

**IRAN**  
**COUNTRY ASSESSMENT**

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**Country Information and Policy Unit  
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## 1. SCOPE OF DOCUMENT

**1.1.** This assessment has been produced by the Country Information and Policy Unit, Immigration and Nationality Directorate, Home Office, from information obtained from a wide variety of recognised sources. The document does not contain any Home Office opinion or policy.

**1.2.** The assessment has been prepared for background purposes for those involved in the asylum/human rights determination process. The information it contains is not exhaustive. It concentrates on the issues most commonly raised in asylum/human rights claims made in the United Kingdom.

**1.3.** The assessment is sourced throughout. It is intended to be used by caseworkers as a signpost to the source material, which has been made available to them. The vast majority of the source material is readily available in the public domain.

**1.4.** It is intended to revise the assessment on a six-monthly basis while the country remains within the top 35 asylum-seeker producing countries in the United Kingdom.

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## 2. GEOGRAPHY

**2.1.** The Islamic Republic of Iran (Persia until 1935) lies in western Asia, and is bounded on the north by the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, by Turkey and Iraq to the west, by the Persian (Arabian) Gulf and the Gulf of Oman to the south, and by Pakistan and Afghanistan to the east. It has an area of 1.6 to 1.7 million square km. (636,000 to 635,000 sq.) **[1(a)] [4(j)]** The climate is one of extremes. It is a land of desert and mountain and is in the main semi-arid with, by contrast, a sub tropical climate in the north and northwest along parts of the Caspian coast. **[1(a)]** This is a result of the considerable rainfall that falls in these areas. The Caspian coast has a hot and humid climate and this region is by far the most densely populated. **[1(a)]** The capital city is Teheran, with an estimated population of 7-8 million. **[36]** The towns of Mashad, Esfahan, Tabriz and Shiraz each have populations of 1 - 3 million; the total population of Iran is an estimated 66 million (2001 estimate). **[1(a)] [4(j)] [36]**

**2.2.** The principal language is Farsi (Persian) and Persian dialects, spoken by about 58 per cent of the population. 26 per cent of the population are Turkic-speaking, Kurdish 9 per cent, Arab 3 per cent, Lur 2 per cent, Baloch 2 per cent, Turkmen 2 per cent and others 1 per cent. **[1(a)] [4(j)]** The national flag comprises three unequal horizontal stripes of green, white and red, with the emblem of the Islamic Republic of Iran (the stylised word Allah) centrally positioned in red and the inscription "God is Great" on the Red and Green stripes. **[1(a)]**

### Economy

**2.3.** Pre - Revolutionary Iran 's economic development was rapid. Traditionally an agricultural society, in 1961 Iran initiated a series of economic, social and administrative reforms that became known as the Shahs White Revolution **[1(a)]**. The core of this program was land reform. By the 1970's, Iran had achieved significant industrialisation and economic modernisation however the pace of growth had started to slow by the late 70's. **[4(j)]**. Since the Revolution in 1979 increased central control, the disruption caused by the Iran/Iraq war and a general decline in oil prices in late 1985 had a detrimental effect on the economy. **[1(a)] [4(j)]**

**2.4.** In March 1989, Khomeini approved President Rafsanjani's 5-year plan for economic development. **[4(j)]** Since then Iran's five-year economic plans have emphasised a gradual move towards a market orientated economy and the development of the private sector. The third five-year plan, which came into force in March 2000, commits the government to an ambitious programme of liberalisation, diversification and privatisation. **[24(a)]** However a lack of consensus on the privatisation drive has resulted in delay. **[5(ad)]**

**2.5.** Today, Iran' economy is a mixture of central planning, state ownership of oil and other large enterprises, village agriculture and small scale businesses. **[1(a)] [4(j)] [24(a)]** It has been stated by an Iranian official **[5(ae)]** that the unemployment rate is 14 per cent nationwide whilst the International Money Fund (IMF) has put it as high as 16 per cent. **[5(af)]**

**2.6.** The Iranian press also reported in September 2002 that some 12 million out of a population of 66 million live below the poverty line. **[5(ag)]**

**2.7.** A key factor in Iran's economic prospects is whether it will be able to gain full re-admittance to the international trading community (World Trading Organisation (WTO) membership etc), which will depend in large part upon the outcome of the political contest in Tehran and the success of Iran's policy of détente towards the outside world. **[1(a)] [21(w)][5(ax)]**

**2.8.** Whilst the Secretary General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development has said that UNCTAD supports Tehran's will to join the WTO currently the United States administration is opposed to Iran gaining membership of the WTO. It is to be expected that non-members will suffer grave economic losses in future years as a result of the majority of the International Community following the same trade policies. **[5(ac)]**

**2.9.** In its annual review (September 2002) of the Iranian economy the IMF, notwithstanding concerns over unemployment rates and fiscal policy concluded that the economy had performed well during the year **[5(af)]** and the World Bank is planning to lend Iran \$755m over the next two years although opposition from some of the World Bank's shareholders is to be expected. **[21(x)]**

**(for further information on geography, refer to Europa Yearbook, source [1(a)][1(b)]**

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### **3. HISTORY**

**3.1.** Iran was one of the first countries to be occupied by the early Islamic armies that erupted from out of Arabia in the seventh century. Iran [Persia as was] had been one of the greatest empires of the ancient world and despite frequently being overrun by other powers always maintained its own cultural and political identity. Within the Islamic world it retained its own language and adherence to the Shi'i interpretation of Islam. **[1(a)] [4(j)]**

#### **Pre 1979:**

**3.2.** Modern Iranian history can be said to have begun when in 1907 a constitution was introduced which limited the royal absolutism exercised by past ruling dynasties. In 1921 Reza Khan, an army officer seized control of the government ruling as Reza Shah Palavi from 1925 onwards. **[4(j)]** In 1941 he was forced to abdicate and his son became Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi ruling until 1979. **[4(j)]**

**3.3.** During late 1977 and 1978 public opposition to the regime increased dramatically, in part in response to the worsening economic situation, resulting from a slowdown in the pace of growth **[1(a)] [4(j)]** and particularly as a result of the repressive nature of the Shah's rule. By late 1978 anti-government demonstrations and strikes were widespread, staged both by left wing and liberal opponents of the Shah, and Islamic activists.

The most effective opposition came from supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini, who was by then based in France. [1(a)]

### **1979 - 1989:**

**3.4.** The Shah was forced to leave Iran in January 1979, and Khomeini arrived in Teheran on 1 February 1979. A 15-member Revolutionary Council was formed to govern the country, in co-operation with a provisional government, and on 1 April 1979 Iran was declared an Islamic republic. Supreme authority was vested in the Wali Faqih, a religious leader (initially Khomeini), appointed by the Shi'ite clergy. In October 1981, Ayatollah Hojatoleslam Ali Khamenei was voted President and Mir Hussein Moussavi was appointed Prime Minister. [1(a)]

**3.5.** In September 1980 Iraq invaded Iran. Iranian forces displayed strong resistance and the war developed into a long conflict of attrition until a cease-fire came into effect in August 1988. Peace negotiations became deadlocked in disputes regarding the sovereignty of the Shatt al-Arab waterway, the exchange of prisoners of war, and the withdrawal of armed forces to within international boundaries. The process received a boost when Saddam Hussain (President of Iraq) sought formal peace with Iran in the 1990s [1(a)] as a result of the Gulf War.

**3.6.** Elections to the second Majlis (Parliament) in April and May 1984, resulted in a clear win for the IRP. The elections were boycotted by Nehzat-Azadi, the Iran Freedom Movement, and the sole opposition party to have a degree of official recognition, although this has since been revoked, in protest at the allegedly undemocratic conditions prevailing in Iran. Evidence to support such allegations was provided by the UN Human Rights Commission in a report (published 1987) claiming that at least 7,000 executions of political opponents had been carried out by the Islamic regime between 1979 and 1985. [1(a)]

**3.7.** In 1985 there were reports of anti-government demonstrations and rioting in Teheran, and other cities, precipitated by austere economic conditions and dissatisfaction with the conduct of the war with Iraq.

**3.8.** Elections to the third Majlis in April and May 1988 apparently provided a stimulus to reformist elements in the Government identified with Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (Speaker of the Majlis) and Prime Minister Moussavi by producing an assembly strongly representative of their views. [1(a)]

**3.9.** Ayatollah Khomeini died on 3 June 1989, and was replaced as Wali Faqih (spiritual leader) by President Ali Khamenei who was quickly elevated to the clerical rank of Ayatollah in order to satisfy constitutional demands of the position. Rafsanjani easily won the presidential election in July 1989 (his only opponent was widely regarded as a 'token' candidate.) At the same time, voters in a referendum supported proposed amendments to the Constitution; the most important of which was the abolition of the post of Prime Minister, and a consequent increase in power for the President. [1(a)]

### **1990 to 1996:**

**3.10.** In the early 1990s Rafsanjani successfully contained the influence of the 'conservative' faction within the leadership, and emerged from the fourth Majlis elections in 1992 in a strengthened position with regard to his policies of economic reform. Serious rioting reported to have occurred in several cities in April and May was attributed by some observers to dissatisfaction with the Government's economic reform programme. When Rafsanjani stood for re-election to the presidency on 11 June 1993 he was re-elected but had lost popular support since the previous election. **[1(a)]**

**3.11.** In 1993 the UNHCR adopted a resolution condemning continuing human rights violations in Iran and further extended the special Rapporteur's mandate. On Islamic Republic Day (1 April) an amnesty was decreed; the prison terms of 1,682 individuals convicted in public, military and Islamic Revolutionary courts were reduced. **[2(a)]** A campaign to uphold Islamic morality was launched, resulting in hundreds of arrests for dress code violation.

**3.12.** In February 1994, President Rafsanjani survived an assassination attempt, responsibility for which was claimed by the self-styled Free Officers of the Revolutionary Guards, **[1(a)]** and by Babrak Khorramdin (BKO), an underground organisation opposed to the Islamic regime. **[2(a)]** Later that month, Ayatollah Khamenei announced an amnesty providing for the pardon or reduction of sentence of 1,500 prisoners. Further amnesties, affecting smaller numbers of prisoners, continued to be granted periodically on religious holidays and anniversaries. **[2(a)] [2(b)]**

**3.13.** Elections to the fifth Majlis were conducted in 1996. The Society of Combatant Clergy (a conservative faction which enjoyed the unofficial patronage of Ayatollah Khamenei) won only 96 seats, which represent a major decline as compared with 155 in the previous Majlis. The main reformist group which emerged at that point, the Servants of Construction, won a similar number of seats. The UN Special Rapporteur noted a number of irregularities in the elections; in particular the nullification of election results in eight jurisdictions apparently on ideological grounds. Most of the candidates disqualified were pragmatists rather than conservatives. **[4(a)]**

### **1997 to 1999:**

**3.14.** President Rafsanjani stood down in 1997, in conformity with the Constitution that provides for the Presidency to be held by an individual for two consecutive terms only. **[1(a)][4(b)]** In March 1997 he was appointed Chairman of a committee, the Expediency Council, which arbitrates between the Majlis and the Council of Guardians, the upper house of the legislative process, for a five-year term maintaining his continuing influential role in political life. **[1(a)]**

**3.15.** In August 1997, President Seyed Mohammad Khatami, regarded as a "liberal" and supported by the Servants of Iran's Construction **[1(a)]** amongst others, was inaugurated; following a landslide victory in elections held on May 23 (the 2<sup>nd</sup> of Khordad in the Iranian calendar). During the campaign, a lively debate on political, economic and social issues occurred. There was considerable government intervention and censorship, with disqualified candidates and the intimidation of opposition campaigners by the encouragement of vigilante groups. Ayatollah Khamenei, in a break

with precedent, backed one candidate, Majles Speaker Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri. Nonetheless, Khatami's election victory, with nearly 70 per cent of the vote, was not disputed and the regime apparently did not engage in election fraud. Khatami's election appeared to demonstrate a strong desire among his supporters, primarily women, youth and the middle class, for greater social and cultural freedom and increased economic opportunity. **[4(b)]** In a reflection of this new mood in the country, President Khatami in the months following his election to the Presidency appeared conciliatory to the West and also urged more tolerance of dissent in Islamic societies amongst groups "who keep within the framework of law and order". **[1(a)]** There were signs that Khatami, with popular support, intended to move Iran towards greater openness and cultural rapprochement with the West. Khatami stated his intention to loosen constraints on freedom of expression, denounced terrorism and expressed regret for hostage taking at the US Embassy in Teheran. **[7]** Ayatollah Khamenei, meanwhile, continued to denounce the West's military and cultural ambitions, particularly those of the USA and Israel. The divergent messages between the two men were interpreted by Western commentators as indicative of the conflict between Iran's "moderate" and "conservative" factions. **[1(a)]**

**3.16.** President Khatami also continued to face active opposition of conservative Ministers within the Majlis. Khatami did not push for direct political dialogue, compromising between moderate and conservative views.

**3.17.** The result of the Presidential election appeared to revive long-standing rivalries among members of the senior clergy in Iran, with Ayatollah Montazeri openly opposing Ayatollah Khomeini's authority and demanding that Khatami be permitted to govern without interference. Violent demonstrations in Qum and Teheran followed, until Khamenei urged an end to the protests; he none the less demanded that Montazeri be tried for treason and that all others who questioned his authority be prosecuted in accordance with the law. Montazeri's supporters protested in subsequent months that Montazeri was under house arrest. Khamenei expressed unprecedentedly vociferous criticism of Montazeri in May 1998. A subsequent pro-Khamenei demonstration in Esfahan was reportedly attended by some 200,000 of his followers. **[1(a)]** The house arrest or detention of some senior clergy remains an important and ongoing human rights issue.

**3.18.** Elections for the 86-member Council of Experts were held on 23 October 1998 amid controversy over the process of determining the eligibility of candidates. **[19]** The Council retains the power to appoint and dismiss the country's spiritual leader and to interpret its Constitution. **[17(b)]** It also has the power to oversee the leader's work and to dismiss him if he fails to perform his duties properly. This was the first national election since the presidential election in May 1997 and it aroused considerable interest. The Council of Guardians decided the eligibility of candidates to stand for election to the Council of Experts. **[19]** The conservatives succeeded in winning a majority of the 86 seats. **[19]**

**3.19.** President Khatami's attempts to introduce reform continued to meet resistance. The issue of press censorship increasingly became a focus of rivalry between conservatives and reformists. **[1(a)]** These tensions erupted into violence. On 8 July 1999, around 500 moderate students rallied outside Tehran University dormitory

complex, to protest peacefully at the closure of the newspaper Salam and calling for the expansions of press freedoms. The rally ended in clashes with hard-line vigilantes of the Ansar-e Hezbollah group. Police, who reportedly stood by during the clashes, raided the dormitories with excessive force. There were reports that students were thrown from windows. Student leaders were arrested in the early hours of the following day. The authorities later stated that one student had been killed, but students claimed that there had been eight deaths **[1(a)][4(g)][5(p)][5(r)]** The demonstrations and sit-ins continued for six days and spread to other major cities. On 11 July, at least 10,000 students took part in a street protest in Tehran, and were attacked by Ansar-e Hezbollah members armed with clubs. Police in the city centre fired tear gas and shots into the air to disperse the crowd. 1,400-1,500 students were detained in the wake of the student protests. **[4(g)][18(a)]** The protests were followed by a rally, in support of the Islamic republic, officially organised with the help of Basij.

**3.20.** The Supreme Council for National Security, led by Khatami, announced that two senior police officials had been dismissed and that the chief of police had been reprimanded. Following an appearance before a closed session of the Majlis in August 1999 it was reported that the chief of police had informed the legislature that almost 100 police officers had been arrested for their role in the campus raid. At the end of August it was announced that Tehran's head of police had been dismissed. In mid-September it was reported that four alleged leaders of the July riots had been sentenced to death; 45 defendants had been sentenced to terms of imprisonment and fined, and a further 20 had been acquitted. **[1(a)]**

## **2000:**

**3.21.** In elections which took place in February **[22]** and May, pro-reform candidates swept into power in the Majlis. In the first round in February, the initial counting took an inordinately long time. Then a partial recount was ordered, and then another, which was abandoned halfway for reasons which remained obscure. Then there was a lengthy pause during which there was much sniping and recrimination between the Interior Ministry, which was generally sympathetic to the reformists, and the conservative Council of Guardians. The Council of Guardians said that at 505 of 577 polling stations reviewed, fraud affected at least 10 per cent of the votes. The council also carried out an unprecedented third recount of ballots in the Tehran constituency **[21(a)]**. It was not until Ayatollah Khamenei delivered a ruling telling the Council of Guardians to inWalidate those voting boxes which had definitely been tampered with, but to accept the rest of the results, that the issue of the Tehran constituency was laid to rest, **[21(b)]** and the second round of the elections could take place  
The final results of the Majlis elections were **[23(a)]**:

2 <sup>nd</sup> of Khordad Front (reformist)	189 seats
Conservatives	54 seats
Independents (mixture of conservatives/reformists)	42 seats
Religious Minorities	5 seats
Total	290 seats

**3.22.** In the February round of elections, Rafsanjani finished a long way behind leading

reformist rivals. In the first count he only just scraped through in 30<sup>th</sup> position in the 30 seat Tehran constituency, although this was later revised to 20<sup>th</sup> position. There were allegations that Rafsanjani's supporters had cheated to get him into parliament. In May, Mr Rafsanjani resigned his seat saying he was doing so for reasons of national unity. However he still remains a powerful figure as the Chairman of the Committee to Determine the Expediency of the Islamic Order. **[21(c)]**

**3.23.** There has been a gradual increase in Iran's contacts with the outside world. In July 1998, Iran and Iraq concluded talks to enable Iranian pilgrims to visit Shi'a Muslim shrines in Iraq for the first time in 18 years. The two sides agreed that 3000 Iranians would be able to travel to the holy cities of Karbala and Najaf in southern Iraq every week from August 1998 onwards. **[5(a)]**

**3.24.** Possibly having found Validation from the reformist victory in the recent Majlis election, President Khatami welcomed the Foreign Minister of India to Iran in May 2000. **[21(d)]** Khatami himself visited China in June 2000 **[21(e)]** and Germany in July. **[21(f)]** Perhaps most importantly, in September, Khatami visited United Nations' headquarters in New York to take part in the Millennium Summit. There the US President, Bill Clinton, and Secretary of State, Madeline Albright made a last-minute change to their schedules to hear Khatami's address, but did not meet him. The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan said, "I think we are moving forward, and perhaps I won't say we've made a major stride but let's say the ice is being broken and things are beginning to move in the right direction." **[21(g)]**

**3.25.** In March 2000 a gunman shot and severely wounded newspaper editor Saeed Hajjarian, a senior political advisor to President Khatami. The methods used raised widespread suspicions that the security forces were involved in the attack. The gunman later was arrested and sentenced along with four other defendants to 15-year prison sentences, although he has since been freed.

**3.26.** In August 2000 two leading reform intellectuals, Mohsen Kadivar and Abdul Karim Soroush were prevented by semi-official club- and knife-wielding vigilantes from addressing a student convention in Khorramabad. Subsequent clashes between students and vigilantes resulted in the death of a police officer and injuries. The authorities arrested 150 persons **[4(h)]**

**3.27.** In November 2000 investigative journalist Akbar Ganji went on trial for statements he allegedly made during an April conference in Berlin on Iranian politics. He was arrested in April upon his return to Iran and held over the next 6 months for long periods in solitary confinement. Ganji told the court that he was beaten and tortured in prison. Ganji previously had written articles implicating former President Rafsanjani in a series of murders of dissidents and intellectuals apparently carried out by security forces. **[4(h)]**

**3.28.** Also in November a Revolutionary Court began the trials of 16 writers, intellectuals, and political figures who took part in the same Berlin conference on the implications of the February Majlis elections. The 16 defendants, who were arrested in Iran after the conference and charged with taking part in antigovernment and anti-Islamic activities, included Akbar Ganji, newspaper editor Mohammed Reza Jalaipour,

Member of Parliament Jamileh Kadivar, women's rights activists Mehrangiz Kar and Shahla Lahji, opposition politician Ezzatollah Sahabi, student leader Ali Afshari, and others, including a translator for the German Embassy in Tehran. The trial was ongoing at year's end. [4(h)]

### **2001 to Current:**

**3.29.** The Presidential Elections of 8 June 2001 saw the return of President Mohammad Khatami as president. Khatami won a landslide victory, securing 77 percent of the vote, and secured a second four-year term. [21(k)][21(l)] 10 members of the Freedom Movement were arrested (in April 2001) in the campaigns leading up to the June elections: the Freedom Movement was banned in March 2001. [21(j)] Khatami was then confirmed in office by Iran's supreme spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. However, in early August 2001, there was a slight hitch in the confirmation of the appointment by the Guardian Council, as conservative elements opposed to Khatami disrupted the election of replacement members to the Council, rendering it temporarily inquorate, by presenting two hard-line candidates designed to upset the Majlis. [21(k)][21(l)][21(m)]

**3.30.** The Majlis is currently mainly reformist. It was upset in August 2001 when a prominent woman member was sentenced to 22 months in jail by the conservative judiciary for comments made against clerics. 10 of the 11 female MPs threatened to walk out of the parliament and so disrupt parliamentary business. Five more MPs have subsequently been sentenced to jail terms – one of which, Loqmanian, was actually sent to jail for a brief period before the Majles speaker, Karroubi, walked out and threatened not to return to his duties until Loqmanian was freed. The Supreme Leader subsequently pardoned him. [21(n)][21(o)]

**3.31. Post September 11 situation.** Iran strongly condemned the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, led by a statement by Khamenei on 17 September, [21(p)][21(q)] reiterated during the visit of the UK Foreign Secretary on 25 September. [21(r)] Iran and Iraq however condemned the bombing of Afghanistan by the United States on 8 October 2001.

**3.32.** However, in mid October details emerged of a secret agreement between Iran and the USA whereby Iran would offer assistance to any US personnel either shot down or forced to land within its borders, provided the USA respected Iran's territorial integrity. [1(b)] There were also reports that Iran might be sharing intelligence with the USA. [1(b)] Yet, despite an apparent shift in bilateral relations, in 2001 Iran continued to head the US Administration's list of states deemed to be most active in sponsoring terrorism. [1(b)]

**3.33.** Early in 2002 relations deteriorated rapidly with the USA when the President, in his State of the Union address referred to Iran as forming (together with Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea) an "axis of evil", explicitly accusing Iran of aggressively pursuing the development weapons of mass destruction and of "exporting terror". [1(b)] The statement was denounced, in the strongest terms by both "moderates" and "conservatives" in the Iranian leadership. [1(b)]

**3.34.** The speed with which the US led military campaign in Afghanistan met its' immediate goals worked broadly in Iran's favour. The removal from power of the Taliban

to be replaced by a more favourable Northern Alliance regime meant that the prospect of a peaceful Iran/Afghan border becomes much more likely. **[5(x)]** Relations with extra-regional countries including the UK, whose foreign secretary travelled twice to Tehran in late 2001 and in October 2002, also showed signs of improvement. **[1(a)]**

**3.35.** In September 2002 the UK named its new ambassador to Iran, after a previous nomination earlier this year led to disagreement. **[1(b)] [21(y)]** The newly nominated ambassador is now expected to go to Tehran before the end of 2002 and take up his post in January 2003. **[21(y)]**

**3.36.** Domestically the intense factional struggle between the pro-reform elected government and, legislature and hard-line conservatives entrenched within the state's unelected institutions continues. **[5(y)]**

**(for further information on history, refer to Europa Yearbook, source [1(a)] [1(b)]**

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## **4. STATE STRUCTURES**

### **Political system and Constitution**

**4.1.** Iran's Constitution was adopted in 1979, and was amended in 1989 to provide for the abolition of the post of Prime Minister and consequent increase in power of the Presidency. It states that the form of government of Iran is that of an Islamic Republic and that the spirituality and ethics of Islam are to be the basis for political, social and economic relations. Persians, Turks, Arabs, Balochis, Turkomans and others will enjoy completely equal rights. **[1(a)]**

**4.2.** The Constitution provides for a President to act as chief executive. The President is elected by universal adult suffrage for a term of 4 years. President Khatami was elected to his post in May 1997, after ex-President Rafsanjani completed the maximum permitted two terms. Legislative power is vested in the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis) with 290 members (increased from 270 members) **[5(v)][4(g)]** who are similarly elected for a four-year term. Provision is made for the representation of Zoroastrians (1), Jews (1) and Christians (2). A 12 member Council of Guardians was established in 1980 and supervises elections and ensures that legislation is in accordance with the Constitution and Islamic precepts. **[1(a)]** 6 clerical members are appointed by the Supreme Leader, with 6 lay jurists appointed by the head of the judiciary and approved by the Majlis. **[4(f)]** The Council of Guardians has been criticised for allegedly using its power of veto to exclude candidates for all elections (Presidential, Majles, Assembly of Experts, Local Councils) on the basis of discriminatory and arbitrary criteria. **[8(a)]**

**4.3.** The executive, legislative and judicial wings of state power are subject to the authority of the Wali Faqih (supreme religious/spiritual leader) who, in the absence of the Imam Mehdi (the hidden Twelfth Imam), carries the burden of leadership. All legislation passed by the Majlis must be sent to the Council for the Protection of the

Constitution, which will ensure that it is in accordance with the Constitution and Islamic legislation. **[1(a)]**

**4.4.** On 29 November 1997 President Khatami ordered the establishment of the “Committee for Inspection and Supervision on the Implementation of the Constitution”. The aim was to regulate policy, give preference to articles relating to the individual and social rights, and improve communication of the legal rights of the individual. The text of the order, forwarded to the UNHCR in September 1998, depicts the strong mandate of the Committee as one which could go a long way towards resolving many of the existing discrepancies between the Constitution and actual laws and practices within Iran.

