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Security and protection in Mogadishu and South-Central Somalia

Joint report from the Danish Immigration Service's and the Norwegian Landinfo's fact finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya and Mogadishu, Somalia

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Overview of Danish fact finding reports published in 2012 and 2013

Update (2) On Entry Procedures At Kurdistan Regional Government Checkpoints (Krg); Residence Procedures In Kurdistan Region Of Iraq (Kri) And Arrival Procedures At Erbil And Suleimaniyah Airports (For Iraqis Travelling From Non-Kri Areas Of Iraq), Joint Report of the Danish Immigration Service/UK Border Agency Fact Finding Mission to Erbil and Dahuk, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), conducted 11 to 22 November 2011

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Security and human rights issues in South-Central Somalia, including Mogadishu, Report from Danish Immigration Service's fact finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya and Mogadishu, Somalia, 30 January to 19 February 2012

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Introduction and disclaimer

In January-February 2012 the Country of Origin Information (COI) unit of the Danish Immigration Service (DIS) as well as the Norwegian COI unit Landinfo undertook fact finding missions to Nairobi, Kenya and Mogadishu, Somalia. However, as these missions were not joint fact finding missions separate reports and notes were produced as a result of these two missions. The Danish fact finding report as well as the Norwegian Thematic Notes from these two missions are available at www.newtodenmark.dk and www.landinfo.no respectively.

In October 2012 the DIS' COI unit and Landinfo undertook a joint fact finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya and Mogadishu, Somalia. The purpose of this Danish-Norwegian mission was to gather updated COI on South-Central (S/C) Somalia, including Mogadishu on matters mainly related to security, human rights and humanitarian issues. The Danish-Norwegian report from this mission is available at www.newtodenmark.dk and www.landinfo.no

In April-May 2013 the DIS' COI unit and Landinfo undertook an additional joint fact finding mission. The mission took place from 16 April to 7 May 2013. The report at hand is the delegation's joint report from this mission.

The mission comprised a series of interviews with interlocutors in Nairobi and Mogadishu. The Danish-Norwegian delegation consulted non-governmental organisations (NGOs), international NGOs, international organisations, including United Nations (UN) agencies, and individuals. A full list of interlocutors interviewed can be found at the end of the report at hand.

The list of interlocutors interviewed was decided upon by the delegation based on the Danish and the Norwegian COI units' previous contacts from former fact finding missions to Somalia and Nairobi, Kenya as well as the expertise, remit and role of each interlocutor, their relevance to the Terms of References (ToR) of the mission. Additionally, the list of interlocutors was also decided by advice from consultations with key interlocutors as well as by availability. Altogether the delegation consulted 16 interlocutors, including meetings in Nairobi with the Danish and Norwegian embassies.

The delegation was assisted by the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) during its visit to Mogadishu. The UNDSS provided security and logistical assistance throughout the delegation's stay and movements in the city. While in Mogadishu the delegation held meetings in Hamar Weyne and Medina districts, and at the Peace Hotel in Waberi district as well as at the United Nations Common Compound (UNCC). UNDSS advised the delegation to spread its meetings in Mogadishu over several locations.

Due to security concerns for persons from the international community in Mogadishu the delegation was advised by the Danish Embassy in Nairobi and the UNDSS to limit its stay in the city to three days only. The delegation was also advised not to be accommodated at any hotel in Mogadishu. The

delegation was accommodated by the security company SKA-Somalia at Aden Abdulle International Airport, Mogadishu.

All interlocutors who were interviewed were informed that the delegation's final fact finding report would be a public document, and all agreed to have their reviewed and approved meeting notes included in the report at hand. Each interview note has been forwarded to the relevant interlocutor for comments and final approval before being included in the report at hand.

Altogether 7 of the 16 interlocutors requested to be referred to anonymously. These interlocutor's statements have been referred to anonymously. See list of organizations and individuals consulted at the end of this report. In addition the delegation also held a meeting at the Medina Hospital regarding accessibility of medical treatment in Mogadishu. A note on medical treatment will be published separately.

It should be noted that the report at hand does not intend to cover all security and protection issues in S/C Somalia. This report is basically an update on security related issues in S/C Somalia since October 2012.

The report at hand does not include any policy recommendations or analysis by the delegation and, unless otherwise indicated via a footnote, is based entirely on the approved interview notes and/or other documentary material provided by the listed interlocutors. Whenever the delegation found it relevant it has included some references to already published material, in particular media reports. Where it has been necessary to explain or clarify a point or phrase made by an interlocutor, the authors (i.e. the delegation) have provided short additional supplementary explanations. These have all been marked in closed brackets [...].

The delegation would like to thank UNDSS for its competent assistance and for facilitating its visit to and meetings in Mogadishu. The delegation would also like to thank all interlocutors for their kind support as well as for their patience and professional cooperation with the delegation during and after the fact finding mission.

The report at hand was written and edited during the fact finding mission to Nairobi and Mogadishu, and it does not include any country of origin information after 7 May 2013.

The delegation to Nairobi and Mogadishu comprised Jens Weise Olesen, Chief Advisor, Country of Origin Information unit, DIS, Copenhagen, Denmark, and Dag Petterson, Senior Advisor, Landinfo, Oslo, Norway.

The report at hand is available at the DIS's website www.newtodenmark.dk and Landinfo's website www.landinfo.no

1 Security issues in Mogadishu

1.1 Influence of and support to al-Shabaab

UNDSS, Mogadishu, explained that UNDSS covers the whole of Somalia. UNDSS is there to protect the UN, not the Somali population other than Somali personnel working for the UN. It was added that there are five threat categories which UNDSS apply:

- Armed conflict
- Terrorism
- Crime
- Civil unrest
- Hazards

Regarding armed conflict UNDSS, Mogadishu, explained that despite al-Shabaab's partial combat withdrawal from Mogadishu in August 2011 this withdrawal was only completed by the end of May 2012. Since then there have been no more al-Shabaab troops holding fixed combat positions in Mogadishu, but there continue to be underground al-Shabaab cells and terrorism. The district of Daynile was the last district of Mogadishu to be liberated from al-Shabaab. Since then, i.e. end of May 2012, there were approximately six weeks of calmness and no fighting in Mogadishu. However, following this period there have been armed attacks again, against targets in the city's outlying districts such as security forces' patrols and police stations. Al-Shabaab undertakes these hit and run attacks with small arms and occasionally slightly heavier weapons like rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). Al-Shabaab is not trying to retake Mogadishu, not even the outlying districts of the city, but it instead uses the attacks as a form of harassment and as a reminder of its presence.

Regarding the political process in Somalia Peter Klansoe, Regional Director, Horn of Africa & Yemen, Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Nairobi, explained that it is important that this process deals with the issue of the rights of the minorities in Somalia. This is the only way in which the Somali National Government (SNG) will be able to gain and increase the support of the population. If this is not happening the people will take matters into their own hands, and this is exactly how the platform of al-Shabaab previously was established. Today the political picture is somehow blurred, but it is crucial for the SNG to get the support of the Somalia people.

Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre, Mogadishu, is hopeful about the SNG, but it was emphasized that there are still a lot to be done before the SNG will function as a genuine government. People are talking freely about what the SNG should do, but the main issue at the moment is peace and security.

Regarding public support to the SNG Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre stated that approximately 80% of the population wants the government to be successful. The alternative would be disastrous for Somalia and its people. This is also the reason why the international community

should be economically and politically supportive of the SNG, and this should be now rather than tomorrow.

Regarding Mogadishu Peter Klansoe, DRC, explained that al-Shabaab still has influence in the city. People are still worried about al-Shabaab and there are still individuals who support or work for al-Shabaab. This is also occurring in refugee camps in Kenya and al-Shabaab has attacked police stations in Kenya. Similar developments are also occurring in Ethiopia.

Concerning security for the people of Mogadishu, an international NGO (B), Mogadishu, explained that there has been an improvement since al-Shabaab left the city [in August 2011]. Looking back, the city was divided into two parts with one part controlled by al-Shabaab and one controlled by the Somalia government and the international forces. During this time, people suffered a lot of hardship, it was difficult for people to move around and they had to adapt to different sets of rules when they moved from one sector to another. Fighting along the frontline caused many casualties.

These days there are no armed struggle and no frontline [in Mogadishu], people can move freely around in the city and people have moved back from the Afgoye corridor and from elsewhere.

However, according to the international NGO (B), Mogadishu, there are still threats in the city. Different kind of improvised explosives, hand grenade attacks and assassinations create fear among people, and al-Shabaab still has influence that affects people's lives. Checkpoints have been removed, but when people are moving around, they must constantly be careful. For example, since people started to go to Lido beach there have been two attacks there, one car bomb and one suicide bomber. On the other hand, there are clear improvements. For instance, before October last year, people did not dare to go to Bakara market, today they are going.

Al-Shabaab can hit anywhere in Mogadishu, according to an international NGO (B), Mogadishu. However, its influence is stronger in some parts of the city than in others. Al-Shabaab's influence is most noticeable in Suqahoiaha (Hurriwa district), in the northern part of Daynile, the Industrial Road area and at the Bakara market. This is the reason why people think twice before they go to these areas. Nevertheless, al-Shabaab members can be found everywhere, and you cannot identify an al-Shabaab by the way he is looking.

Today there is much freedom of movement in Mogadishu and people have full access to all [16] districts of Mogadishu, according to the international NGO (B), Mogadishu.

The international NGO (B), Mogadishu, explained that the influence of al-Shabaab in Mogadishu is not visible, but it is able to undertake attacks all over the city. That is why people avoid saying or doing things that can provoke al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab mainly targets:

- Government officials
- African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
- People working for international organisations

- People they suspect to be spying on them for the government

Thus, people think about their own movements, and they try not to be in the wrong place at the wrong time.

Al-Shabaab has infiltrated the police, the intelligence and the military, where they have their informants. These informants work for al-Shabaab mainly for economic reasons. Generally wages are low, and people working for the government are not paid regularly. Thus, by paying 100 United States (US) \$, al-Shabaab can easily make someone act on its behalf. These days only the ones working for the intelligence seems to be paid on time.

According to the international NGO (B), Mogadishu, al-Shabaab is in a more difficult financial situation than ever. However, it still gets funding from abroad, and it collects taxes in the areas it controls. It taxes farmers and pastoralists, but it also receives money from big money transfer companies and telecom companies. If it does not receive money from these companies, it will have to shut down its branch offices in the areas it controls.

In Mogadishu al-Shabaab also exerts its influence by calling people and threatening them, according to the international NGO (B), Mogadishu. The phone numbers it does not have, it will get through those informants it has within the telecom companies. Al-Shabaab threatens people dealing with the SNG and AMISOM, telling them that if they are not stopping what they are doing, it will come and kill them. This is still going on.

The international NGO (B), Mogadishu, explained that concerning assassinations, compared with October last year this has increased, especially in the period December 2012 to February 2013, but by March 2013 there has been a decrease. This means that the number of assassinations is going up and down periodically.

The people working for al-Shabaab in Mogadishu mainly do it for money, according to an international NGO (B), Mogadishu. However, there are also those who do so because they support al-Shabaab ideologically. Finally, there are people who act on behalf of al-Shabaab because they are forced by threats to provide information.

The international NGO (B), Mogadishu stated that al-Shabaab does not kill civilians indiscriminately. On the other hand, when it is staging large scale attacks it does not mind if civilians are killed.

Generally, people are very careful when they are talking about al-Shabaab, according to the international NGO (B), Mogadishu. When you for instance are in a café, you don't give critical or negative remarks on al-Shabaab, as you don't know if there is someone around who support them. Even among family members people are careful. This means that anyone who expresses negative attitudes to al-Shabaab could be in danger. This also goes for places like Baidoa and Belet Weyne. It was added that for these reasons people are very supportive of the presence of AMISOM.

An international NGO (A), Nairobi, explained that another issue related to the rapidly dwindling support for al-Shabaab is the fact that it denied the international community access to areas under its control even when S/C Somalia was hit by famine in 2011. People remember that they have received emergency relief from the international community during the last 20 years and they will not forget that al-Shabaab denied them relief when it was badly needed. Many Somalis became internally displaced persons (IDPs) during the 2011 famine, especially in central Somalia.

The international NGO (A), Nairobi explained that another concern regarding security for the people of Mogadishu is the incapacity of the SNG to provide public services and a return to normal life for the citizens. This is going very slow and it may become a security issue if the SNG does not succeed with this. However, it was added that al-Shabaab will never be able to retake Mogadishu.

The present security situation in Mogadishu will most likely continue if the international community does not seize the time, i.e. enhance its efforts to support the SNG with institution building and services. There is presently an enormous need for international assistance. It is imperative that the SNG can show people that the government is functioning and that it provides services.

According to UNDSS, Mogadishu, it is not uncommon for al-Shabaab fighters to wear the uniforms of the Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF) in order to infiltrate the city. Regarding the number of civilian casualties UNDSS stated that it does not record or report systematically on such casualties, as this is not within UNDSS's remit [mandate].

When asked why people do not talk about al-Shabaab Hakan Bilgin, Country Director-Somalia, International Medical Corps-Somalia (IMC), Nairobi, explained that it is a positive sign, and that the majority of the population does not support extremist groups. This is why it is the moment now to engage, i.e. to move forward with assistance to the government. This is how one can give people an idea of a better future.

Hakan Bilgin, IMC, explained that local people in Somalia will know about the presence of extremist group's members but they will not systematically report it to the authorities. They just accept that they have some influence.

Regarding support for extremist groups Hakan Bilgin, IMC, explained that Somalis are not extremists. However, Somalis may be conservative Muslims but they are in no way supporters of Islamic extremism.

Regarding support from the Somali public to AMISOM Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre, Mogadishu, explained that everybody knows that AMISOM supports the SNG, and that this is being appreciated by the Somalis. There is no negative attitude against AMISOM among Somalis. People are also aware that the SNAF, the security forces and the SNG cannot protect the people on its own. It is AMISOM who is 'driving the car'. However, it is our wish to become independent of AMISOM, but this is not within reach yet.

1.2 Al-Shabaab's capacity to undertake attacks

UNDSS, Mogadishu, explained that as of today the usual kind of attacks by al-Shabaab is hit and run attacks as well as hand grenade attacks and targeted killings. Some hand grenade attacks might be undertaken on behalf of al-Shabaab by paid youngsters (this is known to have happened in the past). From time to time there are also mortar and other indirect fire attacks, and in early April 2013 there was a mortar attack on the Mogadishu stadium. This stadium is occupied by AMISOM. However, there is no clear evidence that this or previous indirect fire attacks were undertaken by al-Shabaab. In mid-2012 there were several pretty accurate mortar attacks on Villa Somalia as well. UNDSS added that every few months there are such attacks, almost invariably at night.

UNDSS, Mogadishu, emphasized that indirect fire attacks may also be undertaken by others than al-Shabaab. It could be clan related disputes or other issues, but very often no one knows who is behind those attacks. UNDSS made it clear that because of the above mentioned kind of attacks the security is still under threat.

UNDSS, Mogadishu, explained that there are no recent reports of al-Shabaab having attacked or killed civilians deliberately through armed attacks. Actually this has not taken place for some years because al-Shabaab no longer has fixed combat positions inside Mogadishu. However, when al-Shabaab did have combat positions in Mogadishu, it was accused of purposelessly hiding in civilian areas or using them [the combat positions] from which to direct attacks, which would of course potentially expose the civilians to any retaliatory attacks by AMISOM and government forces

According to UNDSS, Mogadishu, the hit and run attacks by al-Shabaab are only directed against government affiliates and institutions like the police and the SNAF.

UNDSS, Mogadishu, explained that al-Shabaab undertakes attacks with all types of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). There was a decline in the numbers of actual and attempted IEDs across 2012. However, during the first quarter of 2013 IED attacks have been going up compared with numbers of attacks in the last quarter of 2012.

