

Index

Central Region	1-4
Northern Region	5-10
Western Region	11-12
Eastern Region	13-16
Southern Region	17-21
ANSO Info Page	22

HIGHLIGHTS


- **AOG mobility in Ghazni**
- **Potential for complex attacks in urban centers**
- **NGO abduction in Badakhshan**

ANSO is supported by

EUROPEAN COMMISSION



Humanitarian Aid



Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC



COUNTRY SUMMARY

As of the end of May, AOG activity volumes this year stayed 40% below the volumes for the same actor and period in 2011 (for the comparison of AOG activity volumes, see graph on p. 20). Nonetheless, AOG incidents exhibited a 32% increase between May and April, displaying a proportionate growth well in line with the trends established last year and in 2010. Whereas the opposition activity in 2010 culminated with the parliamentary elections in September, 2011 did not include any such milestone and the conflict reached its peak in July after a very intensive late-spring and early-summer campaign. A steep growth between May and June is also to be expected this year, although the AOG activity volumes will remain well below the intensity of the conflict in 2011 and possibly also lower than the volumes in 2010.

As the opposition campaign intensifies, the shift in regional distribution of AOG attacks from South to East, identified during the first quarter of this year, slowly tilts back to the former region. This month concluded with South returning to the fore with 38% of all AOG attacks in 2012, followed by East with 36% and West with 11%, the latter region maintaining its position as the main 'diversion' front outside the two core theatres. The robust growth in the Southern Region is in part due to the upscale in Ghazni, which experienced 159 AOG attacks this month. Obviously, the announcement of Operation al-Farooq also triggered AOG activity in the established hotspots elsewhere, such as in Kapisa and Parwan in Central and Kunduz in North.

Unlike the activity volumes and territorial

distribution, the AOG tactical portfolio remains relatively consistent. Opposition activity remains driven by conventional attacks (SAF, RPG, etc), followed by IED and indirect fire (rocket, mortar, etc). This month, close range attacks constituted 61%, of all AOG attacks, IED strikes 29% and indirect fire 10%. Although present, suicide and complex attacks did not represent any significant proportion in terms of volumes, but continue to be used as a force multiplier in the battlefield, in assassination campaigns or as pure 'statement attacks' in urban areas, where the conflict engagements increasingly converge.

Casualty figures also highlight the ongoing importance of IED deployment in the opposition campaign. This month, IEDs caused 51% of all IMF and ANSF casualties (corresponding to 386 out of 752 personnel injured or killed), followed by conventional attacks (38%), complex and/or suicide attacks (6%), ending with indirect fire attacks (5%). For IMF forces alone, 68% of all casualties this month resulted from IED blasts, leaving the road-side devices the most effective AOG method of attack while also one which regularly causes the highest toll of civilian casualties, as demonstrated with 47 civilians killed in IED attacks this month alone.

With the conflict season beginning in earnest, the composition of NGO incidents also shifted towards conflict related causes, as witnessed this cycle with 3 AOG initiated incidents (Badakhshan, Ghor, Kunar), 2 authored by ANSF-IMF (Nangarhar, Kabul) with only one linked to a local community issue (Nangarhar) and the absence of income-oriented crime.


CENTRAL REGION

KABUL

An outlier case of an IMF force protection shooting was recorded in the early morning of the 24th in Karte Parwan, PD 4, where an NGO member drove too close to an IMF convoy. The incident passed without serious consequences for the NGO staff besides damage to his vehicle, but serves as a reminder of the risks of inadvertent driving near security convoys. To their credit, the IMF managed to significantly reduce these types of escalations in the last two years in Kabul, albeit the threat of unwanted escalations, incl. at ANSF checkpoints, remains a reality to be addressed in NGO movement SOPs.

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	1

Overall, ANSF authored 32 out of 35 incidents this cycle. A discernable shift on ANSF side occurred with conflict related arrests and weapons seizures (14 cases) prevailing over criminal and drug-related cases (12 and 4 respectively). NDS disrupted AOG operations in Kabul City, Bagrami and Paghman, including the interception of an approximate 360 kg of explosives during transit in the vicinity of the Kabul International Airport in PD 9 ('KAIA Circle'/Hawa Shenasi). That high-profile AOG attacks continue to feature in the security landscape in the capital was further underlined



with an NDS seizure of two BBIED vests in a hideout in Charkh Ab, Bagrami, on the 17th.

Meanwhile, AOG in Surobi authored an inconclusive direct attack on an ANA convoy on the Gogamunda section of the highway, but were more successful in deterring ANSF eradication teams from accessing the areas under poppy cultivation in the north of the district.

KAPISA


Robust ANSF-IMF operations in the key conflict areas in Tagab (such as Anar Joy and Qorghal) did little to prevent increased mobility of opposition fighters who authored 12 out of 14 incidents. AOG activity converged on the road network in Tagab, Alasay and the adjacent parts of Nijrab (Afghaniya Valley) and Mahmudi Raqi (Shukhi) and encompassed primarily direct attacks, followed by IED deployment and indirect fire.

In terms of AOG activity levels, May surpassed January as the most kinetic month so far this year. The yearly comparison is even more story-telling since AOG activity volumes this year denote an 83% increase compared to the same period last year, from 41 attacks in January-May 2011 to

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

75 in 2012. Whereas it can be reasonably argued that the opposition activity remains driven by the expanding ANSF presence, the level of AOG mobility provides strong evidence as to the overall failure of ANSF and IMF to control key terrain in the southern districts. To what extent the ongoing conflict surge impacts the civilians is evidenced with 27 confirmed civilian fatalities since the beginning of this year, a proportionate increase to 44 civilians killed over 12 months last year.

The inclusion of the entire province into the up-coming third tranche of the transition and the withdrawal of French combat troops by the end of this year, reconfirmed during French President's visit to the IMF base in



Nijrab this cycle, outline the fact that the security handover in Kapisa is dominated by external realities and disregards the situation on the ground. Another crucial component of the current IMF-ANSF strategy, the ALP, remains ridden with local rivalries and factionalism, a prospect that tilts the tactical advantage further onto the side of the opposition. While the ALP factional tensions, present mainly in Nijrab, have passed without major escalations so far, it is worth noting that the IEA expansion in Tagab and Alasay in 2008-9 took advantage of very similar cleavages among local armed factions there.

WARDAK

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0


This cycle, in line with long standing trends, the majority of escalations continued to occur along main roads. The Saydabad section of the Kabul-Ghazni Highway saw an effective IED strike on a PSC vehicle (injuring two PSC guards), while in Maydan Shahr, AOG carried out a close-range attack against an ANA convoy transiting along the Kabul – Bamyan Highway (causing injuries to two ANA soldiers). Although demonstrating a notable decline from the PRP, AOG direct attacks remained the most notable of the reporting period, with five cases affecting Maydan Shahr (as above), Jaghatu and Jalrez, although only two were IED-related (both effective strikes). In addition to the previously mentioned, the second IED strike occurred in Chaki Wardak, and targeted an IMF vehicle, resulting in two IMF fatalities.

Outside of AOG initiated activities, the districts of Maydan Shahr, Jaghatu and Saydabad experienced activities initiated by security forces. These included two air strikes (Saydabad and Maydan Shahr) resulting in a total of 11 AOG members killed. Despite the considerable impact these operations had, the increasing deployment of air assets recently observed in many kinetic areas countrywide poses risks for the IMF due to difficult topography and climate even without any confirmed surface-to-air threats. This was highlighted on 28 May, when an IMF

helicopter crashed, due to a technical problem in Nirkh, killing two IMF soldiers.

Over May, the volume of AOG activities—in line with seasonal trends—continued its steady rise. Nevertheless, this volume remains significantly below the levels recorded during 2011, marking a drop from 138 attacks attributed to the opposition between January and May 2011, to the current 49 for the same period this year. Although it may be argued that the AOG concentration on the eastern border provinces draws significant resources from the AOG pool, which would have otherwise been allocated for their activity in Wardak, the yearly comparison actually makes a strong case to the current success of the ANSF/IMF campaign in the province, in particular when it comes to preventing AOG operations along the highway in Saydabad.

Nonetheless, caution is in place as to the durability of such gains, since a significant portion of these is secured through the deployment of irregular forces, including the ALP, often hastily incorporated as soon as their leaders ‘defect’ or proclaim their loyalty to the GOA/IMF sponsors, while, at the political level, the ‘reconciliation’ process remains in the realm of individual politicians and strongmen using their private connections to strike local deals outside the institutional setup.



Under these conditions, the current stabilization actually includes a struggle for influence and resources among local leaders rather than a consolidation of the GOA presence. The fragile character of such developments is best seen with the ALP process which, in key AOG districts such as Chaki Wardak and Saydabad, struggles with high levels of attrition and inconsistencies in the staffing, in particular with regard to the inclusion of non-local fighters into the program despite the evident efforts of the IMF/GOA sponsors to prevent such transgressions from happening. Of note, despite their contested character, both Saydabad and Nirkh have been slated for the upcoming third tranche of the transition.