**[10(m)]** Suffrage is universal at 15. **[4(j)]**

**4.5.** In September 2002 Iran's frustrated reformist President Mohammed Khatami has presented a new bill to parliament aimed at enhancing his powers. It is the second of two proposals which reformists hope will clear the way for the enactment of changes which have been largely blocked by the entrenched hardline minority still holding positions of power. **[21(ae)]**

### **Citizenship**

**4.6.** Citizenship is based upon the Iranian Civil Code which stipulates that in general, birth within the territory of Iran does not automatically confer citizenship. Some instances where birth does confer citizenship is when a child is born to unknown parents, child born to non-citizens, one of whom was born within Iran or a child born to non-citizens, if after reaching the age of 18 the child continues to live within Iran for at least one year. **[32]** A child born to an Iranian father regardless of the country of birth is Iranian by descent. **[32]**

**4.7.** A foreign woman married to an Iranian man is entitled to citizenship.

**4.8.** Iranian citizenship may be acquired upon fulfillment of the following conditions: Person must be at least 18 years of age, have resided in Iran for five years, not to be a military service escapee and not to have been convicted of a major crime in any country. **[32]** The wives and minor children (under 18) of naturalised citizens are also considered Iranian citizens. **[32]** Dual citizenship is not recognised. **[32]** Iran allows individuals to hold dual nationality, but will treat a dual national as Iranian and ignore the second nationality. **[26(b)]**

### **Political parties**

**4.9.** The Islamic Republican Party (IRP) was founded in 1978 to bring about the Islamic Revolution under Ayatollah Khomeini. After the Revolution the IRP became the ruling party in what was effectively a one-party state. In June 1987 Ayatollah Khomeini officially disbanded the IRP at the request of party leaders, who said that it had achieved its purpose and might only ‘provide an excuse for discord and factionalism’ if it were not dissolved. [A list of political organisations is at [Annex B.](#)]

**4.10.** However, during 1998 several new political parties, which applied for registration, were established. **[4(f)]** In May 1998 a licence was granted to the “Servants of Construction”, a party including leading members Kharbaschi (former mayor of Teheran), Culture Minister Mojaheerani, Interior Minister Abdullah Nouri and Rafsanjani’s

daughter Faezeh Hashemi. **[19]** On 7 July 1998 the Solidarity Party of Islamic Iran was officially recognised as a new political party. It was set up by a group of Majlis deputies and executive officials. The party stated that it had been formed “to create a healthy political climate”, reinforcing society’s needs for new political parties and groupings. The party was registered and its manifesto and constitution approved by the Interior Ministry. **[5(a)][6(a)]**

**4.11.** The same month, four further political associations were given “activity” permits: the “Society of Kermanshahi Students and Alumni”, the “Yazd Almohsenin Society”, the “Islamic Centre of Teachers of the Town of Borujen” and the “Association of Industrial and Economic Specialists and Managers. This was with the agreement of the Majlis and the Ministry of the Interior, **[5(d)]** setting the pattern for political parties seeking to establish themselves. In October 1998 a few Members of Parliament set up an “Islamic Worker’s Party” and in December 1998 two brothers of President Khatami founded the “Islamic Partnership Front”. **[19]** Vice-President Masumeh Ebtekar and four ministers founded the “Islamic Iran Participation Front” the same month. **[17(c)]**

**4.12.** Of the unregistered parties within Iran, some such as the “Iran Nation Party” had been tolerated. However, in November 1998 the leader of that party, Dariush Forouhar, and his wife Parvaneh Forouhar were murdered by unknown assailants. Three senior members of INP were arrested at the outbreak of the street riots in July 1999, accused of provoking riots and using anti-Islamic slogans. Nine activists have reportedly been killed in the last decade. **[4(g)][5(s)]**

**4.13.** Prominent political dissidents who disappeared in 1998 were Pirouz Davani in August and Javad Sharif in November. A spate of disappearances in late 1998 also included prominent writers and intellectuals, with Mohammad Mokhtari and Mohammad Jafar Pouyandeh later found dead. Several senior figures of the leadership blamed the disappearances and murders on “foreign hands,” it was revealed that active-duty agents of the Ministry of Intelligence had carried out the killings. Minister of Intelligence Qorban Ali Dori-Najafabadi and several of his senior deputies resigned their posts following these revelations. In June 1999 the Military Prosecutor’s Office released an initial report on the investigation, identifying a cell from within the Ministry of Intelligence led by four “main agents” as responsible for the murders. The leader among the agents reportedly was a former Deputy Minister of Intelligence, Saeed Emami, who, the government stated, had committed suicide in prison by drinking a toxic hair removal solution several days prior to release of the report. The report also indicated that 23 persons had been arrested in association with the murders and that a further 33 were summoned for interrogation. **[4(g)]** In the early part of the year 2000, the Government announced that 18 men would stand trial in connection with the killings. The trial began in late December in a military court. The proceedings were closed. However, news reports indicated that 15 defendants pleaded guilty during the opening stages of the trial. The identity of the defendants is still unknown, but former Minister of Intelligence Dori-Najafabadi had not been charged. Reform-oriented journalists and prominent cultural figures declared publicly their demands for a full accounting in the case and speculated that responsibility for ordering the murders lay at the highest level of the Government. Several citizens, including prominent investigative journalist Akbar Ganji, were arrested in connection with statements they have made about the case **[4(h)]** On 27 January 2001, fifteen intelligence officers were convicted for their involvement in the serial murders of liberal intellectuals in 1998/99 but the Supreme Court quashed the verdict in

August 2001 and ordered a re-examination of the case. Press reports in late May 2002 indicate that two death sentences have been commuted and four unnamed individuals sentenced, but there has been no formal confirmation of this. Five of the interrogators have been jailed on charges of mis-treatment of the accused. The lawyer representing some of the victims, Naser Zarafshan, has also been given a prison sentence on charges of exposing state secrets. **[26(d)]**

## **Judiciary**

**4.14.** The traditional court system is not independent and is subject to government and religious influence. **[4(k)]** The judicial system has been designed to conform, where possible, to an Islamic canon based on the Koran, Sunna, and other Islamic sources. Article 157 provides that the head of the judiciary shall be a cleric chosen by the Supreme Leader. Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi resigned as the head of the judiciary in August 1999, and was replaced by Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahruddi. The head of the Supreme Court and Prosecutor General also must be clerics. **[4(j)][4(k)]**

There are several different court systems. The two most active are the traditional courts, which adjudicate civil and criminal offences, and the Islamic Revolutionary Courts, established in 1979 to try political offences, narcotics crimes “crimes against God”, economic crimes such as hoarding and overpricing and official corruption. A special clerical court examines alleged transgressions within the clerical establishment and a military court investigates crimes committed in connection with military or security duties by members of the army, police and Revolutionary guards. **[4(k)]** Defendants have the right to a public trial, may choose their own lawyer, and have the right of appeal **[4(g)]**. Trials are adjudicated by panels of judges, advised by the government to base their decisions on Islamic law. **[4(f)]** The Revolutionary Courts may consider cases that are normally in the jurisdiction of the civil and criminal courts, and may also overturn their decisions. **[4(a)]**

**4.15.** Trials in the Revolutionary Courts, where crimes against national security and other principal offences are heard, have been notorious for their disregard of international standards of fairness. Revolutionary Court judges have acted as prosecutor and judge in the same case, and judges have been chosen for their ideological commitment to the system. Pre-trial detention often is prolonged and defendants lack access to attorneys. Indictments have often lacked clarity and included undefined offences such as “anti-revolutionary behaviour,” “moral corruption,” and “siding with global arrogance.” Defendants do not have the right to confront their accusers. Others have been show trials that are intended merely to emphasise a coerced public confession. In 1992 the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights concluded that “the chronic abuses associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Courts are so numerous and so entrenched as to be beyond reform.” The Government has undertaken no major reform of the Revolutionary Court system since that report. The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights then concluded that these courts were associated with abuses. **[4(f)][4(g)]**

**4.16.** The legitimacy of the Special Clerical Court (SCC) system has been a subject of wide debate. The clerical courts, which were established in 1987 to investigate offences and crimes that are committed by clerics, are overseen directly by the Supreme Leader, are not provided for in the Constitution, and operate outside the domain of the judiciary.

In particular, critics alleged that the clerical courts were used to prosecute certain clerics for expressing controversial ideas and for participating in activities outside the area of religion, including journalism. According to the US State Department on Human Rights Practices for 1999 in November 1999, former Interior Minister and Vice President Abdollah Nouri was sentenced by a branch of the SCC to a 5-year prison term for allegedly publishing “anti-Islamic articles, insulting government officials, promoting friendly relations with the United States,” and providing illegal publicity to dissident cleric Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri in the pages of Khordad, a newspaper that was established by Nouri in late 1998 and closed at the time of his arrest. Nouri used the public trial to attack the legitimacy of the SCC.

**4.17.** In April 1999 a branch of the SCC convicted Hojjatoleslam Mohsen Kadivar, a Shi’a cleric and popular seminary lecturer, to 18 months in prison for “dissemination of lies and confusing public opinion” in a series of broadcast interviews and newspaper articles. Kadivar advocated political reform and greater intellectual freedom and criticised the misuse of religion to maintain power. In an interview published in a newspaper, Kadivar criticised certain government officials for turning criticism against them into alleged crimes against the State. He also observed that such leaders “mistake themselves with Islam, with national interests, or with the interests of the system, and in this way believe that they should be immune from criticism.” He also allegedly criticised former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini and demonstrated support for dissident cleric Ayatollah Montazeri. Kadivar’s trial was not open to the public. **[4(g)]**

**4.18.** The Supreme Court, which has 16 branches, revoked all laws dating from the previous regime which did not conform to Islam. **[1(a)]** It has limited authority to review cases. **[4(f)]** In October 1982 all courts set up prior to the Islamic Revolution were abolished. In June 1987 Ayatollah Khomeini ordered the creation of clerical courts to try members of the clergy opposed to government policy. A new system of qisas (retribution) was established, placing the emphasis on speedy justice. Islamic codes of correction were introduced in 1983, including the dismembering of a hand for theft, flogging for fornication and violations of the strict code of dress for women, and stoning for adultery. **[1(a)]**

**4.19.** Since May 1994, judges have been responsible for prosecution in public and revolutionary courts. **[9(a)]** Amnesty International has reported that trial hearings are often heard in camera and that political detainees have been denied access to legal counsel during judicial proceedings, despite official assurances to the contrary. **[9(a)][4(b)][9(b)]** Political trials which take place within prisons are sometimes conducted secretly. Where trials and summary proceedings of political prisoners deny the detainee access to legal counsel, they breach Iran’s Constitution and also Article 14(D) of the ICCPR, to which Iran is a signatory. **[9(c)] [9(a)][4(b)]** Amnesty International cites detainees in Iran having described the use of ill treatment and torture to obtain forced confessions. **[9(c)]**

**4.20.** During 1996, at least 110 people, including political prisoners, were executed. **[9(a)][4(b)]** 200 public executions were reported by the state media in 1995. **[10(a)]** (Also see paragraphs 5.9-5.20.) Hangings within prisons such as Quasar of men detained for several years on charges of espionage during the Iran-Iraq war took place in early 1995. **[9(b)]**

**4.21.** During 2000 at least 75 executions were reported and 16 death sentences imposed, often in connection with murder charges were reported. **[9(m)]** Death sentence continued to be carried out throughout 2002 for example 5 drug smugglers were hanged in a prison at Mashad on 20 May 2002 and the previous week 4 people were hanged inside Tehran's Qasr prison. **[5(av)]** On 29 September 2002 5 members of a band "the black vultures" convicted of rape were hung, in public. **[21(z)]**

**4.22.** Although the Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, there is reportedly no legal time limit on incommunicado detention, nor any judicial means to determine the legality of detention. Suspects may be held for questioning in jails or in local Revolutionary Guards offices. **[4(b)]**

**4.23.** The Law indicates a range of applicable punishments for types of offences. For example, two to ten years imprisonment for a person found to have formed a political organisation deemed to be destroying the security of the country, although the definition of what destroys the national security is not made clear. Similarly, punishments of imprisonment, lashes or fines can be imposed for insults against Iranian leaders or government representatives, but effectively serve to limit freedom of speech as the Law does not define the term "insult". **[3(c)]**

**4.24.** The Ta'zirat dictates that absolute authority be exercised over the populace. The degree of adherence to the proposed punishments within does vary, but continued reports of stoning and executions have brought international calls for greater reform. **[10(s)]**

Four types of proof exist within the Iranian legal system. The application of confession, testimony, and oath and "the knowledge of the judge" remain unclear to those outside the Iranian judiciary. There is a marked concern that confessions are often gained by coercion and that the "testimony of righteous men" excludes women and members of religious minorities. **[10(g)]**

**4.25.** The Iranian authorities have said that many of the executions conducted in Iran relate to drug trafficking offences, but no corroborative statistics or information on the protection of human rights policies in dealing with such offenders is available. Numbers of stoning and deaths as a consequence are unclear, though most take place in the larger cities such as Teheran, Hamedan, Isfahan and Kermanshah. All are endorsed by the Supreme Court **[10(b)]**, including stoning of women found guilty of sexual relations outside marriage. **[10(h)]**

**4.26.** However, the Iranian Foreign Ministry states that whilst execution is in Islamic law and cannot be overturned, the government is looking to alternative forms of punishment to stoning. **[10(b)]** In November 1997 an individual stoned to near death three months earlier was released after widespread international condemnation of the punishment. **[4(f)]** Western human rights groups recognised that no (public) stoning were carried out in 1998 **[10(b)]** until a non-fatal stoning took place in Lahijan in late November. **[10(n)]** The subject was acquitted after he managed to free himself as the sentence was being carried out. **[15(f)]** Two public stonings were carried out in May 2001 of women accused of adultery and acting in a pornographic movie respectively.

**4.27.** Amputation has been used as a punishment, although the practice has been widely regarded as contravening Article 7 of the ICCPR. In September 1997 three Iranians had hands or fingers amputated for theft and forgery offences. **[10(b)]**

**4.28.** Arbitrary arrest and detention has been and remains a feature within Iranian society. **[8(f)]** In 1997 large numbers of people arrested for suspected espionage or other political activity remained in detention without charge or trial, said to have been denied access to a lawyer of their choice or any other legal counsel. **[8(b)]** Senior Shi'a religious leaders and their followers have also been arrested and detained over recent years, some of whom are still detained or under house arrest (see paragraphs 6.50-6.52 on Religious Dissidents). However, in March 1997 the decree to prohibit pre-trial detention of suspects, particularly the young, elderly, female or unwell, was issued by the Chief Justice (Ayatollah Mohammed Yazdi). **[3(b)]**

**4.29.** The President of the Central Bar Association in Iran has described the shortage of lawyers as a potential stumbling block if lawyers are to play their role in fulfilling President Khatami's vision of a civil society. However, in 1998 the Association admitted 800 new candidates to its Bar admission course; it has established a Legal Assistance Department to make legal advice and the services of a lawyer more accessible, including to groups such as Baha'is; and a disciplinary court for lawyers within the Bar Association has been active since 1997 and deals with complaints made against lawyers perceived as not having diligently represented their client's interests. The Bar Association published an open letter in August 1998 which set out the shortcomings of the present court system and lawyers and legal officials are beginning to speak out individually on changes needed. The changes are likely to impact on the future effectiveness of the role of lawyers as advocates for human rights. **[19]**

**4.30.** In December 2000, Judiciary Chief Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi announced an initiative to reform the Iranian judicial system. He said that the country is "still a long way off from having a reformed and developed judicial organization." He also announced that 40 judges, clerks, and other officials had been arrested on corruption charges. Some sources outside the country claim that Shahroudi used this initiative to purge the judiciary of some of its more moderate elements in the guise of fighting corruption. **[4(j)]**

**4.31.** The United Nations Special Representative stated in his report of 16 January 2002 that the long awaited bill on the reform of the Judiciary has finally reached the Majlis. **[10(p)]** At the time of preparation of this report, he had not seen a detailed description of the bill. However, according to press reports, it stipulates that exceptional tribunals like the revolutionary courts will be able to deal only with cases explicitly referred to them by law. Officials and military personnel will be tried only by Tehran's Criminal Courts. If this works out to be the case in practice, it will be a major improvement.

### **Military Service**

**4.32.** In August 2001 the Regular Armed Forces numbered about 513,000, **[1(b)]** including conscripts: army 325,000, Revolutionary Guard Corps (Pasdaran Inqilab) some 125,000, navy 18,000, airforce around 45,000. There are some 350,000 reserves. **[1(b)]** It is believed to have a few hundred thousand men in active service. **[3(c)]** The military is entrusted by the Constitution with the task of protecting the

independence, territorial integrity and system of government of the Islamic Republic. **[3(a)]** Paramilitary forces comprise an estimated 300,000 volunteers of the Basij and some 40,000 under the command of the Ministry of the Interior. **[1(b)]** Iranian men become eligible for conscription for a 21 month period of compulsory military service **[1(b)]** on their 18<sup>th</sup> birthday although the voluntary recruitment age is sixteen. **[30]** Permanent military exemptions may be government-granted, purchased (no longer) or medically certified. There are a number of conditions for exemption, relating to age, disability, education and date of departure from Iran. The disabled, sole family guardians and support, and only sons, are exempted without cost. Men who left Iran after 1990 may purchase exemption for \$1,000 -3,000. Those with PhDs or BAs who left Iran before March 1990 may pay up to \$16,600. **[25]** Men who are continuing graduate studies abroad who pay their own expenses will be granted a full exemption. Those who qualify are able to return to Iran periodically throughout their studies. Men born after 1958 who have degrees in fields deemed essential by the state, such as medicine, pharmacy, and dentistry, are not eligible for exemption. **[2(c)]**

**4.33.** The penalty for draft avoidance in peacetime is an extra 6 months-2 years service, and in wartime up to 10 years extra service or punishment at the discretion of the convicting judge. **[2(c)]** However, new provisions on buying exemption from military service and dealing with desertion cases are said to have been enacted recently, extending previous practices although not sanctioned by Kamenei. **[3(c)]** Time still to be served and prison sentences imposed for desertion may now be bought off. **[19][25]**

**4.34.** The right to conscientious objection is not legally recognised and there are no provisions for substitute service. **[25]** Iran appears as a co-signatory to a letter dated 24 April 2002 addressed to the UN Commission on Human Rights concerning the question of conscientious objection. In it she states that Iran does not recognise the universal applicability of conscientious objection to military service. **[10(q)]**

## **Internal Security**

**4.35.** The Constitution says that reputation; life, property and dwellings are protected from trespass except as "provided by law". This used to enable security forces to enter homes and offices, monitor telephone conversations and open mail without court authorisation. **[4(f)]** However in April 2000, the Supreme Court barred the security forces from seizing "illicit" materials from private homes such as tapes, CDs and videotapes. **[5(q)]**

**4.36.** There is shared responsibility for internal security. Agencies involved include the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, the Ministry of Interior and the Revolutionary Guards, **[4(f)]** a military force that was established after the revolution. Paramilitary volunteer forces known as Basijis, and gangs of thugs known as the Ansar-e Hezbollah (Helpers of the Party of God), act as vigilantes, and intimidate and threaten physically demonstrators, journalists, and individuals suspected of counterrevolutionary activities. The Ansar-e Hezbollah often are aligned with particular members of the leadership. **[4(k)]**

**4.37.** The Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami (Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), was created by the revolutionary regime suspicious of the regular military. Its ground forces are said to number 100,000. It operates as the principal arm

of domestic security, although it has to apply for a search warrant before it can raid a private home. In August 1994 some Pasdaran units refused to intervene in riots in the city of Ghazvin. A Pasdaran commander was among four senior army officers who are said to have sent a letter to the country's political leadership, warning the clerical rulers against "using the armed forces to crush civilian unrest and internal conflicts." Nevertheless, the Pasdaran is reported to be continuing to disperse unauthorised gatherings by using violence. **[9(a)]**

**4.38.** In April 1998 the head of the Revolutionary Guards Corps made clear the fact that they would repress efforts to achieve reform by persons perceived to be "counter-revolutionaries". **[8(d)]**

**4.39.** The Basij, or Baseej (paramilitary volunteer forces), come under the control of the Revolutionary Guards. **[3(a)][4(f)]** They have been active in monitoring the activities of citizens, enforcing the hijab and arresting women for violating the dress code, and seizing 'indecent' material and satellite dish antennae. . In May 1999 the Minister of Islamic Culture and Guidance stated in public remarks that the Government might support an easing of the satellite ban. However, Supreme Leader Khamenei, who makes the ultimate determination on issues that involve radio and television broadcasting, quickly criticised any potential change as amounting to "surrender" to Western culture, effectively ending any further debate of the idea. **[4(g)]** The "Special Basijis" are not permitted to participate in political parties or groups, although other members of the Basij can belong to political associations if they are not on a Basij mission and do not use the name or resources of the Basij for the association. Basijis can participate in specialist or trade associations.

**4.40.** Ashura Brigades were reportedly created in 1993 after anti-government riots erupted in various Iranian cities. In 1998 they consisted of 17,000 Islamic militia men and women, and were composed of elements of the Revolutionary Guards and the Baseej volunteer militia. **[3(a)]**

**4.41.** Hezbollahi ("partisans of God") consist of religious zealots who consider themselves as preservers of the Revolution. They have been active in harassing government critics and intellectuals, have firebombed bookstores and disrupted meetings. They are said to gather at the invitation of the state-affiliated media and generally act without meaningful police restraint or fear of persecution. **[2(c)][3(a)]**

### **Legal Rights/Detention**

**4.42.** The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran contains many important safeguards of rights and freedoms that are guaranteed in the international instruments to which Iran is a state party including those relating to freedom of expression and fair trial. These seek to ensure that all individuals enjoy the same rights under law. **[9(j)]**

**4.43.** Restrictive, contradictory and vaguely worded provisions contained in the Penal Code, **[9(m)]** the Theologians' Law - a body of law that deals with offences committed by clerics - and the Public and Revolutionary Courts' Procedural Law undermine the right to freedom of expression. For example, the Penal Code prohibits a range of activities, such as those connected with journalism or public discourse, which do not amount to recognisably criminal offences. **[9(j)]**

**4.44.** No reliable information is available regarding the number of disappearances. In the period immediately following arrest, many detainees are held incommunicado and denied access to lawyers and family members. **[4(k)] [8(f)]**

**4.45.** It was reported in a written statement by France Liberte (a non Governmental Organisation in special consultative status to the UN Commission on Human Rights) that Iranian cities have been the scene of an unprecedented spate of savage punishments including amputation of fingers and legs as well as floggings that have been carried out in public. **[10(s)]**

**4.46.** In March of 2002 the reformist parliament approved the outline of a bill banning the use of torture to gain information from detainees. Before becoming law, the bill will have to go through a second reading and be approved by the Guardian Council. **[5(aa)]** On the 8 June 2002 the Guardian Council rejected and returned the Bill for more "clarification". **[8(g)]** The bill is currently stuck in the legislative process due to the inability of all parties to agree on a suitable definition of torture.

