Exekutionen, körperliche und sexuelle Gewalt und Entführungen von Pashtunen im
nördlichen Afghanistan Summary executions, beatings, sexual violence and
abductions of Pashtuns committed when Northern Alliance forces regained power
in the north of the country Paying for the Taliban’s Crimes: Abuses Against
Ethnic Pashtuns in Northern Afghanistan HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH APRIL 2002 VOL. 14,
NO. 2 (C) AFGHANISTAN Paying for the Taliban’s Crimes: Abuses Against Ethnic
Pashtuns in Northern Afghanistan You are Pashtun. You don’t belong in this
area. You must leave for Kabul, and leave [this area] for us. Jamiat commander
speaking to Pashtun villager in Baghlan province. The Taliban did the crimes,
but the punishment was for us. Pashtun elder, describing the abuses his village
faced at the hands of Hizb-i Wahdat fighters. I’ve complained only to Allah.
Who hears our complaints? We will only get in more trouble if we complain. We
have no power. Whoever has the guns has the power. We are sick of the guns, of
the commanders. Take them all away and let us farm. Elderly Pashtun villager
whose house was looted by Jamiat forces. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH APRIL 2002 VOL. 14,
NO. 2 (C) TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY..............................................................................................................
1 RECOMMENDATIONS
.........................................................................................
3 To the International
Community:............................................................................
3 To the United Nations Security Council:
................................................................. 3 To the
Afghan Interim Administration:
.................................................................... 3 To
Junbish-i Milly-yi Islami, Jamiat-e Islami, and Hizb-i Wahdat:
.............................. 4 A NOTE ON THE USE OF NAMES, DATES, AND TERMS
USED IN THIS REPORT
.......................................................................... 4
INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................
5 The Return to Warlordism in Northern Afghanistan
................................................ 5 The Major
Parties...................................................................................................
5 Warlordism and the International Community
......................................................... 6 Abuses Faced by
Pashtuns
......................................................................................
8 Displacement of Ethnic Pashtuns
............................................................................ 9
THE LEGACY OF TALIBAN ABUSES
..................................................................10 BALKH
PROVINCE...............................................................................................12
Chimtal District
....................................................................................................12
Bargah-e Afghani .....
........................................................................................12
Yengi Qala..............
........................................................................................15
Rape in Chimtal District
...................................................................................18
Charbolak District
.................................................................................................18
Nauwarid Janghura...
........................................................................................18
Kakrak ....................
........................................................................................19
Khanabad................
........................................................................................20
Balkh
District........................................................................................................21
Balkh City...............
........................................................................................21
Turwai Kai Settlement
......................................................................................23
Aghab-e Godam Settlement
..............................................................................23
Spin Kot Settlement .
........................................................................................24
Dawlatabad District
...............................................................................................25
Pai-e Mashhad Afghani
.....................................................................................25
Koter Ma ................
........................................................................................26
Bagh-e Zakhireh ......
........................................................................................27
Other Affected Pashtun Villages in Dawlatabad District..
........................................................................................29
FARYAB PROVINCE
.............................................................................................29
Shoor Darya
Valley................................................................................................29
MK Village .............
........................................................................................30
Haji Mullah Hashim and Khoja Abbas
Villages...................................................32 Islam
Qala............................................................................................................34
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH APRIL 2002 VOL. 14, NO. 2 (C) SAMANGAN PROVINCE
......................................................................................35
Hazrat-i Sultan District
.........................................................................................35
Shurkul ...................
........................................................................................35
Khoja Pirshan ..........
........................................................................................35
Aibak
District........................................................................................................36
Hassan Khel ............
........................................................................................36
Ghazi Mullah
Qurban.......................................................................................37
BAGHLAN PROVINCE
.........................................................................................37
Nahrin
District......................................................................................................37
Qona Qala...............
........................................................................................37
Baraki.....................
........................................................................................39
Lakan Khel..............
........................................................................................40
Jadran .....................
........................................................................................41
Other Pashtun Villages in Nahrin District
...........................................................42 Kilagai
Valley........................................................................................................42
KUNDUZ AND OTHER PROVINCES
..................................................................43 THE
RESPONSE OF THE AFGHAN AUTHORITIES...........................................44
Establishment of Independent
Commission.............................................................44
Preliminary Steps toward Improving Security in the North
.......................................45 THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY...................................46 The United States and the
International Assistance Force for Afghanistan (ISAF)......46 The ISAF
Contributing
Countries..........................................................................47
The United Nations
...............................................................................................48
A F G H A N I S T A N : P A Y I N G F O R T H E T A L I BA N ’ S C R I M E S
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 1 APRIL 2002 VOL. 14, NO. 1 (C) SUMMARY Since the collapse
of the Taliban regime in northern Afghanistan in November 2001, ethnic Pashtuns
throughout northern Afghanistan have faced widespread abuses including
killings, sexual violence, beatings, extortion, and looting. Pashtuns are being
targeted because their ethnic group was closely associated with the Taliban
regime, whose leadership consisted mostly of Pashtuns from southern
Afghanistan. Directly implicated in many of the abuses are the three main
ethnically-based parties and their militias in northern Afghanistan—the
predominantly ethnic Uzbek Junbish-i Milly-yi Islami, the predominately ethnic
Tajik Jamiat-e Islami, and the ethnic Hazara Hizb-i Wahdat—as well as non-
aligned armed Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Hazaras who are taking advantage of the
vulnerability of unprotected and selectively disarmed Pashtun communities. In
response to reports of abuses against Pashtuns, Human Rights Watch sent a team
of four researchers to northern Afghanistan in February and March 2002. The
team visited dozens of Pashtun villages and communities in four northern
provinces (Balkh, Faryab, Samangan, and Baghlan) and also met with
representatives of the Afghan interim administration, diplomatic
representatives, and humanitarian workers. Widespread looting and extortion of
Pashtun communities was documented throughout the region. A typical pattern of
attacks emerged in the Shoor Darya region of Faryab province. Local villagers
said armed Uzbeks associated with the local Junbish faction took away their
guns (but not those of members of other ethnic groups) in mid-November and
proceeded to violently loot their villages, taking livestock, stored grains,
household goods, carpets, money, and jewelry over the course of the next few
weeks—a period described by one villager as “forty days of terror.” In many
Pashtun villages, the looting was accompanied by severe beatings of Pashtun men
and sometimes women. M.J., an elder of the Pashtun village of Spin Kot in Balkh
province, described a typical beating, committed in this case by Hazara
soldiers: “One was twisting my head and two were kicking me in the back. They
were beating me with a shovel, questioning me about guns and money. They beat
me there for about two, two and a half hours.” The beatings finally stopped
when M.J. showed the soldiers where he had hidden his money. A.S., a wealthy
livestock owner from the Shoor Darya region, was almost beaten to death by two
Junbish soldiers who wanted money from him: “At first they choked me with my
turban. I lost consciousness, and they tied my hands. Then they started beating
me with a kardoom [a cable with a metal ball at the end]. I can’t remember how
many times they hit me, on my back, my legs, my hands. They broke my arm with
the kardoom.” The beating stopped when A.S. agreed to give the men money and
hand over his motorbike. Cases of abductions for ransom were documented
throughout the region. Junbish soldiers arrested M.K and his friend, both
Pashtun villagers from Hassan Khel in Samangan province, in late December, and
kept them for a week in a basement, beating them with wire cables, until the
men agreed to pay money. Raiders also killed Pashtun civilians during the
looting. In the village of Bargah-e Afghani, located in the Chimtal district of
Balkh province, Hazara gunmen killed thirty-seven Pashtun men after tying most
of them up, beating them in front of their families, and demanding money to
spare their lives. In the nearby village of Yengi Qala, Hazara gunmen killed
four men and two elderly women during looting. Junbish soldiers beat to death
two Pashtun boys, aged fifteen and eighteen, in the village of Deshdan Bala in
Balkh province. A village elder, Lal Jan, was severely beaten and then taken
away by Uzbek gunmen in the Shoor Darya valley of Faryab province: he is
presumed dead. Women and girls were also raped during the looting raids. In
Balkh city, Hazara gunmen gang-raped a fourteen-year-old Pashtun girl and her
mother, before beating her father unconscious and looting the home. On January
16, 2002, three Hazara soldiers raped a sixteen-year- old girl in Chimtal
district. In Kunduz province, Jamiat soldiers beat thirty-year-old P.M.
unconscious, and then raped his wife. Human Rights Watch received reports of
other cases of rapes, and many women described how they had to fight off
attackers or hide young female relatives out of fear of rape. The most severe
looting-related violence has subsided in some areas, but Pashtun communities
throughout the north remain extremely vulnerable to serious human rights http:
/ /www.hrw.org/reports/2002/afghan2/afghan0402.pdf 00799afgh.pdf pub/
nz64_00799afgh.pdf HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH APRIL 2002 VOL. 14, NO. 2 (C) A F G H A N
I S T A N Paying for the Taliban's Crimes: Abuses Against Ethnic Pashtuns in
Northern Afghanistan You are Pashtun. You don't belong in this area. You must
leave for Kabul, and leave [this area] for us. Jamiat commander speaking to
Pashtun villager in Baghlan province. The Taliban did the crimes, but the
punishment was for us. Pashtun elder, describing the abuses his village faced
at the hands of Hizb-i Wahdat fighters. I've complained only to Allah. Who
hears our complaints? We will only get in more trouble if we complain. We have
no power. Whoever has the guns has the power. We are sick of the guns, of the
commanders. Take them all away and let us farm. Elderly Pashtun villager whose
house was looted by Jamiat forces. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH APRIL 2002 VOL. 14, NO. 2
(C) TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY..............................................................................................................
1 RECOMMENDATIONS
.........................................................................................
3 To the International
Community:............................................................................
3 To the United Nations Security Council:
................................................................. 3 To the
Afghan Interim Administration:
.................................................................... 3 To
Junbish-i Milly-yi Islami, Jamiat-e Islami, and Hizb-i Wahdat:
.............................. 4 A NOTE ON THE USE OF NAMES, DATES, AND TERMS
USED IN THIS REPORT
.......................................................................... 4
INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................
5 The Return to Warlordism in Northern Afghanistan
................................................ 5 The Major
Parties...................................................................................................
5 Warlordism and the International Community
......................................................... 6 Abuses Faced by
Pashtuns
......................................................................................