As to the coming weeks, NGOs with operations in the west of the province, including the two Behsuds, Day Mirdad and the western edge of Jalrez will benefit from keeping an eye on the interactions of the local sedentary population with the Kuchi nomads, the latter increasingly converging along their seasonal migration routes to the summer pastures. While local accounts denote a degree of tension building up among the Hazara communities, in Behsud II in particular, the modality of interaction between the communities is yet to be seen as besides localized violence and deterrence by force, the relations between the two segments of the society also typically include local deals and accommodations of interests based on the logics of rural economy.

NOTICE:

The graphs provided in the report are accurate as of the **30th of May 2012**.
 NGO incident counts includes the total for all incidents attributed to all actors.

LOGAR


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

The reporting from Logar denoted a surge in AOG activity levels with AOG incident volumes displaying almost a 70% increase in May when compared to the aggregated volumes from January to April this year. This is a recurrent seasonal trend, that usually sees AOG activity volumes double between April and May and once again between May and June, before reaching the saturation which maintains in place during the summer fighting season.

In line with the previous cycle, AOG escalations were focused on Puli Alam, which accounted for 60% of all AOG-initiated incidents this period. Of some note, the district witnessed a diversification of AOG tactics which, besides IEDs and direct attacks, encompassed also an abduction and an IDF assault. The latter was carried out against the Puli Alam

ANP HQ, where an effective mortar strike killed one ANP and injuring two others. The facility seems to be high on the AOG list of priorities as several days later it came under another AOG direct attack, which caused injuries to one policeman. The targeting of ANP personnel continued in Puli Alam, when on the 27th an AOG abducted and killed a policeman who was on leave. This marks the third abduction recorded in the district this year, with the first two occurring in February and March, both targeting ANSF personnel.

On the provincial level, ANP facilities also appeared to constitute the AOG target of choice. Charkh and Baraki Barak hosted altogether four AOG attacks on ANP, including an assault against the ANP HQ in Charkh. Although there were no ANSF casualties, these attacks underscored



the risk of collateral impact for the civilians. In Charkh a local female was killed during a clash, while an AOG inaccurate rocket strike intended to target an ANP CP injured eight civilians in Baraki Barak.

ANSF/IMF documented activities were concentrated on Puli Alam, Muhammad Agha and Baraki Barak. A large amount of ammunition was seized in Muhammad Agha, while in Puli Alam an ANA/ANP operation claimed the lives of two ANSF and nine AOG members, with an additional 11 AOG members and four ANP sustaining injuries. Of note, Puli Alam, Mohammad Agha and Khushi districts have been included into the upcoming third tranche of the transition.


PANJSHIR

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Security events are usually rare in the province, yet this reporting cycle was shaped by several notable incidents. During the last day of the previous period (on the 15th) a rocket impacted in the Bazaar area of Bazarak. Much like the previous IDF incident on the 9th of April in the same location, the projectile detonated in an open field and did not cause any casualties. This was followed on the 23rd, with a night-time detonation of explosives inside a school in the Koh Talkha area of Bazarak, damaging the building but causing no casualties. Subse-

quently, an ANP detail was deployed to the area and located two pressure plate IEDs which were emplaced on a secondary road in the vicinity of the school, suggesting the potential targeting of first responders.

Although a stream of local accounts put forward a possible AOG connection to the incidents; a more likely explanation links the events to local power-struggles, which often motivate local actors to support their case with instilling a sensation of insecurity. AOG infiltrations from the east



and the north cannot be excluded, but have been extremely rare in the past. The IEA-IMU complex attack on the PRT base last year is an outlier as the case was indeed a statement attack marking an AOG reaction to the early stage of the transition process country-wide, and henceforth external to the local security landscape.

PARWAN

With Ghorband remaining the focal area for the opposition activity in Parwan, AOG further intensified their campaign in the valley this cycle. This was illustrated through a series of close range attacks against the DAC, as well as against ANP check posts and the security and logistics convoys along the main road.


Overall, out of 20 opposition attacks enacted in the Ghorband Valley since the beginning of this year, 15 of these took place in May. Despite the fact that the AOG resurgence during the late spring months can be considered an expected development in accordance with seasonal trending displayed over the last two years), it is also of note that the current AOG activity levels significantly surpass the January - May volumes of last year by 40%. With the opposition doing more and earlier this year, the outlook for the safety of passage between Parwan and Bamyan is quite grim ahead of the summer season.

Whereas the first week of this reporting period saw 3 separate

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

attacks on ANSF facilities located along the highway in Siyagerd, during the second week the armed opposition seemed to be more directly focused on the disruption of vehicular movements through the Valley. Similar to the previous cycle, the Alaqan Chardehi area was the scene of repeated AOG incursions on the main road. In the early hours of the 24th an AOG attacked simultaneously an ANP check point and the DAC, while another sizable group ambushed three IMF in the Alaqan Chardehi area. As a result, one of the trucks was set ablaze and the remaining vehicles damaged.

However, the most noteworthy incident occurred three days later, when three separate AOG units approached the main road in Alaqan Chardehi, Darez Gered (Ghorband) and in Dahani Wazghar of Shinwari District. The AOG operating in Alaqan Chardehi attacked on two separate occasions a total of four IMF contracted trucks, burning the vehicles (one driver killed in the



second incident). AOG freedom of movement has been further underlined by the fact that the group continued to operate in Alaqan Chardehi till the 28th, and eventually withdrew on their own just prior to the arrival of a sizeable ANSF detachment.

Regarding past practices, an increase in AOG activity usually leads to an increase in ANSF/IMF presence. The incentives on the ANSF side are even higher this season, as the GOA announced the inclusion of both Shinwari and Ghorband districts into the upcoming third tranche of the transition. Although it is true that the transition announcements rarely do change the situation on the ground in the short term, the transition process will likely include further expansion of ANSF assets and resources allocated to secure the Ghorband Valley. In light of the current situation, there is a high likelihood of sizeable military operations in the area in the short-term future.

BAMYAN

Along with criminality, sporadic activity of Baghlan-based AOG elements featured in the security landscape of the province this period.


Another incursion of Tala Wa Barfak based AOGs into Kahmard took place on 18th May, when an armed group opened fire on two local trucks on the main road in Karimak area, but withdrew without causing casualties. The incident marked the second AOG authored incident to occur this year in the district. Prior to this, the Eshpushta area saw an

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

attack on an ANP CP on the 23rd of March, whereas Sayghan experienced another attack on ANP that same month.

On a different note, Kahmard was the scene of a local vendetta, when two civilians were killed inside their residence over a personal dispute. Despite these one-off incidents, incident reporting from the province remains low, displaying a decrease by 35% as compared to January-May 2011.

In light of this, Bamyan continues to be assessed as one of the most



permissive security environment for NGO activities, although the security and provincial authorities remain vocal about their perceptions of potential risks linked to AOG infiltrations from Tala wa Barfak and the Ghorband Valley.

NORTHERN REGION

BADAKHSHAN


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	1

Five NGO staff members – two international females and three national males—were stopped by armed men and abducted as they moved between Fayzabad and Raghistan districts by horseback around midday of the 22nd. The NGO did not work in the area where they were abducted (Shelk Haza in Yaftali Sufla), but traveled through the area relatively regularly. The incident is believed to have been planned and conducted by local actors from Shahri Buzorg district with AOG and ACG ties, but little else can be reported at this time, as the situation remains ongoing.

The incident marks the first abduction of foreign NGO staff members in the entire North since a case occurred in Takhar late in 2010. Further to this, it marks the first NGO incident ever recorded in Yaftali Sufla district (as well as the first security incident of any type this year), and the first NGO abduction ever recorded by ANSO in Badakhshan. Although groups have been reported in Shahri Buzorg with mixed ACG/AOG affiliations, NGO abductions have been rare in 2011 and 2012, and the factors above combine to suggest that the current incident marks a significant outlier to the security paradigm

for the region. However, although rare, significant AOG and ACG incidents in Badakhshan are not without precedent. The most out-of-norm amongst these was the execution of a group of international and national NGO staff members working in Kuran Wa Munjan in August 2010 which was conducted by a foreign AOG and encompassed wider cross-border dynamics beyond the realm of local security landscape. More typically, the province has also seen a low volume of AOG and ACG incidents, including some involving NGOs. Few of these have been purely AOG-political, with most of them related to the drug trade or local conflicts, both of which are largely the realm of GOA, ACG, and AOG power-brokers.

AOGs were active in other districts, most notably in Warduj and neighboring Jurm, but also in Kishim and as well targeted by an IMF night raid in Fayzabad. The latter of these incidents—the arrest of a university professor (alleged by IMF to be an IMU member) and five guests during a night raid in Fayzabad—resulted in civilian unrest when students of the arrested professor protested the operation in two locations, but were turned away by ANP warn-



ing shots when they attempted to breach the provincial governor’s office after he refused to see them. The demonstration is not expected to have long-term ramifications. While local reports from the area suggest that the individual was known to be tied to Hizb ut-Tahrir, the level of participation the group had in actual armed activities remains questionable as does any connection of the individual to the IMU.