### **Death Penalty**

**4.47.** By law the death penalty can be carried out for offences such as espionage, murder, armed robbery, abduction, rape, adultery or incest, sexual intercourse between a non-Muslim man and a Muslim woman, homosexual intercourse, drug smuggling, the use of arms to spread fear or alarm among the people or deprive them of their freedom or security, or the spreading of corruption on earth (mofsed). **[3(c)]** There is an instance in which a thirteen year old boy Azizullah Shenwari was sentenced to death (drug trafficking) although this was later commuted to life imprisonment currently under appeal. **[9(k)]**

**4.48.** The number of executions recorded by Amnesty International in Iran until June 2001 was 44, **[3(c)]** and is recorded as having reached 139 by years end, although the true figure may be much higher. **[9(n)]** According to a written statement submitted by France Liberte, a NGO, to the UN Commission on Human Rights the number of announced executions since the beginning of 2002 - in six months - amounts to 200, indicating a 50 percent rise compared with the same period in 2001. **[10(s)]**

**4.49.** Human rights monitors have alleged that many of those executed for criminal offences, primarily narcotics charges, may be political dissidents. **[4(k)]** The Iranian authorities do not permit visits to imprisoned dissidents from human rights monitors, although they have promised to look into their policy in the post-resolution environment. **[4(f)] [4(k)]**

### **Prisons**

**4.50.** Prison conditions are harsh. Some prisoners are held in solitary confinement or denied adequate food or medical care in order to force confessions. Female prisoners reportedly have been raped or otherwise tortured while in detention. **[10(r)]** Prison guards reportedly intimidate family members of detainees and torture detainees in the presence of family members. **[4(k)]**

**4.51.** According to a January 2002 report by the UN Commission on Human Rights the press reported a statement by the head of the National Prisons Organisation stating that

there were about 160,000 inmates of whom about two thirds were in prison for drug-related offences, that most of the inmates were aged between 22 and 38, and that 5,000 were women. Moreover, the prison population had increased over 40 per cent in the previous year, and the prisons were now housing more than 100,000 inmates beyond their capacity. Some commentators have questioned whether the figure of 160,000 includes the inmates of the detention centres run by many of the security agencies which were supposed to have been integrated with the National Prisons Organisation; this has not yet been effected. **[10(p)]**

**4.52.** The dominant feature of Iranian prisons is their overcrowding and this seems to have had the inevitable results of prison disturbances on the one hand and breakouts on the other. It also noted that HIV/AIDS and other diseases were spreading rapidly throughout the prison population. **[4(k)]** In 2000, drug users constituted more than half of the prison population and the number of inmates incarcerated for drug related crimes was 80,415. **[34]** by September 2002 it was being reported that up to two thirds of Iranian prisoners were in jail on drug related offences. **[5(ar)]** Eighty per cent of prison authorities acknowledged that drug use took place inside prisons although not at a great rate. **[34]**

**4.53.** One of the main plans to deal with these problems seems to be the establishment of a parallel system of camps for drug related offences, to be located in remote parts of the country. The Director of the Prisons Organisation reports that eight such camps are now in existence. **[10(p)]** The proliferation of unofficial, illegal detention centres, such as the so-called Prison 59 in Tehran also gave cause for concern. **[8(f)]**

## **Medical Services**

**4.54.** There are two types of hospitals in Iran, private and governmental. To receive treatment in the governmental hospitals, one must belong to the Social Security Scheme whereby the employer pays the subscriptions for the employee, which would then entitle them to subsidised medical treatment and medication. In Tehran and other larger cities such as Shiraz and Isfahan there are many well-reputed hospitals. These are staffed by physicians and specialists, most of whom are very experienced and internationally trained. There is an extensive range of specialist care found in Tehran, both in the private and governmental sector. For complex medical conditions where treatment is not available locally, the patients can apply to the Supreme Medical Council for financial assistance towards payment of medical expenses overseas. The Supreme Medical Council consists of a group of specialist doctors who assess and examine each case to determine whether such assistance in funding should be allocated. **[26(a)]**

## **Drug Addiction**

**4.55.** Drug addiction is considered a crime but the authorities are ready to consider drug use as a medical problem. Drug users who are undergoing treatment are not meant to be persecuted, nor are the specialists offering treatment. The costs of diagnoses, treatment, medicines and rehabilitation are to be paid by the addicts according to the approved tariffs but the government will finance the costs for those unable to pay. **[34]**

**4.56.** The State Welfare Organisation, affiliated to the Ministry of Health is in charge of treatment and rehabilitation of drug users. Up until recently there were 12 treatment and

rehabilitation centres in the country with one centre for women. The centres were described as having the infrastructure of an overcrowded prison. These centres have now been closed and the new approach is the introduction of outpatient treatment centres. [34] In 2000, the number of out-patients centres in provincial capitals was 100 compared to 65 centres in 1999 and 40 in 1998. During 2000 it was anticipated that the treatment centres could offer services to over 100,000 volunteer addicts per annum. [5(at)] [34] In recent years a number of treatment facilities have been established by the private sector and are openly advertising in the press. The qualifications of the people running these clinics, and the outcomes of their activities, still remains largely untested. [34]

## **Drugs**

**4.57.** Most medications are available locally under various generic and company labels. [28(b)] Those medicines not available, which are approved by the US Food and Drug Administration, can be ordered through the Red Crescent Society by presenting a doctor's prescription. The prices for medications bought in Iran are by far much cheaper than the UK prescription and dispensing charges. There has also been considerable development in the pharmaceutical industry in Iran during the last decade. The essential raw material for the majority of medicines is imported from overseas and then the medicine produced and packaged locally. This is again subsidised by the government. There is also a black market for certain types of foreign medications and the cost of such medications is quite high in comparison to those readily available at pharmacies. [26(a)]

## **Psychiatric**

**4.58.** In Iran, a village based primary care system serves over 60 regions of the country, with village centres linked to surrounding hospitals and medical schools. The national health program supports training in mental health care. [28(c)] The government has also established four regional centres for the prevention of mental disorders. [27]

**4.59.** With a view to expanding mental health services in 2001 and beyond, Iran's national mental health programme was being revised, a new mental health act was in preparation, and efforts were being made to increase inpatient and outpatient mental health facilities and counselling services. [28(b)][28(c)][29]

**4.60.** A private members bill to make the administrative and technical affairs of the medical institutions in Iran consistent with the principles of holy Shari'ah was approved in 1998. The bill applied to all state and private medically related institutions set up with the permission of the Ministry of Health. [5(g)]

## **People with Disabilities**

**4.61.** There is no available information regarding whether the Government has legislated or otherwise mandated accessibility for the disabled. However, the Cable News Network reported in 1996 on the harsh conditions in an institution for retarded children who had been abandoned by their parents. Film clips showed children tied or chained to their beds, in filthy conditions, and without appropriate care. It is not known to what extent this represents the typical treatment of the disabled. [4(h)]

## **Hiv/Aids**

**4.62.** The first AIDS case was identified in 1986. The cumulative total to late 1997 was 1,297 cases of HIV infection and 192 cases of AIDS. The Iranian National Committee on AIDS has reported a cumulative total of 1,953 HIV/AIDS cases by April 2000. As of July 2001 there were 2,458 reported HIV infections and 357 AIDS cases. However, in 1999 it was estimated 25,000 people in Iran were HIV positive while in the same year the Ministry of Health estimated there were 60,000 people infected with HIV or AIDS. **[34]** In August 2002 it was announced that based on the latest available figures, over 3912 people were HIV afflicted and that 3,680 had contracted aids. **[5(au)]**

**4.63.** It appears there are scant HIV prevention programs in place among drug users or drug injectors in Iran and what is available is unlikely to be specific and/or explicit about the ways to avoid becoming HIV infected. It has been reported that there are no printed materials on HIV/AIDS for drug users and drug users are a hidden population and difficult to gain access to. Efforts to distribute needles and syringes to imprisoned drug users has met with strong objections. **[34]** In recent times however, harm reduction pilot programs have been introduced in the three provinces most affected by injecting drug use (Kermanshah, Shiraz and Tehran) and the Ministry of Health has initiated these. **[34]**

**4.64.** Although a National Aids Policy (Nap) does exist, and HIV infections are highest among intravenous drug users (IDUs), the coordination of activities between the NAP and the National Drug Control Headquarters is generally lacking. Brochures have been prepared for schools and families on the issues of HIV/AIDS but none have specifically been produced for drug users. The main focus of the policy appears to be to control the nation's blood supply and the prevention of HIV transmission through medical injections. Specific mention and/or activities aimed at drug users has been omitted. **[34]**

## **Education**

**4.65.** Primary education, beginning at age six and lasting five years, is compulsory for all children and is provided free of charge although this has not been fully implemented in rural areas. **[1(b)]** Secondary education may last for a further seven years, divided into two cycles; one of three, and another of four years.

**4.66.** In 1996 primary enrolment in schools included 90per cent of children aged between 6 and 11 years (91per cent of boys, 88per cent of girls). In 1996 the total enrolment at primary and secondary schools combined amounted to 86per cent of the school-age population (90per cent boys, 83per cent girls). In 1997/98 the illiteracy rate within the population over the age of 15 years was 20.3per cent for males and 34.1per cent for females. **[1(a)]**

**4.67.** Expenditure on education by the government represented 15.6per cent of total spending in 1999/00. **[1(a)]**

**4.68.** There are 37 Universities, including 16 in Tehran. There were 678,652 students enrolled at Iran's public colleges and universities in 1999/2000, in addition to the 726,228 students enrolled at the Islamic Azad University. **[1(b)]** Applicants to universities are assessed for their support of government ideology and the Islamic system. Prospective university professors are required to co-operate with government

authorities over a number of years before they are appointed. **[4(f)]**

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## **5. A. HUMAN RIGHTS: OVERVIEW**

**5.1.** The Secretary-General to the United Nations, Kofi Annan, defined human rights obligations in Iran when he spoke at the University of Teheran on 10 December 1995. He said that:

“Human rights are what make us human. They are the principles by which we create the sacred home for human dignity... Human rights are the expression of those traditions of tolerance in all cultures that are the basis of peace and progress. Human rights, properly understood and justly interpreted, are foreign to no culture and native to all nations.” **[10(b)]**

**5.2.** Iran is a signatory to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and five other international instruments. **[9(j)]** It is not a signatory to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women or the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. **[10(c)]** Neither is it a signatory to the optional Protocols to the ICCPR (including that aimed to abolish the death penalty). **[9(c)]** Amnesty International continues to bring Iran’s continued use of the death penalty up as a major concern. **[9(h)][9(i)]**

**5.3.** In 1996 the government established a human rights committee in the Majlis and a human rights commission in the judiciary, but observers believe that they lack independence. Also in 1996 the government allowed the first visit in 5 years of the UN Human Rights Commission Special Rapporteur. The UN Special Rapporteur and Human Rights Watch reported that the government was generally co-operative during their visits. However, the government continues to deny the universality of human rights and attempts to discredit critics. The UN Special Rapporteur for Religious Freedom and the UN Special Rapporteur for the Freedom of Expression also travelled to Iran in 1996. **[4(a)][4(b)]** While the UN Special Representative on Iran has not visited Iran since 1996, an invitation to visit the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances has been issued by the Government of Iran. **[10(b)]** In July 2002 Iran's permanent representative to the United Nations in Geneva invited the representatives of the UN human rights commission to visit Iran. **[5(az)]** One is scheduled to visit in November 2002.

**5.4.** Procedures governing arrest, detention and trial are rarely made public. **[4(b)][9(d)]** Reports of systematic human rights abuses include extrajudicial killings and summary executions; disappearances; widespread use of torture and other degrading treatment; harsh prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; lack of due process; unfair trials; infringement on citizens’ privacy; and restrictions on freedom of speech, assembly, association, religion and movement. **[4(f)]** An example of alleged human rights abuses is that of the ill treatment of a magazine editor released in May 1998, said to have included mock-execution. **[8(d)]** Following a prison inspection by President Khatami in

1997, the new Director-General for prisons, Morteza Bakhtiari, told the UN Special Representative that the prison system is was going to be reorganised, including the elimination of illegal detention centres. [19]

**5.5.** Brigadier General Ghamreza Naqdi, head of intelligence and security for the national police, was tried in 1999. He was accused of torturing detainees, following complaints brought by 312 Tehran district mayors and municipal officials, who were detained with Karbaschi in 1998. [5(l)] He was acquitted of torture but sentenced to 8 months in jail on lesser charges including slander. Two other defendants were sentenced to up to five months in jail for keeping city officials in solitary confinement, preventing them from exercising in fresh air and ordering their hair shaved off; [5(q)]

**5.6.** Several Iranian dissidents who fled abroad were tracked down and killed throughout the 1980s and 1990s by Iranian government agents. [4(b)][9(d)] Human rights are still being violated [10(b)] and in some areas the situation is thought to have deteriorated. [10(a)] The Khatami government, however, is putting emphasis on the rule of law, and has condemned all forms of terrorism, although Khatami considers that support for people who fight for the liberation of their land is not support for terrorism. [4(b)][9(b)][5(h)]

**5.7.** This said, the prospect of improvement of the human rights situation in Iran has grown stronger since Khatami was elected and Iran appears to be in the early stages of transition. [10(b)] President Khatami's plans for a tolerant and diverse society continue to unfold. Areas of acceptable public debate have broadened and the overwhelming mandate given to the Khatami government by the electorate in 1997 supported the objective of a civil society that respects the rule of law and personal freedoms. [10(b)]

**5.8.** Progress is being made, particularly in the area of freedom of expression, but it faces considerable opposition. [10(m)] This includes factional struggle and occasional violent tactics from hard-line elements opposed to change, [4(f)] within the security forces such as the Revolutionary Guards Corps as well as outside. [8(d)]

**5.9.** The national human rights institution, which aims to develop and protect human rights in Iran, is the Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC). The UN Commission on Human Rights recognises that the IHRC should aim to work within the 1993 Paris Principles, which establish benchmarks for the competence of such national institutions as well as their composition of members and operational and other working methods. This is particularly important given the resistance to government objectives from some powerful quarters in Iran. [10(b)]

**5.10.** In late 1997 the Special and Permanent Representative of Iran to the UN in Geneva appealed to the Iranian government to ensure that the internationally recognised safeguards on human rights are adhered to. In particular, that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, ratified by Iran in 1996) and the Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from being subjected to Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1975) be applied. [10(b)] Mr Kharazi, the Iranian Foreign Minister, invited comments and dialogue with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and other participating states, but did not

commit to any revision of the UDHR which includes Iran. [10(d)]

**5.11.** The US State Department Report of 2001 [4(k)] notes that the authorities in Iran restrict the work of local human rights groups. However, whilst international non-government organisations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International are not permitted to establish offices in Iran or to conduct regular investigative visits there, [4(f)] the government is providing other financial and organisational support for NGO's in Iran. [19] HRW and members of an European judicial monitoring NGO were permitted to send representatives to Shiraz for the trial of 13 Iranian Jews on espionage charges. [4(k)] However they were not allowed to monitor the trial proceedings.

**5.12.** In April 1998 the UN Commission on Human Rights welcomed the moves by the Iranian authorities to enable greater freedom of expression, particularly in the media and cultural fields, and in the willingness to allow more public demonstrations. It also recognised the expectation of the Iranian public for tangible progress with human rights and freedom of individuals, and the need to clamp down on extrajudicial groups who attempt to curtail all these areas of concern. The Commission is continuing to look at the human rights situation and in particular that of women, the minority religious groups such as the Baha'is and Christians, and the harassment of journalists, writers and dissidents. [10(i)]

**5.13.** Throughout 2001 scores of political prisoners, including prisoners of conscience, were arrested and others continued to be held in prolonged detention without trial or following unfair trials. Some had no access to lawyers or family. In a continuing clamp-down on freedom of expression and association, led by the judiciary, scores of students, journalists and intellectuals were detained. At least 139 people, including one minor, were executed and 285 flogged, many in public. [9(q)]

### Freedom of Speech and the Media

**5.14.** The Constitution provides for the freedom of the press, except when published ideas are "contrary to Islamic principles or are detrimental to public rights." In practice the government does restrict freedom of speech and the press. [4(f)] The Government exerts control over the media by methods such as controlling television and radio broadcasting networks and access to newsprint. It owns all broadcasting facilities. [4(f)] However, since his inauguration President Khatami has stated his intention to loosen constraints on freedom of expression. [4(b)] Some signs of this were observed in 1997 and early 1998. In October 1997 a yearlong ban on the Iranian-Armenian monthly publication 'Araz' and the 2½ year ban on the 'Jahan-e Eslam' newspaper were lifted. [4(b)]

**5.15.** In March and April of 2001, the Revolutionary Court ordered the arrest of at least 60 academics, journalists and intellectuals associated with the *Milli Mazhabi* (national-religious trend), notably the *Nehzat-e Azadi*, Iran Freedom Movement. Some were released within days and many others between May and October 2001. In November 2001, at least 26 detainees were publicly accused by the judiciary of "acts against national security" and "seeking to overthrow the state by illegal means", vaguely worded charges which could attract long prison sentences. In November 2001, trial proceedings against at least 12 members of the *Nehzat-e Azadi* were initiated with the reading of a 500-page indictment. [9(q)]

**5.16.** On 27 July 2002 Iran's Revolutionary Court sentenced more than 30 (33) liberal dissidents to up to 10 years in Jail. The court also ruled to dissolve the Freedom Movement. **[5(ay)]**

### **Press Law**

**5.17.** Oversight of the press is carried out in accordance with a press law that was enacted in 1995. The law established the Press Supervisory Board, which is composed of the Minister of Islamic Culture and Guidance, a Supreme Court judge, a Member of Parliament, and a university professor who is appointed by the Minister of Islamic Culture and Guidance. The Board is responsible for issuing press licenses and for examining complaints. **[4(k)]**

**5.18.** The 1995 Press Law prohibits the publishing of a broad and ill-defined category of subjects, including material "insulting Islam and its sanctities" or "promoting subjects that might damage the foundation of the Islamic Republic." Generally prohibited topics include fault-finding comment regarding the personality and achievements of the late Leader of the Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini; direct criticism of the Supreme Leader; questioning the tenets of certain Islamic legal principles; and advocating rights or autonomy for ethnic minorities. **[4(k)]**

**5.19.** In July 1999, Majlis deputies voted in principle for a major overhaul of Iran's press law. Proposed changes in the law include compelling journalists to reveal their sources, barring journalists and editors linked to certain opposition groups from engaging in any form of press activity, and increasing conservative influence over the media. **[5(o)]**. In August 1999 another amendment apparently directed at the independent press was proposed, which would define a new class of "political offences," including the "exchange of information with foreign embassies, diplomatic representatives, media, and political parties, that may be determined to put national interests in jeopardy." **[4(g)]**

**5.20.** In March 2000, immediately after the success of reformers to capture a majority of seats in Parliament in the February 2000 parliamentary elections, the outgoing Parliament passed amendments to the Press Law that gave the Press Court increased procedural and jurisdictional power. The new Parliament (which was seated in May 2000), introduced a bill in August 2000 to reverse the restrictive amendments. However, Supreme Leader Khamenei intervened with a letter to the Speaker demanding that the bill be dropped from consideration. Despite some strongly worded objections from members, the bill was withdrawn. **[4(k)]**

**5.21.** Offending writers are often subject to trial, with fines, suspension from journalist activities, lashings, and imprisonment being common punishments if found guilty of offences ranging from propaganda against the State to insulting the leadership of the Islamic Republic. **[4(b)][10(b)]** Instances of vigilante activity against clerics and intellectuals regarded as critical of the Islamic establishment have been reported. **[8(c)]** Police raids and attacks by Ansar-e-Hezbollah on the offices of newspapers and liberal publications were reported in 1998, apparently without subsequent action being taken by the courts. **[4(f)]**

**5.22.** In June 1998 31 members of the Majlis demanded the impeachment of the Interior Minister, Hojatolislam Abdollah Nouri, accusing the noted liberal and supporter of reform

as having used the media to create discord. Nouri was dismissed by a majority vote in the Majlis but President Khatami immediately appointed him to a newly created Cabinet post of Vice-President for Development and Social Affairs. He also appointed Nouri's former deputy Mussavi Lari, also a liberal, as the acting Interior Minister in the wake of Nouri. **[17(a)]** In September 1998 Nouri and Ayatollah Mohajerani (the Culture and Islamic Guidance minister) were attacked by an unidentified group at a public meeting. **[19]**

**5.23.** Frequent clashes between moderates and conservative clergy over the freedom of journalism and the press have been evident since 1995. **[3(a)]** The levels of freedom of expression permitted by the Government during 1998 varied. The atmosphere of tolerance in early 1998 led to wide public debate, resulting in alarm within anti-reformist groups. The judiciary then closed down several publications and jailed writers and editors for exceeding what was interpreted to be permissible expression. At least 12 publications were banned or suspended in 1998. **[4(f)]**

**5.24.** When the pro-Khatami newspaper "Jameah" was banned by the courts in June 1998 for publishing controversial remarks made by a senior military official as well as immoral and insulting material, **[3(a)]** the editor was convicted of libel. He was also banned from practising for one year by the special press court. **[17(a)]** The paper was immediately permitted to re-open under a new name ("Tous"), which publicly questioned the authority of Ayatollah Khomeini and was banned by the Justice Department a week later. The ban was revoked by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance and a licence issued to re-open under the third name ("Aftab-e Emrouz", or "Today's Sun") in August 1998. **[3(a)]** In October 1998 4 employees of the newspaper were arrested following publication of an article questioning the policies of the Iranian government in Afghanistan. **[4(f)]**

**5.25.** Other actions against publications included the temporary closure of weekly paper "Navid-e-Esfahan" in October 1998 on charges such as "acting against the country's security and disturbing public opinion", and the suspension of biweekly publication "Asre-e-Ma" for "fabrication and dissemination of insults". The definition of what constitutes freedom of expression and what represents treason was considered by Iranian leaders. The President's press advisor confirmed in a press interview in September 1998 that the executive and the judiciary differed in their interpretation. She made it clear that the Press Supervisory Board, which has a representative from both the judiciary and the legislature, is responsible for supervising the press. It is not the role of the courts to do so. **[10(b)]**

**5.26.** In May and June 1999, a number of pro-reform newspaper publishers and editors were called before the Special Revolutionary courts or the Special Court for Clergy for alleged press violations. Amnesty International reported the detention on unspecified charges of Heshmatollah Tabarzadi, editor-in-chief of the weekly newspaper Hoveyat-e-Kish (Our Identity) and Hossein Hashani, its director. Tabarzadi is also president of the Islamic Students Association. **[5(m)][9(g)]**

**5.27.** Iran's leading reformist newspaper, Salam, was banned by the Special Court for Clergy following a complaint by the intelligence minister. Salam had published what it claimed to be a secret memo detailing a plan by hard-liners to muzzle the moderate press. The memo was attributed to Information Ministry official Sa'id Emami, who

subsequently died in prison. The court charged Salam with violating Islamic principles, endangering national security and disturbing public opinion. The ministry subsequently withdrew its complaint but the ban remained in force. **[5(p)]** Salam's publisher was found guilty on all counts, including defamation, insulting language and publishing a classified document. **[5(u)]**

**5.28.** Many of the leading publications that represented the views of the reform movement were ordered closed during the year, including Rah-e No, Jame'eh, Salaam, Iran-e Farda, Adineh, Neshat, and Khordad. In March the magazine Zan (Woman) was ordered closed by a Revolutionary Court for publishing part of a New Year's greeting to the citizenry from the former Empress, Fara Pahlavi, who is living in exile, and for printing a cartoon satirising an aspect of Shari'a (Islamic law) that is currently in effect, under which the "blood money" that is paid to the family of a murdered woman equals half that paid to the family of a murdered man. A leading reformist daily, Neshat, was ordered closed in September, and its editor, Mashallah Shamsolvaezin, was arrested on charges concerning the publication in Neshat of an article that called for the abolition of the death penalty. However, his arrest was not carried out by the authorities until November. He was sentenced to a 6 month prison term for forgery, 12m rials fine for the use of a forged document and a 2.5 year prison term for publishing two sacrilegious articles. **[4(g)][5(w)]**.

