13. Juni 2014

 

In seinem Bericht an den UNO-Sicherheitsrat (UN Security Council) vom Jänner 2014 (Berichtszeitraum 1. März 2011 bis 15. November 2013) schreibt der UNO-Generalsekretär, dass bewaffnete oppositionelle Gruppen Kinder sowohl für unterstützende Tätigkeiten als auch für Kampfhandlungen rekrutieren und verwenden würden. Es gebe zwar keine Informationen über die Rekrutierung von Kindern durch Regierungstruppen, diese seien jedoch für die Verhaftung, willkürliche Festnahme und Folter von Kindern wegen deren vermeintlichen oder tatsächlichen Verbindungen zur Opposition, sowie für die Verwendung von Kindern als menschliche Schutzschilde verantwortlich. Die Vereinten Nationen hätten übereinstimmende Berichte über die Rekrutierung und die Verwendung von Kindern durch mit der Freien Syrischen Armee (FSA) in Verbindung stehenden Gruppen erhalten. Die Verhaltensregeln der FSA vom August 2012 würden kein Verbot der Rekrutierung und Verwendung von Kindern enthalten, es gebe aber Anzeichen, dass die Praxis auch nicht aufgrund einer politischen Vorgabe oder systematisch angewendet werde. Interviews mit Kindern und ihren Eltern würden darauf hindeuten, dass der Verlust von Eltern und Verwandten, politische Mobilisierung und Gruppendruck von der Familie oder der Gemeinschaft zum Engagement der Kinder bei FSA-nahen Gruppen beitragen würden. Viele Jungen hätten angegeben, dass sie es als ihre Pflicht betrachten würden, sich der Opposition anzuschließen. Auch scheine die Teilnahme von Kindern oft durch erwachsene Verwandte ermöglicht worden zu sein. Die unterschiedlichen bewaffneten oppositionellen Gruppierungen hätten unterschiedliche Regeln zur Rolle von Kindern und zum Alter, ab dem Jungen eine militärische Ausbildung erhalten würden und ab dem ihnen das Tragen von Waffen oder die Teilnahme an Angriffen erlaubt werde:

„11. Armed opposition groups recruited and used children, both in support roles and for combat. While no information was available on the recruitment of children by Government forces, they were responsible for the arrest, arbitrary detention and torture of children for their perceived or actual association with the opposition, and for using children as human shields.

12. Throughout the reporting period, the United Nations received consistent reports of recruitment and use of children by FSA-affiliated groups. The FSA Code of Conduct of August 2012 did not mention or prohibit the recruitment and use of children. However, monitoring and verification activities indicated that it was not conducted as a policy or systematically. Interviews with children and their parents indicated that the loss of parents and relatives, political mobilization and peer pressure from families and communities, contributed to the involvement of children with FSA-affiliated groups. Many boys stated that they felt it was their duty to join the opposition. The absence of age-verification procedures or command order prohibiting these acts also enabled child recruitment. In addition, participation of children seems to have often been facilitated by an elder male relative. For instance, in 2011, an FSA member from Homs governorate claimed that there were many children in his group, including his 15-year-old son. Although children were trained in using weapons and knives, the decision to arm a child was made on an individual basis. Various armed opposition groups had different rules on the role of children, and the age at which boys were given military training and permitted to carry arms or participate in attacks. A 12-year-old boy from Idlib city, for example, claimed he had been turned down from joining his brother in FSA in 2012 owing to his age.” (UN Security Council, 27. Jänner 2014, S. 4)

Jungen im Alter von 12 bis 17 Jahren seien ausgebildet, bewaffnet und als Kämpfer oder zur Besetzung von Checkpoints verwendet worden, so der Bericht des UNO-Generalsekretärs weiter. Die FSA würde Kinder auch als Köche, Träger, Waffenschmuggler, Spione, Boten sowie zum Reinigen von Waffen und zum Vorbereiten und Laden der Munition verwenden. Auch gebe es Fälle, in denen Jungen und Mädchen von der FSA für medizinische Evakuierungen eingesetzt worden seien, was sie einem hohen Risiko ausgesetzt habe:

„13. Boys aged 12 to 17 years were trained, armed and used as combatants or to man checkpoints. For instance, a 15-year-old boy reported having been recruited in April 2012 by FSA in Tall Kalakh (Tartus governorate), and having participated in military operations. After having been caught in a Government ambush, he fled the area and left the group. Also indicative was the case of a 16-year-old boy from Homs, who reportedly joined FSA in 2012 as a combatant. In March 2013, his family reported to the United Nations that he was still fighting with the group. Two boys, aged 16 and 17 years, were reportedly treated in a makeshift hospital in February 2012 in the city of Aleppo after fighting under the command of FSA. FSA also used children as cooks, porters, cross-border smuggling of arms, lookouts, spies and messengers, as well as to clean weapons and prepare and load ammunition. For instance, a 17-year-old boy from Al Qusayr, Homs governorate, was trained, given a weapon and used to assist civilians trapped or wounded during shelling, and to bury the dead. Cases were also documented of boys and girls being used by FSA in crossborder and cross-line medical evacuations for the delivery of medical supplies to field hospitals and to assist emergency and trauma health services, which put them at high risk.” (UN Security Council, 27. Jänner 2014, S. 4-5)

Der Bericht des UNO-Generalsekretärs erwähnt, dass Fälle von Rekrutierungen und Verwendung von Kindern durch syrisch-kurdische bewaffnete Gruppen besonders gegen Ende des Berichtszeitraums dokumentiert worden seien. Berichte über Jungen und Mädchen zwischen 14 und 17 Jahren, die unterstützend und kämpfend mit syrisch-kurdischen bewaffneten Gruppen in der Provinz Al-Hassaka in Verbindung stünden, seien dokumentiert und verifiziert worden. So habe ein 17-jähriger Junge angegeben, sich im Juli 2012 einer bewaffneten Gruppe angeschlossen zu haben, um seine Viertel in der Grenzstadt Qamischli zu beschützen. Es habe auch Anschuldigungen in Bezug auf Kinder, die mit den Gruppen Jabhat al-Nusra und ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Sham) in Verbindung stehen würden, gegeben, diese hätten aber bis zum Zeitpunkt des Erscheinens des Berichts nicht bestätigt werden können. Besonders besorgniserregend seien auch Fälle von Rekrutierungen unter der Flüchtlingsbevölkerung der Nachbarländer:

„14. Cases of recruitment and use of children by Syrian Kurdish armed groups were documented in particular towards the end of the reporting period. Reports of boys and girls aged 14 to 17 years associated with Syrian Kurdish armed groups in Al Hassakeh governorate in support and combat functions were documented and verified. Children have mostly been used to man checkpoints and transfer information and military supplies, but they have also been trained to participate in combat. A 17-year-old boy stated that he had joined Syrian Kurdish armed groups in July 2012 to protect his neighbourhood in the border town of Al Qamashli (Al Hassakeh governorate). He claimed that he had received training and later had participated in military operations and guarded checkpoints. Allegations were also received of children associated with Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS, but no cases could be verified at the time of writing the present report.

15. Of particular concern were cases of recruitment or attempted recruitment of children within refugee populations in neighbouring countries. The majority of incidents were related to recruitment by FSA-affiliated groups or Syrian Kurdish armed groups. The lack of education or job opportunities and peer pressure were identified as key factors leading to the recruitment of refugee children.” (UN Security Council, 27. Jänner 2014, S. 5)

Die Vereinten Nationen hätten keine Berichte erhalten über Kinder, die formell durch Regierungstruppen rekrutiert worden seien, so der Bericht des UNO-Generalsekretärs. Allerdings hätten Berichten zufolge Regierungstruppen und regierungsnahe Schabiha-Milizen und Volkskomitees junge Männer, darunter auch welche unter 18 Jahren, eingeschüchtert und festgehalten, damit sie sich ihnen bei Angriffen oder bei Checkpoints in umkämpften Gebieten anschließen. Auch habe es Berichte über die Verwendung von Kindern als menschliche Schutzschilde gegeben:

„16. The United Nations did not receive reports of children having been formally recruited by Government forces. However, Government forces, including the Shabiha militia and the popular committees/National Defence Forces, reportedly intimidated and seized young males, including those under the age of 18, to join their ranks at checkpoints and during raids in pro-Government and contested areas. In one instance in July 2012, a man reported to the United Nations that the Syrian Armed Forces had tried to recruit his 16-year-old son while they were passing a checkpoint in Deir ez-Zor governorate.

