



Security Council

Distr.: General
9 June 2009

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 17 of Security Council resolution 1828 (2008), by which the Council requested me to report every 60 days on the deployment and operations of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the political process, the security and humanitarian situation in Darfur, and compliance of the parties with their international obligations. The report covers the months of April and May 2009.

II. Political developments

2. Negotiations between the Government of the Sudan and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) resumed on 4 May 2009 and were concluded on 12 May with an agreement to pursue the implementation of the 17 February Agreement of Goodwill and Confidence-building for the Settlement of the Problem in Darfur, which had been signed in Doha on 17 February 2009. The two sides reiterated their commitment to the peace process and reaffirmed their attachment to Doha as the venue for negotiations. Further to the February agreement, the parties exchanged lists of their respective detainees and agreed to set up a committee with the participation of the Mediation to verify the lists, with a view to accelerating the process of releasing prisoners. In addition to this issue, the parties discussed the humanitarian situation in the aftermath of the expulsion of humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from Darfur, as well as the requirement for a cessation of hostilities.

3. In early April, 21 senior Sudanese Liberation Army-Unity (SLA-Unity) and United Resistance Front (URF) commanders joined JEM, including Suleiman Jamous, Adam Bakhit and Adam Ali Shogar. In a separate development in mid-April, the “Tripoli group”, comprised of five rebel movements, confirmed its willingness to participate in the peace process and met with the Mediation in Doha on 29 April.

4. From 18 April to 4 May 2009, the Swiss Minister for Foreign Affairs invited a group of approximately 50 military and political representatives from SLA-Abdul



Wahid (SLA-AW) to a workshop in Switzerland. Approximately half of the participants came from Darfur, including SLA military and political leaders and SLA supporters from camps for internally displaced persons. A large part of the SLA's diaspora leadership, from Nairobi, Chad and Europe were also present, including the movement's chairman. During the meeting, SLA-AW participants confirmed the movement's position that political negotiations with the Government could not take place until preconditions were met, including disarmament of the pro-Government militias, removal of new settlers from the land of the internally displaced persons and a cessation of offensive military actions. The meeting demonstrated a broad consensus within the movement in rejecting the Doha talks and negotiations with the Government without significant preconditions. The participants showed scepticism with regard to the Government's willingness to negotiate in good faith or adhere to its commitments.

5. Following high-level negotiations in Doha from 29 April to 3 May, the Governments of Chad and the Sudan signed the "Doha Agreement" as a step towards the normalization of bilateral relations. The Agreement was reached with the joint sponsorship and mediation of the Governments of Qatar and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and it committed the two countries to cease support to their respective armed opposition groups, and requested the Dakar Contact Group to urgently reconvene in order to adopt an action plan for the deployment of a border observation and protection force. The parties also recommended the inclusion of Qatar in the Contact Group in the light of its efforts in support of peace in the region.

6. On 27 May 2009, JEM and the Government returned to Doha to build on the 17 February 2009 agreement, discuss the military situation on the ground, and work towards addressing outstanding issues such as exchange of prisoners and a cessation of hostilities.

7. The African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur, led by former South African President Thabo Mbeki, visited Darfur on 3 and 4 April and from 18 to 21 May 2009 in order to consult with representatives of Darfur civil society, political parties, rebel movements, and internally displaced person groups. The Panel was announced on 21 July 2008 by the African Union Peace and Security Council and held its inaugural meeting on 18 and 19 March 2009, during which it was given a mandate to make recommendations on issues of accountability and reconciliation in Darfur. The Panel is to submit its report to the African Union in July 2009.

8. The initiative by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation to bring 345 participants from Darfur civil society to Addis Ababa from 12 to 16 May 2009 to discuss peace and reconciliation efforts was to be an important aspect of the peace process and was supported by both UNAMID and the African Union-United Nations Joint Chief Mediator, Djibrill Bassolé. The initiative was cancelled two days before its scheduled launch, after the Government of the Sudan refused to issue visas to participants, alleging a lack of transparency in the selection of participants.

9. President al-Bashir visited Zalingei (Western Darfur) on 7 April 2009, during which he referred to 2009 as the Year of Peace and Voluntary Return in Darfur, and stressed his commitment to support reconciliation and compensation of war-affected populations.

