



## Security Council

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### Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali

#### I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 2164 (2014), the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) until 30 June 2015 and requested me to report to it every three months on the implementation of the resolution and the Mission's mandate. The present report provides an update on major developments since my previous report, of 27 March 2015 ([S/2015/219](#)), and recommendations for the extension of the mandate of MINUSMA.

#### II. Political process

2. There have been significant developments in the inter-Malian dialogue since my most recent report. On 15 May, the Government, the Platform coalition of armed groups, composed of Coordination des mouvements et fronts patriotiques de résistance I (CMFPR-I), a faction of the Coalition du peuple de l'Azawad (CPA), a faction of Mouvement arabe de l'Azawad (MAA) and the Groupe d'autodéfense touareg Imghad et alliés (GATIA), and representatives of two of the Coordination coalition of armed groups, namely another faction of CPA and of CMFPR-II, signed the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali emanating from the Algiers process (Accord pour la paix et la réconciliation au Mali issu du processus d'Alger) in Bamako, in the presence of the international community and national stakeholders. The other movements of the Coordination which includes the Mouvement national pour la libération de l'Azawad (MNLA), the Haut Conseil pour l'unité de l'Azawad (HCUA), the Mouvement arabe de l'Azawad (MAA), the Coordination des mouvements et fronts patriotiques de résistance II (CMFPR-II) and a faction of the Coalition du peuple de l'Azawad (CPA), did not sign the agreement, but they did initial it the previous day, on 14 May, in Algiers. Such developments constituted important progress, while dialogue continued with a view to securing the adhesion of all parties to the agreement. Those efforts, however, have been hampered by the serious deterioration of the security situation across the north of Mali since the end of April, particularly in Ménaka (Gao region), which saw ceasefire violations by all Malian parties and violent clashes between Platform and Coordination elements.



## Inter-Malian dialogue and reconciliation

3. Following the initialling of the draft agreement by the Government and the Platform on 1 March in Algiers, the mediation, comprising Algeria, the United Nations/MINUSMA, the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the European Union, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania and the Niger, continued its efforts to bring all parties to initial the draft agreement. On 17 March, a delegation of the international community travelled to Kidal to meet with representatives of the Coordination, who had gathered to consult with their constituency. During that visit, the Coordination submitted a list of observations to be considered and discussed prior to its initialling of the agreement. The mediation indicated that no further amendments to the draft peace agreement would be considered. On 18 March, during a press conference, the Minister of Digital Economy, Information and Communication and Government spokesman of Mali announced the Government's decision not to enter into further negotiations with the Coordination. Following discussions with the mediation, however, the Government later accepted to discuss implementation issues, subsequent to the initialling of the agreement by the Coordination.

4. The Government of Mali also organized sensitization activities relating to the agreement. On 31 March, the Minister of Solidarity, Humanitarian Action and Reconstruction of the North, of the Government of Mali, visited the refugee camp of Tabarey-Barey in the Niger, where he presented the content of the draft agreement to Malian refugees there. On 4 and 6 April, the Minister of National Reconciliation travelled to Nouakchott and to the M'bera refugee camp in Mauritania to sensitize Malian communities there to matters relating to the agreement and to encourage their return once conditions would so permit. Meanwhile, popular demonstrations took place on 11, 12, 14 and 15 April in Kidal, Ménaka and Ber to denounce the Coordination's intention to initial the agreement.

5. Between 14 and 19 April, MINUSMA, in line with its mandate concerning the protection of civilians, which includes the mitigation of intercommunal violence, supported a peace caravan to Goundam Cercle. The initiative of elected and traditional local leaders, particularly the chief of the Kel-Antessar tribe, was undertaken to help restore trust between the communities of Goundam. Peaceful messages were disseminated to people in over 20 localities in the Cercle, including members of Arab, Peulh, Songhai and Tuareg communities, as well as representatives of the M'bera refugee camp in Mauritania. Activities included large public meetings in Bintagoungou, Douékiré, Goundam, Mbouna and Scale, as well as focus groups aimed at promoting reconciliation. The initiative helped foster dialogue between communities and improve confidence, in order to prepare for the reintegration and voluntary return of refugees from the M'bera refugee camp.

6. Following discussions held in Algiers on 4 April between my Special Representative in Mali and Head of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, Mongi Hamdi, and the Secretary-General of MNLA, Bilal Ag Acherif, the latter indicated, in a letter addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria, Ramtane Lamamra, that the Coordination would be willing to initial the draft agreement, provided that consultations would be held on their outstanding observations on the text. On 6 April, Mr. Lamamra invited the parties to Algiers for an initialling ceremony, scheduled to take place on 15 April. On 10 April, however, the spokesperson of MNLA issued a communiqué on behalf

of the Coordination reiterating its refusal to initial the agreement “in its present form at that date”. During further talks held in Algiers from 14 to 19 April, the Coordination delegation, led by the Secretary-General of MAA-Coordination, Sidi Ibrahim Ould Sidati, reaffirmed its commitment to initial and sign the agreement on the condition that a set of issues be addressed first, including guarantees from the mediation. In consultation with the Government of Mali, the mediation decided that further discussions would not be pursued and that a formal signature of the agreement would take place in Bamako on 15 May, to which all Malian parties would be invited. The Government of Mali thereafter transmitted invitations to the ceremony to national and international representatives.

7. Efforts to facilitate the adhesion of the Coordination to the agreement in time for the signing ceremony continued nonetheless. Following difficult and intense discussions that took place in Nouakchott, on 25 and 26 April, between my Special Representative and the leadership of the Coordination, Mr. Ag Acherif confirmed, in a letter addressed to my Special Representative on 26 April, that the Coordination would agree to initial the agreement prior to further consultations. That effort was set back on 27 April, however, when combatants from GATIA and MAA-Platform attacked and took control of Ménaka, a town Coordination forces had been occupying under the terms of the ceasefire agreement of 23 May 2014. The incident set off a series of retaliatory ceasefire violations by the Coordination, fuelling a spiral of violence by all sides that threatened to derail the peace process.

