Volume 5, No. 3 - September 2001
Volume 5, No. 3 - September 2001
By Bulent Aras
Editor's
Summary: The
author analyzes the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran, its changing
balance of power, debates, and wider meaning. He suggests that this comprises an
ongoing experiment in the attempt of Muslims to find some system which combines
tradition and religion with stability and material success. The emerging
situation is one in which President Muhammad Khatami is simultaneously president
and leader of the opposition. There is a lively debate among Iranians and
Islamists in other countries about the proper course to seek and the appropriate
mix of secularism and democracy for their societies.
The
history of the Iranian political system since the early days of the revolution
might be called a "transformation process." An analytical study of
this experience can provide clues on the system's future shape. The
revolutionary elite, operating under the heavy impact of the shi'a legacy
concerning the legitimacy and authority of political relations, created an
ideological political system which has been controlled by a set of institutions
dominated by religious leaders and pro-revolutionary elites.(1) The gradual
transformation of the political system has led to a two-track model, based on
the hegemony of bureaucratic institutions or state elites and the limited role
of conventional political elites in this system.
Arguments
based on notions of a "failure of political Islam" or "Iranian
Westernization" are not the best way to understand the evolution of the
Iranian institutions, political thought, or the system as a whole. What is going
on in Iran is less a failure of the Islamic revolution or of Islam itself than
it is an ongoing experiment, a search for a new Muslim identity, in which
various ideas and structures are being tried and in some cases rejected. This is
an ongoing process that has been occurring throughout the Islamic world for more
than 80 years. Due to the absence of a universal institutional template,
different societies and polities are likely to construct various unique
identities and models of "good governance." An analysis of Iran, in
this context, might help us to gain a better grasp on the whole picture and a
better understanding of the ongoing processes of political change throughout the
Islamic world.
Such
an attempt should first emphasize the main turning points of the political
history of the revolution. Without detaching them from their historical context,
the dynamics of change and the emergence of different political positions need
to be seen as mechanisms of transformation that have been in operation for over
two decades. In this way, it would be possible to analyze the transformation of
the Iranian political system along with its broader political implications.
THE
IRANIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM SINCE THE REVOLUTION
It
is useful to look at the political history of the Islamic revolution as divided
into three distinct periods. The first period might be referred to as the
"first republic" or the period of revolutionary Islam, from 1979 to
1988. The second period, from 1988 to 1997, might be referred to as the second
republic or the reconstruction period. The third republic or the period of
searching for a more open society began with the election of Mohammed Khatami in
1997.
Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini assigned Mehdi Bazargan the task of establishing a
transitional regime in Iran following the Islamic revolution of 1979. Bazargan
adopted a cautious approach, defending gradual, step-by-step change, opposing
the use of any domestic violence so as to mobilize support for the new regime.
He closed the revolutionary courts that had been founded following the Islamic
revolution and sought to provide and strengthen the rule of law in Iran. He
resigned, however, after the student attack on the U.S. embassy on November 4,
1979. The Iranian people voted for Abulhassan Sadr for the presidency; but, he
was soon dismissed by Khomeini. The next president, Mohammed Ali Rejaee, was
assassinated by the opposition Mojahedeen-i Khalq organization.(2)
After
1981, control of the Iranian political system shifted to pro-revolutionary
elites who closely followed Khomeini's line of thinking. Throughout this period,
the state attempted to maintain society in a state of emergency with the help of
radical religious factions, declaring that their goal was not only to
"free" Iranian society, but the whole world as well. All resources
were mobilized to conduct this "war" and to provide the world with a
more happy future founded upon religious principles. These elites sought to
mobilize mass support for their cause of establishing a permanent Islamic regime
in Iran.(3)
This
period was characterized by an attempt to stifle all divergent opinions,
declaring all opposition to be "anti-revolutionary" and "agents
of imperialism." Other salient characteristics of this period were a belief
in a charismatic velayet-i faqih (the mandate of the jurist) and an
overtly ideological character of the state machinery. Islam was seen as the only
legitimate source of political thought and it completely dominated the public
sphere; revolutionary elites accepted the politico-religious doctrines of
neither East nor West and sought to struggle against what they saw as
"global imperialism," especially as represented by the United States.