17. The United Nations also gathered reports of the use of children as human shields during Government forces ground operations, particularly ones that were carried out in 2011 and 2012. For example, during Ramadan in 2011 in Kafr Nubl (Idlib governorate), Government forces reportedly used civilians, including at least eight children, as human shields, threatening to kill the children if the opposition did not surrender; the fate of the eight children remains unknown. In April 2012, the Syrian Armed Forces reportedly invaded Deir Balbi (Homs governorate) and forced women and children into the street. As FSA groups approached the town, civilians, including children, were reportedly forced to line up and stand between the tanks and soldiers of the Syrian army to dissuade FSA groups from attacking. In March 2012, in Homs city, the Syrian Armed Forces reportedly abducted children from schools and marched them in the streets with loudspeakers announcing their arrival and informing potential attackers not to fire as they had children with them. In August 2012, in Kuferzita village, Hama governorate, the Syrian Armed Forces reportedly arrested a large number of children, both boys and girls, mainly between the ages of 10 and 12, and used them as human shields. Children were also forced to face Government tanks, sing pro-Government songs and organize a demonstration in favour of the President of the Syrian Arab Republic under threat that they would be arrested or detained. The Syrian Armed Forces reportedly abducted approximately 20 of these children, who were released a week later in a state of shock and with marks of torture.” (UN Security Council, 27. Jänner 2014, S. 5-6)

Auch in seinem jüngsten Bericht an den UNO-Sicherheitsrat vom 23. April 2014 erwähnt der UNO-Generalsekretär, dass er Berichte über Rekrutierung von Kindern erhalten habe:

„13. The treatment of civilians under the control of parties to the conflict also continued to raise serious concerns during the reporting period. This includes reports of killings; enforced disappearances; torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; arbitrary arrest and detention; kidnappings; and increasing sexual violence, by many parties to the conflict. In addition, reports have been received of incidents of child recruitment and child labour.” (UN Security Council, 23. April 2014, S. 3)

Die unabhängige internationale Untersuchungskommission zu Syrien berichtet im Februar 2014 an den UNO-Menschenrechtsrat zum Thema Verletzung von Kinderrechten durch Regierungskräfte und regierungsnahe Milizen, dass regierungsnahe Milizen Kinder ab dem Alter von 13 Jahren bewaffnet und an Checkpoints in Aleppo, Dara’a und Tartus eingesetzt hätten. Im Oktober 2013 seien in Ataman Kinder ab 14 Jahren bewaffnet und von Volkskomitees ausgebildet worden. Regierungskräfte und Milizen hätten Handlungen durchgeführt, die Kriegsverbrechen darstellen würden, darunter Folter von Kindern in Haft und die Rekrutierung und Verwendung von Kindern:

„Violations of children’s rights

1. Government forces and pro-government militia

72. Pro-government militia armed and used children from the age of 13 at checkpoints in Aleppo, Dara’a and Tartus. In October 2013, in Ataman (Dara’a), children from the age of 14 were armed and trained by popular committees.

[…] 78. Government forces and militia perpetrated acts that constitute war crimes, including torture of children in detention and the recruitment and use of children. Use of children by pro-government militia violates the commitment of the Syrian Arab Republic to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child.“ (UN Human Rights Council, 12. Februar 2014, S. 13)

Zum Thema Verletzung von Kinderrechten durch nichtstaatliche bewaffnete Gruppen berichtet die unabhängige internationale Untersuchungskommission zu Syrien, dass Kinder von Ahrar al-Sham, verschiedenen mit der FSA in Verbindung stehenden Gruppen, von Jabhat al-Nusra und von ISIS rekrutiert und verwendet worden seien. Ende 2013 seien Kinder in kämpfender Funktion bei FSA-nahen Gruppen in Tamoura (Aleppo), mit Jabhat al-Nusra in al-Hassaka und mit der ISIS in ar-Raqqah und Aleppo beobachtet worden. Bewaffnete Gruppen würden rekrutierte Kinder von 12 bis 14 Jahren Checkpoints zuteilen und sie zum Laden der Munition verwenden. Minderjährige Kämpfer der YPG (Popular Protection Units, kurdische bewaffnete Gruppierung) seien im Juli und August 2013 in Qamischli in al-Hassaka und in Ayn al-Arab in ar-Raqqah gesehen worden. Nicht-staatliche bewaffnete Gruppen hätten Kriegsverbrechen begangen, indem sie Kinder unter 15 Jahren eingezogen und verwendet hätten, um aktiv an Kampfhandlungen teilzunehmen:

„2. Non-State armed groups

79. Children were recruited and used by Ahrar al-Sham, several FSA affiliated groups, Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS. In late 2013, children were observed in combat roles with FSA-affiliated groups in Tamoura (Aleppo), with Jabhat Al-Nusra in Al-Hasakah, and with ISIS in Ar Raqqah and Aleppo. Children were wounded during active combat.

80. Armed groups assigned child recruits from the age of 12 to 14 years to checkpoints and used children to load ammunition. In 2013, minors were seen at ISIS checkpoints in Ar Raqqah and at Saddam Hussein Battalion checkpoints in Aleppo. Children received weapons training by Jabhat Al-Nusra in Tal Rifat (Aleppo) in July 2013. ISIS used a school in Al Bab (Aleppo) as a military training camp for boys in September 2013.

81. Underage YPG fighters were seen in Qamishli (Al-Hasakah) and in Ayn Al-Arab (Ar Raqqah) in July and August 2013. In a letter dated 30 September 2013 addressed to the commission, the YPG stated its policy not to use children under 18. An order issued on 14 December from its central command to YPG commanders echoed these guidelines. Adherence to this policy continues to be monitored.

[…] 84. Non-State armed groups have perpetrated the war crime of enlisting and using children below the age of 15 to participate actively in hostilities, and have recruited and used children under the age of 18 years in hostilities contrary to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child. […]“ (UN Human Rights Council, 12. Februar 2014, S. 13-14)

In einem mündlichen Update der unabhängigen internationalen Untersuchungskommission zu Syrien an den UNO-Menschenrechtsrat vom März 2014 wird berichtet, dass bewaffnete Gruppen, darunter ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra und FSA-nahe Gruppen weiterhin Kinder für Kampfhandlungen verwenden würden. Die Anwesenheit bewaffneter Jungen und Mädchen zwischen 14 und 17 Jahren sei bei Checkpoints der YPG in Qamischli, al-Malikiya und al-Hassaka dokumentiert worden, obwohl YPG-Kommandanten im Dezember 2013 Befehle erhalten hätten, Kinder unter 18 Jahren nicht zu rekrutieren:

„Non-State armed groups

35. Armed groups, including ISIS, Jabhat Al-Nusra and FSA-affiliated groups have continued to use children in hostilities. Fighters under the age of 18 years were observed in the attack on Adra in December 2013. Armed 16 and 17 year olds were observed at ISIS and FSA checkpoints in eastern Aleppo governorate in February.

36. In Al-Raqqah governorate, ISIS has used children to inform on supporters and opponents of ISIS within the civilian population under its control. The use of children in such functions endangers their welfare and interferes with children’s rights.

37. Despite orders issued to YPG commanders in December 2013 not to recruit children below the age of 18 years, the presence of armed boys and girls aged 14 to17 years, was documented at YPG checkpoints in Qamishli and Al Malikiyah in Al Hasakah as well as in Afrin, Aleppo.“ (UN Human Rights Council, 18. März 2014, S. 5-6)

Die Child Protection Working Group (CPWG), eine globale Vernetzungsinitiative für Akteure im Bereich des Kinderschutzes im Rahmen des von UNHCR geleiteten „Global Protection Cluster“, veröffentlichte 2013 eine zwischen Februar und Mai 2013 durchgeführte Erhebung auf der Basis von Interviews zum Kinderschutz in Syrien. Darin wird angegeben, dass 61 Prozent der Befragten angegeben hätten, dass Kinder andere Kinder für Streitkräfte und bewaffnete Gruppen rekrutieren würden. Mögliche Erklärungen, die sich aus den Antworten der Befragten ergeben hätten, seien die Erosion der öffentlichen Ordnung, der Mangel an konstruktiven altersgerechten Aktivitäten und Angeboten, psychosozialer Druck, den Kinder in Form von Aggression, Wut oder Hoffnungslosigkeit verspüren oder der bei ihren Pflegepersonen zu potentiellem Mangel an Aufsicht führe. Schließlich gebe es auch speziell im Falle von Rekrutierungen ein Gefühl der Verpflichtung gegenüber Familie und Gemeinschaft:

„Children’s participation in violence was listed by 45% of respondents. The most commonly reported types of violence were looting and/or pillage (63%) and children recruiting other children into armed forces and armed groups (61%). Respondents were not directly asked to propose reasons for children’s participation in violence; however, responses to other questions suggest a range of possible explanations: the erosion of public order; lack of constructive, age-appropriate activities and services; psychosocial distress in children (e.g. aggression, anger, hopelessness) and their caregivers (potentially leading to lack of supervision); and, specific to the case of recruitment, a sense of obligation to family and community.” (CPWG, 2013, S. 11)

Syrien habe das Zusatzprotokoll der UN-Kinderrechtskonvention über die Beteiligung von Kindern in bewaffneten Konflikten ratifiziert, so die CPWG weiter. In seiner Erklärung anlässlich der Ratifizierung habe Syrien angegeben, dass niemand unter 18 Jahren in die nationalen syrischen Streitkräfte eingezogen werden dürfe. Auch habe Syrien sein Strafrecht im Juni 2013 novelliert und dabei die Strafen für die Rekrutierung von Kindern verschärft. Vor dem Konflikt habe es keine Beweise für die Rekrutierung von Kindern gegeben.

Laut der von CPWG durchgeführten Umfrage würden 71 Prozent der befragten Personen glauben, dass die Rekrutierung von Kindern durch Streitkräfte und bewaffnete Gruppen im Steigen sei, 40 Prozent hätten angegeben, dass sie persönlich Kinder kennen würden, die sich angeschlossen hätten. Die Daten würden „freiwillige“ Rekrutierungen von Kindern nahelegen, wobei Kinder ab 15 Jahren von ihresgleichen und ihren Gemeinschaften als junge Erwachsene mit Verpflichtungen gegenüber Familie und Gemeinschaft betrachtet würden. Auch könnte ihre Verbindung mit Streitkräften und bewaffneten Gruppen als vorteilhaft angesehen werden, da es Einkommen, Status und Schutz verleihe:

„Syria has ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict. In its declaration upon ratification, it stated that no one under the age of 18 was permitted to enlist in Syria’s national armed forces or reserves. Syria also amended its Penal Code in June, toughening sentences for child recruitment and gender-based violence. Prior to the conflict, there was no evidence of children being recruited into the armed forces. Respondents were not asked to distinguish between armed forces or groups, nor to identify specific perpetrators.

Most respondents (71%) believed that the recruitment and use of children by armed forces and armed groups was increasing, with a sizable number (40%) stating that they personally knew children who had joined. Recruitment in their area of departure had been noted by 62% of respondents, suggesting that the use of children by armed forces and armed groups in Syria is happening at significant scale in the conflict. Certainly, the Secretary General’s most recent report on Children and Armed Conflict confirms that children under 18 years of age have been used by armed groups in both combat and support roles, such as loading bullets, delivering food and evacuating the injured.

Evidence suggests recruitment is of a ‘voluntary’ nature, with children aged 15 and above perceived by themselves and their communities as young adults with obligations towards their families and communities. Their association with armed forces and armed groups may also be perceived as beneficial, conferring income, status and protection. When asked about the type of work children are engaged in, 20% of respondents said children are being used by armed forces and armed groups. Almost half of all respondents (48%) said that some families had sent children outside of Syria in order to avoid recruitment.” (CPWG, 2013, S. 13)

Es gebe Einzelberichte, wonach Rekrutierungen häufig über Familienbande stattfinden würden, so die CPWG in ihrem Bericht. Dafür spreche auch der hohe Anteil der Befragten, die „zu Hause“ als Ort der Rekrutierung angegeben hätten. Auch die Schule sei häufig als Ort der Rekrutierung angegeben worden:

„There is anecdotal evidence (including from humanitarian interviews) that recruitment frequently happens through family links to armed forces and armed groups – e.g. siblings or parents. This correlates with the high rate of respondents mentioning home (32%) as a location of recruitment, and the fact that families are often the pivot for engagement in Syrian society. This is corroborated by information from the Commission of Inquiry that reported the use of kinship systems, as well as sectarian affiliation and cash payments for recruitment. When asked what type of violence children were participating in, 61% of respondents replied that children were engaging in the recruitment of other children, which may or may not be linked to familial connections or peer associations in other settings. This could also correlate with the high rates of respondents mentioning school as a location of recruitment. The overall data indicates a relatively even spilt between respondents reporting that recruitment took place along sectarian lines and those reporting that it did not. Highest rates were recorded in Rural Damascus and Al-Hassakeh.