8. As detailed in the next section, MINUSMA immediately initiated contacts with the parties at all levels to defuse tensions and prevent a further escalation of violence. My Special Representative proposed a series of recommendations to end the wave of violence in the north, with a particular focus on the situation in Ménaka. The Coordination initially refused a new invitation to attend consultations in Algiers unless the Platform withdrew from Ménaka, but eventually agreed to travel to Algiers on 13 May, at the insistence of my Special Representative. On 14 May, the Coordination initialled the agreement in the presence of the mediation and other parties, while insisting that discussions be held with the Government before it would sign the agreement.

9. On 15 May, the formal signing ceremony of the agreement took place in Bamako. The ceremony was attended by 10 Heads of State and several representatives of governments and international organizations, as well as a significant number of national actors, including representatives from civil society, political parties, traditional and religious leaders from the northern and southern regions and former Heads of State and prime ministers. In addition to my Special Representative, I was represented by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. Following consultations with the Security Council on 7 May, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations articulated, in a statement that he delivered on my behalf, the principles that would guide United Nations support for an agreement signed by only some of the parties, namely, that dialogue would continue, the agreement would remain open for signature by outstanding parties, ceasefire commitments would remain valid and efforts would be made to identify those elements of the agreement that could be viably implemented pending the signature of the agreement by all parties. Large demonstrations later took place, on 26 May, in Bamako and Goundam (Timbuktu region) and on 27 May in Timbuktu city, to express support for the peace agreement.

10. Following intense engagement by my Special Representative and other key stakeholders, a series of consultations took place, from 27 May to 5 June, between the mediation and all Malian parties in Algiers on a two-step road map with a view to facilitating the adhesion of Coordination to the agreement. First, the road map aims to mitigate the prevailing security situation by re-establishing ceasefires, building on arrangements for Ménaka and reaffirming the parties' commitment to a cessation of hostilities throughout the country. Second, the road map consists of consultations between the parties on the modalities for the implementation of the agreement, including the establishment of the *Comité de suivi de l'accord*, the implementation framework foreseen by the agreement. On 5 June the Coordination, the Government of Mali and the mediation signed a summary of preparatory consultations on the implementation of the peace agreement and a ceasefire arrangement that inter alia provided for the disengagement of the parties from Ménaka. The Platform refused to sign those two documents.

### **III. Security, stabilization and protection of civilians**

11. During the reporting period, the frequency, intensity and geographical spread of clashes and attacks increased, especially in the period leading up to and immediately following the ceremony for the signature of the agreement held on 15 May. Tensions escalated between the Platform and the Coordination, both seeking opportunities to assert influence and make territorial and political gains. Clashes and movements of armed groups mainly occurred in the Gao and Timbuktu regions, but also increasingly towards the south, in Mopti and Ségou regions, and led to significant displacement of civilians.

#### **Clashes between and attacks by compliant armed groups**

12. On 27 April, GATIA and MAA-Platform elements unexpectedly attacked and took over the town of Ménaka from the Coordination, which had been occupying it under the terms of the 23 May 2014 ceasefire agreement. Elements of the Malian armed forces, previously sheltered in the co-located Malian armed forces-MINUSMA camp, left the premises and were active both inside and outside the town. Fighting between armed groups continued in the following days on the outskirts of Ménaka and in key locations in the area. MINUSMA deployed joint investigation teams to assess the fighting and its consequences and supported the deployment of a joint observation and verification team from Gao on 29 April. MINUSMA immediately reinforced its military presence in the town so as to deter further violence.

13. The Coordination retaliated by launching a series of attacks against Government- or Platform-held localities in Timbuktu region. On 28 April, four Coordination vehicles were observed in the close vicinity of Timbuktu. The Coordination leadership in Ber requested the departure of the Malian defence and security forces from Timbuktu and indicated its intention to enter the city in order to oust them. As the parties reinforced their positions, MINUSMA engaged with and obtained the commitment of the local Coordination leadership not to enter Timbuktu. In the following days, several attacks against the Malian defence and security forces were conducted in Timbuktu and Mopti regions and resulted in four

civilians being killed and nine being injured; 19 members of the Malian defence and security forces were killed and 15 were injured; and eight persons were abducted. Three elements of the Coordination were killed and four were wounded. In addition, 12 inmates escaped from the prison in Diré (Timbuktu region). Looting and stealing from the civilian population by Coordination elements were also reported in Ténenkou (Mopti region). Attacks by the Coordination against other armed groups were reported in Timbuktu region, including kidnappings, looting and arson.

14. With the aim of encouraging a return to the observance of the ceasefire, the Force Commander of MINUSMA organized an extraordinary meeting of the Mixed Technical Commission on Security on 2 May, in Gao, with the participation of Government, Platform and Coordination representatives. The findings of two joint observation and verification team missions conducted in Timbuktu and Ménaka on 29 April were presented, and it was concluded that violations of the ceasefire agreements had been committed on all sides. Further joint observation and verification teams were sent to Bintagougou, Goundam and Leré. MINUSMA proposed a disengagement plan for Ménaka, which provided for a pullback of all armed groups from the town and the assumption by MINUSMA of responsibility for security in the town and the establishment of a protective “red line” 5 km north of the town. The Platform rejected the proposal, remaining in Ménaka, while Coordination representatives questioned the Mission’s impartiality in denying them access to the town as provided for in previous ceasefire arrangements.

15. On 8 May, an armed confrontation between Ganda Koy elements and individuals suspected of criminal activity took place in Arbichi village, 42 km from Gourma-Rharous (Timbuktu region), resulting in the death of one suspected criminal and the arrest of another, who was handed over to the Malian armed forces and taken into custody in Timbuktu. The clash triggered a series of incidents, with the Coordination storming villages located along the Niger River, causing the displacement of people from the northern, Coordination-controlled bank of the river to the southern bank, controlled by the Malian armed forces and Ganda Koy elements. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as of 1 June, 59,565 persons have been displaced in recent weeks as a result of the insecurity.