8 Displacement of Ethnic Pashtuns
............................................................................ 9
THE LEGACY OF TALIBAN ABUSES
..................................................................10 BALKH
PROVINCE...............................................................................................12
Chimtal District
....................................................................................................12
Bargah-e Afghani .....
........................................................................................12
Yengi Qala..............
........................................................................................15
Rape in Chimtal District
...................................................................................18
Charbolak District
.................................................................................................18
Nauwarid Janghura...
........................................................................................18
Kakrak ....................
........................................................................................19
Khanabad................
........................................................................................20
Balkh
District........................................................................................................21
Balkh City...............
........................................................................................21
Turwai Kai Settlement
......................................................................................23
Aghab-e Godam Settlement
..............................................................................23
Spin Kot Settlement .
........................................................................................24
Dawlatabad District
...............................................................................................25
Pai-e Mashhad Afghani
.....................................................................................25
Koter Ma ................
........................................................................................26
Bagh-e Zakhireh ......
........................................................................................27
Other Affected Pashtun Villages in Dawlatabad District..
........................................................................................29
FARYAB PROVINCE
.............................................................................................29
Shoor Darya
Valley................................................................................................29
MK Village .............
........................................................................................30
Haji Mullah Hashim and Khoja Abbas
Villages...................................................32 Islam
Qala............................................................................................................34
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH APRIL 2002 VOL. 14, NO. 2 (C) SAMANGAN PROVINCE
......................................................................................35
Hazrat-i Sultan District
.........................................................................................35
Shurkul ...................
........................................................................................35
Khoja Pirshan ..........
........................................................................................35
Aibak
District........................................................................................................36
Hassan Khel ............
........................................................................................36
Ghazi Mullah
Qurban.......................................................................................37
BAGHLAN PROVINCE
.........................................................................................37
Nahrin
District......................................................................................................37
Qona Qala...............
........................................................................................37
Baraki.....................
........................................................................................39
Lakan Khel..............
........................................................................................40
Jadran .....................
........................................................................................41
Other Pashtun Villages in Nahrin District
...........................................................42 Kilagai
Valley........................................................................................................42
KUNDUZ AND OTHER PROVINCES
..................................................................43 THE
RESPONSE OF THE AFGHAN AUTHORITIES
...........................................44 Establishment of Independent
Commission.............................................................44
Preliminary Steps toward Improving Security in the North
.......................................45 THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY...................................46 The United States and the
International Assistance Force for Afghanistan (ISAF)......46 The ISAF
Contributing
Countries..........................................................................47
The United Nations
...............................................................................................48
A F G H A N I S T A N : P A Y I N G F O R T H E T A L I B A N ' S C R I M E S
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 1 APRIL 2002 VOL. 14, NO. 1 (C ) SUMMARY Since the collapse
of the Taliban regime in northern Afghanistan in November 2001, ethnic Pashtuns
throughout northern Afghanistan have faced widespread abuses including
killings, sexual violence, beatings, extortion, and looting. Pashtuns are being
targeted because their ethnic group was closely associated with the Taliban
regime, whose leadership consisted mostly of Pashtuns from southern
Afghanistan. Directly implicated in many of the abuses are the three main
ethnically-based parties and their militias in northern Afghanistan-the
predominantly ethnic Uzbek Junbish-i Milly-yi Islami, the predominately ethnic
Tajik Jamiat-e Islami, and the ethnic Hazara Hizb-i Wahdat-as well as non-
aligned armed Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Hazaras who are taking advantage of the
vulnerability of unprotected and selectively disarmed Pashtun communities. In
response to reports of abuses against Pashtuns, Human Rights Watch sent a team
of four researchers to northern Afghanistan in February and March 2002. The
team visited dozens of Pashtun villages and communities in four northern
provinces (Balkh, Faryab, Samangan, and Baghlan) and also met with
representatives of the Afghan interim administration, diplomatic
representatives, and humanitarian workers. Widespread looting and extortion of
Pashtun communities was documented throughout the region. A typical pattern of
attacks emerged in the Shoor Darya region of Faryab province. Local villagers
said armed Uzbeks associated with the local Junbish faction took away their
guns (but not those of members of other ethnic groups) in mid-November and
proceeded to violently loot their villages, taking livestock, stored grains,
household goods, carpets, money, and jewelry over the course of the next few
weeks-a period described by one villager as "forty days of terror." In many
Pashtun villages, the looting was accompanied by severe beatings of Pashtun men
and sometimes women. M.J., an elder of the Pashtun village of Spin Kot in Balkh
province, described a typical beating, committed in this case by Hazara
soldiers: "One was twisting my head and two were kicking me in the back. They
were beating me with a shovel, questioning me about guns and money. They beat
me there for about two, two and a half hours." The beatings finally stopped
when M.J. showed the soldiers where he had hidden his money. A.S., a wealthy
livestock owner from the Shoor Darya region, was almost beaten to death by two
Junbish soldiers who wanted money from him: "At first they choked me with my
turban. I lost consciousness, and they tied my hands. Then they started beating
me with a kardoom [a cable with a metal ball at the end]. I can't remember how
many times they hit me, on my back, my legs, my hands. They broke my arm with
the kardoom." The beating stopped when A.S. agreed to give the men money and
hand over his motorbike. Cases of abductions for ransom were documented
throughout the region. Junbish soldiers arrested M.K and his friend, both
Pashtun villagers from Hassan Khel in Samangan province, in late December, and
kept them for a week in a basement, beating them with wire cables, until the
men agreed to pay money. Raiders also killed Pashtun civilians during the
looting. In the village of Bargah-e Afghani, located in the Chimtal district of
Balkh province, Hazara gunmen killed thirty-seven Pashtun men after tying most
of them up, beating them in front of their families, and demanding money to
spare their lives. In the nearby village of Yengi Qala, Hazara gunmen killed
four men and two elderly women during looting. Junbish soldiers beat to death
two Pashtun boys, aged fifteen and eighteen, in the village of Deshdan Bala in
Balkh province. A village elder, Lal Jan, was severely beaten and then taken
away by Uzbek gunmen in the Shoor Darya valley of Faryab province: he is
presumed dead. Women and girls were also raped during the looting raids. In
Balkh city, Hazara gunmen gang-raped a fourteen-year-old Pashtun girl and her
mother, before beating her father unconscious and looting the home. On January
16, 2002, three Hazara soldiers raped a sixteen- year-old girl in Chimtal
district. In Kunduz province, Jamiat soldiers beat thirty-year-old P.M.
unconscious, and then raped his wife. Human Rights Watch received reports of
other cases of rapes, and many women described how they had to fight off
attackers or hide young female relatives out of fear of rape. The most severe
looting-related violence has subsided in some areas, but Pashtun communities
throughout the north remain extremely vulnerable to serious human rights A F G
H A N I S T A N : P A Y I N G F O R T H E T A L I B A N ' S C R I M E S HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH 2 APRIL 2002 VOL. 14, NO. 1 (C ) abuses. Human Rights Watch
documented several cases of abuse that occurred during our visits. In one
village in Shoor Darya, the sudden arrival of Human Rights Watch researchers
scared off two Uzbek gunmen who had come to extort money from the village
elders. In another village in Samangan province, a village elder told Human
Rights Watch that he had been forced to give up twelve of his sheep to a local
Junbish commander on the morning of our visit. On February 20, 2002, N.M., from
Qona Qala village in Baghlan province, was beaten by a local Jamiat commander
who wanted money: "They hit me with a stick and a rifle butt. The [commander]
was holding me, and the son beat me for thirty minutes.... While I was being
beaten, my wife came to ask them to spare me. They kicked her hard." In
Samangan province, the Human Rights Watch team was informed that Junbish
soldiers had abducted a Pashtun man from the market the day of our visit,
presumably to seek ransom from the family later. The chairman of the Afghan
interim government, Hamid Karzai, has taken some positive steps to address the
anti-Pashtun violence in northern Afghanistan, most notably by appointing a
three-person independent commission to investigate the issue. But his capacity
for addressing the violence is limited, as real power in northern Afghanistan
rests with commanders who are associated with the three main parties, including
those implicated in the abuses. Leaders of those parties who hold positions in
the interim government have on occasion taken corrective action. For example,
General Abdul Rashid Dostum has removed some abusive Junbish commanders from
power, most noticeably in Faryab province, and has placed new commanders among
threatened Pashtun communities to protect them-but other Junbish commanders
continue to carry out abuses with seeming impunity. An Afghan national army
that could guarantee the security of all Afghans is only in the conception
stage, there is no national police force, and a security vacuum exists in the
meantime. The international community needs to act to stop the violence against
Pashtuns in northern Afghanistan, a task that for the foreseeable future cannot
be handled solely by the Afghan authorities. Both the signatories of the Bonn
Agreement and the United Nations Security Council have entrusted the U.N. with
a great deal of responsibility in helping Afghanistan achieve a civilian
representative government. The U.N. Security Council needs to expand the
mandate of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for Afghanistan
to include areas outside Kabul, most urgently northern Afghanistan. Efforts at
accountability for past and current abuses should be accelerated, and the
capacity of United Nations agencies in Afghanistan and the interim government
to monitor human rights abuses must be bolstered. The United Nations should
work to identify vulnerable minority populations, including those who are
displaced from their homes, and make particular efforts to ensure the delivery
of humanitarian assistance to these communities. With international financial
support, the U.N. should assist the Afghan government in establishing
impartial, multiethnic commissions at the local level to resolve grievances and
disputes between communities over land, property, and access to water
resources. A F G H A N I S T A N : P A Y I N G F O R T H E T A L I B A N ' S C
R I M E S HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 3 APRIL 2002 VOL. 14, NO. 1 (C ) RECOMMENDATIONS
To the International Community: * Support the expansion of the mandate and
duration of the International Security Assis- tance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan
to include areas outside Kabul, most urgently northern Afghanistan. Pledge
troops and other sup- port for an expanded ISAF. * Support the timely creation
of an Afghan national army that is representative of Af- ghanistan's diversity,
is professional, and re- spects the rights of civilians. * Insist that Afghan
commanders and combat- ants responsible for war crimes or other seri- ous human
rights violations are not allowed to serve in any capacity in law enforcement
or military roles. * Immediately cease any direct or indirect mili- tary
support, financial support, or technical cooperation with commanders and forces
that are implicated in war crimes or serious human rights violations. *
Increase funding for human rights monitor- ing in Afghanistan, including the
Afghan Human Rights Commission that is to be es- tablished under the provisions
of the Bonn Agreement, and the various human rights monitoring mechanisms of
the United Na- tions. * Establish permanent training programs in human rights
and humanitarian law for Af- ghan police and military forces. * Support efforts
to establish accountability for past and current abuses committed in Af-
ghanistan, including efforts at promoting in- ternational justice as well as
the strengthen- ing of Afghan institutions of justice that re- spect
internationally recognized norms. * Publicly denounce human rights abuses
against ethnic Pashtuns and other communi- ties and urge respect for the rights
of all Af- ghans as one of the principle objectives for the international
community in Afghanistan. * Provide international protection and assis- tance
to ethnic Pashtuns who flee Afghani- stan for fear of persecution, as well as
those who are internally displaced. In particular, urge neighboring countries
such as Pakistan, Iran, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to open their borders to
asylum seekers from Af- ghanistan. * Ensure that humanitarian assistance
reaches Pashtuns and other communities in northern Afghanistan that have been
internally dis- placed as a result of ethnically-targeted vio- lence, including
urban displaced persons and persons living in unregistered displaced per- sons'
settlements. To the United Nations Security Council: * Expand the mandate of
the ISAF in Afghani- stan to include areas outside Kabul, most ur- gently to
northern Afghanistan. * Establish a committee of experts to investi- gate past
and current crimes against human- ity, war crimes, and other grave abuses
committed in Afghanistan, and to recom- mend appropriate measures of
accountabil- ity. * Establish an effective and comprehensive U.N. human rights
monitoring presence throughout Afghanistan, as envisioned under the Bonn
Agreement. To the Afghan Interim Administration: Human Rights Watch appreciates
that the Afghan Interim Administration is for the moment a relatively weak
body, with only limited effective authority outside Kabul. In order to
adequately address the tasks it faces, the Interim Administration will need
extensive support from the international community. * Work toward the timely
establishment of an Afghan national army that is representative of
Afghanistan's diversity, is professional, and respects the rights of civilians.
