ACCORD Anfragebeantwortung

Nach einer Recherche in unserer Länderdokumentation und im Internet können wir Ihnen zu oben genannter Fragestellung Materialien zur Verfügung stellen, die unter anderem folgende Informationen enthalten:

 

„Government Corruption and Transparency

The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption; however, the government did not implement the law effectively, and officials sometimes engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. There was a widespread public perception of government corruption at all levels. The World Bank's worldwide governance indicators reflected that corruption was a serious problem. According to Transparency International's 2007 Global Corruption Barometer, 21 percent of respondents stated that they or their family members had paid a bribe during the past year.

Public officials are subject to financial disclosure under the conflict of interest law; however, the Committee for Financial Disclosure may only recommend dismissal for failure to file reports, and not for the substance of the information reported.

During the year authorities made some new arrests for corruption and continued the prosecution of high-profile cases from previous years. While the government's Anticorruption Council frequently made public statements and granted interviews, the body had no legal standing and had only an advisory role. There were reports of authorities failing to act in response to detailed reports of suspected corruption. Unlike in previous years, there were no reports of high-profile politically motivated investigations.

On January 22, the trial of the "bankruptcy mafia" commenced. A total of 36 defendants, including Goran Kljajevic, former president of the Belgrade Commercial Court and commercial court judge Delinka Djurdjevic, faced charges of bribery, abuse of office, and illegal bankruptcy. The government accused the defendants of operating a lucrative scam in which the commercial court would declare enterprises bankrupt and the Postal Savings Bank would provide cheap loans to favored businessmen to buy the enterprise's assets at a below-market price. The trial was ongoing at year's end.

In April Dejan Simic, former vice governor of the National Bank of Serbia, and Socialist Party of Serbia director Vladimir Zagradjanin were indicted for bribery. Simic allegedly accepted a suitcase containing the equivalent of $146,000 cash (100,000 euros) in exchange for agreeing to register the Credit Export Bank. The trial had not begun by year's end.

In May the trial of 53 persons charged in the "highway mafia" case began. Prosecutors accused the defendants of using false payment cards and illegal software on two major tollgates between 2004 and 2006, resulting in a loss of approximately $9.5 million (6.5 million euros) in state revenue.

In July police charged a former general manager of the power utility Elektroprivreda Srbije, Ljubomir Geric, and three other former executives of the company in connection with agreements between the utility and two trading companies between 2001 and 2004, citing the loss of millions of dollars to the state budget.

In September the fraud and embezzlement trial of Mihalj Kertes, the former Head of the Customs Service during the Milosevic era, began. The case was part of the ongoing "Cyprus money laundering" investigation of former Milosevic officials, conducted by the organized crime prosecutor's office.

The leader of the Power of Serbia Movement, Bogoljub Karic, remained outside the country at year's end. Shortly after Karic formed a new parliamentary caucus in 2006, police issued a warrant for his arrest on charges of tax evasion, mismanagement of millions of dollars, and money laundering while he was owner of the telecommunications company Mobtel. Authorities took no additional action in this case.

The trial of deputy public prosecutor Milorad Cvijovic was underway at year's end. Cvijovic was charged with the unauthorized appropriation of a court document from the archives of the state prosecutor's office in 2005 in order to influence proceedings in a commercial case.

There was no new information in the trial of former minister of defense Prvoslav Davinic, charged with facilitating apartment leases for his bodyguards. On July 2, prosecutors indicted Davinic, Major General Milun Kokanovic and Colonel Jovica Vuckovic for abusing their positions in connection with a 2005 military equipment purchase scandal. Mile Dragic, reported as the owner of a military equipment firm, was concurrently charged with attempted fraud and possession of illegal weapons.

Government implementation of the 2004 access to information law continued to be slow, and the government generally did not provide access in practice. The law provides for public access to information of "legitimate public importance" (with many exceptions) and establishes an independent commissioner, selected by the Serbian parliament, to handle appeals when government agencies reject requests for information. In March the Commissioner of Information released a report on the law that concluded that agency compliance was increasing but was still poor. According to a September 2006 report by Transparency International, 81 percent of local institutions, 67 percent of public enterprises, and 35 percent of ministries were failing to fulfill their obligations under the access to information law, even as requests for information tripled between the end of 2005 and the end of 2006. NGOs reported that their requests for information from the government frequently went unanswered.

