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HIGHLIGHTS

- Decreasing AOG attack rates
- Deadly SVBIED attack against IMF in Kabul
- Multiple complex attacks within Kandahar City
- Continued IMF searches of NGO health facilities

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COUNTRY SUMMARY

The conclusion of October clearly indicates that the conflict is now entering into its winter drawdown phase (see graph p. 12). This is a well established dynamic that marks steadily decreasing AOG attack rates during the concluding months of a year, typically following the conflict peaks which occur during mid-year, generally between June-September. It is worth noting that this period is trending nearly 30% below those figures recorded last year marking a welcome respite, though this follows the most active and kinetic summer on record. Beyond the seasonal factors, the present drawdown can be attributed to 2 primary factors; the obvious need for an operational pause on the part of opposition elements, as well as the continued pressure being applied against the same by security forces.

This sustained operational tempo, driven primarily by the IMF and particularly concentrated on parts of East and Central, should be viewed as the application of a broader agenda related to the imminent implementation of the 2nd tranche of the transition process. These endeavours appear to have two primary, and associated, goals at present; disruption of the Haqqani Network along with 'sealing' cross-border infiltration routes (as seen recently in Khost). Beyond the obvious regional strategic implications (and possible 2nd tier effects of encouraging negotiations), this appears primarily designed to limit obstructions to ANSF handover and allow them to efficiently take over their areas of responsibility. Overall, IMF efforts can best be described by the Clauswitzian term 'Economy of Force', though this term has

long been used to describe the international military effort in Afghanistan. Understanding this dynamic will become increasingly important as ISAF forces concurrently draw down force levels as transition progresses, a process that will likely be kept deliberately obscured.

In many ways this term can also be used as the prism with which to view AOG activities. This is particularly true for attacks within Kabul City, where the opposition conducts a sufficient number of high-profile/significant attacks (as seen this period) to ensure the impression of insecurity without having to mount full scale operations to enact it actually. The same can be said for Kandahar City, though this occurs at a much higher frequency - as attested by the 2 complex attacks reported this period, one against the PRT and one particularly vigorous attack which directly impacted an NGO facility.

While the armed opposition sector remains responsible for the majority of NGO incidents this year (see graph p. 15 for AOG/criminal stats only), the past few months have clearly established the trend regarding IMF transgressions at NGO run health facilities. The 3 reported this period, all in East and Central (with the exception of Kabul, an area that is encompassed by the ISAF Eastern Region) brings the total of such incidents to nearly 15. While there are usually available channels for dialogue with local conventional forces (i.e. PRT, ANSF), in many cases it is special operations elements responsible, highlighting one of the key challenges surrounding this issue for the affected organisations.

CENTRAL REGION


KABUL

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	0

Opposition activity within the capital can best be described by the term ‘economy of force’. They conduct enough attacks to leave the impression of insecurity, without having to mount full scale efforts in order to actually enact it, a strategy embodied in the defining moment of this cycle: a devastating SVBIED strike against IMF on the Darulaman Road, which reversed the balance of an otherwise meagre 2 AOG operations in the province vs. the over 20 operations undertaken by IMF and ANSF in the city and surrounding rural districts.

Around mid-day on the 29th, an SVBIED vehicle targeted an IMF convoy transporting NTM-A mentors from Camp Eggers to Camp Julien in Darulaman. The attacker unmistakably opted for the second vehicle in the convoy, an armored bus (‘Rhino’), hitting the target from the rear. The detonation which followed propelled the IMF bus several dozens of meters from the point of contact and resulted in catastrophic damage to the vehicle. As of the time of writing, there was no conclusive evidence as to what type of vehicle was used for the attack with the options being either a Toyota Corolla or a Toyota Town Ace mini-van. The blast killed 13 IMF personnel, 1 ANP and 4 civilians. 4 civilians and 3 ANP

sustained injuries in addition to the IMF driver of the targeted bus who was the only occupant to survive the attack. The location, a large, straight stretch of the southern-most section of the Darulaman Road, and the timing, 1130 hrs, appear to have been well chosen both to facilitate the attack in terms of enabling the pre-deployment of the SVBIED on the Darulaman Road and the surveillance of the target, as well as to reduce civilian casualties. The IED is estimated to have consisted of over 200 kg of high-velocity explosives which makes it one of the most potent devices to have ever been used in an AOG attack in Kabul. A similar charge in a residential area would have necessarily resulted in an exponentially higher number of civilian casualties. Of note, this locality had already witnessed two SVBIED strikes on IMF convoys on the 18th of May 2010 and again on the 12th of November 2010. The former resulted in a high number of casualties on the IMF side (7 killed and 7 wounded) and among civilians (12 killed and 47 wounded). The latter basically failed as the SVBIED charge detonated before the driver was able to make the contact with the targeted IMF-ANA convoy. Yet, 2 IMF and 1 ANA casualties still resulted



from the attack. Following the Darulaman Road northwards, another suicide motorcycle-borne IED charge targeted an NDS commuter bus in Saraye Alauddin on the 12th of January this year, while the coordinated attacks on the 13th of September also included a lone BBIED exploding at an ANP station off the Darulaman Road and another in Deh Mazang.

The upcoming traditional Jirga (with the main event preliminarily scheduled from the 16th to the 20th of November and the auxiliary functions ongoing as of the 12th) will mark yet another period inviting AOG ‘statement’ attacks. These can take form of spectacular/suicide attacks or more economical IDF strikes. Both methods had been used to discredit similar events hosted by GOA in the past. Moreover, the political event has been widely associated with the future of IMF installations in the country. This will likely provide ground for political rallies. Though still a minor dynamic, student networks at the Kabul University and the Polytechnic Institute have been particularly vocal on the issue. In counter-point, to the extent that NGO stay away from security targets, including the Jirga delegates and the public rallies, the event will emphasize the current NGO security paradigm rather than bring important changes to it.

NOTICE: The graphs provided in the report are accurate as of the **26th of October 2011.**

PARWAN

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	1


Parwan experienced an unusually kinetic cycle with 12 out of 15 recorded incidents triggered by AOG. The NGO community notated a spate of AOG escalations in the Ghorband Valley, including a concerted effort to oust an INGO from Shekh Ali, a district which has not seen much significant violence until then.

During the night of the 16th, two mortars impacted in the vicinity of an INGO office in the district center, with one of them hitting the boundary wall of the compound but failing to detonate. The indirect fire was followed by protracted SAF, this time aimed at the INGO guest-house facility located within a distance from the office compound. Neither of the two incidents resulted in casualties. During two days which followed, the district representative of the INGO received threatening phone calls from a presumed AOG spokesperson who voiced a clear demand for the INGO to vacate the premises and leave the district. The agency put its activities on hold and engaged the local community. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the attack was authored by an exogenous IEA group which operates in Sare Mazana in the neighbouring Ghorband wa Siyagerd district. Prior to the incident, only five AOG-related escalations had been recorded in Shekh Ali since 2006, though a similar IDF attack was recorded a month ago targeting the DAC of Surkhi Parsa, another usually quiet district. Whereas the local population in both districts remains largely estranged from

armed opposition, an access route in the area links the Ghorband Valley with Wardak. This makes the locality of strategic interest to IEA units in Siyagerd. Despite the fact that the INGO package of services includes the National Solidarity Program, which at times may be negatively associated with GOA by AOG, it appears plausible that the AOG primarily targeted the INGO as a proxy towards the community in order to exert a degree of influence, and more pragmatically, to secure their escape avenues towards Wardak.

Indeed, the pragmatic consideration of such AOG approaches came to the fore with a substantial ANSF-IMF clearing operation involving over 400 security personnel deployed in Puli Rangab, Qemchak, Saydan, Joy Dokhtar, Qaltak and Wazghar. The move interrupted the series of six AOG direct attacks on IMF-ANSF associated targets in Puli Rangab and the surrounding areas. Reminiscent of the September offensive in Shinwari, the operation was still on-going as of the time of writing. Parwan province will make a part of the second tranche of transition and the current IMF-ANSF efforts, including the expansion of ALP and the introduction of ANA into the area, are to be seen as a part of the process. While the robust moves undeniably impact AOG capabilities in the short term, the durability of the security gains will only be tested with the beginning of the fighting season next year.

A trio of significant events was



also recorded in the eastern districts of Sayyed Khel, Bagram and Kohi Safi. On the 23rd in Sayyed Khel, a suicide operative equipped with a BBIED attempted to approach the convoy of the Minister of Interior. The vehicles were stopped on the side of the road in Dolana when the attacker left his cover under a nearby bridge and walked towards the convoy. The security detail eliminated the AOG operative with accurate SAF which prevented the detonation of the IED charge. Yet, the incident revived the discussion on GOA-ANSF capabilities to prevent the leakage of tactically relevant information such as details on VIP movements.

On the 25th, a light magnetic IED detonated on a fuel tanker bound for the Bagram IMF base in Dosaraka. When a crowd of local residents gathered on the site to collect the fuel pouring out from the tanker, the truck burst into flames with the accompanying explosion killing 10 and injuring nearly 40 civilians. Despite its unforeseen consequences, the incident confirms magnetic IED deployment as an established pattern on the road network in Bagram.

On the 26th in Angur Bagh, Kohi Safi, a road-side mechanical IED detonated against an IMF vehicle injuring two servicemen. Whereas Kohi Safi is not an important staging area, it is in AOG interest to keep the area open for the purposes of operational depth in relation to their primary areas of interest such as Bagram, Tagab and Kabul. Road-side IED activity meant to interdict IMF-ANSF patrolling efforts is an established, though infrequent, activity.

LOGAR


Out of 26 documented incidents this cycle, 22 were initiated by IMF-ANSF. While the majority pertained to targeted capture/kill operations, IMF special operations forces were also responsible for 2 breaches into INGO-operated health facilities. Meanwhile, recorded AOG activity dropped from an already low amount of 10 incidents during the previous cycle to a meagre 2 cases during the second half of October.