**5.29.** Article 168 of the Iranian Constitution states that enquiry into press offences will be undertaken in open court before a jury. The press control regime is seen to need improvement, although progress is being made. The circulation of the press doubled between mid-1997 and 1998; up to 900 press publications licences were active in 1998; and at least 7 professional press associations have been established. **[10(b)]**

**5.30.** The repression continued throughout 2001. At least 20 newspapers and other publications were suspended by the courts on an array of vague charges such as "publishing lies" and "defamation." Publications were suspended for indeterminate periods by the judicial authorities, including the Special Court for the Clergy, and journalists were detained or sentenced to prison terms. Only two of the more than 50 publications closed in previous years were permitted to reopen. **[9(q)]** By years end, at least five journalists were in jail on charges related to their journalistic work, while dozens more had been summoned to court, were appealing pending prison sentences, or had been fined and barred from practising their profession. **[29]** On the 11 August 2002 it was reported by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance that 85 publications had been banned since March 1998. **[5(aw)]** However by 07 August 2002 more than 5 Iranian news-based Web sites had been opened, 2 of them in place of recently banned daily newspapers. **[5(ax)]**

**5.31.** The Tehran Press Court prosecuted reformist publications throughout 2001, despite vocal protests from journalists and members of the reform dominated Majles, or Parliament. In December, three Iranian Parliamentarians were convicted of libel and other offences in connection with their scathing criticisms of the judiciary. Among them was Hossein Loghmanian, who was jailed for libelling the courts after he denounced the press crackdown. **[29]**

**5.32.** The 73 year old journalist, Siamak Pourzand was detained by security forces on November 29 2001. None of the charges against him have been made public. Whilst

the official newspaper Iran Daily reported that his trial had begun in public on 6 March 2002, and that he was represented by a lawyer, his family have contradicted this. Pourzand heads the Asiatic and Cultural Complex in Tehran and has contributed to several reformist newspapers. All of them have since been reported, closed. **[8(f)]** On the 9 July 2002 the Tehran Appeals Court upheld an 11 year prison sentence against Pourzand. **[9(p)]**

**5.33.** The monitoring of film and theatre productions has shown marked improvement, with routine and objective clearance procedures. The main inhibitors seem to be the scarcity of venues for showing the work. **[10(b)]**

**5.34.** It was reported in 1998 that over 15,000 books were now being published each year, with only 100 rejected since 1995. Details of the reasons for individual titles being rejected are reported in the press. Publishers are being issued permanent licences rather than ones valid for 12-18 months. **[10(b)]** Owning and operating a print shop or reprography centre is governed by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance regulations governing the printing industry, namely under Article 4. **[2(i)]**

## **Internet and Satellite**

**5.35.** The Internet remained a small but important source of alternative information for many Iranians. Perhaps contrary to expectation, the Internet in Iran is not censored. **[21(z)]** Although the Head of the Judiciary, in September 2002, called for the establishment of a special committee to launch a judicial study on Internet related offences and for the presentation of a Bill on the issue. **[21(ac)]** According to one estimate, there are some 380,000 Internet users in Iran, out of a population of 73 million. The country had about 100 Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and about 1,500 Internet cafés in the capital, Tehran. Some ISPs do take it upon themselves to filter objectionable political and moral content. In November 2001, the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution, an unelected body with legislative powers in the field of culture and education, announced that the state would take control of all Internet service providers over the next two years. **[9(q)]** In May, the authorities closed down some 450 Internet cafés in an apparent attempt to protect the state telecommunications monopoly against competition from low-cost Internet telephone service. The cafés were allowed to reopen in June after they obtained new licenses. **[21(t)] [21(u)] [29]**

**5.36.** That month, however, state telecom ordered Iranian ISPs to block material deemed immoral or threatening to state security, including dissident Web sites. It was unclear whether the order was practical or enforceable. And in November, the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council, a government body, issued a decree requiring all private ISPs to dismantle their operations and hand over their assets to the state. The controversial decree had not yet been implemented at press time.

**5.37.** Likewise, it remained unclear whether the directive was enforceable and whether the council had the constitutional authority to pass it in the first place. Parliament was expected to debate the issue in 2002. **[21(v)] [29]**

**5.38.** Television and radio remained in the hands of the conservative establishment and largely reflected its views. Satellite dishes remained popular, despite a 1995 ban on

their use, allowing Iranians access to international programming. In late October, however, authorities confiscated some 1,000 dishes and arrested several dish owners. The dish crackdown was an apparent state response to provocative broadcasts by satellite channels affiliated with secular Iranian opposition groups based in the United States. Satellite broadcasts of Iranian soccer matches were introduced by commentators who condemned the Islamic regime and called on Iranian citizens to hold street demonstrations. They also broadcast footage showing soccer fans vandalizing property after the matches. The authorities later threatened to confiscate thousands more dishes. [29][4(k)] In May 2002 it was reported By the authorities in Tehran Province that amongst other things they had confiscated 11,191 Satellite dishes. [21(ab)]

## **Freedom of Religion**

**5.39.** Religious freedom is set out in the 1979 Constitution of Iran. Jafari (Shi'ite) Islam is the official religion of Iran and accords full respect and recognition for other Islamic schools, including the Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki, Hanbali, and Zaydi. [3(a)][4(b)] Shi'a Muslims make up 89 per cent of the population, Sunni Muslims amount to 10 per cent and non-Muslims such as Zoroastrians, Christians, Jews make up the remaining 1 per cent. [3(b)]

**5.40.** Article 13 recognises the Zoroastrian, Jewish and Christian minorities, [3(c)] specifically described in the Constitution as "protected religious minorities". [4(b)] Within the limits of the law, members of these faiths are free to perform their religious rites and ceremonies, and to act according to their own canon in matters of personal affairs and religious education. Article 14 calls for the respect of the human rights of non-Muslims as long as they refrain from engaging in conspiracy or activities against Islam or the Islamic Republic of Iran. Article 15 protects the use of tribal and regional languages in the press, mass media and in schools. [10(b)] Article 64 provides for Majlis representation of the Zoroastrians, Jews and Christians [3(a)] to reserved Majlis seats. [4(f)]

**5.41.** Contrary to Article 19, which says that all people of Iran enjoy equal rights whatever their ethnic group or tribe [10(b)], discrimination against religious minorities by the Government exists. [4(f)] Members of religious minorities other than the Zoroastrians, Jews and Christians are not elected to representative bodies. Neither do members of religious minorities hold senior government or military positions. [4(f)] Although Zoroastrians, Jews and Christians are permitted to maintain schools, they experience disruptive interference of their administration by the government. All public school students, including non-Muslims, must study Islam. [4(l)] University and public sector employment applicants are screened for adherence to Islam. [4(c)]

**5.42.** Religious minorities suffer discrimination in the legal system, receiving lower awards than Muslims in injury and death lawsuits, and incurring heavier punishments. However, the Majlis debated a Bill to equalize blood money for Muslims and non-Muslims and it was reported on 01 September 2002 that a Christian family received the same "blood money" as that of a Muslim in a murder case. [5(aq)] Muslim men are free to marry non-Muslim women but marriages between Muslim women and non-Muslim men are not recognised. [3(c)] [4(j)][4(i)][4(k)]

**5.43.** The Government is highly suspicious of any proselytising of Muslims by non-Muslims and can be harsh in its response, in particular against Baha'is and evangelical Christians. **[3(c)][4(j)][4(i)][4(k)]**

**5.44.** The Government does not ensure the right of citizens to change or renounce their religious faith. Apostasy, specifically conversion from Islam, can be punishable by death. **[3(c)][4(j)][4(i)][4(k)]**

**5.45.** Religious minorities, whose numbers have dwindled, remain particularly vulnerable. In August 2001, the UN Human Rights Commission's special representative on Iran reported that the number of individuals belonging to ethnic and religious minorities emigrating from Iran was estimated to be in the tens of thousands annually. **[35]**

### **Legal Framework**

**5.46.** Laws relating to religion have been used repeatedly to limit freedom of expression. These include, in particular, Art. 513 of the Penal Code and Art. 6 and 26 of the Press Code. **[3(c)][4(j)][4(k)]** Under Art. 513, offences considered to amount to "insult" to religion can be punished by death or imprisonment of [between] one to five years. Similarly, Art. 6 and 26 of the Press Code proscribe "writings containing apostasy and matters against Islamic standards (mavazin-e eslami)" and "the true religion of Islam...", but state that such cases will be heard in a criminal court. **[3(c)][4(j)][4(k)]**

**5.47.** Both the Penal Code and Press Code do not specifically define what activities constitute insult to religion and have, indeed, been used to punish people for the expression of their opinion. **[3(c)][4(j)][4(k)]** Non-Muslim owners of grocery shops are required to indicate their religious affiliation on the fronts of their shops. **[4(l)]**

### **Sunni Muslims**

**5.48.** Sunnis are in theory the largest religious minority in Iran, but are not recognised as a minority as they are part of the same Islamic family as the majority, the Shi'a Muslims. **[3(b)]** Sunni Muslims are largely drawn from the Kurdish, Arab, Turkoman, Baluchi and other ethnic minorities. **[3(a)]** They live mainly in the southern provinces of Sistan/Baluchistan and Khorassan. **[4(b)]** The area is economically poor, with limited developmental prospects. Of the occasional clashes between the Sunnis and the Shi'as in areas of mixed population, most have been in west Azerbaijan and in Sistan/Baluchistan. **[10(b)]** Sunnis also have accused the state broadcasting company of airing programming insulting to Sunnis. There have been instances where Sunni clerics have been killed in recent years, some allegedly by government agents although it is unclear exactly how serious the situation is. **[4(k)]**

### **Christians**

**5.49.** According to the Iranian government, in 1997 there were between 117,000 and 200,000 Christians in Iran, although the UN Special Representative (UNSR) used the figure of 300,000 in a 2001 report **[4(l)]**, made up of Assyro-Chaldeans and Armenians, **[3(c)]** with the greater number being Armenian. **[2(c)][3(b)]** it is difficult however, to obtain a reliable estimate as there is the added complication of mixing ethnicity with

religious affiliation. **[10(o)]** The UNSR also reported that Christians were emigrating at an estimated rate of 15,000 to 20,000 per year. **[4(l)]** They are concentrated mainly in urban areas, and are legally permitted to practice their religion and instruct their children, but may not proselytise Muslims. **[3(a)]** The authorities have become particularly vigilant in recent years in curbing what is perceived as increasing proselytising activities by evangelical Christians, whose services are conducted in Persian. Conversion of a Muslim to a non-Muslim religion can be considered apostasy.

**5.02.** Government officials have reacted to this perceived activity by closing evangelical churches and arresting converts. Members of evangelical congregations are required to carry membership cards, photocopies of which must be provided to the authorities. Worshipers are subject to identity checks by authorities posted outside congregation centres. Meetings for evangelical services have been restricted by the authorities to Sundays, and church officials have been ordered to inform the Ministry of Information and Islamic Guidance before admitting new members to their congregations **[4(h)]**

**5.51.** There were reports of eight deaths of evangelical Christians at the hands of the authorities in the past 10 years. Late in 1999, an investigative reporter alleged that officials within the Intelligence Ministry were responsible for the murders of three prominent evangelical ministers in 1994, a crime for which three female members of the Mujahedin-e Khalq organisation had been convicted. **[4(g)]**

**5.52.** Mistreatment of evangelical Christians continued during the period covered by this report. Christian groups have reported instances of government harassment of churchgoers in Tehran, in particular against worshipers at the Assembly of God congregation in the capital. Instances of harassment cited included conspicuous monitoring outside Christian premises by Revolutionary Guards to discourage Muslims or converts from entering church premises and demands for presentation of identity papers. **[4(j)] [10(p)]**

**5.53.** The Constitution provides for the representation of Assyrian and Chaldean Christians in reserved seats in the Majlis. **[3(a)]** Armenians have lived in Iran for centuries, mainly in Tehran. The government appears to be tolerant of groups such as Armenian Christians because they conduct their services in Armenian and thus do not proselytise. Christian associations without an ethnic focus sometimes face difficulties in obtaining legal recognition of their existence. **[2(c)]** Christians are allowed to maintain their own schools and participate in a broad range of cultural activities within their own community. **[3(b)]**

## **Apostasy**

**5.54.** As stated above, proselytising Christian churches, especially Evangelicals, are likely to be regarded more suspiciously by the Iranian authorities. **[3(b)]** Apostasy, or conversion from Islam to another religion, is not acceptable in Islamic law. **[3(c)]** An innate-apostate (one whose parents were Muslims and who embraced Islam but later left Islam), if a man, is to be executed. If a woman, she is to be imprisoned for life, but will be released if she repents. A national apostate (a person converting from another faith to Islam, and then reconverting back to the other faith) is to be encouraged to repent and, upon refusal to repent, is to be executed. **[3(c)]** The most prominent cases

of apostasy appear to occur from Islam to Christianity. Proselytising apostates (converts who have begun preaching Christianity) are likely to face execution. 17 clerics are known to have been in detention in 1995. **[3(a)]**

## **Jews**

**5.55.** Jews are a constitutionally recognised minority of 20,000-40,000, **[2c][3a]** with one representative in the Majlis. **[3(a)]** Before 1979 the Jewish population of Iran was estimated at 100,000. Most live in Teheran. After the revolution they were eased out of government positions as well as from some private sector employment. As a result they are engaged for the most part in small businesses and commercial pursuits. **[4(e)]** They are permitted to obtain passports and travel (including to Israel), but they are normally denied multiple entry visas and permission for entire families to travel abroad together. **[2(c)][4(e)]**

**5.56.** In May 1998 a Jewish businessman Ruhollah Kakhodah-Zadeh, was hanged in prison without a public charge or legal proceeding. He may have been killed for assisting Jews to emigrate. As an accountant, Kakhoda-Zadeh had provided power-of-attorney services for Jews departing the country.

**5.57.** In February and March 1999, 13 Jews were arrested by security forces in the cities of Isfahan and Shiraz. Among the group were several prominent rabbis, teachers of Hebrew, and their students, one a 16-year-old boy. They were held for 14 months or more without formal charges until their trial began in May 2000. The delay in clarification of charges appeared to violate Article 32 of the Constitution, which states in part that in cases of arrest “charges with the reasons for accusation must, without delay, be communicated and explained to the accused in writing, and a provisional dossier must be forwarded to the competent judicial authorities within a maximum of 24 hours so that the preliminaries to the trial can be completed as swiftly as possible”. **[4(h)]**

**5.58.** Eight Iranian Muslims were also arrested. There was a strong feeling that the case was being used by hard-liners to undermine the reformists’ efforts to improve Iran’s image and relations with the outside world. **[21(i)]** Defence lawyers said the prosecution’s case rested largely on confessions given while the defendants were held in solitary confinement with no lawyers present. Two prominent ayatollahs had called for the death penalty but in the event the judge imposed jail sentences of four to thirteen years for 10 of the accused Jews. These sentences were further reduced on appeal. 3 others were acquitted. **[15(g)][23(b)]** One of the 10 convicted was released in February 2001 upon completion of his prison term. A second was released at the end of his prison term in January 2002. **[4(l)]**

**5.59.** Education of Jewish children has become more difficult in recent years. The Government reportedly allows the teaching of Hebrew, recognizing that it is necessary for Jewish religious practice. However, it strongly discourages teachers from distributing Hebrew texts to students, in practice making it difficult to teach the language. Moreover, the Government has required that several Jewish schools remain open on Saturdays, the Jewish Sabbath, in conformity with the schedule of other schools in the school system. Because working or attending school on the Sabbath violates Jewish religious law, this requirement has made it difficult for observant Jews to both attend school and

adhere to important tenets of their religion. [4(l)]

**5.60.** Jews are reportedly allowed to practice their religion freely, provided that they do not proselytise. Their laws on divorce and burial are accepted by the Islamic courts and they enjoy a degree of self-administration. In general they do not face persecution because of their religion. This said, they might face bureaucratic difficulties such as having to wait longer for the issue of travel documents. [4(k)]

## **Zoroastrians**

**5.61.** The Zoroastrian (the pre-Islamic religion of Iran) population of several thousand includes South Asian Zoroastrians (Parsis) and is concentrated in the southern cities of Yazd and Kerman. [3(a)][3(b)] The Government figures reported by the United Nations in 1996 place the size of the Zoroastrian community at approximately 35,000 adherents. Zoroastrian groups cite a larger figure of approximately 60,000, according to the same U.N. report. Zoroastrianism was the official religion of the pre-Islamic Sassanid Empire and thus played a central role in the country's history. [4(l)] Traditionally, Zoroastrians do not accept converts [26(c)] and favour marriage between blood relations; they do not proselytise. [3(a)] They are free to practice and teach their religion and have one representative in the Majlis. [3(b)]

**5.62.** There were no reports of government harassment of the Zoroastrian community during the period covered by this report. [4(j)]

## **Sabeans (Mandeans)**

**5.63.** The Iranian Mandeans are included among the recognised religious minorities and live mainly in Khuzistan, near the Iraqi border. They work mainly in agriculture and with precious metals, are a low-profile group and are small in number. [3(b)] The small community faces discrimination similar to the countries other pre Islamic religious minorities. [4(j)] Mandaeanism enjoyed official support as a distinct religion prior to the revolution, but their legal status as a religion since then has been the subject of debate in the Majlis and never has been clarified. [4(l)]

## **Baha'is**

**5.64.** The Baha'i faith was founded in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century in southern Iran as an offshoot of Shi'a Islam. It has since developed into a separate religious faith. Baha'is believe in a God who is completely transcendent and unknowable, and that divine manifestations occur throughout the ages, in the form of prophets or messengers ("Divine Educators"), including Adam, Moses, Jesus, Zoroaster, Buddha and Mohammad. They believe that the founder of their faith, Baha'ullah, was a divine manifestation, who will be followed by other manifestations as mankind develops, but that this will not happen for at least 1,000 years. Thus Baha'i doctrine accepts all prophetic religions as being true, but claim that theirs is the most suitable to the present age. They do not accept the Islamic belief that Mohammad is the 'seal' of prophets. Unlike Islamic practice, according to which the child of a Muslim is deemed automatically to be a Muslim, the Baha'is believe that each individual is responsible from the age of 15 for his/her own faith. [11][13]

**5.65.** There is no priesthood in the Baha'i faith, but there is an administrative hierarchy

of elected local and national Spiritual Assemblies, with considerable authority. The highest organ of administration is the Universal House of Justice in Haifa. Other institutions include the appointed bodies known as the Hands of the Cause of God and the Continental Board of Counsellors, both concerned with spreading the faith and protecting the Baha'i community. [11][13]

**5.66.** The Baha'i community in Iran is said to number 300,000 - 350,000 - the largest religious minority in the country - and traditionally has suffered discrimination. [3(b)] [3(c)][10(I)] Their religion is not acknowledged as a separate faith by Iranian Muslims, but are regarded as a heretical sect. Anti-Baha'i sentiment is rooted in the theological disapproval of the religious establishment; the perception that they co-operated with the Shah regime and opposed the revolution; [11][13] and the belief that they are agents of espionage activities, [3(b)] [4(j)] Zionism and imperialism. The Baha'i World Centre is in Haifa, Israel, and before 1979 many Baha'is made remittances and pilgrimages to Israel. Baha'i links with an area which is now in Israel lies in Baha'ullah's death in exile in what was at that time Ottoman Palestine. Participation in party politics is not permitted among Baha'is and anyone breaking this rule is liable to expulsion. [11][13] There is no evidence of Baha'is being involved in partisan politics, in Iran or elsewhere. [10(I)][11][13]

**5.67.** Not being one of the protected religious minorities in Iran, Baha'is experience discrimination including extrajudicial executions [3(b)], arbitrary detention, dismissals from employment and confiscation of properties. [4(k)] Many have reportedly been denied retirement pensions and work permits, unemployment benefits, business and commercial licences. Some Baha'is dismissed from public sector jobs were required to return the salaries and pensions received while they were working, [4(k)] and Baha'i farmers can be denied access to farm co-operatives, which deprives them of their only access to credits, seeds and fertilisers. Although Baha'is do have access to the courts and have used them on occasion to attempt to reverse specific decisions, almost invariably the court rules against them. Baha'is are refused entry to universities, [3(b)][13] but in the past year have been allowed to enrol in the pre-university year at the high school level. [10(b)]

**5.68.** Property rights of Baha'is are generally disregarded and both private and business properties may be confiscated. Blood money for Iranians killed is not enforceable where the victim is a Baha'i, and there have been instances of Baha'i conscripts having been killed by fellow soldiers or officers while undertaking military service. In 1996 the Head of the Judiciary stated that Baha'ism was an espionage organisation [4(f)] and Baha'is have since been strictly forbidden to seek probate. [10(I)]

**5.69.** Freedom of movement out of the country can be difficult for Baha'is. [2(c)][10(b)] They are generally denied identity cards and passports [3(b)], although in 1997/8 there was an increase in the number of passports issued. [10(I)] Registration of Baha'is is a police function. [4(I)]

**5.70.** However, it has become somewhat easier for Baha'is to obtain passports in order to travel abroad. In addition some Iranian embassies abroad do not require applicants to state a religious affiliation. In such cases, Baha'is more likely are able to renew passports. [4(k)]

**5.71.** In January 1998, 21 Baha'is were held in prisons within Iran under various charges relating to their beliefs, 4 of whom faced the death penalty for Baha'i activities or apostasy. In July 1998 one of the detained Baha'is was executed, accused of converting a woman from Islam to the Baha'i faith. **[4(f)][8(d)][10(l)]** The woman had denied the accusation. **[4(f)][10(l)]** Two additional Baha'is had death sentences passed in October 1998 for practising the Baha'i faith and have appealed against the decision. **4(f)][10(b)]** The European Parliament called upon the Iranian authorities not to carry out the death sentences. **[5(l)]** Another Baha'i was sentenced to ten years imprisonment in October 1998.

**5.72.** By early 1999 the number of Baha'is detained had fallen to 14 **[4(f)]**, 6 of whom remained on death row **[4(f)][10(b)]**, and 7 known to be facing prison sentences of 3 to 8 years. Charges again ranged from teaching the faith to espionage activities. They had been asked to support closure of the Baha'i Institute of Higher Education (BIHE) and to withdraw co-operation with it. **[10(b)]** In March 1999, the four remaining detainees from the 1998 raid on the Baha'i Institute of Higher Learning were convicted and sentenced to prison terms ranging from 3 to 10 years. **[4(h)]** But currently no Bahai is on death row.

**5.73.** Over the past 2 years, the Government has taken some positive steps in recognizing the rights of Baha'is, as well as other religious minorities. In November 1999, President Khatami publicly stated that no one in the country should be persecuted because of his or her religious beliefs. He added that he would defend the civil rights of all citizens, regardless of their beliefs or religion. Subsequently the Expediency Council approved the "Right of Citizenship" bill, affirming the social and political rights of all citizens and their equality before the law. In February 2000, following approval of the bill, the head of the judiciary issued a circular letter to all registry offices throughout the country, which permits any couple to be registered as husband and wife without being required to state their religious affiliation. This measure effectively permits the registration of Baha'i marriages in the country. Previously Baha'i marriages were not recognized by the Government, leaving Baha'i women open to charges of prostitution. Consequently children of Baha'i marriages were not recognized as legitimate and therefore were denied inheritance rights. **[4(k)]**

**5.74.** September 2001, the Ministry of Justice issued a report that reiterated that government policy continued to aim at the eventual elimination of the Baha'is as a community. It stated in part that Baha'is would only be permitted to enroll in schools if they did not identify themselves as Baha'is, and that Baha'is preferably should be enrolled in schools that have a strong and imposing religious ideology. **[4(l)]**

**5.75.** Members of the Baha'i community continued to be denied the right to participate in religious gatherings and faced official discrimination in education, employment, travel, and housing. According to the UN Human Rights Commission's special representative on Iran, seven Baha'is remained in jail in Iran during the year. **[35]**

**5.76.** In what appeared to be a hopeful development, in 2002 the Government offered the Tehran community a piece of land for use as a cemetery. However, the land was in the desert, with no access to water, making it impossible to perform Baha'i mourning rituals. In addition the Government stipulated that no markers be put on individual

graves and that no mortuary facilities be built on the site, making it impossible to perform a proper burial. [4(l)]

### **Freedom of Assembly and Association**

**5.77.** The Constitution permits assemblies and marches “provided they do not violate the principles of Islam”. [4(k)] In practice, the government restricts freedom of assembly. [4(b)] There have been reports that demonstrations and riots have been broken up by the armed security and anti-riot forces, resulting in deaths and arrests. [4(b)][8(b)][4(k)]

**5.78.** There is conflict between the announced government policy on freedom of expression and the activities of some of the judiciary and security services, as well as the extra-judicial groups such as Ansar-e-Hezbollah. However, since the 1997 election, the government has shown signs of addressing the unlawful measures resorted to by some groups to curtail freedom of expression. In October 1997 the Ministry of the Interior granted permission to the Union of Islamic University Students to hold a rally. Social issues, some of which were anti-Constitution in nature, were raised at the rally and the Government later defended its decision in the Majlis. [10(b)]

**5.79.** There are reports of low grade conflict surrounding the events staged in July 2000 by students to mark the anniversary of the 1999 student demonstrations. Contemporary reports conflict, but reformist events were countered by conservative student events, and confrontation between the two groups occurred. The riot police were usually on hand, sometimes dispersing demonstrators at the onset of violence, and in other instances standing by as the factions struggled and then broke away, intervening afterwards and arresting stragglers. [2(i)]

**5.80.** In August 2000, two leading reform intellectuals were prevented by semiofficial vigilantes armed with clubs and knives from addressing a student convention in Khorramabad. Subsequent clashes between students and vigilantes resulted in the death of a police officer and injuries. The authorities arrested 150. [4(k)]

**5.81.** In October 2001 riots and demonstrations broke out throughout the country after the national soccer team lost a match it had been heavily favoured to win. The main participants in the unrest were young persons, who appeared to use the situation to show their general displeasure with the restrictive lifestyle imposed on them by the Regime. The Government arrested hundreds. [4(k)] but all were quickly released.