Regarding IED attacks UNDSS, Mogadishu, explained that remote controlled IED attacks or roadside bombs tend to target AMISOM, SNAF and convoys and such attacks sometimes result in the killing of civilians, i.e., collateral damage.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)-Somalia, Mogadishu, stated that the Somalia Federal Republic Government (SFRG) [i.e. SNG] relies heavily on AMISOM regarding security and control in Mogadishu as well in other regions of S/C Somalia.

Regarding security, UNHCR-Somalia stated that al-Shabaab maintains its intent and capabilities in Mogadishu. The influence of al-Shabaab is particularly clear in the evenings.

Regarding [the recent] hand-grenade attacks by al-Shabaab in Mogadishu, UNHCR-Somalia, Mogadishu, explained that, at the time of the mission, these attacks were, mainly, against SNAF soldiers. However, there were also civilian casualties in connection with some of the attacks.

Regarding IEDs UNDSS, Mogadishu, explained that some IEDs (also known as explosively-formed projectiles or EFPs) can penetrate armored vehicles and even cause fatalities, though fatalities are not known to have occurred since late 2011. Al-Shabaab continues to use EFPs though they are said to be of much lesser strength than EFPs seen in other countries.

An international NGO (C), Nairobi, explained that al-Shabaab is not yet finished, but it is severely weakened by internal division, as well as economically, militarily, politically and socially. However, al-Shabaab may strike as long as it has enough suicide attackers.

An international NGO (B), Mogadishu, explained that the numbers and influence of the international fighters in al-Shabaab is less today than it was in 2009/2010. Many of these fighters have left the country in recent times, i.e. because of internal rivalry in al-Shabaab and because it has lost its previous strength. The international NGO (B) did not agree that more than 50% of al-Shabaab's leadership are foreigners. However, previously there were many foreigners in al-Shabaab.

When asked if al-Shabaab is supported by foreign Islamists an international NGO (A), Nairobi, explained that the top levels of al-Shabaab's leaders are not originating in Somalia. This means that they are not concerned about the well-being of the people. They do not even care when people are dying from famine in areas under its control. Al-Shabaab wants to see itself as the sole source of livelihood, thus it offers job opportunities for people who will work for it as fighters, spies, infiltrators or suicide attackers etc. However, al-Shabaab has lost its main resources of income; it now has a very weak political, social and economic foundation. On the other hand, there are still wealthy individuals abroad who support al-Shabaab economically.

Hakan Bilgin, IMC, stated that there are a lot of rumors around the numbers of foreign fighters in Somalia, which goes between 20 and 200.

UNDSS, Mogadishu, explained that no one will know how many al-Shabaab fighters are present in Somalia, though it is likely that there are at least several thousand. Regarding Mogadishu it is a fact that the city is dominated by anti al-Shabaab sentiments. The people are mostly not supportive of al-Shabaab, though the Murusade clan (which is the third least powerful in the city) is viewed by some as having some al-Shabaab supporters.

A positive development in Mogadishu and in S/C Somalia is against al-Shabaab's wishes, according to an international NGO (C), Nairobi. However, as long as there are poor IDPs and urban poor people as well as ordinary people, who do not become part of the 'good life' there will be potential al-Shabaab supporters.

The international NGO (C), Nairobi, stated that al-Shabaab is considerably weakened today, and it is very much up to the international community to decide whether or not al-Shabaab may be able to regain control.

An international NGO (C), Nairobi, explained that Kismayo (Jubbaland), Puntland, Somaliland and maybe Ethiopia will benefit if al-Shabaab takes over Mogadishu. However, this is most unlikely to happen and today the people of Mogadishu, men and women, business people etc. are all supporters of the SNG.

According to the international NGO (C), Nairobi, persons close to the President, Speaker of Parliament and the Prime Minister are not corrupt. Those people are to be considered as honest and informed. They only want to see positive developments and a normal life for ordinary people. It was added that people will never accept al-Shabaab and this is a major reason why the movement will never regain control over Mogadishu and S/C Somalia.

According to Mohamed Farah Siad, Managing Director, Mohamed International Ltd., Hamar Weyne District, Mogadishu [who is a well-known businessman in the city], what is mostly needed in Mogadishu today is a reliable police force. To make Mogadishu secure, 3,000 well trained police troops should be deployed in all parts of the city. They should be selected according to qualifications, i.e. not chewing khat, and be given regular salary, good accommodation and proper food. However, in Mohamed Farah Siad's opinion the SNG is not able to establish such a police force. Mohamed Farah Siad added that he has been living in Mogadishu since his birth in 1945.

Concerning the situation of al-Shabaab today, Mohamed Farah Siad, Mogadishu, stated that the movement is weakened psychologically, financially and militarily. It is not able to rule in a good way anymore. There is no stability and it has started to move from area to area. In addition it has begun to confiscate people's assets. Today al-Shabaab is dangerous and people have started to hate it. Mohamed Farah Siad explained that he is not going down to his farm [south of Merka] anymore, as he used to do before.

1.3 Targeted killings/attacks by al-Shabaab

An international NGO (A), Nairobi, explained that al-Shabaab pay youngsters, including minors to throw hand grenades at various targets in Mogadishu. The targets are most often SNAF and police forces as well government institutions. It was emphasized that al-Shabaab does not want to send a message that it deliberately kills civilians.

Al-Shabaab is fighting against 'normalization' in Mogadishu. As an example of this the international NGO (A) made reference to an incident in 2012 when al-Shabaab targeted and killed a large number of Somali students who had just graduated and were on their way to Turkey as part of a student program.

However, the international NGO (A) added that in general al-Shabaab does not deliberately target civilians and the risks involved in living in Mogadishu are basically a question of being at the

wrong place at the wrong time, but being increasingly desperate al-Shabaab wants to send the message that Mogadishu is not safe.

Regarding targeted attacks Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre, Mogadishu explained that in particular al-Shabaab is targeting government employees and affiliates. It also target NGOs and anyone who dare to speak out negatively about al-Shabaab. In general people do not talk about al-Shabaab in public. Those who dare to speak out against al-Shabaab are those who enjoy protection or just because they are braver than many. In addition Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre stated that anyone who works actively for a normalization of livelihood in Mogadishu could be at risk of being threatened or killed by al-Shabaab. Whenever an NGO holds a workshop or a meeting it sees to it that everybody participating is known by the other participants.

Concerning hand grenade attacks UNDSS, Mogadishu, explained that numbers of such attacks are high, since having risen during 2012. These attacks are directed against SNAF soldiers, government affiliates, police officers, hotels and teashops frequented by politicians plus any government institution. Such attacks are most often undertaken in the evening. Around three-quarters of all hand grenade attacks in Mogadishu are likely to be by al-Shabaab, but UNDSS made it clear that not all such attacks are not only committed by al-Shabaab.

UNDSS, Mogadishu, further explained that civilians with any known government affiliation could be at risk of a targeted al-Shabaab attack, but there is also the problem of being at the wrong place at the wrong time.

UNDSS, Mogadishu, stated that there are on average several targeted killing and unknown killings (i.e., where the motive is unclear) per week in Mogadishu.

When asked who are among the main targets of al-Shabaab UNDSS, Mogadishu, stated that the two main targets are the SNG (which includes anyone affiliated to the SNG, e.g., security forces, government officials, businessmen who deal with the SNG and so forth) and AMISOM. After that, internationals (including the UN, NGOs, diplomats etc.) are targeted by al-Shabaab though UNDSS cannot say whether, say, the UN is third or tenth on al-Shabaab's list of preferred targets. The UN is definitely on al-Shabaab's list of targets and has been targeted by al-Shabaab across Somalia, but for various reasons the UN is not al-Shabaab's primary preferred target.

UNDSS, Mogadishu, added that it would be 'a scoop' for al-Shabaab to undertake a successful attack on the international community in Mogadishu.

According to UNDSS, Mogadishu, al-Shabaab still has the capacity to undertake targeted attacks and when the international community becomes increasingly present in Mogadishu and in S/C Somalia there might be reasons to be concerned about potentially increasing al-Shabaab attacks. More spectacular al-Shabaab attacks, such as the 14 April [2013] high court attack, are also possible though they are unlikely to take place frequently because they are costly for al-Shabaab.

UNDSS, Mogadishu, explained that there are currently at least four to five weekly hand grenade attacks in Mogadishu and usually more. Most such attacks take place in the evening. Roughly three quarters of all hand grenade attacks are currently assessed as being by al-Shabaab, they could be by regular al-Shabaab members or it could be youngsters paid by al-Shabaab to do such attacks.

Regarding targeted killings of for instance business people, which currently take place on average at least several times a week in Mogadishu, UNDSS, Mogadishu, stated that such assassinations could be undertaken by anyone who can pay for this. It could be elements other than al-Shabaab. However, again, it is assessed that around three quarters of targeted killings in Mogadishu are currently by al-Shabaab.

When asked if al-Shabaab tracks down defectors in Mogadishu UNDSS, Mogadishu, reiterated that most al-Shabaab attacks are targeted attacks and they do include the killing of al-Shabaab defectors. UNDSS added that there are fewer reports recently of al-Shabaab undertaking forced recruitment in S/C Somalia, but that does not necessarily mean there is less forced recruitment, though some clans are increasingly unwilling to support al-Shabaab.

A UN agency, Nairobi, stated that forced recruitment to al-Shabaab only occurs in areas controlled by al-Shabaab. Thus, forced recruitment does not occur in Mogadishu now.

An international NGO (B), Mogadishu explained that individuals, who are targeted by al-Shabaab, belong mainly to the following groups:

- Former al-Shabaab members who have deserted (this is most common)
- SNA-soldiers
- Police
- Members of the government
- Members of Parliament (MPs)
- People associated with the government or AMISOM, who could even be a person just running a small shop near a government office

When asked why journalists are not included in the above mentioned list, the international NGO (B) explained that in fact there has not been a single case where al-Shabaab has taken responsibility of the killing of journalists.

Concerning the big number of assassinated journalists, it is not justified to say that al-Shabaab is targeting this group specifically, according to the international NGO (B), Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab has taken responsibility for the killings of only journalists from the state run Radio Mogadishu. Who is behind the rest of the killings of journalists is not clear. In this connection, it should be

mentioned that Shabelle Media has had a conflict for a long time with the government. It was added that most journalists will not report negatively about al-Shabaab.

An international NGO (C), Nairobi, emphasized that it is al-Shabaab's strategy to attack SNG institutions, especially the courts. However, it must be emphasized that it is also al-Shabaab's strategy to attack the international community in Mogadishu.

According to UNDSS, Mogadishu, there are persons who have been executed by al-Shabaab for not paying Zakat (an Islamic tax) to it.

According to Hakan Bilgin, IMC, the vast majority of attacks [by al-Shabaab in Mogadishu] are not directed against civilians, but extremist groups [al-Shabaab] will probably continue its actions with or without civilian casualties.

1.4 Activities by the SNAF, police forces, District Commissioners (DCs) and criminal gangs

Regarding crime UNDSS, Mogadishu, explained that SNAF soldiers commit crimes against civilians. This can happen if they do not pay extortion fees requested by the soldiers, and there are reports of civilians having been shot dead by SNAF soldiers.

According to UNHCR-Somalia, Mogadishu, there are DCs who undertake a kind of taxation in Mogadishu. The militias of those DCs are collecting taxes by going from house to house in their districts. This practice is basically protection money. One will need to pay the taxes; otherwise they will not be protected by the DC's militia.

UNDSS, Mogadishu, confirmed that taxation can take place in Mogadishu. This can be genuine tax collection, but it is possible that there are also "taxations" in exchange for protection.

UNDSS, Mogadishu, explained that during the last half a year there are signs that aid distribution in Mogadishu continues to be a target for SNAF soldiers in the sense that they looted aid or even have fired against IDPs in order to get access to aid intended for the IDPs. However, UNDSS stated that such incidents were more regular in previous years.

UNDSS, Mogadishu, explained that it does not receive many reports of ordinary crime incidents, most UNDSS reports are concerning SNAF and al-Shabaab, and persons wearing SNAF uniforms. However, reports are sometimes received of regular crimes (meaning not involving al-Shabaab or SNAF-uniformed men) such as armed robberies and rapes. Some targeted killings, as mentioned, are also likely to be criminal and not terrorist in nature.

With regard to human rights violations committed by the government forces UNDSS, Mogadishu, explained that in mid-March 2013 there were a number of extrajudicial killings of al-Shabaab prisoners. More than 20 persons were executed by what was widely believed to be SNAF and Somalia security forces. There was even the possibility that this was being done on purpose as the government wanted to show people that 'we deal with such people harshly'.

Concerning abuse and persecution from SNAF and the police forces, an international NGO (B), Mogadishu, stated that the number of incidents has decreased, especially after the Afgoye corridor was taken by government forces. The only time people these days are afraid of the police, is when the police is upset and angry after attacks from al-Shabaab. In such kind of situations, the soldiers can start to shoot indiscriminately. However, when things are normal, people do not fear police or SNAF soldiers.

An international NGO (B), Mogadishu, explained that from time to time, the police conduct sweeping mass round-ups where they may arrest hundreds of young men to identify al-Shabaab supporters. Last time this happened, was four days after the attack on the Benadir Supreme Court 14 April [2013]. These round-ups mostly take place after major al-Shabaab attacks or when there is intelligence telling that al-Shabaab is planning an attack. After having been questioned, the vast majority of those arrested are released the same day, and they are not mistreated during custody.

Regarding the recent round ups of youngsters by the SNAF and security forces the UN agency, Nairobi, explained that the Ministry of Interior and National Security is increasingly interested in improving security in Somalia and this is the reason behind the round ups in Mogadishu as well as in villages in the countryside. The UN agency has made an agreement with the Ministry of Interior and National Security that minors arrested by the security forces and SNAF should be released immediately and handed over to the UN agency for custody. With regard to adults having been arrested the UN, AMISOM and the SNG have not yet reached an agreement with the Ministry of Interior and National Security. Thus, these detainees are in the custody of the Ministry of Interior and National Security.

According to the UN agency, Nairobi, round ups of minors and youngsters are still occurring in Mogadishu. However, the focal point of the Ministry of Interior and National Security and well as the focal point of the Ministry of Defense are both cooperating closely with the UN agency. Both focal points and AMISOM are reporting to the UN agency whenever there are reports of minors being rounded up. The UN agency described this cooperation as very good.

Regarding mass arrest of youngsters by the police Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre, Mogadishu, stated that this is still occurring in the government's attempt to remain vigilant, they often arrest unlawfully and indiscriminately. The police forces are trying to disclose persons with affiliation to al-Shabaab and they do that by mass arrests. The vast majority of those being arrested are released by the end of the day, but there are reports of youngsters being detained for weeks or even months. One of the biggest challenges is when people are arrested it is difficult to get out unless your family is willing to pay a bribe and even then it is difficult. Many people are incarcerated without charges for long periods of time. Children and adults are not separated. There are outbreaks of diseases in the prisons and all humanitarian actors have been denied access. The last being International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) who's access was denied and there

have been concerns of cholera outbreaks. Petty criminals are incarcerated with radicals and high risk individuals.

An international NGO (B), Mogadishu, explained that apart from the IDPs, there are no groups in Mogadishu today that can be characterised as vulnerable as regards being at risk of abuse and persecution. However, men who dress in a way that gives the impression that they are stern Muslim believers are at risk of being stopped and questioned by the police.

UNDSS, Mogadishu, explained that it is a problem that sometimes SNAF soldiers are fighting against each other. The SNAF is not a homogenous army, the soldiers may report to different commanders, and some of these commanders may have a clan based loyalty. Many such conflicts are linked to crime at the SNG checkpoints, and they are especially about money collected illegally at checkpoints, i.e. who gets the money. These conflicts are due to lack of payment of soldiers and this problem is not only prevailing in Mogadishu, it is also present in other parts of Somalia.