On March 30, the government signed a contract to build a highway from Horgos to Pozega through Vojvodina. The Anticorruption Council, local Vojvodina officials, journalists, and NGOs following corruption publicly questioned whether the contract was awarded to the lowest bidder. Infrastructure Minister Velimir Ilic repeatedly refused public efforts to obtain the contract, citing a secrecy clause in the contract, which he claimed was intended to protect the contractor's proprietary information. After continued public pressure and public requests for information under the access to information law, the ministry posted most of the contract on its Web site. At year's end, the government was in the process of implementing the contract.” (USDOS, 11. März 2008, Sek. 3)

“It is now widely accepted that the justice system is the weakest of Kosovo’s main institutions. That reality is reflected in the decision of the European Union to focus the efforts of its European Security and Defence Policy mission to Kosovo on police and justice issues.

Kosovo’s inadequate justice system has far-reaching consequences. In particular, many of Kosovo’s ongoing human rights problems, particularly ethnically- and politically-motivated violence, can be traced back to the failure of the authorities to bring perpetrators to justice.

Human Rights Watch’s research indicates that the weakness of Kosovo’s criminal justice system has many causes. A major change to the system, introduced in 2004, whereby prosecutors rather than judges take the lead in investigating cases, has yet to be fully implemented.

Prosecutors now appear to take a more active role in leading investigations than was the case at the time of our previous report of May 2006, “Not on the Agenda: The Continuing Failure to Address Accountability in Kosovo Post-March 2004.” But proscutors’ cooperation with the police remains problematic. Prosecutors are supposed to be assisted in their new investigative role by a judicial police branch, with dedicated officers. But the branch has yet to be established, largely because of opposition from both international and national police, who fear that a separate branch would create divisions within the police. No formal alternative arrangements have been put in place.

Concerns over lenient sentencing practices and a lack of understanding by judges of the applicable law remain, although training for national judges has improved.

The justice system remains deeply divided between its national and international elements. There has been some progress in improving collaboration between national prosecutors and judges and their international counterparts. But the continuing lack of confidence among international institutions about the ability of the national officials fairly to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate sensitive cases means that national police, prosecutors, and judges are frequently cut out of such cases. The lack of integration in the system undermines its efficiency and hampers efforts to build capacity among national prosecutors and judges.

Inadequate witness protection remains a major impediment to justice, especially for organized crime, war crimes, and attacks on minorities. As cases of witness intimidation and harassment are widespread, many witnesses are unwilling to come forward, fearing for their lives. Kosovo lacks a witness protection law, and judges and prosecutors often fail to use existing protective measures available in courtrooms. For witnesses in the most sensitive cases, relocation outside Kosovo is the only effective means of protection. Yet foreign governments have so far been reluctant to accept witnesses at risk.

Despite millions of euro of funding, the electronic case management system is still not operational, exacerbating the backlog in cases and making effective monitoring and resource allocation almost impossible. Outreach to affected communities is inadequate, leaving victims and witnesses in the dark about the outcome of cases, and further undermining confidence in the system.

There is insufficient independent oversight over the work of judges, prosecutors, and the police. The inspectorate body set up to investigate complaints against the Kosovo Police Service lacks experience and authority. And the justice system generally lacks transparency, making it hard for the public to determine whether justice is being done, and to hold to account the national and international institutions that are responsible for justice.

An EU rule of law of mission (known as “EULEX”), with international judges, prosecutors and police officers, is the main element of the new EU-led mission to Kosovo, reflecting international recognition of the scale of the problem. But ending impunity and building the rule of law will depend on the ability to learn from the mistakes of the past, and a willingness on the part of the Kosovo government and the new international mission to police, prosecute, and punish criminal conduct, wherever and by whomever it is committed.” (HRW, März 2008, S. 1 f., Introduction)

“Witness Protection and Relocation

Better Witness Protection

PARTIALLY IMPLEMENTED

The unwillingness of many people in Kosovo to cooperate with the police in criminal investigations remains a critical impediment to the accountability for crimes, including, but not limited to, organized crime and inter-ethnic and political violence. The most important factor is the systemic inability to protect those witnesses who are willing to testify.