III. Security situation

10. Despite the 3 May 2009 Doha Agreement between the Governments of Chad and the Sudan, the period under review was characterized by increased fighting along the Chad-Sudan border, an incursion into Western Darfur by Chadian national forces, and several clashes in Western Darfur between JEM and SLA/Minni Minawi (SLA/MM) supported by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).

11. On 5 May, following a reported build-up of JEM forces in eastern Chad, UNAMID received reports that JEM had occupied Umm Barru, Northern Darfur, and several nearby locations, including Shegeg Karo, Mozbat and Farawiya. Subsequent clashes occurred in those locations on 6 and 7 May between JEM and SLA/MM, supported by SAF. On 8 and 9 May, UNAMID observed SAF aerial bombardments of JEM locations near Umm Barru, in response to which approximately 160 civilians gathered in the UNAMID team site in Umm Barru. At the request of SLA/MM, UNAMID evacuated 30 injured SLA/MM combatants from Umm Barru to El Fasher on 10 May 2009.

12. On 17 May 2009, JEM forces attacked and seized control of a government military base in Kornoi (50 km west of Umm Barru). On 20 May, 15 government soldiers received medical assistance at the UNAMID team site in Umm Barru. On 24 May 2009, JEM forces attacked an SAF camp in Umm Barru, during which approximately 350 civilians sought refuge in the UNAMID team site in Umm Barru and 53 wounded persons were treated by UNAMID personnel. During the fighting, rounds struck the UNAMID team site in Umm Barru causing damage to 14 UNAMID vehicles. As at 26 May 2009, Government and SLA/Minni Minawi forces still held Umm Barru and fighting had ceased.

13. In my previous report to the Security Council (S/2009/201), I alerted the Council to the mobilization of Chadian armed opposition groups in El Geneina and along the Sudan-Chad border. In late April, forces of the Chadian armed opposition groups began to cross into eastern Chad in three different locations, via Tissa, Dague and Modeyna. Heavy fighting in eastern Chad between Chadian armed opposition groups and Chadian national forces was reported from 4 to 9 May.

14. On 15 and 16 May, Chadian air and ground forces pursued forces of Chadian armed opposition groups at least 40 kilometres into the Sudan, approximately 60 kilometres south of El Geneina. On 17 May, the Minister of Defence of Chad, Adoum Younousmi, confirmed that the raid had taken place in Sudanese territory, and claimed that 100 members of Chadian armed opposition groups had been captured. Minister Younousmi stated that the entry into the Sudan was justified on the grounds that Chad could “use its right of pursuit” to conduct subsequent attacks if necessary. On 19 May, the Secretary-General of the Sudanese National Congress Party was quoted in the national media as saying that the “Sudan will respond in an adequate manner to the Chadian aggression against its national territory”. These inflammatory statements by both parties continue to escalate tensions in the region and constitute a marked deterioration from the levels of cooperation in Doha on 3 May 2009.

15. For the United Nations, Security Phase IV continues to be in effect throughout Darfur. Notwithstanding the ongoing military conflicts that occurred in Darfur during the reporting period, carjacking and banditry continue to pose the most significant risk to United Nations personnel.

16. During the reporting period, a total of 143 security incidents affecting United Nations staff were recorded, including increasingly violent incidents of carjacking. On 7 May 2009, a UNAMID Military Observer was killed by an unknown armed man during a carjacking incident in Nyala.

17. On 4 April 2009, four staff members of the NGO Aide Médicale Internationale were abducted in Edd al-Fursan, Southern Darfur. While two of the national staff members were released the following day, two international staff members were held until 29 April 2009, when they were released into Government custody. That was the second kidnapping incident of international staff to take place in Darfur within a space of three weeks.

18. Several violent incidents involving Government security institutions have taken place during the reporting period. On 2 May 2009, an exchange of fire between members of Government forces and Central Reserve Police near Nyala resulted in the death of three civilians. In another incident, on 9 May 2009, four civilians and two Government soldiers were killed in an exchange of fire between Arab militias and the SAF in El Fasher market.

