12. September 2014

Allgemeine Informationen

Die Organisation für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (OSZE) schreibt in einem im Februar 2014 veröffentlichten Bericht zu den Präsidentschaftswahlen vom November 2013, dass es in Tadschikistan insgesamt acht registrierte Parteien gebe, von denen drei nicht im Parlament vertreten seien. Bei diesen handle es sich um die Demokratische Partei Tadschikistans (DPT), die Sozialdemokratische Partei Tadschikistans (SDPT) und die Sozialistische Partei Tadschikistans (SPT):

„In total, there are eight registered political parties, three of which are not represented in the parliament: the Democratic Party of Tajikistan (DPT), the Social-Democratic Party of Tajikistan (SDPT), and the Socialist Party of Tajikistan (SPT).” (OSZE, 5. Februar 2014, S. 4)

The US-Außenministerium (US Department of State, USDOS) hält in seinem Länderbericht zur Menschenrechtslage in Tadschikistan vom Februar 2014 (Berichtszeitraum 2013) fest, dass nur drei der insgesamt acht registrierten Parteien als regierungsunabhängig bezeichnet werden könnten. Oppositionsparteien seien genauen Prüfungen durch die Regierung ausgesetzt. Alle hochrangigen Mitglieder der Regierung seien Mitglieder der Demokratischen Volkspartei Tadschikistans (engl.: People‘s Democratic Party of Tajikistan, PDPT). Zudem seien auch die meisten Abgeordneten des Parlaments Mitglieder der PDPT oder anderer regierungsnaher Parteien bzw. Unabhängige, die der PDPT nahestehen würden:

 

„Eight political parties, including the PDPT, were legally registered. Observers considered only three of these parties to be independent of the government. Opposition political parties had moderate popular support and faced scrutiny by the government. All senior members of President Rahmon’s government were PDPT [People‘s Democratic Party of Tajikistan] members, and most members of the country’s 97-seat parliament were members of the PDPT, belonged to progovernment parties, or were PDPT-affiliated independents.” (USDOS, 27. Februar 2014, Section 3)

1) Lage von Oppositionellen bzw. Personen, insbesondere Frauen, die wiederholt soziale und politische Gegebenheiten kritisieren und sich für Demokratie, Frauen- und Kinderrechte einsetzen

In den ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehenden Quellen konnten im Rahmen der zeitlich begrenzten Recherche keine spezifischen Informationen zur Lage von Personen gefunden werden, die sich für Frauen- und Kinderrechte einsetzen. Folgende Informationen beziehen sich auf die Situation von Personen, die sich für Demokratie und Menschenrechte allgemein einsetzen bzw. die sozialen und politischen Gegebenheiten kritisieren:

Gewaltandrohungen und Übergriffe

Das US Department of State (USDOS) schreibt in seinem Länderbericht zur Menschenrechtslage vom Februar 2014, dass es während des Berichtjahres 2013 einige Übergriffe auf die politische Opposition gegeben habe. So habe im April 2013 eine Gruppe von Unbekannten Machmadali Chait, den stellvertretenden Vorsitzenden der (oppositionellen, Anm. ACCORD) Islamischen Partei der Wiedergeburt Tadschikistans (engl.: Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, IRPT), schwer verprügelt. Die Menschenrechtsorganisation Freedom House habe diesen Angriff mit dem zunehmenden Druck gegenüber der IRPT vor den Präsidentschaftswahlen vom November 2013 in Zusammenhang gebracht. Bis zum Berichtszeitpunkt habe die Regierung nicht verlautbart, dass sie in dieser Sache Ermittlungen eingeleitet habe:

„There were a few attacks against the political opposition. For example, in April a group of unknown persons in Dushanbe beat Makhmadali Khait, the deputy head of the IRPT [Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan]. Khait required hospitalization in intensive care. A Freedom House report linked the attack on Khait to increasing government pressure on and intimidation of the IRPT in the period preceding the November presidential election. The government did not indicate that it had opened any investigation into the case.” (USDOS, 27. Februar 2014, Section 3)

Über den Anschlag auf Chait berichtet auch Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) im April 2013 (RFE/RL, 19. April 2013).

 

Im Juli 2014 berichtet die Medienorganisation Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), dass mehrere Mitglieder der Partei der Islamischen Wiedergeburt (IRP) in der Region Badachschan von einem Mob verprügelt worden seien:

„Tajikistan’s leading opposition force, the Islamic Rebirth Party (IRP), has complained of a concerted government campaign designed to discredit and weaken it ahead of a parliamentary election due next year. Central Asia’s only legal Islamic party, the IRP has just two out of 63 seats in parliament, but its 42,000 members make it the second-largest political force after President Imomali Rahmon’s People’s Democratic Party. IRP leader Muhiddin Kabiri told IWPR that he expected systematic attacks on the party ahead of the February 2015 polls. […] On April 28, Kabiri’s chairman Saidumar Husaini and a number of party activists were beaten up by a mob trying to disrupt a meeting in Khorog in the southeastern Badakhshan region. Another party meeting, this time in the southern Kulob region, suffered a similar attack on June 10.” (IWPR, 29. Juli 2014)