* Ensure that former commanders and com- batants responsible for war crimes or
other serious human rights violations are not al- lowed to serve in any
capacity in law en- forcement or military roles. * Prosecute commanders and
combatants re- sponsible for war crimes or other serious human rights
violations. * Initiate a national process to resolve compet- ing land and
property claims between ethnic A F G H A N I S T A N : P A Y I N G F O R T H E
T A L I B A N ' S C R I M E S HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 4 APRIL 2002 VOL. 14, NO. 1 (C
) communities in Afghanistan, and to foster better relations between ethnic
communities. To Junbish-i Milly-yi Islami, Jamiat-e Islami, and Hizb-i Wahdat:
The three main ethnically-based armed militias in northern Afghanistan are also
represented in the interim government. In particular, Defense Minister Mohammad
Qasim Fahim is in command of the Jamiat forces; Deputy Defense Minister Abdul
Rashid Dostum is in command of Junbish; and planning minister and co-chairman
of the Interim Cabinet Haji Mohammad Mohaqiq is the senior leader of Hizb- i
Wahdat in northern Afghanistan. As such, these officials bear a special
responsibility to ensure compliance by the respective forces under their
command to implement the following recommendations: * Respect international
humanitarian law by prohibiting all attacks on civilians, including looting,
extortion, beatings, killings, and sex- ual violence, and prosecuting those
responsi- ble for such abuses. * Investigate the actions of commanders and
soldiers accused of involvement in attacks against Pashtuns or members of other
com- munities, and inform the Afghan Interim Administration of the result of
such investi- gations and the identity of the persons re- sponsible for such
attacks. * Fully cooperate with criminal investigations and prosecutions by
Afghan interim authori- ties. * Suspend from active duty and disarm any
personnel who have been accused of attacks against Pashtuns or civilians,
pending the outcome of investigations. * Meet with Pashtun civilian leaders to
work out strategies for better relations among the different ethnic communities
in northern Af- ghanistan, and publicly condemn all acts of violence targeting
Pashtun communities. * Support the creation of national Afghan civil- ian and
military institutions, and work to- ward the demobilization and disarming of
factional militias. A NOTE ON THE USE OF NAMES, DATES, AND TERMS USED IN THIS
REPORT Many Afghans use only one name, and Afghans who use two names do not
necessarily use the same last name across generations, as is the practice in
the West with family names. Because of the overlapping use of several different
calendars in parts of Afghanistan (including both the lunar Muslim and solar
Afghan calendars, as well as the Western calendar) and the fact that many rural
Afghans do not keep careful track of dates, it is difficult to establish the
exact dates of many of the incidents documented in this report. Many witnesses
dated events with a loose reference to the religious calendar, such as "around
the twentieth day of [the Muslim holy month of] Ramadan." In writing this
report, we have tried to be as accurate as possible in estimating the time and
occurrence of each incident, but the reader should take most of the dates in
this report as approximations rather than as exact dates. Similarly, ages of
victims and witnesses in the report are often approximations, as rural Afghans
often do not know their exact age. The Afghan national currency is Afghani.
Most Afghans count money in terms of lakhs, with one lakh equaling 100,000
Afghanis. There are two forms of Afghanis currently in circulation: one issued
by the former Jamiat- dominated government in Faizabad, referred to as Daulati
Afghanis; a second issued by General Dostum of Junbish, referred to as Junbish
Afghanis. The two versions have widely different exchange rates: at the time of
this writing, Daulati Afghanis trade for 38,000 to the U.S. dollar, while
Junbish Afghanis trade at 72,000 to the U.S. dollar. A F G H A N I S T A N : P
A Y I N G F O R T H E T A L I B A N ' S C R I M E S HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 5 APRIL
2002 VOL. 14, NO. 1 (C ) INTRODUCTION The Return to Warlordism in Northern
Afghanistan On November 9, 2001, the Taliban fled from northern Afghanistan's
largest city, Mazar-i Sharif. This ended more than two years of brutal Taliban
rule in this part of Afghanistan that began with the massacre of thousands when
the Taliban first took control of Mazar-i Sharif in August 1998. The Taliban's
fullscale retreat left Mazar-i Sharif and surrounding areas in the hands of
three rival commanders and their soldiers-the predominantly ethnic Uzbek
Junbish-i Milly-yi Islami of General Abdul Rashid Dostum, the predominantly
ethnic Tajik Jamiat-e Islami led in Mazar-i Sharif by Ustad Atta Mohammad, and
the smaller ethnic Hazara Hizb-i Wahdat, led in the north by Haji Mohammad
Mohaqiq. 1 On February 3, 2002, the three parties signed a U.N.-backed
agreement establishing a 600- person security force for the city. The force,
headed by Junbish commander Majid Rouzi, is to include 240 officers from
Jamiat, and 180 each from Junbish and three Hazara parties, including Hizb- i
Wahdat. Since the agreement went into effect, the remaining troops have begun
withdrawing to their respective bases on the city's outskirts, although it
remains uncertain whether they will fully comply with the withdrawal agreement.
2 Even in Mazar-i Sharif, the balance of military fire-power remains firmly in
the hands of the three ethnic parties, and not the lightly armed 600-person
security force they have agreed upon. Outside of Mazar-i Sharif, competition
for territory between the factions remains acute and skirmishes initiated by
low and mid-level commanders present recurrent security problems. During the
last two weeks of February, for example, fighting between Junbish 1 John Ward
Anderson and Molly Moore, "For Now, Rival Warlords Put Aside Bitter Feuds of
Past," Washington Post, November 12, 2001. 2 As of late February 2002, the
security force had closed down approximately 70 to 80 percent of the
unauthorized armed posts in Mazar-i Sharif. Human Rights Watch interview with a
U.N. official, Mazar-i Sharif, February 23, 2002. However, armed gunmen who did
not belong to the security force were still evident in significant numbers
throughout the city. and Jamiat forces broke out at least twice in Sholgara,
south of Mazar-i Sharif, and in Khulm, to its east. In other parts of the
north, commanders affiliated with the three major parties have established de
facto authority over large areas. Jamiat forces have taken effective control of
Baghlan province, while Junbish is dominant in Faryab, Jowzjan, and most of
Samangan province. Kunduz and Balkh, the province that includes Mazar-i Sharif,
remain contested, and at the time of Human Rights Watch's visit, gaining the
support of ethnic Pashtun commanders was becoming a decisive factor in this
power struggle. In Balkh, a realignment of Pashtun commanders-many of whom
supported General Dostum in the pre-Taliban period-with Jamiat was underway,
while their counterparts in Kunduz were mainly allied with Junbish. 3 This
represents, however, only a rough overview of the territorial fragmentation of
northern Afghanistan; at a local level, and on a district level in cities, the
picture is considerably more complex. In many districts of Balkh province, for
example, Junbish, Jamiat, and Hizb-i Wahdat forces control villages within the
same vicinity, creating an intricate patchwork of shifting alliances. The Major
Parties Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan (National Islamic Movement of
Afghanistan, hereinafter known as Junbish) brought together northern, mostly
ethnic Uzbek, former militias of the communist regime who mutinied against
President Najibullah in early 1992. It also included former leaders and
administrators of the old regime from various other ethnic groups, mainly
Persian-speaking, and some Uzbek mujahidin commanders. In 1998 it lost all of
the territory under its control, and some of its commanders defected to the
Taliban. Its founder and principal leader remains General Abdul Rashid Dostum,
who rose from security guard to leader of Najibullah's most powerful militia.
This group took control of Mazar-i Sharif in alliance with other groups in
early 1992 and controlled much of Samangan, Balkh, Jowzjan, Faryab, and Baghlan
provinces. A coalition of militias, Junbish was the strongest force in the
north from 1992 to 1997, but was riven by internal disputes. Junbish became
largely inactive in 1998, until Dostum returned to northern Afghanistan in
April 2001. General 3 Human Rights Watch interviews with U.N. offi- cials,
Mazar-i Sharif, February 2002. A F G H A N I S T A N : P A Y I N G F O R T H E
T A L I B A N ' S C R I M E S HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 6 APRIL 2002 VOL. 14, NO. 1 (C
) Dostum currently serves as deputy minister of defense in the interim
government. Jamiat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan (Islamic Group of Afghanistan,
hereinafter known as Jamiat) is one of the original Islamist parties in
Afghanistan, established in the 1970s by students at Kabul University where
Jamiat's leader, Burhanuddin Rabbani, was a lecturer at the Islamic Law
Faculty. Although Rabbani remains its official head, Jamiat's most powerful
figure was its military commander, Ahmad Shah Massoud, until his assassination
by suspected al- Qaeda elements on September 9, 2001. As the dominant faction
of the Northern Alliance that controlled the key supply routes, Jamiat has
received significant military and other support from Iran and Russia. Massoud
was succeeded as defense minister of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, the
administration established by the Northern Alliance, by Mohammad Qasim Fahim.
