Query response on Lebanon: Information on organisations Hezbollah and Amal, their activities and influence as well as on incidents in January and May 2008 [a-8025]

1 June 2012
This response was commissioned by the UNHCR Protection Information Unit. Views expressed in the response are not necessarily those of UNHCR.
This response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to ACCORD within time constraints and in accordance with ACCORD’s methodological standards and the Common EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin Information (COI).
This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status, asylum or other form of international protection.
Please read in full all documents referred to.
Non-English language information is comprehensively summarised in English. Original language quotations are provided for reference.
 
Amnesty International (AI) reports in May 2012 that the Lebanese Center for Human Rights (Centre libanais des droits humains, CLDH) has reported on allegations of torture by persons affiliated to Amal. The Amal political party has filed a criminal complaint against the organization:
“Marie Daunay and Wadih Al-Asmar, staff members of the Lebanese Center for Human Rights, were questioned by the General Prosecutor on 22 March after the Amal political party, headed by Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri, filed a criminal complaint against the organization because it had reported allegations of torture by people affiliated to Amal. The case was pending at the end of the year.” (AI, 24 May 2012)
Human Rights Watch (HRW) in January 2012 also reports on this issue:
“In March the general prosecutor opened a criminal investigation against the Lebanese Center for Human Rights (CLDH) after Amal, a leading political party, filed a complaint against CLDH for alleging that some detainees reported being tortured by members affiliated with Amal.” (HRW, 22 January 2012)
The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB), in a query response of November 2011, cites the following comments by the director of the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut and the president of the Lebanese Center for Human Rights with regard to Hezbollah:
“The Director of the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, expressing his personal assessment, indicated that ‘although [Hezbollah is] very powerful, they generally don't threaten or interfere with people on an individual basis; unless that person is a security threat to them, or has done something to one of their members, etc.’ (Director 4 Oct. 2011). The Director also stated that an individual may fear Hezbollah due to a ‘previous clash or conflict with them, or [with] one of their members’ (ibid.). Furthermore, in his personal view, if Hezbollah is ‘after’ someone, there is ‘no protection in Lebanon’ (ibid.). According to the President of the CLDH, ‘the Lebanese state implicitly acknowledges the practices of Hezbollah and does not offer any protection to people that fear that they will be victims of violations perpetrated by Hezbollah’ (CLDH 5 Oct. 2011). The President also states that ‘[t]here are no safeguards to protect the detainees at the hands of Hezbollah from torture and other ill-treatments’ (ibid.).” (IRB, 16 November 2011)
“According to the President of the CLDH, ‘Hezbollah conducts arrests, investigations and detentions in a number of zones under its control’ (5 Oct. 2011). The President of the CLDH indicated that these practices should be considered contrary to Lebanese law (ibid.). A report written by the CLDH indicates that at times, Hezbollah ‘tortures’ detainees that are suspected of collaboration with Israel before giving them to the Lebanese authorities (CLDH et al. Jan. 2011, 25). The report also states that it is impossible to assess the prevalence of allegations of torture conducted by Hezbollah (ibid., 29).” (IRB, 16 November 2011)
In a country advice published in September 2011, the Australian Refugee Review Tribunal (ARRT) cites an Operational Guidance Note[1] by the UK Home Office:
“The UK Home Office noted that while inter-factional fighting in May 2008 resulted in many deaths and injuries, there were ‘no known reports of reprisals by Hizballah against individuals for affiliation to a particular Lebanese political group’. The report noted, however, that if an applicant feared the actions of local Hezbollah members, ‘internal relocation to an area not under Hizballah control is likely to be an option in the majority of cases’. Further, ‘[i]ndividuals who are able to establish that they are of significant adverse interest to Hizballah may be unable to obtain protection in Hizballah areas or relocate’.” (ARRT, 5 September 2011, p. 2)
In an country advice of April 2011, the ARRT reports on the situation of individuals that are “of specific interest” to the Hezbollah:
“The March 14 Alliance has its powerbase in what are prominent Sunni, Druze and Maronite Christian areas which are confined to the northern half of Lebanon, including the northern and western suburbs of Beirut. Therefore, it is unlikely that a March 14 Alliance member would be targeted by Hezbollah in this part of the country. However, the UK Home Office reports that although Hezbollah is a dominant force in the southern suburbs of Beirut, as well as in the Bekaa Valley and southern Lebanon generally, if an individual was of specific interest to the organisation, it is unlikely that either moving to another part of the country or relying on state protection would be an option.” (ARRT, 7 April 2011, p. 6)
The US Department of State (USDOS), in its country report of May 2012 (covering the year 2011), states that Hezbollah retained significant influence over parts of the country and operated detention facilities. Further, Hezbollah continued the practice of arbitrary arrest and detention. Government forces were unable to enforce the law in the predominantly Hezbollah-controlled Beirut southern suburbs:
“Despite the presence of Lebanese and UN security forces, Hizballah retained significant influence over parts of the country, and the government made no tangible progress toward disbanding and disarming armed militia groups, including Hizballah. Palestinian refugee camps continued to act as self-governed entities and maintained security and militia forces not under the direction of government officials.” (USDOS, 24 May 2012, Executive Summary)
“Nongovernmental entities such as Hizballah and Palestinian militias also operated detention facilities, about which there was no information available.” (USDOS, 24 May 2012, Section 1c)
“Authorities failed to observe many provisions of the law, and government security forces--as well as extralegal armed groups such as Hizballah--continued the practice of arbitrary arrest and detention, including incommunicado detention. […]
In June Hizballah announced it had detained several individuals it suspected of spying for foreign intelligence agencies. Hizballah did not release the names of the detained individuals, and no further information was available regarding their status at year’s end.” (USDOS, 24 May 2012, Section 1d)
“The government maintained security checkpoints, primarily in military and other restricted areas. Government forces were unable to enforce the law in the predominantly Hizballah-controlled Beirut southern suburbs and did not typically enter Palestinian refugee camps.” (USDOS, 24 May 2012, Section 2d)
The USDOS further states that political parties including Amal and Hezbollah were known to influence the General Confederation of Lebanese Workers (CGTL). In December 2011 members of the Amal Movement and the pro-Syrian Sunni Ahbash group clashed in Beirut. Three persons were killed and 11 injured:
“The law provides that unions conduct activities free from interference, but in practice the Ministry of Labor interfered in union elections and registered unions not considered representative by the General Confederation of Lebanese Workers (CGTL), which represents a total of 52 union federations. The Ministry of Labor has previously encouraged the establishment of unions for political purposes, including some that did not have significant representation among the sector they represented. Political figures also sought to influence union activities. Political parties including Amal and Hizballah were known to influence the CGTL.” (USDOS, 24 May 2012, Section 7a)
“On December 15, a fight between two individuals evolved into an armed clash between members from the Shia Amal Movement and the pro-Syrian Sunni Ahbash group in Bourj Abi Haidar in Beirut, leaving three dead and 11 injured. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) intervened to contain the clash.” (USDOS, 24 May 2012, Section 1)
In its previous country report of April 2011 (covering 2010), the USDOS provides the following information on riots and conflicts in January and May 2008 involving Hezbollah and Amal:
„During January 2008 riots protesting power outages in the predominantly Shia Muslim area of Shiyah, an unknown assailant shot and killed an Amal movement official. In response the riots turned violent, with protestors throwing stones and setting cars ablaze; seven civilians died, and more than 19 were injured. In February 2008 the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) arrested 17 persons, including 11 soldiers and three officers, for excessive use of force in containing the protests. Authorities later released on bail the three officers, some of the soldiers, and other individuals. […]
According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), during the May 2008 conflict, members of the opposition groups Hizballah, Amal, and the Syrian Socialist National Party (SSNP) used small arms and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) in densely populated areas of Beirut, killing numerous civilians. For example, HRW reported opposition gunmen shot and killed Amal Baydoun and her son, Haytham Tabbarah, with an RPG while the two were trying to flee their Ras al-Nabaa neighborhood. Opposition gunmen shot and injured Tabbarah's two brothers later that day while they were trying to join their family at the hospital. “ (USDOS, 8 April 2011, Section 1a)
In its query response dated 16 November 2011 the IRB provides further information concerning Hezbollah:
“The Associated Press (AP) reports that Hezbollah is the ‘most powerful political and military force in Lebanon’ (3 July 2011). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, the Director of the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, expressing his personal assessment of Hezbollah, indicated that Hezbollah is ‘very influential’ and ‘can do what it wants’ (Director 4 Oct. 2011). Jane's Intelligence Review indicates that Hezbollah is ‘arguably militarily and politically stronger now than at any other time in its 30-year history, yet it is also facing some of its greatest ever challenges’ (13 Oct. 2011). Jane's Intelligence Review also states that Hezbollah is Lebanon's ‘dominant military and political actor’ (13 Oct. 2011)
Hezbollah's military wing is called Islamic Resistance (Jane's Intelligence Review 13 Oct. 2011; Al Jazeera 13 Dec. 2007). According to Jane's Intelligence Review, Islamic Resistance is ‘one of the most formidable non-state military forces in the world,’ and has reportedly ‘expanded enormously’ since the 2006 war between Israel and Lebanon (13 Oct. 2011). Referring to US government estimates, the CFR indicates that Hezbollah has ‘several thousand militants and activists’ (CFR 15 July 2010). Jane's Intelligence Review explains that expansion has occurred in manpower, armaments, deployment, strategies and means of communication (13 Oct. 2011).” (IRB, 16 November 2011)
 