Folter, Freiheitsentzug und andere Repressionen

The US-Außenministerium (US Department of State, USDOS) hält in seinem Länderbericht zu Tadschikistan vom Februar 2014 fest, dass Folter gemäß der Verfassung Tadschikistans verboten sei. Im Jahr 2012 habe die Regierung das Strafgesetzbuch novelliert und darin einen Artikel eingeführt, in dem Folter auf völkerrechtskonforme Art definiert worden sei. Es habe jedoch weiterhin Berichte darüber gegeben, dass Schläge, Folter und andere Formen des Zwangs bei Verhören angewendet worden seien, um Geständnisse zu erpressen. Die Behörden hätten Menschenrechtsorganisationen keinen ausreichenden Zugang zu Informationen gewährt, der es ihnen erlaubt hätte, diese Berichte näher zu prüfen:

„The constitution prohibits the use of torture. Although in 2012 the government amended the criminal code to create a separate article defining torture in line with international law, there continued to be claims of beatings, torture, or other forms of coercion to extract confessions during interrogations. Officials did not grant sufficient access to information to allow human rights organizations to investigate the claims.” (USDOS, 27. Februar 2014, Section 1c)

Weiters schreibt das USDOS, dass die Strafprozessordnung kein explizites Verbot von willkürlichen Verhaftungen enthalte und solche Verhaftungen in der Praxis häufig vorkämen. Laut Strafprozessordnung seien Polizisten verpflichtet, die Staatsanwaltschaft innerhalb von zwölf Stunden über eine Verhaftung zu informieren und innerhalb von zehn Tagen Strafanzeige zu erstatten. Nur wenige BürgerInnen seien sich ihres Rechts bewusst, gegen eine Verhaftung Rechtsmittel zu ergreifen. Es gebe nur wenige Kontrollen über die Machtbefugnisse von PolizeibeamtInnen und Militärangehörigen, Festnahmen vorzunehmen:

„The CPC [Criminal Procedure Code] does not explicitly prohibit arbitrary arrests, and arbitrary arrests were common. The CPC states that police must inform the prosecutor’s office of an arrest within 12 hours and file charges within 10 days. Few citizens were aware of their right to appeal an arrest, and there were few checks on the power of police and military officers to detain individuals.” (USDOS, 27. Februar 2014, Section 1d)

Wie das USDOS weiter berichtet, hätten die Behörden erklärt, dass es im Land keine politischen Gefangenen oder politisch motivierte Verhaftungen gebe. Laut Angaben von Oppositionsparteien und örtlichen BerichterstatterInnen habe die Regierung jedoch ausgewählte politische GegnerInnen verhaftet und strafrechtlich verfolgt. Es gebe keine verlässlichen Schätzungen über die Zahl von politischen Gefangenen:

„While authorities claimed there were no political prisoners or politically motivated arrests, opposition parties and local observers reported the government selectively arrested and prosecuted political opponents. There was no reliable estimate of the number of political prisoners.” (USDOS, 27. Februar 2014, Section 1e)

Wie die Menschenrechtsorganisation Freedom House in ihrem im Juni 2014 veröffentlichten Bericht Nations in Transit 2014 (Berichtsjahr 2013) festhält, habe die Regierung, um ihre Macht im Vorfeld der Präsidentschaftswahlen vom November 2013 zu konsolidieren, RegimekritikerInnen im In- und Ausland ins Visier genommen habe. So sei vermutlich der Geheimdienst Staatliches Komitee für Nationale Sicherheit (GKNB) am Verschwinden des Regimekritikers und ethnisch usbekischen Aktivisten Salimboj Schamsiddinow im Jahr 2013 beteiligt gewesen. Im Dezember 2013 sei der Vorsitzender der kürzlich gegründeten nichtregistrierten Partei „Neues Tadschikistan“, Said Saidow, aufgrund fragwürdiger Anschuldigungen verhaftet und zu 26 Jahren Gefängnis verurteilt worden.

Freedom House bemerkt, dass die Regierung Nichtregierungsorganisationen (NGOs), die sich mit nichtpolitischen sozioökonomischen oder „weichen“ Menschenrechtsthemen befassen würden, relativ freie Hand lasse. Wenn eine NGO jedoch versuche, auf politisch sensible Themen wie Korruption oder systematische Menschenrechtsverletzungen aufmerksam zu machen, könne dies ernsthafte Konsequenzen nach sich ziehen. Im Jänner 2013 habe ein Gericht in Chudschand die zuvor getroffene Entscheidung bestätigt, die NGO Amparo Vereinigung Junger Anwälte, die sich für die Rechte junger Wehrdienstleistender eingesetzt habe, aufzulösen.

Es habe weiters auch Berichte über Einschüchterung von und Gewalt gegen JournalistInnen während des Jahres 2013 gegeben. Einige BloggerInnen hätten nach eigenen Angaben Drohungen von den Behörden erhalten, nachdem sie sich kritisch über Regierungsbeamte und staatliche Einrichtungen geäußert hätten. So sei etwa der Blogger Rustam Gulow, der über die illegale Praxis der zwangsweisen Verlängerung des Wehrdienstes geschrieben habe, Berichten zufolge immer wieder von der Polizei festgenommen worden.

Wie Freedom House berichtet, seien das Justizsystem und die Exekutive korrupt und würden in fast allen Fällen für den Staat bzw. die Wohlhabenden Partei ergreifen. Obwohl das Ausmaß der Repressionen seit der Bürgerkriegszeit (den 1990er Jahren, Anm. ACCORD) abgenommen habe, herrsche nach wie vor ein Klima der Straflosigkeit vor. Artikel 88(3) des tadschikischen Strafgesetzbuchs enthalte ein Verbot der „Verwendung von Beweismitteln in Gerichtsverfahren, die unter Folter erzwungen“ worden seien. Jedoch habe der Europäische Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte (EGMR), dem Tadschikistan nicht angehöre, die Lage im Land als „besorgniserregend“ bezeichnet, zumal der Einsatz von Folter „systematisch, weit verbreitet und alltäglich“ sei.