According to UNDSS, Mogadishu, many crimes are undertaken by men in SNAF military uniforms. However, you cannot always know if the crimes are committed by al-Shabaab, criminals or genuine SNAF soldiers, all wearing SNAF uniforms. Some criminal SNAF elements do, however, definitely exist.

According to Peter Klansoe, DRC, there are incidences of SNAF, or SNAF affiliated [militias], committing violations. These violations are typically rape and recruitment and it is normally the weaker population groups who suffer from this. There are reports on such violations every month. However, the UN Security Council has emphasized that the President of Somalia has taken initiatives to eliminate the impunity that soldiers and police forces has enjoyed so far. In addition to the violations committed by the SNAF and the police there are some militias in Mogadishu who also commit crimes. These militias are supportive of the SNG but they are beyond its control.

According to Peter Klansoe, DRC, there is now a little bit more law and order in Mogadishu than at the beginning of 2012, but there are still certain DCs who undertake their own business. Some are good and some are not so good.

According to Mohamed Farah Siad, Mogadishu, the [former] Transitional Federal Government (TFG) headed by Sheik Sharif, was dominated by Islamists who did not know anything about governance. President Hassan of the new government [the SNG] is a good man. However, the offices of the government are dominated by Islamists that the president is forced to work with. In the cabinet there are persons having links to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The Islamists are not able to take Somalia into a modern and competitive world. For instance, Somalia needs good relations with Ethiopia. Mohamed Farah Siad added that cooperation with Egypt can “damage our relations” because of Ethiopia’s conflict with Egypt about the water of the Nile. Generally, it is wrong to prioritize relations to the Islamic world. What is important is to develop trade and economic cooperation with Ethiopia and Kenya.

Mohamed Farah Siad, Mogadishu, explained that he had only 10% hope for a better future. However, if the new government should not succeed, he did not think that the country would fragment into warlordism, unless the neighbouring countries financed clan based warlords. However, al-Shabaab could be able to retake the big cities if the government failed. A major problem in Somalia is that neither the government nor anyone else in Somalia is respecting the human rights. The way to root out al-Shabaab is to establish good governance in Mogadishu and in the other cities in S/C Somalia and let AMISOM and the Somali forces fight them militarily.

1.5 Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV)

According to a UN agency, Nairobi, there are also other security concerns than armed conflict and terrorist attacks to be taken into account. Reported Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) went up three- or fourfold last year. From July to December 2012 SGBV went up two and a half times. However, the president made a statement in late November 2012 declaring his intolerance of SGBV, and declared that perpetrators of SGBV would be severely punished, including execution.

The UN agency, Nairobi, added that al-Shabaab does not undertake forced marriages in Mogadishu.

Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre, Mogadishu, explained that the recent case regarding an alleged victim of rape and a journalist reporting on the case has had a very negative impact on reporting on rape cases. The SNG is now much more focused on the issue, but it seems like it is more interested in hiding the level of rapes than the incident of it, but it will still take time before anything on the ground changes. However, it is positive that the above mentioned case became well known nationally in Somalia as well as abroad. Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre was one of the first NGOs to address the problem of rape in Somalia. It is good that the SNG is acknowledging it but now it needs to respond and stop silencing people as it has.

A UN agency, Nairobi, explained that [the NGO Somali Women and Development Centre (SWDC) in Mogadishu] actively supported the woman involved in the well-known rape case regarding a journalist and the woman.

Concerning this rape case the UN agency, Nairobi explained that data from January to March 2013 shows that SGBV reporting went down. The decrease is due to the fact that women are now more cautious to report such cases. They are afraid to report and admit being raped despite the fact that the government has voiced its commitment to fight SGBV. The reluctance to report SGBV may be due to the fact that the government is unable to really fight SGBV because its operational level is still too weak. The ministries are in place but only on the top level, the operational level is not yet in place, i.e. the ministries have a very low technical capacity.

On the other hand the UN agency explained that the increase in SGBV is also due to the fact that there is much better reporting in the areas liberated from al-Shabaab, but also that there are an increasing number of reports of SNAF soldiers having committed SGBV, including rapes. There is

a correlation between newly recovered areas and the occurrence of SGBV crimes committed by SNAF and allied militias.

Regarding the recent rape case in Mogadishu a representative of a Diaspora organization in Mogadishu did not agree with Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre [in Mogadishu] that this case had not improved the situation for women who have been or are at risk of rape. Everyone in Mogadishu considered the woman to be a liar when she claimed she had been raped. However, the period following the case the number of rapes in Mogadishu fell dramatically. On the other hand, people are not more inclined to talk openly about rapes. It is mostly IDP women from minority clans who are victims of rape and they are not ready to report it. The representative believed that the above mentioned rape case was a setback regarding reporting of rapes. Many rape victims will now fear that they will not be believed.

The UN agency, Nairobi, explained that verified reports show an overall improvement in security for ordinary people, but also that SGBV is a very serious issue, and maybe even increasing due to the liberation of areas under control by al-Shabaab.

UNHCR-Somalia, Mogadishu stated that in light of the prevalence of gender based violence (GBV), female heads of households or single women, without access to nuclear family and clan protection mechanisms and children are at heightened risk of [violations].

1.6 Security improvements in Mogadishu

According to representatives of an international agency, Mogadishu, there has been a significant improvement regarding security in Mogadishu as well as in the rest of S/C Somalia since October 2012. Gunshots and grenade attacks have decreased in number since October 2012 and the UN agencies have adapted their mitigations measures accordingly. There is much easier movement and the UN is no longer using the AMISOM provided Casspir vehicles, i.e. landmine-proof vehicles, when its agencies are moving around.

According to representatives of the international agency, Mogadishu, the people of Mogadishu are feeling much more comfortable today than for many years. On the other hand security is still an issue as the SNG has recently removed the chief of its security forces and this has meant that there has been a temporary relaxation of security in the city. The removal took place as the President is trying to appoint heads in the administration according to the 4.5 formula.

Regarding improvement in security in Mogadishu and its surroundings a UN agency, Nairobi, stated that the last 15 months have been positive, there has been a lot of improvement particularly in Mogadishu. The UN agency is now able to go by road all the way up to Afgoye and spend the day in the area before returning to Mogadishu on the same day. In many areas Casspirs are no longer required for the UN but only armoured vehicles. However, killings take place from time to time in Mogadishu, [and are] a reminder that things are not normal. Although security has improved a lot, also for the ordinary people living in Mogadishu, there is still a need for improvements.

Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre, Mogadishu, explained that the security situation for ordinary people in Mogadishu has improved since October 2012. There is no shelling and no fighting with heavy arms any longer. Al-Shabaab does not deliberately target groups of civilians. However all security is fragile as it is clear now that when something is planned clearly, al-Shabaab does have the capacity to execute the mission. The government is reactive not proactive.

Peter Klansoe, DRC, explained that although the security situation in Mogadishu steadily improves there is still a lot of uncertainty. The situation is not stable and it is not just serenity and peace in Mogadishu. The overall context in Somalia is still fragile, in spite of the security improvements and progresses that have been made since August 2011.

An international NGO (A), Nairobi, stated that the security situation in Mogadishu for ordinary people has improved since October 2012 when the DIS and Landinfo undertook its last fact finding mission to Nairobi and Mogadishu. People are returning from the Diaspora in increasing numbers and today the citizens of Mogadishu have access to all parts of the city. Almost all unauthorized checkpoints have been removed since October 2012 and there are fewer SNG checkpoints than ever. However a main concern is the fact that the SNG and AMISOM have not been able to completely eliminate al-Shabaab's influence in Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab is still capable of undertaking terrorist attacks like the one that took place on 14 April, but al-Shabaab does not deliberately target civilians. The international NGO also stated that despite al-Shabaab still being capable of undertaking attacks there is much more private services available to the citizens of Mogadishu. There is also a lot of construction work taking place; and al-Shabaab's activities in Mogadishu are generally very limited.

A UN agency, Nairobi, confirmed that most checkpoints in Mogadishu have been removed. All illegal or unauthorized checkpoints are now gone. The UN agency also stated that the risk of a return to warlordism in Mogadishu as reported by the DIS in February 2012 is no longer an issue. It is now the SNG and AMISOM who are in control of Mogadishu, not the DCs and their militias.

Regarding the previously reported fear of the DC's militias in Mogadishu the international NGO (A), Nairobi, explained that the only remaining warlord-like DC in Mogadishu is the DC of Medina district. This DC has his own militia, but he does also enjoy some respect for his administration and a relative security in Medina District. It was added that all other DCs do not pose a potential threat to the SNG or the people. The security situation in Mogadishu is still improving and it was described by the international NGO (A) as quite good.

UNDSS, Mogadishu, stated that from a UN point of view there has been a gradual improvement regarding security since early 2012 and UN threat and risk levels for Mogadishu have gone down. Furthermore, UNDSS explained that the security improvements in Mogadishu are reflected in UNDSS' daily and weekly security reports [these reports are not available to the public]. The UN risk levels in all of Mogadishu's 16 districts have gone down in the past year or so from a previous 'Unacceptable Risk', and 'Very High Risk' to 'High Risk' in almost all areas, apart from the

AMISOM Protected Area which is 'Medium Risk'. This reflects a gradual improvement with regard to the security environment for the UN in Mogadishu. The highest threat level is categorized as 'Unacceptable'. However, 'High Risk' is still significant and means that considerable risks remain, though they have been successfully countered to date by the UN with risk management measures.

Regarding security in Mogadishu UNDSS, Mogadishu, explained that AMISOM does assist in upholding the security of Mogadishu, but most of the AMISOM soldiers are out in other parts of the country. AMISOM does not patrol all the streets of Mogadishu, but its soldiers are deployed in specific locations and its main focus is to keep al-Shabaab out of the city.

Regarding the threat of terrorism UNDSS, Mogadishu, stated that al-Shabaab is still present in Mogadishu as well as across Somalia, but it has no capacity to undertake conventional warfare in Mogadishu, and there is no more a frontline in the city.

UNDSS, Nairobi, stated that security for ordinary people in Mogadishu had improved since October 2012. Freedom of movement for ordinary people living in Mogadishu has improved, as most check points have now been removed. All illegal check points have been completely removed.

Peter Klansoe, DRC, explained that although the security situation in Mogadishu steadily improves there is still a lot of uncertainty. The situation is not stable and it is not just serenity and peace in Mogadishu. The overall context in Somalia is still fragile, in spite of the security improvements and progresses that have been made since August 2011.

A representative of a Diaspora organization in Mogadishu stated that the security situation has improved slightly while she has been in the city [since January 2013]. However, there have been attacks in the town by al-Shabaab during the representative's stay. Furthermore, Mogadishu is currently under imminent threat of further more serious attacks by al-Shabaab [see below in section 1.8]. The representative arrived from abroad in late January 2013.

Regarding security for the people of Mogadishu an international NGO (A) explained that the SNG recently replaced many leaders of its security and intelligence forces. This rather profound change has weakened these forces temporarily and al-Shabaab immediately exploited this situation. From the end of January up to April 2013 al-Shabaab has undertaken an increasing number of targeted killings and attacks in Mogadishu. This is also the reason why al-Shabaab was able to undertake the remarkable attack on the Supreme Court on 14 April [2013]. The same day al-Shabaab also killed two Turkish NGO workers in Mogadishu. Both attacks were suicide attacks.

Regarding the killing of two Turkish NGO workers on 14 April [2013], Hakan Bilgin, IMC, stated that the two NGO workers were not killed by the attack, but a Somali accompanying the Turks was killed.

According to an international NGO (C), Nairobi, the SNG understands the importance of security in Mogadishu, but the wish to be a leading force in establishing administrations in S/C Somalia and

the power struggle with Kismayo (Jubbaland) and Puntland has diverted the attention of the SNG away from the security challenges in Mogadishu.

The international NGO (C), Nairobi, explained that the SNG has made a mistake by being too preoccupied with obtaining international recognition, and with making an impact on what is happening in Jubbaland, Hiraan and Bay/Bakool. The SNG has declared that the security of Mogadishu is important to make the city attractive, but so far, the SNG has done too little to consolidate the achievements that have been made in Mogadishu.

According to the international NGO (C), Nairobi, the SNG has announced that about 1,000 specially trained troops will be deployed in Mogadishu in the near future. In the opinion of the international NGO (C) this would be a major contribution to the security of Mogadishu as people will get confidence in the SNG. This is the first priority of the president. This special force (Mogadishu Security Brigade) comprises professional soldiers and they will be paid their salaries.

An international NGO (A), Nairobi, explained that the president of Somalia recently declared that between 800 and 1,000 well trained soldiers will soon be deployed in Mogadishu in order to limit al-Shabaab's influence and further improve security in the city. The force is called Mogadishu Security Brigade and it comprises carefully selected soldiers. They have all undergone professional training during the last three months in Mogadishu. The international NGO (A) expected that the deployment of the Mogadishu Security Brigade would take place within the next two to three weeks. The delegation had its meeting with the international NGO (A) on 18 April.

It was added that the selection process of soldiers to the Mogadishu Security Brigade has been strictly careful, the soldiers are not to use khat and their salaries are guaranteed by the SNG. Salaries will be paid with revenues from Mogadishu's seaport and airport. Both ports are major sources of income for the SNG. The international NGO (A), Nairobi, emphasized that the deployment of this security force would significantly enhance security for the people of Mogadishu and civilians will enjoy more peace when the Mogadishu Security Brigade begin to break up and defeat the last remaining cells of al-Shabaab infiltrators and fighters in Mogadishu.

The international NGO (A), Nairobi, further explained that when the Mogadishu Security Brigade has been deployed to Mogadishu the existing SNAF forces in the city will be deployed to the outskirts of Mogadishu. This deployment will further improve security not only in Mogadishu but in the Benadir region. The international NGO (A) explained that it was quite optimistic about the improvement of security but added that it was also cautious.

Regarding information on the upcoming deployment of 800 to 1,000 specially trained soldiers, i.e. the Mogadishu Security Brigade, Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre, Mogadishu, stated that

the media have reported about this [see link to SAHABI online¹], and added that people will be very pleased to see this happening. People have become more concerned during the first weeks of April as no one knows when and where al-Shabaab may strike. However, it is all about being at the wrong place at the wrong time.

With regard to the announced deployment of a Mogadishu Security Brigade, UNDSS, Nairobi, had no detailed information. However, UNDSS had heard rumours about this, and recommended the delegation to consult UNDSS Mogadishu on the issue. UNDSS Nairobi considered that such a deployment would be a 'good signal' to the people of Mogadishu.

UNDSS, Mogadishu, had no further information about the role and time of deployment of a special Mogadishu Security Brigade force.

Hakan Bilgin, IMC, entirely agreed that a deployment of the Mogadishu Security Brigade and the deployment of SNAF to the outskirts of Mogadishu would contribute to the improvement of security in the city considerably. On the other hand Hakan Bilgin, IMC, had heard about the deployment plans. However, there are a lot of rumors in Somalia.

An international NGO (B), Mogadishu, had not heard about deployment in the near future of specially trained 1,000 troops in Mogadishu [i.e. a Mogadishu Security Brigade]. However, the international NGO (B) had heard about 124 troops trained in Djibouti and some trained in Uganda who has been deployed in Mogadishu in mid April 2013. There is also a specially trained anti-terror force at the airport called Alpha Group ('Gaashaan' in Somali), and it is said that 39 of them are trained in the United States of America (USA).

Hakan Bilgin, IMC, stated that the most positive sign of improvements in Somalia was when Turkish Airlines began its direct flights between Istanbul and Mogadishu. The first International Airlines to do so after twenty years. This was a very clear and strong message to the people in Mogadishu/Somalia.

According to Hakan Bilgin, IMC, the seaport of Mogadishu is very busy and it will need to be enlarged as there are many ships which may be anchored for weeks in the ocean before they can enter the port. An enlargement and modernization of the seaport (with cranes and container management facilities) will significantly boost the Somali economy and contribute to the overall improvement of quality of life among the population.

