Two separate military coups in 2022 restored military rule after nearly eight years of political reforms that had yielded democratic gains. That January, Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba ousted the democratically elected president, Roch Marc Christian Kaboré. Captain Ibrahim Traoré led the second coup that September, dismissing Damiba’s transitional government, suspending the constitution, and placing power in the junta he had formed and led. That October, the Traoré-led junta organized a national forum, during which Traoré was formally recognized as president. The forum also drafted a transitional charter which provided him with the authority to name a transitional government and legislate by decree until the naming of legislators.

Traoré named Appollinaire Joachim Kyélem de Tambèla as prime minister and named a 23-member transitional government in October 2022.

The 2022 coups dissolved both the elected parliament and the subsequent transitional bodies. That November, the Traoré-led junta and its national forum established a 71-member Transitional Legislative Assembly (ALT) through the transitional charter. Twenty ALT members were chosen by Traoré and 16 were chosen from the security and defense forces. In addition, 13 civil society leaders who were not affiliated with a political movement were named to the body; 12 came from political parties (4 from the former majority party, 4 from the former opposition, 2 from the unaffiliated opposition, and 2 from other parties); and another 10 came from civil society. The 20 members appointed by Traoré and the 16 from the security and defense forces make up a one-seat majority at 36 members. The charter cannot be revised without Traoré’s support and a two-thirds majority vote from the transitional legislature.

The transitional charter, which operates as the guiding legal text under Traoré’s junta, stipulates that all legal matters be determined by the 1991 constitution unless otherwise decided by the transitional legislature. There is no defined electoral framework currently in place, nor is there a plan in place to draft legislation to provide that framework.

In a state television interview in September 2023, Traoré disclosed that elections originally expected to take place in July 2024 were indefinitely postponed, citing the country’s security situation.

The laws regulating political parties were effectively suspended following the 2022 coups. Political parties received token representation in the transitional legislature based on their affiliations under the previous civilian administration.

Immediately following the September 2022 coup, the Traoré-led junta suspended political party and civil society activity, underscoring their limited influence. Political parties and civil society organizations have been systematically marginalized since. Several political parties have been prevented from holding their meetings by the government, including the Union for Progress and Change, the People’s Movement for Progress, and the Congress for Democracy and Progress.

No legal electoral framework has been enacted since the September 2022 coup, leaving political parties no clear way to gain power. Many critics of the junta observed that it has acted to entrench itself in power while no efforts to organize elections have been undertaken.

The junta has attempted to characterize its seizure of power as popular and enjoying public support, but it effectively rules by decree. Burkina Faso’s armed forces remain fragmented, and power has changed hands in an arbitrary, tumultuous manner, underscored by the two coups in 2022 and a reported coup attempt in September 2023. In parts of the country, armed militant groups target local leaders for assassination and abduction, effectively controlling the territory; as much as half of the country’s territory is out of government control.

The 2022 coups have returned the military to the center of the political arena, eliminating political rights for the population.

Members of the Fulani (Peul or Fulbè) community face considerable stigma. Security officers have reportedly engaged in extrajudicial violence against Fulani people.

Elected and transitional bodies were dissolved by coup leaders in 2022, leaving no freely elected officials to enact policy. Few or no checks exist on the junta’s decision-making capabilities, with power highly concentrated in the executive. The National Assembly was dissolved in the January 2022 coup, while a transitional legislature was dissolved in the September 2022 coup. Traoré legislated by decree until the unelected ALT’s members took office and a legislative session opened that November.

Prior to the 2022 coups, corruption was already widespread, particularly among customs officials and municipal police. Few, if any, impediments remain to safeguard against official corruption following the coups. Formal bodies exist to address corruption, such as the Superior Authority for State Control and the Fight against Corruption (ASCE-LC) and the independent Anti-Corruption National Network (REN-LAC). Their ability to provide oversight of the junta, however, has been minimal, accelerating the deleterious effects of corruption on public services. The junta has used corruption charges to target officials of past civilian governments, particularly when they have been critical of the regime. These charges are largely viewed as politically motivated.

Very little is known about the composition of the ruling junta, which refers to itself as the Patriotic Movement for Safeguard and Restoration (MPSR). Many political parties and civil society organizations have underscored this fact and the danger this lack of transparency presents.

The media environment in Burkina Faso has historically been relatively robust. However, physical insecurity has curbed media activity and military leaders have further constrained the press. Journalists face increased risks due to militant attacks, and some have been threatened, abducted, and killed in recent years.