As a result, virtually all forms of foreign investment were discouraged.(4)
This
period continued until the end of the Iran-Iraqi war in 1988. The end of the
war, however, along with Khomeini's death, laid the foundation for a political
restructuring of society. The recognition of the need to change the direction of
state policy was mostly due to the regime's inability to cope with the massive
problems that it faced as a result of its isolation. In addition, the
revolutionary elite began to lose its ideological cohesiveness and profound
differences began to emerge.
By
1988, the Iranian economy nearly collapsed and domestic production had decreased
by five-fold. Iran continuously used up its resources during the war and at the
same time population increased around 40 percent. Iranian economy was not in
good shape even shortly after the revolution. A profound currency crisis, the
loss of human life and material damages that resulted from the war, a severe
budget deficit, and floating petroleum prices presented extremely grave problems
for Tehran.
The
second republic began with Khamanei in a position of religious authority and the
assumption of Rafsanjani to the presidency.(5) In this era, the rights that
accompanied religious leadership were extended by legal amendments and the
office of the premier was merged with that of the presidency. The subsequent
erosion of the legitimacy of the religious regime, the economic demands of the
people, coupled with the collapse of the Soviet bloc led to a search for a new
economic order in Iran. Rafsanjani's tenacious personality and his progressive
ideas concerning economic development were central factors that led to an
eventual restructuring of the economy. Economic reconstruction became the
central goal of this era. Other government objectives included a gradual
separation of the economic realm from ideological elements, large-scale
privatization, greater freedom with respect to foreign trade, and a
restructuring of the legal framework in conformity with international laws and
norms.
These
attempts at economic reconstruction and political liberalization created great
excitement throughout the society and the debate over passing from a religious
to a more modern or secular administration dominated discussions in intellectual
circles. Cornerstone premises of the revolution, such as the hegemony of
religious values, came to be seen by many as obstacles to reconstruction. By
March 1989, Iran had moved into a period of a planned economy that initiated
widespread economic changes throughout the country.
At
the same time that economic reconstruction was pursued throughout the country,
the ruling elite also adopted a more pragmatic line with respect to foreign
policy, especially toward Europe and the Gulf Arab monarchies. Their principal
goal was to attract foreign investment and aid in order to overcome the massive
damages caused by the war. They sought to find a place for Iran in the
international political economy. Rafsanjani gained legitimacy in the eyes of the
religious leadership by putting forward the idea that reconstruction would
create an exemplary state for other Muslim countries, through economic
development and advancement.(6) He was successful, therefore, in getting
permission to attract and accept foreign investment.
The
ruling elite failed, however, to accept fully the extension of economic
liberalization into the cultural and political realms. The resistance of the
religious leadership restricted progressive development to economic
considerations. The gains made during this period, therefore, were very limited.
Conservative attitudes remained dominant, especially in the cultural sphere and
success in economic reconstruction was limited as well. Attempts at political
and economic reconstruction and liberalization, for the most part, only served
to facilitate the emergence of a new class of wealthy people who prospered on
the basis of state resources. Poverty among the common people increased even
further.
The
period of second republic, though on a limited scale, led to an opening of space
in which the main premises of the revolution came to be questioned and a more
open and civilian style of government was first imagined and then slowly put
into place. These developments came to be called the "intellectual
religious movement"--it was fostered, in particular, by the writings of
Aldulkarim Soroush. Reformist intellectuals became increasingly alienated from
the state and organized privately. Much of this activity took place in the
universities. Probably the most important aspect of this era was the emergence
of a variety of political demands, supported by various institutions and
organizations. The emergence of new politico-economic demands, the increasing
search for a more open society and rich intellectual debates constituted the
main source of "Khordad 2," (May 23, the day Khatami was elected) as
the new Iranian revolution came to be called. Nevertheless, the conservative
bloc of religious leadership, although faced with a profound legitimacy and
authority crisis, continued to dominate developments throughout this period.
Demands
for continued reform became united under the umbrella movement led by Mohammed
Khatami, who the Iranian people selected as their third president on May 23,
1997. At least in theory, there was a shift from a system based on a charismatic
leader to a system inspired by the will of the people.(7) This opened up new
horizons and provided greater opportunity for the representation of popular
demands in the administration. It also meant that, for the first time, the
Iranian people were able to constitute a serious challenge to the dominant
minority, which had heretofore ruled the country with an iron hand. Most of the
basic premises of the revolution came to be seen as outmoded and a new social
contract became both a necessity and a reality.