**5.82.** In July 2002 several thousand people took to the streets of the Iranian capital, Tehran, to mark the anniversary of violent street protests in 1999. The protesters defied a government ban on any gathering to commemorate the riots, which were sparked by a police raid on a student dormitory. There were sporadic clashes and some demonstrators were arrested or beaten, but no serious injuries were reported. [21(ad)]

### **Employment Rights**

**5.83.** Unemployment was an issue discussed in closed, unofficial sessions by the Majlis in 1998. The Majlis and the Government aimed to address the problem together with ways of creating employment and managing investment. The private sector is to be involved in future sessions. The Majlis estimated that between 1986 and 1996 over 8,300,000 joined the employment age group of 15 to 64 years in Iran, whilst only

3,600,000 jobs were created. Notwithstanding this, the unemployment rate fell from 14.8per cent to 9.1per cent, and the population growth rate fell correspondingly from 3.2per cent to 1.7per cent. [5(e)] However, 800,000 citizens are added to the labour market each year, [19] and whilst 9per cent unemployment is the official statistical guideline, unofficial estimates of 20per cent [19] or 25per cent may be more realistic. [4(f)] The Majlis estimated that the average economic growth rate must reach 6.7per cent (it was at 1per cent in July 1998) to maintain the employment level. [5(e)] Inflation in 1998 was an estimated 25per cent. [4(f)]

**5.84.** The capacity of the country's mining and industrial sectors to create employment was also discussed. Ongoing projects in the industrial sector would create 51,000 new jobs each year if completed, but have been delayed due to a shortage of rials and foreign currency. Concern about the recession among the Majlis has led to calls for reform of the law on taxation and employment. [5(g)]

**5.85.** The Labour Code allows for the establishment of unions; however, the Government does not allow independent unions to exist. [4(k)] There is one national, government controlled, labour organisation known as the Worker's House, founded in 1982. [4(k)] The Labour Code also allows employers and employees to establish guilds. The guilds issue vocational licenses and help members find jobs. [4(k)]

**5.86.** No strike is tolerated that is deemed to be at odds with Government policy. The law also prohibits strikes by government workers. However in January 2002 teachers 5took part in large demonstrations, outside Parliament in Tehran, demanding higher pay and better conditions. [21(af)]

**5.87.** Newspapers in 1999 reported an "unauthorised rally" by thousands of workers over the Government's labour policies and the poor economy. Instances of late or partial pay for government workers reportedly are common.

**5.88.** The Labour Law prohibits forced and bonded labour by children, employment of minors under 15 years of age and places restrictions on the employment of minors under age 18; however, laws pertaining to child labour are not enforced adequately and child labour is a serious problem. [4(k)]

**5.89.** There are no known affiliations with international labour organisations. [4(k)]

## **Trafficking**

**5.90.** The law does not prohibit specifically trafficking in persons, however people were reportedly trafficked to, through, and from the country during the year. [4(k)] There have been regular but unconfirmed reports of the MKO trafficking children from camps in Iraq to Europe and North America. [30]

## **Freedom of Movement**

**5.91.** Iranians enjoy freedom of movement within Iran. [2(c)] Citizens may travel to any part of the country, although there have been occasional restrictions on travel to Kurdish areas during times of heavy fighting. [4(f)] However, leaving Iran may be difficult for certain Iranians, particularly women, Baha'is, Jews (in some cases), certain government opponents, those thought to be members of the radical opposition groups [2(c)] and

draft-age males. **[4(f)]**

**5.92.** All Iranians may apply to the passport office within the Ministry of the Interior for passports and exit visas. Any outstanding business with government, such as unpaid taxes, would have to be settled before the government would issue travel documents. Men must submit proof that they have either completed their military service or have an exemption **[2(c)]**. Government employees may need a letter of permission or to post a bond to travel abroad. Citizens who were educated at public expense and whose skills are in short supply are required to post bonds to obtain exit permits. **[4(f)]** Women must have written, notarised permission from their father, husband or legal guardian, except in certain circumstances (e.g. widows). No one under 18 is issued a passport, except under special circumstances where the minor is travelling without a parent or guardian. **[2(c)]**

**5.93.** Passports are checked at the airport for criminal offences by the police, and against computerised lists by the Ministry of Intelligence for political, Sharia, narcotic, commercial or tax offences. The airport authorities seem to be in possession of lists which are not the same as those kept at the passport office and possession of a passport and exit visa does not guarantee exit. With so many checks by the authorities involved, it would be difficult for passengers who are wanted by the Iranian authorities to pass the control system at Teheran's airport by means of bribery or false documentation. Counterfeit passports are, reportedly, uncommon in Iran. **[2(c)]**

**5.94.** People seeking to leave Iran illegally do so most commonly overland through Turkey, Pakistan or Azerbaijan. **[2(c)] [3(c)]** The penalties for violating or attempting to violate exit regulations, such as leaving on an illegal or falsified document, range from 1 month -3 years imprisonment and/or a fine. **[2(c)]**

**5.95.** Citizens returning from abroad are sometimes searched and interviewed by the authorities upon return. This happens particularly at times when the authorities note increased activities of dissident groups outside the country, as in late 1998. **[4(f)]** On the basis of the information Amnesty International receives, usually a person who gets back will be asked why s/he was abroad. If the answer is along the lines of "I just tried to find a job", they will most likely be allowed to go home to their families. Generally speaking, it does depend on what kind of documentation exists on the returnee and what the actual practice of the country is in which the concerned individual applied for asylum. **[3(c)]**

**5.96.** Upon return, in recent years the practice has become more liberal with regard to possession and confiscation of items purchased abroad, such as CDs from Dubai and other Western products. It mostly depends on what the authorities are looking for. If they assume that a person has returned from a country like the USA this person certainly will be questioned and undergo stringent checks, but will normally not be detained for a longer period of time. **[3(c)]**

**5.97.** Since 9 August 1998, British Airways has resumed direct flights to Teheran and stated the intention to station its flight crew there. **[6(b)]** Iranian nationals need to obtain a visa to travel to, or through, the United Kingdom. **[2(a)][20(b)]**

## Refugees in Iran

**5.98.** The Government of Iran generally co-operates with the UNHCR and other humanitarian organisations in assisting refugees. Iranian law contains provisions for granting refugee status in accordance with the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol. **[4(f)]**

**5.99.** The country hosts a large refugee population, mostly Afghans who fled during the Soviet occupation. The UNHCR estimates that there are approximately 1.4 million Afghan refugees in the country, though the Government puts estimates as high as 2.3 million.

**5.100.** The UNHCR estimate that there were about 386,000 Iraqi Kurdish and Arab refugees in Iran at the end of the year 2000. Many of these Iraqi refugees originally were expelled by Iraq at the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war because of their suspected Iranian origin. In numerous instances, both the Iraqi and Iranian Governments dispute their citizenship. Other Iraqi refugees arrived following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. **[4(h)]** During 2001, the governments of Iraq and Iran signed an agreement to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of refugees in both countries. At year's end, it was unclear how the agreement would affect Iraqi refugees in Iran. Some 1,727 Iraqi Arabs repatriated from Iran in 2001, a modest increase from the 1,360 who repatriated in 2000. UNHCR did not promote these repatriations, however, telling would-be returnees that the agency could not monitor or guarantee their safety upon return. **[35]** An estimated 18,000 Iraqi Kurds returned spontaneously to northern Iraq in 1999 without UNHCR assistance and without passing through government controls. In 2000 and 2001, spontaneous repatriations of Iraqi Kurds to northern Iraq slowed considerably; only 2,277 were known to have returned in 2000, while in 2001 the number dropped once again, to 1,389. **[35]**

**5.101.** In early 2002 the Iranian authorities and UNHCR were co-operating in establishing registration centres for refugees wishing to return to Afghanistan; exit points were to be constructed at three points along the Iran-Afghanistan border in preparation for the commencement of voluntary repatriations. **[1(b)]** The programme of voluntary returns under UNHCR auspices commenced in April 2002 and it is expected that 400,000 will have returned by the end of 2002. **[1(b)]**

**5.102.** Although the Government claims to host more than 30,000 refugees of other nationalities, including Tajiks, Bosnians, Azeris, Eritreans, Somalis, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis, it has provided no information about them nor allowed the UNHCR or other organisations access to them. **[4(h)]**

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## 5. B. HUMAN RIGHTS: SPECIFIC GROUPS

### Ethnic minority groups

**5.103.** In general, the government does not discriminate on the basis of race. **[2(b)]** The majority are ethnic Persians. The largest ethnic minority in Iran are the Azaris. Other

minorities include the Kurds, the Arabs of Khuzistan, the Baluchis of Baluchistan and Sistan, the Bakhtiari of the Bakhtiari mountains, the nomadic Qashqais of central/southeast Iran, and the nomadic Sunni border tribe of Turkomans.

## **Kurds**

**5.104.** The Kurds are believed to number about 6 million and live in the northwest of the country, principally in the province of Kurdistan, along the borders with Iraq and Turkey. The Islamic regime deals harshly with rebellious Kurdish leaders seeking autonomy - notably those of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and the Marxist Komalah - and their militant supporters. **[3(b)][4(e)]** Iranian troops are permanently stationed in Kurdish areas and also monitor the activities of members of the Iraqi Kurdish Democratic Party in the areas. **[3(b)]** However, ethnic Kurds can be found in all walks of life in Iran both in the private and public economic sectors as well as in Iran's military and civilian establishments. **[3(a)][4(e)]**

**5.105.** Most Kurds are Sunni Muslims but there is a minority of Shi'i Muslim Kurds in Iran, primarily in the province of Kermanshah. While the Kurds in Iran traditionally had a nomadic component to their society, most have been settled due to government policy. The Kurds speak several dialects of the Kurdish language and are divided into many tribes. **[33]**

**5.106.** The status of the Kurds in Iran remains basically unchanged since 1989. The KDPI and Komala are still engaged in a military campaign in an effort to gain regional autonomy, mostly using bases in the part of Iraq which is now the Kurdish autonomous zone. **[33]**

## **Arabs**

**5.107.** The Arabs in Iran probably date back to the Arab conquest during the 7th and 8th centuries which brought Islam to Iran. The main factor that differentiates them from Iran's Persian speaking majority is that they speak one of several dialects of Arabic. **[33]** At least two million Arabs, mainly Shi'a Muslims, live in Iran, chiefly in Khuzestan and in the south. The Sunni Arabs tend to live on the Gulf coastline. **[3(a)]** About 40% live in urban areas and the majority of these urban Arabs are unskilled workers. Some urban Arabs and most rural Arabs are tribally organized. The rural Arabs of Khuzestan are mostly farmers and fishermen and many of those that live along the Persian Gulf coastal plains are pastoral nomads. These areas contain most of Iran's oil reserves. **[33]** Many are employed in the agriculture and oil industries. **[3(a)]**

**5.108.** Both the urban and rural Arabs of Khuzestan are intermingled with the Persians, Turks and Lurs who also live in the province and often intermarry with them. Despite this, Iranian Arabs are regarded by themselves and by Iran's other ethnic groups as separate and distinct from non-Arabs. **[33]**

**5.109.** The government of Iraq, both before and after Iran's 1979 revolution, accused Iran of discrimination against its Arab population. (Despite this, the Arab population of Khuzestan sided with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war). **[3(a)][33]** Outside of Khuzestan there is little ethnic solidarity among Iran's Arabs. The division between Shi'i and Sunni Muslims also hampers ethnic solidarity. **[33]**

**5.110.** The Arab Political Cultural Organization (APCO) was formed in 1979. It requested some concessions in April 1979 and was given the green light to form a provincial council with limited autonomy. Unrest occurred afterwards due to the presence of Revolutionary Guards, especially in the Khuzestani city of Khorramshahr. The unrest continued and escalated when the Arabs started bombing oil refineries and pipelines on "Black Wednesday" June 14, 1979. On April 30, 1980, they seized the Iranian embassy in London in order to free 91 Arabs imprisoned in Iran. **[33]**

**5.111.** However attempts to gain autonomy gave way to support for Iran during the Iran-Iraq war.

**5.112.** Like every other group, however, Arabs do not openly express their ethnic identity. In terms of levels of discrimination, there is some evidence of riots in Abadan that have been connected to the fact that Khuzestan as a province has been neglected by the central government. **[3(c)]**

**5.113.** There have been death sentences, mainly against people with ethnic background, although those convicted had been involved in violent acts such as the bombing of offices and liaisons, etc. **[3(c)]** As recently as January 2002 five Arab activists were hanged in Ahvaz for arms smuggling. According to the Ahwazian Arab Peoples Democratic and Popular Front, an organisation based in Europe, another five men have recently been condemned to death in Ahvaz, apparently for opposing the government's policy of land seizures in the region **[9(o)]** and on 10 June 2002, according to Amnesty International, a sixteen year old, a member of Iran's Arab minority, was reportedly detained without charge at Tehran's Mehrabad airport. Detained with other individuals, not specifically Arab, he was held in connection with passport and visa violations, though the arrest may have been politically motivated. **[9(m)]** Amnesty has expressed concern in terms of possible torture and illegal detention. **[9(m)]**

## **Baluchis**

**5.114.** The Baluchis are Sunni Muslims, numbering between one and two million. **[3(a)]** Iranian Baluch are not targeted as a group and not persecuted unless they are involved in some general opposition-related activities. They are mainly concentrated in Baluchistan province at the border with Pakistan and Afghanistan. **[3(c)]** There are large areas in these provinces that are not under the control of the Iranian authorities. In addition, the jails are overcrowded with Afghans and Baluchis who have been lured into the lucrative drug trade. **[3(c)]**

**5.115.** The situation of the Baluchis since 1989 seems to have remained unchanged, both economically and politically. They still inhabit some of the poorest regions in Iran and still are denied autonomy by the Iranian government. **[33]**

## **Azeris**

**5.116.** Iranian Azeris are not targeted as a group and not persecuted unless they are involved in some general opposition-related activities. **[3(c)]** The Azerbaijanis, also known as the Azeris, are the largest minority in Iran composing between one quarter and one third of Iran's population (estimates vary because the Iranian census does not

count Azeris specifically). They are Shi'i Muslims and in most respects similar to the rest of the Iranian population. [33] Many prominent Iranian Shi'i clerics have been and are Azeris. The one factor that differentiates them from the rest of the Iranian population is that their native language is Azeri Turkish. They live in the northwestern provinces of East and West Azerbaijan as well as in Tehran and scattered communities in between these provinces and Tehran. [33]

**5.117.** For a brief period after the revolution, the Azeri language press flourished. Also, with Soviet encouragement and support, Azeri nationalism and the desire for autonomy began to resurge. However, the Iranian government considered this nationalism to be the result of Soviet interference in Iranian affairs and began to repress this resurgent nationalism in the early 1980s. After 1981, there were few reports of disturbances and by 1984, only one of the many Azeri language publications remained. The Azeris, as of the late 1980s, have participated in the Iranian government at a national level as much as any other group, including ethnic Iranians, up to the highest levels of government. [33]

**5.118.** The Azeris have no illegal or legal political parties or organizations. As has been the case since the mid-1980s, the Azeris have not had to deal with much repression or discrimination. The Iranian government prefers to emphasize the cultural similarities between the Persian speaking majority of Iran and the Azeris. The only repression or discrimination that occurred since the revolution has been immediately after the revolution in order to repress the stirring Azeri nationalism and demands for autonomy. [33]

## **Women**

**5. 119.** Iranian women were very much involved in the 1979 Revolution. Women were told to take to the streets and participate in the overthrow of the Shah and in the establishment of an Islamic State. While initially women in the Revolution were heralded as heroic militants, gradually the clerical elite has come to describe the ideal woman as an obedient wife and mother. [3(c)]

**5.120.** Both the Constitution and international conventions adopted by Iran grant men and women equal rights. This conforms to Islamic criteria. Further, Article 21 of the Constitution stipulates that the government shall guarantee women's rights in all respects and create a favourable atmosphere for restoring their material and spiritual rights. [3(b)]

**5.121.** This is not to say that women do not face social and legal discrimination. [4(f)] The view of women in a primarily familial context and motherhood role continues to be encouraged. Women may work or study, [4(k)] although some areas of study are closed to women, female students are segregated from male teachers, and social constraints inhibit their opportunities. [2(d)] This said, the literacy level was more than 80 per cent among Iranian women in 1998 [14(a)] and may now be above 90 per cent. [10(b)] In a recent statement made by the adviser to the President on Women's Affairs, it was reported that the percentage of 6-14 year old girls attending school had increased from 94 per cent to 97 per cent and that the percentage of girls accepted at universities had increased to 64 per cent. [5(aj)] The choice of a woman's occupation depends on her husband, who may prevent her working if he deems it contrary to the family's interest, although he must prove this to the Special Civil Tribunal. [2(d)][3(c)]

**5.122.** The State enforces gender segregation in most public spaces, and prohibits women mixing openly with unmarried men or men not related to them. Women must ride in a reserved section on public buses and enter public buildings, universities, and airports through separate entrances. although this restriction does not appear to be enforced universally. Women are prohibited from attending male sporting events, **[4(h)]** although foreign women have been allowed to watch international football matches in Iran. In August 2002 the authorities banned women ,as well as youth under 25, from smoking the Middle Eastern Water Pipe, or Narguileh, in Tehran's restuarants and cafes. As part of a bid to maintain "social discipline". **[ 5(ap)]**

**5.123.** 30per cent of doctors are said to be women. **[10(b)]** However, in 1998 the Majles passed legislation that mandated segregation of the sexes in the provision of medical care. The bill provided for women to be treated only by female physicians and men by male physicians and raised questions about the quality of care that women could receive under such a regime, considering the current imbalance between the number of trained and licensed male and female physicians and specialists. **[4(h)]** This law is almost universally ignored without problem. Women's recruitment to the police force was approved in 1998, though mainly to work in women-related functions; it was announced on 29 August 2002 that soon, in Zanzan Province, female police officers will carry out patrol duties ;and soon similar units will become active in other provinces. **[5(ai)]** Women journalists now have their own professional association. **[10(b)]** and the first female university chancellor has been appointed, albeit to a women's university. **[10(b)]**

**5.124.** In the political field, women have been appointed to two positions of some responsibility by President Khatami, with Masumeh Ebtekar appointed as the first female vice president (for environmental protection) thereby giving a woman Cabinet rank for the first time since the founding of the Islamic Republic. **[1(a)][4(b)]** and Azam Nouri as Deputy Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, both in 1997. He has also appointed a woman to serve as Presidential Advisor in the Foreign Ministry's Department for Women and Social Affairs. One of the district mayors of Teheran is also female. However, women held only 12 of the 290 Majlis seats after the year 2000. **[1(a)][4(g)][4(h)]** On 27 May 2002 it was reported that the government was planning to employ women in the Foreign Ministry as secretaries and charge d'affaires. **[5(ak)]**

**5.125.** Women have been appointed to four positions of female family court judge by President Khatami. **[3(b)]** However, the role of the four female judges was challenged and described as symbolic, as judicial consultants brought in to improve the image of women in Iran for the benefit of the international community. **[10(j)][10(b)]** Their authority is limited principally to family law cases. **[4(f)]** Following the first female prosecutor appointment in 1996, twenty women were reported to be training as investigative judges. **[3(b)]** Women have also been appointed to senior diplomatic positions overseas. These developments indicate some change in the situation of women within Iran. **[10(b)]**

**5.126.** Women suffer discrimination in the legal code, **[3(c)]** particularly in family and property matters. It is difficult for many women, particularly those living outside large cities, to obtain legal redress. Under the legal system, women are denied equal rights

of testimony and inheritance. **[10(j)]** In a bill passed by the Majlis 22 May 2002 gave divorced mothers the same custody rights over boys as girls **[5(al)]** and now awaits Guardian Council approval. A woman's testimony is worth half that of a man's, making it difficult for a woman to prove a case against a male defendant. **[9(c)]**

**5.127.** Violence against women in the family is recognised, with "blood money" (Deyah) only awarded if the aggrieved party is a man. In addition, families of female victims of violent crimes are reported to have to pay for an assailant's court costs. The Majles have just passed a bill equalising blood money for men and women (before, that of men was worth twice that of women), but the law has yet to be ratified. Little detail is known of the degree of domestic violence in Iran, with no official statistics on abuse within the family. **[4(f)]** There is a lack of legislative provision to regulate actions against women. Iran welcomed UN contributions to the drafting of a convention on the elimination of forced labour and trafficking in women for sexual and other exploitation. **[10(n)]**

**5.128.** A prominent Iranian scholar, Ayatollah Bojnourdi, spoke out in favour of the revision of laws, which are discriminating between men and women. In 1998 the judiciary's Bureau of Women's Affairs further said that legislation meant to reduce hardship for women in divorce and property cases had not yet properly implemented. **[10(b)]** In addition to the position of women regarding evidence of witness, inheritance, retribution and judgement in civil and penal codes, the continued arranged marriages of young girls by fathers and grandfathers was noted. **[10(b)]**

**5.129.** Women are given segregated medical treatment following the recent "Medical Religious Standard Conformity Act", other than where emergency wards are used. They also travel in segregated railway carriages unless travelling with a male companion; have access to separate parks within some cities; and can use separate facilities in a newly opened passport office. While the Iranian authorities have claimed such steps are for the safety and convenience of women, they do not represent gender equality according to international standards. **[10(b)]**

**5.130.** In December 1997 President Khatami called for a re-evaluation of religious attitudes towards women, to "purge practices that are considered religious but are not". **[10(b)]** Conservatives responded by trying to ban activism for women's rights. **[8(d)]** In June 1998, Legal scholar Hojatoleslam Sayyid Mohsen Saidzadeh was convicted by the SCC for his outspoken criticism of the treatment women under the law. He was released from prison early in 1999; however, the Government banned him from performing any clerical duties for 5 years and prohibited him from publishing. **[4(g)]** A bill aimed at making defence of women's rights outside legal and Sharia frameworks illegal, passed its second reading in August 1998. This bill would also prevent pictures of unveiled women from appearing in the press. **[8(d)]**

**5.131.** Limited practical improvement in the condition of women is evident. The Deputy Speaker in the Majlis has stated that laws need to be amended before women can enjoy their full rights. In 1998 the Government published several papers on a three-year action plan to help prevent, identify and deal with violence against women **[10(b)]**

**5.132.** With regard to passports, the requirements are usually checked when a person

wanting to leave applies for a passport. If the criteria, one of them being the husband's permission, are not fulfilled the passport will not be issued. Once you are at the airport you should not have a problem. There does not seem to exist a special written permission by the husband for a woman to leave the country. **[3(c)]**

## **The Hijab**

**5.133.** The Hijab (modest dress code) became mandatory in 1980 and is required to be worn in all public places regardless of a woman's religion or citizenship. **[3(c)]** Women's hair must be fully covered and their faces free of make-up. Contravention of the dress code is punishable by either a verbal reprimand, **[3(a)][3(b)]** a fine, 74 strokes of the lash **[3(a)][3(b)][8(b)]** or a prison term of up to three months. **[8(b)]** Enforcement has varied considerably since the death of Ayotollah Khomeini, and continues to be enforced arbitrarily. Thousands of women have been arrested and taken in for questioning and in some cases flogged; arrests are carried out by the morality police, the Revolutionary Guards and the Baseej. Detentions increase during periods such as the period of Moharram in May 1998, associated with mourning and piety. **[8(d)]** Failure to observe the Islamic dress code at work by government workers can result in prosecution under a law passed in 1993. **[4(f)]**

**5.134.** The public attempts at loosening the Hijab are driven predominantly by those aged under 25 years, who make up 60per cent of the population. The battle between Khatami and the hard-line conservatives over relaxing the Islamic restrictions continues. **[14(a)]**

**5.135.** The Web is providing a way for women in Iran to talk freely about taboo subjects such as sex and boyfriends. **[21(z)]** as a result of the increase in the number of weblogs or online journals. **[21(z)]**

## **Marriage**

**5.136.** Current law in Iran sanctions two types of marriage: permanent marriage and temporary marriage (called sigheh or mut'a). Temporary marriage is limited by a period of time, normally specified in the marriage contract, which may vary from 1 hour to 99 years. The husband may terminate the marriage at any time. Men are allowed up to four permanent wives and an unlimited number of concubines or temporary wives. **[2(d)][4(f)]** Muslim men are free to marry non-Muslim women, but marriage between Muslim women and non-Muslim men is not recognised. **[4(f)]**

**5.137.** The marriage rate increased by only 4per cent from 1987 to 1995, whereas the divorce rate increased by 9per cent over the same period. **[3(b)]** The showing of the film "Leila" in Teheran in 1997 generated public debate about the status of married women, and of multiple marriage in particular. **[10(b)]** The minimum legal age for marriage is 9 years, **[4(f)]** although the Majles have passed a bill raising the age to 13 for girls and 15 for boys. Although marriage at the minimum age is rare. **[4(h)]** All women must have the permission of the father or a living male relative to marry.