The Damiba-led junta restricted the operations of the Superior Council for Communication (CSC), though Traoré appointed a new head in late 2022. In November 2023, the ALT passed a law giving the CSC the power to review social media accounts with at least 5,000 online followers or subscribers, shut media outlets, seize equipment, and rescind press cards. That law also allows Traoré to select the CSC’s head, sparking considerable backlash among local media organizations.

The Traoré-led junta has moved to restrict media activity since taking power. Authorities suspended French broadcaster Radio France Internationale (RFI) in December 2022. The communications minister did the same to France 24 in March 2023. Correspondents from the French newspapers Le Monde and Libération were told to leave the country in April. The CSC suspended the French La Chaîne Info television channel in June, saying it disseminated false information. Authorities shut Radio Omega, a Burkinabè outlet, in August after it interviewed a spokesman for a Nigerien group calling for the return of that country’s civilian government, though the suspension was lifted in September. The junta suspended Jeune Afrique after the French magazine reported on internal dissent within the armed forces in September. Journalists Issaka Lingani and Yacouba Ladji Bama, both of whom criticized Burkinabè authorities in their reporting, were conscripted by the government in November.

Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 because the junta has increasingly censored and targeted critical local and foreign media.

Burkina Faso is a secular state, and freedom of religion is generally respected. The population is predominately Muslim with a large Christian minority. Followers of both religions often engage in syncretic practices. However, religious activity is affected by ongoing insecurity. Islamic militant groups have been known to attack Christian religious leaders, worshippers, and churches. Muslim worshippers are also targeted by Islamist militants; in January 2023, terrorists killed nine Ahmadi Muslims, including an imam, when they attacked a mosque in the northeastern village of Goulgountou.

Academic freedom is unrestricted in principle, though a legacy of tension between the government and academic organizations had persisted under civilian rule.

Islamic militant groups in the north and east regularly threaten schools and teachers, resulting in the closure of numerous institutions. These groups have killed public school officials for refusing to adhere to and teach extremist ideology and curriculums. Prolonged insecurity and militant Islamist violence has left large swathes of territory without primary and secondary education for years. According to the Norwegian Refugee Council, 6,134 schools were closed due to insecurity as of February 2023, affecting 31,000 teachers and over a million students, disproportionally female students.

Private discussion had gone unrestricted in much of the country. However, attacks and intimidation by Islamic militants in the north and east, an increased security presence in response to their activities, and 2019 penal-code revisions dissuaded people from discussing local news, politics, and other sensitive topics. In some areas, Burkinabè fear surveillance from the informers of Islamic militants, who may attack communities who speak out against them.

The junta has sought to restrict expression, particularly from its critics. Public figures and ordinary citizens who openly criticize its rule or are accused of acts against the regime have faced detention, harassment, abduction, and forced conscription. In November 2023, for example, the junta used an April mobilization decree to conscript at least 12 people from civil society, political parties, and the media who had criticized its rule. That same month, the regime adopted a law giving the CSC more power to review social media accounts with large followings.

Score Change: The score declined from 3 to 1 because public figures who openly criticize the junta have faced detention, harassment, abduction, and forced conscription.

The transitional charter relies on the 1991 constitution, which provides for freedom of assembly, as a legal foundation. Projunta demonstrations have taken place in 2023, with the junta sometimes calling on its supporters to show support in public. In September, the junta claimed to have foiled a coup plot after having called on supporters to hold public demonstrations.

Antigovernment protests have been discouraged and suppressed. In October 2023, a collection of trade unions and civil society organizations intended to hold a meeting in Ouagadougou to mark the 2014 uprising against then president Blaise Compaoré, but did not do so after the city’s mayor called on them to cancel it.

While many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have operated openly and freely, human rights groups have reported abuses by security forces in the past. NGOs face harassment in carrying out their work and NGO leaders argue that some legal provisions, including vaguely worded terrorism laws, can be misused to silence human rights defenders.

The operating space for NGOs and human rights organizations has been constrained since the coups of 2022 and due to growing violence. Towns, displacement camps, and large swathes of territory are routinely cut off from state authorities. Humanitarian access is limited, particularly in northern Burkina Faso where armed conflict is especially intense. In February 2023, Doctors Without Borders (MSF) suspended its operations in the Boucle du Mouhoun region after armed men killed two of its staff members there. MSF resumed operations in March.

In the past, unions frequently and freely engaged in strikes and collective bargaining and coordinated with civil society to organize demonstrations on social issues. However, the government used legal means to suppress union activity, including the denial of permits for planned demonstrations.

The 2022 coups left the basic structure of the 1991 constitution in place, which does provide for the right to strike and to form trade unions. However, the transitional charter adopted after the coup that installed Traoré places superseding authority in the executive to intercede in organized labor activity.