16. Starting on 13 May, fighting around Ménaka resumed, with Coordination and Platform elements clashing at In Kadeouane, approximately 80 km north of Ménaka. Members of the Malian armed forces left their camp and took up positions within and north of the town, where they have remained in defensive positions since 15 May. MINUSMA continued to advocate for the disengagement of all Malian parties from the town and communicated to the Coordination that any offensive movement towards Ménaka would be interpreted as a threat to the civilian population. Two further efforts to convene the CTMS to discuss the Mission’s Ménaka proposal failed when the Platform, despite commitments to the mediation team, refused to attend. On 26 May, some 1,000 protesters gathered in front of the Mission’s camp in Ménaka, demanding a meeting with the Government and MINUSMA leadership. MINUSMA also received a letter from the town’s mayor, requesting MINUSMA to expand its authority in the town and to enlarge the proposed protection zone up to 30 km. MINUSMA continues to provide medical evacuation of injured combatants from the area.

## **Asymmetric and extremist attacks**

17. Violent extremist and criminal activities increased in all northern regions and southward into Mopti and Ségou regions. The incursion of extremist elements and the targeting of local authorities and of suspected informants of the Malian defence and security forces in Mopti region, as well as attacks in Bamako, were particularly worrisome developments.

18. Attacks against local administration officials in Mopti region led several of them, including seven sub-prefects and one mayor, to leave their posts. On 26 April, a vehicle carrying the prefect of Youwarou and the sub-prefect of Dogo hit an improvised explosive device or mine on the Dogo-Déké axis; no casualties were reported. On 29 May, four rockets were fired in the direction of the airport in Gao by unknown assailants, without causing casualties or damage.

19. Attacks against civilians also intensified, leading to 9 civilians being killed and at least 14 being injured by improvised explosive devices or mines and, for the first time in Gao, by a rocket attack. Numerous acts of retaliation, abductions and threats against civilians were also registered in Gao, Mopti, Ségou and Timbuktu regions. During the reporting period, two Malians and one Romanian were kidnapped. From mid-March to 20 April, logistics convoys, mainly of MINUSMA and its suppliers, faced several attacks, including on the Ménaka-Ansongo (Gao region), Timbuktu-Goundam (Timbuktu region), Gao-Almoustarat (Gao region) and Gao-Gossi (Gao and Timbuktu regions) axes. Those attacks resulted in five civilian contractors being killed and three being injured, while five vehicles were damaged or destroyed by gunfire and mine attacks. In response to the intensification of attacks on civilian vehicles, on 27 April, the Malian armed forces began escorting civilian transport vehicles on the Timbuktu-Goundam, Goundam-Tonka (Timbuktu region), Timbuktu-Douentza (Timbuktu and Mopti regions) and Gao-Gossi-Douentza (Gao and Timbuktu regions) axes.

20. Attacks against the Malian defence and security forces using improvised explosive devices also increased during the reporting period. Five incidents were recorded, resulting in two uniformed personnel being killed and nine being injured.

21. MINUSMA was the target of numerous attacks, mostly involving the use of improvised explosive devices, but also encountered one mortar attack in Kidal. Twelve peacekeepers were injured, in multiple attacks, and nine additional peacekeepers were injured on 15 April, when an attacker attempted to break into the Mission's camp in Ansongo (Gao region) with a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device and detonated the device outside the camp. On 17 April, Al-Mourabitoun claimed responsibility for the attack.

22. In addition, on 16 May, an attack with a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device was launched against a force convoy of MINUSMA that had established its overnight position in the vicinity of Almoustarat (Gao region), leading to the minor injury of one peacekeeper. On 20 May, an armed attacker unsuccessfully tried to set fire to a vehicle of the Mission parked outside the house of MINUSMA military personnel in Bamako, then opened fire on a local guard, the house and other vehicles, and threw two hand grenades, which did not explode. On 22 May, 11 mortar shells were fired at the Mission's camp in Ber (Timbuktu region), landing 5 m away from the camp, without causing casualties. On 25 May, a shooting incident in Bamako, which Malian authorities and MINUSMA are still investigating,

resulted in one peacekeeper being killed and a second being injured. Meanwhile, on 28 May, an armoured vehicle escorting a MINUSMA convoy, including the Force Commander and Police Commissioner, hit a mine or improvised explosive device about 20 km east of Timbuktu; three peacekeepers were injured and the vehicle was destroyed.

### **Protection of civilians**

23. While civilians in northern Mali were rarely deliberately targeted by attacks, they suffered collateral damage, including from improvised explosive devices and mines, as well as rockets. According to the United Nations Mine Action Service, 50 civilian victims of such incidents (including 9 who were killed and 41 who were injured) have been registered during the period under review. In addition to civilian casualties, improvised explosive devices, mines and explosive remnants of war hindered freedom of movement and affected access to services and economic opportunities.

24. The Mission implemented its protection of civilians mandate through a variety of measures. In order to respond to the growing violence in the Timbuktu region, MINUSMA was in direct contact with the Coordination leadership and local authorities to try and defuse the situation. MINUSMA further organized assessment missions to Bintagoungou, Diré, Léré and Goundam (Timbuktu region), following clashes in those localities, so as to engage with and reassure the population as well as to evaluate the security situation and its impact on civilians. MINUSMA immediately initiated investigations of the sites of attacks in support of local security authorities. In several cases, MINUSMA assisted with the evacuation of wounded civilian victims, such as in Ansongo (Gao region) on 15 April. In Gao, Mopti and Timbuktu regions, the Mine Action Service completed explosive search and clearance operations in public buildings, as well as in private houses, which were previously occupied by armed groups, enabling the safe re-establishment of State authority and the return of displaced people. During the reporting period, the Mine Action Service conducted risk education sessions on explosive hazards for 15,025 people and education sessions on small arms and light weapons for over 8,700 people in communities at risk in Gao, Mopti and Timbuktu regions.

25. Despite being constrained by the need to allocate significant resources to the protection of MINUSMA camps and escorting logistics convoys, the force deployed long-range patrols to areas of heightened tension, such as Ténenkou (Mopti region) in order to deter further clashes and reassure civilians. Similarly, MINUSMA police undertook long-range as well as coordinated patrols with Malian security forces to reassure the population. In Ménaka (Gao region), the force deployed 200 additional troops, as of 28 April, to reinforce the existing MINUSMA presence and deter attacks on civilian-populated areas.