IV. Humanitarian situation

19. Humanitarian assistance in Darfur during the reporting period continued to focus on efforts to cope with the consequences of the expulsion of 13 international and the dissolution of three national NGOs operating in Northern Sudan on 4 March 2009. While there was considerable concern regarding the possible consequences of the expulsions, by mid-May a number of actions had been taken to mitigate the impact of that development, particularly in the areas of food, health and water. The Government boosted many of its humanitarian delivery capacities, in particular with respect to water delivery. Additionally, the remaining humanitarian actors in Darfur assumed greater responsibility for the provision of critical life-saving support. The arrival of new national actors in Darfur via government line ministries provided additional capacities to mitigate the effects of the expulsions.

20. Considerable work remains to be done to address gaps in life-saving sectors. While there are reasonable grounds for confidence that basic needs such as food requirements will continue to be met, areas such as shelter and sanitation are severely underserved and, as Darfur enters the rainy season, the risk of outbreaks of disease will rise. The health sector also remains an area of concern. The pre-expulsion standards of delivery have yet to be restored, particularly in a number of large internally displaced person locations (including Kalma and Hassa Hissa camps for internally displaced persons, and the Jebel Marra area). In terms of non-life-saving sectors, the expulsions have had a serious effect which will be felt increasingly over time. For example, distributions of seeds and tools to 160,000 households (797,000 people) could not take place this year, which will have a significant impact on the coming harvest.

21. The situation in Zam Zam camp for internally displaced persons near El Fasher, where, as I previously reported (S/2009/201), some 46,000 newly displaced persons arrived following fighting in Southern Darfur earlier this year, continues to be very serious. The camp has far exceeded its capacity to provide adequate humanitarian services to the internally displaced persons, and the influx of these new arrivals has placed considerable strain on water resources in the camp. To

support ongoing efforts by the humanitarian community, UNAMID continues to transport 45,000 litres of water per day to the camp — enough for approximately 3,000 people — and has provided daily escorts for agencies and staff. Senior United Nations representatives have repeatedly requested the Government at all levels that more land be made available to accommodate new arrivals in the camp, but to date no land has been provided.

22. After the 4 March expulsions, and following recent incidents of hostage taking and criminal attacks, some of which have been described in the present report, the humanitarian community has significantly reduced its presence in remote field locations. By 1 June 2009, the international humanitarian presence in Southern and Western Darfur was at approximately 64 per cent of pre-4 March levels. In Northern Darfur, however, the aid community is effectively confined to El Fasher owing to the situation of insecurity. In order to assist humanitarian activities in Darfur, UNAMID is currently providing 24-hour protection of four warehouses previously managed by an expelled NGO and 67 vehicles belonging to United Nations partners and NGOs.

23. The Government of the Sudan has recently taken a series of positive steps towards facilitating humanitarian assistance in Darfur, including publicly welcoming remaining and certain new NGOs to work in the region, allowing some individual staff members of expelled NGOs with needed skills to return to Darfur, and it has agreed to issue one-year multiple-entry visas to all international aid workers in Darfur. It has also expanded the membership of the High-Level Committee to include more ministries from the Government of National Unity, including the ministries of international cooperation and finance, and more members from the international community, including representatives of the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the African Union and the League of Arab States. UNAMID will continue to participate in these meetings.

V. UNAMID operations

24. During the reporting period, UNAMID military conducted 790 confidence-building patrols, 1,040 escort patrols, 243 night patrols and 14 investigation patrols, covering 1,587 villages. UNAMID police carried out a total of 5,896 patrols inside camps for internally displaced persons including firewood/grass escorts, and 1,844 patrols outside the camps, including town/village patrols.

25. The security level in Darfur remains at Phase IV. The mission continued to face restrictions on its freedom of movement during the reporting period, imposed mainly by the Government of the Sudan, as well as obstructions to the implementation of UNAMID quick-impact projects by the Sudanese National Intelligence and Security Service, and detention of UNAMID national staff in violation of the status-of-forces agreement between the United Nations and the Government of the Sudan.

26. On 7 April 2009, a UNAMID patrol team was prevented from passing a Government checkpoint near Shaeria (Southern Darfur). On 27 April 2009, a UNAMID escort patrol from Zam Zam to Sector West was ordered to return to its base by Government soldiers at a checkpoint in Shara (4 km from Zam Zam, Northern Darfur) on the grounds that the security situation in the area was unpredictable. Also in Northern Darfur, on 2 May 2009 a UNAMID escort patrol

team from Zam Zam was turned away at a Government checkpoint and not allowed to proceed to Kabkabiya (Northern Darfur). In Western Darfur, on 24 April 2009 a local JEM leader denied a UNAMID confidence-building patrol access to Bardani village (80 km north of El Geneina).