**5.138.** Following the 1979 Revolution in Iran, Islamic leaders told the populace to procreate and produce an army of 20 million. The population subsequently grew by up to 4per cent per annum. However, the clerics now support the notion of contraception

with teachings from the Koran, and the population growth rate has halved. **[15(a)]**

**5.139.** Iran's reformist parliament passed a bill on 27 August 2002 which would allow donation of foetuses for the first time since the 1979 Islamic Revolution but the bill needs approval by the conservative Guardian Council of Clerics to become law. **[5(an)]**

## **Divorce**

**5.140.** Divorce applies to permanent marriage only. A husband wishing to divorce is required **[3(c)]** to obtain court permission to register the divorce if his wife does not agree to the divorce, but registration can only be delayed by the court, not prevented. A husband is not required to cite a reason for divorcing his wife. The conditions under which a woman may divorce depend on the year that she married, and the legislation that was in effect at the time of her marriage. **[2(d)][4(b)]** On 28 September 2002 it was reported that the Guardian Council had returned, to the Majlis, for further consideration, a bill which would allow women greater rights to divorce their husbands. **[5(am)]** Divorced women, particularly in rural areas, may find themselves socially isolated and may face financial difficulty. **[19]**

**5.141.** In 1986 the government issued a 12-point model contract for marriage and divorce which limited the privileges traditionally accorded to men under Islamic law. A divorced woman's rights to a share of the matrimonial properties and to increased alimony rights were recognised. **[4(f)]**

**5.142.** In the event of divorce, the father traditionally has legal custody of his children **[2(d)][4(b)]**, unless a woman can show her spouse to be an unfit father and applies under legislation passed in November 1998 to obtain custody. **[4(f)][10(b)]** The civil code provides for custody of a male child to belong to the mother until the child is 2 years old, and of a female child until she is 5. **[2(d)][4(b)]** Women who remarry are forced to give up custody of children from earlier marriages to their father. **[4(f)]**

**5.143.** The position of a divorced woman and further relationships after divorce can be fraught, with accusations of "immoral behaviour" and possible "adultery" brought to the Ershad. **[2(m)]**

**5.144.** The phenomenon of husband killing, punishable by death, is on the rise in the male dominated society, some point to abuse or philandering as factors. **[5(ao)]**

## **Abortion**

**5.145.** The position of whether it is legal to perform abortions is unclear in law, and many doctors are reluctant to proceed. This is irrespective of a fatwa by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei that abortion may be undertaken in cases of medical necessity, such as when thalassaemia has been detected. Illegal abortion clinics have been prosecuted in recent years. **[2(e)]**

**5.146.** There are a number of women's organizations (semi-official as well as non-governmental) that have been created since the Revolution and in particular in the last few years such as the Cultural and Social Council for Women, the Women's Affairs Commission, Women's Affairs Bureau, Women's Sports Department, International

Office for Women, Bureau for Promotion of Rural Women's activities, Rural Women's Cooperative, Women's Solidarity Societies, etc. **[3(c)]**

## **Children**

**5.147.** Education is officially compulsory for five years, between 6 and 10 years of age, but this entitlement has not been fully implemented in rural areas. Secondary education from the age of 11 lasts for up to seven years, in blocks of three and four years. 15 of the 36 universities are in Teheran. **[1(a)]**

**5.148.** The law prohibits employment of minors under 15 years of age and places special restrictions the employment of minors under the age of 18. The law permits children to work in agriculture, domestic service and some small businesses, but minors may not normally be employed in night work or hard labour. **[4(h)]** Most children have access to some form of health care. **[4(b)]** There is no known pattern of child abuse. **[4(f)]**

**5.149.** There are indications of under 18s in Government armed forces as the voluntary recruitment age is sixteen. There are also reportedly extensive child involvement in paramilitary organisations. Child soldiers, some as young as nine were used during the Iran - Iraq war of 1980 -1988. **[30]**

**5.150.** At a meeting of the United Nations General Assembly on Children on 10 May 2002 Dr. Kamal Kharrazi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated that the Iranian Parliament had been active in the promulgation of necessary legislation with the view to improving conditions for children and youth throughout the country. A new bill had been initiated in Parliament, which focused on child growth, protection and development. The aim of the bill is to tackle major causes of social and family problems that children may be subjected to. **[31]** As of 29 August 2002 the Bill had not yet been ratified by the Guardian Council. **[5(ah)]** It is also noteworthy to mention that the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention of 1999 on the Worst Forms of Child Labor has recently been adopted by the Parliament and Iran has therefore become a party thereto. **[31]**

## **Homosexuals/ Transsexuals**

**5.151.** Although homosexuality is never spoken about and thus a hidden issue, in practice it is not difficult to encounter homosexuals in Iran. There are special parks in Tehran, known as homosexual meeting places. There are also a large number of transvestites walking around in North Tehran. Furthermore, sex changes are permitted in Iran and operations are frequently and openly carried out. A different sexual orientation may, however, create problems. Still, homosexuality is practised every day, and as long as this happens behind closed doors within your own four walls, and as long as people do not intend to proselytise 'transvestitism' or homosexuality, they will most likely remain unharmed. **[3(c)]**

**5.152.** Technically, homosexual behaviour is sharply condemned by Islam, and the Islamic code of law (Sharia law) adopted by Iran. Sodomy is punishable by death if both parties are considered to be adults of sound mind and free will. **[2(b)]** It must be proven by either four confessions from the accused, the testimony of four righteous men who witnessed the act **[2(b)][15(b)]** or through the knowledge of a Sharia judge "derived through customary methods". If the accused repents before the witnesses testify, the

penalty “will be quashed”. **[2(c)]**

**5.153.** From a legal point of view it is important to take a look at Iranian law (the Islamic Punishment Act), which carries the following provisions for homosexual acts:

Art. 110: The prescribed punishment for homosexual relations in case of intercourse is execution and the mode of the execution is at the discretion of the religious judge.

Art. 111: Homosexual intercourse leads to execution provided that both the active and the passive party are of age, sane and consenting.

Art. 112: Where a person of age commits homosexual intercourse with an adolescent, the active party shall be executed and the passive party, if he has not been reluctant, shall receive a flogging of up to 74 lashes.

Art. 113: Where an adolescent commits homosexual intercourse with another adolescent, they shall receive a flogging of up to 74 strokes of the whip unless one of them has been reluctant.

Art. 114 to 126 establish how to prove homosexual intercourse.

Art. 127 to 134 relate to lesbian sexual relations. Punishment for sexual intercourse among lesbians is 100 lashes and in case of recidivity (3 times) execution. **[3(c)]**

**5.154.** So far, no cases of execution only on the grounds of homosexual relations have been identified. In fact, the burden of proof is quite high and it would be difficult to prove homosexual liaisons or intercourse. According to some reports in local papers there have been instances of execution of homosexuals. It is not confirmed whether the homosexual act alone led to execution or whether the person was accused on other charges too. **[3(c)]**

**5.155.** However, jurisprudence, burden of proof notwithstanding, certainly has used accusations of homosexuality. Furthermore, it does happen that homosexuality is mentioned as one of the accusations amongst other offences held against the defendant. For instance, accusations of homosexuality have been used in unfair trials, such as the case of a Sunni leader in Shiraz in 1996/97, who was clearly prosecuted for politically reasons. There have also been other political cases, although not in the recent past. **[3(c)]**

**5.156.** According to the Ta’azirat of November 1983 (Valid to June 1996) sentences of imprisonment for between 1 and 10 years and up to 74 lashes are possible. The death penalty may also be incurred if the act is deemed “Act against God and corruption on earth”. Since June 1996 the revised Ta’azirat omits direct threat of lashes or the death penalty. The penalties of lashing and of death are, however, still judicial options, even though they not mentioned within the revised Ta’azirat. Reports suggest that since 1996 they have rarely been used. **[19]**. The most recent report of execution is of the death by stoning of a man dates from 1995, on charges of repeated acts of “adultery and sodomy”. **[2(c)]** Reports of use of the death penalty in cases where the only offence is sodomy/execution are extremely difficult to substantiate, and are held to be an unlikely sentence. More usually lashing is the punishment. **[2(j)]**

**5.157.** However, strict though the legal position is, expert opinion consulted by the Canadian IRB states “... in practice (homosexuality) is present, and has been in the past, for the most part tolerantly treated and frequently occurring in countries where Islam predominates... In practice it is only public transgression of Islamic morals that is

condemned and therefore Islamic law stresses the role of eye-witnesses to an offence.”  
[2(j)]

**5.158.** The same source stated that the police are not empowered nor do they actively pursue homosexual activity of any kind that is performed behind the “veil of decency” of closed doors. [2(j)]

**5.159.** Sources indicate that there held to be many differing levels of homosexual activity within Iranian society. In rural areas, even *lavat* - sexual activity can be considered socially to be compensatory sexual behaviour for heterosexual sexual intercourse, and the practitioners held not to be homosexuals. [2(j)] The key offensive practice is sodomy, or more particularly to be sodomised, as an unnatural inversion of God’s creation, and some experts hold that “homosexuals” are understood in Iran to be willing passive partners. [2(j)]

**5.160.** Lesbian cases rarely come before the courts, as the case usually fails the test of proof (four righteous witnesses). Sources hold that lesbian behaviour in public is impossible to distinguish from accepted social contact between women in Iran. [2(o)] The source concludes, “Of female same-sex behaviour (musahaqa) almost nothing is known. Islamic law considers it sex outside marriage and therefore as adultery, with all the consequences already described. Yet because no penetration takes place, punishment is theoretically limited to one hundred lashes. In practice lesbian behaviour is regarded as relatively unimportant, because it usually takes place discreetly.” [2(o)] Other sources expand that lesbianism (defined as genital contact between women) is punishable by 100 lashes each and by death on the fourth offence. [2(c)]

## Political Dissent

**5.161.** The Constitution provides for the establishment of political parties and professional associations as long as they do not violate the principles of “freedom, sovereignty and national unity” or question Islam or the Islamic Republic. [4(f)]

**5.162.** Open opposition to the Iranian Constitution’s principles of Islamic clerical supremacy is not tolerated. Most independent organisations have either been banned, co-opted by the regime, or are moribund. The regime follows closely the activities of prominent political opposition figures abroad, attempts to disrupt their activities, and occasionally carries out political assassinations of such leaders. Inside Iran, militant political opponents are either executed or given long prison terms, particularly members of the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK). [4(c)] A list of political organisations, including those operating abroad, is at [Annex B](#).

**5.163.** There have been reports that many of those executed for alleged criminal offences, primarily narcotics charges, were actually political dissidents. Furthermore, a law passed in November 1995 criminalised dissent and applied sentences of imprisonment, or in extreme cases the death penalty, to offences such as “attempts against the security of the State”, including imprisonment terms of between three to ten years for assassination attempts against the Leader of the Islamic Republic or the chiefs of the three branches of state power or supreme religious authorities (Marja’e Taqlid). Insults against high-ranking Iranian officials, against the memory of Imam Khomeini,

and against the Leader of the Islamic Republic, carry the threat of execution if they fall under the "Sab-Onnabi" (blasphemy) category, or sentences to an imprisonment term between six months and five years. [4(a)][12] Reliable statistics are not available, but observers believe that scores of hundreds of Iranians are currently imprisoned for their political beliefs. [4(b)]

**5.164.** Activities of opposition groups such as Tudeh, Iran Paad, Komala, and Fedayeen have not been evident in Iran in recent years. [19] Over 1,000 members of such dissident groups were executed in 1988 / 1989, including 38 named members of Tudeh. [2(f)]

**5.165.** In December 1999 authorities rearrested former Deputy Prime Minister and long-time political dissident Abbas Amir-Entezam after an interview with him was published in an Iranian newspaper. Amir-Entezam has spent much of the past 20 years in and out of prison since being arrested on charges of collaboration with the United States following the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran by revolutionary militants in 1979. In his original trial, Amir-Entezam was denied defence counsel and access to the allegedly incriminating evidence that was used against him gathered from the overtaken U.S. Embassy. Since then he has appealed for a fair and public trial, which has been denied him. He has been a frequent victim of torture in prison; he suffered a ruptured eardrum due to repeated beatings, and kidney failure resulting from denial of access to toilet facilities, and an untreated prostate condition. He reports having been taken on numerous occasions before a firing squad, told to prepare for death, only to be allowed to live.

**5.166.** In September 2001 he was released for one month's "obligatory leave" on medical grounds, reportedly at the request of his doctor. [9(l)]

### **Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK or MKO)**

**5.167.** The Mojahedin organisation is one of the most active militant opposition groupings with a worldwide network of members and supporters. Its ideology, based on Islam, emphasises the necessity of social change and incorporates many Marxist ideas. It advocates a two-pronged strategy of armed struggle and the use of propaganda to achieve its political objectives. During the 1970s, the MEK was at the forefront of opposition to the Shah. During the early phase of the Islamic revolution it was an uneasy ally with the clergy, was responsible for several assassinations and supported the take-over of the US Embassy and the holding of American hostages. However, the clergy's drive to consolidate power led to a final break in 1981. Since 1986, when the French government closed down its headquarters in Paris, the Mojahedin has been based in Iraq and has branches in Europe and North America. In 1987, MEK's leader Masud Rajavi announced the formation of the National Liberation Army, which conducted raids into Iran during the Iran-Iraq war. The Mojahedin have been responsible for acts of sabotage, violent attacks that victimise civilians, and violence against Iranian government targets in the West. [2(a)][4(c)][4(d)]

**5.168.** Popular support for the Mojahedin has declined in Iran, and Iraq's support of it has fluctuated with the level of hostility between the two regimes. The Iranian regime's treatment of the Mojahedin opposition has been extremely severe, with reports of large

numbers of executions and torture. Known or suspected members of MEK face either execution or long prison terms if caught in Iran. [4(c)] The organisation claimed responsibility for 2 attacks in June 1998, including one a revolutionary court where three people died as a result. In August 1998 the MEK took responsibility for an attack on the former head of Evin Prison. Iran sporadically launches attacks in MEK bases in central Iraq. [19]

### **Rastakhiz Party and Monarchists**

**5.169.** The Rastakhiz Party was established by the Shah in 1975 to run a one-party state and membership was viewed as a civic duty. All officials of the government, even those at the middle and lower levels of the bureaucracy were almost automatically made members of the party because of their government employment status. Iranians, particularly those in the professions or in business, regardless of their political views, usually joined to enhance their professional or business prospects. The Islamic regime has not in the past nor does it now act against Iranians simply because they or their relatives were members of the Rastakhiz Party. [4(c)]

**5.170.** A purported Monarchist organisation entitled Javid Iran was investigated by the Canadian IRB in June 2001. The organisation was alleged to have been active in Shiraz between March and October 2000. No information about this organisation could be found by the IRB and an expert source doubted its existence. [2(h)]

**5.171.** There is no evidence of any pattern of action by the regime today against Iranians simply because at one time they were middle-level or low ranking functionaries of the Shah's bureaucracy. [4(d)]

### **SAVAK**

**5.172.** The Islamic regime was especially harsh against very high officials of SAVAK, the Shah's security organisation, following the fall of the Shah. During the first months of the Revolution, high level SAVAK officials were either executed or given very long prison sentences. Many SAVAK employees - particularly those known or suspected of having an active role in repressing Muslim clergymen and secular opponents of the Shah - were punished severely. However, a number of highly trained SAVAK employees have become part of the new security apparatus set up to replace SAVAK. In general, most low level SAVAK functionaries who found themselves detained for a short time during the initial stages of the Revolution were simply dismissed. [4(c)]

### **Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI)**

**5.173.** There are two major Kurdish parties in Iran as well as many smaller ones, including Kurdish branches of other Iranian political parties. [33] The KDPI was originally formed as an illegal organisation after World War II during the Shah's reign, to seek cultural and local autonomy. [4(b)] It has maintained a constant policy of demanding democracy for Iran and autonomy for the Kurds. It has not demanded a separate state, perhaps because of the close historical and cultural ties between Iran and its Kurds. Most of its support comes from the urban middle class, intellectuals, merchants and government employees. Since 1981, it has formally been part of the Iranian National Resistance Council (a coalition of Iranian opposition groups based in Paris) and has militarily opposed the Iranian government. [33]

**5.174.** The regime deals harshly with its leaders and their militant supporters. There are reports of extrajudicial killings and questionable detentions of Kurdish militant activists. **[4(b)][4(c)]** In November 1998 a former member of the KDPI was sentenced to death following his forcible return to Iran from Turkey. **[9(f)]**

**5.175.** The KDPI has been driven into neighbouring Iraq. Iran's support for Jalal Talabani, the leader of the PUK which runs the chunk of the Iraqi enclave contiguous with Iran, has helped to prevent the KDPI from launching cross border attacks. **[24(b)]** It is not known whether the KDPI uses children as soldiers. **[30]**

## **Komala**

**5.176.** The Revolutionary Organization of the Toilers of Kurdistan (Komala) is the other major Kurdish party. While there are claims that it has existed as an underground organization since 1969, it first appeared publicly in 1983 as the Kurdish branch of the Communist Party of Iran. While it has often violently disagreed with the KDPI, the Komalah has supported the KDPI's stance for democracy and autonomy. **[33]**

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## **5. C. HUMAN RIGHTS: OTHER ISSUES**

### **Adultery**

**5.177.** Under the Islamic Penal Code adopted by the Majlis in November 1995, those found guilty of adultery, witnessed by at least three others, are subject to execution by stoning. If a husband discovers his wife in an adulterous act he may kill her and her partner without legal consequence; a wife who discovers her husband with another woman does not have the same right. **[2(b)]** There have been several reports of execution for adultery in recent years. **[2(b)][15(b)]**

**5.178.** One IRB report has qualified understanding of the law regarding adultery, stating that the standard of proof and punishment concerning adultery reflects the contradictory practices and decisions of the Iranian Islamic courts. In essence, rural small town courts are more likely to inflict harsher sentences and perverse judgements than courts in Tehran. Reporting in 1997, the source stated that there were no recent cases of stoning in Tehran. Stoning for adultery is held not to be a widespread phenomenon. **[2(k)]** However, in July 2001, Amnesty international has received a reported case of a stoning to death of a woman for adultery, the sentence undertaken in Evin prison, Tehran. **[9(h)]**

**5.179.** Temporary marriage (*Sigheh* in Farsi) is often used as a means of smoothing problems over; a woman's first temporary marriage requires her father's written permission. **[2(k)]**

**5.180.** The sentencing to death by stoning in January 1998 of a German businessman for having been found guilty of intercourse with a Muslim woman was classed as punishment for adultery because he was not Muslim. **[16(a)]** The accused countered the charges by claiming his conversion to Islam, **[14(b)]** A Mehrabad Court of Appeal

upheld the death sentence in October 1998. By February 1999 the case had been returned to the Teheran justice department for further review. [5(j)] [5(k)] He was eventually acquitted for lack of evidence but fined 20 million rials and allowed to leave Iran in January 2000. [24(k)]

**5.181.** The case of Mohammad Ali Ghasemi from Teheran was also publicised in late 1995. He was convicted of three adulterous relationships with women and illegal drug use, resulting in a sentence of 170 lashes. [10(k)] Flogging is the standard punishment for single males involved in adultery: such cases do not carry the death penalty. [2(n)]

**5.182.** Enticing a person to commit adultery is an offence, with lashes as punishment left to the judge's discretion. Such punishment may be dictated to the married person even if they are the unwilling object of such attention. [2(l)]

### **Illegal Drugs Situation**

**5.183.** Iran, which borders the largest opium producing country in world, Afghanistan, has become a major bridge linking the drug production zone to the lucrative consumer markets of the Persian Gulf, Turkey, Russia and Europe. [34] Currently the major trafficking routes into Iran can be found in the provinces of Khorassan, Sistan and Baluchestan, areas with harsh climatic conditions and rugged mountainous terrain. In these areas there are numerous border skirmishes with drug smugglers and in 2000 a total of 1,532-armed confrontations occurred. In the last two decades more than 3,000 law enforcement officials have been killed and 10,000 disabled. In 2000, 142 law enforcement personnel and 904 drug traffickers have been killed in armed clashes. [34]

**5.184.** Drug use is on the rise in Iran and the country is increasingly vulnerable. Drugs are commonly bought from street dealers and ethnographic studies show that deserted buildings, gardens or parks in the suburban areas of cities are common sites for using drugs. Opium tends to be used in the privacy of people's homes and hashish is commonly used at parties, rolled as a cigarette and smoked. [34] The government of Iran estimates the number of drug addicts at over 1.2 million with an additional 600,000 drug users. [34] by September 2002 this figure had been further reported officially as 3 per cent of the population of near 70 million people. [5(as)]

**5.185.** The Anti-Narcotics Law of 1988 covers all aspects of drug control including cultivation, production, consumption, sales and distribution. In 1997 this law was amended in order to be more responsive to the internal drug problem. The age of criminal responsibility is 16 years. The possession of smuggling of opium and cannabis of up to 50 grams can result in a fine of 4 million rials and up to 50 lashes. The penalties become harsher according to the amount that is found on the person. The death penalty may be commuted to life imprisonment and 74 lashes if the quantity does not exceed 20 kg and the perpetrator did not succeed in smuggling/distributing/selling. The execution of drug offenders is usually limited to drug lords, organised drug criminals and armed drug traffickers. Anyone who deals in, puts on sale or carries heroin or morphine is sentenced to various punishments, for example for more than five centigrams to one gram the fine is two to six million rials in cash plus 30 to 70 lashes. [34]

**5.186.** It is up to the judge to distinguish whether the person is an addict or a trafficker; a positive test to opium shows the person was an addict while possession was interpreted as being a trafficker. [34]

**5.187.** The imposition of the death penalty on the “most serious crimes “ resulted in 155 executions in 1998, 60 of which were carried out in public. **[10(b)]** Of the 199 executions in 1997, most were said by the authorities in Iran to have been related to drug trafficking. **[10(b)]** The judiciary has had a free hand to deal with drugs traffickers, supported by new legislation. **[3(a)]** 60per cent of the 160,000 prisoners, including most of the female prisoners currently in the state system, are said to be there for drug-related offences. **[10(b)]** However, human rights monitors have alleged that many of those executed for criminal offences such as narcotics charges were political dissidents. **[3(b)]**

**5.188.** An appeal by a businessman in early 1998 against a sentence of death was unsuccessful. He had been convicted in June 1997 of corruption, embezzlement and organising parties at which drugs were present. **[9(e)]**

**5.189.** The Iranian media provides public information on drug-trafficking violations, having seized large quantities of drugs such as opium and heroin on its borders with Afghanistan. **[5(c)][5(g)]** It has announced the blocking of drug shipments from Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Persian Gulf Arab States and Europe. **[5(c)]** The army and the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps maintain a strong presence at the borders in order to deal with drug smuggling. **[5(i)]**

**5.190.** The European Parliament, and in particular the United Nations Drug Control Programme, is to financially support Iranian anti-narcotics campaigns at the country’s western and eastern borders. **[5(g)]** The United States has now removed Iran from its list of countries perceived to contribute to the international trade in illegal drugs via the USA. **[10(b)][17(c)]** However, the US continues to regard Iran as a transit point for opiates heading for Europe. **[17(c)]**

**5.191.** The Government of Iran is now openly recognising the extent of the social problem generated by drugs in the country. Official estimates are that 2 million persons out of a population of 65 million are now addicts. The extent of smuggling has reportedly made soft drugs as accessible as cigarettes, especially in border cities. The efforts of the Iranian authorities to stop this traffic have been internationally recognised, but Iran is paying a high price in terms of human life and budgetary resources in this struggle. **[10(p)]**

### **Exiles / Dissidents outside Iran**

**5.192.** Executions of exiled dissidents have taken place outside Iran in 1995. In separate cases in Turkey, Germany and Switzerland assassins were found guilty of having carried out executions of Iranians abroad on the orders of the Iranian authorities, including the Ministry of Intelligence and Security. **[3(a)]** The Istanbul Court of Appeal upheld in 1998 the conviction of an Iranian national for complicity in the 1996 murder of Zahra Rajabi and Ali Moradi, who were both associated with the National Council of Resistance (NCR), an exile group that has claimed responsibility for several terrorist attacks within Iran. The UN Special Representative reported in 1998 that Italian security authorities continued their investigation into the 1993 killing in Rome of Mohammad Hossein Naghdi, the NCR’s representative in Italy. **[4(g)]** In July 1999, Germany said it

had arrested an Iranian in Berlin on suspicion of spying on exiled dissidents. Iran denied that the man had links to its government. **[5(t)]**

**5.193.** The ascendancy of political moderates in parliamentary elections in February 2000 sparked a backlash by hard-liners that continued into 2001, resulting in a crackdown on freedom of expression and other human rights abuses, particularly directed against members of the reformist media, women, and minorities. The backlash continued to dissuade many Iranian expatriates from returning and convinced many Iranians to leave. **[35]**

**5.194.** The 15 Khordad Foundation, a revolutionary charity linked with the conservative clerical leadership in Iran, has continued to offer Muslims and non-Muslims alike a reward to murder British novelist Salman Rushdie. **[3(a)]** The thirteen-year threat of assassination to Rushdie followed the issue of a fatwa, or religious edict, in 1989 by Ayatollah Khomeini to punish blasphemy of Islam in “The Satanic Verses”.