Given Kosovo’s size and social structure, witness relocation outside Kosovo may be the only effective way to protect witnesses in the most sensitive cases. But much greater use of witness protection measures short of relocation could bring real benefits in other cases.

It is clear from discussions with representatives from the UNMIK DoJ, the European Union, and donor governments, that improved witness protection has become a priority for donors. Funding from various donors has meant that witness protection equipment (“witness boxes,” video links, voice changing devices, etc) is now available in all main courts in each of the regions.But despite the wide range of measures currently available to conceal witnesses’ identity, a November 2007 joint report from the OSCE and the US Office in Pristina concluded that frequently prosecutors do not request and judges do not use such measures

This phenomenon may be explained by an insufficient awareness among police, prosecutors, and judges of the effect that witness protection measures can have on the outcome of the proceedings.Witness protection continues to suffer from lack of a coherent legal framework. A comprehensive witness protection law is currently being developed, in order to provide clear guidelines, rules of procedure, and to assign responsibilities to all parties involved in witness protection. At this writing, there is no coherent budget for witness-protection-related expenses, with funding channeled through various institutions’ budgets (including the KPS and UNMIK), which diminishes its efficiency and causes unnecessary delays.

Human Rights Watch’s interlocutors have emphasized the continued importance they attach to appropriate handling of sensitive data. However, one international official noted that occasional disclosure of the identity of protected witnesses to the local press (which often irresponsibly publicizes the identity of witnesses) still results from careless file handling by the courts and other administrative structures.According to a local prosecutor Human Rights Watch spoke to, existing procedures are “porous” enough to allow for a wide range of persons to deal with files, which increase the risk of inadvertent disclosure of witnesses’ identities or other confidential case information.

Witness Relocation Arrangements with States outside the Region

NOT IMPLEMENTED

For some witnesses, relocation outside Kosovo may be the only viable option. Nevertheless, cases of successful witness relocation remain rare. Those arranged to date relied on ad hoc negotiations between the UNMIK Witness Protection Unit and the governments in question.Foreign governments have been reluctant to accept witnesses from Kosovo, in part because of wider issues relating to their migration and asylum policies. Kosovo’s unusual legal status has also complicated efforts to reach agreement with other governments to accept witnesses.

Another problem is the lack of adequate financial resources to transport and then to support the relocated witnesses, resulting in the hosting states assuming financial responsibility.

The greater clarity on Kosovo’s status may facilitate better coordination on this issue. But fundamentally, it requires political will on the part of the US, EU, and other governments to accept witnesses in their territory, and to provide adequate financial support to the witness relocation program.” (HRW, März 2008, S. 21 f.)

Kosovo Criminal Justice Scorecard 24

Role of International and National Authorities

Outreach to Affected Communities

NOT IMPLEMENTED

The principle of open justice requires that justice must not only be done, it must be seen to be done. That requires an effective outreach program to communicate with the public what is happening in the criminal justice system, including letting victims know the status of investigations into their complaints. Human Rights Watch’s research on the status of the March 2004 investigations revealed a widespread lack of knowledge about the ongoing investigations and prosecutions among the affected minority communities. Almost all the displaced persons and municipal representatives we interviewed for our May 2006 report said they had little or no knowledge of any actions taken to bring to justice those responsible for the March violence. This lack of information deepened the level of distrust toward both international and Kosovo institutions within the minority communities.

Since then, some attempts have been made by UNMIK, UNMIK police, the KPS, and KFOR to reach out to the communities, especially minorities that are the most vulnerable to violence. Community policing has been strengthened by deploying more police officers to perform monitoring and liaison functions. Local safety councils exist in most municipalities, but the frequency with which they meet and the level of their activity varies greatly.