The risk was seen to be significantly higher for boys, with 77% of respondents stating that recruitment affected ‘mostly boys’ or ‘only boys’. 21% of respondents believed boys and girls were equally at risk of recruitment. This was further confirmed by responses to the type of work children are engaged in: 66% said being used by armed forces and armed groups mostly affected boys and 33% of respondents felt it affected both boys and girls. The risk was overwhelmingly seen to be higher for children aged over 14 years (96% of respondents).” (CPWG, 2013, S. 14)

In einer Anfragebeantwortung des norwegischen Herkunftsländerinformationszentrums Landinfo vom Mai 2014 zur Rekrutierung von Kindern durch bewaffnete Gruppen werden mehrere Gesprächspartner zitiert, die im September 2013 in Beirut zum Thema Zwangsrekrutierungen von Jugendlichen befragt wurden. Vertreter von Human Rights Watch, Crisis Group und verschiedenen westlichen Botschaften hätten angegeben, dass sie keine Hinweise auf zwangsweise Rekrutierungen in bewaffnete Gruppen hätten, weder auf Regimeseite noch auf Seiten der Opposition. Die meisten Kinder würden sich freiwillig melden. Gleichzeitig erlebe eine Reihe von jungen Männern und Kindern unter 18 Jahren den sozialen Druck von Familie und Gemeinschaft und Erwartungen ihrer Umgebung, sich bewaffneten Gruppen anzuschließen und sich am Krieg zu beteiligen. Diese Form des sozialen Drucks herrsche in Syrien und unter den Flüchtlingen in den Nachbarländern. Auch wirtschaftliche Erwägungen seien ein wichtiger Antrieb bei Rekrutierungen. Der Krieg habe viele Familien abhängig von zusätzlichen Einnahmen aus Kinderarbeit gemacht, und Löhne von bewaffneten Gruppen seien eine der wenigen Einkommensmöglichkeiten. Die Einstellungen der Eltern zu Rekrutierung von Kindern durch bewaffnete Gruppen seien unterschiedlich. Einige Eltern seien stolz darauf, dass ihre Kinder sich bewaffneten Gruppen anschließen, andere würden aktiv versuchen, eine Rekrutierung ihrer Kinder zu verhindern. Einige seien sogar von zu Hause geflohen, um die Rekrutierung ihrer Kinder zu vermeiden:

„Representanter for Human Rights Watch (HRW), Crisis Group og ulike vestlige ambassader som Landinfo snakket med i Beirut i september 2013, forklarte at de ikke så noen indikasjoner på at det foregikk tvangsrekruttering til væpnede grupper, verken på regimesiden eller blant de opposisjonelle. De fleste barn lar seg verve frivillig. Samtidig opplevde en del unge menn og barn under 18 år et sosialt press fra familie og nærmiljø og forventninger fra omgivelsene om at de burde slutte seg til væpnede grupper og delta i krigen. Denne formen for sosialt press gjorde seg gjeldende inne i Syria og blant flyktninger i nabolandene. Økonomi var også en viktig drivkraft i rekrutteringen. Krigen har medført at mange familier er avhengig av ekstrainntekter fra barnas arbeid, og lønn fra væpnede grupper er en av få inntektsmuligheter. Foreldrenes holdninger til rekruttering av barn til væpnede grupper varierte. Enkelte foreldre var stolte over at barna sluttet seg til væpnede grupper. Andre forsøkte aktivt å forhindre at deres barn ble rekruttert. Enkelte flyktet sågar fra sitt hjemsted for å unngå rekruttering av egne barn (HRW 2013; Crisis Group 2013; FN-organisasjon i Jordan; Vestlige diplomater i Beirut 2013).“ (Landinfo, 28. Mai 2014, S. 2)