The period also included a further four incidents in Warduj. While two included AOG members joining the APRP program, on May 29th AOG again caused major disruption to ANSF when they attacked a checkpoint and killed eight ANP (three AOG also died in the attack). This represents yet another significant strike against GOA forces in the area, with the last one prior to this occurring on May 15th—reported this cycle—when an AOG attack on an ANSF position left four ANSF dead. This insecurity was joined by two incidents in neighboring Jurm that included an AOG attack on an ANP patrol. Outside of some arrests of ANBP allegedly involved with the AOG, thus far insecurity in Warduj has remained largely confined to the district, but it will mark a significant development if neighboring districts such as Jurm, Baharak, or Ishkashim) begin to see linked insecurity.

ACRONYMS:

Please see the final page for a list of ANSO-utilized acronyms.

BALKH


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

Balkh witnessed 20 security incidents this period, roughly on par with the PRP and the same period (late May) in 2011. This volume was notable, however, as it occurred despite a significant decrease in manifested activities in the most insecure districts in Balkh—with only three in Chimtal and one in Chahar Bolak, as opposed to eight and four (respectively) last period—which saw a short term lull in activity due to ongoing ANSF/IMF operations. However, the two districts are expected to continue to witness AOG activity as opposition groups work to maintain control of the Alburz sub-district—the one area in Chimtal which AOGs have been able to use as a safe haven and exhibit continuing control over—and extend their influence further afield.

The lull west of Mazar was balanced by increased incident volumes in other districts. Four security incidents occurred in Mazar-e Sharif. Unexceptionally, criminality accounted for two of the incidents (including one where a university student was shot and killed as a result of an interpersonal dispute), but the other two consisted of seizures of IEDs or IED components. IED-related insecurity has rarely been a significant part of the security paradigm in Mazar. Although the city saw a relative spike in 2011 (five IED detonations and four IEDs discovered and/or defused), this year no IED detonations have occurred. This cycle IED making materials (a large quantity of fuses and detonators) were seized from

a shop in Mazar, and two IEDs and an AT mine were taken from the back of a rickshaw in transit (with reports suggesting that the ANP were on the lookout for the vehicle due to received intelligence reports). At this time, although arrests have been made in both cases, it remains unclear who the IEDs were targeting, or whether they were meant for Mazar at all, as Mazar is often a transport hub with AOGs passing through but not conducting activities.

Other dynamics of note included a relatively sudden increase in activity in Sholgara, which has seen AOG activity in the past, but very little thus far this year (with only one AOG associated incident prior to these since the end of February 2012). This cycle Sholgara recorded five incidents, all but one AOG related, starting with an attack on three ANP checkpoints (on the 20th), an attack on a village (on the 21st), an IED discovery (on the 22nd), and then finally an IED detonation against a PGM vehicle (on the 29th). It appears likely that this AOG is under the same leadership as that which was chased out of Tandorak in Chahar Kint, and that they are now working to reassert their presence and demonstrate their ability to conduct operations. Not surprisingly, this has taken place in conjunction with increased AOG activity in Dara-I Sufi Payin (Samangan), as the groups are often linked. AOG activity is likely to continue until—and perhaps beyond when—they are actively engaged by IMF/ANSF.



An IED detonation occurred against a national company construction vehicle in Dawlatabad, marking the third security incident—all of them initiated by AOG—this month, and the fourth IED-related security incident thus far this year (in contrast, 2012 witnessed only three the entire year). Further to this, a second group of jerry cans which looked like an IED (but did not consist of explosives) was discovered near the site, which may suggest more complex targeting tactics (the deployment of fake IEDs in order to better target first responders). The northern districts of Balkh (Dawlatabad and Shortepa) may be seeing more AOG-initiated activity as AOGs are pushed by ANSF/IMF operations from Chimtal and Chahar Bolak, although it is unclear to what degree these actions may be the result of local AOGs (existent in some areas, such as the Dawlatabad/Chahar Bolak border), and whether AOGs will focus on—or be able to sustain—operations there.

Lastly, in Khulm, along the Mazar-Aybak road which rarely witnesses manifested insecurity, the ANP ambushed and killed four AOG members who were attempting to initiate activities in the area, with two of them being fairly prominent commanders in the region (one from Khulm, one from Baghlan). The implications of this attack were not clear at the time of this report, as the district has rarely seen dedicated AOG activity, and what AOG presence has been witnessed has usually occurred near the Kunduz (Chahar Dara) border rather than along the main road. At this time, the incident represents a considerable outlier, and does not necessarily suggest any further implications for the Mazar – Aybak road.

FARYAB

Faryab recorded 37 security incidents this cycle prior to late reporting. The continuing increase in AOG activity in Qaysar, Almar, and Pashtun Kot remains a trend worth noting. This period, the 3 districts combined for 23 of the 37 security incidents, almost identical to the 22 of 37 from the PRP. This means the three have accounted for 55 of the 74 incidents recorded in the province this month, a number that is likely to grow with late reporting. This marks a significant increase in insecurity over the course of 2012, with the three accounting for 33 of the 54 incidents that occurred in April, 28 of 42 in March, 21 of 40 in February, and 16 of 34 in January. Looking at the AOG activity volumes province-wise, the current AOG volumes remain 13% below the levels reached by the opposition during the same period last year.


This cycle, Qaysar accounted for ten security incidents, including four separate IED discoveries and two IED detonations, Pashtun Kot accounted for seven, and Almar for six. The level of activity—especially IED activity—in Qaysar has remained consistent and significant, with the previous reporting period recording 13 security incidents, of which seven consisted of IED-related activity (six discoveries and one detonation). While much of the activity has focused on the Qaysar – Ghormach road, this period also saw an IED discovery in the DAC, just in front of the mayor’s office. It is expected that with late reporting, this cycle will sur-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

pass the PRP in terms of activity in Qaysar.

Also of significance amongst these three districts was the NDS shooting of two individuals riding a motorbike along the Maymana – Bilchiragh road in Pashtun Kot on the 28th. Following the shooting, the relatives of those killed—who ANSF has stated did not stop for an ANSF checkpoint and were found to be carrying weapons—and members from their community came to Maymana to receive the bodies, and then brought the bodies to the provincial governor’s office, with the intent to demand justice. Although numerous sources tied the deceased to ACGs in the area, the relatives claimed they were only civilians, and were killed unreasonably. The commotion that occurred resulted in superficial damages to some NDS vehicles as the group lobbied for justice, but the PG was not in the area, and the group soon dispersed without further incident. Although Maymana has seen a fair share of demonstration related violence, it is believed that the known connection that at least one of the deceased have to ACGs in the area, combined with the fact that they are from a relatively less influential ACG make it unlikely the situation will have long standing consequences to the security paradigm.

Outside of the “southern cradle”, Dawlatabad and Qaramqol saw a significant volume of incidents this period (five), including two along the Maymana – Shibirghan road, and one involving the tar-



geting of government officials in Dawlatabad (off the main road). On the main road, AOG twice ambushed ANP patrols, once in Qaramqol (Jungal area) and once in Dawlatabad (near the Jungal area), although both incidents occurred outside of NGO travel hours (1900 and 0600). These districts have seen a consistent volume of AOG initiated activity, which is not surprising considering that they have local AOGs and belong to a secondary transit route leading to the Tri-Provincial area and further east, but that volume has appeared to be increasing lately, with 16 of the 31 incidents recorded in the two districts in 2012 occurring over the last two months (including four incidents along the main road). However, almost all the activity in these districts has remained against hard targets—primarily ANSF and IMF—leaving NGOs to work on ensuring that they are not in the wrong place at the wrong time. Activity in these districts is expected to continue at a significant rate for the summer, although—as with existing trends—to remain strongly focused on hard targets.


Lastly, but of note, Maymana was the scene of a large “Northern Front” political gathering led by General Dostum on the 16th (as was seen in Shibirghan the previous cycle, and Takhar this cycle), and—also of note to the overall security situation in the province—reporting indicates that the IMF forces in the PRT will completely withdraw from the province before this winter. The actual affect of this on the overall security paradigm for Faryab—which has seen a greater deterioration in security this year than any other province in the North—has yet to be ascertained.

SAR-E PUL

After continuous reports that AOGs have been moving regularly around the Sar-e Pul – Shibirghan road in the late evenings and early mornings, AOG twice conducted attacks on ANP along the main road—both times in Hawzi Haji Mohammad Omar area—on the evenings of the 26th and 29th. Although the road has generally demonstrated less insecurity in 2012 than the year prior, it continues to harbour a significant AOG presence that reports suggest are able to find refuge amongst local communities just off the road as well as further east (towards Shiram area) and west (towards Sayyad district). It should be noted that the road witnesses extremely little IED activity, and most of the recent incidents have targeted

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

hard security targets, suggesting a dedicated effort not to disturb the local communities which support them. These skirmishes were also notable in that both involved significantly sized AOGs attacking fairly large ANP contingents in sustained fire-fights, with the latter including a secondary ambush against deployed reinforcements, denoting improved tactics and confidence. Outside of the obvious dynamic—that the continued presence of AOG is resulting in more activity—it has been suggested that AOG leadership is pressuring AOGs to increase their operational tempo to demonstrate their presence, and it appears likely that activity along this road—primarily in the evening hours



when ANSF checkpoints/presence are minimized—will increase with the summer.