## **IV. Human rights protection**

26. The Mission documented violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law during the period under review. A total of 19 civilians were killed in instances of summary executions (9 civilians), indiscriminate mortar

and rocket attacks (8 civilians) or during armed clashes by parties to the conflict (2 civilians) in Gao, Kidal, Mopti and Ségou regions.

27. MINUSMA undertook examinations of alleged summary or arbitrary executions of civilians. Three civilians were victims of summary executions by unidentified individuals for alleged cooperation with Malian armed forces in the Ségou region. On 29 March, unidentified armed men on motorbikes entered the village of Tokala (Ségou region) and summarily executed two persons perceived to be informants to the Malian armed forces. On 22 April, the chief of Dogo village (Mopti region) was shot and assassinated by two men on a motorbike, while in the market, while on 12 April, 1 km south of the same village, a young Peulh, perceived to be an informant of the Malian armed forces, was assaulted by four armed men, strangled and left for dead.

28. In the context of clashes between elements from all Malian parties in Tin Hama (Gao region), six civilian men, all belonging to the Tuareg Kel Essouk group and including a humanitarian worker, were executed on 21 May. Other incidents that raised serious protection concerns include threats made against people cooperating with MINUSMA and the Malian State in Djenné and Douentza (Mopti region).

29. As of 15 May, 219 conflict-related detainees remained in detention by the State, either in Bamako or the regions. Of those detainees, 22 appeared on the lists submitted by the Coordination for release within the framework of the confidence-building measures of article 18 of the Ouagadougou preliminary agreement. In April, two such detainees were released.

30. The Coordination and the Platform continued to detain fighters of opposing groups as well as members of the Malian defence and security forces captured during operations. On 22 May in Ber, Timbuktu region, MINUSMA facilitated the release of 10 members of Ganda Koy and CMFPR-I, who had been held by the Coordination since 28 April, while the Coordination continues to detain two members of the Malian defence and security forces. On 27 April in Ménaka, the Platform captured nine Coordination fighters, who are now held in Tabankort. Since their transfer to Tabankort, MINUSMA has lost access to them. In Kidal region, the Coordination continues to hold one GATIA fighter captured on 20 January in Tabankort, while two more GATIA fighters captured in the same operation were released in April. The Coordination also continues to detain 16 Malian armed forces members captured on 22 May in Tessit, Gao region. MINUSMA has not been able to establish conclusively the number, grounds and conditions of detention of all persons held by armed groups, owing to limited information and a lack of access.

### **Conflict-related sexual violence**

31. During the reporting period, MINUSMA documented 23 cases of conflict-related sexual violence. A judge was appointed to conduct investigations into a number of cases filed by non-governmental organizations on behalf of victims of sexual violence. Meanwhile, 33 additional complaints of grave human rights violations, including acts of conflict-related sexual violence, were filed on 6 March at the court of first instance in Timbuktu against 15 members of armed groups. This was the third such collective complaint filed since November 2014. Meanwhile, only limited services are available to victims of sexual violence. MINUSMA is closely monitoring the process.



## Child protection

32. During the reporting period, 16 new cases of child recruitment by MNLA, GATIA, CMFPR-II, Ganda-Izo and MAA-Platform in Ansongo and Intilit (Gao region) and in Timbuktu region, as well as by the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), in Mopti region, were recorded. Among those recruited children, 15 were arrested and detained by the Malian defence and security forces, some for as long as four months. Of those 15 children, 10 were released during March and April, bringing the current number of children detained for their alleged association with armed groups to 10. MINUSMA and UNICEF conducted six visits to detention centres in Bamako and met with officials of the ministries of Women, Child and Family Affairs, of Defence and Former Combatants, and of Justice, to ensure the swift release of the detained children.

33. MINUSMA and UNICEF verified that nine schools were being used by armed groups, while six additional schools were reported as being used by such groups. The vocational training centre of Gao, which was vacated by MINUSMA Force on 6 December 2014, has been rehabilitated.

## V. Re-establishment of State authority

34. There was limited progress in the re-establishment of State authority in the north during the period under review. As of 23 April, the presence of State representatives in Gao region was as follows: one governor; four out of five prefects; and 18 out of 25 sub-prefects, mostly in the urban centres of Ansongo, Bourem and Gao. In Mopti region, there was one governor; all eight prefects; and 43 out of 108 sub-prefects. In Timbuktu region, there was one governor; all five prefects; and 17 out of 31 sub-prefects. All Kidal State officials (one governor, four prefects and 11 sub-prefects) relocated from Bamako to Gao in mid-February, pending their redeployment to Kidal. The overall number of sub-prefects present at their duty stations, however, further decreased from 55 to 43 sub-prefects (12 left their posts, owing to insecurity).

35. Despite serious concerns about their security, additional judges, prosecutors and prison personnel returned to the north. In Gao region, the public prosecutor at the court of first instance, the president of the tribunal and the investigating judge returned and resumed their duties on 30 March. The new president of Timbuktu's tribunal of first instance, a judge and the prosecutor arrived in the second half of March. The arrival of magistrates is expected to help tackle the exceptionally high number of prisoners currently in pretrial detention. Following the signature of a ministerial order to deploy additional staff to the north, MINUSMA began supporting the Ministry of Justice for the deployment of approximately 30 corrections officers to the north, so as to address the chronic understaffing in prisons.

36. MINUSMA and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) continued to join efforts to strengthen judicial and penitentiary institutions in the north. On 20 March, MINUSMA police inaugurated and handed over rehabilitated and equipped stations to the gendarmerie and national police in Gao. On 21 March, the Mine Action Service completed the rehabilitation of three armouries in Gao city, in support of one police and two gendarmerie stations. On 24 March, the *Maison centrale d'arrêt* of Timbuktu reopened, following the completion of its renovation

through a quick-impact project of MINUSMA. UNDP completed the rehabilitation of the tribunal of Gourma-Rharous on 21 April and provided equipment to the regional directorates of penitentiary institutions in Gao, Mopti and Timbuktu. In addition, MINUSMA and UNDP, through the Global Focal Point for the Police, Justice and Corrections mechanism, helped the Government to review its justice and corrections reform plan.