Khatami
gave priority to civil society, the rule of law, greater political freedom,
respect for pluralism and a more open dialogue with the West. While he did not
describe freedom as anti-religious, he emphasized that institutions that did not
appreciate the importance of freedom were destined to fail and disappear.
Khatami sought to establish an institutionalized freedom in the public sphere
and attempted to draw boundaries that would allow for necessary constitutional
amendments.
The
Khordad 2 movement was the result of differences among powerful factions, the
crystallization of new ideological tendencies, and the demands of the people.
Iranian society is still in search of a new social contract based on openness,
civil society, pluralism, and freedom. In accord with these demands, important
positive developments have come to life: there is greater (though still very
limited) freedom of the press and an increasing acknowledgment of the civil and
human rights of opposition groups.
THE
DECOMPOSITION OF IRANIAN POLITICS
Important
differences in the Iranian political arena emerged in the early part of the
1980s. At that time, the major issues on the political agenda were religious law
and economic development. Not much later, however, differences sharpened over
issues of public planning, foreign affairs, and the reshaping of the political
system.(8) Khatami's ascendancy to the presidency represented a profound turning
point and created a system of two powerful political blocs, conservatives and
reformists, and a third bloc that consisted of relatively weaker groups.
Those
political factions that give precedence to defending the status quo and opposing
reformist demands represent the conservative camp. The main point of reference
for conservative groups is the institution of Velayet-i Faqih and they
consider it as the bastion of all laws and norms. Other references are the call
for continued Islamization of the state and the reflection of this religious
character in all matters of state, absolute obedience to state authority, and
absolute state hegemony in the political realm. The foremost groups in this camp
are the Hizballah along with more moderate conservative groups.
The
Hizballah organization considers itself to be the only legitimate authority in
the Iranian political system and regards all means as acceptable in order to
safeguard the revolution.(9) In their view, human history is a mammoth struggle
between the forces of good and evil, and it is a religious duty to engage in the
war against all evil forces. This group was the leading force in the Iranian
political scenario until 1988; since that time, it has continued to serve as an
extremely important pressure group in Iran. It still holds great power over the
military, as well as government, intelligence, and security institutions. The
history, ideology, and legacy of this movement has largely been shared by the
Islamic Revolution Resistance Front (Jebhe-e Mokavemete Engelabe Eslami)
as well as Ansar-ul Hizballah.
Conservative
groups followed Khomanie in asserting that religious leaders should govern the
state based on shari'a (Islamic law). These groups have accepted the
leadership of the Velayet-i Faqih and have stood opposed to the
development of democracy and civil society as Western inventions. Jame-e
Ruhaniyete Mobarez (Community of Struggling Mullahs), Jemiyete Motelefe-e
Eslami (United Islamic Community) and Peyrevan-e Khatte Emam ve Rehberi
(Followers of the Line of Imam and Religious Leader) may be considered to be the
forerunners of this ideological front.
The
reformist bloc consists primarily of those groups which are in favor of
reforming the Iranian political system and institutionalizing these reforms
through constitutional amendments. The groups gathered in this bloc were among
those responsible for the revolution, but, over time, they gradually became
alienated from the regime. This bloc demonstrated quite dramatically, in the
1997 presidential elections, that it had greatly increased support among the
Iranian people. The reformist bloc argues that democratic principles are or can
be compatible with an Islamic order. They see tolerance and consensus as
integral parts of social life and civil society as a positive project that is
necessary for the respect of human rights and political freedoms. In contrast to
conservatives, they seek to restrict the role of Velayet-i Faqih and to
create a legal framework for this position. The reformist bloc can be classified
into two different groups: moderate reformists and leftist reformists.
Moderate
reformists are gathered together under the leadership of former President
Rafsanjani. They seek to increase the public welfare and overcome the
difficulties or roadblocks to economic development. This group consists of
technocrats, managers, industrialists, and upper level bureaucrats. The groups
in this camp include Khizb-e Karguzarane Sazendegi Iran (Servants of the
Reconstruction Party) and ve Khizb-e Etedal ve Tosee (Moderation and
Development Party).