The other incident worth noting was a premature IED detonation in Kohistanat that occurred as AOG attempted to emplace the device. Kohistanat has served both as part of a transit route for AOG from Faryab and a safe haven. It appears that this type of activity is mainly destined to the ALP. AOG displeasure with the ALP presence will most likely translate into further incidents in the future.

JAWZJAN


Outside of a May 27th gathering in Shibirghan to honour Junbesh youths killed during demonstration violence in 2007, the targeting of CIPs in the Tri-Provincial Area continued to be the dominant security dynamic in the province. Of the 28 incidents that have occurred in Qush Tepa and Darzab this year—15 of which have taken place over the past two months—14 of them have directly involved the targeting of CIPs, including the last eight. This cycle included two SAF attacks and two IED explosions resulting in 4 CIPs killed and 4 injured. As many of the CIPs in Jawzjan come from AOGs who joined the APRP process, it remains questionable how long they will accept being targeted, and whether some

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

will leave to return to the AOG ranks, who have long controlled this portion of the province.

The above noted memorial ceremony went off peacefully, marking the second Junbesh gathering this month, with the first being the political gathering led by General Dostum in early May. Although there have been reports of tension between the PG and General Dostum (after the PG made critical comments to the press), no direct confrontations between these two—resulting in demonstrations or violence—have occurred.

Mingajik continued to see a low level of activity, accounting for two incidents this period, including the premature detonation of



an IED as it was being emplaced. Although security reporting in Mingajik has not been exceptional, six of the eight incidents this year have occurred in the last two months, with two of them involving IED discoveries or detonations. In context, only one IED-related incident occurred between 2010 and 2011, and only five security incidents of any type in 2011. It has been suggested that AOG activity is increasing outside of traditional AOG areas due to ongoing ANSF/IMF operations in combination with CIP deployments, but further analysis will be necessary if activity increases.

BAGHLAN


Baghlan recorded 19 security incidents this cycle prior to late reporting, a significant increase over the 13 from the PRP. Five were initiated by AOG, a number that does exclude IED discoveries.

Despite accounting for the same volume of incidents as the PRP (nine), Baghlani Jadid showed increased AOG activity, recording two separate IED discoveries, an AOG ambush of an ANP vehicle, an RPG attack against a mixed ANSF/IMF convoy, the seizure of a cache that included IEDs, and—most notably—two IED strikes against ANSF vehicles, one occurring on the Puli Khumri – Kunduz road (at 0600 hrs, outside of NGO travel times) and the other killing five ANP in Baghlan Old City. AOG activities have

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

remained largely consistent in the district, and it appears they will continue—including relatively robust IED emplacement—for the foreseeable future.

IEDs were also discovered in Puli Khumri, Andarab, and Dih Salah districts (one account each). No IED-related incidents had been recorded in Andarab or Dih Salah this year (although Andarab had witnessed a number of cache discoveries), further demonstrating a region-wide trend towards increased AOG activity outside of the usual strongholds. Andarab was also the site of a school related incident when a government school was attacked, the guards beaten, and some administrative offices set on fire. Although of



note, the act appears to be the result of a dispute between faculty and students in the school, and not politically motivated nor denoting any new trend.

Dushi recorded two incidents, neither along the Puli Khumri – Mazar road, and Burka one; a night raid resulting in one arrest. It has been suggested that Burka (a known AOG stronghold) may be the recipient of IMF/ANSF attention in the near future as they continue to launch “intel-driven” operations into AOG strongholds throughout the region.

KUNDUZ


IED activity remains prominent in Kunduz. The province recorded 18 security incidents this reporting period, with six in Kunduz and five in Chahar Dara, both traditionally insecure districts with strong AOG presence. While the overall total remains relatively low for Kunduz, 10 of the 18 were IED-related (six detonations and four discoveries), including all but one of those in Kunduz district (which accounted for three of the detonations, one of them ineffectively detonating on the Chahar Dara district governor, and one of them killing the provincial director of the EOD department), two in Chahar Dara (a discovery and a premature detonation), two in Archi (against ANP and ALP, but also causing the death of a child

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

and injuries to one civilian), and one in Khanabad (against an ANP foot patrol).

Of note, the province witnessed an equal 18 security incidents the PRP, with seven in Kunduz and a notable six in Imam Sahib. While late reporting makes it likely this cycle will surpass the last, it has already done so in IED-related activity, where the PRP witnessed only four IED detonations (Imam Sahib, Archi, and two in Kunduz) and no discoveries.

Overall, approximately half of the security incidents recorded in Kunduz district in 2012 have been IED related. While this cycle demonstrated mostly effective targeting of hard targets, the pro-



lific nature of the IED emplacement remains a significant hazard to NGOs moving and/or operating throughout the province.

Outside of IED-related activity, Khanabad saw ANP operations, and ALP were targeted in Chahar Dara and Aliabad. Finally, an IO staff member’s private vehicle was stolen from outside of an IO compound in the only non-IED-related incident in Kunduz City in what appears to be a simple case of common criminality.


SAMANGAN

The increase of IED-related insecurity denoted the most notable development in Samangan, with three IED-related incidents occurring, a significant level of activity for the usually quiet province—especially when coupled with the two from the PRP. In total, May witnessed two IED detonations and one IED discovery in Dara-I Sufi Payin, and two IED discoveries in Aybak. Despite few reports suggesting significant AOG activities/movements thus far in 2012, Samangan has quietly amassed 39 security incidents through the end of May, which represents more than a 50% increase over the previous year’s total (24) between January and May. Although much of the more recent security reporting relates to insecurity either

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

along the Dara-I Sufi Payin – Aybak road or elsewhere in Dara-I Sufi Payin (NGOs usually prefer to access Dara-I Sufi Payin via Sholgara and Kishindeh), the recent IED activity—especially a magnetic IED discovered in Aybak city on the 28th—remains noteworthy.

It has also been suggested that AOGs continue to move into and through the province from Baghlan, and are often being sighted more regularly in Dara-I Sufi Payin. While both IED detonations this month occurred against ANP vehicles, the increased activity remains noteworthy to NGOs working in or around Dara-I Sufi Payin. The IED detonation this cycle was



effective, occurring along the Aybak - Dara-I Sufi Payin road at 0700, and killing one ANP and injuring three others. The final IED-related incident was the removal of an IED from a side road between Aybak and Ruyi Du Ab at 0600 hours on the 22nd. It appears that what IEDs emplacement is occurring is happening—not surprisingly—on key access routes over night, further enforcing the suggestion that NGOs not move prior to 0830 hrs (after ANSF or IMF elements will have run road clearance operations). It remains to be seen whether this relative increase in activity will continue.


TAKHAR

Taloqan City remained the focal point of security reporting this cycle, although little of it demonstrating significant insecurity. The district has thus far accounted for over a third of all security incidents recorded in the province this year, and 12 of the 20 recorded this period. These included three accounts of school girls falling ill, and two large scale gatherings that included a memorial for General Dauod Dauod—who was killed on May 28th of 2011 in an IED strike in Taloqan—and the third National Front gathering in the North, led by General Dostum, on the 30th. Neither of these latter two resulted in manifested insecurity. Outside of these, the variety of incidents in Taloqan ran the spectrum, and ranged from an

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

IED removal (in Chakab area of PD#3), to the robbery of an IO member’s residence (done while the IO member was out, resulting in no violence), to ACG related road robberies along the Taloqan – Chal district road (1900 hrs, outside of NGO travel times).

The incidents that received the most attention were the cases of school girls falling ill at two different schools. Following the April 17th incident where over 150 girls fell ill due to bad water in Rustaq, two different schools in Taloqan saw similar incidents on three different dates (twice at one school). While many locals (and media outlets) were quick to blame AOGs, and suggest a developing trend of AOGs targeting girls’



education, thus far all the girls have recovered, and the lack of any evidence of an external/dedicated poisoning substance or mechanism leave it unclear what brought about the illness, with many suggesting that they were the result of agricultural based substances (such as insecticides) or other more natural explanations. While this remains a dynamic worth following, the IEA has publically stated a more lenient approach to girls’ education, and no group—AOG or otherwise—has threatened the school or taken credit for the poisoning.

WESTERN REGION


HERAT

Whereas AOG activity continued to intensify in the province, the overall volumes so far this year remain 20% below the AOG activity levels for the same period last year. AOG activity was particularly visible in the southern districts of Shindand, Adraskan and Farsi. As is frequently the case, IED emplacement remained robust, with 7 IED attempts this cycle of which 6 came to fruition. Although IED strikes in Obe (Serwan area) and Adraskan were focused on security forces, the prevailing use of victim-operated devices, coupled with attacks in populated areas, constitutes a threat for the local population. This was highlighted in Adraskan when one local was killed and another injured after their vehicle struck an IED. In Seyawshan area

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

of Guzara, when an IED detonated on an IMF vehicle in the vicinity of a primary school, wounding one IMF soldier and 3 school students on the 21st.