Hakan Bilgin, IMC, added that tax collection would be a good sign for the SNG and contribute to the security improvements, but as of today there is no genuine tax collection except for the seaport and the airport.

¹ Sabahi, *Special police force readies to deploy in Mogadishu*, 2 May 2013, http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2013/05/02/feature-02

1.7 Recent attacks by al-Shabaab

Though the overall security situation in Mogadishu has improved since October 2012 when the DIS and Landinfo undertook their latest fact finding mission, UNHCR-Somalia, Mogadishu, added that the recent attacks of April the 15th [14 April 2013] were a wakeup call to those who believed that there were no security problems in Mogadishu.

Regarding the 14 April [2013] attack on the Supreme Court an international NGO (A) explained that this attack was nothing new or unexpected. Al-Shabaab has been undertaking such attacks in the last four/five years.

Peter Klansoe, Regional Director, Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Horn of Africa & Yemen, Nairobi, explained that the 14 April [2013] al-Shabaab attack on the Benadir Supreme Court was nothing new and the attack does not indicate that al-Shabaab has adopted a new strategy. Al-Shabaab will continue to train suicide attackers in order to challenge the ongoing stabilization in Mogadishu. However, al-Shabaab does not have access to the resources it had previously. It has lost Mogadishu and then Kismayo, i.e. the most important income sources for al-Shabaab.

Regarding the 14 April [2013] attack on the Supreme Court Peter Klansoe, DRC, explained that this attack is not an indication of al-Shabaab's military strength and it is not an expression of an increasing military strength

Peter Klansoe, DRC added that on the other hand the 14 April [2013] attack was not a costly attack for al-Shabaab but it attracted huge attention in Somalia as well as in the international community as the intention was to destabilize the political processes in Somalia.

Regarding the 14 April [2013] attack on the high court UNDSS, Mogadishu, explained that this attack was a complex attack involving armed gunmen, person-borne IEDs (i.e., suicide bombers), and a suicide vehicle-borne IED. The vehicle-borne IED that targeted the Turkish convoy on the same day was probably being driven by a suicide bomber, i.e., it was probably also a suicide vehicle-born IED. However, there has been a lot of misreporting regarding the high court attack, because the use of complex attacks is not a 'brand-new' move or tactic by al-Shabaab, as al-Shabaab has used complex attacks (i.e., an attack involving two or more weapons/systems used in some kind of coordinated way) before.

UNDSS, Mogadishu, stated that the 14 April [2013] complex attack was clever in its planning, but not very complicated to undertake once the group of al-Shabaab attackers was inside the high court. However, the attack was the biggest single attack in terms of casualties in Mogadishu in 2013 so far. Because the 14 April attack was rather uncomplicated it is likely that al-Shabaab may be able to undertake a similar attack again, but such attacks are unlikely to take place frequently because al-Shabaab is unlikely to have the capacity to undertake them frequently (i.e., they are expensive in terms of human and explosive resources). UNDSS explained that it is unclear whether this attack was originally intended to target the Turks. Suicide operations probably often take a long time to

plan, though this is not necessarily always the case. What will take long, however, is convincing someone to be willing to commit suicide.

UNDSS, Mogadishu, reiterated that the 14 April [2013] attack was a wakeup call for everyone in Mogadishu. However, the UN agencies are now able to operate in all 16 districts of Mogadishu, but the UN accepts that there might still be casualties among UN staff in Mogadishu as well in all other locations in S/C Somalia.

Regarding the recent attack [14 April 2013] on the Turkish NGO workers UNDSS, Mogadishu, explained that the Turks have been attacked physically and verbally several times during the last one and a half year by al-Shabaab.

An international NGO (C), Nairobi, stated that the 14 April 2013 attack on the Supreme Court in Mogadishu will not have any implications in the long run. However, if such attacks continue to take place in the near future the international community may be affected by this.

An international NGO (C), Nairobi, explained that the recent attacks in Mogadishu by al-Shabaab which took place on 14 April must be seen in the light of the following three circumstances:

- The SNG is weak, with limited capacity and lacking resources. The SNG does not get the intelligence it needs to counter attacks from al-Shabaab and it is not able to pay the security forces regularly. In addition, just around the incident, the national intelligence chief was removed, while three other security chiefs were out of the country in the months before the attack. This was a lack of leadership.
- The SNG has not been able to cooperate in a constructive way regionally with Kenya, Ethiopia and IGAD. In this context the SNG is also weakened, which also means that it gets less information, which is needed to counter al-Shabaab. However, in general there is good cooperation between SNG and AMISOM.
- Al-Shabaab has lost economic resources and the organization is militarily weakened. There is a split in the movement between the nationalists and the internationally oriented 'jihadists'. Godane has stated that he does not recognize the leadership, and Mansur is a captive in the movement. This split is very serious for al-Shabaab. The intention of the attack in Mogadishu on 14 April was to weaken the SNG, and the incident was a heavy blow for the government. But this does not mean that al-Shabaab is strengthened. The attack tells us that the government has to invest more in security.

The international NGO (C) added that if the SNG is not empowered, and is able to show people that it provides security to Mogadishu this could lead to a strengthening of al-Shabaab. There is information/rumours saying that al-Shabaab have more cars and suicide bombers ready for actions in Mogadishu and that they are planning to attack white western representatives in Mogadishu. Success in such an attack could make the international community lose its belief in security in

Somalia and its government. Al-Shabaab is now desperate and it needs to show that it still has capacity.

1.8 UNDSS' recent security alert concerning a possible al-Shabaab attack

On 29 April 2013 UNDSS, Nairobi, issued a warning against the increased likelihood of a major al-Shabaab attack in Mogadishu in early May 2013, [see also below in section 1.8.1].

When asked if the latest security concerns [the above mentioned UNDSS warning] in Mogadishu were closely related to the fact that al-Shabaab would like to stage a major attack in connection with the upcoming London Conference [the conference is scheduled to take place on 7 May 2013] UNDSS, Nairobi, replied “negative, it is not related”.

When asked if al-Shabaab does not succeed in undertaking a major attack in the days/weeks to come would this imply that al-Shabaab is now severely weakened and/or does it imply that AMISOM and SNAF and the SNG have taken important steps in improving the security in Mogadishu, UNDSS, Nairobi, explained that it confirms both. HASM [i.e. Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen or just Al-Shabaab] has been seriously weakened and AMISOM/SNG Security Forces are improving their structure and actions/activities in fighting insurgency and OCGs [i.e. Organised Crime Groups].

According to Peter Klansoe, DRC, Nairobi, one should not base general conclusions on the security situation on the basis of single case alerts or incidences. It must be based on trends. As such Peter Klansoe would not think it is prudent to conclude anything on the basis of whether al-Shabaab manages or does not manage to stage a high profile attack in Mogadishu over the next couple of days [i.e. from 3 May 2013]. The alert is rightly linked to the London Conference, but some are even saying it is instigated by SNG itself to be able to project its security apparatus as a success when nothing happens. Although that may be a bit far reached, the point is that Somalia is a constant pot of rumours, and the danger is always to run with the latest, hence this is why it is so much more important to base general conclusions on fact-based trends over time rather than merely the latest incidents. In other words Peter Klansoe would not draw any general conclusion on al-Shabaab's strengths related to whether a particular attack occurs or not over the next 10 days [i.e. from 3 May 2013].

When asked if the increased security alert in Mogadishu closely related to the fact that al-Shabaab would like to stage a major attack in connection with the upcoming London Conference, the Royal Danish Embassy, Nairobi, explained that in addition to Mogadishu an increasing number of threats have recently taken place in several locations in the region, i.e. in Uganda as well as in Burundi.

The embassy added that some analysts agree that should an attack be successful, the timing of those threats and attacks could be linked to attempts to derail the process leading up the London Conference scheduled for 7 May 2013. At least it is well documented that the number of attacks are now higher than for a very long time, so this analysis cannot be ruled out.

When asked if al-Shabaab does not succeed in undertaking a major attack in the days/weeks to come would this imply that al-Shabaab is now severely weakened and/or does it imply that AMISOM and SNAF and the SNG have taken important steps in improved the security in Mogadishu, the Royal Danish Embassy, Nairobi, stated that one cannot draw such a conclusion directly. There could be several reasons as to why an al-Shabaab attack is not undertaken. It could be related to internal al-Shabaab considerations regarding the success-rate of an attack, internal divisions within the movement and/or a change in internal tactics, strategies etc.

When asked if the increased security alert in Mogadishu is closely related to the fact that al-Shabaab would like to stage a major attack in connection with the upcoming London conference, Hakan Bilgin, IMC, replied “Yes, the London conference is a kind of international exposure for al-Shabaab. And a big action in Mogadishu will certainly contribute to maintain its status worldwide”.

Regarding the question if al-Shabaab does not succeed in undertaking a major attack in the days/weeks to come would this imply that al-Shabaab is now severely weakened and/or does it imply that AMISOM and SNAF and the SNG have taken important steps in improving the security in Mogadishu, Hakan Bilgin, IMC, replied “I think is a bit of both. However, an attack can happen at any time. It does not matter how weak al-Shabaab gets or how efficient the SNG forces and AMISOM can be, [it is] still very unpredictable”.

When asked if the increased security alert in Mogadishu is closely related to the fact that al-Shabaab would like to stage a major attack in connection with the upcoming London Conference an international NGO (C), Nairobi, explained that a [possible] attack is not specifically linked solely to the upcoming London conference, but it is rather an attempt to send signal to the Somalis and the international community that the situation is not stable and that al-Shabaab is still militarily relevant.

When asked if al-Shabaab does not succeed in undertaking a major attack in the days/weeks to come would this imply that al-Shabaab is now severely weakened and/or does it imply that AMISOM and SNAF and the SNG have taken important steps in improved the security in Mogadishu, an international NGO (C), Nairobi, replied ‘yes’ to both questions.

1.8.1 The attack on 5 May 2013 in Mogadishu

It should be noted that all the above comments on a possible attack by al-Shabaab was taken

On Sunday 5 May several international media reported that a major attack has been staged in Mogadishu’s busiest business areas near the K4.

BBC News Africa reported on 5 May that a deadly blast hits government convoy in Mogadishu. The government convoy carried foreign aid workers and the suicide attacker drove his car laden with explosives directly at the convoy.

Government forces had only reopened the main roads in Mogadishu on Saturday 4 May after a four-day ban on vehicle traffic. The attack came only days before the London Conference. According to

BBC the London Conference will discuss how best the international community can support Somalia's progress.

More than 50 countries and organisations are due to take part when it opens on Tuesday 7 May 2013. The conference will be co-hosted by Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and UK Prime Minister David Cameron. BBC added that the UK recently re-opened its embassy in Mogadishu.²

Al-Jazeera reported on Sunday 5 May that "At least 10 people have been killed by a car bomb claimed by al-Shabaab in Somalia's capital Mogadishu, police have said. Monday's [Sunday's] attack targeted Khalif Ahmed Ilig, the Mogadishu security chief, in one of the bloodiest assaults in the war-ravaged capital in recent months.

Witnesses said the car bomb exploded near a vehicle carrying Ilig and other officers along the busy Maka al-Mukarram road. A minibus driving by took the force of the blast. Bystanders helped pull the wounded from the burning minibus and teahouses along the route around 100 meters from the outer perimeter of the presidential palace. Seven civilians, three government security officers and the bomber were killed, police said.

"Most of the people who died were on board the minibus - civilians. This public vehicle coincidentally came between the government car and the car bomb when it was hit. Littered at the scene are human hands and flesh," senior police officer Abdiqadir Mohamud said".³

1.9 Presence of United Nations and Turkey in S/C Somalia

1.9.1 United Nations presence

An international agency, Nairobi, explained that the Somalia Consolidated Appeal (CAP) spans three years, and is based on strengthening the resilience of the people of Somalia to withstand shocks, and with the hope of breaking the recurrent cycle of humanitarian emergencies. The CAP comprises four main strategic objectives:

1. Ensure equal and integrated life-saving assistance to malnourished children and people living in humanitarian emergency and crisis to reduce mortality and destitution;
2. Contribute to improving the quality, reliability, responsiveness and accessibility of basic services and promote predictable safety net programming, thereby meeting the humanitarian needs of vulnerable individuals and households, strengthening their resilience to shocks;

² BBC News Africa, *Deadly blast hits government convoy in Mogadishu*, 5 May 2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22418109?print=true>

³ Al Jazeera, *Deadly car bomb rocks Somali capital*, 5 May 2013, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/03/201331810237113708.html>

3. Invest in household and community resilience through increased access to durable solutions that address livelihood vulnerability, including displacement and climate change – and result in a return to stable and sustainable livelihoods; and
4. Strengthen the capacity and coordination of NGOs, affected communities and local, regional and national level authorities, to prevent and mitigate risks and implement effective emergency preparedness and response.

The resilience agenda is being spearheaded by three agencies (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and World Food Programme (WFP)) and other UN agencies such as UNHCR and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) will complement this through the returns and local governance respectively.

The international agency, Nairobi, underlined the need for capacity building within the new government in Mogadishu as highlighted by the President himself. The overall structure is in place and they have the capacity at the top level, but staffing within the ministries is on-going. The ministries are still too new to be fully functional.

An international agency, Nairobi, explained that the attack on the Benadir Supreme Court in Mogadishu on 14 April did not affect UN humanitarian operations in Mogadishu. Business will continue as before, despite the continuing high-risk environment, noting that only critical staff should be based in Mogadishu. The UN Security Council Resolution 2093 has asked that the UN relocate its offices to Somalia in the course of 2013. The duty station for the RC/HC for Somalia is Mogadishu. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Head of Office has been based in Mogadishu since May 2013, and the UNHCR Representative maintains a permanent presence in Mogadishu.

Regarding food security in S/C Somalia, an international agency, Nairobi, explained that it is dependent on the general security in the area. If people feel secure, they stay and produce, and the markets flourish. If they do not feel secure, they choose other options, like registering as refugees in neighbouring countries. As refugees they will be registered and get access to food rations.

UNHCR-Somalia, Mogadishu, explained that in south/central Somalia, UNHCR has offices in Mogadishu, Dolo, Dhobley, and is planning to establish a physical presence in Baidoa, in the near future. UNHCR-Somalia explained that, further to the operation's migration to Mogadishu, it will only keep a small base in Nairobi. The UNHCR office in Mogadishu is temporarily located at the UN Common Compound (UNCC). Since March 2013, the UNHCR-Somalia Representative is based in Mogadishu.

Hakan Bilgin, IMC, found it to be very positive that the UN agencies are moving their offices to Mogadishu. This will bring a positive message to the Somalia people.

1.9.2 Turkish presence

An international NGO (C), Nairobi, explained that there is a remarkable competition between the United Kingdom (UK) and Turkey regarding Somalia. There is oil in Somaliland, and Turkey has invited Somaliland to participate in the upcoming London Conference. Somaliland accepted the invitation by Turkey while it previously had rejected an invitation by the United Kingdom (UK) to participate. Turkey has guaranteed Somaliland that it will support the independence of Somaliland.

Hakan Bilgin, IMC, explained that IMC has been working in Somalia since 1991 and that he has been in Somalia since early 2009 (joined IMC in 2011). Among other things IMC supports some of the Al Shifa Hospital activities in Hodan district of Mogadishu. The hospital is located near the K4 area.

Hakan Bilgin, IMC, stated that since the intervention of the Turkish government things have moved forward, including the security of the people. This change began in late 2011 when the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan landed in Mogadishu. In addition there is also the religious aspect, and the visit signaled that Turkey was willing to help the Somali people. Somalis are very bright people, they are smart and adaptable. Today Somalis have a strong belief that Turkey is willing to assist them and that it has a genuine interest in Somalia.

According to Hakan Bilgin, IMC, Turkey has an advantage in Somalia as compared to the rest of the international community. Turkey is doing a lot of visible activities in Somalia. Turkey is capable to show what it is doing, and Somalis want to see what has been physically achieved. The Somalis can see roads, mosques, buildings, street lights, and not least the presence of Turkish Airlines in Mogadishu.