27. On 12 May, 12 staff members of six national NGO implementing partners of UNAMID quick-impact projects were arrested by National Intelligence and Security Service at Zalingei airport, briefly detained and interrogated regarding their travel on a UNAMID flight to El Fasher. During this incident, the National Intelligence and Security Service confiscated project funds amounting to 177,000 Sudanese pounds (approximately \$77,000), which the NGOs had received from UNAMID in El Fasher. Although the issue of travel on UNAMID flights was subsequently resolved following interventions made by UNAMID with the National Intelligence and Security Service, the funds have not yet been returned to the NGOs.

28. In another incident, the National Intelligence and Security Service arrested and detained two UNAMID national staff members on 11 April 2009 in El Fasher. The staff members were held in detention for three and four days, respectively, and released without any formal charges. Subsequent medical examination of the staff members indicated trauma and bruising. These incidents are a troubling development and constitute violations of the status-of-forces agreement between the United Nations and the Government of the Sudan.

29. During the reporting period, UNAMID documented 17 cases of arbitrary and illegal arrests and detentions by Government security forces. Fifteen of the detainees have since been released, while two others remain in detention without charges. Four of the released detainees reported being subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or torture while in detention.

30. UNAMID also documented five cases of threats and harassment of human rights workers, Sudanese staff members of UNAMID and international NGOs and civil society members on suspicion of having provided sensitive information to the international community.

31. UNAMID continued to receive allegations of rape and physical assaults against women and girls during the reporting period. The mission documented 12 incidents of sexual and gender-based violence involving 34 victims, 10 of whom were below the age of 18 and 11 of whom were internally displaced persons. In the majority of the cases documented, the victims described the perpetrators as armed men dressed in military uniforms. In a positive development, the Government has worked to expedite the deployment of female police officers to address gender-based violence.

32. During the period under review, UNAMID conducted 20 training courses for local police. Eighteen of the courses were for Government police and covered community policing, human rights, sexual and gender-based violence, child protection and crime investigation, while two courses on community policing were organized for Movements Police.

33. Throughout the reporting period, UNAMID supported an ongoing traditional conflict-resolution process between leaders at the Dourtí camp for internally displaced persons and in the neighbouring Umm Al-Qura Arab community. The UNAMID engagement has also produced positive signs of willingness to negotiate the conflict between a Massalit community and local nomads in Masteri (40 km

west of El Geneina, Western Darfur). In a negative development, on 12 May 2009, the National Intelligence and Security Service terminated a two-day workshop organized by UNAMID at the University of Zalingei (Western Darfur) on the role of native administration in peace, conflict resolution and reconciliation. The workshop was cancelled despite proper registration with local authorities and endorsement by the Deputy Commissioner of Zalingei locality.

34. During the reporting period, three unexploded ordnance-related accidents were reported to UNAMID. Regrettably, all mine action operations in Darfur have continued to be suspended since 2 March 2009, and thus no surveys, destructions of unexploded ordnances or risk education have taken place during the reporting period. The issue was addressed during the meeting of the Tripartite Committee held on 31 March 2009 in El Fasher. Letters were also sent to the Government of the Sudan, one from UNAMID and one from the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, requesting that the mine action teams resume operations as soon as possible in order to fulfil the mandate of UNAMID and provide protection to the civilian population. No response from the Government has yet been received.

VI. UNAMID deployment

35. As at 26 May 2009, the total strength of UNAMID military personnel was 13,455 out of a total authorized strength of 19,555, including 12,814 troops, 378 staff officers, 179 military observers and 84 liaison officers. The current deployment of the troops represents 68 per cent of the authorized strength.

36. The increase in military strength during the reporting period was due to the arrival of the advance party of the second Egyptian infantry battalion, the Bangladeshi Sector Reserve Company, and the Bangladeshi Movement Control Platoon. Once the construction of camps for the Egyptian battalion is completed, it will be deployed in Edd al-Fursan and Tullus (Southern Darfur). In addition, I am pleased to report that on 18 May 2009 we received confirmation from the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand of its approval and planned deployment of a Thai infantry battalion to UNAMID in October 2009. With that confirmation, we expect to deploy all 18 UNAMID battalions to Darfur by the end of 2009.