The
leftist reformists argue that the most important obstacle to the development of
Iranian society is the failure to broaden participation in the political realm
and provide more freedom in this sphere. They see this as necessary to overcome
what they see as a bottleneck in the Iranian political system. They argue that
the minority which holds political power in Iran is not open to popular
accountability and that their performance leaves a great deal to be desired.
This, they argue, is why the dominant group has lost support and is no longer
seen as legitimate by the Iranian people. Mejme-e
Ruhaniyon Mobarez (Community of Struggling Mullahs), Sazman-e Mojahedin
Engelab Eslami Iran (Comabatants of Islamic Revolution), Khizb Khembestegi-e
Iran-e Eslami (Islamic Solidarity Party of Iran), Jebhe-e Moshareket-e Iran-e
Eslami (Islamic Participation Party of Iran), Khizb-e Kare Eslami Iran
(Islamic Labor Party of Iran) are the principal parties that comprise this bloc.
For
reformists, once the republic--as it is defined in the constitution--has been
established in Iran, then the political system will be improved to a
considerable extent. The influential Iranian thinker, Abdul Karim Soroush, known
as intellectual architect of Khatami revolution, is in favor of keeping religion
aside when it comes to ruling the state. He argues that shari'a may be basis of
modern legislation but it should be flexible and adaptable rather than being
static.(10) The power of the intellectuals in Iran, and in other areas with a
Muslim majority or minority, is increasing and also gaining transnational status
since their publications are rapidly translated to other languages.
The
groups that do not belong to either of these two major power blocs fall into two
categories. While some of these organizations, like the Iranian Freedom
Movement, are mild reformists, others seek a radical transformation of Iranian
society. These especially radical factions are organized into a broad range of
different groups, the best-known being the People's Combatants. These groups
have found only limited opportunity for involvement in the political system in
legal ways. Perhaps as a result, some have extended partial support to the
Khatami bloc, at least this was the case in the elections to parliament in
February 1999. Still, they generally consider the reformist bloc to represent a
lesser evil.
THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
Following the elections of 1999, a two-bloc
political model emerged within the Iranian political system. Executive and
legislative offices, along with the presidency, remained in the control of the
reformists, while the economy, the intelligence, the military and the judiciary
remained under the hegemony of the conservative bloc. While traditional
institutions established after the revolution--including the Velayet-i Faqih--have
stayed in the hands of conservative groups; they have lost much of their
influence over the Iranian political system.(11) Velayet-i Faqih is an
institution that closely follows the principles of Khomeini's sermons of the
1960s.
After
the revolution, the demands of prominent religious figures like Huseynali
Muntezeri, Hassan Ayet and Mohammed Huseyin Behesti were included in the
constitution. This resulted in a constitutional recognition that the right to
govern belonged to the highest religious jurist (Faqih), in the absence
of prophets and imams. Khomeini,
therefore, was seen as both the predominant religious and political leader. This
only changed with his death and the ascension of others to positions of
religious and secular authority.(12) This institution has remained a powerful
force in Iranian society despite the fact that it has faced a severe legitimacy
crisis. It has served, more or less, as a tool for the conservative bloc.
Other
institutions like Council of Islamic Consultancy, Council of Supervision, Higher
Council of National Security, Expediency Council and Council of Experts have
also been dominated by conservatives.(13) Ironically, this has meant, in a
sense, that the country's president is also the leader of the opposition. Yet
while reformists have not won this conflict among government institutions, the
very existence of a continuous debate paves the way for the creation of a civil
society or, in Fariba Adelkhah's formulation, "religious public
space."(14) However, the intense rivalry between the two opposing political
blocs has also demolished the sense of national harmony within the state
bureaucracy and created an atmosphere of instability characterized by a profound
lack of confidence.
The
current political constellation has led to the emergence of increasing strife in
public life. Particularly following the assassination attempt on Saeed
Hajjarian, a near civil war-like atmosphere has emerged. Unsolved murders,
increasing political pressures, and arrests have served to maintain high levels
of tension between the two groups. Conservatives not only escalated the tension
but also compelled the other bloc to respond in kind. Although coming to office
on a platform of reform, Khatami has been indecisive in his tactics and
approaches to emerging problems. The climate of increasing political tension is
especially detrimental to the reform movement, its cadres, tools and aims.