Weiters berichtet Freedom House unter Berufung auf die Menschenrechtsorganisation Amnesty International (AI), dass die Sicherheitsorgane unter anderem von Methoden wie Schlägen mittels Knüppeln, Faustschlägen, Fußtritten, sowie Elektroschocks, Übergießen mit kochendem Wasser und Verbrennen mittels Zigaretten und Chemikalien Gebrauch machen würden, um echte bzw. auch falsche Geständnisse zu erzwingen. MenschenrechtlerInnen hätten auch über Fälle von angedrohter oder tatsächlicher Vergewaltigung von männlichen und weiblichen Gefangenen berichtet. Derartige Misshandlungen würden auch begangen, um Personen, die um rechtlichen Schutz ansuchen könnten, einzuschüchtern:

„In an apparent effort to consolidate power in the run-up to the November 2013 presidential elections, the government targeted critics at home and abroad. Tajik authorities unsuccessfully pressed for the extradition of former prime minister Abdumalik Abdullojonov from Ukraine, and the State National Security Agency (GKNB) was likely complicit in the disappearance of government critic and ethnic-Uzbek activist Salimboy Shamsiddinov. Zaid Saidov, leader of the newly formed (unregistered) New Tajikistan Party, was arrested on dubious charges and sentenced to 26 years in prison in December. […]

The Tajik government allows registered NGOs that deal with apolitical socioeconomic or ‘soft’ human rights issues to function relatively freely. On the rare occasions when an NGO attempts to tackle politically sensitive issues like corruption or systematic human rights violations, repercussions are serious. In January 2013, a court in Khujand confirmed an October 2012 decision to dissolve the Amparo Association of Young Lawyers, an activist NGO that had advocated for the rights of military conscripts and challenged the common and illegal practice of press-ganging, physical abuse, and hazing in barracks. […]

There were also reports of intimidation and physical violence against journalists in 2013. In December, the authorities detained and beat Abdurahim Shukurov, a cameraman for the Ozodagon News Agency who had been covering the sentencing of the leader of the unregistered New Tajikistan Party, Zaid Saidov. Some bloggers also complained of threats from the authorities when they wrote critically about government officials or agencies. Blogger Rustam Gulov, for example, who wrote about the government’s illegal practices of forcibly extending young people’s military service, was reportedly detained by the police on multiple occasions. In Moscow, a Tajik opposition journalist, Bakhtiyor Sattori, survived what is speculated to have been a politically motivated stabbing in February. […]

Tajikistan’s judicial and law enforcement systems are deeply corrupt, exercise almost no independence, and, in virtually all cases, side with the state or the wealthy. Though the scale of repression has subsided since the civil war era, the ‘climate of impunity [still] prevails.’ […]

Article 88(3) of Tajikistan’s criminal code outlaws the ‘use of evidence in judicial proceedings obtained under torture.’ However, the European Court of Human Rights, of which Tajikistan is not a member, has described a ‘disturbing situation’ in the country, claiming that the use of torture is ‘systemic,’ ‘widespread,’ and ‘routine.’ […]

Amnesty International reports the use of ‘batons, truncheons, sticks, and kicking and punching’ by Tajikistan’s security forces to extract real or false confessions, as well as ‘use of electric shocks to the body, including the genitals; pouring boiling water on a detainee’s head; drenching with cold water; attaching plastic bottles filled with water or sand to the detainee’s genitals; [and] burning with cigarettes or chemicals.’ Human rights defenders also report about cases of rape or rape threats against male and female detainees.

Abuse of this kind is also used to intimidate any who may seek legal redress. During 2013, there were at least four reported cases—one involving a child—where complaints to law enforcement officials about abuse and torture led to reprisals in the form of intimidation, ill-treatment, and torture in detention centers under the auspices of the Interior Ministry and GKNB.” (Freedom House, 12. Juni 2014)

Laut einem gemeinsamen Bericht von Amnesty International (AI) und der NGO Coalition against Torture of Tajikistan vom April 2014 komme es im Zuge des Vorgehens der Regierung gegen Gruppierungen, die sie als Bedrohung für die nationale Sicherheit betrachte, häufig zu Menschenrechtsverletzungen. Insbesondere würden dabei religiöse Bewegungen und islamistische Gruppen und Parteien ins Visier genommen. Personen, denen vorgeworfen werde, islamische ExtremistInnen zu sein, seien besonders von Folter und andere Formen der Misshandlung bedroht. In der überwiegenden Mehrzahl der Fälle gebe es keine unabhängigen Untersuchungen zu diesbezüglichen Beschwerden.

Trotz der in Artikel 88 der Strafprozessordnung festgeschriebenen Unzulässigkeit von unter Folter erzwungenen Beweismitteln in Gerichtsverfahren habe es in den Jahren 2012 und 2013 keine Fälle gegeben, in denen RichterInnen diese Ausschlussregelung umgesetzt hätten.