In the night of the 27th, a joint IMF/ANA special operations force entered a comprehensive health center (CHC) in Porak (Puli Alam District), searched the facility and arrested one guard, one male nurse, and a person accompanying a patient. The two INGO members were released three days later. On the 29th, IMF SOF searched the Garmaba CHC (Charkh District) for a wounded AOG member during another night-time raid. The incident did not result in any arrest, though the IMF reportedly intimidated the NGO personnel against providing medical treatment to suspected AOG members. In accordance with humanitarian principles (and in the spirit of the Geneva Conventions), mandated health facilities must provide treatment to any patient in need disregarding of his/her political affiliation or status. Besides dealing with the negative repercussion of such incidents towards project staff and beneficiaries, engaging the IMF in a constructive dialogue to prevent similar transgressions in the future remains another issue regularly

	NGO Incidents
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debated among NGOs. While the conventional forces usually have communication channels and complaint mechanisms in place, the special operation forces (SOF), which operate independently from the regional commands and the PRTs, are an elusive target when it comes to NGOs engagement.

A look at the 2011 statistics reveals that the health sector has so far absorbed 70% of all NGO-related incidents recorded in Logar since January. NGO clinics faced direct exposure to AOG-triggered combat operations on 3 different occasions, including the direct SVBIED attack in Azra, while another 6 cases pertained to IMF/ANSF intrusions into NGO-run health facilities. This includes a case of an ANA-IMF company setting up a temporary base in a clinic in Kharwar and a physical attack by an ANP officer on a medical doctor in the district hospital in Puli Alam. The remaining NGO cases pertained mainly to AOG scrutiny of demining NGOs, incl. temporary detentions of staff, and the appropriation of equipment from the project sites. A case of an AOG executing an off-duty NGO deminer during his leave back home in Baraki Barak remains a tragic outlier as the rest of the incidents did not result in open violence against NGO staff. While the AOG-driven escalations have already entered a clear downwards trend with the approaching winter, IMF-ANSF seem eager on seizing the momentum for further



capture/kill operations. As such, the scrutiny of NGO project sites, post-incident searches for wounded combatants in particular, will likely prolong into the early winter months.

Besides interdicting two IED attempts on the road networks in Baraki Barak and Puli Alam, the security forces carried out significant operations in all districts of Logar which resulted in the arrest of over 40 AOG members. In Khushi, IMF-ANA captured two IEA commanders including a mullah from Chaki Wardak reputed for his campaigning efforts in the community. Following an AOG execution of an ANA officer at a day-time illegal checkpoint in Porak on the 14th, IMF-ANSF carried out clearing operations in the corridor stretching along the highway up to the Zarghun Shahr cluster in Muhammad Agha. There, the operation resulted in the arrest of another AOG commander. Estranged from the local community due to forced recruitments, the commander was captured by IMF-ANA based on local tips. Criminal activity by ACG and rogue AOG elements constitutes another distinctive feature of the security landscape in Logar. This cycle, the Puli Alam – Khushi Road witnessed a day-time abduction of an employee of a private company involved in a road construction project. The staff member was on his way from Kabul when he was snatched by a group of gunmen from the Qalai Wazir section of the road. Current information suggests the implication of a local AOG and financial demands for ransom made towards the company.

WARDAK

Squeezed between a rock and a hard place, NGOs in Wardak have to navigate among frequent IMF-ANSF operations and AOG ambitions to govern local communities. During this cycle, both strands of the conflict took their toll on NGO programming.


On the 17th, IMF and ANA carried out a night raid on a residential compound in Gardane Masjid, Chaki Wardak. During the strike, the owner of the house, employed as a teacher by an INGO, and his two daughters were killed. While his son and his cousin were taken into IMF custody, it appeared that the strike was in fact targeting two other relatives of the victim who are alleged to have AOG affiliations. The case received high visibility as one of the detainees is also a former member of the Upper Chamber of the Parliament (Meshrano Jirga). According to the INGO account, the detainees were released with compensation provided by IMF to the relatives of the victims. Of note, the Gardane Masjid cluster witnessed another INGO fatality in similar circumstances in Bianan in October 2010. A local INGO nurse was killed when SOF traced two district level IEA commanders to a neighboring compound where the combatants offered armed resistance which extended into the adjacent buildings. The area, as is most of Chaki Wardak, is under the firm control of the IEA. In localities where AOG exert effective territorial control or maintain a more durable presence, the probability of targeted IMF/ANSF operations increases with the strategic importance of

	NGO Incidents
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the location, the relevance of the targets (such as the presence of high-rank AOG commanders or high concentrations of fighters and assets) and ultimately with the activity levels of the AOG in question.

On the 21st, a local staff member of an INGO and his driver were detained by an IEA unit while touring local communities selected for the NSP. The community intervened on behalf of the victims in both Day Mirdad and Chaki Wardak Districts as it became apparent that the orders to detain the NGO party came directly from IEA provincial command in Chaki Wardak. The driver and his car were released from detention in the morning of the 24th. Meanwhile a shura, including the father of the victim, the community and IEA representatives, led to the safe release of the INGO staff member in the afternoon of the same day. The incident appears part of an initiative by local IEA structures to enforce a ban on all GOA-related programming, though the exact definition of how IEA commanders interpret this association remains unclear. So far, there is not enough evidence to determine whether the case was an individual outlier or whether it reflects a systemic AOG scrutiny of NGO activities in this part of Wardak.

Of note, Day Mirdad District was rather quiet over the summer though a spike in conflict-related escalations has been recorded this cycle. The recent track record includes a pressure-plate IED strike which injured 5 IMF sol-



diers on the access road to the district from Chak as well as a case of an indirect fire towards the DAC in Day Mirdad, which caused 12 civilian casualties sparking a strong reaction from the community towards the AOG. It has been put forward that the AOG activity is linked to an exogenous IEA commander who by the virtue of his own identity presents less regard towards the community.

To conclude the record of NGO incidents, a brief remark on the INGO-related robbery reported from the Behsud-Panjab road in Dahane Rishka, Markazi Behsud in the previous cycle: on the 29th, ANP apprehended a group of four gunmen, originally from Panjab and Shibar, while they were in process of robbing the passengers of a vehicle in Kotale Mullah Yakub. The ANP linked the robbers to another three criminal escalations in the area including the NGO incident. Nevertheless, this claim is yet to be corroborated.

For the overall trends this cycle, AOG activity levels continued to follow the seasonal downturn with 14 authored escalations. 7 direct attacks outnumbered stand-off initiatives including 2 cases of IDF and 4 IED strikes. Another 5 incidents were authored by ANSF-IMF and included the discovery of IEDs on 3 different occasions and the recovery of 2 dead bodies of ANSF members presumed to have been murdered by AOG in Zeywalat (Jalrez/Maydan Shahr) and along the highway in Saydabad. IMF-ANSF continued to pressurize AOG along the main access roads with at least 7 capture/kill and larger sweep operations reported from Saydabad, Chaki Wardak, Nirkh, Jalrez and Maydan Shahr.

DAYKUNDI

The NGO security landscape in Daykundi remains stable with the central and northern parts facing access issues, natural hazards and sporadic criminality (sometimes ascribed to the activities of numerous local warlords) while conflict-related developments remain confined to the southern districts of Kajran and Gizab (officially a part of Uruzgan). This cycle, the Monara area in Kajran witnessed an AOG attack on ALP while an additional 2 crime-related escalations were recorded from Nili and Kitti.


In Kajran, the conflict dynamics are mainly linked to the infiltration of Baghran and Char Chino AOG from the South as the local communities are rather adverse to the ideological AOG players. In counterpoint, the production and trade of opium is rife in the area. The business brings the criminal syndicates and AOG to share financial interests with the communities across different political and tribal affiliations as it also nurtures the dependency of the farmers on their business contacts. Put together, the conflict in Kajran converges on the road network and is played out by AOG/ACG enforcing their passage against IMF-ANSF patrolling efforts. For example, on the evening of the 22nd, an ALP checkpoint, established on the main road in Monara, came under accurate SAF. 1 ALP was killed and an additional 5 servicemen received injuries. The attack was reminiscent of another AOG strike in August which created a

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
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number of casualties among ANP personnel. Since January 2011, the district recorded 23 violent escalations, including 13 AOG strikes and 8 IMF-ANSF incidents of which 5 were discoveries of IED emplaced on the roads. For the AOG strikes, 4 were stand-off IED attacks on security convoys, while 7 pertained to close-range SAF attacks on ANSF checkpoints on the main roads with the security infrastructure also attracting a case of a rocket fire. On one occasion, an AOG stopped two private trucks on the main road and levelled ‘passage fees’ from the drivers.

The ALP is proving to be an important IMF tool regarding control of the roads, though the initiative is still rather new and the opinions differ as to its impact. For the IMF, ALP ensure outreach to the communities and ease the control of the road network where the conflict interests converge. It also circumvents the power of local warlords as both the communities and the IMF reiterate that the ALP are formed from local communities. Meanwhile, ANSF and the provincial authorities seem rather alienated from the program as the initiative remains IMF-driven. Concerns over the creation of a parallel structure, instead of building up a regular police force, and a lack of supervision from the provincial center have been voiced.

In Nili, the NGOs serviced a minor IDP influx to local host com-



munities. The IDP migrated from the Tamazan valley following the September clashes between Uruzgan ANP/ALP force and a local semi-formal defense initiative backed by Daykundi ANP. The history of the conflict dates back to 2008 when a Tamazan-based Nikozai commander formed a militia and pushed an Achekzai AOG element out from the valley. The Tamazan commander then formalized his force as a local security detail hired by USAID contractors to protect a road construction project in the central valley. This September, the Uruzgan forces pushed back with the formal ANP and ALP forces under the command of Ghizab COP forcibly taking over the checkpoints from ANP Daykundi and ousting the Nikozai commander in what the local sources have put forward as a revenge for the 2008 offensive. During the clashes, a brother of the commander was killed while the USAID contractor that was caught in the middle of the fighting abandoned the construction project, taking the Nikozai militia out of the job. Given these circumstances and the support which the Tamazan commander allegedly received from Daykundi power-brokers, the communities expect the conflict to re-escalate. The issue seems to have a wider regional repercussion as the conflict makes it problematic for Daykundi communities to travel via Gizab towards Tirin Kot and Kandahar. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the passengers from Central Highlands are subdued to overly zealous scrutiny by Uruzgan ANP manning the checkpoints in Tamazan.