Fahim retains that post in the interim government. Both Massoud and Fahim were
ethnic Tajiks from the Panjshir Valley, the dominant group within Jamiat. Hizb-
i Wahdat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan (Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan,
hereinafter known as Hizb-i Wahdat) is the principal Shi'a party in Afghanistan
with support mainly from the Hazara ethnic community. Hizb-i Wahdat was
originally formed by Abdul Ali Mazari in order to unite eight Shi'a parties in
the run-up to the anticipated collapse of the communist government. Its current
leader is Mohammed Karim Khalili. The leader of its Executive Council of the
North, Haji Mohammed Mohaqiq, commanded the party's forces in Mazar-i Sharif in
1997. Hizb-i Wahdat has received significant military and other support from
Iran, although relations between Iranian authorities and party leaders have
been strained over issues of Iranian influence and control. The party has also
received significant support from local Hazara leaders. Warlordism and the
International Community For the past two decades, international power politics
have directly contributed to the growth of warlordism in Afghanistan. This
occurred during the mujahidin war against Soviet occupation (1979-1989), the
internecine factional fighting that followed the withdrawal of Soviet troops
and the collapse of the pro-Soviet government (1992- 1996), and the conflict
between the Taliban government and the Northern Alliance that continued up to
the collapse of the Taliban government (1996-2001). Outside powers such as
Russia, the United States, Pakistan, Iran and others have directly and
indirectly provided support for the warlords that they saw as advancing their
interests. 4 The abusive records of many warlords and their forces were often
overlooked as international powers sought to advance their strategic interests
in Afghanistan: During the mujahidin war, for example, the United States
provided extensive support for some of the most extremist and abusive of the
Islamist forces fighting in Afghanistan, ignoring ideology and human rights
norms in their proxy confrontation with the Soviet Union. During the U.S.-led
military campaign against the Taliban and al-Qaeda that commenced on October 7,
2001, the international coalition again relied significantly on Afghanistan's
anti-Taliban warlords to achieve its military objectives. 5 The U.S. and its
allies rearmed anti-Taliban forces, provided them with tactical support through
U.S. special forces liaisons with them on the ground, and gave aerial bombing
support. Afghan anti- Taliban forces did most of the fighting on the ground,
and took military control of the areas they conquered. In the process,
ethnically based factions and individual warlords came, again, to virtually
monopolize power in Afghanistan. Allowing the warlords to carve up the Afghan
countryside among themselves may not have been the aim of U.S. policy during
the anti-Taliban war, but it was an almost unavoidable consequence of the U.S.
reliance on Afghan anti-Taliban forces. Ahmed Rashid, one of the best known
authorities on Afghanistan, analyzed the impact of U.S. support on the renewed
rise of warlords in Afghanistan: 4 See Human Rights Watch, "Crisis of Impunity:
The Role of Pakistan, Russia, and Iran in Fueling the Civil War in
Afghanistan," A Human Rights Watch Short Report, vol. 13, no. 3 (C), July 2001.
5 See Human Rights Watch, "Dangerous Dealings: Changes to U.S. Military
Assistance After September 11," A Human Rights Watch Short Report, vol 14, no.
1 (G), February 2002, pp. 6-8; Susan B. Glasser, "U.S. Backing Helps Warlords
Solidify Power," Washington Post, February 18, 2002. A F G H A N I S T A N : P
A Y I N G F O R T H E T A L I B A N ' S C R I M E S HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 7 APRIL
2002 VOL. 14, NO. 1 (C ) In the 1980s, Washington backed anti- Soviet Afghan
militias which in victory produced the factionalism that brought the Taliban to
power. Now, the same forces, which with U.S. backing ousted the Taliban, are
threatening to return the country to warlordism all over again. Warlords whose
armies acted as proxy U.S. ground forces in the Taliban campaign are now
refusing to disarm or accept the writ of the country's fledgling interim
government. They are even defying the Americans, say Western diplomats.... In
the north, Gen. Rashid Dostum, also heavily armed by the Americans, is
protecting former Taliban leaders and his own commanders, who are carrying out
widespread pillaging and looting, making it impossible for U.N. agencies to
start humanitarian relief. Dostum loyalist Hawaz, who was armed and trained by
U.S. Special Forces in October as backup for the U.S. bombing campaign of
Mazar-e-Sharif, was killed near there on Jan. 2 while looting villagers....
Gen. Dostum has refused to discipline Commander Hawaz's men, even though
interim Prime Minister Hamid Karzai appointed Gen. Dostum deputy defense
minister in a bid to co-opt him. 6 Territorial control by ethnically-based
parties influenced the U.N.-sponsored talks in Bonn that resulted in an
agreement for the constitution of an interim government on December 5, 2001.
The Panjshiri Tajik leadership of Jamiat, the dominant element within the
United Front (Northern Alliance), secured the three most critical government
departments: defense, interior, and foreign affairs. Hizb-i Wahdat received
control of the planning department, whose head-Haji Mohammad Mohaqiq-was also
designated one of five deputy chairmen of 6 Ahmed Rashid, "Fledgling Afghan
Government Faces Scourge of Warlordism-Local Leaders Who Ousted Taliban With
Aid of U.S. Are Restoring Old Fiefs," Wall Street Journal, January 16, 2002.
the Interim Cabinent. 7 Discontent over the allocation of portfolios proved to
be a major source of friction among the major parties. Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum
and Ismail Khan, the military governor of Herat and an ally of Jamiat leader
Burhanuddin Rabbani, immediately denounced what they characterized as the
marginalization of their ethnic parties and regions, respectively. 8 Dostum was
subsequently offered, and accepted, the post of deputy defense minister, while
Ismail Khan pledged to recognize the Interim Administration while proclaiming
autonomy for five western provinces. 9 The current competition and realignments
involving armed parties in northern Afghanistan is in part driven by their
desire to consolidate authority prior to the convening of the emergency Loya
Jirga (Grand National Assembly). The Bonn Agreement itself provided that within
six months of the assumption of office by the Interim Administration, an
emergency Loya Jirga would be convened to appoint a transitional
administration, which would in turn lead Afghanistan for up to two years, until
a "fully representative government can be elected through free and fair
elections." 10 The Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the
Emergency Loya Jirga, whose members were designated in late January, includes
distinguished Afghan civil society representatives; under the terms of the Bonn
Agreement, it has final authority for "determining the procedures for and the
number of people who will participate," including establishing "criteria for
the inclusion of civil society organizations and prominent individuals" and
adopting and implementing procedures for "monitoring the process of nomination
of individuals to the Emergency Loya Jirga to ensure that the process of
indirect election or selection is transparent and fair." 11 7 "Afghan Deputy
Leaders Reflect Afghan Ethnic Mix," Reuters, Decemb er 5, 2001. 8 Peter Baker,
"Afghan Factions Criticize Accord: Some Leaders Vow to Boycott Regime,"
Washington Post, December 7, 2001; "Key Afghan Warlords Re- ject Bonn Deal,"
BBC World News, December 6, 2001. 9 "Afghan Warlord Given Top Job," BBC World
News, December 24, 2001. 10 Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Af-
ghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Perma- nent Government Institutions
("Bonn Agreement"), December 5, 2001, Art. I, Sec. 4; "Kabul Sets June Meeting
Date for Council on Ruling Nation," Asso- ciated Press, April 1, 2002. 11 Bonn
Agreement, Art. IV, Sec. 2. A F G H A N I S T A N : P A Y I N G F O R T H E T A
L I B A N ' S C R I M E S HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 8 APRIL 2002 VOL. 14, NO. 1 (C )
Despite these provisions, many Afghans interviewed by Human Rights Watch
remained apprehensive about the prospects for a transparent selection process
under the prevailing security conditions. Abuses Faced by Pashtuns In northern
Afghanistan, one ethnic group was effectively left out of the new power
arrangement: the ethnic Pashtun minority that had been closely identified with
the Pashtun-dominated Taliban. Most of the Taliban leadership had been Pashtuns
from southern Afghanistan. As soon as the Taliban collapsed, Pashtun
communities were quickly disarmed across northern Afghanistan, and soon faced
widespread abuses at the hands of the three ethnic militias-Junbish, Wahdat,
and Jamiat-as well as by armed Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Hazaras taking advantage of
the imbalance of power created by the sudden disarming of Pashtun communities.
Throughout northern Afghanistan, Pashtun communities faced widespread looting,
beatings, abductions, extortion, and incidents of killing and sexual violence.
In some communities, these abuses continued for months. While the wave of
violence and abuse against Pashtuns has somewhat diminished since the first
months following the fall of the Taliban, Pashtun communities continue to face
serious and regular abuses. In addition, Pashtun communities have been stripped
of their assets, impoverished, and displaced by the abuses, and face a
difficult future. A team of four Human Rights Watch researchers traveled to
northern Afghanistan in February and March 2002 to investigate the human rights
situation in northern Afghanistan. The team visited dozens of Pashtun villages
and communities in Balkh, Faryab, Samangan, and Baghlan provinces. The team
also met with Afghan government representatives, members of the diplomatic
community, and humanitarian aid workers to gather additional information. The
abuses documented in this report represent only a fragment of the overall
abuses suffered by ethnic Pashtuns in northern Afghanistan since the fall of
the Taliban regime. In almost all of the villages visited, Human Rights Watch
researchers were approached by dozens of villagers who offered us more accounts
of abuses similar to the ones documented in this report. Everyone in the
village would try to get the researchers' attention, or give the researchers
detailed list of the goods that had been looted from their homes. Because of
time and resource constraints, our researchers were able to interview only a
fraction of those victims, but their accounts are representative of the
suffering of many more. Our research was also geographically selective. There
are hundreds of Pashtun villages and communities throughout northern
Afghanistan, and it would have been impossible to visit them all. Instead, we
visited clusters of villages in the different northern provinces that
represented the major concentrations of Pashtuns in northern Afghanistan. All
of the Pashtun villages we visited had been affected by the looting and
violence, indicating just how widespread and serious the abuses faced by
Pashtuns in northern Afghanistan were. Human Rights Watch researchers received
credible reports of sexual violence against ethnic Pashtun women and girls.