37. The movement of contingent-owned equipment continues to be relatively unobstructed. Efforts to expedite the second Ethiopian battalion's contingent-owned equipment movement via-letter-of-assist arrangements are ongoing and would enable the advance elements of Ethiopian Light Field Engineering Company and Force Protection Unit to deploy to their final location in the coming weeks. However, 62 Nigerian armoured personnel carriers, which arrived in Port Sudan on 1 May 2009, are still awaiting customs clearances from the Sudanese Government. In order to ensure that these assets are deployed as quickly as possible, the mission has engaged the Government at the highest levels to resolve the issue.

38. Additional planning efforts are being directed at the deployment of five Ethiopian tactical helicopters in the Nyala super camp. Memorandum of understanding negotiations with Ethiopia took place during the week of 26 May 2009, in order to expedite deployment. The Government has allocated parking space for the helicopters, with the agreement that associated personnel will be

accommodated in the Nyala super camp. Construction of the parking spaces by the Chinese Engineer Company is under way.

39. The memorandum of understanding arrangement between the United Nations and Canada for UNAMID use of 103 Canadian armoured personnel carriers was extended until 30 June 2009. Preparations for the withdrawal of the armoured personnel carriers and replacement with contingent-owned carriers are ongoing.

40. The continued lack of key military enabling units, such as the medium transport units, an aerial reconnaissance unit, 18 medium utility helicopters and a Level-II hospital in El Fasher, continues to be a source of concern, as well as the adequate maintenance of contingent-owned armoured personnel carriers. In addition, the withdrawal of Canadian-owned armoured personnel carriers by 30 June 2009 could create a temporary decrease in operational capacity for up to three months while units await the arrival of their new equipment.

41. During the reporting period, a total of 12 uniformed personnel had to be repatriated for health reasons. This underscores the importance of applying United Nations health standards during pre-selection of personnel, and the critical requirement for ensuring that Level-I clinics provided by troop-contributing countries are fully functional.

42. The ability of UNAMID to provide adequate medical services to its staff members was affected by the Government's decision of 12 April 2009 to ground three helicopters contracted by UNAMID for medical evacuation purposes. According to the Government, the helicopters, which were installed with infrared equipment for night-time air evacuation procedures, did not conform to the arrangements reached between the United Nations and the Government. Bilateral efforts are being made at the highest level to resolve the issue so that the helicopters can resume their critical functions.

43. On 25 May 2009, the strength of UNAMID police personnel was 2,877 (1,902 police advisers and 7 formed police units totalling 975 personnel). The two Bangladeshi formed police units completed deployment to Darfur on 24 May. The deployed number of police represents 45 per cent of total authorized strength of 6,432 officers. The slight decrease in individual police officers from the previous reporting period was due to the rotation of police advisers back to police-contributing countries. Due to the security situation, the ceiling for unarmed police personnel remains at a maximum of 1,800.

44. As at 13 May 2009, the number of civilian personnel stood at 3,497 (985 international, 2,195 national and 317 United Nations Volunteers), representing 63 per cent of the approved strength of 5,557. During the reporting period, 5 international staff members departed UNAMID and 17 candidates declined offers of employment. This continuing trend reflects the serious challenges facing UNAMID in recruiting and retaining international staff as a result of insecurity, harsh living conditions and health risks in Darfur. Since the start of the mission, a total of 110 international staff members departed UNAMID and 154 selected international candidates have declined offers of appointment, which constitutes 27 per cent of the currently recruited international staff.

45. During the reporting period, delays in the issuance of visas by the Government of the Sudan to UNAMID personnel has resulted in some 521 total visa applications pending, 308 of which were requested prior to May 2009.

46. A fire occurred at UNAMID headquarters on 19 April 2009, destroying major warehouses for telecommunications equipment and general supplies, a medical office, and the water and environment laboratory. The total loss from the fire is estimated at \$4 million. On the basis of initial investigations, it appears that electrical malfunctioning was the cause of the fire, and UNAMID is updating its overall fire safety procedures. I would like to express my appreciation to the Government of the Sudan for promptly offering its fire services during the incident.