KAPISA

While the communities in Tagab sensed yet another period of exposure to military operations and IED traps on the roads, the overall conflict levels continued to decline and did not deviate from the established trends. Similarly to the previous cycle, AOG ensured 50% of the incidents, though the volume dropped from 14 to 10 incidents. The stand-off attacks, 3 IED strikes (including a case of attempted defusal by ALP) as well as a single case of indirect fire, brought a proportionately greater risk for the community than the two documented direct attacks triggered by AOG. In Kora, along the main north-south artery in Tagab, a pressure plate device killed 3 and injured 1 occupant of a civilian vehicle (with the community suggesting that the intended target was an IMF convoy which drove through the location some 30 minutes after the blast).

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

AOG direct attacks on ANSF-IMF were not effective. A brief SAF targeting an ANP convoy in Sharo Khel of Alasay was easily repelled whereas a better planned ambush on an IMF convoy in Joybar of Tagab turned the attackers into prey and led to one AOG fatality and two attackers captured without casualties recorded on the IMF side.

Throughout three operations in Shukhi (Mahmudi Raqi), Gadakhel (Tagab) and Pachkham (Alasay), ANP displayed rather an usual level of activity collecting one weapons' cache and arresting two suspected AOG members. The IMF-ANA teams marked their presence in Alasay with a search operation in Koratak which led to the arrest of 3 AOG and the discovery of an assortment of weaponry and ammunition. The community continued to acknowledge that the district



remains the main concentration and entry point for AOG intrusions into Tagab and the Afghaniya Valley of Nijrab. The current low-level of AOG activity should not be interpreted as a lack of capability or presence in the areas. Anecdotal evidence from the Afghaniya Valley in Nijrab suggests that AOG remain proactive in rallying support and scrutinizing communities for eventual supporters of GOA/IMF. Particularly for Alasay, given the scarcity of access routes, NGOs should keep an eye on the current IMF-ANSF efforts at policing the district and the main access road from Tagab as such initiatives by the military would typically motivate AOG to scale-up road-side IED activity.


BAMYAN

Whereas a single incident recorded this cycle pertained to ANP collecting a weapon cache in Kahmard, it is rather overland access to the province which is of concern to NGOs. Late reporting from Kotale Kirman (Panjab-Lal road) provided hints to criminal activity along this artery during the previous cycle, though the criminal intrusions are locally associated with small organized groups from northern Daykundi. From the Bamyan side, a mixed group with roots in Shibar and Panjab 'worked' the Behsud-Panjab road in the similar manner (detailed in the Wardak section). Road-side criminality obviously rarely pertains to the communities in the locations of the incidents,

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
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as the locals are the first ones to come under ANP scrutiny. Remarkably, the rates of documented criminal activity on the road network in Central Highlands have dropped this year by 50% compared to 2010 although road security measures are still relatively light in regards to the existing police infrastructure and patrols.

The access to Kabul through conflict-dominated areas in Ghorband (Parwan) and Jalrez (Wardak) remained risky on both sides, though the series of 6 AOG escalations along the main road in Siyagerd and the consequent IMF-ANSF operations made the Ghorband Road more exposed than the access via Jalrez where just 2



events impacted the main road, a case of a road-side IED collected by ANP in Mullah Khel and an accurate SAF attack on an ANP checkpoint in the neighboring Ismail Khel, both taking place between 0800 and 0900 hrs. The current developments in Ghorband encompass an expected opening of an ANA base in Puli Rangab in November. This will likely stem the October spike of AOG-driven escalations along the Ghorband road.

NORTHERN REGION

BALKH


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	10
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A land dispute that occurred in Mazar-e Sharif on the 21st was the most publicized incident in Balkh Province, but more relevant developments included the continuing lull of AOG activity in the area west of Mazar-e Sharif (MeS) following the September establishment of Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) forces, the (likely correlated) surrender of over 60 “combatants” to the APRP program (also from west of MeS, in Chahar Bolak District), and a minor spike of activity in the southern districts (Kishinde, Sholgara, and Zari).

Grabbing a fair amount of headlines, a demonstration turned violent when a group protested the decision of a new land owner to increase rents on their long standing community. The group of 100-200 gathered and subsequently protested to the Deputy Governor of the Province in Kart-e Sajadia, whom they claimed failed to address their concerns. What happened next remains unclear. Most reports suggest that the bodyguards of the Deputy Governor shot into the crowd, and that these were followed by shots from ANP, who were in the process of arriving to take control of the situation. However, other sources have claimed that it was the ANP that shot first, while still others suggest that crowd members had weapons. Although it is unclear who fired first, the situation escalated, resulting in the deaths of 2 civilians and injuries to an additional 7 (including 2 ANP police-

men). Land disputes—even those that end in violence—are not uncommon throughout the region, but it is rare to see violence on this scale in Mazar. That being said, there does not appear to be any lasting impact on the security situation.

Chahar Bolak and Chintal—historically the 2 most insecure districts in the province—remained relatively quiet following the influx of new operations in the areas. As noted in previous reports, there are now 300 CIPs in the 2 districts (200 in Chahar Bolak and 100 in Chintal), and Operation Ebtekar 3 has conducted missions into both, with the result being a notable lull in AOG initiated activity. Further to this, with each CIP member getting paid 150 USD a month, larger groups of combatants (and note here that anecdotal sources suggest that these are actual combatants, rather than children or hungry farmers) have been attracted to the APRP, as noted in the October 18th surrender of 67 combatants to the program. While this has created a significant short term shift in the current security paradigm in both districts, it is important to consider the timing and sustainability of this change. The lull comes at the end of the fighting season and AOG operations typically slow down over the winter period, as high level commanders move to Pakistan. While there seems little doubt that the CIP program, combined with new IMF, ANSF, and



ALP operations throughout the North, have created a distinguishable lull in certain areas, it is questionable whether these suggest sustained change, or just represent early movements into the “winter lull”, presumably until AOGs re-group for a new series of operations in the Spring (as rarely have AOGs easily given up ground where they have strong infrastructure and support, such as they have in southern Chahar Bolak and most of Chintal).

While Chintal and Chahar Bolak showed little activity, a low level spike in insecurity took place in the southern districts of the province. A robbery of public transport vehicles was thwarted in Baluch Payin Village in Zari when the occupants were able to fight the would-be thieves off until the ANP arrived, and a national who was working as a contracted driver for an International Government Organization (IGO) was pulled over by armed men riding in a Toyota Surf and robbed of his mobile phone and cash in the Abe Kishindh area of Kishindh District (in this incident, the vehicle was not searched, and the incident appears purely criminal with no political intent). Two incidents also took place in the latter part of the PRP (both on the 13th), one in Sholgara and another in Kishindh (when an ACG robbed private vehicles in the Chahar Bagh area), making for 4 incidents between the 3 districts over a 3 weeks period. During the lead up to Eid increased thefts often occur, and the above appear to play more into these regional criminal trends than suggesting sustained shifts.

FARYAB

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	1


Despite the coming winter, this reporting period Faryab was not only the focal point of insecurity for the northwest, but in many ways, for the entire Northern Region. Amidst a relatively high volume of security incidents that occurred this reporting period, the first and last days witnessed especially significant incidents.

On the afternoon of the 30th, 3 NGO staff members (2 engineers and a driver) in a white Toyota Hilux went missing from Khwaja Sabz Posh District (between Shebakhtu and Khwaja Qishri Bala Villages) after leaving a village (where they were implementing a project) for Maymana at 1130 in the late morning. Although it is unclear what happened to them at this time—as they have been completely out of contact (and nobody has made demands about them)—locals claimed to have seen their car moving in the direction away from Maymana shortly after they left, and it is suspected that they were abducted. Should this turn out to be the case, it would be the 5th NGO abduction in the North this year, with all of them taking place in Faryab. Although that total is significantly less than the 19 NGO abductions that occurred throughout the region last year, it equals the total number of AOG initiated NGO abductions that occurred in Faryab over all of 2010. Of note, thus far all NGO abductees have been returned within 10 days, with those from the last 2 abductions being released the day after they were abducted after negotiations with local elders.

The first half of the period also saw significant incidents. Late on the evening of the 15th (at approximately 2330) an IMF night raid

took place. Allegations from the community suggest that IMF threw a grenade into a house to clear it, but that the only residents at the time were an old woman and the child she was looking after. The next day the infuriated community moved to organize a protest against the PRT. The Provincial Government intervened and talked with the community all of the 16th, trying to discourage the action, but at the end of the day, the community was still intent on doing so. However, early the morning of the 17th, a BBIED detonated in front of a school against the vehicle of the Provincial Chief of NDS. The blast killed 2 children and injured 5 NDS employees—including the Provincial Head of NDS—and 3 other civilians, with the Chief of NDS (a significant character in Maymana) later succumbing to his wounds on the 24th. The Chief of NDS was a polarizing individual, with some strongly disliking him and other feeling he had done a remarkable job, but his death has had a short term effect on morale in the district. Of note to the general security paradigm, the protest over the IMF raid lost support after the BBIED attack, with many civilians believing that the raid had been an attempt to stop the killer of the NDS chief.

These were not the only significant incidents to occur in the province, which saw a total of 23 security incidents. Foremost amongst the others were 5 incidents in Pashtun Kot which included 2 separate abductions. On the last day of the PRP (October 15th), an AOG abducted 3 former Jihadi commanders with 2 local civilians (Jamiat Party members),



subsequently killing the Jihadi commanders the next day (in the Sahir area, which borders Almar District). Also in Pahstun Kot (on the 16th), the ANP ambushed an AOG while they were coming from a village where the AOG had just abducted 4 local villagers. A further abduction occurred in Qaysar (1 of 6 incidents to occur in the district) when unknown armed individuals shot and killed a local civilian and abducted his wife. Her corpse was later found in a garden in the same village (1 suspect was arrested). Faryab has seen a relatively large number of abductions—NGO and otherwise—in relation to the rest of the region (4 this period), with Qaysar witnessing a particularly high volume of civilian casualties.