While the reports of sexual violence were widespread, Human Rights Watch was
able to confirm only a small number of specific cases due to the difficulties
inherent in documenting such attacks. According to independent studies, Afghan
women symbolize their families' and societies' honor, with Pashtun communities,
in particular, placing a high value on women's chastity. 12 Historically, some
of these communities have sanctioned "honor" killings in which a woman is
killed by her own relatives for bringing "dishonor" upon the family by conduct
perceived as breaching community norms on sexual behavior-including being a
victim of sexual violence. 13 This deep stigma may explain why most women and
men were unwilling to provide details of specific incidents. In addition, some
of the women and girls were unavailable since families had sent them to secure
locations because of a fear of further sexual violence. Women doctors in the
north confirmed that because of the shame associated with sexual 12 Hafizullah
Emadi, The Politics of Women and De- velopment in Afghanistan, (New York:
Paragon House, 1993), p. 22; Anna M. Pont, "Eat What You Want, Dress the Way
Your Community Wants: The Position of Afghan Women in Mercy Corps Interna-
tional Programme Areas," A Mercy Corps Interna- tional Report, (May 1998), pp.
2-4. 13 Emadi, The Politics of Women, pp. 16, 23; Bene- dicte Grima, The
Performance of Emotion Among Paxtun Women, (Karachi: Oxford University Press,
1998), pp. 150-154, 163-165; Human Rights Watch interview with Dr. S., aged 40,
Mazar-i Sharif, Feb- ruary 23, 2002. A F G H A N I S T A N : P A Y I N G F O R
T H E T A L I B A N ' S C R I M E S HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 9 APRIL 2002 VOL. 14,
NO. 1 (C ) violence, many Pasthun families do not seek medical attention for
victims of rape, even if they are severely injured, except when a woman becomes
pregnant. Displacement of Pashtuns Targeted violence against ethnic Pashtuns
has led to the internal displacement of thousands across northern Afghanistan,
with most moving from rural areas toward cities and towns that have larger
concentrations of Pashtuns and where they believe there is greater security.
Although some have taken up residence in private homes, others live in camps
for internally displaced persons (IDPs) or in abandoned villages. Displaced
ethnic Pashtuns face ongoing security problems; Human Rights Watch documented
two cases in which members of armed groups abducted IDPs, in Mazar-i Sharif and
on the outskirts of Baghlan city. Both displaced Pashtun communities and those
who remain in their places of origin also reported persistent difficulty in
securing humanitarian assistance. Pashtun villagers frequently said that they
were systematically denied access to humanitarian aid by local authorities or
non-Pashtun residents on the basis of their ethnicity. Since early January
2002, newly displaced Afghans-the majority of whom have been Pashtuns-have
sought refuge in Pakistan, mostly at the Pakistani border town of Chaman. While
Pakistan's borders have been officially closed since the fall of 2000, the
government of Pakistan has allowed vulnerable refugees, identified as such by
Pakistani border guards, to enter at Chaman in fixed daily quotas starting from
November 2001. On several occasions the numbers of new arrivals to Chaman were
far larger than the daily entry quotas set by the government. Human Rights
Watch has repeatedly criticized Pakistan's official border closure policy, and
the policies that have prevented entry at Chaman, because they obstruct the
right to seek asylum and can endanger the lives of refugees. 14 Families
waiting to enter at Chaman were left to subsist beyond the reach of U.N. or
nongovernmental organization (NGO) assistance workers, in squalid and dire
conditions in a "no-man's land" 14 See, e.g., "Refugee Crisis in Afghanistan:
Pakistan, Tajikistan Must Reopen Borders to Fleeing Af- ghans," Human Rights
Watch Press Release, No- vember 11, 2001. located just outside the Killi Faizo
transit camp. 15 Even with the difficulty in gaining entry to Pakistan, 47,000
Afghans sought refuge in Pakistan through Chaman between January and March 8,
2002. 16 The human rights abuses perpetrated against Pashtuns documented in
this report, together with a worsening humanitarian situation in certain areas,
were at the root of this recent refugee flight. Pashtun refugees consistently
reported fleeing because of ethnic persecution. By early January, for instance,
Pashtun families described fleeing the southwestern city of Herat because of
harassment, telling officials of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) that "the soldiers were looting in the city and forcing people
belonging to the Pashtun tribe to pay them money." 17 Four weeks later, another
wave of Pashtun refugees arrived at the border. "They claim that they were
persecuted because of being Pashtuns," UNHCR spokesperson Kris Janowski said.
18 In late February 2002, ethnic Pashtun refugees told UNHCR they decided to
"seek 15 Once they are allowed to enter, refugees are proc- essed and given
humanitarian assistance in the Killi Faizo camp before being transferred to one
of several permanent camps located in the area. In early De- cember 2001,
approximately 2,000 refugees were trapped in the no-man's land, subsisting
without ade- quate food or water, and sleeping in freezing tem- peratures at
night. See "Refugees Trapped in No Man's Land," BBC News, December 4, 2001. In
January 2002, 13,000 newly arrived refugees were again trapped. See "Number of
Afghan Refugees in No-man's Land Rises," UNHCR News Release, January 11, 2002.
In both the December and January cases, the government of Pakistan eventually
temp o- rarily lifted the quota to allow the Afghan refugees to enter, but only
after weeks of waiting, during which many refugees fell ill because of the
harsh conditions. On February 21, the government of Pakistan again decided to
close the border to all new arrivals at Chaman. This time, more than 10,000
refugees were left waiting to enter Pakistan. 16 See "UNHCR Gets Green Light To
Register Af- ghans Fleeing Hunger and Insecurity," UNHCR News, March 8, 2002.
17 "New Influx of Afghan Refugees Arrives at Cha- man Border Crossing in
Pakistan," UNHCR News, January 29, 2002. 18 "Thousands of Afghans flee
persecution to Paki- stan-UNHCR," Agence France Presse via NewsEdge
Corporation, January 29, 2002. A F G H A N I S T A N : P A Y I N G F O R T H E
T A L I B A N ' S C R I M E S HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 10 APRIL 2002 VOL. 14, NO. 1
(C ) safety after being robbed and intimidated in ethnically mixed villages in
northern Afghanistan, often at the instigation of local commanders." 19 U.N.
Spokesperson Yusuf Hassan commented that UNHCR had "a substantial number [of
new refugees] who have said that they have been forced off of their land, that
their houses have been looted, that they have been violently attacked...and
some of them say their relatives have been killed in what appears to be
increasing attacks against Pashtuns in Afghanistan." 20 Still other refugees
from the camp for internally displaced persons at Spin Boldak, south of
Kandahar, said the area was "teeming with gunmen and bandits" since the
collapse of the Taliban regime. 21 THE LEGACY OF TALIBAN ABUSES Any
understanding of the current abuses committed against Pashtuns in northern
Afghanistan must take account of the severe abuses that the Taliban regime
committed against non-Pashtun ethnic groups in northern Afghanistan, even
though many ethnic Pashtuns living in northern Afghanistan did not participate
in abuses against their neighbors. The brutality of Taliban rule in northern
Afghanistan has left many communities targeted by them with grievances that, in
the absence of judicial mechanisms for accountability and redress, are being
addressed in a vigilante fashion. While the current abuses have taken place
against the background of a legacy of Taliban atrocities, it would be a mistake
to view the attacks against Pashtun communities solely as reprisals for past
abuses. Local commanders and their soldiers, not the civilian communities most
affected by Taliban abuses, carried out the majority of the abuses documented
in this report. These actions have taken place, moreover, in a broader context
of insecurity for civilians, in 19 UNHCR spokesperson Kris Janowski, "Afghani-
stan: Dramatic Increase in Numbers at Chaman Bor- der," UNHCR News, February
19, 2002. 20 Louis Meixler, "Thousands of Ethnic Pashtuns Fleeing Northern
Afghanistan," Associated Press, February 21, 2002. 21 "UN Appeals to Pakistan
on Refugees," Agence France Presse via NewsEdge Corporation, January 16, 2002.