37. The Mission continued to actively engage with and support representatives of the Malian defence and security forces, the parliamentary commission on security, defence and civil protection and civil society organizations involved in security sector reform. MINUSMA reached an agreement to support the Ministry of Defence and Former Combatants in the implementation of the military guidance and planning law for the period 2015-2019, which was adopted on 13 February, starting with a sensitization and planning workshop in Bamako. MINUSMA, in collaboration with the National Democratic Institute, organized a two-day meeting at the Bamako Peacekeeping Training Centre, on 31 March and 1 April, to sensitize Malian civil society actors regarding their role in security sector reform and the Mission's support to the process. In addition, a pilot project to rehabilitate border infrastructure at Labezanga, on the border between Mali and the Niger, was finalized.

38. In March and April, UNDP supported the Government through capacity-building activities on security sector reform, including by training 575 officers of the national police, gendarmerie, civil protection and National Guard, 10 per cent of whom were women.

## **VI. Humanitarian assistance**

39. The deterioration of the security environment in northern Mali continued to hamper the implementation of projects and the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs recorded a significant increase in incidents affecting humanitarian access, with 30 such incidents recorded between 1 January and 23 April 2015, compared to a total of 23 incidents in 2014. Approximately half of the incidents were linked to violence against personnel, goods and humanitarian infrastructure, while the others were linked to military and armed group operations and hostilities. MINUSMA provided security and escort to humanitarian actors in the regions in order to enable them to assess needs and provide necessary assistance. Four cases of violence against humanitarian workers, assets and facilities occurred during the reporting period, including the killing of one staff member of the International Committee of the Red Cross by an extremist group in Gao region, on 30 March. Another three cases linked to general insecurity and criminality led to the temporary suspension of activities by non-governmental organizations and/or their withdrawal in Mopti and Timbuktu regions.

40. As of 1 June, 59,565 additional internally displaced persons were reported across the regions of Timbuktu (54,441), Gao (3,041) and Mopti (2,083), since the surge in clashes in northern Mali on 27 April. This brings the total to 102,757. Some 732 new refugees crossed into the neighbouring countries of Mauritania (236), the Niger (238) and Burkina Faso (258), adding to the 137,500 Malian refugees previously registered in neighbouring countries by UNHCR since the crisis started in early 2012.

41. The results of the harmonized framework, the analytical tool used to standardize evaluation systems for food insecurity in West Africa and the Sahel, for March 2015, indicated that at least 410,000 people would be in need of immediate food assistance, from April to August 2015, and that some 2.7 million people would be moderately food insecure. The World Food Programme (WFP) supported 90,000 internally displaced persons, returnees and individuals affected by economic and environmental stresses with emergency food assistance, in March, and 130,000 individuals in April and May. WFP plans to scale up its assistance to provide at least 350,000 beneficiaries with emergency food assistance as the lean season approaches. It also provided life-saving treatment to about 50,000 children and pregnant and lactating women suffering from moderate to acute malnutrition in March and April and planned to assist 55,000 malnourished people in May.

42. Only 27 per cent of the \$377 million funding requirement for the common humanitarian response plan in Mali for 2015 was mobilized as of early June, putting the implementation of key humanitarian activities at risk this year.

## **VII. Early recovery and development**

43. Despite the deteriorating security situation, several successful initiatives were undertaken through MINUSMA quick-impact projects to help increase the confidence, resilience and recovery of local communities. Initiatives ranged from livelihood development and restoring access to water and electricity, to the rehabilitation of government structures in those areas under government control. Since 20 March, six projects were completed, 31 were ongoing and funding was approved for an additional 55. The total budget for these 92 projects reached \$3 million.

44. On 11 May, MINUSMA and the United Nations Office for Project Services began the assessment of 16 community violence reduction project proposals in Gao, Kidal, Mopti and Timbuktu, aimed at preventing the further recruitment of youth at risk by armed and criminal groups and at contributing to confidence-building in affected communities.

45. The United Nations country team began implementing four approved Peacebuilding Fund projects in Gao and Timbuktu regions on: (a) peace education in northern Mali; (b) strengthening the capacity of women and youth and their resilience to conflict; (c) durable solutions for the peaceful reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees; and (d) access to justice for female victims of sexual- and gender-based violence.

46. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) continued its coordination of the local reconstruction of mausoleums in Timbuktu, with the support of MINUSMA. Rehabilitation work for three private libraries of ancient manuscripts in the historic centre of Timbuktu continued through a quick-impact project facilitated by MINUSMA. On 8 April, MINUSMA Force visited the archaeological site of Es-Souk (Kidal region) and confirmed allegations of looting by the local population. Es-Souk is on the tentative list of sites in Mali for inclusion on the World Heritage List of UNESCO.

## VIII. Operationalization of the Mission

47. As of 1 June, MINUSMA had deployed almost 83 per cent of all authorized civilian staff: 84 per cent of international posts; 81 per cent of United Nations Volunteers; and 85 per cent of all national posts. In terms of gender distribution, 32 per cent of international posts, 34 per cent of volunteer positions and 21 per cent of national posts were occupied by women.

48. As of 1 June, the strength of the Mission's police component stood at 1,055 personnel, reaching 73 per cent of its authorized strength of 1,440, with 65 per cent of individual police officers (8 per cent of them women) and 76 per cent of the formed police unit personnel (3 per cent of them women) deployed (see annex). At the end of April, one of the formed police units stationed in Gao was repatriated.

49. As of 1 June, the strength of the Mission's military component stood at 9,043 troops (including 244 military staff officers) out of an authorized strength of 11,200, representing 81 per cent of the authorized strength for military personnel. Women represent 2 per cent of the Force. The Force is composed of manoeuvre units (66 per cent), enablers (29 per cent) and force multipliers (5 per cent) and is deployed in Bamako (10 per cent), in Sector West (Timbuktu and Mopti regions) (26 per cent), in Sector East (Gao region) (36 per cent) and in Sector North (Kidal region) (28 per cent).

50. Efforts to achieve full operating capability continued. Over the reporting period, tactical military unarmed unmanned aerial systems, complete with a specially constructed runway, and three armed helicopters, were deployed in Timbuktu. The Mission anticipates the deployment of two additional medium-range helicopter units in Kidal and Timbuktu by August. However, MINUSMA still awaits the deployment of a second infantry battalion, outstanding for more than 16 months, and two force protection companies. A troop-contributing country capable of providing an additional armed helicopter unit has yet to be identified. Concerns remain regarding contingency-owned equipment for most of the infantry units.