Finally, anecdotal reports arose concerning increased AOG movements and presence in Gurziwan and Dawlatabad, although no incidents were recorded in either district. Dawlatabad and Gurziwan both border the Tri-Provincial Area, where there has been a recent flood of new actors (150 CIPs, ALP and IMF Special Forces, and relatively new ANA companies), creating the possibility that AOGs have relocated to these 2 districts to escape conflict and consider their response to the new developments. Although not taking place in Dawlatabad, 1 incident did occur just off the main Maymana – Shibirghan road in the neighbouring district of Qaramqol, when an AOG attacked the private residence of an ANP policeman at 0800 in the District Center. Although Qaramqol borders Dawlatabad, and they share the Jungal area where the majority of incidents along this road occur, few incidents take place within the DAC of Qaramqol itself, but if the rumors about Dawlatabad are true, it could also effect security in Qaramqol.

JAWZJAN

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

Jawzjan continued to demonstrate a general lack of manifested insecurity this reporting period, although some notable developments occurred. Perhaps most significant amongst these was the discovery of an IED near Hasan Tabin village in Shibirghan District along the Shibirghan – Sar-e Pul Main road. Although illegal checkpoints have occurred relatively often along this road, IEDs have been extremely rare, and there have been no IED related incidents of any type in Shibirghan District since an April 10th detonation against an ANP Ranger inside the city. IEDs sometimes begin to appear after heavy military actions—as they involve little physical presence—so this may be the result of pressure on local AOGs to the south of the district in Sar-e Pul, but realistically, 1 IED does not necessarily suggest any new trends at this time.

Elsewhere, Darzab and Qush Tepa, which combine to make up Jawzjan’s portion of the AOG stronghold known as the Tri-Provincial Area (TPA), remained quiet following the influx of Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) forces to the area (combined with the existing presence of ALPs, IMF Special Forces groups and ANA in Sar-e Pul and neighbouring Sayyad). The only incident of note this period in the TPA was the discovery of 5 IEDs in Moghul village (Darzab) during a joint ANSF/IMF operation. Reports suggest that unlike the CIPs in west of MeS, the CIPs in Jawzjan come from local arbakis, some of whom may have gone through the APRP process—potentially with many ex-AOGs amongst them—but this has not yet been independently verified. However, likely due to the high visibility (and relatively high paycheck) of the new CIPs—combined with the coming winter



season—the initiative appears to be catching the attention of individuals in the northwest, and in addition to the 67 who surrendered to the APRP from Chahar Bolak (see Balkh), 13 alleged AOGs surrendered to the GOA in Fayazabad on the 19th. It is expected that as the winter season draws closer, and more individuals hear of the relatively large pay CIPs are receiving, the province will witness the seasonal migration of low level combatants and others in need of money to the GOA and the peace process, as individuals seek to cash in while AOG activity decreases (and high level commanders head to Pakistan). Whether this lull will last, and those individuals will stay invested in this process after the winter breaks—when AOGs traditionally mount new offensives—remains to be seen.


BAGHLAN

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

Baghlan saw little of note occur this reporting period. Of the 8 incidents recorded, 1 involved a hand grenade thrown into a private residence (Puli Khumri), while the rest all involved operations, arrests, or IED discoveries by ANSF, or ANP—4 of these (all lead by ANSF) taking place in Baghlani Jadid. The lack of AOG or ACG activities itself marked the most significant development in a province that has shifted between periods of manifested insecurity and extended periods of relative calm. However, in a

province where the dynamics have changed so often and quickly, it is difficult to ascertain whether this lull will sustain until and through the winter.

Despite this, northern Baghlan is known to host local and non-local AOGs, and anecdotal reporting has surfaced suggesting that HiG groups in Baghlani Jadid, groups that had aligned with the GOA just prior to a 2010 confrontation with local AOGs, may be beginning to gravitate back towards establishing links with AOGs.



However, these rumours remained unconfirmed at the time of this report, and despite strong sourcing, no correlating spike in insecurity has occurred in conjunction with this. Further assessment of this, and the potential security implication is likely to be required.


KUNDUZ

Kunduz witnessed a moderate reporting period, notching 27 security incidents, many of which consisted of ANSF/IMF/ANP operations or IED discovery and removals. The most notable exception to these was an RCIED attack against a Provincial Council member on the 28th at 1000 hours in Kunduz City. Although the PC member escaped unharmed, one local was injured in the attack. The targeting of high level GOA officials (especially in Kunduz) remains relatively consistent with existing trends both in Kunduz province, and throughout the North in general (as in the targeting of the Chief of NDS in Faryab this period).

Outside of this, a noteworthy 9 of the 27 incidents took place in Chahar Dara. However, the vast

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

majority of these consisted of ANSF/ANP/IMF led manoeuvres, with 2 operations, and 4 IED discoveries/dismantling's. However 1 was the detonation of an IED against one of the new Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) patrols near Sujani Ulia Village on October 18th and another was also CIP related (an AOG attacked a CIP checkpoint). While these marked the first recorded targeting of any CIPs in any of the 3 areas which they are currently deployed (Kunduz, west of MeS, and the Tri-Provincial Area), they were not the last. In another incident, a CIP in Aliabad shot local civilians—killing 1—on the 28th, allegedly over a personal dispute.




The detonations noted above made up 2 of the 5 IED detonations to take place this reporting period—a notable drop from the summer volume—with an additional 1 each in Imam Sahib, Khanabad, and Archi. Also of note, 2 incidents took place along roads in the province. On the 29th, individuals wearing ANA uniforms stopped and robbed civilian vehicles along the Khanabad – Kunduz road at 1900, and an ACG stopped and robbed vehicles on the Kunduz—Archi road. As noted in other provinces, robberies such as these are likely to increase during the lead up to the Eid holiday.

BADAKHSHAN

Following 2 periods characterized by civic unrest over of the killing of Professor Rabbani, Badakhshan witnessed a period of relative quiet, with the robbery of a private international company on the Yawan – Ragh road, and 3 incidents in Kishim—the most significant of which was an acid attack against 2 young girls—being somewhat of an exception. In fact, besides the previously noted demonstrations and gatherings, very little has taken place to affect the security paradigm of the province in over a month (outside of natural occurrences, such as the flooding of the Yawan – Nosai Road due to heavy rains, and the arrival of heavy snow, which makes movements throughout parts of the province tough).

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	8
This Report Period	0

While not recording a high volume of incident reporting, Ragh District has attracted some attention. Outside of the above mentioned robbery (which actually took place in Yawan on the 30th), an AOG opened fire on—and killed—a village elder accused of cooperating with the GOA on the 16th. These follow an incident that occurred at the beginning of the PRP (October 1st) when an IED detonated on an ANP vehicle. While 2 incidents in a month (3 if you count the incident in Yawan en route to Ragh) do not necessarily suggest any sustained shift in the security paradigm for the district, these are combined with recent anecdotal reports about moderately sized AOGs



moving in and around the area. While most sources suggest that these do not appear to represent any strong AOG presence—despite the fact that the district is known for training religious elders—the groups have been noticed around Patir Village, causing the Provincial Chief of Police (PCOP) to conduct a trip up from Fayazabad to investigate. However, GOA and local sources all report that the district remains operable, and that the groups that have been seen—and may be causing trouble there—are more linked to drug trafficking than any strong political ideology or agenda.

TAKHAR


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

Takhar witnessed 14 security incidents this reporting period, with the majority of them consisting of ANP, ANSF, or IMF initiated operations (as per the other 2 traditionally AOG heavy provinces in the northeast; Baghlan and Kunduz). However, there were some noteworthy stand outs. Perhaps most significantly, 3 illegal checkpoints occurred. Two of them along the main Taluqan – Kunduz road, and one along the Baharak – Khwaja Ghar road. Amongst the two on the main Takhar – Kunduz road, the first occurred on the 16th at 2300 hours and involved only the stopping and robbing of a private vehicle, while the second (on the 19th) occurred at 2100 hours, and included shots being fired at a private truck that refused to stop. In the latter the driver was injured.

Anecdotal reports suggest that these two were the work of one ACG, which is operating with some regularity in the area in the

evening hours. This would fit within the general security paradigm around Taluqan, where crime has made up the majority of insecurity (as opposed to AOG initiated activity). These 2 illegal checkpoints make up the 6th and 7th ACG illegal checkpoints along this particular stretch of road this year. Prior to these, the most recent had occurred on July 27th, with 3 of the other 4 occurring in January. Of note to NGOs travelling this road, all 7 of the ACG illegal checkpoints along this stretch (in Taluqan) have taken place after 1900 hours, which puts them outside of recommended NGO travel times (0900-1500 hours). The one on the Baharak – Khwaja Ghar road took place slightly earlier (1800) but still outside of travel hours. A noted in other provinces, criminal activity—especially robberies—are likely to increase during the lead up to Eid.

Although at first appearing to be a



fourth illegal checkpoint (along the road to Dashti Qala), Pro-Government Militia members (unattached to the ALP program) were seen conducting a checkpoint and stopping and checking cars as well. Whether these ununiformed armed groups will continue to stop civilians—and potentially create confusion and concern—remains to be seen.


Lastly, in Khwaja Ghar on the 27th, an IED detonated prematurely in the DAC near the District Court, killing only the man who was carrying it. This marks the first IED detonation in the district since May 15th, and the first to occur in the DAC all year. Despite relatively low levels of AOG activity this year, Khwaja Ghar shares a border with the traditionally insecure district of Dashti Archi in Kunduz, and has been known to host AOGs who move easily between the 2 districts.