Wie AI weiter ausführt, seien bei NGOs und Anwälten in Tadschikistan zwischen 2011 und 2013 insgesamt 137 Beschwerden wegen Folter und anderer Misshandlung eingegangen. Es scheine jedoch nur in zehn dieser Fälle ordnungsgemäße Untersuchungen gegeben zu haben, wobei hierbei die Täter zumeist mit Disziplinarverfahren belangt worden seien:

„Amnesty International and the Coalition against Torture are concerned that human rights in Tajikistan are frequently violated in the pursuit of groups perceived as a threat to national security, and that people are caught up in arbitrary clampdown operations. Amnesty International’s research indicates that particular targets are religious movements and Islamist groups or parties, and that people accused of being Islamist extremists are at particular risk of torture and other ill-treatment in Tajikistan. Practices of incommunicado detention, lack of safeguards against torture and other ill-treatment continue to be reported in cases which the Tajikistani authorities claim are related to national security concerns. In the vast majority of national security related cases the organizations note lack of impartial investigations into complaints about torture and other ill-treatment and impunity for the officials concerned.” (AI/ April 2014, S. 5)

„The Criminal Procedural Code states in Article 88 that evidence obtained through torture should not be admissible in court, but despite several incidents where defendants alleged in court that they were tortured, in 2012 and 2013 there were no cases of judges implementing exclusionary measures.” (AI, April 2014, S. 6)

„The Tajikistani authorities regularly fail to conduct prompt, thorough and impartial investigations into allegations of torture and other ill-treatment. In the majority of documented cases where credible allegations of the use of torture and other ill-treatment exist, Prosecutors’ Offices ignore complaints from victims of human rights violations or refuse to launch criminal investigations after conducting ‘initial examinations’. […] NGOs and lawyers in Tajikistan registered 137 complaints about torture and other ill-treatment between 2011 and 2013, but fewer than ten of these allegations of torture or other ill-treatment appear to have been properly investigated. In most cases where investigations took place disciplinary proceedings have been used against the perpetrators.” (AI, 24. April 2014, S. 8)

AI schreibt in einem Bericht vom Juli 2013, dass es regelmäßig Berichte gebe, denen zufolge Folter und andere Misshandlungen eingesetzt würden, um Verbrechen durch Einholung von Geständnissen „aufzuklären“. Obwohl seit 2010 einige Entwicklungen hin zu einer Eindämmung von Folter zu verzeichnen seien, darunter die oben erwähnte Kriminalisierung der Folter im Strafgesetzbuch im April 2012, gebe es weiterhin Berichte über Folter und andere Misshandlungen von Verdächtigen in den Anfangsphasen der Haft:

„In Tajikistan, there are regular reports that people have been subjected to torture and other ill-treatment by police and security officers, often in order to ‘solve’ crimes by obtaining confessions. […]

Some positive developments in reducing the incidence of torture in Tajikistan have occurred since 2010, including the April 2012 introduction of a new article in the criminal code criminalizing torture. However, reports of incidents of torture and other ill-treatment of suspects in the early stages of detention continue, indicating that it remains a persistent problem in the country.” (AI, 3. Juli 2013, S. 50-51)

In seinen abschließenden Betrachtungen vom Jänner 2013 hält der UNO-Ausschuss gegen Folter (UN Committee Against Torture, CAT) fest, dass es insbesondere während der ersten Stunden des Verhörs in Polizeigewahrsam sowie in den vom GKNB und dem Amt für den Kampf gegen Organisierte Kriminalität geleiteten Anstalten für temporäre Haft bzw. Untersuchungshaft regelmäßig zu Folter und anderer Misshandlung von Verdächtigen komme. Dies diene in erster Linie der Einholung von Beweismitteln, die im Strafverfahren verwendet werden sollten. Die Einführung des Artikels 88(3) in die Strafprozessordnung im März 2008 (s.o.) sowie ein Dekret des Obersten Gerichtshofs, in dem die Unzulässigkeit illegal eingeholter Beweismittel klargestellt werde, seien zu begrüßen. Jedoch sei der Ausschuss besorgt über das Fehlen von effektiven Umsetzungsmechanismen und der tatsächlichen Umsetzung dieser Rechtsnormen:

„The Committee is seriously concerned about numerous and consistent allegations, corroborated by various sources, of routine use of torture and ill-treatment of suspects, principally to extract confessions to be used in criminal proceedings, primarily during the first hours of interrogation in police custody as well as in temporary and pretrial detention facilities run by the State Committee of National Security and the Department for the Fight against Organized Crime (arts. 2, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15 and 16).” (CAT, 21. Januar 2013, S. 3)

„While welcoming the inclusion of article 88(3) to the Criminal Procedural Code in March 2008, which provides that evidence obtained through ’physical force, pressure, cruelty, inhumanity and by other illegal methods‘ may not be used as evidence in a criminal case, as well as the June 2012 decree of the Supreme Court clarifying the concept of inadmissibility of evidence obtained under illegal methods, the Committee expresses concern at the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms and implementation in practice. It is also concerned at reports that judges frequently dismiss allegations of torture when raised by defendants, and that unless a formal complaint is submitted, the prosecutor will not launch an investigation (art. 15).” (CAT, 21. Januar 2013, S. 5)