VII. Observations

47. I am deeply concerned that the sharp deterioration in Chad-Sudan relations, including movement of Chadian forces across the border into the Sudan on 16 and 17 May 2009, is further destabilizing the already volatile region. This escalation of violence is particularly troubling as it followed the renewed commitments by both States to seek dialogue and re-establish diplomatic ties. I was also seriously concerned by remarks attributed to senior Chadian government officials regarding Chad's intent to continue with cross-border incursions. This is the language of escalation at a time when all parties should be focused on restraint. I wish to underscore that there is no military solution to the situation in the subregion and that peaceful relations between Chad and the Sudan are a prerequisite to peace in Darfur. I urge the Governments of Chad and the Sudan to refrain from any act that may lead to a further escalation of tensions and I call on both States to fully implement their mutual agreements, in particular the Doha Agreement of 3 May 2009 and the Dakar Agreement of 13 March 2008.

48. I am also extremely concerned about the continued military engagement between JEM and both SLA/Minni Minawi and the Government of the Sudan in the area of Umm Barru, Northern Darfur. I note that this clash was reportedly initiated by the JEM and I condemn such military action, which puts civilian lives at risk and which seriously undermines efforts to achieve a peaceful end to the conflict in Darfur. I further remind both the Government of the Sudan and the JEM of the commitment they made in Doha on 17 January 2009, and I call on both parties to suspend military action and apply themselves to addressing these issues in the second round of talks, which began in Doha on 27 May 2009.

49. During the reporting period, the mission faced considerable challenges with respect to its freedom of movement and ability to implement its mandate. When taken together, these incidents signal a negative trend with regard to the Government's cooperation with UNAMID, and include: the obstruction of UNAMID patrolling activities, primarily by Government checkpoints; the detention of quick-impact projects implementing partners; confiscation of quick-impact project funds; the detention and apparent mistreatment of UNAMID national staff; and the prohibitively slow pace with which visas are currently being issued. This must be reversed and we are committed to working with the Government to address and resolve these issues. As the mission completes its initial deployment and transitions into a phase where it is increasingly expected to implement all aspects of its mandate, I call on all parties to respect the presence of UNAMID staff and partners throughout Darfur and to facilitate its mandate wherever possible.

50. While the most critical short-term impact of the expulsion of humanitarian NGOs from the Sudan has been mitigated by a combination of enhanced

government capacity, an increase in responsibility assumed by the remaining humanitarian actors, and new capacities on the ground, I am concerned that the pre-expulsion levels of aid delivery have not been restored. I continue to urge the Government to reconsider its decision and in the meantime I trust the Government will continue to work together with the United Nations and its partners to identify, prioritize and address the most critical life-threatening gaps in humanitarian assistance efforts in Darfur.

51. Regarding the ongoing Darfur-related cases before the International Criminal Court, I take note of the voluntary appearance of Mr. Bahr Idriss Abu Garda, commander of the United Resistance Front in Darfur, before the Court on 18 May 2009, in response to charges of war crimes committed on 29 September 2007 at the Haskanita base of the African Union Mission in the Sudan. I commend the Court's efforts to ensure accountability for crimes against peacekeepers and emphasize that the United Nations respects the independence of the Court and its judicial process. I have reiterated the determination of the United Nations to continue to conduct its vital mediation, peacekeeping, humanitarian, human rights and development operations in the Sudan, and I urge the Government of the Sudan to address the issues of peace and justice in a manner consistent with Security Council resolution 1593 (2005).

52. Even as we continue to address the many and various challenges associated with the Darfur conflict, we are at a critical moment with respect to the Sudan, in which the issues related to the Darfur conflict must be addressed as part of the broader national context. With the increased attention on Sudan-wide elections currently scheduled to take place in February 2010, and the challenging issue of ensuring meaningful representation of all Sudanese in any electoral process, the need to find a viable political solution to Darfur has never been more urgent. For the time being, the main parties continue to choose violence over compromise and have demonstrated an overall lack of will or capacity to resolve this conflict alone. I reiterate my call on all parties, and the States with influence over the parties, to work with Joint Chief Mediator Bassolé towards a negotiated political solution to the conflict.