**[14(c)][15(c)]** On 24 September 1998 Robin Cook, the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, obtained assurances from Kamal Kharazmi, Iranian Foreign Minister, that the Government of Iran had no intention to threaten or endanger the life of Rushdie. Neither would it encourage or assist others to do so. The Iranian assurances were seen as a major breakthrough and both countries upgraded their diplomatic links to ambassadorial level as a consequence. **[15(c)]**

**5.195.** This is not to say that the £1.2 Million bounty (raised to £1.5.Million in 1997) **[16(c)]** and again to about £1.9 million in February 2002 **[17(d)]** , offered on Rushdie by the 15 Khordad Foundation can be realistically expected to be revoked. **[4(k)]** Both the UK Action Committee for Islamic Affairs **[15(c)]** and the leader of the Muslim Parliament for Great Britain **[14(d)][16(b)]** insist that the fatwa is irrevocable and stands, which is in line with the 1997 statement by the Chief Prosecutor in Iran. **[16(c)]**

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# ANNEX A

## CHRONOLOGY

**1925** Reza Khan seized power in Persia by military coup. Subsequently elected Shah.

**1935** Persia renamed Iran.

**1941** British and Soviet forces occupied Iran; Shah forced to abdicate in favour of his son.

**1946** Following end of war, occupying forces left.

**1963** Shah launched 'White Revolution'. Reforms opposed by landlords and conservative clergy.

**1964** Ayatollah Khomeini deported to Iraq for opposition activities.

**1965** Prime Minister Mansur assassinated, reportedly by a follower of Khomeini.

**1977-1978** Anti-government strikes and demonstrations.

**1979 January:** Shah forced to leave country.

**February:** Khomeini returned and took power.

**April:** Iran declared an Islamic republic. Supreme authority given to Walih Faqih appointed by clergy (initially Khomeini).

**November:** Students seized hostages in US Embassy in Teheran.

**1980 February:** Bani-Sadr elected President.

**September:** Iraq invaded Iran. Strongly resisted by Iran; outbreak of hostilities.

**1981 January:** US hostages released.

**June:** Fighting between MEK (supporting Bani-Sadr) and Revolutionary Guard Corps led to Bani-Sadr's dismissal and his departure for France.

**July:** Muhammad Ali Rajaei voted President. Muhammad Javad Bahonar became Prime Minister.

**August:** President and Prime Minister killed in bomb attack. MEK blamed.

**October:** Hojatoleslam Ali Khamenei elected President; Mir Hussein Moussavi appointed Prime Minister.

**1979-1985** Fierce repression of anti-government elements.

**1987** Islamic Republican Party dissolved.

**20 July 1987** UN Security Council adopted Resolution 598.

**1988** Cease-fire declared in Iran/Iraq war.

**1989 3 June:** Death of Ayatollah Khomeini. Replaced by Ayatollah Khamenei(formerly President Khamenei).

**July:** Rafsanjani became President. Post of Prime Minister abolished.

**1993** Rafsanjani re-elected with reduced margin.

**1994 February:** Rafsanjani survived assassination by BKO.

**1997 May:** Rafsanjani stood down. Seyed Mohammad Khatami won Presidential election by landslide.

**June:** Closure of the Iranian Embassy in Kabul, followed by a trade embargo with Afghanistan initiated by Iran.

**August:** Khatami inaugurated.

**October:** Khatami appointed former Prime Minister Moussavi as his senior advisor. American vessels were present in the Persian Gulf to calm tension between Iran and Iraq over the September bombings in southern Iraq.

**December:** The Conference of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference was held in Teheran.

**1998 March:** The Iranian gas and oil industry was opened up to foreign investors for the first time.

**June:** The impeachment of the Interior Minister by the Majlis was followed by his immediate re-appointment by Khatami in a newly created Vice-President Cabinet post.

**July:** The former mayor of Teheran was found guilty on charges of corruption and embezzlement. He was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment and other punishments. The Solidarity Party of Islamic Iran was recognised and registered as a new political party.

An amnesty was issued for 1041 prisoners sentenced by the revolutionary and public courts.

**August:** Iranians were permitted to visit Shi'a Muslim shrines in Iraq for the first time in 18 years.

British Airways resumed direct flights to Teheran.

Iranians, including diplomats, were captured by the Taleban in northern Afghanistan.

**September:** The Government of Iran gave the United Kingdom assurances that it had no intention, nor would it take any action to threaten the life of Salman Rushdie or those associated with his work, nor would it encourage or assist others to do so. They also disassociated themselves from the bounty offered to carry out the fatwa and stated that they did not support it.

**October:** The deaths of Iranians captured in August by the Taleban led to Iranian troops amassing at the border with Afghanistan. Exchange of mortar and artillery fire has resulted.

**1999. February:** State and local elections held for the first time since the revolution.

**July:** A student demonstration for press reform resulted in a police raid on Tehran University dormitory complex. Six days of street riots followed, the worst since the revolution.

**2000. February:** Khatami and his liberal/reformist supporters win 170 of 290 seats in the Majlis. Conservatives lose control of Parliament for the first time since the revolution.

**April:** New Press Law adopted. 16 reformist newspapers banned.

**August:** Fatwa (religious decree) issued allowing women to lead religious congregations of female worshippers.

**2001. June:** Khatami re-elected for a second term after winning just under 77 per cent of the vote.

**August:** Khatami sworn in.

**2002. January:** US President describes Iraq, Iran and North Korea as an "axis of evil" in his State of the Union address. This is a reference to the proliferation of long range missiles said to be under development and a perceived threat considered to be as dangerous to the US as terrorism. This statement causes offence across the Iranian political spectrum.

**February:** Iran rejects the proposed new UK ambassador to Tehran.

**September:** Russian technicians begin construction of Iran's first nuclear reactor at Bushehr, despite strong objections from the United States.

Iran accepts Britain's nomination for a new ambassador, ending a diplomatic spat over the previous candidate's rejection.

UK Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, is in Iran at the end of a Middle East tour for talks that are expected to focus on the Iraq crisis.

# ANNEX B

## Political parties [Iranian names]

All opposition groups in Iran have hitherto been proscribed. Since President KHATAMI's election in May 1997, several political parties have been licensed. Until the Solidarity Party of Islamic Iran was registered in 1998, none of the groups were registered under the Political Parties Act 1981.

- Affiliate of Nehzat-e Azadi (Liberation Movement of Iran)
- Anzar-e-Hezbollah (Helpers of the Party of God)
- Fedayin-e Khalq (Warriors of the People)
- Hezb Democrat Kordestan Iran (Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan)
- Hezb-e Hambastegi-ye Iran-e Islami (Islamic Iran Solidarity Party)
- Hezb-e Kargozaran-e Sazandegi (Servants of Construction Party)
- Hezb-e Komunist Iran (Communist Party of Iran)
- Hezb-e-sabz Hayeh Iran (Green Party of Iran)
- Hezbollah (Army of God)
- Jebbeh-ye Masharekat-e Iran-e Islami (Islamic Iran Participation Front)
- Komala-ye Shureshgari-ye Zahmat Keshan-e Kordestan-e Iran (Revolutionary Organisation of the Toilers of Iran)
- Majma-e Niruha-ye Khat-e Imam (Assembly of the Followers of the Imam's Line)
- Mudjahedin-e Khalq (Holy Warriors of the People)
- National Council of Resistance
- Nehzat-e Azadi (Liberation Movement of Iran)
- Do-e Khordad (Second Khordad Front)
- Rahe Azadi (Democratic People's Party of Iran)
- Rahe Kargar (Organization of Revolutionary Workers of Iran)
- Sarbedaran (Union of Communists of Iran)
- Tudeh Party of Iran (Party of the Masses)

- Worker-communist Party of Iran

### **Monarchist groups:**

- Babak Khorramdin Organization (BKO)
- Constitutionalist Movement of Iran-Front Line (CMI)
- Derafsh-e Kaviani (Organization of Kaviyani Banner)
- Iran Paad
- Movement of National Resistance (MNR)
- Negahbanane Iran(e) Djawid (NID Guardians of Eternal Iran)
- Shahin
- Shora-e Saltanat-talaban-e Iran dar Kanada (Iranian Monarchist Council of Canada IMCC)
- Sultanat Taliban

## **POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS**

### **Ansar-e-Hizbollah (Helpers of the Party of God)**

Formed 1995, seeks to gain access to the political process for religious militants, and includes vigilante activities. Has aligned with some members of the clergy. A public physical assault on two reformist government ministers in Sept. 1998 was attributed to this group. Members were instrumental in the clashes with students in July 1999.

### **Association for the Defence of Freedom and the Sovereignty of the Iranian Nation (ADFSIN)**

Affiliate of Nehzat-e Azadi.

### **Babak Khorramdin Organisation**

Monarchist, strongly anti-clerical. Has claimed responsibility for armed attacks within Iran, inc. attempt to kill President Rafsanjani February 1993.

### **Baluch National Movement**

Seeks greater provincial autonomy.

### **Fedayin-e Khalq (Warriors of the People)**

Urban Marxist guerrillas. Spokesman Farrakh Negahdar.

### **Fraksion-e Hezbollah**

Formed 1996 by deputies in the Majles who had contested the 1996 legislative elections as a loose coalition known as the Society of Combatant Clergy. Leader Ali Akbar Hossaini.

### **Hezb-e Komunist Iran (Communist Party)**

Formed 1979 on grounds that Tudeh Party was Moscow-controlled. Sec. Gen. = Azaryun.

### **Iran Nation Party**

An unregistered party previously tolerated by the Iranian authorities. Was led by Dariush

Forouhar until he and his wife Parvaneh were murdered by unknown assailants on 22/11/98. Current leader Bahram Namazi arrested with two other activists in July 1999.

### **Iran Paad**

A self-proclaimed monarchist support organisation within the United Kingdom and other countries outside Iran. It is based in London and claims to have thousands of members. The group conducts meetings and has held some anti-Iranian regime demonstrations, mainly in London.

### **Islamic Iran Participation Front**

One of a number of new political parties established in 1998. A reformist political group of cultural and political figures. Founded on search for freedom of thought, logical dialogue and rule of law in social behaviour.

### **Islamic Republican Party (IRP)**

Formed 1978 to bring about Islamic revolution under Khomeini. Disbanded 1985.

### **Komala, or Komaleh, or Revolutionary Organisation of the Toilers of Iran**

Established 1969, merged with Union of Communist Fighters in 1983 to form Communist Party of Iran. 2 members of Komala reportedly executed 1992.

### **Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI)**

Largest Kurdish opposition group, demanding autonomy. Based in Iraq. Gen. Sec. = Mustapha Hassanzadeh. Former Gen. Sec Sadiq Sharifkandeh assassinated Berlin 1992.

### **KDPI Revolutionary Command**

Split from KDPI in late 1980s. Engages in military operations.

### **Majma-e Hezbollah**

Formed 1996 by deputies in the Majles who supported Rafsanjani and who had contested the 1996 legislative elections as a loose coalition known as the Servants of Iran's Construction. Leader = Abdollah Nouri.

### **Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK)**

Otherwise **People's Mojahedin of Iran**. Islamist/Marxist guerrilla group formed 1965. Member of National Council of Resistance. Leaders = Masud Rajavi and Maryam Rajavi, based in Iraq since 1986.

### **Movement of National Resistance**

Monarchist, led by late Shapur Bakhtiar, forced into exile in Revolution 1978-1979. Paris-based. No longer very active.

### **Nehzat-Azadi (Liberation Movement of Iran)**

Played a significant part in the Revolution; tolerated by the Islamic regime, although it was declared "illegal" in 1991, after applying for registration in 1989. Supports constitutional rule by political parties within an Islamic framework; does not agree with a role for clerics in government. Led by Mehdi Bazargan and Gen. Sec Dr Ibrahim Yazdi. Although illegal, has not been forced into exile. Bazargan's speeches can be published, but are ignored by the major media.

### **National Council of Resistance**

Formed in Paris by former president Bani Sadr and Masud Rajavi in 1981, following failed uprising. Initially a broad coalition, including MEK, KDPI, National Democratic Front, Hoviyat Group (offshoot of the minority Fedayin) and several small leftist groups. Bani-Sadr left 1984. Now under control of MEK.

### **National Liberation Army of Iran**

Armed militant wing of MEK. Established in Iraq 1985. In July 1988 briefly held Iranian towns of Kerand and Islamabad Gharb. Driven back into Iraq by Iranian troops within days. At least 2,500 political prisoners executed in Iran as a result, not all linked to

MEK. No other major military encounters with Iranian army.

**Organisation of Kaviyani Banner (Kaviyani Flag or Derafsh Kaviani)**

Changed name in 1992 to **Organisation for Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties for Iran**. Emerged from defunct Iranian Salvation Front. Led by Manoucher Gandji, a former minister under the Shah. Main operation consists of broadcasts from radio station Voice of Kaviyani Banner of Iran. Claims network of resistance cells and distributes audio and videotapes within Iran. Not involved in the armed struggle.

**Peykar**

Minor communist opposition group.

**Rah-e Kargar (Worker's Road)**

Minor communist opposition group.

**Rastakhiz Party**

Formed 1975 to run one-party state under Shah. Inoperative since 1979 revolution.

**Sarbedaran**

Minor communist opposition group.

**Solidarity Party of Islamic Iran**

A new political party officially recognised on 7/7/98. It was set up by a group of Majlis deputies and executive officials. The party was registered in accordance with the provisions of the Interior Ministry's Article 10 pertaining to political parties. The Interior Ministry has approved the party manifesto and details of its founders. Sec.Gen. Ebrahim Asgharzadeh.

**Tudeh Party**

Communist. Formed 1941, banned 1949, came into open 1979, banned 1983. First Sec. central committee = Ali Khavari.

**United Baluch Organisation**

Seeks greater provincial autonomy.

**List of Legally Registered Parties as at July 2000. [not definitive]**

So far 110 parties and political groups have received license from the Parties Article 10 Commission. The following is the list of 94 of them of which details are held.

(The date is the date of the license; the names are the members of the founding boards)

**1. Jam'iyat-e Zanan-e Jomhuri-e Elam-e Iran (IR of Iran Women Society),**

02/07/1989;

Sahara Mostafavi, Marziyeh Hadidchi (Dabbagh), Robabeh Rafiei-Taari (Fayyazbakhsh), Fatemeh Iranmanesh, Sediqeh Moqaddasi, Qodsiyeh Firoozan, Sheila Jelodarzadeh and Fatemeh Tabatabaei.

**2. Majma-e Rowhaniyoun-e Mobarez (Militant Clerics League), 02\07\1989;**

Mahdi Karrubi, Seyed Aliakbar Mohtashami, Seyed Mohamadali Abtahi, Abdolvahed Mussavi-Lari, Majid Ansari, Assadollah Bayat, Seyed Mohammad Khatami, Rasul Montajabnia, Sadeq Khalkhali-Givi, Seyed Mahmoud Doaei, Seyed Mohamadreza Tavassoli.

**3. Jam'iyat-e Fadaian-e Eslam (Islam Devotees Society), 02\07\1989;**

Mohadmehdi Abdekhodaei, Mohamadali Lavassani, Seyed Mohammad Mirdamad-Esfahani, Mohamadreza Niknam-Amini, Seyed Javad Vahedi-Bodla, Seyed Hassan Mortazavi, Asghari Omri, Ali Bahar-Hamedani, Mohadmehdi Farju.

**4. Kanoon-e Honarmandan va Nevissandegan-e Mosalman (Muslim Artists &**

**Writers Center), 02/07/1989;**

Morteza Heidari, Farzin Negaarestan, Seyed Mohamadbaqer Fadavi, Adham Zarqaam, Beitollah Sattarian, Seyed Amir Mansouri, Abulqassem Kaakhi, Alireza Noroozi-talab.

**5. Jame-e Rowhaniat-e Mobarez-e Tabriz (Tabriz Militant Clergy Association), 18/08/1989;**

Seyed Hossein Mussavi-Tabrizi, Mohammad Imaani-Yaamchi, Mohammad Karimi, Seyed Razi Balaaghi, Qodrat Shojaie, Najaf Aqazadeh-Astarkaan, Esshaq Forootan, Mohammad Rohanzadeh, Ezzat Lahooti.

**6. Hezb-e Hedayat-e Elam (Islamic Guidance Party), 19/01/1990 [collapsed in 1996];**

Aliakbar Khoshru, Seyed Hossein Abtahi, Ebrahim Heidari, Alireza Allahdaadi, Dariyoush Zargari, Ebrahim Shams, Mohamadrza Taalebian.

**7. Kanoon-e Faregholtahsilan-e Shebhi Qarrehi Hend (Center for Graduates From Indian Subcontinent), 19/02/1990;**

Manouchehr Mottaki, Seyed Mehdi Nabizadeh, Abbasali Taslimi, Javad Salimi, Mehdi Mohtashami, Seyed Ahmad MirJafar-Tafti, Anosheh Gilaninejad, Massoud Mohamadzamani, Mohammad Assadi-Taari

**8. Jam'iyat-e Mo'talefehi Elam (Islamic Coalition Society), 11/12/1990:**

Habibollah Asgarowladi, Assadollah Badamchian, Seyed Asghar Rokhsefat.

**9. Kanoon-e Elam-e Mohandessin (Engineers Islamic Center), 11/12/1990;**

Gholamreza Abdollahi, Majid Habibian, Mokhtar Matinrazm, Aliasghar Khashehchi, Mostafa Noori-Latif, Mohamadhassan Najafi-Qodsi, Mohamadhassan Tavallaie, Ahmad Roshanfeker-Raad.

**10. Kanoon-e Wali-e Asr (Wali-Asr Center), 26/02/1991;**

Ramazan Jannati-Razavi, Hassan Amiri-Qariyehali, Mohammad Sohrabi, Hassan Rashidi-Taashkuie, Mohamadali Khorassani, Aliakbar Amiri, Mohamadali Hakimi, Gholamreza Khorassani.

**11. Anjoman-e Elam-e Mo'allemaan-e Iran (Islamic Association of Iranian Teachers), 09/04/1991;**

Morteza Katiraie, Asghar Noroozi, Movahednia, Abbas Douzdouzani, Goharolsharieh Dastgheib.

**12. Jame-e Elam-e Mohandessin (Islamic Association of Engineers), 28/05/1991;**

Hassan Ghafoorifard, Mohamadreza Bahonar, Seyed Mohsen Behfar, Seyed Morteza Nabavi, Seyed Mojtaba Shohreh-hashemi, Gholamhossein Amiri.

**13. Anjoman-e Mohandesaan-e Iran (Association of Iranian Engineers),**

01/10/1991;

Rahmatollah Khossravi, Mohamadreza Behzadian, Alimohamad Ahmadi, Seyed Hassan al-Hosseini, Karim Malekasa, Ahmad Kabiri, Mohsen Nariman, Mohammad Qomi.

**14. Saazeman-e Mojahedin-e Enqelab-e Elam-e Iran (Islamic Revolution Mojahedin Organization), 01/10/1991;**

Mohammad Salaamati, Behzad Nabavi, Hossein Sadeqi.

**15. Anjoman-e Elam-e Modarressin-e Daneshgaha (Islamic Association of University Tutors), 10/11/1991;**

Najafqoli Habibi, Alireza Saffarian, Mahmoud Saremi, Davood Soleymani, Qorban Behzadinejad, Mirfazlollah Mussavi.

**16. Jame-e Zeinab (S), Zeinab (S.A.) Association, 10/11/1991;**

Maryam Zaferani-Behroozi, Manizheh Noubakht, Nafiseh Fayyazbakhsh, Parvin Salimi, Shamsi Moetazedi, Azam Nooshehgol, Nahidazam Ram-panahi, Massoumeh Rezaie-Nazari.

**17. Khanehi Kargar (Labor House), 04/01/1992;**

Alireza Mahjoob, Hossein Kamali, Ali Rabi'i, Reza MohamadWali, Mohammad Daneshvar, Esrafil Ebadati, Mahmoud Assadi.

**18. Markaz-e Elam-e Daneshgahian (Islamic Center for University Academicians), 21/04/1992;**

Reza Dehqani-Farzaam, Minoo Raastmanesh, Mohamadreza Shirzad, Asghar Zokaie, Majid Qaemian, Bahman Noori, Nasser Derakhshan, Ali Hosseinpour.

**19. Anjoman-e Elam-e Mohandessan-e Zaminshenassi va Ma'dan-e Iran (Islamic Association of Iranian Geologists and Mining Engineers), 26/05/1992;**

Hossein Mozafarinejad, Mohamadbaqer Farhadian, Ebrahim Raastad, Mohamadhossein Ekhtiarabadi, Nematollah Rashidnejad, Mohamadtaqi Karehi, Mohamadjavad Vaezipour.

**20. Jame-e Elam-e Bakhtiyariha (Bakhtiyaris Islamic Association), 26/05/1992;**

Assadollah Kian-ersi, Omidvaar Rezaie, Qassem Soleymani, Ali Yusefpour, Qoli Sheikhi, Ali Qanbari, Zabih Karimi, Mohamadreza Mirqaeab.

**21. Anjoman-e Faregholtahsilan-e Uroupa, Amrica va Oqyanoussiyeh**

**(Association of Graduates From Europe, America and the Pacific), 04/08/1992;**

Mehrdad Fooladinejad, Seyed Hossein Fassihi-Langarudi, Ali Khoshbaaten, Ebrahim Nematipour, Ali Asghari, Hamid Mehdiqoli, Hossein Raqamizadeh, Seyed Amireddin Sadrnejad.

**22. Jame-e Elam-e Farhangian (Educators' Islamic Association), 22/08/1992;**

Ezzatollah Dehqani, Mansoureh Farahmandzad, Maryam Zaferani-Behrooz, Manizheh Noubakht, Seyed Abulqassem Raoofian, Ali Farahmandzad, Assadollah Badamchian, Mohammad Elahian.

**23. Jame-e Zanan-e Enqelab-e Elam (Women Association of Islamic Revolution), 24/11/1992;**

Azam Alaei-Taleqani, Badrolmolouk Emampour, Parvindokht Yazdanian.

**24. Anjoman-e Elam-e Mohandessin-e Khorassan (Islamic Association of Khorassan Engineers), 24/11/1992;**

Aliasghar Azami, Hassan Alijani-Moqaddam, Abbas Amiripour, Ahmad Sheikh-salim, Seyed Mohsen Banihashemi-Chaharom, Ahmad Yarahmadi-Khorassani, Seyed Hashem Banihashemi, Seyed Khalil Mehdizadegan.

**25. Anjoman-e Elam-e Pezeshkan (Islamic Association of Physicians), 20/01/1993;**

Aliakbar Velayati, Abbas Sheibani, Dr. Shahrzad, Vahid Dastjerdi, Shahabeddin Sadr.

**26. Anjoman-e Elam-e Jame-e Pezeshki-e Iran (Islamic Association of Iranian Medical Community), 09/04/1993;**

Mohammad Farhadi, Ahmadali Noorbaala-Tafti, Hassan Hosseini-Toodeshki, Seyed Mohammad Sadr, Mohamadreza Raahchamani, Omidvaar Rezaie-Mirqaed, Seyed Hossein Fattahi, Mohamadreza Vaez-Mahdavi.

**27. Kanoon-e Elam-e Daneshgahian-e Khorassan (Islamic Center of University Academicians of Khorassan) 01/10/1993;**

Mehdi Hassanzadeh, Mohamadali Gandomi, Mehdi Parsa, Hassan Razmi, Seyed Mojtaba Sadat Na'Ichian, Mohamad-sadeq Javadihesar, Wali Niknaam-Shaahrak.

**28. Anjoman-e Elam-e Farhangian-e Khorassan (Islamic Association of Khorassan Educators) 01/10/1993;**

Ahmad Yarahmadi, Nasrollah Mojtahedpour, Javad Aryanmanesh, Seyed Mohsen bani Hashemi, Seyed Ali Fayyazbakhsh, Gholamhossein Afzali, Gholamnabi Golestani, Aliasghar Khalilzadeh, Azizollah Tavakkoli.

**29. Jame-e Anjomanha-ye Islami-e Asnaaf va Bazaar (Association of Islamic Associations of Guilds and Traders)** 31/10/1993:

Said Amani, Ahmad Karimi-Esfahani, Mashallah Javaherian, Mahmoud Faqihi-Rezaie, Morteza Kashani-Zarrin, Massoud Zandiyeh, Mohamadhossein Abdolkhaleqi, Ali Rahmani.