Hakan Bilgin, IMC, stated that there are approximately 10 Turkish NGOs working in Mogadishu. Those who work for the Turkish NGOs are professionals and they come from various Turkish ministries.

Hakan Bilgin, IMC, explained that the main factor contributing to the security improvements for ordinary people in Mogadishu is the people's strong belief that things are essentially improving. The street lights are very visible and they mean a lot to people. The arrival of the Turkish Prime Minister was also significant and Turkey now has an embassy in Hodan district in Mogadishu. The employees of the embassy can go to the market etc. Hakan Bilgin, IMC, added that even if Turks would be targeted in Somalia by extremist forces Turkey will remain in Mogadishu and continue their support to Somalis.

Hakan Bilgin, IMC, explained that if you are too cautious about your engagement, you cannot change much in Somalia. You will have to take the risks, you cannot just wait and see. It is now or never to strongly support Somalia. It was added that the Turkish support for Somalia is focused on health, education and infrastructure as well as the building up of the institutions. Now is the biggest window of opportunity ever since the war started in 1991.

Hakan Bilgin, IMC, explained that Turkey has very good relations with the different ministries, and it has direct access to the Ministers. The Turks can deal directly with the different Ministers. This is due to the fact that one has to respect the Somalis and Turkey shows a real goodwill to support the Somalis. Not only regarding a political approach.

2 Protection and livelihood issues in Mogadishu

2.1 Clan protection

Regarding clan protection a UN agency, Nairobi, explained that there is less risk for anyone being attacked or violated only because of clan affiliation. It does not matter whether you belong to a strong or a weak clan, or an ethnic minority group. The traditional way of negotiating during a dispute is no longer acceptable. For instance, the traditional way of dealing with a rapist would be to demand that the perpetrator marry his victim. This is now becoming increasingly unacceptable and is in force throughout Benadir region and all the way to Afgoye. The clan has now become a social structure rather than a protective structure. This could be due to lessons learned during the previous clan conflicts and the civil war. People are now relating to government structures rather than clans, especially when it comes to business.

Regarding clan protection an international NGO (A) explained that this is much less of an issue than it was two to three years ago. Clan protection is no longer important as there are no clan based militias in Mogadishu. Persons returning from abroad are not at particular risk because of their clan affiliation. When asked if this also include members of small minority clans as well as members of ethnic minority groups the international NGO stated that this is the case. The NGO made reference to the Chief of Police in Mogadishu who is a member of a Bravanese minority group.

The international NGO (A) explained that the people of Mogadishu have less to fear than two to three months ago, both in relation to security and clan issues. When asked if individuals who are having trouble with other persons or if they fear for something would be able to seek assistance the international NGO (A) stated that people can go to the police, contact their elders and/or contact an MP who is representing their own clan. It was reiterated that the clan system is not very strong today and as there are no militias, people have less to fear when it comes to clan affiliation. There are no longer any clan related conflicts in Mogadishu and people can move everywhere in Mogadishu irrespective of their clan affiliation. The only exceptions to this are the livestock market in Haliwa, Gubta area near the former cigarette factory, and in the northern parts of Daynile district. These locations are not particularly safe areas.

The international NGO (A) explained that all Somali clans and minority groups are represented in Mogadishu-based Federal Government [i.e. the SNG]. However, a Somali person not origination from Mogadishu will normally ensure that he or she has contacts to relatives, friends and/or relatives of his or her friends before going to Mogadishu.

Regarding clan protection Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre, Mogadishu, stated that it is very positive that clan protection is no longer an issue, as al-Shabaab soldiers do not differentiate between clans, they kill indiscriminately. And people of the same clan do not trust each other either anymore so it is not enough to be affiliated by clan to someone to gain their trust or protection. This is a general development. However, the police force is not strong enough to protect people and in addition people do not really trust it.

Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre; Mogadishu, reiterated that it is a huge step forward that clan affiliation is no longer a concern. Even marginalized groups such as the IDPs and minority groups are no longer marginalized, harassed or intimidated only because of their clan affiliations. Thus, the security situation for members of small, weak clans and ethnic minority groups has increased considerably during the last year. It is not important which clan or group you belong to. Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre emphasized that there are no limitations in freedom of movement in Mogadishu. Anyone regardless of clan affiliation or sex is free to move around in Mogadishu and no one is being harassed at checkpoints only because of sex or clan affiliation.

UNHCR-Somalia, Mogadishu, confirmed that someone in Mogadishu will not be at risk today solely because he/she is of a different clan, although clan dynamics in combination with other factors are an important element when considering risk, including for the IDP population. It is obvious that one is safer when he or she is residing in an area dominated by his or her own clan or if one has good relations with a dominating clan.

Regarding access to livelihood in Mogadishu, UNHCR-Somalia explained that the presence of nuclear family is a requirement for livelihood support, as the clan will not help with livelihood. The clan will only help when it comes to protection issues and in some instances, especially for highly publicized cases; members of sub-clans contribute funds to support extremely vulnerable cases. However, to benefit from clan protection, the person concerned must be known to the clan elders or to other clan members known to these elders. Information about a newcomer, particularly, when he/she does not belong to the existing clans or nuclear families or when he/she originates from an area formerly or presently controlled by an insurgent group; would certainly attract adverse attention. Even those who originate from the Mogadishu may be perceived as newcomers, if they left a long time ago and have lost all links with their clan-based community.

Regarding clan protection a representative of a Diaspora organization in Mogadishu stated that people no longer rely on clan protection. Clan protection is no longer an issue in Mogadishu, and if you feel you are exposed you will adapt by 'laying low'. If you are laying low you are not in need of additional security or protection. This is the strategy of most of the returning Diaspora. One does not rely on the police or the SNAF for protection or justice. The representative stated that she would not even think of approaching the police as the police forces are all corrupt.

An international NGO (B), Mogadishu, explained that concerning clan protection, generally speaking, everyone relies on his or her clan. There was that idea when al-Shabaab came to Mogadishu that clan affiliation was of no use. However, with the SNG now in control, clan is what you rely on. SNG, the parliament, the police and the intelligence forces are organised according to clan. If a person needs to relate to a government body, he or she will do that through a clan connection. And if someone hires security guards it will be clan based.

The international NGO (B), Mogadishu, explained that, to some extent, Mogadishu is divided into areas where different clans are dominating. However, today people can freely move between all areas irrespective of clan affiliation. On the other hand, when it comes to residing, people will

prefer to live in an area where they have their clan members. A person who starts a business will also do that where his or her clan is. For instance, a Habr Gedir starting a business in an Abgal area would be impossible without involving an Abgal. Without such involvement, you would not have the necessary protection.

An international NGO (C), Nairobi, explained that the 16 districts of Mogadishu are dominated by the Hawiye clans (approximately 10 districts), the Murusade (2 districts) and the minority groups (2 districts).

Regarding clan protection and other clan issues Hakan Bilgin, IMC, stated that it is probably too early to say that the clan issue is over. Mogadishu is basically controlled by two clans – the Abgal and the Habr Gedir – and these clans as well as all other clans have a considerable interest in the financial developments and the business activities/communities. Accordingly the population perceives that security has improved and the clan issue is now less important.

Hakan Bilgin, IMC, did not agree that clan protection is no longer an issue in Mogadishu. Clans still support and protect its members. The more influential you are the more at risk you might be and the more a clan will protect you. Smaller clans and minority groups will need more support by Governments bodies such as Police and Military and AMISOM in some extend. However, Hakan Bilgin, IMC, did agree that members of minority clans and ethnic minority groups are not more at risk of being attacked than members of larger clans, especially if they are influential. Hakan Bilgin, IMC, stated that this development is a very positive step in the right direction.

The representatives of an international agency, Mogadishu, agreed that the clan is no longer a main issue in Mogadishu. The need for clan protection is ‘going down’ and no one will ask you about your clan affiliation any longer. The only concern is whether you are affiliated with al-Shabaab or not. On the other hand, whenever a person is planning to settle in Mogadishu he or she will most likely consider his or her clan affiliation before deciding where to settle down.

The representatives of an international agency, Mogadishu, explained that with the exception of the Darod clans, members of all other clans do not have to be concerned whether or not they have affiliates in Mogadishu. There is no more the ‘power of the gun’ in Mogadishu. The nature of [clan] conflict has morphed from one based on clan blood-letting to more of ideological (religious) one.

Mohamed Farah Siad, Mogadishu, explained that in Hamar Weyne, where he is living, 80% of the residents are ‘foreigners’, in the meaning that they do not originate from Mogadishu. The ‘foreigners’ are mainly Hawiye, Habr Gedir and Abgal.

Any person, irrespective of clan can today settle in Hamar Weyne. In addition, clan affiliation is not important for the people of Mogadishu to feel safe. To obtain justice in Mogadishu it is only a question of money. The judiciary is corrupt. However, if you belong to a strong clan and want for instance to get back your house that was occupied during the civil war; you can force the occupant of the house by bringing in support from your clan. On the other hand, if you belong to a weak clan,

the only way to get your rights is to pay a court what is needed to get a favourable decision from the court.

According to Mohamed Farah Siad, Mogadishu, clan is 'zero' today in Mogadishu; clans do not offer any protection as there are no clan militias threatening people. Clanism is only common among "primitive clans in the bush."

Mohamed Farah Siad added that clans are only relevant when it comes to business, marriage, respect and work, and stated that "clans should not be involved in politics".

2.2 Protection against targeted attacks

Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre, Mogadishu, explained that protection for those at risk of being targeted by al-Shabaab in Mogadishu is generally based on hiring soldiers or police officers. This is actually what many NGOs, politicians, businessmen and other exposed groups are doing. Ordinary people will not have this kind of protection available to them, and sometimes for them even being seen next to a soldier will warrant threats or unnecessary attention; this further creates the gap where civilians don't want to seek security from government, where being seen with them will only cause more trouble and in actuality there is a limit as to how much support the government soldiers and police can give you. However, they are careful not to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. It was added that people are cautious not to talk openly about al-Shabaab as though they are always scared someone may be on its side and spying on them.

Regarding crime Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre explained that if a person is being victim of crime he or she may go to the police, but is it uncertain whether the police will take any action or not.

2.3 Protection of al-Shabaab defectors

A UN agency, Nairobi, explained that there are defectors from al-Shabaab as well as from the SNAF. Many of those are youngsters, including minors. The UN agency has established a number of centers to accommodate and assist defectors or persons who are at risk of forced recruitment. These centers are located in various locations in S/C Somalia, including Mogadishu, Afgoye and Dhusa Mareb.

According to the UN agency, Nairobi, the Ministry of Interior and National Security runs a camp called Serendi Camp. The camp is accommodating defectors from al-Shabaab as well as distrusted persons from al-Shabaab controlled areas. The camp is funded by Norway and its head is a Norwegian. The UN agency has tried to get access to the camp in order to check if it accommodates minors, but access was initially denied. However, the Ministry of Interior and National Security recently admitted that there are approximately 60 minors in the Serendi Camp and the ministry has assured the UN agency that it will be given access to the camp.

3 Military and security developments in South/Central Somalia

3.1 AMISON, SNAF and Ethiopian presence, public support for al-Shabaab

Representatives of an international agency, Mogadishu, explained that there are approximately 17,000 AMISOM [troops] deployed in S/C Somalia, including in Mogadishu. [Ethiopia is not part of AMISOM]. The AMISOM forces are deployed in four different sectors in S/C Somalia, and each sector comprises the following AMISOM forces (see also maps of control in S/C Somalia, Annexes 3, 4, 5 and 6):

Sector 1, Benadir, Lower and Middle Shabelle regions: Burundian and Ugandan forces.

Sector 2, Kismayo and Jubbaland, i.e. Upper and Lower Juba regions: Kenyan and Sierra Leonean forces.

Sector 3, Bay, Bakool and parts of Gedo region: Burundian and Ugandan forces.

Sector 4, Parts of Hiraa region, including Belet Weyne: Djiboutian forces.

The representatives of the international agency, Mogadishu, explained that the SNG has approximately 21,000 SNAF soldiers deployed throughout S/C Somalia. 12,000 of these are getting their salaries from a US funded project. They are paid 100 US \$ per month. This is taking place in the regions of Benadir, Middle and Lower Shabelle.

Regarding the liberated/recovered areas of S/C Somalia the representatives of an international agency, Mogadishu, stated that these areas cannot be considered as totally safe.

When asked why AMISOM does not move forward more quickly the representatives of an international agency, Mogadishu, explained that it is important to realize that AMISOM has limitations in terms of capacity and resources, AMISOM has to ensure that the SNG is ready to deploy its police forces and military in order to fill in the security vacuum that will follow from the ousting of al-Shabaab in areas previously under its control. In addition it is also an issue to establish local administrations in newly recovered areas. This is crucial in order to avoid or contain potential power struggles.

When asked if al-Shabaab enjoys any support from the public in areas under its control an international NGO (A), Nairobi, stated that public support for al-Shabaab has declined considerably during the last two years.

The main factor for this decline is the heavy taxation of agricultural products that al-Shabaab has put on the farmers. The traditional Islamic tax Zakat is not supposed to take place before the harvest is completed, but al-Shabaab levy Zakat even before harvest. Al-Shabaab taxes the farmers while their produce is still standing on the fields. In addition al-Shabaab has levied additional taxes on the people.

Another reason for public discontent is the push of clans to supply recruits for al-Shabaab's militias. Al-Shabaab is demanding young men to participate in its Jihad against the SNG and the international forces. Al-Shabaab not only recruits among the people, they are also expected to deliver firearms to al-Shabaab.

The overall result is a growing discontent among the public in areas controlled by al-Shabaab. It was added by the international NGO (A), Nairobi that the heavy taxation imposed by al-Shabaab is much more than Zakat allows for.

Al-Shabaab's original strategy was to support the marginalized people in Somalia, i.e. the ethnic minority groups, IDPs and the weak and smaller clans. Thus al-Shabaab gained widespread support from those groups especially when it reallocated land previously taken from them by armed clans. However, today al-Shabaab has gone far beyond its original ideology and strategy. Support for al-Shabaab is rapidly declining and diminishing and many young people are fleeing areas under control of al-Shabaab as they fear being forcibly recruited to al-Shabaab.

A UN agency, Nairobi, explained that al-Shabaab also undertake round ups of people in areas under its control. These round ups are mainly to recruit fighters into al-Shabaab. During the time that AMISOM took over Baidoa AMISOM rounded up 42 minors who had been associated with al-Shabaab. Later, one of them was shot by al-Shabaab as he was considered to be a defector from al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab defectors are still at risk of severe retaliation by al-Shabaab, even if they are in Mogadishu.

The international NGO (A), Nairobi, reiterated that in S/C Somalia it is AMISOM and the SNAF who are pushing al-Shabaab because al-Shabaab is not perceived to be militarily strong. However, the reason for AMISON and the SNAF not to push too quickly forward is the fact that the SNG is too weak to fill the vacuums when al-Shabaab is driven out of an area.

The international NGO (A), Nairobi, explained that it operates throughout S/C Somalia, including areas under control of al-Shabaab. However, in such areas the NGO operates through local partners.

According to UNDSS, Nairobi, there are approximately between 16,000 and 17,000 AMISOM soldiers deployed in S/C Somalia.

According to a press release "New EU support to continue improving security in Somalia" by the European Union (EU), dated 19 March 2013 the EU has decided to provide additional support of 33 million Euros to AMISOM. The press release stated that AMISOM "plays an essential role in securing the country on its path towards lasting peace, prosperity and stability". The press release added that "The renewed EU support will allow AMISOM to continue to fulfil its mandate and to reach its total strength of 17,731 troops as authorized by the UN".⁴

⁴ European Union, *New EU support to continue improving security in Somalia*, 19 March 2013 (A 149/13), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/136289.pdf

According to an international NGO (A) it is imperative that the international community is supporting the SNG in capacity building and building of governmental institutions. This support is crucial if the SNG (and AMISOM) are to continue their expansion in S/C Somalia.