Das US-Außenministerium (US Department of State, USDOS) berichtet in seinem Jahresbericht zur Menschenrechtslage vom Februar 2014, dass laut UNO-Untersuchungskommission die Verwendung von Kindern im Kampf im Vergleich zu früheren Jahren angestiegen sei. Junge Männer würden laut der UNO-Untersuchungskommission in die Streitkräfte und die nationalen Verteidigungskräfte eintreten, manchmal erzwungen. Drei 17-jährige Jungen seien an Checkpoints in Aleppo zwangsrekrutiert worden, einer davon sei innerhalb von zwei Wochen getötet worden. Es seien Personen im Alter von 16 und 17 Jahren bei den Schabiha-Milizen beobachtet worden. Die UNO-Untersuchungskommission habe berichtet, dass einige oppositionelle bewaffnete Gruppen Kinder rekrutiert und für die aktive Teilnahme an Kampfhandlungen verwendet hätten. Das USDOS zählt auch einzelne Beispiele aus verschiedenen Berichten auf. Die syrische oppositionelle Koalition habe laut USDOS öffentlich die Rekrutierung und Verwendung von Kindersoldaten zurückgewiesen:

„Child Soldiers: The COI [UN Commission of Inquiry] concluded that the use of children in combat increased compared to previous years. According to the COI, young men entered, sometimes forcibly, the army and the National Defense Forces. Three 17-year-old boys were forcibly recruited at checkpoints in Aleppo; one was killed within two weeks. Older soldiers reportedly mistreated young recruits and pushed them toward frontlines. Persons 16 and 17 years old were observed in the shabiha militias.

The COI reported that some opposition armed groups recruited and used children for active participation in hostilities, potentially drawing them into the mistreatment of detainees. The Abu Yusef Battalion reportedly trained a 14-year-old boy from Homs to use weapons and track soldiers’ movements in al-Waar. A report from several UN relief agencies concluded that opposition forces recruited underage refugees living in camps outside Syria. A March Save the Children report found that armed groups forcibly recruited children under the age of 18 to serve as human shields. The UN secretary-general’s annual report on Children in Armed Conflict found that children under the age of 15 served in support and combat roles in the FSA, acting as porters and loading bullets. The report cited the example of 16- and 17-year-old boys who sustained injuries while in combat with the FSA. The COI reported that a 13-year-old boy, who enlisted with an FSA brigade in Dara’a, was used as a porter whose duties included carrying the wounded and medicines and preparing ammunition. Another 13-year-old boy joined an FSA-affiliated group and provided support services. According to the COI, both Liwa al-Tawheed and Jabhat al-Nusra included fighters between the ages of 14 and 18 years old. The report also noted that other FSA units, such as in Dayr al-Zawr governorate, rejected the use of child soldiers. The Syrian Opposition Coalition publically rejected the use and recruitment of child soldiers.” (USDOS, 27. Februar 2014, Section 1g)

 

 

Quellen: (Zugriff auf alle Quellen am 13. Juni 2014)

·      CPWG - Child Protection Working Group: Syria child protection assessment 2013, 2013

http://cpwg.net/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2013/09/SCPA-FULL-Report-LIGHT.pdf

·      Landinfo: Syria: Rekruttering av barn til væpnede grupper, 28. Mai 2014 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)

http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1788_1402400595_2894-1.pdf

·      UN Human Rights Council: Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/25/65], 12. Februar 2014

http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session25/Documents/A-HRC-25-65_en.doc

·      UN Human Rights Council: Oral Update of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 18. März 2014

http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/OralUpdate18March2014.pdf

·      UN Security Council: Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic [S/2014/319] (Berichtszeitraum 1. März 2011 bis 15. November 2013), 27. Jänner 2014 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)

http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1392195527_n1362707.pdf

·      UN Security Council: Implementation of Security Council resolution 2139 (2014) [S/2014/295] (Berichtszeitraum 22. März bis 21. April 2014), 23. April 2014 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)

http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1399471231_n1430558syr.pdf

·      USDOS - US Department of State: Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2013 - Syria, 27. Februar 2014 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)

https://www.ecoi.net/local_link/270641/399497_de.html