which northern Pashtuns are acutely vulnerable because of their present lack of
protection. Northern Afghanistan, in contrast to the largely Pashtun south, is
a complex ethnic mosaic. Groups with a long history of settlement in the
region-Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Turkmen, and Persian-speaking Arabs-are
interspersed with the descendants of more recent arrivals, including nineteenth
and early twentieth century refugees from Central Asia and Pashtuns whose
settlement was promoted by successive Kabul-based governments. 22 The mainly
Pashtun Taliban movement pragmatically accomodated non-Pashtuns in some parts
of the north, but in other areas curtailed their access to vital land and water
resources. In large parts of northern and central Afghanistan, Taliban rule was
extended through the cooptation of non-Pashtun commanders. After its initial
conquest of the central Hazarajat region in September 1998, for example, the
Taliban withdrew most non-local forces from several districts and left them
under the nominal control of Hazara commanders who had changed their
allegiances. 23 In other areas of the north, such as Balkh and Kunduz, Taliban
rule expanded with the critical support of local Pashtun commanders, 24 and
Pashtun 22 The Pashtun presence in the north dates to the 1880s and early
1890s, when Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, the Durrani Pashtun ruler in Kabul,
forcibly relocated thousands of Ghilzai Pashtuns and mem- bers of other rival
tribes from southern Afghanistan to the north. Later settlers, such as the
Shinwari Pashtuns who began moving to Kunduz from eastern Afghanistan in the
late 1940s, came voluntarily. Both the forced and voluntary migrants were allo-
cated land by the central government, a development that fostered tensions with
communities that conse- quently lost access to farmland and pastures. Louis
Dupree, Afghanistan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 188 and
419; Asger Christensen, "Afghanistan: Can the Fragments be Put Together
Again?," Nordic Newsletter of Asian Studies, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies,
2001, no. 4. 23 Chris Johnson, "Hazarajat Baseline Study ­ Interim Report (Part
I)," U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, March 2000, p. 5
and Appen- dix D. 24 Human Rights Watch, "Afghanistan: The Massacre in Mazar- i
Sharif," A Human Rights Watch Short Report, vol. 10, no. 7 (C) (November 1998),
p. 3; A F G H A N I S T A N : P A Y I N G F O R T H E T A L I B A N ' S C R I M
E S HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 11 APRIL 2002 VOL. 14, NO. 1 (C ) communities in these
areas were correspondingly privileged under Taliban rule. Ethnic Uzbek refugees
from Balkh province, interviewed by Human Rights Watch in Pakistan during
August 2001, described a pattern of encroachment on their land by ethnic
Pashtuns, with the support of the local Taliban-sanctioned administration. 25
According to U.N. staff who were then based in northern Afghanistan, such
encroachment was often legitimized by the manipulation of land deeds. 26 The
Taliban also exacted ruthless reprisals against minority communities that were
perceived to have supported its rivals. In several cases, its forces carried
out large-scale summary executions of Hazara, Uzbek, and Tajik civilians or
systematically destroyed homes and means of livelihood-effectively preventing
the return of displaced populations. In some depopulated areas, such as
Robatak, on the border between Samangan and Baghlan provinces, or in the lower
Bangi valley in Takhar province, new migrants-Pashtuns and Gujjars,
respectively- settled on land that had formerly been occupied by Hazaras or
Tajiks and Uzbeks. 27 What follows is an overview of cases documented by Human
Rights Watch and other independent observers in which Taliban forces carried
out targeted reprisals against non- Pashtun minorities: * Yakaolang and Bamiyan
districts, June 2001: After retaking central Yakaolang, Tali- ban forces under
the command of Mullah Dadaullah burned about 4,500 houses, 500 shops, and
public buildings. As they re- treated east, they continued to burn villages and
to detain and kill Shi'a Hazara civilians in villages and side valleys in
eastern Ya- kaolang and the western part of Bamiyan dis- Michael Griffin,
Reaping the Whirlwind: the Taliban Movement in Afghanistan (London: Pluto
Press, 2001), p. 177. 25 Human Rights Watch interviews with N, aged forty-five,
and K.H., aged thirty-five, (ethnic Uzbek refugees from Zari), Quetta,
Pakistan, August 17, 2001. 26 Human Rights Watch e-mail communication with a
former humanitarian worker in northern Afghanistan, January 23, 2002. 27 Human
Rights Watch e-mail communication with a former humanitarian worker in northern
Afghanistan, January 23, 2002; confidential field report by an in- ternational
NGO, November 15-17, 2000, on file at Human Rights Watch. trict. Several
refugees described witnessing the subsequent movement of ethnic Pashtun
pastoralists into the valleys, and the grazing of large herds of sheep on their
farmlands. 28 * Zari, Balkh province, May 2001: After a week-long occupation by
General Abdul Rashid Dostum's forces, Zari-a mainly Uzbek-populated area-
reverted to Taliban control. While most civilians fled to the hills south of
central Zari, many of those who re- mained or who returned reportedly were
killed by Taliban forces reoccupying the dis- trict. Refugees also reported the
arrests of ci- vilians who returned to Zari and their trans- portation as
prisoners to Kandahar, and the burning of some homes. 29 * Yakaolang district,
January 2001: Taliban forces massacred over 170 Shi'a Hazara civil- ians after
retaking control of Yakaolang dis- trict from the United Front factions Hizb- i
Wahdat and Harakat-i Islami. The victims were herded to assembly points in the
center of the district and several outlying areas, and then shot by firing
squad in public view. 30 * Khwajaghar, Takhar province, January 2001: Taliban
forces summarily executed at least thirty-one ethnic Uzbek civilians while
retreating from Khwajaghar, in Takhar prov- ince. 31 * Robatak pass, May 2000:
Taliban forces summarily executed at least thirty-one Is- maili Hazara
civilians near the Robatak pass, northwest of the town of Pul-i Khumri. These
were men taken during sweep opera- tions throughout Samangan and neighboring
provinces in late 1999 and early 2000. 32 * Northeastern Afghanistan, July
1999: A series of Taliban offensives was marked by summary executions, the
abduction of women, forced labor of detainees, the burn- ing of homes, and the
destruction of other 28 Human Rights Watch, "Afghanistan: Ethnically- Motivated
Abuses Against Civilians," A Human Rights Watch Backgrounder, October 2001. 29
Ibid. 30 Human Rights Watch, "Massacres of Hazaras in Afghanistan," A Human
Rights Watch Short Report, vol. 13, no. 1(C) (February 2001), pp. 5-8. 31 Human
Rights Watch e-mail communication with a human rights investigator, March 2001.
32 Human Rights Watch, "Massacres of Hazaras in Afghanistan," pp. 8-10. A F G H
A N I S T A N : P A Y I N G F O R T H E T A L I B A N ' S C R I M E S HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH 12 APRIL 2002 VOL. 14, NO. 1 (C ) property and agricultural
assets, including fruit trees, one of the mainstays of the local economy. 33
According to one human rights researcher, in Khwajaghar, near Taloqan, 3,000
houses were systematically destroyed in July, and in Shamali, north of Kabul,
de- tainees were used for mine clearance. 34 The affected populations were
mainly Uzbek and Tajik. * Dara-i Suf, July-August, 1999: Taliban forces bombed
the town of Dara-i Suf, a Northern Alliance-held, predominantly Hazara enclave
in Samangan province, with incendiary cluster munitions; ground forces burned
down the entire central market and destroyed wells and homes. 35 * Mazar- i
Sharif, August 1998: After capturing Mazar-i Sharif, Taliban troops rounded up
and summarily executed at least 2,000 civilians, the majority of them ethnic
Hazaras. Thousands more, including eth- nic Uzbek and Tajik men, were detained.
The Taliban governor, Mullah Manon Niazi, made inflammatory speeches in which
he held Hazaras collectively responsible for the murder of Taliban soldiers in
Mazar-i Sharif in 1997 and ordered them to become Sunni Muslims or risk being
killed. Many civilians were also killed in aerial bombardments and rocket
attacks as they tried to flee the city. There were reports that in certain
Hazara neighborhoods women were raped and ab- ducted by Taliban troops. 36 The
grievances of Hazara, Tajik, and Uzbek communities in large parts of the north
run deep and must be addressed. International financial support will be needed
to facilitate the return and rehabilitation of communites that were displaced
as a result of conflict-related violence. The 33 U.N. Special Rapporteur of the
Commission of Human Rights, "Question of the Violation of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms in Any Part of the World: Report on the situation of human
rights in Afghanistan submitted by Mr. Kamal Hossain, Spe- cial Rapporteur, in
accordance with Commission resolution 1999/9," E/CN.4/2000/33, January 10,
2000, pp. 12-13. 34 Human Rights Watch interview with a human rights
investigator, Islamabad, May 2001. 35 Human Rights Watch interview and e-mail
com- munications with a witness in Islamabad who inves- tigated the incident,
November 2000-May 2001. 36 Human Rights Watch, "Afghanistan: The Massacre in
Mazar-i Sharif." victims of the Taliban's abusive reign deserve justice, and
the perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious
human rights abuses must be brought to account before fair and impartial
courts. Equally vital is international support for the creation of mechanisms
that can impartially resolve disputes between communities over access to land,
water resources, and property that underlie many of the communal conflicts in
the north. Despite the cycle of abuses between non- Pashtuns and Pashtuns in
northern Afghanistan, tensions between the communities themselves are not
unsolvable. Human Rights Watch researchers found a significant number of cases
in which Tajik farmers had sheltered Pashtun families who had fled from their
homes, and one case in which Hazara elders successfully interceded with Hizb- i
Wahdat forces that were attacking internally displaced Pashtuns in their area.
BALKH PROVINCE Chimtal District Bargah-e Afghani At around 11 a.m. one day in
the first week of December, a group of about 300 armed Hazaras arrived at the
remote Pashtun village of Bargah-e Afghani, located in the Chimtal district of
Balkh province. 37 Just two days prior to the arrival of the Hazara fighters,
the villagers of Bargah-e Afghani had handed over their firearms to Manzullah
Khan, an Uzbek commander of Junbish, and in return had received a written
confirmation from him that they had been disarmed. Manzullah Khan had also
placed twelve of his soldiers in the village after its population was disarmed,
but the soldiers ran away when the Hazara fighters attacked the village. 38
Most of the villagers quickly fled the village, but the Hazara fighters killed
thirty-seven men who stayed behind, the largest documented killing of civilians
since the fall of the Taliban. Of the thirty-seven killed, seventeen were local
37 Witnesses estimated the date of the attack as occur- ring between the
seventeenth and the twentieth day of Ramadan, corresponding to between December
2 and December 5, 2001. 38 Human Rights Watch interview with village elder
K.W., aged forty-five, Bargah-e Afghani, February 24, 2002. A F G H A N I S T A
N : P A Y I N G F O R T H E T A L I B A N ' S C R I M E S HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 13
APRIL 2002 VOL. 14, NO. 1 (C ) villagers, and the remaining twenty were ethnic
Pashtuns who had resettled in the village. A.S., a thirty- six-year-old farmer
from Bargah- e Afghani remained in the village with his wife and six children
during the attack. At about 12:30 p.m., a group of Hazara soldiers entered his
home and detained him, tying his hands behind his back. When they took him
outside, his wife tried to stop the Hazara soldiers, but they beat her away.
Outside, the men began beating A.S.: My hands were tied, and they were beating
me with their AK-47 assault rifles. They were accusing me of being Taliban and
Al Qaeda.... They told me that I had come from Pakistan and should give them
money. I gave them 30 lakhs [about U.S. $42]. They threw the money away, saying
it was not enough. They looted everything, even my naswar [snuff] box. They
took two kilims [handwoven flatweave rugs], my wife's watch and two other
Japanese watches, a tape recorder. 39 The Hazara gunmen ultimately released
A.S., but he then witnessed the summary executions of three Pashtun men from
the village and later recovered the body of a fourth executed villager: At
first, [twenty-five to thirty-year-old] Abdul Matin was accompanied by his
family. They were crying, "Please save him, do not kill him." The Hazaras were
trying to get the women away from him. Then, when they brought Abdul Matin and
separated him from his wife, in that instant they shot him with about ten
bullets. Then Abdul Hakim [aged fifty] asked them, "Why did you kill him?" They
then shot Abdul Hakim also. Said Alam [aged thirty], the brother of Abdul
Hakim, ran up. He asked them, "Why did you kill my brother?" Then they shot
Said Alam with at least thirty bullets. I later heard that Asadullah [the
twenty- 39 Human Rights Watch interview with A.S., aged thirty- six, Bargah-
e Afghani, February 24, 2002. year-old brother of Abdul Matin] was also killed
by Hazara soldiers, and went to bring back his body. 40 S., the twenty-year-old
relative of Asadullah and Abdul Matin, was at home when the Hazara soldiers
came to arrest her brother. She said that the soldiers had killed Abdul Matin
almost immediately after they came to the family compound. They then tried to
shoot her fourteen-year-old brother, Sharifullah, but she managed to push the
gun away and make it fire in the air. The soldiers then beat her unconscious.