**30. Anjoman-e Elam Faregholtahsilan-e Amrica va Canada (Islamic Association of Graduates From America and Canada)**, 23/11/1993;

Reza Shiva, Farrokh Parsizadeh, Davood Bahrami-Siavoshani, Hamid Nasrollahizadeh, Nasser Soltani, Mansour Khodadadi.

**31. Jame-e Islami-e Daneshgahian-e Iran (Islamic Association of Iranian Academics)**, 30/11/1993;

Ali Abbaspour, Seyed Mostafa Mirsalim, Abbas Sheibani, Reza Maknoon, Karim Zaare'.

**32. Jame-e Elam-e Karmandan (Islamic Association of Employees)**, 06/06/1994;

Mohamad-sadeq Fayyaz, Nasrollah Mirzaie-Nasir, Hassan Kazempour-Dehkordi, Mostafa Biglar, Ahmadreza Bayat, Seyed Kamal Sajjadi, Mohammad Bokharaie, Rahim Alizadeh-Baarooq.

**33. Etehadiyehi Elam-e Daneshjooyan va Faregholtahsilan-e Daneshgaha va Mo'assesaat-e Amoozesh-e 'Ali (Islamic Union of Students and Graduates From Universities and Colleges of Advanced Education)**, 09/12/1994:

Heshmatollah Tabarzadi, Mohamadhassan Alipour, Reza Sarafraaz, Mohamadhossein Zarei, Mohammad Salamati [not to be mistaken with Mr Mohammad Salamati of the Islamic Revolution Mojahedin Organization], Seyed Javad Emami.

**34. Jame-e Islami-e Kargaran (Islamic Association of Workers)**, 11/08/1995;

Alireza Saber-Kouchaksaraie, Mostafa Biglar, Abdullah Hamidi, Mohammad Eqbal, Massoud Berahman, Majid Afshari.

**35. Jame-e Anjomanha-ye Elam-e Assnaaf-e Khorassan (Society of Islamic Associations of Khorassan Traders)**, 15/06/1996;

Ali Shamqadri, Mohamadali Ghaffarian, Massoud Akhavizadeh, Seyed Ali Shoostari, Nasser Moqaddam, Mohamad-ebrahim Vahedian-Azimi, Mohamadhossein Niazmand.

**36. Jame-e Elam-e Dandaanpezeshkan (Islamic Association of Dentists)**,

12/06/1996;

Nasrollah Eshqyar, Abbas Monzavi, Mohamad-sadeq Ahmadakhondi, Ahmadhossein Nekoofar, Kazem Ashofteh-Yazdi.

**37. Jam'iyat-e Elam-e Vokalaa-ye Daadgostari (Islamic Bar Association)**,

04/07/1997;

Nabiollah Ahamadloo, Gholamreza Amini, Said Khorshidi, Abazar Mohebbi.

**38. Jame-e Elam-e Daampezheshkan (Islamic Association of Veterinarians)**;

27/06/1997

Alireza Sadiqi, Mohamadali Akhavizadegan, Mohamadkazem Kuhi, Mohamadali Rad.

**39. Anjoman-e Rooznamehnegearan-e Mosalman (Association of Muslim Journalists)**, 02/08/1997;

Hossein Shariatmadari, Hossein Entezami, Seyed Mohammad Safizadeh, Seyed Jalal Fayyazi, Abbas Salimi-Namin, Seyed Morteza Nabavi, Mehdi Shojaie, Alireza Mokhtarpour, Mehdi Nasiri.

**40. Jam'iyat-e Defaa' az Arzeshha-ye Enqelab-e Elam (Association for Defense of Values of the Islamic Revolution)**, 14/10/1997;

Mohammad Mohammadi-Nik, Seyed Ali Ghayouri-Najafabadi, Seyed Aliakbar Abotorabi, Ali Raazini, Ruhollah Hosseinian, Mohamad-sadeq Arabnia, Ahmad Pournajati, Mohammad Shariatmadari, Mohsen Soltani-Shirazi.

- 41. Anjoman-e Elam-e Kargaran-e Khorassan (Islamic Association of Khorassan Laborers),** 31/01/1998;  
Ahmad Tavakkoli-Afshaar, Mahmoud Mohamadi-Thani, Hassan Sadeqi Fatthabaad, Hassan Saidizadeh, Gholamhossein Torkzadeh, Gholamabbas Hamidi, Mohammad Nejati.
- 42. Kanoon-e Faregholtahsilan-e Azarbaijan-e Gharbi (Center for Graduates From West Azarbaijan),** 10/03/1998;  
Ali Kamyar, Alireza Siavashpour, Qassem Moridi, Amir Eslamitabaar, Mohsen Baqerzadeh.
- 43. Anjoman-e Elam-e Faregholtahsilan-e Daneshkadehi Fanni-e Daneshgahi Tehran (Islamic Association of Engineering Faculty Graduates of the Tehran University),** 13/03/1998;  
Ali Asghari, Reza Faraji-dana, Seyed Mehdi Fakhraie, Habibollah Bitaraf, Abdolmajid Shahidi.
- 44. Anjonman-e Elam-e Faregholtahsilan-e Daneshkadehi Oloom-e Qazaie va Khadamaat-e Edaari (Islamic Association of Graduates of Law and Administrative Services),** 13/03/1998;  
Abdolhashem Yaqoobi, Mohamadhassan Pirzadeh, Abbasali Zaare', Safollah Faghanpour-Azizi, Mohamadhassan Mirzabeigi, Mansour Dastgoshadeh, Aliakbar Mollataba-Elahi.
- 45. Jame-e Elam-e Nassehin-e Qom (Qom Islamic Society of Counselors),** 13/04/1998;  
Hossein Irani, Mohamadali Shar'i, Asghar Abdollahi, Reza Ashtiani-Araqi, Mohammad Khalaj, Aliahmad Mianji, Jafar Emami.
- 46. Anjoman-e Elam-e Faregholtahsilan-e Daneshgah-e Tarbiat-e Mo'allem (Islamic Association of Graduates From the Teachers Training University),** 30/05/1998;  
Yussef Nikimaleki, Yaqoob Siminrooy, Abbas Mirgaloovie-Bayat, Kobra Alipour, Mostafa Monssef, Hossein Salehi.
- 47. Anjoman-e Elam-e Faregholtahsilan-e Filipin (Islamic Association of Graduates From the Philippines),** 01/06/1998;  
Mohamadreza Nezamdoust, Ali Abedzadeh, Parviz Jeihooni, Ahmad Makhmali, Hojjatollah Bakhtiyary.
- 48. Anjoman-e Elam-e Faregholtahsilan-e Italia (Islamic Association of Graduates From Italy),** 01/06/1998;  
Seyed Mohamadbaqer Hosseini, Mohamadhassan Qadiri-Abyaneh, Hojjat Bahrami, Qodratollah Karbalaie, Hassan Haaj-najjari, Hossein Madadi.
- 49. Majma-e Namaayandegan-e Advaar-e Mokhtalef-e Majles-e Shoraa-ye Elam (League of All-Term Majlis Deputies),** 01/06/1998;  
Aliasghar Rahmani-Khalili, Mohsen Rahami, Asghar Faqih-Aliabadi, Gholamreza Ansari, Zabiollah Safaie.
- 50. Hezb-e Hambastegi-e Iran-e Elam (Islamic Iran Solidarity Party),** 10/07/1998;  
Mohamadreza Raahchamani, Seyed Mahmood Mirlohi, Gholamreza Ansari, Elyass Hazrati, Qodratollah Nazarinia, Aliasghar Abde-ahmadi, Gholamheydar Ebrahimbai-Salami, Seyed Mohammad Hashemi, Qorbanali Qandehari, Seyed Waliollah Tavakkoli.
- 51. Jam'iyat-e Fadaian-e Rahbar (Society of Devotees of Leader),** 21/07/1998;  
Nematollah Taqaa', Abbas Toobaie, Mohamadhossein Roozitalab, Mohamadreza Moshfeqian.

**52. Jam'iyat-e Hoqooqdanaan-e Irani-e Modaafe-e Hoqoq-e Bashar (Society of Iranian Lawyers Defending Human Rights), 30/08/1998;**

Gholamreza Amini, Ghodrattollah Noroozi, Fatemeh Hizomi-Araani, Mansour Alizadi, Nabiollah Ahmadloo, Ahmad Arabameri, Said Khorshidi, Abaazar Mohebbi, Hamidreza Dehqanboudeh.

**53. Jam'iyat-e Elam-e Zanan (Islamic Society of Women), 18/10/1998;**

Maryam Mohseni, Batool Rangbar-Kohan, Fatemeh Azizabadi, Sahara Azizabadi-Faraahani.

**54. Kanoon-e Namaayandegan-e Advaar-e Majles-e Shoraa-ye Elam (Center for Deputies of Various Terms of Majlis), 08/11/1998;**

Ali Mobini-Dehkordi, Alinaqi [Seyed-] khamoushi, Mostafa Naseri, Mohamadhashem Rahbari, Abdollah Noroozi.

**55. Jam'iyat-e Khedmatgozaaran-e Sazandegi-e Khorassan (Khorassan Construction Servants Society), 08/11/1998;**

Ahmad Yarahmadi-Khorassani, Ghafoor Helmi-Tarfi, Seyed Jalal Fayyazi, Abdollah Koopaie, Seyed Khalil Mehdizadegan, Mohsen Amirian, Mohamadreza Mohseni, Alireza Safari, Gholamhossein Heidari, Mostafa Yaqini, Javad Aryanmanesh, Abdolmajid Helmi, Aliasghar Azami.

**56. Majma-e Elam-e Karmandan-e Khatt-e Emam (Islamic League of Employees Following the Imam Line), 08/11/1998;**

Ali Toohidloo, Seyed Hassan Kazemi, Mohamadali Safari, Ramazan Mirzaiepour-Shafi'i, Massoumeh Mohtarami.

**57. Jame-e Elam-e Pezeshkan (Islamic Association of Physicians), 10/11/1998;**

Khossro Rahmani, Seyed Ahmadali Kazemi, Amirmahmoud Tafazzoli, Reza Sadeqi.

**58. Majma-e Nirooha-ye Khatt-e Emam (League of Imam Line Forces), 10/11/1998;**

Seyed Hadi Khamenei, Rahmatollah Khossravi, Ahmad Hakimipour.

**59. Jam'iyat-e Tarafdaraan-e Nazm va Qanoon (Society of Advocates of Law & Order), 24/11/1998;**

Hossein Tajarloo, Ali Bazm-azmoon, Yussef Sheikhinejad, Ali Movasheh

**60. Kanoon-e Elam-e Ostadaan-e Daneshgahi Tehran (Islamic Center of Tehran University Lecturers), 25/11/1998;**

Behzad Moshiri, Karen Abrinia, Mojtaba Shariati-Niyasar, Mohamadhassan Panjehshahi, Hassan Farhangi, Nasser Soltani, Reza Shiva, Seyem Mohamadhossein Pishbin.

**61. Jame-e Elam-e Fareqoltahsilan-e Honar (Islamic Association of Arts Graduates), 25/11/1998;**

Abdolhadi Qazvinian, Mohamadjavad Rassaie, Mirlatif Mussavi-Gargari.

**62. Jame-e Elam-e Varzeshkaraan (Islamic Association of Sportsmen), 25/11/1998;**

Mahmoud Mashhoon, Seyed Mostafa Mirsalim, Mohamadreza Rahimi, Hassan Ghafourifard, Eidi Alijani, Mohammad Ansari, Seyed Amirahmad Mozafari, Ahmad Nateq-Noori.

**63. Majma-e Elam-e Baanuan (Women Islamic League), 20/12/1998;**

Fatemeh Karrubi, Soheila Jelodarzadeh, Soussan Seif.

**64. Jam'iyat-e Peirovan-e Velayat-e Faqih Dashtestan (Association of Followers of Guardianship of Supreme Jurisprudent in Dashtestan), 20/12/1998;**

Ali Behbahani, Seyed Esmail Hosseininejad, Mohammad Abedi, Masoud Atashi, Akbar Mohajeri.

**65. Anjoman-e Elam-e Karkonan-e Bimehi Alborz (Islamic Association of Alborz Insurance Employees), 25/12/1998;**

Davoodali Shirazi, Hedayat Sadeqi-Arsegah, Maryam Karimi, Alireza Moqarrab, Qorbanali Fatthi-Gerashini.

**66. Hezb-e Tamaddon-e Elam (Islamic Civilization Party), 03/01/1999;**

Mohammad Honardoust, Mojtaba Haraati-Nik, Alireza Manzari, Morteza Mahmoudi, Mohammad Motevallian, Mirmehdi Najafi, Hamidreza Elmolhoda, Mohamadali Aqaie.

**67. Majma-e Pooyandegan-e Andisheha-ye Elam (League of Searchers for Islamic Schools of Thought) 09/01/1999;**

Mohammad Ashrafi-Mahabadi, Mohamadali Khallaaqpour, Ali Daastaani, Ali Tirdaad, Massoud Shafeizadeh, Eivaz Tizjang, Manouchehr Ebaadi.

**68. Anjoman-e Elam-e Farhangian-e Ostaan-e Qom (Islamic Association of Qom Province Educators), 09/01/1999;**

Seyed Yussef Pour-yazdanparast, Taqi Nazeri, Abbas Mohammadi, Gholamreza Rezaiean-Maleki, Seyed Aliasghar Borqei.

**69. Anjoman-e Rooznamehnegaaran-e Zan-e Iran (Association of Iranian Female Journalists), 09/01/1999;**

Jamileh Kadivar, Ashraf Geraamizadegan, Homeira Hosseini-Yeganeh, Jaleh Faramarzian-Borugeni, Parvaneh Mohhi.

**70. Kanoon-e Elam-e Modaressan-e Marakez-e Tarbiat-e Mo'allem (Islamic Center for Teachers of Teacher-Training Institutions), 14/01/1999;**

Ayyoob Vahdatnia, Mohamadreza Hezaveh, Habibollah Jadidi, Tahereh Shaalchian, Mohammad Vakili-Mahallati, Ruhangiz Dorobaati, Tayyebeh Yazdani.

**71. Majma-e Daneshjooyan va Fareqoltahsilan-e Gilani (League of Gilaki Graduates and Undergraduates), 19/01/1999;**

Behzad Roohi, Seyed Saber Mir-ataie, Sirous Bahramzadeh, Ali Ferdowsi, Shahrokh Ramazan-nejad.

**72. Jame-e Daneshjooyan va Fareqoltahsilan-e Kermanshahi (Association of Kermanshahi Graduates and Undergraduates), 19/01/1999;**

Hamidreza Samadi-shohreh, Marzieh Mahidashti, Nooshin Mohammadi, Hamid Fadaie, Morad Hosseini, Qodratollah Najafi, Mehdi Rangbar.

**73. Hezb-e Islami-e Kar (Islamic Labor Party), 24/01/1999;**

Alireza Mahjoob, Soheila Jelodarzadeh, Abdolrahman Tajeddin.

**74. Majma-e Elam-e Fareqoltahsilan-e Daneshgahi Abu Reyhan Birouni (Islamic League of Graduates From University of Abu Reyhan Birouni), 24/01/1999;**

Mohammad Jariani, Seyed Abdolhossein Vahedi, Mohamadtaqi Shirkavand, Mohamadreza Sharifnia, Seyed Ahmad Mussavi, Seyed Morteza Sahri, Akbar Hakkakaan.

**75. Kannon-e Tarbiat-e Elam (Islamic Training Center), 24/01/1999;**

Hossein Ahmadi, Alireza Baraatian, Yussef Soltani, Mahmoud Farshidi, Nosratollah Taheri.

**76. Jam'iyat-e Zanan-e Enqelab-e Elam (Islamic Revolution Women Society), 24/01/1999;**

Sahara Mazloomifard, Sediqehbeigom Hejazi-Taaqaanaki, Sediqeh Tajifard, Nayyereh Qavi, Minakhanoom Behzadi, Kobra Khaz-ali, Hakimeh Jafarinasab-Kermani.

**77. Tashakkol-e Elam-e Fareqoltahsilan-e Lorestani (Islamic Organization of Lorestani Graduates), 29/01/1999;**

Ebrahim Baraani-Beiranvand, Ali Mikhak-Beiranvand, Mohammad Sharafi, Bahador Walizadeh, Majid Sabbah, Aliyar Rashidpour, Faroud Hashemi.

- 78. Majma-e Daneshjooyan va Fareqoltahsilan-e Yazdi (League of Yazdi Graduates and Undergraduates), 18/02/1999;**  
Ali Afkhami-Fatthabad, Mohamadali Salmaninejad, Mohamadhossein Shariati-nasab.
- 79. Jam'iyat-e Javanaan-e Enqelab-e Elam (Youth Society of Islamic Revolution), 18/02/1999;**  
Seyed Hossein Hosseini, Asghar Abulqassem-Pourkia, Aliasghar Mirzaie.
- 80. Jam'iyat-e Ansar ul-Mahdi (Ansar ul-Mahdi Society), 19/02/1999;**  
Khanoom-ozra Ansari, Seyed Mostafa Hosseini, Abdorrahman Ansari.
- 81. Jam'iyat-e Mostaqel-e Iran-e Elam (Islamic Iran Independent Society), 19/02/1999;**  
Qodratali Heshmatin, Javad Baqerzadeh, Ahmadali Amjadian, Ebadollah Fallahi, Fereshteh Heshmatian.
- 82. Hezb-e Farzandan-e Iran (Children of Iran Party), 19/02/1999;**  
Jamshid Irani, Mohamadreza Abulhassani, Mohamadtaher Ahangari-Osbouie, Araasb Ahmadian, Behrooz Sabouri-Sobhani, Ali Javadi.
- 83. Jebhe-ye Mosharekat-e Iran-e Elam (Islamic Iran Participation Front), 19/02/1999;**  
Mohamadreza Khatami, Hossein Kashefi, Hossein Nasiri.
- 84. Kanoon-e Elam-e Qozzat (Islamic Center for Judges), 19/02/1999;**  
Mohamadhassan Mirzabeigi, Jamal Qezavati, Mohammad Mohammadi.
- 85. Kanoon-e Zendanian-e Siasi-e Mosalman-e Doran-e Qabl az Piroozie Enqelab (Center for Muslim Political Prisoners Before Victory of Revolution), 08/03/1999;**  
Seyed Kazem Akrami, Mostafa Barzegar, Ahmadali Borhanifar, Ahmad Hatami-Yazd, Jalal Samsaami-Fard, Hossein Tousi, Mohamadreza Alihosseini-abbasi, Javad Mansouri, Allahkaram Mirzaie.
- 86. Anjoman-e Modiran va Motekhassesin-e San'ati va Eqtesadi-e Iran (Association of Iranian Industrial and Economic Specialists and Executives), 04/05/1999;**  
Mohsen Safaie-Faraahani, Morteza Alviri, Morteza Haji, Nourollah Abedi, Seyed Reza Norooz-zadeh.
- 87. Kanoon-e Hambastegi-e Farhangian-e Iran (Center for Solidarity of Iran Educators), 04/05/1999;**  
Ali Fa'ez, Mohsen Ashtiyani-Araqi, Mahmoud Kazemi-Bidhendi, Abbas Elam-Mofidabad.
- 88. Kannon-e Farhangi-e Missaq-e Shohada (Cultural Center for Allegiance to Martyrs), 25/05/1999;**  
Bibiqodsiyeh Seyedi-alavi, Zohreh Erfanian Zeirparvar-Javan, Nayyereh Pourjavad.
- 89. Jam'iyat-e Isargaran-e Enqelab-e Elam (Society of Devotees of the Islamic Revolution), 26/07/1999;**  
Davood Danesh-jafari, Hossein Fadaie, Ali Yussefpour, Abdolhussein Ruholamin, Ali Darabi, Asghar Sabouri, Mojtaba Shakeri, Ahmadali Moqimi.
- 90. Hezb-e Islami-e Refahi Kargaran (Islamic Labor Welfare Party), 15/08/1999;**  
Hossein Sarafraz, Abbas Allahyar, Hassan Faraji-Golhin.
- 91. Majma-e Daneshgahian-e Ostaan-e Golestan (League of Golestan Province Academicians), 05/03/1999;**  
Hamid Haqshenas, Yahya Samadinejad, Ehsan Maktabi, Massoud Rahnamaie.

**92. Hezb-e Kargozaran-e Sazandegi-e Iran (Executives of Construction Party of Iran), 15/08/1999;**

Mohammad Hashemi-Bahremani, Ataollah Mohajerani, Mohsen Noorbakhsh, Mohamadali Najafi, Faezeh Hashemi-Bahremani, Hossein Mar'ashi, Reza Amrollahi.

**93. Anjoman-e Eslami-e Fareqoltahsilan (Islamic Association of Graduates), 15/08/1999;**

Vahid Ahmadi, Mahmoud Nili-Ahmadabadi, Adel Torkaman-Rahmani, Rahmatollah Qajar, Mohamadali Doostari, Seyed Hessameddin Zagardi, Ziaeddin Shoaie.

**94. Hezb-e Sa'adat-e Iran (Iran Prosperity Party), 19/05/1999;**

Gholamreza Sediqi Ora'i, Hassan Jamshidi, Mohamadjavad Faza'eli-Akhlaqi, Nasser Mohammadi, Seyed Reza Vasse'i, Hossein Rathaie, Hamidreza Qandehariyoun.

**95. Hezb-e Esteqlal-e Iran (Iran Independence Party), 09/07/1999;**

Secretay Sadeq Shams

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## ANNEX C

### PROMINENT PEOPLE

**BANI-SADR Abolhasan** President 1980-1981. Dismissed by Khomeini and exiled to France.

**BAZARGAN Dr Mehdi** Leader of Liberal Movement of Iran (Nehzat-Azadi). Prime Minister in provisional government Feb-Nov 1979. Died in January 1995.

**EBTEKAR Ma'sumeh** One of seven vice presidents appointed in 1997 and the first woman appointed to such a senior government post since the Islamic Revolution.

**HASHEMI-SHAHRUDI Mahmoud** Head of the judiciary and close to both the president and the supreme leader. He has promised to co-operate with President Khatami in reforming the judiciary. He is broad-minded and relatively untouched by the factionalism which affects the ruling clerics in Tehran.

**HASSANZADEH Mustapha** Gen. Secretary of KDPI.

**KARBASCHI Gholamhossein** Teheran's former mayor, convicted in 1998 on corruption and other charges.

**KHAMENEI Hojatoleslam Ali** President 1981-1989. Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Chief of State and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, 1989-.

**KHARRAZI Kamal** Foreign Affairs Minister

**KHATAMI Seyed Mohammad** President August 1997- following landslide election victory in May 1995.

**KHOMEINI Ruhollah** Ayatollah. Exiled 1964-1979. Supreme leader 1979-1989. Died 3.6.89. Traditionalist Muslim: issued fatwa against Salman Rushdie.

**MONTAZERI Hussein Ali** He is one of Iran's highest ranking theologians and has a mass following among religious reformists. He was once nominated to succeed Ayatollah Khomeini, but was sacked by him for disagreeing on policy issues including human rights on which he took a softer line. He is currently under house arrest in the holy city of Qom after criticising Ayatollah Khamenei for interfering in secular matters.

**MOUSSAVI Mir Hussein** Prime Minister 1981-1989 (post abolished). Senior advisor to President Khatami, October 1997-.

**NATEQ-NURI Ali Akbar** Majles Speaker in 1997; unsuccessfully opposed Khatami in 1997 Presidential elections, despite backing of Khamenei.

**NOURI Hojatoleslam Abdollah** Minister of Interior 1997-June 1998. Vice-President for Development and Social Affairs, June 1998-.

**PAHLAVI Mohammad Reza** Shah of Iran 1941-1979. Died in Egypt July 1980.

**RAFSANJANI Ali Akbar Hashemi** President 1989-1995. One of seven vice-presidents appointed in 1997 [1997-].

**RAJAVI Massoud** Leader of MEK. Active in overthrow of Shah and led unsuccessful coup in 1981. Fled to France 1981.

**RAHJAVI Maryam** Wife of Massoud Rajavi; significant figure in MEK.

**RAJANI Muhammad Ali** Prime Minister 1979-1981. Elected President July 1981; assassinated late August 1981.

**YAZDI Mohammad** The former head of the judiciary, which he turned into a bastion of the right. One of his changes was to establish general courts which gave total power to the judge and did away with many of the safeguards for the defendant. He was deputy speaker in parliament under Rafsanjani for several years. He is now a member of the powerful Council of Guardians.

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# ANNEX D

## SOURCES

### [1] Europa publications:

**1(a) Europa Regional Survey of the World: The Middle East and North Africa 2002**

**1(b) Europa World Year Book: 2002**

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