Along with IED emplacement, direct attacks remained popular and constituted 7 strikes this cycle. With the exception of an IMF convoy targeted along the Herat-Kandahar Highway, the close-range attacks were focused on ANF/ALP convoys and CPs which, in addition to Shindan and Adraskan, affected Karukh, Kushki Kunha, Kushk and Pashtun Zarghun. In Karukh, a large AOG attacked and overran an ANP CP located in Masjed Chubi area, Herat-Qala-i-Naw Road. Although noteworthy, the incident does not necessarily suggest



any significant shift to the existing security paradigm, as AOGs are known to operate on a sporadic basis along this stretch of the road. In the last two weeks, Herat city remained quiet with the majority of incidents authored by ANSF. Nevertheless, criminality continues to be of concern as the kidnap industry came to the fore in Guzara, Injil and Koshan this cycle. Although the majority of abduction cases reported across the province are financially motivated and rarely impact NGOs (with only one NGO incident recorded thus far this year), the issue represents a well-established threat in relation to the NGO operational environment in the province.

GHOR

Ghor witnessed a total of 17 security events, of which 9 were AOG/ACG authored. A renewal of activities has been reported from Pasaband and affected an NGO.


On the 18th, AOG attacked an ANP check post located in the DAC area with RPGs and SAF. During the attack, an RPG round impacted in the yard of an NGO compound, causing minor damages to the structure. Prior to this incident, the most recent AOG-initiated incidents in Pasaband occurred in early April. The mid to late April lull in AOG activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	1

coincided with the relocation of some Helmandi units to their home province for the poppy harvest. It appears likely that the current resumption is linked to their return.

Elsewhere, the opposition activity included an IED related death of a civilian in Kotale Kohkani area, while in Dawlat Yar, AOG targeted the DAC area with an ineffective rocket attack, marking the second IDF strike on the DAC this year.

Lastly, the reconciliation process in Ghor seems to have gained



further momentum with a significant number of armed elements joining the APRP in Chaghcharan, Charsada and Du Layna. Such mass reconciliation may indicate an onset of a new balance of power in the province such as the long debated establishment of local militia; nonetheless, the exact impact of these recent events on the security paradigm in the province remains to be seen.

BADGHIS


This period was notable for the low volume of security reporting including 15 security incidents, 10 initiated by AOG. The sum denotes approximately a 50% decrease when compared to the PRP, when 30 security incidents were recorded with 14 initiated by AOG. While this does not necessarily suggest the beginning of any trend, the drop remains significant as it translated into a stagnation of AOG activity volumes in May as compared to April, a situation which constitutes an outlier when compared to Herat, Farah but also Faryab in the north where the opposition activity intensified this month.

There are several reasons for this stagnation. Heavy storms resulting in serious flooding hampered movements and operations, while reports indicate that AOGs fo-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

cused on poppy cultivation and the levying of taxes on locals, a dynamic that often goes severely underreported. Lastly, anecdotal reports suggest that in some areas, such as Dare Boom of Qadis, community elders have been able to convince AOG not to target local defence initiatives and the security forces including the ALP with IMF leaving the area. The extent to which these local deals will be honoured remains questionable.

Where AOG activity occurred, it followed existing trends, including IED detonations followed by RPG/ SAF attacks. Ghormach district accumulated the highest level of AOG activity this period, while individual significant incidents included an IED detonation in Muqur district against the



Muqur chief of police vehicle (resulting in the death of one ANP and injuries to three others - including the CoP). Attacks against mid-level GOA leadership are always notable, but do not denote any shift in targeting tactics. In Qadis district, both security incidents this period consisted of attacks against entities associated with the GOA, including an RPG/SAF attack on an ALP post, and the shooting and killing of the son of a community elder accused of cooperating with GOA. As above, these are not surprising targets, as AOGs compete with ALP for land ownership and community influence, and use the targeting of influential community members to intimidate.

FARAH


Farah experienced another busy period with a total of 41 security events. Of those, the armed opposition authored 22 incidents.

AOG activity in Farah District gained in strength and seriousness as demonstrated with the complex attack in the provincial capital on the 17th when 4 AOG operatives wearing ANSF uniforms and equipped with RPGs and small arms attacked the Governor's compound. The assault was carried out through the secondary gate of the compound indicating a level of prior surveillance in order to identify the target vulnerability. The attack eventually ended with the death of all the attackers but also caused numerous casualties amongst security forces as well as civilians caught in the cross-fire.

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

In contrast to the frequent use of IEDs, complex attacks with suicide vectors have so far been rare in the capital and the current case marks the first such attack this year. Further incidents, such as the NDS seizure of a suicide vest in District 1, attest to the AOG attempts at developing their capacity for further high-profile attacks in the city in the short-term.

Outside Farah, AOG activity particularly affected the districts of Bakwa and Bala Buluk, which accounted for nearly a half of all incidents recorded this period. Whereas in Bakwa AOG continued their efforts on disrupting vehicular movement along the Herat – Kandahar Highway, with an IED strike against PSC guards



escorting an IMF-contracted logistical convoy, Shiwan of Bala Buluk experiences an overall intensification of conflict. A surge in AOG close-range attacks, including simultaneous assaults on several ANA check posts on the 18th, prompted the ANSF to conduct an operation the following day, which resulted in at least 10 militants killed and another 7 detained. This cycle strongly indicates that Shiwan will remain a conflict hotspot for the upcoming weeks.

EASTERN REGION

NANGARHAR

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	12
This Report Period	2


Nangarhar was home to 2 NGO incidents during the second half of May, both occurring on the same day and neither of which were related to the activities of the armed opposition. In the first, an IED detonated outside an international staff guesthouse in Jalalabad, Zone 3, with nightletters simultaneously dropped, as a result of a local issue that relates specifically to the NGO involved; as such, it does not represent a change in the wider position of NGOs in the city. In the second incident, a national staff member of a medical NGO was detained during an IMF operation in Sherzad that was searching for a specific AOG figure, in the latest in a series of such incidents in rural Nangarhar over the past year – manifestations of the misfortune that can befall NGO national staff with family or friends active in the armed opposition.

Furthermore, in a similar incident an IO national staff member was detained by the NDS and IMF in Akhundzada Saheb area of Behsud district, like neighbouring Khalis Family Colony an opposition hotspot on the outskirts of the provincial capital – the incident clearly demonstrating the difficulty of living in Khalis Family Colony without some form of contact with people active in the armed opposition, and as such security force scrutiny is a fact of life.

The city itself continued to be broadly calm, with just 2 IED detonations, both taking place in Zone 4. The first occurred in the Zara Tsaranwali area, next to the Eidgah Mosque and near to the home of the *mullah* that has been previously targeted on multiple occasions by IED attacks, for his perceived cooperation with the IMF (known as the ‘PRT Mullah’). The second was more serious, when a pre-planted IED detonated against the main ANP CP on the Torkham Highway just to the city-side of the ANA Brigade, killing 2 ANP policemen at it.

However, while such lower level AOG activity has remained mostly absent from the city, an ongoing threat of complex attack remains present. This was powerfully indicated during the past fortnight in an incident in Mohmand Dara, when a suicide vest exploded in a private vehicle as it was turning onto the main Torkham-Jalalabad Road in the direction of the provincial capital. While at the time of writing it remains unclear how many of the occupants, 2 of whom were killed and 4 of whom injured, were BBIED operatives, it is likely that the vehicle was carrying multiple AOG fighters destined to conduct a complex attack within the city.

Elsewhere, after a period of calm, insecurity in Bati Kot re-emerged with force, with 2 IEDs striking



IMF vehicles in Chardeh, one of which killed 1 IMF soldier and injured 4 others, while AOG fighters also attacked ANSF targets in the Shinwar Qala and Spin Khwar areas. Furthermore, AOG members also kidnapped a GOA official, who was fortunate to be released after the mediation of local elders. Interestingly, the only security force operations in Bati Kot were conducted by ANSF, which in total detained 11 suspected AOG members – and which also led to the seizure of large quantities of weapons from civilian homes, many of which have no armed opposition purpose and which were instead for self-defence (such as 100 year old British rifles).

In other significant incidents in the province, on the 30th the deputy governor of Deh Bala was killed in an IED strike just outside the DAC, which also killed his brother and the district’s finance director – an unusually violent incident for this generally peaceful district. In Sorkh Rod, a magnetic IED detonated against the vehicle of a local elder, killing him, in the Khairabad area, in what appears to have been a targeted killing. And in Lal Pur, an AOG attack on an ANBP CP in the Fatehmina area left 8 AOG fighters dead, with 3 others injured in the exchange of fire, summing to one of the least effective attacks Pakistani AOG cadres have conducted across the border in recent years.