The soldiers took Asadullah with them to carry looted goods to their car, and
shot him about one hour later. 41 Twenty-seven-year-old S.W. was at home with
his shepherd, twenty-year-old Sardar Mohammed, a Pashtun who had resettled in
the village after fleeing from Faizabad in Badakshan province. Hazara soldiers
came to his home three times during the attack, first looting his home and then
shooting and killing Sardar Mohammed: They entered my home and tied my hands.
Then they asked me for weapons-I did not have any weapons. I had some carpets.
They loaded the three carpets on my back, loosened my handcuffs and told me to
bring them to their car. Then I returned to my home. Another team of soldiers
came. The group had stolen a bicycle from a neighboring house, and they told me
to carry it to [the edge of the neighboring] Turkmen village. There, they
brought their truck and were using me as a porter. All of the expensive items
were carried by me and some others to the vehicles. They themselves were also
carrying things. I went back and forth three times. ... Then, I was in my room.
Four soldiers entered the house. One of the soldiers came to me, a second went
towards the shepherd, who was sitting against the 40 Ibid. 41 Human Rights
Watch interview with S., aged twenty, Bargah-e Afghani, February 24, 2002. S.,
like many Afghans, uses only one name. A F G H A N I S T A N : P A Y I N G F O
R T H E T A L I B A N ' S C R I M E S HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 14 APRIL 2002 VOL. 14,
NO. 1 (C ) wall [of the courtyard]. [The soldier] shot six bullets at him, and
he died at this place. ... They did not come near him, they shot him from a far
distance [across the courtyard].... He was just sitting there, being quiet. 42
G.D., aged forty-five, was hiding in his cow shed together with twenty-five-
year-old Mohammed Umar when a group of eleven Hazara fighters entered: Eleven
Hazaras came into the compound. They came inside the cow shed and found
Mohammed Umar hiding behind a clay pot. They asked him for weapons and money.
He replied that he was a poor farmer. They tied his hands, and one soldier hit
him with his weapon on his head. Then Mohammed fell down and lost
consciousness. Another soldier instantly fired at him [emptying] a clip of
thirty bullets. Then they left the compound. 43 G.A., the thirty-year-old
sister of Amir Khan, aged twenty, and Zafar Khan, aged thirty, told Human
Rights Watch how Hazara soldiers detained and beat her two brothers, demanding
money and drugs before killing them: About twenty people came. They entered
into the rooms and brought the men out, beating them. They had tied their hands
behind their backs with their handkerchiefs. They were beating them, saying,
"If you have money, give us money, If you have opium, give us opium." Each of
my brothers was beaten by four gunmen, they were beating them with weapons.
They were screaming, and I was crying. They beat them until they killed
them.... We [women] went back inside the home and they followed us, demanding
money. I told them that I didn't have any money. Then they took the men ... to
42 Human Rights Watch interview with S.W., aged twenty-seven, Bargah-e Afghani,
February 24, 2002. 43 Human Rights Watch interview with G.D., aged forty-five,
Bargah-e Afghani, February 26, 2002. another neighborhood, to see if they could
find money from neighbors. Then they brought them back and shot them. 44 Two
other witnesses gave similar accounts of additional incidents in which the
Hazara soldiers killed Pashtun civilians. M.J. watched a group of about twenty
Hazara soldiers tie up her father, fifty- year-old Mohammed Khan, and her
uncle, fifty-two-year-old Sher Khan. The soldiers began beating the men,
demanding money: "Then they shot them inside our compound, and only then did
they loot our jewelry." 45 The Hazara soldiers proceeded to loot six carpets,
four pairs of kilims, three Iranian carpets, a gas light, a sewing machine, a
tape recorder, household goods, and a tractor from the compound: "They put all
the looted goods on the back of the tractor and left." 46 M., aged sixteen,
witnessed the beating and killing of her father, seventy-year-old Safdar Bey,
and her brother, twenty-six-year-old Amir Khan: Six men came to our house, they
were Hazaras. When they entered into the house, they beat us and looted our
household goods. When they were beating my father, I was holding him, trying to
stop them from killing him. They beat me [away] with their weapons. The beating
lasted for about one and one half hours. Amir Khan, my brother, was also there.
They also held him and were beating him. They tied their hands behind their
backs, and their feet were also tied. They had bruises all over their bodies.
The Hazaras were asking us for 2,000 to 3,000 lakhs [about U.S. $2,800 to
$4,200]. If we didn't pay the money, they would kill [my father and brother]. I
saw the killing. At first, they beat them with their weapons, very forcefully.
Then they shot them with about thirty bullets. 44 Human Rights Watch interview
with G.A., aged thirty, Bargah- e Afghani, February 26, 2002. 45 Human Rights
Watch interview with M.J., age un- known, Bargah-e Afghani, February 26, 2002.
M., like many Afghans, uses only one name 46 Ibid. A F G H A N I S T A N : P A
Y I N G F O R T H E T A L I B A N ' S C R I M E S HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 15 APRIL
2002 VOL. 14, NO. 1 (C ) Then they fired at them with [a heavier weapon]. Amir
Khan was laid down on the ground, and they stabbed him with their bayonets....
They fired at both of them at the same time, but [my father] Safdar Bey only
died two days later. Amir Khan died instantly. They were [shot] in the
courtyard inside our compound. Then, they entered inside our rooms and searched
them. We had carpets, kilims, a sewing machine-they took all of these. Some
golden coins were also taken, as well as four pairs of earrings, four rings,
our clothes, six watches. But they didn't abuse us anymore. They also found
2,000 lakhs [about U.S. $2,800]. 47 Twenty-year-old A.A. was detained by two
Hazara fighters in the street, and ordered to walk back to his home. While he
was walking in front of the two fighters, he was suddenly attacked by them and
nearly killed: "When I was walking [home], one of them hit me with the bayonet
of his gun. It entered in the back of my head and came out of my mouth. I lost
six teeth. I lost consciousness." 48 A.A.'s father carried him to the hospital
in Shiberghan, where he barely survived his injuries. His face was still
heavily bandaged when Human Rights Watch interviewed him more than two months
after the attack. Los Angeles Times reporter Geoffrey Mohan interviewed a
Hazara commander named Rajab about the attack. Rajab, who is believed to
control a significant area of Chimtal district, admitted that killings took
place in Bargah-e Afghani, and claimed that the attack was in retaliation for
earlier incidents of attacks against Hazara villagers by Pashtuns: Yes, that's
right, something happened [in Bargah-e Afghani.] ... But when the Taliban first
came, there were about 2,000 Hazara families in Chimtal [district]. These
Pushtun people killed about 300 Hazara people and put 500 in jail. They looted
the Hazara people's 47 Human Rights Watch interview with M., aged six- teen,
Bargah-e Afghani, February 26, 2002. 48 Human Rights Watch interview with A.A.,
aged twenty, Bargah-e Afghani, February 24, 2002. houses. They looted my house
and knocked down the walls.... They killed about 300 people, and we killed
maybe 10. We took cattle from dead people, but it was cattle they had taken
from us.... No one knows who did this, but these people who are living in
Bargah now, they oppressed people, they looted houses, they raped people. 49
The Pashtun village of Bargah-e Afghani is adjacent to a Turkmen village,
Bargah-e Turkman. Human Rights Watch also went to speak with the Turkmen
villagers about their treatment in the time of the Taliban as well as the
events during the attack. The Turkmen villagers claimed that Pashtuns from
Bargah-e Afghani had looted their village when the Taliban first came to power.
While the Taliban were in power, their Pashtun neighbors had to provide troops
for the Taliban, and had demanded that the Turkmen village provide them with
ten to fifteen men to fight on a monthly rotation. 50 Following the deadly
attack, security conditions improved for the Pashtun population in Bargah-
e Afghani. Manzullah Khan, the Junbish commander to whom the villagers had
originally handed over their weapons and who had sent the Uzbek soldiers who
had fled during the attack, returned Junbish soldiers to the village following
the attack. The village has not been attacked since. Yengi Qala Yengi Qala is a
large village in Chimtal district, with a mixed population of ethnic Pashtuns,
Tajiks, and Hazaras. According to an ethnic Pashtun village elder of Yengi
Qala, sixty- two-year-old S.M., about half of the Hazara population of the
villages surrounding Yengi Qala fled the area when the Taliban came to power in
northern Afghanistan, at least in part because some of the Hazara villagers had
actively resisted the Taliban advance. 51 According to an ethnic Tajik
shopkeeper in the town, a group of 49 Geoffrey Mohan, "Vengeance is Taking its
Toll in Wake of Taliban," Los Angeles Times, March 2, 2002. 50 Human Rights
Watch interview with A., aged fifty- two, February 26, 2002. A., like many
Afghans, uses only one name. 51 Human Rights Watch interview with S.M., aged
sixty-two, Yengi Qala, February 26, 2002. A F G H A N I S T A N : P A Y I N G F
O R T H E T A L I B A N ' S C R I M E S HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 16 APRIL 2002 VOL.