UNDSS, Nairobi, explained that AMISOM and SNAF get support from the population in the areas they are moving into, i.e. liberating from al-Shabaab. However, the general experience is that when AMISOM and SNAF arrive the local population are a little scared and hesitant as they are not sure of what will happen. They may think that AMISOM will withdraw and that al-Shabaab will be back again soon. However, after a two to three of months when people see that AMISOM and the SNAF is there to stay and that they are able to provide security, they turn completely supportive. This has happened in Belet Weyne, Baidoa, Luuq, Merka, Jowhar, Afgoye, Kismayo and Afmadow, and in all other locations under control of AMISOM and SNAF in S/C Somalia.

People living in areas controlled by al-Shabaab are generally fed up with it, and want to get rid of al-Shabaab. For instance, in Bulo Burti people demonstrated openly for the first time against al-Shabaab because of increased taxation, and this discontent is now spreading in other areas controlled by al-Shabaab. From a military point of view, it is difficult for UNDSS to understand why AMISOM and SNAF are not proceeding to take more territory from al-Shabaab. For instance, it should now be easy to take Jalalaqsi and Bulo Burti, and then open the road from Mogadishu via Jowhar to Belet Weyne, a move that would utterly weaken al-Shabaab.

Peter Klansoe, DRC, stated that the overall analysis is that al-Shabaab has never been very strong politically or militarily. However, it has not been challenged by any articulated resistance by other powers in Somalia, and it is only the armed forces of Ethiopia, AMISOM (Kenya is now part of AMISOM) which have been able to defeat al-Shabaab. These international forces have been successful in fighting al-Shabaab. The forces are still pivotal in keeping al-Shabaab at bay.

Peter Klansoe, DRC, added that it the strategy of AMISOM and the SNAF [in S/C Somalia] to minimize al-Shabaab's access to the cities and the roads connecting these cities. The success of this strategy is completely dependent on the presence of the international community, i.e. AMISOM and the Ethiopian forces. In those rural areas where al-Shabaab is present it has full control. It has established administrations as well as courts in those areas.

Peter Klansoe, DRC, explained that al-Shabaab's financial situation is difficult as it does not have any main sources of income any longer. Thus it has reverted to heavy taxation in areas under its control or influence. This has led to increasing pressure on the population as the elders have been forced to collect taxes in areas controlled by al-Shabaab. Elders who did not cooperate with al-Shabaab have been punished severely, and some have been executed by al-Shabaab.

Al-Shabaab is under heavy pressure according to Peter Klansoe, DRC. In the areas under its control it has been necessary for it to increase its taxation of the populations. This has drawn resources away from the people and they are becoming increasingly fed up with al-Shabaab. During the last

six months al-Shabaab has recruited some 100 fighters per month in S/C Somalia. This has put increasing pressure on the populations in areas under its control.

Regarding forced recruitment and violations against children Peter Klansoe explained that al-Shabaab recruits between 80 and 100 child soldiers per month in S/C Somalia and there are significant violence incidents affecting children and the entire population in this area of Somalia

These violations include killings, mutilations, recruitments, sexual violence, forced marriages, abductions and attacks on schools and hospitals. The total number of child violations documented and verified in S/C Somalia was approximately 230 in March 2013 alone. The number of such violations against children maintains a high rate since January 2013, especially abductions which most often will result in recruitment into armed groups whereas girls were abducted for the purpose of being married off to al-Shabaab fighters and other members. However, it is important to note that not all these violations were committed by al-Shabaab. The SNG forces as well as various militias are also committing violations. The SNG forces have abducted children suspected of being al-Shabaab members. However, children who were found to have no links to al-Shabaab have been released.

According to Peter Klansoe, DRC, al-Shabaab still recruits children in S/C Somalia in rather large numbers, approximately 80 to 100 per month. However, the violations reported are only the tip of the iceberg.

An international NGO (C), Nairobi, explained that the SNG should have respected the pro-SNG local administrations that have been established in S/C Somalia, but the SNG has been too occupied with the progresses in Mogadishu, especially the developments of the business community.

3.2 Kismayo, Lower Juba and Gedo regions and the 'Jubbaland' issue

UNDSS, Nairobi, explained that after al-Shabaab had left Kismayo 30 September 2012 the Ras Kamboni militia in cooperation with Kenyan forces took control of Kismayo. Just after this happened the Kenyan contingent was incorporated into AMISOM, so now the area is under control of AMISOM.

UNDSS, Nairobi, explained that since October 2012 there is an anti-al-Shabaab alliance controlling the area between Dhobley, Afmadow, Kismayo, Ras Kamboni, Buur Gabo, Badaade, and up to Dadaab in Kenya.

Immediately after the take-over of Kismayo, the Ras Kamboni militia established an interim administration in the city headed by the Ras Kamboni leader Ahmed Madobe.

Since then the UN-embargo of export of charcoal and import of sugar has been an issue. To avoid a conflict with the local business community, the interim LA [i.e. Local Administration] opened up for export of charcoal however; one can observe that this embargo is now violated daily. The intention of the sugar embargo was to further squeeze al-Shabaab of getting income from taxation and allowing transportation of sugar to the Kenyan border.

During the initial stage after the take-over of Kismayo, the town was more or less a ghost town. However, since January 2013, people have returned in large numbers, the markets have opened and trucks are busy, so the town is back to normal activity. Also new buildings are constructed, which have not happened for some years. And not least, the population of the town has increased substantially, maybe ten times since the takeover. Refugees are also returning from Dadaab Refugee Camp in Kenya, and business people are taking the business activity to a higher level since the embargo is not working, which it did when al-Shabaab controlled the town.

The security for the people of Kismayo is now relatively good. However, there is a potential threat because of the high presence of militias. The main militias are the ones of the Marehan and of the Ogaden clans. The main Ogaden militia is the Ras Kamboni militia, which is trained, equipped, paid and completely under command and control of Kenyan forces deployed in Somalia. Finally, there is a militia loyal to the Somali government. This latter is badly equipped and has been without payment. However, it is the only militia that is opposing the Ras Kamboni militia. SNAF and the pro-SNG militia are controlling the northern part of the city, and Kenyan troops are between them and the Ras Kamboni militia to avoid clashes between the two forces.

The Ras Kamboni militia has control in the port, where also Kenyan troops are present. The three most important types of goods handled in the port are charcoal, sugar and cement.

UNDSS explained that it recently had met with Madobe, the head of the Ras Kamboni militia. Madobe had stated that Jubbaland would declare independence on 23 April 2013 – meaning that the State of Jubbaland would no longer be part of the Somali federation, but be an independent state like Somaliland. Relevant in this connection, is that Madobe recently had been in Nairobi for talks with the newly elected leadership of Kenya. However, what was discussed and agreed on during these talks, UNDSS had no information.

Representatives of an international agency, Mogadishu, had not heard of rumors that a Jubbaland administration would declare independence from Somalia and found it most unlikely that this would take place.

There is no consensus among the different parties in the three regions, Lower and Middle Juba and Gedo that constitute Jubbaland concerning its position towards the SNG in Mogadishu. But there are clearly those who want independence, headed by Madobe, and those who want to be part of the Somali federation. UNDSS added that 450 Marehan troops trained in Gedo region [by Kenya] were likely instructed by the SNG to go to Kismayo to attempt to disrupt the Jubbaland Conference. Some info received indicates that the group, on its way to Kismayo, went through al-Shabaab controlled territory and were hosted by al-Shabaab.

Concerning the Jubbaland Conference, 500 delegates were present, including representatives from al-Shabaab controlled areas. Apparently, there were two opinions among the delegates on when to declare the independence of the State of Jubbaland. There were those who voiced that the

declaration could not come before all territories in the area were taken from al-Shabaab, and then there were those who argued that the declaration had to come first and then the time would come for fighting al-Shabaab. There was also another dispute during the conference on whether people from the Diaspora should be part of the administration of the state. Madobe and his group are strongly against involving anyone from the Diaspora in running the administrations to be established.

Peter Klansoe, DRC, stated that Kenya has for years prepared for its intervention in Lower Juba. There could be several reasons why Kenya has intervened in Lower Juba, but security is the main concern. Kenya wants stability in this region and it has probably been motivated to intervene by clan issues (the Ogadeni clan reside in the border areas of Lower Juba), as well as the discovery of oil in the seabed area between southern Somalia and Kenya. However, it is the Ras Kamboni militia which now controls this rather large area of Lower Juba and there are no indications that this will change soon. The Ras Kamboni militia will retain its control and it is allied with the Kenyan forces in Lower Juba.

Peter Klansoe, DRC, explained that Lower Juba's [Jubbaland's] demand for independence of the SNG may seriously challenge the federal system in Somalia, and Kenya's main interest is to ensure stability in Lower Juba. It was added that the newly elected president of Kenya may be more aggressive towards Somalia than the previous president. The revolving issue in Lower Juba is whether or not the SNG will be able to create a framework for the various clans' access to the rich resources in the region, including in Kismayo.

Regarding the Jubbaland issue Hakan Bilgin, IMC, stated that this issue is both an economic and a security issue, especially for Kenya.

According to representatives of an international agency, Mogadishu, the reopening of some roads in S/C Somalia is not only a security issue; it is also a political issue. Whenever the SNG finds that it is not controlling a road all the way it may be very reluctant to reopen such a road. The road between Mogadishu and Kismayo is mostly controlled by al-Shabaab, i.e. between Merka and Jilib in Lower Juba region. The political reason for not pushing forward to open the road all the way to Kismayo is that Kismayo gets its supplies through its seaport and from Kenya.

3.3 Merka and Brava, Lower Shabelle region, and Jowhar, Middle Shabelle region

UNDSS, Nairobi, explained that Merka is strongly controlled by AMISOM and SNAF. However, al-Shabaab is staging small scale hit and run attacks there, like the ones they do in Mogadishu, throwing hand grenades and assassinating people. Nevertheless, these kinds of actions are now going down.

The same goes for Jowhar in Middle Shabelle, which is even better than Merka security wise. However, al-Shabaab is not able to attack Merka or Jowhar militarily. Since the summer offensive 2011, al-Shabaab has not had capacity for such operations. Al-Shabaab is now back to its roots as a militia, and is no longer able to stage large-scale military operations.

There is no good answer to the question, why AMISOM and SNAF do not use the operational momentum to take more territory from al-Shabaab in Lower Shabelle. However, there is reason to believe that internal friction, insufficient logistical support and lack of coordination between AMISOM and SNAF are hampering the progress in the military offensive. However, it is also important to note that AMISOM does not want to overstretch its forces, and that AMISOM is dependent on the support it gets from the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA). UNDSS, Nairobi, explained that recently, a contingent of 250 Sierra Leonean soldiers was deployed in Sector 2, i.e. Lower Shabelle region. In addition a further 650 AMISOM soldiers will soon be deployed in the same area.

When asked why al-Shabaab is not being defeated in those areas still under its control an international NGO (A), Nairobi, explained that everybody knows that al-Shabaab does not pose a threat to AMISOM in Lower Shabelle as well in all other locations under its control. However, AMISOM does not want to overstretch its forces and the SNG is still too weak to fill in the political power vacuums created when AMISOM takes control of an area liberated from al-Shabaab.

The international NGO (A), Nairobi, added that the city of Brava as well as areas of the southern part of Lower Shabelle are controlled by al-Shabaab. It was added that al-Shabaab uses the seaport of Brava, but its port is only suitable for smaller boats.

Concerning the presence of al-Shabaab in Lower Shabelle Peter Klansoe, DRC, explained that al-Shabaab controls approximately 50% of the rural areas in the southern part of Lower Shabelle. The cities and the main roads in this area are however controlled by AMISOM and the SNAF. Al-Shabaab's control in Lower Shabelle is based on fear and suppression, and the fact that no one is fighting against it.

According to Mohamed Farah Siad, Mogadishu, the improvements in Mogadishu since al-Shabaab left have been small, maybe 1,5%. The reason is that Somalis, being from the Diaspora or not is not able to build administrative institutions. To do that, assistance from abroad is necessary. The business activities in Mogadishu are going up, investments and money are coming in, but this is not something the SNG can be given credit for. The business community of Mogadishu have to take care of their security themselves and protect each other. Merchants in the Bakara market still pay al-Shabaab for protection, especially the ones who trade with other towns in Somalia. Mohamed Farah Siad pays al-Shabaab to maintain his business in Lower Shabelle. However, trading and transporting goods between Mogadishu and other towns in Somalia also requires payment to government soldiers.

Mohamed Farah Siad, Mogadishu, explained that he has a farm 30 km south of Merka in an area controlled by al-Shabaab. In his opinion, al-Shabaab imposed a quite reasonable taxation system in that area. The taxation is based on the size of the farm, amount of water used for irrigation and machinery in use, a system which, according to Mohamed Farah Siad is excellent. Al-Shabaab is also able to provide justice. However, above this "al-Shabaab knows nothing and have crazy ideas",

according to Mohamed Farah Siad. For instance, when he wanted to export his agricultural products to Kenya, al-Shabaab told him that he was not allowed to trade with Christians.

3.4 Bay, Bakool and Hiraan regions (Baidoa, Hoddur and Belet Weyne)

3.4.1 Baidoa, Bay region

Representatives of an international agency, Mogadishu, explained that there are AMISOM troops as well as Ethiopian troops in Baidoa. However, there is limited cooperation between AMISOM and Ethiopia.

Concerning Somali attitudes towards Ethiopia UNDSS, Nairobi, explained that it recently had been present at an UN-meeting in Baidoa where also representatives from the SNG were present. Some of these were from the Diaspora and had lived many years abroad before they joined the SNG. UNDSS was very surprised hearing the Diaspora representatives talking about the Ethiopians as ‘crusaders and occupiers’. The fact is that the SNG is completely dependent on Ethiopia to be in control over parts of Bay, Bakool and Hiraan regions. UNDSS added that it has not noticed similar hostile attitudes towards Kenya. UNDSS emphasized that people from the Diaspora seems to be more radical in this respect than locals.

3.4.2 Hoddur, Bakool region

According to Peter Klansoe, DRC, AMISOM and the Ethiopian forces are pivotal in keeping al-Shabaab at bay. As an example of this Peter Klansoe referred to the recent incident when Ethiopian troops suddenly withdrew from the city of Hoddur in Bakool region. Immediately afterwards al-Shabaab took control of Hoddur.

Peter Klansoe, DRC, explained that the Ethiopian forces withdrawal from Hoddur in Bay region was a demonstration of its power. The Ethiopian military had been provoked by statements by the SNG regarding its performance. It was emphasized that it will be crucial that AMISOM has the capacity to intervene and replace Ethiopian troops when they leave a location. It is not the SNAF who is in control of areas and locations in S/C Somalia; it is the Ethiopian and AMISOM forces. However, AMISOM would not withdraw from Mogadishu as long as the SNG is unable to protect the city against al-Shabaab. As long as the SNG is not completely capable to build its own institutions, including an army and a police force one can expect the AMISOM will remain. On the other hand, Ethiopia is the indeterminate factor as it has its own agenda.

Regarding the recent withdrawal from Hoddur by the Ethiopian troops the representatives of an international agency, Mogadishu, explained that there are several theories regarding this. The withdrawal could be related to lack of funding and political support for the Ethiopian mission in Somalia. Others may say that it could also be a strong political message from Ethiopia to the SNG and the international community that Ethiopia will not accept interferences with its operations in Somalia. The withdrawal could also be a tactical maneuver to put pressure on AMISOM who should have taken responsibility of Hoddur much earlier. Now al-Shabaab has taken control over Hoddur.