KUNAR

Kunar was home to a single NGO incident during the period, which took place in the AOG-dominated Manogai district. As a medical team was returning from a monitoring visit to the district hospital, they were stopped on the main road by a group of opposition fighters, who asked that the men exit the vehicles (leaving the women to sit in the vehicles); they then asked the team leader, whose name they knew, to identify himself. Once he did, the armed men began questioning him as to his qualifications and reasons for being in the area, during which time calls began to be received by the armed men from members of the local community, who confirmed his identity and his legitimacy as a medical worker. The armed men then let him and the team go, apologising politely for holding them up.

Such incidents point to the importance of strong community relations in AOG-dominated areas, as well as preparing staff for how to deal with such questioning.

In the broader provincial conflict, trends continued within expected parameters, albeit with overall conflict levels continuing to increase as we approach the middle of summer. Some stand-out developments did occur, however, most notably a) the growing role being played by ALP cadres in the districts in which they are currently operational, as well as b) a significant increase in kinetic activity in Nari – a dynamic closely tied to developments in neighbouring Kamdesh. Finally, c) in Wata Pur, two notable Arab fighters were killed in a drone strike, as these highly AOG-dominated districts


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	1

west of Asadabad up to Nuristan’s Waygal begin to be the focus of a more targeted FATA-esque drone campaign.

Firstly, ALP forces played a central role in the conflict incidents reported from Narang, Sirkanay and Chawkay. The most noteworthy incident took the form of an ALP unit disrupting an AOG unit as the latter was hoisting a white IEA flag in the Koko area of Narang. Elsewhere, in Sirkanay’s Donia area, an IED detonated against an ALP CP, injuring one local policeman. A number of other, more standard, hit-and-run SAF attacks against ALP CPs also took place, the notable feature of these being that they outnumbered similar attacks against ANP and ANA. These ALP units continue to hold up relatively well, with low desertion rates (unlike some programmes in other provinces) thus far, further intensification of their position in the conflict, particularly in the context of further IMF drawdown, may change this.

In Nari, there was a noticeable uptick in AOG attacks on security force targets, particularly involving the ANA/IMF base in the DAC area. In two consecutive days of IDF attacks, 2 ANA soldiers were killed, while 3 IMF soldiers and at least 3 ANA soldiers, possibly a significant number more, injured. A further rocket attack took place a week later, but this one caused no injuries. In the Sawo area there were 2 separate attacks on ANP convoys, and subsequently IMF conducted an air strike in the area, killing 1 AOG fighter.

In Wata Pur, an IMF drone strike



towards the end of the fortnight led to the death of 2 Arab fighters, including 1 reported by IMF to have been a senior AQ commander who was the organisation’s Afghanistan deputy. This made two such drone strikes that successfully killed senior AOG commanders in the wider Pech valley area, after the strike in Waygal earlier in the period (see Nuristan). The incidents demonstrate the likely shape of a post-IMF ground force presence in Kunar and Nuristan, where their kinetic operations are likely to be ‘FATA-ised’, that is, to take the form of drone strikes on high-value targets – which, however, are a very blunt instrument, and likely to lead to negative changes in these areas in terms of social radicalism, humanitarian access and greater violence as AOG cadres seek to carve out locals they believe are informing on their locations to the IMF.

Finally, Marawara saw an unusual incident, where AOG fighters loyal to the district’s senior commander forcibly destroyed a small number of poppy fields. While much was made of it in the media, the amount of poppy destroyed was extremely small, in a mountainous area with a miniscule population and minute amounts of arable land. It was, in fact, highly likely to have been a public relations exercise by the AOG commander in question, who had shortly before been appointed the district shadow governor of Wata Pur. It is likely that he felt that, in the wake of his first formal political position for the opposition, and his first formal authority west of Asadabad into the strategically important Pech, it was an opportune time to indicate something positive about his philosophy of government, thus justifying his actions on the basis of religious principles in a highly religious province.

KHOST

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	0

After a particularly kinetic first half of May, Khost returned to a level of conflict incidents more in line with April, likely a function of the effort the armed opposition expended as part of demonstrating a start to ‘the summer fighting season’ that was announced at the beginning of the month. However, if overall conflict incidents dropped somewhat, there were a number of major conflict events which compensated.


Perhaps most serious of all, IMF air strikes in Musa Khel, which is effectively under the control of the armed opposition, led to the deaths of between 20 and 55 HQN fighters on the 27th, including significant numbers of Waziristanis. Exact numbers are not currently known at the time of writing, as few details have emerged, but even the highest estimate of the death total would be consistent with the scale of HQN strength in these districts away from the main Khost river plain.

In all, there were 13 major IMF operations during the period, but the others beyond the stand-out Musa Khel one were more consistent with the traditional form of such operations in Khost – that is, with AOG members arrested rather than killed. These dozen operations took place across the province without a specific focus, and saw a total of 30 suspected AOG members detained, including a number of HQN figures

defined by the IMF as ‘facilitators’. ANSF also conducted a small number of operations, two of which took place in Khost city, seizing explosive materials and arresting 2 suspects, while the other took place in Tani, again seizing explosive materials. There were also 14 separate cases of ANP defusing/control detonating IEDs, the majority in Khost but also in outlying districts, continuing their good work in this regard.

In terms of AOG activity, the most serious incident was a BBIED attack on an ANP CP in Tere Zayi, which killed 2 ANP, 1 ANBP and 9 civilians on top of the attacker, and injuring 6 others. The next most notable incident was a twin IED attack in Khost city; an initial detonation in the area of the city’s Women’s Park drew out the ANP, who then discovered and defused another RCIED. This seems clearly to have been a failed AOG attempt to target the first security force responders, very similar to a previous incident in the Education Department park during the previous period which injured a number of ANP.

Finally, there was an unusual occurrence of conflict activity in the normally peaceful Jaji Maydan, when AOG fighters attacked a school teacher’s house in Man Mela village, 3 of whom were subsequently killed when ANP responded to the situation. Beyond



these, a standard number of scattered IDF, SAF and IED attacks took place across the province, with none standing out as of major consequence.

In the remaining incident of some note, a second albeit less intense bout of mass sickness occurred at the Mando Zayi school that had seen the same during the previous period. While it had appeared that the causes of this sickness had been toxic paint, this second round complicated the issue somewhat. On the 20th, a further 50 students at Werza Middle School were taken to hospital suffering the same illness. When ANP responders arrived at the school, an IED that had been planted outside the school detonated against their vehicle. While the immediate suspicion would be that the armed opposition had been responsible after all, it is more likely that they exploited the ongoing situation to conduct this IED attack. However, mystery continues to shroud the case, as no definitive proof of toxic substances has been found from samples taken at the school, throwing up as specific interpretations as mass hysteria - that are likely wide of the mark.

Finally, in an incident that harks back to a simpler time, an old land conflict between the Nareeza tribe that live along the Tani border with North Waziristan, and the Waziri tribe of the Pakistani agency, erupted into an armed conflict during the period, fortunately leading to no casualties.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”


NURISTAN

Developments in Nuristan broadened from their recent concentration in Kamdesh to the wider province, with significant incidents also taking place in Waygal, Wama and Nurgaram. AOG-controlled Waygal saw the most consequential incident during the period, and the district's most significant development in a number of months. On May 23rd, an IMF drone strike targeted senior IEA leadership in the Amshoz village area of the district, killing Nuristan's deputy provincial shadow governor and another mid-level IEA commander. The deputy PSG, a local of Amshoz, had been instrumental in the repeated seizures of both Waygal and Bargi Matal districts in the past 3 years, and was likely a central local facilitator of the Arab AOG presence in the district, which along with

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Kunar's Manogai and Wata Pur districts have been the key areas of operation of these foreign AOG cadres. As discussed in the Kunar section, these drone strikes are likely to become more common in Nuristan, as the conventional IMF presence dwindles and is replaced by a form of kinetic intervention more akin to that of the FATA in the past 5 years.

Activity did however continue in Kamdesh, with two AOG assaults on ALP CPs in Adree on consecutive days. The first was the most severe, lasting for 7 hours and leading to the death of 1 ALP policeman and 6 AOG fighters, as well as the injury of a further policeman and 9 opposition fighters. The next day's skirmish was shorter, with no casualties, in what is likely to have been a



straightforward demonstration of ongoing capability by the armed opposition after the previous day's heavy fighting.

Wama and Nurgaram also saw fighting, but primarily in the form of IDF attacks. In Parun, 2 rockets were fired in the general direction of the city, injuring 5 ANA soldiers after landing in an ANA facility, while similarly in Nurgaram's Kala Gosh, 2 rockets were fired at the old PRT base, killing 2 ANA soldiers and injuring 4 more. Also in Nurgaram, AOG fighters attacked an ANA CP in Muqem Gala, killing an ANA officer and injuring 2 of his soldiers.


PAKTYA

While no NGO incidents were recorded during the period, Paktya saw a number of significant kinetic events, including a substantial increase in the rate and intensity of IMF operations against the province's AOG cadres. In Jaji, 3 separate operations by IMF led to a combined total of 30 AOG deaths, including 4 Arabs, in an operation in the DAC area. Furthermore, a total of 11 AOG members were killed in an air strike in Sayed Karam, which has recently seen a deterioration in its security in spite of close proximity to Gardez. In Zurmat, another air strike killed 4 AOG fighters in the Mamozai area, while more controversially, an air strike in Shwak struck what ap-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

pears to have been a civilian house, killing 7 children and 2 adult civilians, leaving another child badly injured.