51. The persistent targeting of convoy movements in northern Mali by criminal and/or violent extremist actors, as outlined in paragraph 19 above, continues to pose a serious threat to the ability of the Mission to deliver supplies to personnel and bases in the north and causes significant delays to construction projects. The deteriorating security situation, the lack of appropriate security vehicles, the unavailability of alternative supply routes to northern Mali and the continued non-functioning of Kidal airport as a result of vandalism have had a negative impact on the ability of both the Mission and its contractors to ensure a timely resupply of its northern deployments, especially in Aguelhok, Kidal and Tessalit. The Mission continues to experience water scarcity in the Kidal area and is working through its engineering contractors to address the situation. The increasingly critical situation in terms of support operations in northern Mali was assessed in the context of the review of the mission concept, which is addressed below.

52. During the reporting period, MINUSMA continued to implement its counter-improvised explosive device strategy and action plan to improve the safety and security of MINUSMA personnel. The two MINUSMA explosive ordnance disposal and route verification companies conducted 17 missions in support of convoy movements, daily road clearance tasks and post-blast investigations, as well as neutralizing improvised explosive devices and removing unexploded ordnance.

In-country training on improvised explosive device safety response was provided to 156 MINUSMA military and police personnel, as well as training in the use of individual first aid kits, for 174 personnel, with a particular focus on infantry units. Predeployment training in the field of counter-improvised explosive device measures also began for forthcoming and rotating infantry units, with training for 863 troops completed during the reporting period.

## **IX. Financial aspects**

53. I have submitted to the General Assembly, for its consideration, a note seeking additional funding for the period from 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015 in the amount of \$80.3 million (see [A/69/828](#)), in addition to the amount of \$830.7 million previously appropriated for the maintenance of the Mission for the same period under the terms of General Assembly resolution 68/259 B, in order to enable the Mission to support a counter-improvised explosive device action plan, including the counter-improvised explosive device training for MINUSMA Force and police contingents, improve Force protection capabilities and enhance the national counter-improvised explosive device capacities of the Malian defence and security forces. At the same time, my budget proposal for the maintenance of the Mission for the period from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016, amounting to \$936.1 million gross, is currently before the Fifth Committee for review and consideration (see [A/69/784](#)). Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of MINUSMA beyond 30 June 2015, the cost for maintaining the Mission until 30 June 2016 would be limited to the amounts approved by the General Assembly.

54. As at 29 May 2015, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for MINUSMA amounted to \$34.1 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to \$1,868.8 million.

55. As at 30 April 2015, amounts owed to troop and formed police contributors totalled some \$113.8 million. Reimbursement of troop/formed police costs has been made for the period up to 28 February 2015, while reimbursement of the costs for contingent-owned equipment has been made for the period up to 31 December 2014, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

## **X. Mission concept**

56. With a view to informing the Security Council's consideration of the renewal of the Mission's mandate and in the light of the changed political and security environment in Mali since 2014, MINUSMA undertook a review of its mission concept of October 2013. It will be finalized and approved by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support in July.

57. The revised draft mission concept has identified the following goal, towards which all integrated efforts should be directed: "on the basis of a political settlement, conditions are being established for legitimate and functioning State authorities to provide basic security and services to the population". Three core Mission objectives were identified to reach this end state: (a) a sustainable and credible peace process, supported by regional actors, that includes processes at the national and subnational levels, to foster a viable peace agreement and its

implementation; and (b) security and stabilization, through integrated efforts, in key areas critical to the peace process. This would require (c) the full operational capacity of MINUSMA, including the capacity to protect and sustain the Mission and conduct priority tasks. The protection of civilians and effective public communication are identified as cross-cutting priority tasks.

58. In pursuit of those objectives and in order to maximize the positive impact of the Mission's limited resources, MINUSMA would focus its efforts in five key geographical areas surrounding Gao, Kidal, Ménaka, Mopti and Timbuktu. A multidimensional and integrated approach, tailored to the specific political, security, governance, humanitarian and development conditions of each area, would be elaborated, with resources aligned in support of area-driven efforts. MINUSMA would continue to engage closely with Malian, international, regional and United Nations partners. The draft Mission Concept is aligned with the United Nations Peacebuilding and Development Assistance Framework and the benchmarking exercise endorsed by the Government of Mali.

59. With a view to supporting effective mandate implementation, the revised draft Mission Concept envisages that deployments in the current 16 sites will be oriented in support of the three core objectives and priority geographical areas identified in paragraphs 57 and 58 above, taking into account the degree of operational support available. There would be locations where all Mission components would have a continuous presence; sites that consist of military and police formed units, with provisions for the temporary deployment of civilians; and bases intended for only a military or formed police presence, in austere conditions, that would enable expeditionary movements for larger military units.

60. This more targeted approach to MINUSMA deployment would lead to a significantly increased demand on the Mission's flexibility and mobility, particularly with respect to convoy escorts, long-range patrols and aviation capabilities. In particular, MINUSMA would need to be able to sustain itself, ensuring access to the main supply routes as well as main population centres. This would require a reconfiguration of MINUSMA military and police assets so as to ensure that military logistics capabilities are enhanced and support the Mission in areas non-permissive for civilian contractual support. It would also require a greater emphasis on sufficiently equipped military and formed police units, as well as enhanced protection. The Mission's progress in deterring and reducing the threat of mines and other attacks using improvised explosives on Mission personnel illustrates the impact that can be achieved by ensuring that units have the appropriate equipment, training and procedures to operate in asymmetric environments. A qualitative rather than a quantitative approach will be pursued in order to ensure that the Mission has the mobility and flexibility it requires, that can be sustained in remote areas.

61. As a temporary measure, MINUSMA is putting together innovative "survivability packages" to improve the operational status of some contingents, until the capabilities envisioned in the respective statements of unit requirements are achieved, either organically or by drawing on support from other deployed units. The packages will include services relating to the provision of purified water, electricity and minor engineering. In the longer term, however, non-performing units will have to be reviewed and replaced so as to enable the Mission to achieve the robust flexibility and mobility essential for its continued presence in and access

to the north. Other efforts under way to strengthen the performance of military and police units include enhanced in-mission training and exercises. The Mission is also engaging closely with its contractors to ensure that their transport capabilities meet the qualitative requirements to operate along austere and insecure supply routes.