SAMANGAN

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Samangan recorded 6 security incidents this reporting period, with 3 of them taking place in Aybak, 2 in Ruyi Du Ab, and 1 in Dara-I Sufi Bala. Most notable amongst these were 2 road robberies that occurred late in the month, 1 in Ruyi Du Ab and 1 in Dara-I-Sufi Bala (along the road connecting the district to Dara-I Sufi Payin). While neither of these were particularly exceptional, nor politically motivated, they together depicted a soft spike in crime, as often occurs just prior to

Eid (a holiday that includes expensive sacrifices). In one of the two (on the road between Dara-I-Sufi Payin and Dara-I-Sufi Bala, marking only the second incident to occur in Dara-i-Sufi Bala this year), 7 armed men stole cash and mobile phones from the vehicle occupants, while in the other, a sheep was stolen from a shepherd, but in both, the goal was obviously a quick robbery and escape. Both incidents were rare in their respective areas, and are assessed



more likely to be due to the time of year (and the holiday) than any dedicated or sustained shift in the security paradigm, however, as general security has decreased slightly the last 2 months, further assessment may be required.

SAR-E PUL


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

Sar-e Pul witnessed only 2 security incidents this reporting, but both of them were noteworthy. The more significant between the 2 occurred on October 23rd, and consisted of the abduction of 2 civilians who worked for a private company that was being contracted out by an IO. The incident occurred in Khomorabad Village at approximately 1500 hours, and was attributed to a well known AOG commander in the area. The 2 were returned unharmed 3 days later—reportedly without the payment of any ransom, although it was originally asked for—after the intervention of local elders. Reports also surfaced that the group was told that the organization they worked for was “un-Islamic” and they should stop working there, and that further, their organization should cease operating in the district. This is a message that has been sent to a couple of different actors throughout the country recently (not necessarily in the North), and despite the fact that this did relate to an NGO, it serves to reaffirm the importance of strong commu-

nity acceptance and knowledge of all the actors in organizational operating areas. Although this was the first abduction Sar-e Pul Province has witnessed since July 17th, the province has witnessed a total of 13 this year.


The other incident in the province consisted of an illegal checkpoint in the Sangtoda area, between Sar-e Pul and Sozma Qala on the 22nd (1800 hours, maintained for 2 hours). Sozma Qala District—and the road connecting Sar-e Pul City to the Sozma Qala DAC—have seen a slight increase in AOG initiated activity recently, with this marking the third security incident to take place along this stretch of road over the past 5 weeks. Of note, the first of these was also an illegal checkpoint which occurred on September 21st in Sar-e Pul District. While 3 AOG initiated incidents along one stretch of road would be noteworthy anywhere throughout the region, it is especially so here, where no other incidents had been recorded prior to these since 2010.

AOG actors have been known to



operate here in the past (2010), but there is also the possibility that the increased activity in the area is a by-product of the new actors (ALP and IMF) in the northern—and more traditionally insecure—districts of the province (Sar-e Pul and Sayyad), which could be causing AOGs to temporarily relocate south (or further west outside of the Tri-Provincial Area) to avoid detection and/or sustained conflict.

In relation to those districts to the north (Sar-e Pul and Sayyad), while they have remained devoid of incident reporting outside of the above abduction, anecdotal reports are suggesting that AOG movements of groups of 10-25 armed men on motorcycles are being sited once again, despite the presence of the new actors. However, whether AOGs will look to “retake” ground, or re-establish their presence amidst all these new actors before the winter, or whether they will wait until next Spring, has yet to be assessed.



WESTERN REGION

HERAT

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	8
This Report Period	0


This reporting period, the total number of AOG incidents in the province decreased from 17 to 10 (when compared to the PRP). This downward trend can be attributed not only to country wide seasonal trends (AOG activity typically declines from October on due to winter), but also because of stabilization of the city and the surrounding areas (Guzara and Injil). The city continued to record no AOG incidents, and security reporting was limited to ACG activity (though the volume, particularly abduction cases, increased). Further to this, the increase in ANSF presence/patrols in Injil and Guzara appears to have affected the number of AOG incidents, which decreased over the same period from 3 to 0.

The ongoing heavy presence and operations of ANSF/IMF in the west of Obe, and the east of Pashtun Zarghun, continued to forcibly relocate AOG elements to the border area between Obe and Chishti Sharif and the west of Pashtun Zarghun. The recent reappearance of AOG activity in Chishti Sharif can be partially attributed to these relocations, but it is also affected by local AOG elements

(as witnessed by the detention of three private trucks, conducted by a local AOG along the Herat-Chaghcharan main road).

Further, the extension of ANSF/IMF operations into areas northwest of Pashtun Zarghun (as seen in ANSF/IMF operations backed by air assets along the main road) pushed AOG elements further down into the mountainous south of the district. The premature detonation of an IED which killed 4 locals and wounded 3 others from Taqcha village (located in the south of the district and occurring while they were defusing 4 IEDs) has been attributed by one of these relocated AOG elements. Of note, most locals from the village previously confronted this AOG element after they were reportedly armed by the GOA this August (this AOG element was dislodged into the west of Obe after ANSF launched a major operation).

Although the mass deployments of ANSF may continue to contain activity along this main road for a short period (particularly during the winter, due to the fact that climate has often limited AOG movements), it would be ques-



tionable to suggest that they will provide long term stability in the eastern districts, due to the difficulty involved in maintaining that volume of forces and extending operations into mountainous areas such as the southern areas in both Obe and Pashtun Zarghun.

In the northern districts, 3 AOG incidents were recorded, with 2 of them being IED attacks on security targets (IMF convoys and ANP patrol vehicles) along the Herat-Thurghundi main road in Kushk. This remained relatively consistent with long term trends. In the southern districts, another AOG concentration area in the province, AOGs continued to maintain activity around the airfield area in order to disturb establishment of the regional airpower of ANSF/IMF (seen in an IED attack against an ANP patrol vehicle in Aziz Abad area, killing 2 ANP officers and wounding 2 others). However, despite this, ANSF/IMF presence and operations, and the ongoing negotiations between the Provincial Governor and local AOG elements, continued to affect a downturn in AOG incidents, as seen over the past 2 months.


FARAH

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

This reporting period, Farah hosted 16 AOG incidents in total (nearly a 30% decrease from the PRP) suggesting that perhaps the trend of increasing AOG activity—which started after the end of Ramadan—may be temporarily ending. AOG activity continued to be concentrated mainly in Pusht Rod (5 AOG incidents, mainly along the main road connected to Farah City) and Bala Buluk (6 AOG incidents mainly along the main road between Farah City and Herat-Kandahar road in Shiwan area). The reversal of the trend may be partially explained by the fact that poppy cultivation has come into season, and the process of seeding has extracted manpower from AOG activity, along with the increased presence of ANSF/IMF troops in

areas such as Khaki Safed and Bakwa (which had been heavily affected by AOG activity). Particularly, in Bakwa, where AOGs frequently attacked convoys along the Herat-Kandahar main road, the additional large number of ANSF and IMF forces appears to have created a lull, and the number of AOG incidents has decreased from 7 to 2 when compared with the last two reporting periods. Seasonal trending may play a role as well.

As for tactical preferences amongst AOGs, while IED and direct fire attacks remained dominant (accounting for nearly 69% of AOG incidents, mainly targeting ANSF/IMF), abductions initiated by AOGs remained a significant concern in the province as



well. Of note, there were 2 abduction cases initiated by AOGs. The first one involved a local civilian who was accused of cooperating with the GOA, and the other one involved the abduction of 10 local civilians in Pur Chaman belonging to AOG's rival tribe (all of them were released following the negotiations by elders). While the exact circumstances of these cases were not the same, these incidents suggest that AOGs continue to use abduction as an intimidation tactic in order to exert their influence over populations (as opposed to financial gain).


GHOR

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	14
This Report Period	1

Ghor recorded one criminal incident which directly involved an NGO this reporting period. A group of armed individuals entered the project office of an INGO in Tulak, stole some assets, and set the office on fire. Although this incident was likely attributed to criminal purposes (due to the fact that there was no trace of ideological/political rhetoric), some anecdotal reports have suggested that it could be the result of local elements who were affected by the closing-down of the office. Of note, this marks the 15th NGO direct incident in the province this year. The large volume may be partially due to the complexity and dynamics shaped by significant movements of exog-

enous AOG elements from the south, as well as struggles amongst multiple local powerbrokers, which have combined to make accurate risk assessment and sustained community acceptance difficult for NGOs.

Seasonal trends have demonstrated an expected downturn in AOG activity starting early this month (with the number of security incidents declining in comparison to the last two months from 20 to 10). 5 out of the 6 total AOG incidents that occurred this reporting period were concentrated in Tulak and Shahrak, and 4 out of those 5 were attributed to longstanding conflict between two local commanders, which had



been exacerbated since one of the commanders joined the GOA last year. In all 4 of these incidents, supporters of the commander attacked the ANP officers (often at a check post) belonging to his rival. While the province is likely to continue to manifest less AOG and ACG activity—as per seasonal trends—local disputes amongst powerbrokers are likely to remain significant factors within the security paradigm in the province for the foreseeable future.

BADGHIS


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Badghis remained the hottest spot in the Western Region, and continued to demonstrate a trend of increased AOG activity this reporting period. 25 AOG incidents were recorded in total, a volume which exceeded the previous peak this year as recorded in July (23 AOG incidents over two weeks). While the exact reason for this increase is not yet clear, the nomination of the new District Shadow Governor (DSG) in Muqur early this month could be a strong causal agent. The DSG is apparently reputed to be an effective and prominent commander, who has reportedly reorganized AOG factions that were previously fragmented by ANSF/IMF operations, and also increased the level of activity against ANSF/IMF. The number of AOG initiated incidents in the district have sharply risen this


month (22), and in fact exceeded the volume of incidents in Murghab District for the first time (Murghab has traditionally been considered the AOG stronghold of the province).

At the provincial level, Murgab and Qadis continued to host a steady and high number of AOG incidents this reporting period (5 in Murgab and 4 in Qadis). In contrast, AOG activity in Ghor-mach had been low since the last major operation was conducted by ANSF/IMF at the end of September, and ANSF/IMF appeared to maintain their presence / operational tempo and contain AOG movement (with only 1 AOG incident, 2 operations, and 2 IED discoveries initiated by IMF/ANSF recorded this month).