Despite this, the country’s major trade confederation was openly critical of the junta in 2023. In April, it criticized the conscription of political opponents and the prevalence of hate speech and physical threats endorsed by Traoré. In July, it criticized disappearances and the imposition of new taxes. A union of magistrates went on strike in July to condemn the military’s release of a traditional healer accused of torture.

The judiciary is formally independent but has historically been subject to executive influence and corruption. In October 2022, the Constitutional Council officially inaugurated Captain Traoré as president after he seized power in that September’s coup.

In late December 2023, the ALT passed constitutional amendments that abolished the High Court of Justice and allowed individuals who are not magistrates to sit on the Superior Council of the Judiciary.

Constitutional due-process guarantees have been undermined by corruption and the inefficacy of the judiciary and police force. The judicial system is also affected by ongoing insecurity, which has caused the closure of some courts and has limited access to judicial services. According to the magistrates’ union, the constitutional amendments then under consideration in December 2023 placed the Public Prosecutor’s Office more directly under the Justice Ministry.

The security environment is affected by Islamic militant groups, bandits, and militias. Traditional leaders, government officials, lawmakers, and civilians are regularly targeted for kidnapping or assassination by militants. Militants target government institutions, like health clinics and schools, restricting access to government services. Children are increasingly being recruited by militants and engage in armed activity.

Security forces, militias, and civilians faced armed attacks during 2023; in an August report, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies warned that militant attacks had become more frequent and occurred on more territory after the 2022 coups. Some 7,762 people were killed in Burkina Faso due to Islamist militant activity in 2023 according to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project.

Government forces and state-allied militias like the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) commit extrajudicial violence, particularly against members of the Fulani ethnic group. Burkinabè soldiers were implicated in the summary execution of at least 156 people in Karma in April 2023, with survivors blaming the army in a press conference later that month. In June, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported on several incidents where Burkinabè soldiers arrested, disappeared, or killed Fulani victims. Militants and militias are also believed to orchestrate forced disappearances.

Ongoing violence has prompted significant internal displacement. In August 2023, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees said there were 2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Burkina Faso.

Allegations of torture and abuse of suspects in custody by police are common, and prison conditions are poor. Security forces have been accused of forcibly detaining and abusing civilians.

While the constitution outlaws all forms of discrimination, prejudice occurs in practice. Members of the Fulani ethnic group have expressed dissatisfaction over government neglect, discrimination, and abuse, particularly at the hands of security forces and militias. Their treatment has worsened since the military seized power in January 2022 and recruited volunteer militias that have intentionally targeted Fulani people. Military rule has also eliminated legal guarantees of protection.

LGBT+ people, as well as those living with HIV, routinely experience discrimination, including difficulty accessing health services. While illegal, gender discrimination remains common in employment and education.

Due to insecurity, authorities have established heavily guarded checkpoints on roads and has instituted curfews and states of emergency in some provinces. Travelers are sometimes subjected to bribery or harassment by security forces at checkpoints.

Urban centers such as Djibo, Sebba, and Ouahigouya, where hundreds of thousands of IDPs have fled, were blockaded by militants during much of 2023, making the delivery of vital supplies dependent upon airlifts which have sometimes come under attack. Displaced women fleeing extremist violence have been targeted by Islamist militant groups. Burkinabè authorities may control only half of the country.

In recent years, the government implemented reforms to reduce the amount of capital necessary to start a business, facilitating the ability to obtain credit information, and improving the insolvency resolution process. However, the business environment is hampered by corruption and insecurity. The 2022 coups cast further doubts over the country’s regulatory environment. In June 2023, the ALT passed legislation meant to address land grabs and the country’s housing supply.

Insurgents have regularly interfered with commercial activities, including by stealing livestock, imposing taxes, and interrupting mining operations. State authorities have little control over a significant portion of the country.

Women face discrimination in cases involving family rights and inheritance. Early marriage remains an issue, especially in the north. The practice of female genital mutilation is less common than in the past but still occurs. Domestic violence remains a problem despite government efforts to combat it. Gender-based violence has become a major issue due to physical insecurity.

Under the April 2023 mobilization decree, the junta can conscript individuals and has used that decree against Burkinabè criticizing its rule.

Burkina Faso is a source, transit, and destination country for human trafficking. Child labor is prominent in the mining sector, with at least 200,000 children working in mines. Children are also recruited by militant groups. Women from neighboring countries are recruited by traffickers and transported to Burkina Faso, where they are forced into prostitution.

According to the US State Department’s Trafficking in Persons Report 2023, Burkinabè authorities began reporting prosecutions and convictions of traffickers, after not doing so for four years; identified more victims than in the past; and enacted a national action plan.