/442635_en.html
- Jamestown Foundation Number of People Registered in Russia as Extremists Continues to Grow; Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 13 Issue: 58, 24 March 2016 (available at ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/321651/447276_en.html
- Memorial Human Rights Center: "Новый курс" Магомедова? Причины гражданского противостояния, ситуация с правами человека и попытки консолидации общества в Республике Дагестан (март 2010 - март 2011 гг.), 4 September 2012
http://www.memo.ru/uploads/files/846.pdf
- RFE/RL – Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Radicalization Splitting Society In Russia's North Caucasus, 4 November 2011 (available at ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/205155/310285_en.html
- RFE/RL – Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Another Car Explodes In Russia's Daghestan, Killing Police Officer, 30 March 2016 (available at ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/321768/447406_en.html
- RFE/RL – Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Retired Police Chief Murdered In Russia's Daghestan Region, 29 April 2016 (available at ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/323612/449551_en.html
- SWP - Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik: Dagestan: Russlands schwierigste Teilrepublik, April 2015
http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/2015_S08_hlb_isaeva.pdf
[i] The German Institute for International and Security Affairs of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) is an independent scientific establishment that conducts practically oriented research on the basis of which it then advises the Bundestag (the German parliament) and the federal government on foreign and security policy issues.
[ii] Human Rights Watch (HRW) is an international non-governmental organization that conducts research and advocacy on human rights.
[iii] Memorial is an independent non-governmental group encompassing more than 80 national and regional organisations in 7 countries and, since its formation in 1988, has the objective of accounting for political prisoners and victims of the Stalin era. Over recent years Memorial has developed a network for reporting ongoing human rights violations in the Russian Federation and other countries of the former Soviet Union.
[iv] The International Crisis Group (ICG) is a transnational non-profit, non-governmental organisation that carries out field research on violent conflict and advances policies to prevent, mitigate or resolve conflict.
[v] The Jamestown Foundation is an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit organisation that provides information on terrorism, the former Soviet republics, Chechnya, China, and North Korea.
[vi] Amnesty International (AI) is a non-governmental organisation focused on human rights.
[vii] The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute (CACI) constitutes together with the Silk Road Studies Program an independent and privately funded Transatlantic Research and Policy Center.
[viii] Caucasian Knot is an internet mass medium with a human rights orientation, that provides information on the Caucasus. It was founded in 2001 by the human rights organisation Memorial.
[ix] The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) is a centre of excellence for migration, integration and asylum. It is responsible for conducting asylum procedures, granting refugee protection and supporting integration nationwide. Its duties also include migration and integration research –it has a legally grounded research mandate to collect analytical information on steering immigration.
[x] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) is a broadcaster funded by the U.S. Congress that provides news, information, and analysis to countries in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East.