References: (all links accessed 1 June 2012)
·      AI – Amnesty International: Amnesty International Report 2012 - The State of the World's Human Rights, 24 May 2012
http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/lebanon/report-2012
·      ARRT - Australian Refugee Review Tribunal: Country Advice Lebanon – LBN39198 – March 14 Alliance – Hezbollah – State Protection, 5 September 2011 (available at ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1336569024_lbn39198.pdf
·      ARRT - Australian Refugee Review Tribunal: Country Advice Lebanon – LBN38440 – the Special Tribunal for Lebanon – Hezbollah – 14 March Alliance, 7 April 2011 (available at ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1336567713_lbn38440.pdf
·      HRW - Human Rights Watch: World Report 2012, 22 January 2012 (available at ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/208793/314330_en.html
·      IRB - Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada: Hezbollah, including areas of operation, political involvement, military activity, recruitment practices, mistreatment of citizens and state protection [LBN103846.E], 16 November 2011 (available at ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/206540/311830_en.html
·      USDOS - US Department of State: Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2011 - Lebanon, 24 May 2012 (available at ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/217709/324339_en.html
·      USDOS - US Department of State: Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2010, 08 April 2011 (available at ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/158222/260656_en.html
 


[1] These documents aim to provide guidance for UKBA officials on whether the main types of claim are likely to justify the grant of asylum, humanitarian protection or discretionary leave.