Das USDOS schreibt in seinem im Februar 2014 veröffentlichten Länderbericht zur Menschenrechtslage im Jahr 2013, dass unabhängige Medien aktiv seien, obwohl die Regierung starken Druck auf Medieneinrichtungen ausübe. Manche Printmedien würden zwar regierungskritische politische Kommentare und investigative Berichte veröffentlichen. Gleichwohl betrachte die Regierung bestimmte Themen wie Kritik am Präsidenten und dessen Familie oder finanzielles Fehlverhalten von Personen, die dem Präsidenten nahestünden, als Tabuthemen. Journalisten seien weiterhin mit Schikanen und Einschüchterungen seitens der Behörden konfrontiert. Trotz einer Entkriminalisierung von Verleumdung (engl.: „libel“) im Jahr 2012 würden Behörden regelmäßig Medienorganisationen, die kritisch über die Regierung berichtet hätten, wegen Verleumdung verklagen. Seit Juli 2012 stelle Verleumdung nur noch ein zivilrechtliches Delikt dar. Für die Beleidigung des Staatspräsidenten würden jedoch weiterhin bis zu fünf Jahre Haft drohen. Nichtsdestotrotz würden insbesondere regierungskritische Zeitungen häufig wegen Verleumdung verurteilt:

„Independent media were active, despite significant and repeated pressure by the government on media outlets. Although some print media published political commentary and investigatory material critical of the government, journalists observed that authorities considered certain topics off limits, including derogatory information about the president or his family or questions about financial improprieties by those close to the president. […]

Journalists continued to face harassment and intimidation by government officials. Although the government decriminalized libel in 2012, state officials regularly filed defamation complaints against news outlets in retaliation for publishing stories critical of the government. […]

In July 2012 the government repealed the law criminalizing libel and defamation, and the offenses were downgraded to civil violations; however, the law retains controversial legal provisions that make publicly insulting the president an offense punishable by a fine or up to five years in jail. Nevertheless, libel judgments were common, particularly against newspapers that were critical of the government.” (USDOS, 27. Februar 2014, Section 2a)

In seinem im Jänner 2014 veröffentlichten Bericht Freedom in the World 2014 schreibt Freedom House, dass die Verfassung Tadschikistans die Meinungs- und Pressefreiheit garantiere. Das Strafgesetzbuch enthalte indes den Tatbestand der Rufschädigung (engl.: „defamation“). Bisher sei es häufig zu harten Gerichtsurteilen gegen regierungskritische Zeitungen wegen Verleumdung (engl.: „libel“) gekommen. Zudem würden sich Anklagen gegen Journalisten nicht nur auf Verleumdung und Beleidigung beschränken. Wie Freedom House berichtet, sei im Oktober 2013 der Journalist Mahmadjusuf Ismoilow unter dem Vorwurf der Bestechung zu elf Jahren Haft verurteilt worden, nachdem er zuvor in einem Artikel vom März 2013 die lokalen Behörden kritisiert habe:

„Despite constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and the press, independent journalists face harassment and intimidation, and the penal code criminalizes defamation. Crippling libel judgments have been common, particularly against newspapers that are critical of the government. Though Tajikistan decriminalized libel in 2012, reclassifying it as a civil offense, the act of publicly insulting the president remains punishable by a jail term of up to five years and charges against critical journalists are not limited to libel or insult. [...] In October, journalist Mahmadyusuf Ismoilov was sentenced to 11 years in prison on bribery charges after publishing an article in March that criticized local authorities.” (Freedom House, 23. Jänner 2014)

Die Menschenrechtsorganisation Human Rights Watch (HRW) geht in seinem im Jänner 2014 veröffentlichten Jahresbericht 2014 (Berichtsjahr 2013) auf folgende Fälle von hartem Vorgehen der Behörden gegen RegierungskritikerInnen und Oppositionelle im Vorfeld der Präsidentschaftswahlen vom November 2013 ein, darunter auch auf die bereits oben erwähnten Fälle von Salimboj Schamsiddinow und Said Saidow:

„Authorities cracked down on government critics and the political opposition ahead of November’s presidential election. [...]

In March, Salimboy Shamsiddinov, head of the Uzbek society of the Khatlon region, was reported missing after leaving his home in Qurghonteppa. The authorities declared that there was no sign that Shamsiddinov was beaten or kidnapped. In July, officials claimed that a body resembling Shamsiddinov’s was found in a river in neighboring Uzbekistan, but Shamsiddinov’s family stated they did not recognize the body from the picture they were shown.

In April, unknown assailants attacked Mahmadali Hayit, deputy head of the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), outside his home in Dushanbe. The attack happened days before the IRPT’s planned 40-year anniversary convention. Hayit told Human Rights Watch that he had been under surveillance before the attack, and that unknown individuals in plain clothes were regularly coming to his home to inquire about his whereabouts.

In May, businessman and former Minister of Industry Zaid Saidov was detained at the Dushanbe airport on returning from a trip abroad. In April, Saidov had announced the creation of an opposition political party, New Tajikistan. Fellow New Tajikistan members believe that Saidov, currently on trial in a security services detention center on corruption, embezzlement, polygamy, and rape charges, was targeted for his opposition activity.

Also in May, Sherik Karamkhudoev, an IRPT leader from the autonomous province of Gorno-Badakhshan, was sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment for ’participating in mass disorders’ in a closed trial. Karamkhudoev was reported missing in April 2012 after government troops launched a military operation in his home region. He resurfaced two weeks later in security services custody in Dushanbe. His lawyers and family publicly stated that he was tortured in pretrial detention.