As for tactical preferences, while IED and direct fire attacks re-



mained the dominant tactics for AOG (72% of AOG incidents were associated with these two tactics, mainly targeting ANSF/IMF), the use of BBIEDs was newly introduced. A BBIED was used against ANSF for the first time in Badghis (at an ANSF/IMF contracted fuel station, killing 2 ANA soldiers and 3 local civilians, and wounding 3 other locals), and a BBIED vest was also discovered in Muqur. Since BBIEDs were foreign to local AOGs, the continuous influx of exogenous AOG into the province appears to have affected AOG tactics, but whether this becomes a sustained change will require further assessment.



EASTERN REGION

NANGARHAR


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	14
This Report Period	2

Nangarhar saw a number of important developments in its security environment and trajectory over the past fortnight, ranging from surprisingly heavy violence in Achin and further insecurity in Bati Kot – including 2 inter-related NGO incidents there – to the announcement on transition and the re-emergence of the IED campaign in Jalalabad city.

First, in the wake of the burning down of the girls’ school in Chardeh, and the attacks on fuel trucks and IMF convoys, registered in Bati Kot at the end of the previous period, IMF conducted a number of search operations of the district in the first days of this period. Of course, given their demonstrable inclination in the area in recent months to focus on NGO clinics when looking for AOG fighters – consistently to no avail – the IMF came to two separate NGO medical facilities in Bati Kot on consecutive days, first in Chardeh where they found nothing, and then to the DAC area where they arrested a man queuing for treatment, releasing him later in the week after seemingly finding nothing. More important for NGOs than these unproductive interventions, however, was the night letter left by the IEA sub-faction, the Tora Bora Jihadi Mahaz, clearly stating their firm opposition to a development presence in the district – which though does not seem to extend to these NGO medical facilities. For the 2 weeks following these developments, Bati Kot’s AOGs

went quiet, only to re-surface on the 30th with an IED at the DAC, and then an attack on an ABP vehicle in Barikaw on the 31st. They can be expected to continue.

Second, while Bati Kot lay quiet, the Achin land dispute finally came to the boil. Having brokered an agreement between the feuding tribes on the 26th, the provincial government and security forces decamped to Achin and successfully disarmed the Alisher Khel. On the 28th they then turned to the Sepai, the dispute’s original agitators and the sub-tribe that had previously sought to augment its tribal power through a 2009 agreement with IMF to provide an anti-AOG militia. However, the Sepai, having recently reportedly flipped to receiving weapons and other support from the IEA, rebuffed ANSF when the latter sought to disarm them, initiating an armed clash that, after Sepai tribesmen attacked the tent of the provincial governor and senior ANP leadership, and an IMF helicopter, ended up leading to more than 30 tribesmen killed, 50-80 detained, and 17 injured to varying degrees of severity. At the time of writing, IMF and ANSF continue to garrison the area, but anger amongst the Sepai is likely to lead to them moving even further from the GOA and into the waiting arms of the IEA, who will likely be more than happy by these developments, given the Sepai’s strategic location along the border with Pakistan. Moreover, it ap-



pears that the IEA was indeed seeking to bring this state of affairs about; ANSF detained a BBIED operative, a teenage boy, as he was making his way through Rodat to Achin, on the 26th where his reported target was the provincial governor. It may also be the case that the ambush on the tent which sparked the heavy fighting late in the afternoon was in fact carried out by IEA elements within the Sepai, although details concerning this aspect of the day remain unclear.

Jalalabad city also saw notable developments. With regards its actual security environment, two IEDs occurred in Zone 2 – one against the ANP CP on Angur Bagh road and the other next to the house of the brother of assassinated Mahaz-e Melli commander Haji Zaman – a likely indication of the re-emergence of an IED cell operating out of the Khalis Family Colony area and into the south of Jalalabad via Farm-e Hadda. We can expect more such attacks in the coming weeks and months. Moreover, plans for security transition were announced for Jalalabad and surrounding districts – Sorkh Rod, Behsud, Kama, Kuz Kunar and Rodat – which will take place in December. IMF will remain in JAF, and as such the very visible air presence in the city will not be affected, but it will be interesting to see how the transition affects security in the city; it remains unclear at the moment, but will most likely result in AOG efforts to probe for and exploit the weaknesses of the ANSF in the period of handover.

KUNAR


In Kunar, the only stand-out incident was the suicide attack on the NDS city office in Kerala, Asadabad, in which a female BBIED operative detonated her vest at the main gate, injuring 2 NDS guards and 4 civilians, one of whom, a woman, subsequently died. It is extremely rare for females to become BBIED operatives, although this is in fact the second time in Kunar; it is likely that she was dispatched by the AOG in Marawara/Sirkanay and Bajaur Agency, where a history of Arab Salafi militancy has brought a more gender-equal view of suicide bombing found in the Arab world.

Beyond this incident, the conflict in the province continued to decline in line with seasonal trends, with direct attacks, the most standard AOG TTP, seeing a con-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	8
This Report Period	0

siderable drop – as well as a notable absence of cross-border shelling incidents. There were some other noteworthy occurrences in the provincial capital, however. First, a local doctor working at the PRT was kidnapped from the city centre, on the 24th. Moreover, a large university student demonstration about the shooting of a Kunari student at Gardez University took place on the 25th in the Yar Gul part of the city, and passed off without incident, good evidence for the greater moderation of these students as compared with their Nangarhari compatriots.

The remaining 2 significant incidents took the form of IDF attacks. The first was a mortar attack on the IMF facility in Nari's Bari Kot, which killed an ANA



soldier, while in the second, AOG fighters brought down an IMF helicopter with an RPG just across the river from the Topchi IMF base, the main facility in the province. There were, however, no reported casualties from the incident.

From the IMF side, operations took place in Sirkanay, Nari and Wata Pur, most notably in the first, in which 10 AOG fighters were killed in an airstrike in Shankore, and in the second, 3 fighters were killed during a joint operation. In Wata Pur, finally, an air operation took place towards the end of the period, with no further details at the time of writing.

LAGHMAN


In Laghman during this period, AOG kinetic operations continued to fall, although concerns over their presence in particular parts of the province remained. Mehtarlam city's security situation was quiet, and indeed somewhat improved, after a short period of deteriorating security in the wake of transition, where AOG presence significantly increased, particularly at night. ANSF continued to arrest local and non-local AOG members in and around the provincial capital, with reports that a number of foreign, i.e. Pakistani, AOG members were amongst the haul on one occasion.

In Alishing, after last period's spate of IEDs on the main district

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

road, just one was recorded during this period, causing no reported casualties. However, just north of the DAC on the 16th, AOG fighters ambushed an NDS convoy in a short hit-and-run attack, injuring 2 NDS officials during the exchange of fire. In Alingar, the only notable incidents were two, an AOG attack on a fuel tanker that left it burning and beyond repair on the main district road, and the kidnapping of an employee of a national election body in the Salaw valley, where previously such abductions have also occurred.

Along the Qarghayi stretch of the Highway, an IED struck an ANA ranger on the early morning of the 30th, killing an ANA officer; this



was swiftly followed by an IMF operation on and away from the Highway in the Mashal-e Kamar area, which netted 2 AOG fighters, including one who was injured by gunfire before he was arrested. Given that transition is about to take place in this district, it is likely that we will see an increase in such IED attacks on ANA targets over the coming months, which, after all, remain much more vulnerable to such attacks than IMF, given their lack of mine-resistant armoured vehicles.

PAKTYA

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	1


With the cold weather now present in Paktya, the seasonal downturn continued apace, with AOG-initiated kinetic incident volumes consistent with last period's levels, coming down roughly 100% from the summer peak. However, both IMF and AOG activity was still substantial during the period, with the former also causing the fortnight's only NGO incident. In Zawo village in the extreme east of Gardez district, an AOG-dominated area close to HQN strongholds in Zadran territory, IMF detained two demining staff during a search operation, in the first of such cases to occur in the eastern region. The precise details behind this incident remain unclear, but it is clear that living in such an area as a deminer would be quite dangerous, not the least because of AOG pressure to exploit one's munitions skills.

This incident was part of a broader picture of continuing IMF pressure on HQN territory and figures in Wuza Zadran and Shwak – as well as in the capital district – and also the consistently high levels of kinetic pressure being exerted on Zurmat, home to the Mansur Network, a constituent faction of the IEA. In Wuza Zadran, multiple AOG fighters were reported killed during an air strike on the 23rd, after an operation to clear ground in the northern Saroti area of the district on the 19th. A number of AOG fighters were arrested in multiple operations in Gardez

district, and in Zurmat, 1 fighter was killed and a number arrested during one of the number of operations that took place there. Finally, in Ahmadabad a HQN commander was arrested on the 18th, and another 8 fighters on the 24th.

Furthermore, from the ANSF and NDS side, notable successes in disruption and interdiction were scored; indeed, the 2 events were perhaps the most significant conflict developments in Paktya in the past month. First, on October 16th alert ANP policemen opened fire and quickly shot dead 4 BBIED-wearing suicide attackers travelling in a VBIED as they approached and sought to assassinate the provincial governor as he was moving in a convoy past the Gardez Municipality buildings; just 1 police officer and a civilian were killed, in an incident that would have had a massively destabilising effect on provincial security if successful. Second, late in the period NDS interdicted a Hino truck at the Mirzaka Dosaraka, laden with wood to cover up the large number of suicide vests laden with explosives it was transporting – almost certainly the result of inside information; sources indicate that the load was likely coming from HQN stronghold Musa Khel, in a *modus operandi* mirroring the recent SVBIED attack on the Gardez PRT.

Yet, it's a truism to say that these



two disrupted AOG operations also demonstrate the ongoing capabilities and intentions that the HQN and other AOGs operating in Paktya continue to maintain, and particularly in the first, just how close they came to a major strategic coup. More widely, direct attacks on IMF and ANSF continued at seasonally expected levels in Zurmat, Chamkanay, Jaji and outer areas of Gardez district, with a small number of IEDs also recorded. In Gardez city, gunmen shot and wounded a local man for working with the IMF, and established an illegal vehicle CP on the KBL-GDZ road in the late afternoon in Tandan. Finally, in Jaji's Sikander Khel, AOG fighters abducted an ANP policeman and destroyed his vehicle.