Such a large uptick in both operational intensity and the number of fatalities from these operations is unusual in the province, and evidence of the IMF's concern at the rapid increase in AOG presence across Paktya now the extremely harsh winter has broadly disappeared. As with the highly lethal operation in neighbouring Khost's Musa Khel district (see Khost) during the period, these operations also point to the ongoing reality that the HQN remains powerful and deeply entrenched in these provinces, and far from



strategic defeat in spite of the weight of military operations the IMF can throw at them.

In terms of AOG activity during the period, it remained roughly in line with recorded levels over the past 6 weeks, although this time concentrated in just four districts, Shwak, Sayed Karam and Zurmat as well as the provincial capital. However, in all, AOG incidents in these districts managed to kill more of their own than security forces, in a number of premature IED detonations and unsuccessful ambushes.

SOUTHERN REGION

GHAZNI


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

Security incidents continue to plague Ghazni at an increasing rate; with a total of 78 AOG initiated attacks during this report period, it can be claimed that its status as key terrain for both AOG and IMF/ANSF is confirmed. The pace of work exhibited by AOG in the area is striking although the recorded volumes for this month still remain 34% below the volume of attacks enacted by the opposition in May last year. With the vast majority of AOG assaults this cycle being direct attacks, this tactical choice demonstrates both the strength in manpower and equipment, and the accompanying mobility of the opposition networks to strike out so broadly across the province. Indeed, this show of force is meant to be just that, as a large number of direct attacks consisted of a brief initial engagement followed by a rapid disengagement displays a reluctance to take casualties and a weak determination to inflict them. Yet another show of capability came on 30 May as AOG fired seven rockets towards Ghazni city. It is fortunate that only six civilians were wounded as a result of this barrage, however the attacks have served to unsettle an already unsettled community.

Adding to this is the continued intimidation of the community through the threats levied against the school system. After a broad shut-down following initial threats by AOG last month, approximately 15% of the schools in the

province remain closed. There have been no reports of attacks against the re-opened schools or their personnel, and it is thought that AOG leadership has reconsidered its approach in the face of defiance and anger from parents and communities. Certainly the trigger for the AOG threats – the government’s effective motorcycle registration program which was threatening to limit AOG use of its ‘workhorse’ vehicle – has not been rescinded, and this entire episode could represent a real climb-down for AOG leadership. In this light, the unusual rocket barrage fired at Ghazni City could be construed as a blunt message from AOG that they are still very capable of exerting their will on the community.

With respect to direct attacks, on 18 separate occasions AOG gunmen attacked the DACs of the province – virtually all of them, and in some cases, two or three times – with SAF, and retreated before proper IMF/ANSF reinforcements could arrive. Similarly, IMF/ANSF patrols were attacked in 15 individual incidents, with little or no effect on either side, primarily in the districts of Giro, Andar, Zana Khan and Ab Band. This report period also featured another clash between AOG associated with HiG and IEA, as a firefight, reportedly lasting several hours, resulted in the deaths of eight IEA and two HiG fighters, with another 12 IEA



fighters wounded and detained by HiG fighters. There has been much speculation regarding this unusual trend. Previous clashes were reportedly related to a fight over spoils (a tanker vehicle) however there has been no confirmation regarding this latest firefight.

IMF/ANSF operations were muted this report period, quite possibly due to a botched raid which took place in Qarabagh district (near the area known as Kobi), in which three civilians were mistaken for AOG and killed. Later that day, around 300 local residents staged a demonstration protesting the killing and demanding an end to such raids, however the gathering broke off peacefully as evening approached.

Lastly, in a sign of future intentions, there were two instances where potential suicide bombers were identified and detained before any operation could be mounted. In Ghazni district, near the village of Rawza Kotal, four individual suspected of being suicide bomber trainees were caught in a safe house, along with their explosive vests. Also in Ghazni district, near the area of Qala-e-Kolokhak, two other potential bombers were seized by NDS during a raid on a suspected AOG training camp. The use of suicide bombers has been, in relation to provinces such as Kandahar and Helmand, rare and certainly these detentions raise the possibility of an increase in BBIED attacks against high-value targets in and around Ghazni City over the summer period.

HELMAND

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0


Incident levels for Helmand province remained static for a third straight report period. Security incidents were mixed, with a decrease in AOG direct and indirect attacks, and a slight increase in the pace of IMF/ANSF operations, both in direct actions against AOG forces, and also in search and seizure operations.

As expected during this point in the drug production cycle, the past two weeks featured a continuation of some impressive seizures of opium and heroin, in addition to caches of weapons, ammunition and explosives. The largest of these occurred near Baghran district’s DAC where an IMF/ANA force engaged with AOG during a routine patrol. After a brief firefight, a search of the immediate area revealed a major drug processing facility and over 3000 kg of opium was seized, with the processing facility then destroyed. Other sizable seizures occurred in Nahri Sarraj, where NDS seized 180 kg and an assortment of weapons from a ruined building being used as a storage area, and in Naw Zad, where a huge cache consisting of 110 kg of opium, 20 kg of ammonium nitrate, 20 IEDs, one motorcycle and an assortment of weapons and ammunition were discovered during an operation near Sara Qala village. In other areas of the province five seizures were made totaling another 450 kg of opium. The discovery of both large amounts of opium /heroin and IEDs/ explosives speaks to the dependency of AOG fighters to the income derived from poppy cultivation and processing. There has been speculation that local

AOG units are much more independent in their actions than AOG in other areas, as a result of having a source of income apart from the funds raised by the leadership from foreign funders. Certainly one can say that AOG operations are somewhat less predictable than those witnessed in Kandahar, however the overall strategy appears to remain the same as elsewhere in the south.

IED strikes were another common source of security incidents this report period, occurring on a total of 12 occasions, with the most notable being a strike against an IMF vehicle near Nahri Sarraj’s DAC, which killed the two IMF soldiers inside and a strike against an ANP vehicle in Musa Qala’s Konjak area, which resulted in the deaths of one civilian and one ANP officer. In another serious incident, a roadside IED hit a local Mazda truck, killing two civilian passengers and severely wounding the driver. ANP officers responded to the scene and after a series of searches, arrested a foreign AOG fighter in a nearby house.

Helmand is currently in the midst of a ‘mini-surge’ of suicide attacks; since the start of the year, there have been a total of nine AOG suicide attacks, almost equalling the total for the entire year 2011 (10). In the first incident, an AOG fighter, fitted with a suicide vest, approached an ANP checkpoint at the entrance to the DAC of Nawa-i-Barakzayi district in Helmand. The ANP officers manning the checkpoint recognized the threat and shot the individual dead before he could deto-



nate his device. In the second BBIED incident, a suicide bomber riding on a motorcycle detonated his device while he was stopped near an ANP check post near Musa Qala’s DAC. This represents the third suicide attack in Musa Qala district since the start of April, highlighting the area as a priority for AOG efforts.

In another direct attack, gunmen riding on a motorcycle opened fire on school students near the town of Grishk, wounding two of them. The identity of the gunmen has not been confirmed, however most consider AOG implication unlikely – a deliberate effort to attack schools and other educational facilities would most likely be more pronounced and preceded with warnings and threats, something not present in this incident. Also of note is an attack by AOG on an ALP patrol in Musa Qala’s Miya Manda area, wherein an ALP patrol was ambushed and four ALP recruits were killed, and another three severely wounded before AOG fighters broke off the engagement.

Lastly, IMF/ANSF operations kept pace with previous report periods, with a total of 13 recorded operations. In the area of Dasht Regayi, in Lashkar Gah district, IMF soldiers arrested four individuals suspected of being trained as suicide bombers, along with some suicide vests and other explosives. Similarly, an operation in Trikh Zaaber village of Nawa-i-Barakzayi district netted five AOG fighters, and three RPGs after a short firefight. The most notable success however was the capture of a mid-level AOG commander in the Mukhtar Qala area of Lashkar Gah, along with 15 of his fighters and some communications equipment.

ZABUL


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Incident levels decreased slightly, following the significant burst of AOG activity reported during the previous report period although the current month still exhibits a considerable growth. This cycle nevertheless, AOG operations were for the most part muted with IED strikes making up the majority of incidents reported. IMF/ANSF operations were also down, although there were a handful of search and seizure operations conducted in the districts of Shinkay, Shahjoy and Qalat.

Civilians fared particularly poorly over the past two weeks. In the area of Hassan Karez, in Shahjoy district, two civilians were killed, and four others were wounded, when PSC armed guards opened fire on a civilian vehicle that was involved in an accident with the

PSC vehicle. No arrests have yet been made. An IMF logistical convoy also crashed with a civilian mini-bus in the area of Jaldak, in the district of Tarnak wa Jaldak. As a result, five civilian passengers were killed and five other civilians were wounded. Near the village of Roghani, in Naw Bahar district, a roadside IED hit a local motorcycle, killing one civilian and wounding two others.