## **XI. Observations**

62. The signing of the peace and reconciliation agreement by the Government of Mali and some of the armed groups on 15 May in Bamako was a critical milestone in the inter-Malian dialogue. I congratulate the Government of Mali and the signatory armed groups for taking this important step forward. I am grateful for the dedicated efforts of Algeria and the members of the mediation, as well as those of the broader international community, that have encouraged and supported the peace process, starting with the Ouagadougou preliminary agreement, of 18 June 2013, and the Algiers process since July 2014. The presence of so many Heads of State and representatives of Governments and international organizations at the signing ceremony in Bamako reflects the unprecedented level of engagement of the international community in the peace process.

63. Ultimately, the responsibility for peace lies with the Malians themselves. Continued and sustainable progress towards peace and reconciliation requires the genuine commitment and engagement of the Malian parties. An inclusive peace process, supported by all parties to the conflict, is the only way to achieve the political settlement to which all parties have declared their commitment. It is also a prerequisite for addressing the insecurity, criminality, limited governance, humanitarian needs and underdevelopment that threatens an increasingly broader swathe of Mali and its population. The Coordination's initialling of the peace agreement on 14 May is a hopeful step, but it now needs to take the next step. I urge the leadership of the Coordination to be mindful of their responsibilities to the communities they seek to represent and to sign the agreement without further delay.

64. The violence that has spread and intensified in the run-up to and since 15 May is a clear indication of the risks that Mali will continue to face if dialogue is interrupted. I am deeply concerned by the numerous violations of the ceasefire that have taken place in northern Mali in the past weeks, by all armed movements, including the takeover of Ménaka by the Platform on 27 April. The current violence is increasingly targeting civilians and local authorities and is leading to serious abuses of human rights by all sides. Thousands have been displaced from their homes. The signature of the peace agreement cannot provide a licence to any party to pursue military options. I urge all parties to abide by the existing ceasefire agreements and declarations on the cessation of hostilities and to ensure their continued participation in the mechanisms established to oversee their implementation.

65. In the light of the urgency of the current situation, my Special Representative, in collaboration with the mediation, proposed a twofold road map, first, to ensure a global cessation of hostilities in the northern regions and second, to discuss practical arrangements for the implementation of the peace agreement and to clarify the parties' respective observations on the agreement. Consultations on these two elements, and the signing by the Government of Mali and the Coordination of documents on the implementation of the peace agreement and on ceasefire

arrangements to address, inter alia, the situation in Ménaka, represent a significant advance of the inter-Malian peace process. As a consequence, on 5 June, the Coordination indicated that it will proceed to sign the peace agreement. I very much welcome this. I regret, however, that the Platform refused to sign these painstakingly negotiated arrangements and I urge the group to do so in the coming days.

66. Looking forward, I encourage both signatories and non-signatories, supported by the mediation, to focus on implementation modalities and on guarantees that could reassure all parties that their concerns can be addressed in the implementation phase. It will take the commitment and good faith of all parties to identify and start implementing elements of the agreement that contribute to building confidence and trust among the parties as well as providing tangible benefits for communities throughout Mali. The polarization of the Malian population is fast becoming one of the tragedies and future concerns of this conflict. I urge all parties to collectively explain the peace process to the population so as to ensure public buy-in and foster genuine national reconciliation at all levels. I also strongly encourage the Government to do its utmost to deliver security and basic services in those areas where it is present so as to reassure the population of its full commitment to the well-being of its citizens.

67. At this critical juncture, the provision of continued coherent support by the mediation and the international community will be essential to reassure the parties that an inclusive political settlement is achievable. International support and financial resources will be critical to enable practical implementation and early wins. The donor community will need to be engaged to support the delivery of the promise of economic development held out by this agreement.

68. I recommend that the Security Council give consideration to refocusing the Mission's mandate as follows: first, MINUSMA good offices efforts could be directed towards facilitating and supporting dialogue with and among all stakeholders to encourage the full adhesion of all parties to the agreement and its concerted implementation. Efforts to facilitate dialogue towards reconciliation and social cohesion at the local and national levels could be reinforced by outreach to and activities in support of local authorities, community and religious leaders and civil society groups. Such efforts could help prevent the further increase of intercommunal tensions and contribute to building confidence among the population. To this effect, I encourage donors to generously contribute to the Trust Fund in Support of Peace and Security in Mali, which is managed by MINUSMA.

69. Second, MINUSMA could continue to prioritize security and stabilization as part of efforts to enable progress in the peace process. This could include an enhanced role for MINUSMA in monitoring and supervising the observance of ceasefires, including through strengthened ceasefire mechanisms, confidence-building measures and proactive engagement with all armed groups. Effective monitoring and reporting will involve all of the Mission's components in preventing and investigating potential violations of agreed ceasefire arrangements, as well as close engagement with all participating armed elements. To reinforce this effort, the Security Council may wish to consider the introduction of sanctions against the perpetrators of ceasefire violations. To this end, I would recommend that the Council authorize the deployment of 40 military observers, in addition to the current military authorized strength, to support MINUSMA monitoring and supervision of



ceasefires agreed between the Malian parties. Human rights monitoring and promotion, operational support for community violence reduction activities and for efforts to combat impunity, as well as counter-explosives action and risk education and robust action to protect civilians, in those instances where they are under imminent threat of physical violence, could help support the re-establishment of a more stable environment, which is essential for facilitating dialogue at all levels.

70. The third priority area of engagement could be in supporting the parties' progressive and consensual implementation of the peace agreement. As the only member of the international mediation with a presence in the north, MINUSMA will have a lead role to play through its function as the secretariat of the Comité de suivi de l'accord, as well as in the implementation of specific provisions of the agreement on the ground. It can assist the parties in identifying and prioritizing those implementation steps that would help to build confidence, encourage the adhesion of outstanding parties and promote the inclusive, concerted and complete implementation of the agreement. Such steps could include measures to promote the justice and reconciliation components of the agreement, while also supporting the parties in elaborating road maps and frameworks to address the security and defence reform provisions of the agreement, including disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities. This will require presence, patient dialogue and sustained engagement, which MINUSMA field presence can help to provide.