Concerning Ethiopia's withdrawal from Hoddur, an international NGO (C), Nairobi, did not see this as an initial step in a complete Ethiopian pull out from Somalia. This act must be interpreted on the backdrop of what has been said by the Somali Prime Minister, which could be understood in the line that the Ethiopians are not needed in Somalia. By withdrawing the troops, Ethiopia wanted to send a clear signal that they are necessary for keeping stability in Somalia.

UNDSS, Nairobi, explained that by drawing its forces out of Hoddur, the Ethiopians wanted to send a political signal to Mogadishu. This came after a Somali politician had stated that the Ethiopia troops are an occupying force as they are not part of AMISOM. By its move, the Ethiopian military wanted to tell that it is contributing to the stabilization of Somalia. SNAF is not yet able to take over Hoddur. To do that would be to overstretch its military strength, also because of the distance to its bases at the moment. However, there is information indicating that the Ethiopians are now gathering forces to retake Hoddur.

3.5 Visions for the local administrations in S/C Somalia

A UN agency, Nairobi, explained that lately the President announced his visions regarding the federal structures and local administrations in Somalia. He has stated that the regional capitals should be administered centrally, i.e. that there should be a large compound in each regional capital. These compounds should then comprise administration, schools, hospitals police forces and social services. The UN agency added that the President and the Speaker of Parliament are very balanced, well informed and articulate.

4 The formal justice system, customary law and property issues

4.1 Justice system

Regarding the justice system in Somalia, UNHCR-Somalia, Mogadishu, explained that it will not be any time soon that one will see a functioning, fair and efficient justice system in Mogadishu. Impunity was the main cause for GBV, in particular, for sexual violence. GBV prevention and response is a priority for many agencies, including UNHCR. So far there is no functioning formal, justice system in Mogadishu or in the rest of S/C Somalia. The police often do not handle cases of sexual violence in an objective manner. There is a lack of capacity to investigate cases of sexual violence, which means that most cases do not reach the required standard of evidence for prosecution. Additionally the capacity of organizations involved in legal counseling and representation is very limited.

Regarding protection for ordinary citizens in S/C Somalia and in Mogadishu the representatives of an international agency, Mogadishu, explained that people have more trust in their own sub-clan than in the SNAF and the police, and they do not trust the judicial system at all. The latter is also due to the fact that many people do not have the capacity and the economic resources to take a case to the court.

An international NGO (A), Nairobi, explained that the Benadir Court as well as the Benadir Supreme Court are functioning, but both courts are marred by corruption.

According to representatives of an international agency, Mogadishu, there is no court in Mogadishu or in the rest of S/C Somalia who issues title deeds. There is no way to enforce a title deed should you have one. A title deed will never be accepted by a court when a property dispute is surfacing.

4.2 Customary law

An international NGO (B), Mogadishu, explained that if a person gets into a private conflict, it is possible to take the case to the court. However, most likely the court will state that it cannot solve the case and refer the case to clan elders. This means that clan elders representing the two parties negotiate. In this way, it is much easier to reach a compromise than in the court. This institution of elders solving conflicts is accessible all over the city. Conflicts concerning property can be solved this way. Normally elders are reliable and honest. It is also possible for persons from weak clans to reach reasonable solutions this way, even if it can be difficult. It has been like that since days of the Islamic Courts (ICU/UIC). Normally, the parties will avoid open conflict turning into violence. However, these days there are never clashes between clans in Mogadishu.

The international NGO (B), Mogadishu, added that the main reason for people to prefer the customary way of solving conflicts is that the judiciary is corrupt.

4.3 Property issues

Regarding property issues in Mogadishu Peter Klansoe, DRC, explained that this issue is becoming increasingly pressing. However, there are no strong governmental institutions which can address the

problem. Property issues are not only endemic to Mogadishu. In the agricultural areas of Lower Shabelle and Lower Juba disputes are becoming increasingly common. This will be a rather subtle issue, especially in Lower Juba as many refugees and IDPs originating there have been away from their agricultural homelands for a very long time and their lands have been occupied by others.

According to Peter Klansoe, DRC, it is becoming rather common that land disputes occur when IDPs have been allocated new land and developed it. Private persons may claim that this land is their property, especially when the land has been developed by the IDPs. This is a phenomenon that prevails throughout Somalia, including in Mogadishu. Especially in Mogadishu there are growing property and land disputes. Such disputes may create armed conflicts and it will be difficult to contain this issue. This issue is increasing in all of Somalia and so far it is the strongest part who will win, almost like the former 'Wild West' in the USA. The absence of a judicial system in Somalia for 20 years has not made it easy to properly address this problem and it may thus continue for years to come.

5 Issues related to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Mogadishu

5.1 Conditions for IDPs

When asked if the remaining IDPs residing in government buildings have been removed from the city Peter Klansoe, DRC, stated that this has not yet taken place. However, there are lots of examples of IDPs who have been forcibly evicted from government buildings and land. DRC and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) have undertaken a joint project regarding allocation of land and resettlement of evicted IDPs. The issue is whether the IDPs should be located in regular IDP camps or in smaller settlements in Mogadishu city. However, one should be observant regarding the SNG's willingness to allocate land to the IDPs. On the other hand there is a positive and ongoing process regarding relocation of the IDPs. NGOs and the UN agencies are cooperating with the SNG regarding IDPs, but the SNG and its ministries are still too weak to properly address this problem. The SNG is not yet to be considered as a functional partner in its cooperation with the NGOs and the UN.

A tripartite cluster project with several implementing partners, including DRC and NRC have recently been made. The project is regarding improvements to be made in the newly established IDP camps. Peter Klansoe, DRC, added that the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and UNHCR in Mogadishu are also addressing the needs of the IDPs.

Regarding resettlement of IDPs from other parts of S/C Somalia and who presently are in Mogadishu Peter Klansoe, DRC, explained that there are a number of ongoing processes directed towards assistance to those IDPs who wish to return voluntarily to their home areas.

Since the Somalia Federal Republic Government (SFRG), [i.e. the SNG] Cabinet was proclaimed in November 2012, UNHCR-Somalia, Mogadishu, witnessed an increase in the number of its interlocutors, especially, within the Ministry of Interior and National Security, which is, also, dealing with IDP and refugee matters.

In December 2012, UNHCR-Somalia started a dialogue with the SFRG [i.e. the SNG] on capacity-building and the drafting of policy for IDPs in Mogadishu.

Regarding an IDP strategy, it should be noted that the division of tasks between Mogadishu and the regional governments has not as of yet been clarified. It was added that, in 2012, Puntland adopted an IDP policy while Somaliland is, also, on its way to do so.

UNHCR-Somalia explained that its relations with the SFRG [i.e. the SNG] are good and those who are focal points for humanitarian issues are mostly people with NGO professional background and very cooperative.

The Disaster Management Agency (DMA) is a government agency under the Ministry of Interior and National Security. UNHCR has an ongoing dialogue with DMA, and a number of DMA experts are persons from the Diaspora. DMA is supported by the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

UNHCR described the overall process and dialogue with the SFRG [i.e. the SNG] regarding IDPs and refugees as positive.

UNHCR-Somalia noted that many IDPs in Mogadishu have been displaced several times. Approximately 30% of all IDPs in Mogadishu originate from Mogadishu and many have been displaced more than once.

UNHCR explained that there were also Ethiopian refugees living, mainly, in Somaliland and Puntland who were in limbo, as the majority of them did not have any local integration prospects.

Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre, Mogadishu, explained that street children in Mogadishu are not being taken care of by anyone. Most of these children have no family or relatives and many are addicted to drugs. It was estimated that there are more than 5000 such children in Mogadishu according to a report made by the child protection working group in 2010 which Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre is the co-chair of. Now there are plans of undertaking another assessment by the working group where Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre is leading the coordination.

According to Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre, Mogadishu, there are no public services available to the population in Mogadishu. And services that are available under public service title are usually for a fee.

5.2 Sexual violence against IDPs

Regarding IDPs and SGBV a UN agency, Nairobi, explained that even in government run IDP camps there are serious problems. Recently UNs local partners have been threatened by the local authorities. The Municipal Authority (DMA) in the area concerned accused the UN agency for lying about the occurrence of SGBV in the IDP camp. The UN agency emphasized that it is not the DMA who is the perpetrator behind SGBV.

When asked if there is any risk of over-reporting of SGBV the UN agency, Nairobi, explained that now that the UN has access to the same areas as the local NGOs reporting of SGBV the risk of over-reporting has diminished. Thus, today it would be largely incorrect to accuse local NGOs and other observers of over-reporting.

The UN agency referred to a recent event where in just one morning at the centre run by Somali Women Development Centre (SWDC) [in Mogadishu] there were 16 women from IDP camps who reported that they had been raped. The UN agency added that the perpetrators are not only soldiers from SNAF; there are other perpetrators as well.

The UN agency added that there have been occasions where the police have threatened and even detained social workers as they were working with assistance to victims of SGBV. The police enjoy complete impunity.

6 Freedom of movement, security and checkpoints

6.1 Freedom of movement in Mogadishu

When asked if the unauthorized or illegal checkpoints in Mogadishu are still an issue UNDSS, Mogadishu, explained that these checkpoints have ‘died down’, especially since September/October 2012 when there were many of them in Mogadishu and the nearby Lower Shabelle region. However, there are still some illegal checkpoints in Mogadishu and Lower Shabelle.

Regarding checkpoints in Mogadishu UNDSS, Mogadishu, stated that there are fewer checkpoints than last year. However, checkpoints come and go.

Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre, Mogadishu, explained that when al-Shabaab left Mogadishu in August 2011 the previous government [the TFG] established a lot of checkpoints throughout the city. These checkpoints have now disappeared and new ones have been established in the outskirts of Mogadishu. However, as many of the SNAF soldiers are not being paid properly there have been reports of harassments, extortions and other violations taking place at some of these checkpoints.

Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre, Mogadishu, explained that harassments are still taking place in the outskirts of Mogadishu, and that this is still a very big issue. When government forces are patrolling the streets, armed militias are not able to establish [illegal] checkpoints. However, once the government forces are out of sight, such [illegal] checkpoints appear.

The representative of Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre, Mogadishu, explained that she had never experienced being harassed at any checkpoint in Mogadishu. In addition the representative and the staff of Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre have never been threatened by al-Shabaab. This is due to the fact the Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre are working closely with local communities wherever it operates. This means that everyone knows about Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre activities, including al-Shabaab. Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre enjoy a lot of respect among the people, especially as it works on assisting minors to get out of recruitment into armed militias and forces, including al-Shabaab.

Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre added it is normal that men will be checked much more thoroughly than women at checkpoints.

Regarding checkpoints the representatives of an international agency, Mogadishu, explained that there has been a decrease in the numbers of these since October 2012. AMISOM is providing security at Villa Somalia and the Parliament as well as at other key points in Mogadishu. All checkpoints in Mogadishu are manned by SNAF soldiers.

Regarding the checkpoints in Mogadishu UNHCR-Somalia, Mogadishu, stated the majority of illegal checkpoints were removed already in late 2012. Freedom of movement has been drastically improved in the city and there is freedom of movement, especially, in daylight, as the unauthorized or illegal checkpoints have now been removed. All remaining checkpoints are controlled by SNAF.

When asked if there have been any incidents concerning ordinary civilians at any checkpoint UNHCR stated that there are no recent reports on serious incidents although incidents of harassment of civilians especially along the Afgoye-Mogadishu road were commonly reported. There are no recent reports on the existence of illegal checkpoints in Mogadishu since January/February 2013.

According to Peter Klansoe, DRC, freedom of movement in Mogadishu has been increasingly improving. Although freedom of movement has improved, but it is not a complete freedom of movement as checkpoint comes and goes, more in some areas than others. The illegal checkpoints have been removed and most of the SNG checkpoints are also gone. There is no longer armed conflict between al-Shabaab and the SNAF/AMISOM. Today one sees SNAF soldiers as well police forces in the streets of Mogadishu. However, as a result of the 14 April [2013] attack by al-Shabaab one can expect to see some additional checkpoints in the coming days and maybe weeks.

During the delegation's visit to Mogadishu from 21 to 23 April it did not notice any checkpoints between the airport and Hamar Weyne and between Hamar Weyne and the Medina hospital.

An international NGO (B), Mogadishu, explained that today women can move freely around in Mogadishu without having to fear the police or SNAF.

Hakan Bilgin, IMC, agreed that the removal of illegal or unauthorized check points [normally these were check points controlled by various DCs] in Mogadishu is a sign of improving security in the city. On the other hand this does not imply that the DCs do not have any influence any longer

6.2 Freedom of movement in S/C Somalia

When asked if ordinary people in Mogadishu would go by land to other locations/cities in S/C Somalia UNHCR, Mogadishu, stated that people are going by buses and other vehicles to such locations. However, there have been a few reports of travelers being executed by al-Shabaab when it suspected someone to be a government affiliated person. It happens maybe two to three times a week in all of S/C Somalia.

Regarding overland travels in S/C Somalia representatives of an international agency, Mogadishu, explained that ordinary civilians, i.e. people not working for the SNG, are travelling between Mogadishu and Kismayo, Baidoa, Jowhar and Afgoye. They mostly go by bus and there are now fewer checkpoints along the Mogadishu – Kismayo road. There are no checkpoints between Mogadishu and Baidoa. However, there is no guarantee against al-Shabaab ambushes along the road. On the other hand, ambushes may also be committed by ordinary criminals. The representatives of an international agency, Mogadishu, confirmed that al-Shabaab will kill anyone it suspects is working for the SNG or the international community. It was added that the road between Mogadishu and Kismayo is not safe all the way. However, ordinary people will travel along this road anyhow as long as they know how to get by.

The representative of Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre, Mogadishu, explained that she would never travel along the roads leading to Baidoa and to Kismayo from Mogadishu. This is due to the

threat of al-Shabaab. A well-known person or a person looking a bit westernized may be at severe risk if al-Shabaab stops the vehicle. However, ordinary people will travel by bus or other transportation along these roads as well as to other locations in S/C Somalia, irrespectively of whether al-Shabaab is in control of an area you may have to pass through in order to get to your final destination.

6.2.1 Mogadishu – Kismayo road

Concerning travelling between Mogadishu and Kismayo, an international NGO (B), Mogadishu, explained that for ordinary people with no issues with al-Shabaab there is no risk going by road through Shabaab-controlled areas along the coast.

6.2.2 Mogadishu – Afgoye – Baidoa road

Regarding the Mogadishu – Afgoye – Baidoa - Luuq corridor UNDSS, Mogadishu, explained that al-Shabaab has no permanent physical presence along the road. However one cannot say that it is 100% safe.

An international NGO (B), Mogadishu explained that al-Shabaab operates along the road from Mogadishu to Baidoa, but it has no checkpoints along the road. However, there is reason to believe that it will be informed about government people who travel on the road. What it normally does, is that they stop cars and check the people who are on board. Then it will take out the ones it thinks are working for the government or it for some reason regards as enemies. Ordinary people with no issue with al-Shabaab go on with no problems, and normally it will not ask for money or take valuables. Such ambushes and checks happen more or less every day on the road from Mogadishu to Baidoa. This is why the international NGO (B) will not go by road to Baidoa and therefore goes by plane. If SNAF forces, AMISOM or SNG officials are going by road to Baidoa, they have to go in a convoy.

7 Return to Mogadishu and S/C Somalia

7.2 Diaspora returning from abroad

According to UNHCR-Somalia, Mogadishu, many people from the Diaspora have returned to Mogadishu, also, because they see business opportunities. In general, there is no discrimination for the sole reason of belonging to the returning Diaspora.

Regarding returns from the Diaspora, an international agency, Nairobi, explained that ordinary people returning to Mogadishu and other locations in S/C Somalia are citing improvements in the security situation as some of the reasons for returns. Others have also been shocked by what they see when they come back, especially those who have been abroad for many years.

An international agency, Nairobi, explained that Mogadishu is now a ‘buzz’, people are going around minding their own business and there is an increasing freedom of movement for everyone.

Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre, Mogadishu, explained that there is an increasing number of Somalis returning to Mogadishu from abroad as compared to October 2012. However, the 14 April [2013] attack may result in a slight decrease for the time being as many will give it a second thought before going back to Mogadishu.

A representative of a Diaspora organization in Mogadishu explained that those who are returning to Mogadishu and other locations in S/C Somalia are mostly resourceful people who see opportunities, have business to do and/or seek political influence and positions. It would be extremely difficult to return to Mogadishu if you have no one to rely on when you come back.

The representative stated that an increasing number of Somalis from the Diaspora are returning. Safety and security are issues to consider before you return as there are frictions between those who stayed behind and those who are now returning from their refuge abroad. The Diaspora is being perceived as competitors as they may take up jobs from the locals and their increasing presence in Mogadishu has resulted in price increases on goods as well as on properties. Irrespectively on whether you have been staying in Kenya, Europe or North America you are perceived as a competitor when you go back to Somalia.

The locals in Mogadishu believe that returning people from the Diaspora have been enjoying the easy life abroad compared to the harsh conditions and difficult life they have had while they stayed in Somalia. In addition, the fact that youngsters from abroad have been taking part in al-Shabaab’s attacks in Mogadishu does not make returning Diaspora people more welcome.

There is a constant debate between those who stayed behind and those who are now returning from abroad. Even ‘Tarzan’, the Mayor of Mogadishu and Governor of Benadir region has commented that there are women from the Diaspora who have not been dressed appropriately when they have been to Lido Beach in Mogadishu. Lido Beach is a beach area frequently visited by the locals since al-Shabaab left Mogadishu in August 2011. However, Lido Beach is also popular among people

from the Diaspora, but the two population groups are not intermingling when they are at the beach. The representative of a Diaspora organization in Mogadishu explained that in March 2013 a guard employed by the café at the Lido Beach shot at two young Somalis – a woman and a man – when they were bathing together and having fun with an inflated tube. The young man was then arrested by the police.

The representative of a Diaspora organization in Mogadishu admitted that there are arrogant persons from the Diaspora who will never intermingle with the locals.

Concerning the Diaspora people coming back to Somalia, Mohamed Farah Siad, Mogadishu, said that they are most welcome with their money and skills. He did not know about a general tension between local people and the ones who have returned from the Diaspora. In his opinion, the ones who have negative attitudes towards the Diaspora might suffer from an inferiority complex.

Mohamed Farah Siad added that he has told three of his sons now living in Ohio, USA, to come back to Mogadishu to work with him. He expects his sons to be back in Mogadishu in three months.

Regarding price increases for housing and property the representative of a Diaspora organization in Mogadishu explained that a rented apartment may cost up to 5,000 US \$ per month.

A representative of a Diaspora organization in Mogadishu explained that persons from the Diaspora are more worried about security than those who stayed behind and thus have become familiar with weapons and armed conflict. The Diaspora is especially worried about the infiltration by al-Shabaab.

As an illustration on the distinction between ‘them and us’ the representative of a Diaspora organization in Mogadishu referred to another recent incident on Lido Beach. A woman from the Diaspora was walking on the beach wearing jeans. The locals on the beach gathered into an angry crowd shouting at the woman. The guards at Lido Beach café shot into the air in order to spread the crowd. The representative explained that you will have to adapt in order to be respected, and added that it will take a few months to adapt but you will accept in the long run. ‘They and us’ is a widespread perception in present-day Mogadishu.

The representative of a Diaspora organization in Mogadishu explained that the first three months in Mogadishu are the hardest for a returned member of the Diaspora. However, most people from the Diaspora are staying despite the difficulties they may face during the first few months. On the other hand, a number of returnees are going back to their country of asylum because they could not find a job in Mogadishu. Males as well as females are returning to Mogadishu.

The representative of a Diaspora organization in Mogadishu added that a new class system is developing in Mogadishu. There is an upcoming middle class of locals who have found job opportunities within the government as well within the business community. In addition you have a class of Diaspora people who are investing and taking advantage of the opportunities within the political and economic domain.

The representative of a Diaspora organization was also quite clear that the reality remained that those from Diaspora who held valid passports would always have the opportunity to 'escape' should the security situation deteriorate. It is the resources available to the Diaspora that allows them to remain in Mogadishu for the time being.

A person returning from the Diaspora, who wants to start a business or invest in Mogadishu, needs a network in the city, according to an international NGO (B), Mogadishu. That could be through family residing there. If there is no family in place, it is necessary to get into a partnership with someone residing in Mogadishu, and that would preferably be with a member of your own clan.

An international NGO (B), Mogadishu, explained that there are many people coming to Mogadishu these days. All flights from Nairobi, Istanbul and the Middle East are fully booked. However, the 14 April attack may for a while make people more hesitant to return. On the other hand, many people are coming to Somalia to settle.

An international NGO (C), Nairobi, stated that the most important developments at the moment are that people are coming back and staying, and making investments. This is very positive and important.

According to the international NGO (C), Nairobi, many Somalis from the Diaspora are these days coming to Mogadishu to invest and seek opportunities for economic activity. These people are dependent on a reasonable level of security to pursue their activities. Al-Shabaab's recent attacks on the Lido Beach and on a restaurant where the new westernized middle class of Mogadishu gather had the intention to create fear among these people. So far al-Shabaab has not managed to scare people away from Mogadishu, but it is crucial that the SNG as soon as possible, and in a convincing way, can demonstrate that it is able to prevent terrorist attacks in the city.

According to an international NGO (A) al-Shabaab has recruited many Somalis from the Diaspora, especially as suicide attackers. The 14 April 2013 attack on the Supreme Court and on the two Turkish NGO workers was committed by suicide attackers. The attack on the Supreme Court was committed by a Canadian citizen among others. The international NGO (A) stated that it is a severe problem that al-Shabaab has been rather successful in attracting Somalis from the Diaspora. This will probably continue in the time to come.

Regarding tensions between the Diaspora and those who stayed behind Hakan Bilgin, IMC, confirmed that this is the case in certain circumstances. However, these tensions are not violent and the fact that the Diaspora are returning back to Mogadishu in increasing numbers is very positive with regard to a modernization of Somalia.

The Diaspora should be given better opportunities in Somalia as this will be a strong message to the Somalis, i.e. that people should be considered according to their values [qualifications].

The representatives of an international agency, Mogadishu, explained that people from the Diaspora are now returning, but of course one cannot compare the present security situation in Mogadishu with the period before the civil war as this would be inaccurate. However, security in Mogadishu as well as in all other parts of S/C Somalia is still fragile. This is due to the fact that AMISOM remains the major security provider [i.e. AMISOM is currently the only major security provider].

Representatives of an international agency, Mogadishu, explained that according to those who have returned from abroad [there] are those who see opportunities. Security is only one reason to return, and there are many other pull factors like economic and political opportunities as well as social issues.

Hakan Bilgin, IMC, explained that the flights between Mogadishu and Istanbul are fully booked three to four months ahead. It was added that the business class seats are the first to be booked. These seats are occupied by well off Somalis, and they are many.

When asked if it is an asylum related issue that Turkish Airlines fly directly between Mogadishu and Istanbul Hakan Bilgin, IMC, explained that of course this could be a problem. However, Somalis without a visa from the Turkish embassy or any other valid visa will not be allowed to board the plane.

According to representatives of an international agency, Mogadishu, some people think most people who go to Europe are mostly looking for economic opportunities rather than protection from persecution. This however does not mean there are no individuals who are genuinely seeking protection.

7.3 Returning refugees and IDPs

According to UNHCR-Somalia, Mogadishu, there are cross-border movements that take place by land or by air to Mogadishu. There are also some movements of IDPs from Mogadishu towards other regions and districts in S/C Somalia, such Bay, Middle and Lower Shabelle.

UNHCR-Somalia stated that around 14,000 Somali refugees in Kenya have crossed into Somalia during January-March 2013. UNHCR will need to continue monitoring these cross-border movements in order to determine to what extent these are temporary or more durable returns. UNHCR-Somalia explained that, while there were windows of opportunities, general conditions were not conducive for sudden and large-scale returns to S/C Somalia.

As a result of the Kenya edict, there was a high number of induced movements from Kenya (Nairobi, Dadaab, or elsewhere) to Mogadishu, in particular during the period of December 2012-February 2013. At the time, there were three to four commercial flights per day from Nairobi to Mogadishu, while previously there were only three flights per week. This trend significantly decreased from mid-February 2013 onwards.

Regarding returnees from Kenya, UNHCR-Somalia explained that, in Mogadishu, there have been both spontaneous and induced returns. Those interviewed who came from Dadaab stated that they

did so because of lack of security in the camps. There have, also, been reports of violence and harassment by the Kenya police in Nairobi and elsewhere.

Most of those returning from Kenya by air were doing so on a “Go-Home” travel document issued by the Somali embassy in Nairobi. The majority of those arriving from Kenya to Mogadishu live with families in Mogadishu while others have already moved to IDP settlements, e.g. Zona K (Hodan district).

When asked if there are Somali refugees in Kenya who return to Somalia Peter Klansoe, DRC, explained that not many refugees are returning at the moment. Between 20,000 and 30,000 have returned from Kenya and this has to be compared with a total of approximately 850,000 refugees who are presently in the region. There are approximately 450,000 in Kenya; 200,000 in Ethiopia and the same in Yemen. However, those who have returned did not do it completely voluntarily as they have been under pressure from the Kenyan authorities, especially the Kenyan police who have committed human rights violations against Somali refugees in Kenya. Peter Klansoe added that DRC and UNHCR are monitoring the returnees in Somalia.

Peter Klansoe, DRC, explained that there is a consortium of NGOs and UN agencies that are studying and analyzing the conditions for the refugees in Kenya as well as the conditions in the areas of return in Somalia. In some of the return areas security conditions are not very encouraging. Because of this many refugees and IDPs are thinking twice before they decide to go home or stay where they are. Many IDPs in Somalia have been displaced several times, some up to more than ten times. Peter Klansoe added that it is for similar reasons that people become IDPs or refugees. They have all fled for security and livelihood concerns.

Peter Klansoe, DRC, added that security in Mogadishu is not as good for the weaker population groups, i.e. the IDPs as it is for the better-off segment of the people.

8 Security issues at Mogadishu airport

8.1 Security at Mogadishu's international airport

UNDSS, Mogadishu, explained that there have been no significant security incidents at Mogadishu's international airport for months, barring a likely mortar round that landed near the airport in 2012 and another that landed on the runway in mid-2011, but the 14 April [2013] attack on Turkish NGO workers took place approximately a mile from the airport area. Al-Shabaab is, however, likely to be keen to attack the airport and there have been concerns about the security measures employed at the airport.

9 Issuance of documents by Somali authorities

UNHCR-Somalia, Mogadishu, stated that, to date, there is no official birth registration in Mogadishu.

A UN agency, Nairobi, explained that it recently requested the government to begin registration of births. However, there is still no governmental system for registration of births, marriages or deaths.

UNHCR-Somalia explained that in Mogadishu, passports are issued by the immigration authorities and a passport costs approximately 80 US \$. In addition the Somali embassy in Nairobi issues “Go-Home” travel documents at a cost of 70 US \$. The “Go-Home” document allows a Somali to enter Somalia without being in possession of a passport.

Regarding issuance of official documents in Somalia Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre, Mogadishu, explained that there are no official documents issued by any SNG authority, the only exception being the issuance of passports, driver’s licenses, licenses to establish shops and small business and title deeds. A Somali passport costs 90 US \$ and the entry procedure at the airport is quite simple. Those with an old Somalia passport (dated back to the time of the Siad Barre administration) will be requested to apply for the recently issued passports.

Marriage certificates are issued by some Sheikhs, but there are no public, official marriage certificates and there is no official registration of marriages. There are no official records of births and deaths, only the hospitals are registering these events. This may be an opportune time to undertake such registrations with the government registering IDP communities to be relocated and similar technologies can be used for birth and ID registrations.

Regarding marriage Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre, Mogadishu, explained that a marriage taking place according to Sharia law is legal in Somalia, even though the couple may be under the age of 18. However, according to national law the age of marriage is 18. There are many religious leaders who promote marriage at the time of a girl’s first menstrual period. By religious and cultural standards she is fit to marry.

Regarding the issuance of official documents in Somalia Hakan Bilgin, IMC, stated that this is a real challenge. There are no official documents, and you can get some documents, if you know the right channels. The DCs may issue some types of documents, based on their knowledge of the clans, but these are not official governmental documents.

Organizations, agencies and individuals consulted

A representative of a Diaspora organization in Mogadishu.

An international agency, Nairobi.

An international NGO (A), Mogadishu.

An international NGO (B), Mogadishu.

An international NGO (C), Nairobi.

A UN agency, Nairobi.

Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre, Mogadishu.

Hakan Bilgin, Country Director-Somalia, International Medical Corps - Somalia (IMC), Nairobi.

Mohamed Farah Siad, Managing Director, Mohamed International Ltd., Hamar Weyne District, Mogadishu.

Peter Klansoe, Regional Director, Horn of Africa & Yemen, Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Nairobi.

Representatives of an international agency, Mogadishu.

Royal Danish Embassy, Nairobi.

United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), Mogadishu.

United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), Nairobi.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees - Somalia (UNHCR-Somalia), Mogadishu.

Abbreviations

AMISOM – African Union Mission in Somalia

CAP – Somalia Consolidated Appeal

COI – Country of Origin Information

DC – District Commissioner

DIS – Danish Immigration Service

DMA – Disaster Management Agency

DRC – Danish Refugee Council

EU – European Union

FAO – Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

GBV – Gender Based Violence

HASM – Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (i.e. Al-Shabaab)

ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross

ICU – Islamic Courts United, also called Union of Islamic Courts (UIC)

IDP – Internally Displaced Person

IED – Improvised Explosive Device

IMC – International Medical Corps

IOM – International Organization for Migration

LA – Local Administration

MP – Member of Parliament

NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation

NRC – Norwegian Refugee Council

OCG – Organized Crime Group

OCHA – Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

PM – Prime Minister

RPG – Rocket Propelled Grenade

S/C Somalia – South-Central Somalia

SFRG – Somalia Federal Republic Government, i.e. Somali National Government (SNG)

SGBV – Sexually and Gender Based Violence

SNAF – Somali National Armed Forces

SNG – Somali National Government, i.e. Somalia Federal Republic Government (SFRG)

SWDC – Somali Women Development Centre

TFG – Transitional Federal Government

ToR – Terms of References

UK – United Kingdom

UN – United Nations

UNCC – United Nations Common Compound

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

UNDSS – United Nations Department of Safety and Security

UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Fund

UNSOA – United Nations Support Office for AMISOM

US – United States

USA – United States of America

WFP – World Food Programme

Annexes


Annex 1: Map of Somalia



Map No. 3690 Rev. 10 UNITED NATIONS
December 2011

Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section

Annex 2: Map of Mogadishu⁵



⁵ UNHCR. *City Plan – Mogadishu*.


http://psugeo.org/Africa/DMS/Hard%20Copy%20Maps/Somalia_Mogadishu_city_plan.jpg

Annex 3: The area of control – Hiraan Region

THE AREA OF CONTROL HIRAAN REGION AS OF 02 MAY 2013


LEGEND:

- AMISOM/EDF/SNAF/ASWJ-CS AOC
- HASM



Annex 4: The area of control – Bay&Bakool Regions



THE AREA OF CONTROL BAY&BAKOOL REGIONS AS OF 02 MAY 2013




Annex 5: The area of control – Gedo Region

THE AREA OF CONTROL GEDO REGION AS OF 02 MAY 2013

LEGEND:

-  KDF/EDF/ASWJ-G/SNAF AOC
-  HASM AOC



Annex 6: The area of control – Lower Juba

THE AREA OF CONTROL LOWER JUBA AS OF 02 MAY 2013

LEGEND:

- AMISOM/RASKAMBONI BG/SNAF AOC
- HASM AOC
- NO-MAN LAND