In September, authorities in Dubai pardoned Umarali Kuvvatov, head of the opposition movement Group of 24, following 10 months of detention on a Tajik extradition request. Kuvvatov, who was detained in Dubai’s airport in December 2012, stated that he feared assassination were he to be returned to Tajikistan and is now in hiding outside Tajikistan. A former businessman with close ties to the Rahmon family, Kuvvatov believes he is being pursued because of his opposition activities and his knowledge of high-level corruption.” (HRW, 21. Jänner 2014)

Auf den Fall Saidow geht das US Department of State (USDOS) in seinem im Februar 2014 veröffentlichten Länderbericht 2013 wie folgt ein:

„In May the Anticorruption Agency detained prominent Tajik businessman and former minister of industry Zaid Saidov at the Dushanbe airport upon return from a trip abroad. While Saidov was abroad, authorities opened criminal cases against him. Saidov reported to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty from Paris before his return to the country that the allegations were baseless and were part of growing pressure against him by authorities since April, when he announced his intention to establish the New Tajikistan political party in conjunction with several Tajik businessmen and academics. In September, Saidov’s closed trial hearing began. Authorities did not permit civil society organizations to monitor the hearings. On December 25, a court sentenced Saidov to 26 years in prison and ordered his property confiscated after the court found him guilty of fraud, corruption, statutory rape, and polygamy” (USDOS, 27. Februar 2014, Section 1e)

Das Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) berichtet im Juni 2013 über die Lage weiterer Mitglieder der von Saidow gegründeten Partei „Neues Tadschikistan" bzw. der Koalition für Demokratie und Zivilgesellschaft, die sich für den inhaftierten Saidow einsetze:

„Zayd Saidov, a former industry minister, was arrested on May 19, a month after setting up a political party called New Tajikistan. (See Emerging Force in Tajik Politics Arrested for more on this case.) Six days later, opposition politicians, human rights defenders and media activists set up a group called the Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society, which in turn established a committee in support of Saidov. Almost immediately, participants begin warned off. Journalist Mavjuda Sohibnazarova, a founding member of New Tajikistan and a participant in the Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society, said in media interviews that she had received death threats on Facebook and by phone. The messages told her to leave the party and stop supporting Saidov. On May 28, she was questioned by the national security service about her party membership. At this meeting, she said, intelligence officers also promised to investigate the threats against her. Another member of the coalition, Ramzia Mirzobekova, a journalist working for the leading news agency Asia Plus, was summoned by the security service the following day. In media interviews and on Facebook, she said she was questioned about her views on Saidov and her reasons for joining the coalition. She was warned that certain ‘external and domestic forces' might use her for their own ends. This prompted another coalition member, Social Democratic Party leader Rahmatillo Zoirov, to publish an open letter condemning the pressure placed on fellow-members.” (IWPR, 5. Juni 2013)

Weiters berichtet das USDOS über den oben erwähnten Fall des Journalisten Machmudjusif (Mahmadjusuf) Ismoilow wie folgt:

On October 28, courts sentenced journalist Makhmadyusif Ismoilov to 11 years’ imprisonment for blackmailing and extorting 400 somoni ($83.70) from a woman in the Asht district. He denied any wrongdoing and posited that the case against him was retaliation by local authorities whom he criticized in the media this year. Authorities detained Ismoilov for 11 months in 2010 on charges of defamation, insult, and incitement to hatred over an article he wrote accusing Asht government and law enforcement officials of corruption, abuse of power, and mismanagement of funds. Ismoilov was released in October 2011 after paying a 35,000 somoni ($7,330) fine; he was barred from journalistic work for five years. Ismoilov’s lawyer planned to appeal the October 28 court decision." (USDOS, 27. Februar 2014, Section 2a)

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) berichtet im April 2014, dass das Stadtgericht Duschanbe ein Urteil gegen die Journalistin Olga Tutubalina wegen „Beleidigung der tadschikischen Intellektuellen“ bestätigt. Tutubalina müsse ihren drei Klägern, die sich durch einen von ihr verfassten Artikel beleidigt gefühlt hätten, obwohl sie darin nicht namentlich genannt worden seien, eine Entschädigung in Höhe von 6000 US-Dollar zahlen:

„The Dushanbe City Court has upheld a ruling against independent journalist Olga Tutubalina. The court ruled on April 30 that the previous court decision against Tutubalina, who is deputy chief editor of the Asia Plus website, should remain unchanged. In February, a court in Dushanbe found Tutubalina guilty of ’insulting Tajik intelligentsia.’ The court ruled then that Tutubalina must pay $6,000 to three plaintiffs who claimed they were insulted by an article written by Tutubalina, even though they were not named in the article.” (RFE/RL, 30. April 2014)

In einem Artikel vom März 2014 geht IWPR näher auf die Hintergründe des soeben genannten Falles ein. Darin wird erwähnt, dass Tutubalina im Juni 2013 auf der Website der Nachrichtenagentur Asia Plus einen Blogeintrag gepostet habe, in dem sie der Intelligenz des Landes vorgeworfen habe, dass diese sich für das Vorgehen der Behörden gegen Oppositionelle instrumentalisieren lasse:

„On February 25, a court in the capital Dushanbe found against both Olga Tutubalina and the Asia-Plus news agency where she is an editor, in a libel case in which it was alleged that a blog entry she published last year caused collective ’physical and mental suffering‘ to intellectuals as a class of people. The three plaintiffs represented five institutions including the Union of Writers, the Academy of Sciences and the Union of Artists, Composers and Architects – all state-sponsored bodies. The court imposed a fine of 30,000 somoni (6,200 US dollars) and instructed the defendants to publish an apology. The plaintiffs had been seeking 200,000 somoni. Tutubalina posted the offending piece on the Asia-Plus website in June 2013. She alleged that the intelligentsia as a whole allowed the authorities to use it as a tool against the opposition. Tutubalina cited the case of well-known poet Bozor Sobir, whose returned from a long exile in 2011 at the invitation of Tajik president Imomali Rahmon. Sobir was one of the founders of the democratic movement in Tajikistan in the early 1990s, but Tutubalina noted that following his homecoming, he called on his fellow-intellectuals to rally around Rahmon and questioned the need for a multi-party system. She quoted a letter from Vladimir Lenin to writer Maxim Gorky in 1919 in which he condemned ‘the educated classes, the lackeys of capital who consider themselves the brains of the nation. In fact they are not its brains but its shit.’ The entry on Tutubalina’s popular blog, which often covers controversial issues like pressures on the political opposition or the plight of Tajik migrants in Russia, received more than 24,000 views and over 50 comments. Mehmon Bakhti of the Union of Writers, who was among those behind the lawsuit but not a plaintiff, refused to comment on the verdict, apart from indicating that he and his colleagues intended to hand over the damage payments to children’s’ charities. One of Tutubalina’s lawyers, Inoyat Inoyatov, told reporters that the verdict was groundless, and was the result of a politically-motivated case intended to silence a vocal critic. He said the defence team would be appealing against the decision.” (IWPR, 12. März 2014)

Die Nachrichtenwebsite EurasiaNet berichtet im Jänner 2014 über das Vorgehen der Behörden gegen den ethnisch usbekischen gesellschaftskritischen Schriftsteller Pulod Abujew, der in seinen Texten laut eigenen Angaben über ArbeitsmigrantInnen, Korruption und die „Scheinheiligkeit“ von BeamtInnen schreibe:

„Last July, authorities in Tajikistan confiscated the only manuscript of a little-known novelist’s latest book. In what can only be described as an Orwellian sequence, after the manuscript was seized at a Dushanbe printing house, the author was hauled in for interrogation and asked questions like, ‘who ordered you to write this book?’ The author, Pulod Abuev, 69, later appealed to representatives of the feared State Committee for National Security (GKNB) to have his work returned to him. After some time, Abuev was told that a special committee at the state-run Academy of Sciences had reviewed his writings, including stories critical of Tajikistan’s widespread corruption, and decided it ‘
‘offends the Tajik people.’ The manuscript, thus, was not returned. At a January 17 news conference, Abdulvokhid Shamolov of the Academy of Sciences, who conducted the review of Abuev’s work, said the author had expressed support for the theories of an unnamed ‘Uzbek scientist’ who has denied the existence of the Tajik nation. ‘The Academy of Sciences and the National Security Committee [GKNB] have performed their duties – to ensure security in the country,’ Shamolov said in comments carried by the Asia Plus news agency. Abuev’s case has heightened fears among some in Dushanbe’s creative class that Tajik authorities are trying to stamp out any form of freethinking under the vague pretext of patriotism. Already self-censorship is widespread among journalists who face libel charges and death threats when tackling tricky subjects. Local observers say the chief enforcer of the government’s perceived ‘group-think’ campaign is the GKNB, which is the recipient of training assistance from the American military. Abuev believes he was labeled an agent of rival Uzbekistan simply for expressing forthright views about the present state of Tajik society. One of the short stories in the manuscript is a thinly disguised tale about a new toll road that profits relatives of the president’s family. ‘I write about life, about labor migrants, about corruption and the hypocrisy of bureaucrats. Somebody has seen a threat to national security in my work. This is ridiculous,’ Abuev told EurasiaNet.org. […] When a social critic happens to be a member of an ethnic minority, the personal attacks can get ugly, noted Temur Varky, a Tajik citizen from a minority background who operates an independent television station in Moscow that broadcasts to audiences in Tajikistan.” (EurasiaNet, 28. Jänner 2014)

Die britische Wochenzeitung The Economist berichtet im Juni 2014 über die Inhaftierung von Alexander Sodiqow, eines tadschikischen Studenten an einer kanadischen Universität, der in der unruhigen östlichen Region Berg-Badachschan zu Konfliktlösungen und zur Zivilgesellschaft geforscht habe. Er werde in Haft ohne Kontakt zur Außenwelt gehalten und sei Berichten zufolge wegen Hochverrats angeklagt worden:

„It was always dangerous to be a journalist or government critic in Tajikistan. But, until recently, the predatory and paranoid regime of Emomali Rakhmon, the president, left graduate students alone. That changed June 16th when Alexander Sodiqov, a Tajik political science student in Canada who is employed by Britain’s University of Exeter, was detained by the secret police (still known colloquially as the KGB). He is being held incommunicado, but was reportedly charged with treason for interviewing an opposition leader shortly after meeting the British ambassador at a party. He faces 20 years in jail. Colleagues and rights activists have called the allegations farcical. Mr Sodiqov, 31, was detained in the restive eastern mountainous region of Gorno-Badakhshan while researching conflict resolution and civil society. The sparsely populated region is home to minority Pamiri ethnic groups marginalised by the nationalistic Mr Rakhmon in the far-off capital, Dushanbe. It is also awash with Afghan narcotics from across the long, porous border.” (Economist, 24. Juni 2014)