71. The recent increase in attacks against humanitarian partners raises serious concern, as they obstruct the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the affected communities. I call on all parties to contribute to the creation of a secure environment for humanitarian access and humanitarian space, and to disassociate themselves from those perpetrating such attacks. Continued engagement and support by MINUSMA to ensure timely and unhindered humanitarian access will remain an essential Mission task.

72. Northern Mali is an extremely difficult environment in which to operate. MINUSMA is likely to continue to face significant security and operational challenges in the near future. Violent extremism, transnational organized crime and banditry will still pose significant threats to ongoing stabilization efforts. I call on Mali, the region and all international partners to continue to enhance efforts to address these threats and to strengthen capacities to enhance border security.

73. Meanwhile, it is imperative that the units provided by troop- and police-contributing countries have the capacities and capabilities required to operate safely and effectively in such environments. For this reason, I am not proposing, at this point in time, an increase in the Mission's military and police authorized strength, beyond the 40 military observers referred to in paragraph 69 above, but I am proposing a reconfiguration of their capabilities to improve their mobility, their ability to proactively monitor and support ceasefires and confidence-building, and their ability to protect and sustain themselves and the Mission. I call on bilateral partners to support the deployment of contingents to Mali, including by providing prior training and the necessary equipment.

74. The attacks against MINUSMA and its contractors are unacceptable and must stop forthwith. I strongly condemn these barbaric acts and express my deepest condolences to the families of victims of these crimes as well as to the Government of Mali and the Governments of the countries of origin of the United Nations peacekeepers who have lost their lives. I reiterate my appeal for the crimes to be

investigated and punished in earnest. I am grateful for continued coordination between MINUSMA and Operation Barkhane, in line with their respective mandates, and for the medical evacuation and essential assistance that the French forces continue to provide to MINUSMA.

75. I therefore recommend that the Security Council extend the Mission's mandate for a period of one year, until 30 June 2016, with an increased authorized military strength of 11,240 personnel, including the recommended addition of 40 military observers, and maintaining the currently authorized police strength of 1,400 personnel, while also refocusing the mandate of MINUSMA, as outlined above.

76. Given the fluid environment in which the future of MINUSMA is being considered, flexibility and responsiveness will be essential. If and when progress is made in the peace process, consideration may need to be given to additional resources and tasks in support of particular implementation activities. To that end, I encourage the Security Council to remain actively engaged in support of the inter-Malian peace process and to consider the periodic review of the Mission's mandate in support thereto.

77. Lastly, I wish to express my appreciation to my Special Representative for Mali, Mongi Hamdi, and to all United Nations civilian and uniformed personnel in Mali, for their continuing hard work in very difficult conditions. I would also like to express my gratitude to all troop- and police-contributing countries, the African Union, ECOWAS, the European Union and bilateral partners, the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, non-governmental organizations and all other partners for their important contributions in support of peace and stability in Mali.

## Annex

# United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali: military and police strength as at 1 June 2015

Country	Military component (staff officers and units)			Police component								
				Individual police officers			Formed police units			Total police		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Bangladesh	1 583	–	1 583	–	–	–	140	–	140	140	–	140
Benin	256	–	256	27	1	28	140	–	140	167	1	168
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Burkina Faso	857	14	871	20	2	22	–	–	–	20	2	22
Burundi	–	–	–	15	–	15	–	–	–	15	–	15
Cambodia	304	13	317	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Cameroon	3	–	3	17	1	18	–	–	–	17	1	18
Canada	1	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Chad	1 097	13	1 110	4	–	4	–	–	–	4	–	4
China	388	14	402	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Côte d'Ivoire	123	–	123	11	1	12	–	–	–	11	1	12
Democratic Republic of the Congo	–	–	–	5	1	6	–	–	–	5	1	6
Denmark	18	1	19	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Djibouti	–	–	–	1	–	1	–	–	–	1	–	1
Egypt	63	–	63	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
El Salvador	87	4	91	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Estonia	1	1	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Finland	4	–	4	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
France	18	–	18	5	–	5	–	–	–	5	–	5
Gambia	2	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Germany	7	1	8	7	–	7	–	–	–	7	–	7
Ghana	214	–	214	1	–	1	–	–	–	1	–	1
Guinea	232	–	232	4	1	5	–	–	–	4	1	5
Guinea-Bissau	1	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Indonesia	37	2	39	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Italy	2	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Jordan	1	–	1	3	–	3	–	–	–	3	–	3
Kenya	3	1	4	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Liberia	42	4	46	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Luxembourg	–	–	–	2	–	2	–	–	–	2	–	2
Mauritania	6	–	6	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Nepal	170	4	174	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

Country	Military component (staff officers and units)			Police component								
				Individual police officers			Formed police units			Total police		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Netherlands	452	22	474	18	6	24	–	–	–	18	6	24
Niger	854	5	859	8	1	9	–	–	–	8	1	9
Nigeria	155	25	180	2	–	2	119	20	139	121	20	141
Norway	18	3	21	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Portugal	45	4	49	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Republic of Korea	–	–	–	2	–	2	–	–	–	2	–	2
Romania	1	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Rwanda	–	–	–	1	–	1	14	–	14	15	–	15
Senegal	662	2	664	11	2	13	273	2	275	284	4	288
Sierra Leone	3	–	3	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Sweden	226	17	243	1	2	3	–	–	–	1	2	3
Switzerland	1	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Togo	917	18	935	4	–	4	140	–	140	144	–	144
Tunisia	–	–	–	10	–	10	–	–	–	10	–	10
Turkey	–	–	–	1	–	1	–	–	–	1	–	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	2	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
United States of America	10	–	10	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Yemen	7	–	7	9	–	9	–	–	–	9	–	9
<b>Total</b>	<b>8 875</b>	<b>168</b>	<b>9 043</b>	<b>189</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>207</b>	<b>826</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>848</b>	<b>1 015</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>1 055</b>