As such, we can expect further IMF pressure on HQN and Mansur cadres in their heartlands into the winter, while Gardez and districts to the north will continue to see falling AOG incidents as local units go into hibernation and others flow out to Pakistan until the beginning of next year's fighting season. But we can also expect some continuation of high value targeting by AOGs into the winter, in an effort to continue their own pressure and demonstrate that IMF pressure has not been effective.

ANSO Staff Contact Information:

Please see the final page of this report for a full list of contact details for all ANSO staff.

KHOST

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0


As predicted, IMF operational intensity rose substantially during the past fortnight, as targeting of the provincially dominant Haqqani Network continued to grow across the Loya Paktya region (see also Paktya). One key focus of operations was Musa Khel, site of last period’s arrests of high value HQN targets, where a multi-day operation (15th-18th) took place that involved targeting other HQN commanders and establishing a permanent ANSF presence; in all, 19 AOG fighters were reportedly arrested, and a number of caches of explosives seized. However, in an indication of how wide and deep HQN presence and support runs in the district, 10 days after the operation a large truck laden with suicide vests, thought to have come from Musa Khel, was seized in central Paktya. Moreover, the ultimate consequence of these short and sharp clearing operations, and of the establishment of small and isolated outposts, as in so many other opposition-dominated rural areas of the eastern region over the past decade, is likely to be rising insecurity as AOG cadres bounce back from initial clearing operations to repeatedly attack new ANSF and IMF OPs, therefore generating greater insecurity for a resentful local population.

Qalander, bordering Musa Khel and long a safe haven within Khost for local and foreign AOG cadres, also saw IMF search operations, in which some explosive materials caches were discovered, while in Nadir Shah Kot, a HQN commander was detained in a

search operation on the 27th. In all of these, IMF have clearly focused directly upon and targeted HQN strongholds, in a marked change to the dominant pattern of operations present until the beginning of October.

Another, more traditional, operational focus was the border with North Waziristan, most particularly Gurbuz and Tere Zayi, where IMF border-strengthening operations took place, involving the deployment of extra forces in an attempt to close off Khost from HQN infiltration from across the border. Moreover, in Sabari 4 separate clearing operations netted roughly 20 AOG fighters, including a number of HQN commanders, although fatalities were not recorded during any of the operations. Finally, in Spera DAC area, an operation detained 7 AOG fighters, unusual for that district heavily AOG-dominated district, the key crossing for infiltrating HQN fighters moving on the southern route from Waziristan into Paktika, Ghazni and Wardak, and sometimes as far as Kabul.

Yet for the opposition, the heavier pressure brought to bear on them over the past month, specifically, and recent months more widely, did not significantly degrade their operational capability during the period, as measured by the number of direct and IED attacks conducted across the province; this was consistent with previous recent periods, although dropping from the summer peak due to seasonal fighting trends.



More specifically, roughly 15 IED detonated against ANSF and IMF vehicles across the province, focused on Gurbuz and Sabari, while AOG units ambushed mostly ANSF targets across the districts of Gurbuz, Khost, Sabari, Spera and Tani, much of it on the border. A stand-out incident was the ambushing and killing of 3 local males working with an IMF supply company as they drove a Corolla in the Laken area of Khost Matun district on the 28th.

Indeed, while security on the main Khost plain remained relatively good, with border defence relatively effective, behind these AOG operations there appears, according to multiple sources, to have been a significant increase in cross-border infiltration from Waziristan in the past weeks, as the HQN seeks to maintain and augment its position across the region in the face of IMF pressure.

Finally, in wider developments, on the 29th the GOA announced that the road between Khost city and Ghulam Khan, the border crossing running to North Waziristan capital Miranshah, would be upgraded to facilitate increased cross-border trade, coming nearly 7 months after it was announced by the Pakistani army that similar works would occur on the Pakistan side of the border. While legitimate concerns exist over the impact that such greater road access would have on the infiltration capabilities of Waziristan-based AOG cadres, there are also strong argument to suggest that security would not be substantially negatively affected, due to the effective presence of SOF-managed ‘campaign forces’ operating along the border.

SOUTHERN REGION

KANDAHAR

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	1

For the second consecutive reporting period, Kandahar province witnessed a series of spectacular incidents. Kandahar City in particular further reaffirmed its strategic and symbolic role for parties involved in the conflict by attracting two complex attacks this period. Of significance to the NGO community, one of these complex attacks involved ‘soft targets’.


In the early hours of October 31st, in Kandahar city, an SVBIED breached a common wall that separated an NGO compound from an IO guesthouse. Following the explosion, 3 AOG operatives entered the perimeter of the IO compound and engaged security guards. A subsequent fire fight between the attackers and the security forces continued for several hours, until eventually all of the attackers, as well as some of the local guards, were killed. The explosion and protracted fighting resulted in 3 IO national guards killed and 3 NGO staff wounded, and caused serious damages to both compounds. An attack like this, against such ‘soft targets,’ marks an unprecedented event in Kandahar city. However, they are not completely unheard of, and the neighbouring province of Helmand saw a two-fold attempted suicide attack that targeted the compound of an INGO (albeit one with a different profile than that of most NGOs) on March

17th, 2010.

The second significant incident occurred on October 27th, when 4 AOG operatives wearing suicide vests entered an empty building located in the vicinity of the PRT compound, and from this position opened fire on the PRT with RPGs and small and heavy weapons. The ensuing fire-fight with security forces lasted late into the night, and resulted in the deaths of all of the involved AOG members, as well as causing several casualties amongst the ANSF/IMF and civilians. It later appeared that the ground attack was supposed to be reinforced by the use of VBIEDs/RCIEDs, as security forces located in the area a minivan and two motorcycles rigged with explosives.

Parallel to the attack on the PRT, a suicide attacker driving a car detonated (apparently prematurely) in the vicinity of an IMF base in Panjwayi District, killing himself, but causing no other casualties. The timing of the attack - as well as the intended target - indicate a strong possibility that the operations were coordinated. It is interesting to note that 7 out of the 8 suicide/complex attacks that have been recorded across the province over the past three months have involved the use of a VBIED.

In regard to the province as a whole, the security landscape re-



mained relatively consistent with the previous report. This period the districts of Zhari, Panjwayi and Kandahar City accounted for the bulk of AOG activity. IED emplacement continued to represent the main threat, with at least 23 recorded incidents (both detonations and discoveries) which were concentrated in Zhari (with 9 incidents) and Kandahar City (5). The toll of casualties related to IED emplacement was again significant. Demonstrating this, two separate IED incidents occurred in District 9 and 10, injuring a total of 8 civilians.

Targeted killings continued as well. Notable were two separate attacks on the Provincial Head of Hajj Department. In Zhari, the official escaped an IED strike unharmed, but several days later he was injured as a result of a grenade attack in Daman District.

Lastly, ANSF/IMF units uncovered a large quantity of IEDs, explosives and ammunition this period. During an operation in the Bandle-Timor village of Maywand for example, 125 kg of explosive materials and 70 IEDs were seized on the 24th. In regards to significant seizures conducted by security forces, Spin Boldak came to the fore with approximately 2500 kg of ammonium nitrate (which has been banned in Afghanistan due to its use in making of IEDs) seized from a truck in the Weesh area on the 22nd.

URUZGAN

In Uruzgan the security landscape did not change significantly in comparison to the previous report, with a total of 20 security incidents, 8 attributed to AOGs. Also, not surprisingly, the large majority (70%) of all incidents recorded throughout the province were related to IED emplacement.


14 IED related incidents occurred in the province, including 6 detonations. The distribution of these incidents displayed a familiar pattern, with Tirin Kot, Dihrawud, Char Chino and Chora districts as the main recipients.

A notable incident occurred on 16 October in the Bazaar area of Dihrawud, when a bicycle-mounted RCIED detonated while ANP personnel were buying bread from a bakery. The blast killed 1 civilian passer-by and wounded 2 ANP and another civilian. The device was likely set up to target ANP personnel, as

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

the bakery was frequented regularly by police employees. This assumption is backed by data that shows that Uruzgan witnessed 185 IED detonations (incl. premature) thus far this year, of which 78% targeted ANSF and IMF. Generally speaking, AOGs in Uruzgan, as the above incident and past practices demonstrate, have been less reluctant to risk significant civilian casualties in their attempts to reach their targets.

This reporting cycle, AOGs also continued the targeting of high-ranking ANP officials. On the 20th an RCIED detonated against a vehicle carrying the Char Chino Chief of the Crime and Investigation Department, who was killed in the incident along with 4 other ANP. In the same district, but on the following day, 2 ANP were killed in another IED strike. As mentioned previously, IED em-



placement remains robust in Tirin Kot District, and as such poses a significant threat for the local population. This was highlighted on 18 October, when 3 civilians were wounded in an IED detonation while travelling in a car through Aram Shah village. As compared to IEDs, direct attacks are generally rare in Uruzgan, with this period being no exception. Only two direct attacks were recorded over the past two weeks (both in Tirin Kot), resulting, however, in 2 ANA, 1 ANP and also 1 civilian wounded. Lastly, the level of reported ANSF/IMF activity was limited in the last two weeks, with only 3 separate events, amongst these three, two operations (respectively in Char Chino and Khas Uruzgan) resulted in a reported 7 AOGs killed, and a further 6 detained.

ZABUL


In the last fortnight a total of 33 incidents were reported in Zabul, with 13 initiated by AOGs, demonstrating little change in the geographical distribution and tactical patterns of AOG efforts. Current data shows that AOG activity was focused on Qalat, Shahjoy and to a lesser extent on Shinkay and Tarnak Wa Jaldak.

An attempted killing was reported from Qalat District on 18 October, when an AOG members riding on a motorcycle shot and wounded an ANP official. In fact, 2 of the 4 total AOG direct attacks this period occurred in this district. In the evening hours of 25 October, AOG simultaneously

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

attacked 2 ANP check posts located in the areas of Shaado village and on the Qalat City – Sori District Road, but causing no casualties. However, on the same day, a separate attack on an IMF patrol in Khwazi area resulted in 1 civilian wounded in the cross-fire.