The councils were established by UNMIK to provide a platform where police, KFOR, village leaders, and municipal officials could meet to discuss all safety-related concerns. They are composed of international (UNMIK, KFOR, sometimes also UNMIK police) and local (KPS, municipal authorities, minority community leaders) representatives, and monitored by the OSCE.

In practice, it appears that neither the local safety councils nor community policing have contributed a great deal to the resolution of security problems at a local level. According to a Serbian community leader, many within minority communities see the structures as little more than window dressing, designed to create the impression that “things are going well and improving.”

Greater Transparency

NOT IMPLEMENTED

Open justice also requires transparency in the functioning of the criminal justice system. Obtaining accurate and up-to-date information on the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and inter-ethnic violence is a difficult task in Kosovo, especially for non-English-speaking individuals based outside Pristina.More generally, the criminal justice system lacks transparency. No significant changes have occurred in this regard since the publication of our May 2006 report. As noted above, the absence of a functioning electronic case management system hampers access to case information, including statistics.

Moreover, the public is not well informed about criminal court decisions, and outreach to victims and complainants frequently fails to take place. Members of the public, including affected communities, rely on the Kosovo media for information about the criminal justice system. The media tend to focus only on the most high-profile trials.“ (HRW, März 2008, S. 24 f.)

“Judicial Framework and Independence.

The strengthening of the judiciary in Kosovo continued in 2007. The process of promulgating laws improved, but implementation remained a chronic problem. The body of applicable laws in Kosovo is still a tangle of divided areas; this hampers the delivery of justice, as judges are not always certain of the legal basis for their decisions. The court system still features an insufficient number of judges and a weak Office of the Prosecutor General. Nevertheless, steps were taken in 2007 to improve the protection of witnesses, the Office of the Special Prosecutor was created, and several high-profile public cases were initiated. Procedures were not respected during the election of a Kosovar ombudsperson, causing concern and opposition from both Kosovar and international human rights organizations. Kosovo’s rating for judicial framework and independence remains at 5.75.

Corruption. Corruption remains widespread in Kosovo. The Office of the Auditor General continued publishing reports on massive abuse of public funds and procedures at PISG- and UNMIK-controlled institutions. The Anticorruption Agency (AKK) became operational and submitted 47 cases to the Office of the Special Prosecutor. The AKK solved 61 cases, while 16 were pending at year’s end.

The AKK took steps to conform with the Law on Public Procurement and annulled tenders amounting to €7 million (US$10.3 million) where regulations had been violated. The UN Office of Internal Oversight Services began investigating top UNMIK officials, while UNMIK police and the Kosovo Police Service arrested high-level PISG officials suspected of money laundering. Despite the general lack of political will to fight corruption, 2007 featured some of the most concrete anticorruption activities and successes to date in Kosovo; thus, the corruption rating improves from 6.00 to 5.75.“ (FH, Juni 2008)

“Ethnic Minorities

The BBC reported on 15 February 2008 that “Kosovo's Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi has vowed to protect the rights of all minorities as the province prepares to declare independence from Serbia.” CNN added “Thaçi said he was establishing a new government office for minorities. ‘Not a single citizen of the new independent Kosovo will feel discriminated against or set aside,’ he said.”

The USSD report for 2007 noted that “During the year violence and other crimes directed at minorities and their property lessened but remained a problem.”

The 120,000 remaining ethnic Serbs are mainly located in the three northern municipalities of Leposavic, Zubin Potok, Zvecan; the most southerly municipality of Strpce, and in the northern half of the city of Mitrovice. (BBC News, 15 February 2008) (See Municipality Profiles below). The USSD report for 2007 noted that: “There were multiple reports of violence against Kosovo Serbs during the year, which was usually investigated by the international police unit, a unit composed of UN international police officers within the KPS that reports directly to the police commissioner, who is also an international staff member.” (UK Home Office, 20. März 2008)

Diese Informationen beruhen auf einer zeitlich begrenzten Recherche in öffentlich zugänglichen Dokumenten, die ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehen. Diese Antwort stellt keine Meinung zum Inhalt eines bestimmten Ansuchens um Asyl oder anderen internationalen Schutz dar. Wir empfehlen, die verwendeten Materialien zur Gänze durchzusehen.