14, NO. 1 (C ) four Pashtun families who had resettled in Yengi Qala did
continue to abuse the non-Pashtun population during the Taliban period, but the
majority of Pashtun villagers were not involved in such abuses: "The Pashtuns
who committed these crimes were mostly immigrants [i.e., from elsewhere] and
they are no longer here now. They looted the Hazaras' mattresses, their goods,
even their windows and doors." 52 Almost immediately after the fall of the
Taliban in Mazar-i Sharif on November 9, 2001, Hazara fighters who had left the
area during the Taliban reign began returning to their villages around Yengi
Qala. On the morning of November 12, at about 6 or 7 a.m., Hazara fighters
began heading for Yengi Qala. On the way to Yengi Qala, the Hazara fighters
came across a sixty-year-old Pashtun servant named Ismail, who was on his way
to Shiberghan with a donkey laden with sacks of flour. Hazara fighters shot
Ismail, and dumped his body in a nearby river. 53 Sixty- two-year-old S.M., an
ethnic Pashtun village elder in Yengi Qala, saw the Hazara fighters approach
after he had finished his morning prayers, and immediately fled the village
towards Jar Qala, together with most of the Pashtun villagers. When S.M.
returned home two days later, he found his home looted, with even the windows
removed from the walls: They took my four cows, six bokhars [1,400 kilograms]
of wheat. They looted everything from my house, you can see they even took the
window frames.... They [also] took eight pairs of kilims, about nineteen new
mattresses, twelve sleeping sets [mattresses with sheets and blankets, rolled
together], and twelve more blankets. They broke all of the boxes [used for
storing valuables] and took all of our clothes. In the women's boxes, there was
also jewelry. They took a machine to produce cotton seed oil, my radio, two
tape recorders, forty antique tea pots, and many other things. 54 52 Human
Rights Watch interview with T.S., aged thirty-two, Yengi Qala, February 26,
2002. 53 Human Rights Watch interview with S.M., aged sixty- two, Yengi Qala,
February 26, 2002. 54 Ibid. During the looting in the village, the Hazara
soldiers killed three more people, including two women and the mentally
disabled nephew of S.M. According to S.M., who did not personally witness the
killing but spoke to several eyewitnesses, his forty-year-old mentally disabled
nephew Said Nabi Shah was killed after being tied up and beaten by the Hazara
fighters: "[The Hazara fighters] entered into my brother's compound, and they
tied my brother's son up by the hands. They were beating him, pulling him up to
a hill near the village. There, they shot and killed him. When we found his
body, his hands were bound with his turban." 55 S.M. vehemently denied to Human
Rights Watch that he or other Pashtun village leaders had been involved in
anti-Hazara abuses during the reign of the Taliban, and claimed to have
personally protected Hazara villagers in the area from Taliban atrocities. He
felt that he had been targeted for abuse simply because he was a Pashtun
village elder: "When you are the elder of a village, when things change, people
always blame you [for the past.] The other fault of mine is that I am Pashtun
and the Taliban are also Pashtun. The Taliban did the crimes, but the
punishment was for us." 56 Two elderly women were also killed. Noor Bibi, aged
about sixty, and her sister, seventy- year-old Goldaneh, were abandoned by
their relatives when they fled the village, "because they were too old to be
taken along." When the relatives returned to their homes, they found the two
elderly women shot dead in their home. 57 Human Rights Watch could not find any
direct witnesses to the killings, but the neighbors said they took place during
the period that Hazara forces were looting homes. 58 Villagers also blamed two
additional killings on Hazara fighters belonging to Hizb- i Wahdat. Around
November 23, right after dusk, thirty- year-old Alauddin went to visit his
sister, who had been ill. He left his sister's home later that night, together
with Dad Mohammed, the sister's twenty-eight-year-old son. A number of Hizb-
i Wahdat soldiers took away the men from right outside the sister's home, and
the bodies of the two men were found three days later. J., the 55 Ibid. 56
Ibid. 57 Human Rights Watch interview with J., aged thirty- five, Yengi Qala,
February 26, 2002. J., like many Afghans, uses only one name. 58 Ibid. A F G H
A N I S T A N : P A Y I N G F O R T H E T A L I B A N ' S C R I M E S HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH 17 APRIL 2002 VOL. 14, NO. 1 (C ) thirty-five-year- old brother of
Alauddin, described how the bodies were found: "The bodies were found with
their hands tied behind their backs, and both were shot in the head. Alauddin
had also been shot in the left shoulder. Dad Mohamed had been shot twice in the
head. There were also bruises on their bodies, I guess from rifle- butts." 59
Many other villagers also suffered looting at the hands of the Hazara forces.
M.A., who was over sixty, said a group of six Hazara fighters came to his home
around December 5 or 10, 2001, at 2 p.m. He recognized their commander as
Abdullah Chatagh of Hizb-i Wahdat. They demanded M.A. hand over his AK-47
assault rifle, and then started looting and beating: "They took my four cows,
our rugs and kilims, and 360 lakhs [about U.S. $500]. They said, `you're
Pashtun,' and started beating me with rifle butts on my back, legs, and arms."
60 When asked if he made a complaint about the looting, M.A. replied that he
thought a complaint would be useless and expressed the feelings of many: I've
complained only to Allah. Who hears our complaints? We will only get in more
trouble if we complain. We have no power. Whoever has the guns has the power.
We are sick of the guns, of the commanders. Take them all away and let us farm.
61 T.S., a thirty-two-year-old ethnic Tajik shopkeeper, narrowly escaped
execution at the hands of the Hazara forces, under the control of Commander
Zahi: Commander Zahi[`s forces] arrived and said they suspected us of being
Talibs [Taliban supporters] and protecting the Talibs. They then collected
eight of us, Tajiks [and other non-Pashtuns] and lined us up. They told us to
get in one line. When we got in line, they fired above our heads. They wanted
to shoot a second time, but their weapon jammed so we managed to escape. Zahi
was with two bodyguards, he was riding a horse. 59 Ibid. 60 Human Rights Watch
interview with M.A., aged over sixty, Yengi Qala, February 26, 2002. 61 Ibid.
The other [Hazara] soldiers were behind them, farther away. 62 Following the
Hazara attack, the Tajik population of the village contacted the Mazar-i Sharif
based Jamiat commander Ustad Atta Mohammad and requested protection for their
village. At about 8 p.m. that same day, two truckloads of weapons were sent by
Jamiat to the village "to distribute to Jamiat supporters," according to T.S.
"Then we could bring peace back to our village," T.S. continued, "and we
invited the Pashtuns who had escaped to return to the village." 63 S.M., the
Pashtun village elder whose house was looted, confirmed that relative peace had
returned to the village, and that they were now living under the protection of
a Jamiat commander, Ghazi Shojaeddin. 64 A second villager confirmed that
security had improved since Jamiat took over security, stating, "Security is
now better because Jamiat is protecting us against Hizb- i Wahdat since about
twenty days. But it is only inside the village. We are still afraid to go
outside [the village], or to go out at night." 65 He added that they could
still not travel on the roads "because the [Hizb-i Wahdat soldiers] will stop
cars on the road and demand money and threaten us." 66 However, although most
Pashtun villagers in Yengi Qala were loathe to speak about abuses by their new
protectors, armed Tajiks have also carried out abuses against Pashtun
civilians. J. told Human Rights Watch that armed Tajiks had also looted Pashtun
homes during November and December 2001. 67 Around December 10, 2001, three
armed Tajiks took forty-two-year-old A.M., an ethnic Pashtun, from his home to
an old cemetery: "They held a gun to my temple and asked for money, I thought
they were going to kill me. Then a villager passed by on the road and saw us,
so they let me go after I gave them 150 lakhs [about U.S. $210]. They didn't
beat me, they didn't have to. I knew they would kill me if I didn't pay them."
68 62 Human Rights Watch interview with T.S., aged thirty- two, Yengi Qala,
February 26, 2002. 63 Ibid. 64 Human Rights Watch interview with S.M., aged
sixty-two, Yengi Qala, February 26, 2002. 65 Human Rights Watch interview with
J., aged thirty-five, Yengi Qala, February 26, 2002. 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid. 68 Human
Rights Watch interview with A.K., aged forty-two, Yengi Qala, February 26,
2002. A F G H A N I S T A N : P A Y I N G F O R T H E T A L I B A N ' S C R I M
E S HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 18 APRIL 2002 VOL. 14, NO. 1 (C ) Rape in Chimtal
District Human Rights Watch received second-hand reports that women and girls
had been raped and kidnapped in Chimtal district, but we were able to confirm
only one case of rape in the district. This does not mean that rape or
abductions did not take place on a larger scale, but points to the difficulty
of confirming cases of rape in a society where such abuses are considered
"unspeakable." A Pashtun school administrator in Mazar-i Sharif told Human
Rights Watch that three Hazara soldiers raped a sixteen-year-old female
relative of hers in Chimtal city on January 16, 2002. A group of four soldiers
came to the home while the girl was bathing. The men tied up her father in the
front room, and three of the soldiers raped his daughter in front of him and
looted the home. The girl has been forced to leave her village, "because
everyone heard about [the rape] and it was shameful for the family." Her father
and brother refuse to see the rape victim, and have even threatened to kill her
for bringing shame on the family. The school administrator stressed that there
were other cases of rape, but that in most cases the families affected tried to
keep the information private: There are more rape and sexual violence cases
against Pashtuns.... This is because the other [ethnic groups] have weapons
now, and the Pashtun do not have weapons to defend themselves. Pashtun
communities in particular are least likely to seek medical care in the event of
sexual violence because of social stigmatization. ... The social stigma is so
severe that in some cases families have killed their female family members [who
were raped]. 69 Charbolak District Soon after the fall of the Taliban in Mazar-
i Sharif on November 9, 2001, Junbish troops took over a sizable military base
located in the Charbolak district on the main Shiberghan- Mazar-i Sharif
highway. Human Rights Watch visited three Pashtun villages in the district that
had suffered abuses, including looting and beatings, from Junbish soldiers
stationed at the 69 Human Rights Watch interview, Mazar-i Sharif, February 19,
2002. military base. The abuses occurred in late November and December, and
took place during a "disarmament campaign" in which the Junbish soldiers were
supposedly looking for weapons. According to people in all three villages,
their security situation had improved significantly since the initial attacks.
A former Taliban commander, Mohammed Wali, who is from Charbolak district, has
switched allegiance to Junbish after the fall of the Taliban, and has provided
protection for the Pashtun villages in the area. In return for the protection,
each of the villages is providing a number of men to Commander Wali to serve as
soldiers. Nauwarid Janghura Around November 15, 2001, at about 4 p.m., a group
of about thirty to forty armed Uzbek men entered the Pashtun village of
Nauwarid Janghura. 70 In fear of their lives, most of the villagers ran away
when they saw the Uzbek soldiers approaching, leaving behind only a few men,
some children, and a few women. Seventy-five-year-old B.M. remained in the
village, too old to flee quickly. He saw the Uzbek soldiers enter the homes of
the villagers, carrying out carpets and other valuables. When they cam