Repressionen gegen Familienangehörige

In einem E-Mail vom 11. September 2014 gab ein Wissenschaftler an einer westeuropäischen Universität, von dem keine Erlaubnis zur Nennung seines Namens und seiner Institution vorliegt, Auskunft zur Frage, ob ihm Fälle bekannt seien, in denen Familienmitglieder von politischen AktivistInnen bzw. MenschenrechtsaktivistInnen wegen der Aktivitäten letzterer ins Visier der Behörden geraten bzw. bestraft worden seien. Laut dem Wissenschaftler gebe es zahlreiche solcher Fälle. Er habe diese Fälle nicht historisch dokumentiert und sei oft nicht in der Lage, Geschichten, die er gehört habe, zu überprüfen. Einige dieser Berichte habe er jedoch verifizieren können. Zudem gebe es zahlreiche Berichte über solche Fälle, sodass Derartiges „zweifellos recht häufig“ vorkomme. (Wissenschaftler an einer westeuropäischen Universität, 11. September 2014)

 

Freedom House berichtet im Jänner 2014, dass die Behörden im August 2013 Familienangehörige des verhafteten Geschäftsmannes Said Saidow, die gegen dessen Inhaftierung protestiert hätten, wegen „Untergrabung der öffentlichen Ordnung" in Haft genommen hätten:

„In May, businessman Zayd Saidov was arrested on charges of rape, statutory rape, theft, extortion, and polygamy shortly after announcing the formation of a new political party; in August, family members who protested his arrest were themselves jailed for ‘undermining public order.’" (Freedom House, 23. Jänner 2014)

Wie Human Rights Watch (HRW) im Oktober 2013 berichtet, sei die Menschenrechtsaktivistin Oinihol Bobonasarowa von zwei Oppositionsparteien als Kandidatin für die Präsidentschaftswahlen im November 2013 nominiert worden. In der Folge hätten Behörden auf mindestens drei ihrer nahe Verwandten Druck ausgeübt und sie mit Verlust ihres Arbeitsplatzes oder strafrechtlicher Verfolgung bedroht:

„Bobonazarova, a well-known human rights activist, was jointly nominated in September by Tajikistan’s two opposition parties, the Social Democratic Party and the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), as their presidential candidate. Bobonazarova told Human Rights Watch that authorities had interfered with her campaign, intimidating, and in some cases detaining, her campaign workers in various regions of the country. Authorities also threatened people who had signed petitions in favor of her candidacy that they would have unspecified ‘problems’ and pressured at least three of her close relatives, threatening them with the loss of their jobs or prosecution.“ (HRW, 22. Oktober 2013)

 

 

Quellen: (Zugriff auf alle Quellen am 12. September 2014)

·      AI - Amnesty International: Return to torture: Extradition, forcible returns and removals to Central Asia [EUR 04/001/2013], 3. Juli 2013

http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR04/001/2013/en/6c3910ea-30bb-4b67-a7f2-b2ffc5780a09/eur040012013en.pdf

·      AI - Amnesty International/ Coalition against Torture of Tajikistan: Tajikistan: Joint follow-up submission to the Concluding Observations of the United Nations Committee against Torture [EUR 60/002/2014], 24. April 2014

http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR60/002/2014/en/834a5ba8-24e4-49cf-a73b-2428c2fb95ab/eur600022014en.pdf

·      CAT - UN Committee Against Torture: Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Tajikistan, adopted by the Committee at its forty-ninth session (29 October - 23 November 2012) [CAT/C/TJK/CO/2], 21. Januar 2013

https://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1369652854_cat-c-tjk-co-2-en.pdf

·      Economist: A scholar faces treason charges, 24. Juni 2014

http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2014/06/studying-tajikistan-turns-dangerous

·      EurasiaNet: Tajikistan: Intellectuals Finding Little Room for Reasoned Discourse, 28. Jänner 2014 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)

http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/268597/396640_de.html

·      Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2014 – Tajikistan, 23. Jänner 2014

http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/tajikistan-0#.VBBvgkDFxlE

·      Freedom House: Nations in Transit 2014 - Tajikistan, 12. Juni 2014 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)

https://www.ecoi.net/local_link/281427/411711_de.html

·      HRW - Human Rights Watch: Tajikistan: End Crackdown Ahead of Election, 22. Oktober 2013

http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/10/21/tajikistan-end-crackdown-ahead-election

·      HRW - Human Rights Watch: World Report 2014 - Tajikistan, 21. Januar 2014 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)

http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/267822/395177_de.html

·      IWPR - Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Tajik Government Takes Out Critics, 5. Juni 2013

http://iwpr.net/report-news/tajik-government-takes-out-critics

·      IWPR - Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Tajik Journalist Fined for Collective Libel, 12. März 2014 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)

http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/271776/400455_de.html

·      IWPR - Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Tajikistan's Islamic Opposition Feels Pressure, 29. Juli 2014 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)

http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/282052/412412_de.html

·      OSZE - Organisation für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa: Republic of Tajikistan

Presidential Election 6 November 2013; OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final

Report, 5. Februar 2014 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)

http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1788_1391693737_110986.pdf

·      RFE/RL - Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Tajik Opposition Leader Beaten In Capital, 19. April 2013 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)

http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/245668/369144_de.html

·      RFE/RL - Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Dushanbe City Court Upholds Defamation Ruling Against Journalist, 30. April 2014 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)

http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/274989/404095_de.html

·      USDOS - US Department of State: Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2013 - Tajikistan, 27. Februar 2014 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)

https://www.ecoi.net/local_link/270757/400864_de.html

·      Wissenschaftler an einer westeuropäischen Universität: E-Mail-Auskunft, 11. September 2014