IED related incidents constituted the AOG favoured tactic across the province for a total of 8 reported with 4 detonations. IED incidents affected Qalat (4), Tarna Wa Jaldak (2), and Shahjoy and Shinkay (with 1 incident each). The main targets of IED strikes remained ANP and IMF patrols. ANSF/IMF operations were robust, with 13 documented occur-



rences province wide. In addition to several cache seizures, these operations were focused on AOG manpower. On 18 October, in Daychopan a total of 15 AOG were reported to have been killed during an operation, and IMF conducted an air strike against an AOG that was holding a meeting in Tarnak Wa Jaldak District. The latter operation resulted in a reported 19 AOG killed, 1 wounded and another 2 arrested, as well the seizure of a quantity of weaponry and explosive materials.

GHAZNI

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

In the last two weeks the incident volume recorded in Ghazni remained high and served to once again distinguish the province as the most kinetic in the Southern Region. This period at least 113 security incidents were recorded, with around 55% of them attributed to AOG activity.


The province experienced a variety of AOG initiated incidents, though they consisted of the standard pattern of direct and indirect assaults, IED emplacement, and intimidation related efforts. In the last fortnight AOG activities were particularly focused in Qarabagh, Giro and Ghazni Districts.

On the provincial level, the threat picture remained consistent with previous periods, displaying a significant ration of direct attacks, followed by IED deployment and IDF assaults. AOG direct attacks were concentrated on ANP check posts (targeted on 12 separate occasions), then on districts centres and ANSF/IMF convoys (experiencing respectively 10 and 11 attacks). Although the majority of these attacks followed the 'hit and run' tactic, there were several examples of protracted engagements with security forces. A noteworthy incident occurred

in the area of the Andar DAC, when an AOG attacked a joint ANSF/IMF convoy with SAF. Following the engagement, an IED targeted an IMF vehicle, wounding 3 IMF soldiers. An additional 4 separate attacks resulted in a total of 1 ANP killed, and 1 ANA soldier, 1 PSC guard and 1 ANP wounded.

There were 20 IED related incidents this period affecting IMF convoys, ANP patrols and civilian movement, with the majority of these incidents occurring in Qarabagh, Andar and Ghazni. Although most of these devices were located before detonating, 7 IEDs did detonate, causing numerous casualties. In Giro, on 23 October, a single incident claimed the life of 1 IMF soldier, and injured another 8. Prior to this, on the 17th, in another IED strike reported in the DAC area of Qarabagh, 3 PSG guards were killed.

In the last two weeks at least 17 rocket and mortar attacks were recorded throughout the province, with the Qarabagh DAC being the most frequent target, along with Giro and Gelan. Whereas a rocket attack against Ghazni City on 25 October was



ineffective, a local IMF contractor was wounded in a separate incident when several mortar rounds impacted an IMF base located in the area of the Qarabagh DAC on the 22nd.

In addition to these attacks, the AOG campaign of intimidation and assassination continued, focusing in the last two weeks on Ghazni District. Four separate targeted killings were reported in the last fortnight, resulting in 2 ANP wounded and 1 ANP killed. The most recent incident occurred on the 29th in Ghazni City, when an NDS employee was shot and wounded by two AOG riding on a motorcycle. The victim subsequently died of his wounds in the hospital.

On the ANSF/IMF side, at least 26 arrests/clearing operations were documented this period, with the majority of them occurring in Dih Yak, Andar and Zana Khan. It is worth noting that the south-eastern districts of Dih Yak and Zana Khan accounted for more than 55% of all reported ANSF/IMF activity. In terms of results, in addition to the seizure of weaponry and explosive materials, a total of 15 AOG were killed with an additional 22 arrested.

ACRONYMS:

Please see the final page of this report for a list of ANSO-utilized acronyms.

HELMAND


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

The lull in AOG activity that has been recorded in Helmand Province since late September continued throughout this reporting period. In the last fortnight a total of 21 AOG initiated incidents were reported across the province, displaying a slight decrease in comparison to the previous period.

The geographical distribution of those incidents indicates that AOGs were focused in particular on the districts of Nahri Sarraj, Naw Zad, Sangin and Kajaki. Although less significant than previously, IED emplacement remained the main threat in the area. In the last two weeks at least 12 IED strikes affected Helmand (in addition to a further 7 IED discoveries/disposals that were recorded across the province). Albeit limited in number, IED deployment this period was particularly deadly for security forces and the local population. On 19 October, 4 civilians were killed and 3 others were wounded when their vehicle struck a roadside IED in Khanashin District. In a similar incident involving a private car that occurred on the 23rd in Musa Quala (Sarbashah village), an IED strike killed 5 occupants and injured another 3. An additional 2

incidents injured 2 civilians on foot in Nad Ali. Besides civilians, 2 IMF soldiers were wounded along with 1 ANCO during 3 IED related incidents, and two separate IEDs reported from Naw Zad during the 24th of October claimed the lives of a total of 7 IMF soldiers. Although direct AOG attacks played only a minor role this reporting cycle, with 7 reported incidents, during one of these attacks, another IMF soldier was killed in Nahri Sarraj.

On the ANSF/IMF side, documented operations continued at a high rate, and concentrated on Nahri Sarraj, Lashkar Gah and Kajaki. In the latter district ANA/IMF launched a five-day operation in order to clear the Kajaki-Sangin Main Road that resulted in the reported deaths of 21 AOG members, and injuries to an additional 5 others. The operation is supposed to be followed in the near future by the establishment of several check posts along this road. Apart from operations targeting AOG manpower and supply channels, ANSF/IMF focused its efforts on interrupting the drug business with an eradication campaign that was conducted across Nahri Sarraj and Nawa-i-



Barak Zayi, along with several anti-drug operations in Sangin, Marja and Lashkar Gah districts.

Lastly, in Lashkar Gah city, criminal activity came to the fore with two noteworthy incidents. On 25 October, armed men using an ANP Ranger vehicle abducted the son of a former Governor of Helmand Province. The exact circumstances of the incident have not been elucidated, but the incident appears to be related to criminal activity rather than ideological motivations. Another notable incident occurred prior to this, on the 22nd, when several individuals wearing ANP uniforms broke into a private residence during the night. The residents of the house resisted and engaged the attackers in a fire fight that resulted in the death of one of the inhabitants.

The fact the armed groups were wearing ANSF uniforms and/or using ANSF equipment is worth noting, nonetheless as past practice indicates, it is unfortunately a quite common element in such incidents.

PAKTIKA

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0


As with other provinces in the southeast, Paktika continued to see the expected seasonal decline in violence during the second half of October, with AOG kinetic operations falling slightly from the last period. However, in line with the generally greater levels of violence that characterise the province, even with the slight decline – much down from the August peak – there were still a number of combat fatalities on both sides. For the IMF, 3 soldiers were killed and another 5 wounded in 3 separate IED strikes in Yahya Khel and Yosuf Khel, while 2 ABP police were killed in an AOG ambush in Wor Mamay, which also led to the death of one of the ambushers.

AOG cadres also suffered considerable losses, as per normal in the mountainous province. In Gomal, 9 fighters were killed and 6 detained in multiple ground and air operations, one of which also killed a local woman. In Ziruk, one HQN fighter was detained, while 3 others were detained in two operations in Sarobi, and yet another 8 in Yahya Khel. Finally, in Gayan, 7 AOG fighters were

killed in a joint operation. Province-wide, the above demonstrated a picture of considerable security force intensity over the past month, in spite of the deteriorating weather.

Despite this, nothing stood out as representing a notable change in the generally insecure and highly contested conflict environment. AOG cadres continued to stage direct and indirect attacks on security forces, including characteristically inaccurate IDF attacks on IMF bases. None of these attacks, however, caused any casualties – bar one in which 3 AOG fighters were killed in Khushamand – but did maintain the pressure on security forces, an important opposition objective in and of itself.

Sharana itself was relatively quiet, as usual, with just one rocket attack on the city targeting the administrative centre, yet one AOG ambush did occur in the immediate outskirts of the city; a female Provincial Council member was ambushed in Kotwal area by a large number of gunmen, who mildly injured her but severely



injured her husband, as they were travelling to Yosuf Khel district. There was also a small protest on the 29th in front of the provincial ANP HQ, concerning the death of a woman in a car accident with another civilian vehicle the previous day; it remains unclear what reaction the protestors expected of the ANP.

Towards the end of the period, visiting IMF and ANA senior officers from Kabul pronounced that security was improving across the province. Yet, while this is certainly true in a relative seasonal sense, in any sort of durable terms the statement remained strongly questionable; the measure, of course, will be the other side of the winter, but given the intense weakness or entire absence of the GOA in much of Paktika, as well as the highly difficult task of sustaining border defence forces without the IMF’s sophisticated communications and air-transport capabilities, one could also argue that there are significant reasons to be concerned for the long term security picture in the province.

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MISSING THIS PERIOD.?

ANSO did not provide analysis for the following areas:

- ☞ Panjshir, Nuristan & Nimroz

These areas will be included in subsequent reports. If you have any information that would help us better understand the dynamics, please contact your local ANSO office.

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ANSO REGIONAL DIVISIONS

COMMON ACRONYMS

ACG-Armed Criminal Group / **AEF**-Afghan Eradication Forces / **ANA**-Afghan National Army / **ANBP**-Afghan National Border Police / **ANP**-Afghan National Police / **AOG**-Armed Opposition Group / **APPF**-Afghan Public Protection Forces (local deputised militias) / **DC**-District Centre / **GOA**-Government of Afghanistan / **IDF**-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / **IED**-Improvised Explosive Device / **IMF**-International Military Forces / **NDS**-National Directorate of Security (Intelligence) / **PRP**-Previous Reporting Period / **PSC**-Private Security Company / **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Grenade / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire / **VBIED**-Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device / **PDO**-Private Development Organisation / **ALP**-Afghan Local Police / **LDI**-Local Defence Initiative / **IEA**-Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban) / **PSG**-Provincial Shadow Governor (IEA) / **DSG**-District Shadow Governor (IEA)