Khatami's vague policies have created great disappointment and a sense of
loneliness among the Iranian people. The cyclical, political repercussions of
mass political events in the big cities is a result of this general
frustration.(15)
Khatami
and his reformist colleagues are trying to change the system without being
perceived as threatening to the state's security. The conservative bloc, on the
other hand, is trying its best to paint the reformists as a threat to the future
of Iranian society by provoking them to radical alternatives. Their aim is to
force them to give up any serious attempts at meaningful reform.(16) This
situation may result in increasing levels of political violence, as has been the
case before when political institutions failed to answer to the increasing
demands of the people.
THE
WIDER IMPLICATIONS
Throughout
the Islamic world, political legitimacy has become the product of elections.
After many long years of political authoritarianism, in many Islamic countries,
electoral democracy has come to hold a dominant position in the eyes of the vast
majority of the people. Iran became a landmark example in this regard with the
election of Khatami. Once
democratic elections were recognized as the source of political legitimacy, then
the focus of attention shifted to jostling amongst the various political
parties. Political parties have come to be seen as the most suitable
institutions for absorbing and representing the highly politicized demands of
people in Islamic countries. The recent multiparty elections in Iran and
Indonesia are landmark examples in this regard. While democratic systems in
Islamic countries leave a great deal to be desired in terms of freedom and
participation, from Algeria to Indonesia there is a widespread attempt to
maintain and improve multiparty political systems.
Perhaps
the single most important ongoing development in Islamic countries is the
changing perception of the role of religion in the public sphere. This
development has even led to misperceptions or exaggerations concerning the
failure of political Islam or the decline of Islamic civilization.(17) Others
argue over the compatibility (or incompatibility) of Islam and democracy.
This is a most complex issue given that the former is an ontological
position and the other a political ideology.(18)
The
other side of the coin has been the development of a nationalization or
statization of Islam in certain Islamic countries. This trend is highly visible
in Malaysia, Turkey, Indonesia and in various Arab countries, which are
constructing different versions of a "national" Islam for different
purposes. One clear aim is to restrict the actual power of Islamic groups in the
political realm and the attempts of authoritarian leaders to diminish the role
played by Islamic groups in the political structure. Nevertheless, these
attempts have failed to decrease the overall influence of Islamic thinking in
their countries.
The
change toward greater freedom and pluralism is not unique to the Islamic world
and is also happening in different parts of the globe. At this point, it is
necessary to mention the input of the globalization to the processes touched
upon here. Globalization can be defined as the significant intensification of
global connectedness--economic, political, social, and cultural
relations--across borders, with a high degree of consciousness of this
intensification. The proliferation of media and means of communication, and
increasing ease of travel, direct results of globalization, has had positive
impacts over the ongoing developments in Islamic world. Eickelman's
interpretation of the new media revolution gives clues to understand the
positive impact of this trend. He argues that: "the asymmetries of the
earlier mass-media revolution are being reversed by new media in new
hands."(19) The new media and the new contributors led to the emergence of
greater awareness of diverse ways to express their ideas and created new
channels for participation in an enlarged public sphere.
What
is most striking, perhaps, is that demands for greater secularization and
modernization are now coming from Islamists themselves. Again, however, the
literature tends to misinterpret the demands as moderate impulses in Islam.(20)
What is especially clear is that there is a widespread search for a new identity
in the Islamic world. Conceptual endorsement of civil society--Jame'e Madani,
for example, in Iran and Sivil Toplum in Turkey--are now widely discussed
subjects in Islamic countries. On the other hand, it is important to note that
this does not mean that the new civil societies that are imagined are
necessarily based on Western models. Nevertheless, emergent models of good
governance do generally bear a great similarity to those of the West. Muslim
intellectuals are increasingly employing Western concepts in dynamic debates
over "good governance."
Robert
Hefner's argument that the real clash of civilizations in the modern era will
not be "between the West and some homogeneous other but between rival
carriers of tradition within the same nations and civilizations"(21) seems
relevant to our discussion. The possible tense clashes within different
civilizations may be avoided by profiting from the each other's riches through
hybridization, reciprocal borrowing and cohabitation. The West, in this sense,
stands to benefit from these dynamic developments in Islamic civilization and
good relations with the Islamic world. At the same time that Islamic
civilization has tended to adopt many characteristics of the West, it could also
be seen as emerging as an alternative political model to the dominant West.