There were 15 other IED-related incidents, including six discovery and disposal operations, and six involving fatalities and/or serious injuries. In the most significant, near the village of Shar-e-Safa in the district of Tarnak wa Jaldak, an RCIED hit a PSC vehicle which was escorting an IMF-contracted logistical convoy, kill-



ing five PSC guards, wounding another three, and destroying the vehicle.

Lastly, IMF/ANSF operations, although limited in number, resulted in some notable successes. Near the village of Jafar, in Shahjoy district, IMF soldiers arrested eight suspected AOG fighters after surrounding a house known to be an AOG safe house. In the same district, this time in the area known as Tazi, a joint IMF/ANP force detained five suspects after discovering 13 prepared IEDs and a sizable amount of ammonium nitrate in a local house.

URUZGAN

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0


IEDs dominated the incident profile of Uruzgan province during the report period, although direct attacks were also featured, as AOG maintained a steady rate of operations against a variety of targets. IMF/ANSF responded with a series of operations which resulted in several notable successes.

The most significant incident was the suicide attack near the DAC of Tirin Kot, the provincial capital. An AOG fighter fitted with a BBIED detonated his explosives while an IMF convoy was coming out from an ANP station. As a result, two IMF soldiers, two civilian children and the attacker were killed, and eight other IMF soldiers, two IMF interpreters and

seven civilians were wounded, one of the most impactful suicide attacks in recent months.

In the Kwanj area of Chora district, AOG attacked an ANP post with RPG and SAF and killed three ANP officers, before being driven off by a relieving force of IMF soldiers. Four wounded AOG fighters were detained by IMF units. Seven other AOG attacks were recorded, primarily against ANA/ANP posts, however there were no significant casualties reported.

As mentioned, IEDs remained the biggest threat through the province. On 12 separate occasions IED strikes resulted in either loss of life or injury, including an inci-



dent in Khas Uruzgan's bazaar area, wherein an RCIED struck an ANP vehicle, killing three ANP officers, including the ANP chief of the district. Other notable IED strikes occurred in the bazaar area of Dihrawud district as an RCIED wounded the former head of the Uruzgan provincial council when it hit his vehicle, and in the Toray area of Tirin Kot as another RCIED struck an ANP patrol, killing two officers and destroying their vehicle.


PAKTIKA

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0


The previous report period witnessed a significantly elevated level of AOG activity, culminating in three major operations, including a complex attack on the provincial capital. The unusual intensity of last period's AOG campaign can probably be explained by the desire of AOG leadership to emphasize the start of Operation al-Farooq, the AOG spring offensive, as well as create negative international media during the NATO/G8/G20 meetings concerning Afghanistan recently held in the United States which featured discussions between the US and Afghan presidents. In this light, it is therefore unsurprising that AOG activity this cycle was muted with IMF/ANSF clearly taking the initiative and conduct-

ing a large number of effective operations. IEDs were a threat as well, accounting for numerous casualties amongst ANSF.

The most significant incident was an IMF air strike in the area of Tawdobi in Sar Hawza District that killed 12 AOG fighters, and resulted in the seizure of substantial numbers of weapons and communication equipment. In the area of Ismail Baba of Waza Khwa district, ANBP engaged with an AOG force for almost an hour, resulting in the deaths of three AOG members and the detention of another five. Seven other IMF/ANSF operations resulted in the deaths of a total of 13 AOG and the arrest of 18 others.



Of most impact during the report period was the numerous IED strikes recorded. In the Jagan area of Sharan district a roadside IED hit a patrolling ANP vehicle, killing three ANP officers and destroying their vehicle. Near the village of Kotal, in Omna district, a roadside IED hit a patrolling ANA vehicle, killing four ANA soldiers and wounding two others. In a similar incident near the DAC of Barmal, an IED struck an ANA vehicle, killing all four soldiers inside.



KANDAHAR


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

Kandahar Province experienced an increase in incidents during the report period, with IED discovery and disposal operations and direct AOG attacks in the districts contributing to the increase. Direct attacks in the city remained low, and IMF/ANSF operations appeared to be somewhat subdued during the last two weeks.

In the first of two successful suicide attacks this period, a 12-year old AOG operative equipped with a BBIED detonated his device near to an ANBP vehicle in Spin Boldak, killing himself, and wounding two ANBP officers. In the second attack, a vehicle, a Toyota Surf fitted with explosives, was driven by an AOG fighter into the main entrance of the Arghistan district ANP HQ where it

detonated killing five ANP officers in addition to the driver, and wounding another six ANP officers.

Although the usual hit and run shootings have declined province-wide, there are indications that more deliberate attacks are now the preferred approach. In the districts one sees more prolonged attacks on ANSF posts, often using heavy weapons systems and RPG fire. There were 15 such attacks during the report period, focusing on Panjwayi and Zhari districts. The most impactful of these occurred in Shah Wali Kot, as a sizable AOG force attacked an ALP post with heavy weapons and SAF, resulting in three ALP officers killed.



In contrast, Kandahar City itself has seen less violence, although this is not to say that there were no targeted killings. In District 6, AOG fighters riding on a motorcycle shot and killed two civilians in a shop; one of the victims was the brother of a local ANP commander. Similarly, in District 2 two AOG members shot and killed an off-duty ANP officer while he was on way home. A third targeted killing occurred in District 6, as an AOG gunman shot and killed a local mullah over the accusation that he was working for the GoA.

ANSO STAFF AND VACANCY ANNOUNCEMENT:

We are pleased to announce that our colleague **Mr. Rory Brown** has taken over his new role as **ANSO RSA Central**, based in Kabul, as of the 1st of June 2012.

Until the arrival of the new ANSO RSA East in July, Rory Brown will also cover the Eastern Region. His contact details are included on the last page of this report.

*

We are presently recruiting for ANSO RSA South position based in Kandahar. If you have a solid working experience from a similar environment, an NGO mindset combined to an analytical background, and a desire to be challenged, all the while being a member of a close knit team, you are encouraged to forward a cover letter, CV, and 2 substantive writing samples to jobs@ngosafety.org.

Please refer to ANSO RSA South Vacancy in the subject line of your email.

This report will be archived at the above address approximately 60 days after production. Citation of the report for non-commercial purposes is permissible only with prior permission. Please contact director@ngosafety.org.

Contact List

NORTH REGION OFFICE (MAZAR)

Brian Laguardia - north.afg@ngosafety.org - 0799 404 617

Firoz - north2.afg@ngosafety.org - 0799 408 252

EAST REGION OFFICE (JALALABAD)

Vacant - east.afg@ngosafety.org - 0799 248 362

Naseer - east2.afg@ngosafety.org - 077 2546 242

SOUTH REGION OFFICE (KANDAHAR)

Peter Dimitroff - south.afg@ngosafety.org - 0796 688 416

Dr. Mohibullah- south2.afg@ngosafety.org - 0700 492 550

WEST REGION OFFICE (HERAT)

Taro Yamagata - west.afg@ngosafety.org - 0799 322 192

Sayed Karim- west2.afg@ngosafety.org - 0707 474 135

CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (KABUL)

Rory Brown - central.afg@ngosafety.org - 0799 323 792

Mukhtar - central2.afg@ngosafety.org - 0799 322 116

COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL)

Nathan Ronaldson-director.afg@ngosafety.org-0799 325 349

Tomas Muzik - ops.afg@ngosafety.org - 0797 165 017

Camille Tanchoux - admin.afg@ngosafety.org - 0797 093 073

Patrick Malach - mobile.afg@ngosafety.org - 0793 230 118

MISSING THIS PERIOD:

ANSO did not provide analysis for the following areas:

☞ Daykundi, Laghman, Nimroz

These areas will be included in subsequent reports. If you have any information that would help us better understand the dynamics, please contact your local ANSO office.

ANSO is overseen by an NGO Advisory Board. If you have any questions or feedback, good or bad, let them know on:

Advisoryboard.afg@ngosafety.org

NGO can register up to five persons to each of ANSO mailing lists. For a registration form please contact:

Registration.afg@ngosafety.org



ANSO REGIONAL DIVISIONS

COMMON ACRONYMS

ACG-Armed Criminal Group / **AEF**-Afghan Eradication Forces / **ANA**-Afghan National Army / **ANBP**-Afghan National Border Police / **ANP**-Afghan National Police / **AOG**-Armed Opposition Group / **APPF**-Afghan Public Protection Forces (local deputised militias) / **DC**-District Centre / **GOA**-Government of Afghanistan / **IDF**-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / **IED**-Improvised Explosive Device / **IMF**-International Military Forces / **NDS**-National Directorate of Security (Intelligence) / **PRP**-Previous Reporting Period / **PSC**-Private Security Company / **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Grenade / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire / **VBIED**-Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device / **PDO**-Private Development Organisation / **ALP**-Afghan Local Police / **LDI**-Local Defence Initiative / **IEA**-Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban) / **PSG**-Provincial Shadow Governor (IEA) / **DSG**-District Shadow Governor (IEA) / **PGM** - Pro-Government Militia / **APRP** - Afghan Peace and Reconciliation Program