There is, of course, widespread resistance to the notion that the West is the
best.(22) Khatami showed himself to be representative of this search for
alternative models when he called for a dialogue between East and West.
Iranian
society is struggling to cope with great difficulties that are faced in attempts
to shift from religious conservatism to democratic processes that respect
religious values. Iran is an extremely important political player within the
specific context of the Middle East and throughout the Islamic world in general.
The Iranian people are attempting to open up new horizons, which would enable
them to realize their full potential for influencing ongoing trends in the
Islamic world in general. The Iranian case serves as a particularly salient
example of the way in which the people are well aware of notions of "good
governance"; and, they are quite willing to struggle to establish better
forms of government if given the opportunity.
The
current Iranian regime may be able to resist substantial progressive change for
some time by blaming outside powers for the nation's problems. It could well be
argued that a regime in Iran that faces so much popular opposition and is trying
to stem political processes arising from major social changes does not have much
chance of surviving in the country's future. It is possible that the Khatami-led
reform movement may be repressed or reduced in the short run. Nevertheless, a
more likely scenario would be that an even stronger reform bloc will emerge,
less intimidated by state security, and determined to reconstruct the Iranian
political system along more moderate and democratic lines.
NOTES
1.
For legitimacy and authority relations in Shi'a tradition see Said Amir
Arjomand, (ed.), Authority and Political Culture in Shi'ism (Albany, NY:
SUNY Press, 1988).
2.
For more information see Sadik Zibakelam, Jame'e Madani, Tehran, 1378.
3.
Mohammed Khatemi, Bim-e Moc (Fear of Wave) Tahran, 1378, pp.17-47
4.
Said Berzin, Jenahhayi Siyyasi Der Iran Emrooz (Contemporary Political
Positions in Iran) Tahran, 1378., p.52.
5.
Anoushiravan Ehteshami, After Khomeini: The Iranian Second Republic
(London: Routledge, 1995) 1995
6.
Feramerz Refi Pur, Tose-e ve Tezad (Progress and Conflict), Tehran, 1377.
7.
See www.moshareket.com, 12 February 2000.
8.
Fath, 23 February 2000.
9.
Hussein Allah Kerem, Sobh, Vol.2, No.1, (1996), p.61.
10.Abdul
Karim Soroush, Mehdi Bazargan et. al., Gerayi Dini (Religious
Renewal),Tahran,1378.
11.
Hamit Reza Celayi Pur, Pes Ez Dovom-e Khordad (After Khordad 2), Tahran,
1378
12.
Shahrough Akhavi, "Contending Discourses on Shi'i Law on the Doctrine of
Wilayat- al Faqih," Iranian Studies, Vol 29, Nos. 3-4 (Summer-Fall
1996); Muhsen Kediver, Hukmet-e Velayi, Tahran, 1378
13.
For the roles of these institutions see, Iranian constitution provided in
English at http://eurasianews.com/Iran/const.htm.
14.
Fariba Adelkhah, Being Modern in Iran (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2000).
15.
Sobh-e Emrooz, 17 February 2000.
16.
Emadeddin Baki, Terajedi Demokrasi Der Iran (Tragedy of Democracy in
Iran), Tahran, 1378.
17.
Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1994).
18.
For example see, John L. Esposito and John Voll, Islam and Democracy
(London: Oxford University Press, 1996).
19.
Dale Eickelman, "Islam and the Languages of Modernity," Daedalus,
Vol. 129, No.1 (Winter 2000), p.131
20.
See for example Charles Kurzman, (ed.), Liberal Islam: A Source Book
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
21.
Robert W. Hefner, "Multiple Modernities: Christianity, Islam and Hinduism
in a Globalizing Age," Annual Review of Anthropology, No. 27 (1998),
p.92.
22.
For an inspiring article in this issue see, M. A. Muqtedar Khan,
"Constructing Identity in Global Politics," The American Journal of
Islamic Social Sciences, Vol. 3, No.3 (Fall 1998).
*Bulent Aras is assistant professor in the Department of International Relations at Fatih University in Istanbul, Turkey. Aras is also director of the Institute of Social Sciences in the same university He is author of The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process and Turkey (Nova: 1998), The New Geopolitics of Eurasia and Turkey's Position (Frank Cass: forthcoming), and co-editor of The Oil and Geopolitics in the Caspian Sea Region (Praeger: 1999).