Document #2107361

Freedom House (Author)

Nations in Transit 2024 - Ukraine

TRANSITIONAL OR HYBRID REGIME
40
/ 100
Democracy Percentage 40.48 / 100
Democracy Score 3.43 / 7
LAST YEAR'S DEMOCRACY PERCENTAGE & STATUS
39 / 100 Transitional or Hybrid Regime
The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 1 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. The Democracy Percentage, introduced in 2020, is a translation of the Democracy Score to the 0-100 scale, where 0 equals least democratic and 100 equals most democratic. See the methodology.
 

Author

  • Nazar Boyko

Score changes in 2024

  • Judicial Framework and Independence improved from 2.25 to 2.50 due to the implementation of legislation that allows the government to fill vacant positions in the Constitutional Court, as well as the formation of two judicial institutions—the High Council of Justice and the High Qualification Commission of Judges—that unblocked the process of vetting and appointing judges.
  • Corruption improved from 2.25 to 2.50 due to the success of anticorruption institutions in addressing systemic corruption in military procurement and the mobilization of military personnel.
  • As a result, Ukraine’s Democracy Score improved from 3.36 to 3.43.

Executive Summary

In 2023, Ukraine continued to defend its territory and people against a full-scale Russian invasion that brought more damage and atrocities. According to UN figures, as of November there have been 28,500 civilian casualties in Ukraine since the war began, with 10,000 killed and 18,500 injured.1 These figures likely underestimate the number of casualties since they do not include data from the Ukrainian territories under Russian control. For instance, in Russian-controlled Mariupol city, Ukrainian authorities said that as of April there had been more than 20,000 casualties.2 As of September, the war had caused more than $150 billion in damage to Ukrainian infrastructure.3 More than a third of the damage affected the housing sector. In March, the World Bank estimated that Ukraine would need $411 billion for recovery and reconstruction.4 Since the Russian invasion, 3,790 educational and 1,661 medical facilities have been damaged or destroyed.5 6 In the middle of 2023, Ukraine was more affected by landmines than any other country, with landmines endangering an area larger than Florida.7 In June, the occupiers blew up the Kakhovka Dam, causing hundreds of casualties and the largest environmental disaster in the Black Sea area in decades.8 9 10 In December, a cyberattack disrupted service for customers of the country’s largest mobile operator, Kyivstar, which served 24 million subscribers.11 The cyberattack was likely orchestrated by the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) and was the most impactful cyberattack on the Ukrainian network since the war began.12 13 It took more than a week for Kyivstar to fully restore service.14 At the end of December, Russia launched its largest air attack yet on Ukraine, targeting 120 cities and villages and killing 39 people.15 16

At the end of the year, public statements by the Commander-in-Chief Valery Zaluzhny and President Volodymyr Zelensky highlighted their conflicting assessments of the war and the situation at the frontline. While the former emphasized that the war was at a stalemate due to the parity of both sides’ military technologies, the latter disagreed with this assessment.17 18 The subsequent exchange led to speculation about disagreements between the political and military leadership.19 20 Some observers speculated that the tensions between Zelensky and Zaluzhny were due to the modest achievements of the Ukrainian counteroffensive operation and Zaluzhny’s higher approval ratings than Zelensky’s.21 22 Zaluzhny’s popularity could make him Zelensky’s main opponent during the next election.

Despite the challenging conditions, the government maintained control over the country and continued to function. Moreover, at the end of the year, the European Council decided to initiate negotiations with Ukraine to join the EU.23 The government took many steps to fulfill the council’s requirements after Ukraine was selected as an EU candidate country in 2022.24 While the process was not always smooth and provoked heated debates among representatives of the EU, the Ukrainian government, and civil society, EU leaders consistently recognized Ukraine’s progress in making the required reforms.25

The government postponed the parliamentary elections scheduled for the fall of 2023 and the presidential election scheduled for the spring of 2024 due to the martial law regime that remained in place, safety concerns, personnel challenges, strained administrative and financial capacity, and public opinion against holding the elections. The debate over the expediency of holding the elections on schedule evolved into a discussion on the conditions needed to efficiently conduct the first postwar elections. The Central Election Commission, alongside international and domestic experts, developed a legal framework for conducting postwar elections.

Similar to 2022, civil society remained vibrant and actively engaged in the war effort by volunteering for the army, documenting war crimes, and running social projects in support of internally displaced people, among other actions. Also, expert civil society organizations contributed their professional expertise, advocacy efforts, and monitoring services to support the necessary reforms for Ukraine's European integration. Volunteering and fundraising for the army became more institutionalized and professional. In 2023, activists again organized public protests after a break in demonstrations since the war began. Several waves of local protests swept across the country. Some citizens called on local authorities to prioritize military spending over infrastructure projects, while others protested in support of demobilizing servicemen who had served since the beginning of the war.

The media landscape changed little from the previous year. The national telethon, produced and broadcast by the largest television networks, persisted despite increasing criticism. On one hand, the telethon limited competition among participant-channels; on the other hand, its funding from the state budget rendered it vulnerable to government influence and intervention. Meanwhile, at the local level, the war presented challenges for the media, including a shortage of personnel and financial resources due to the shrinking ads market.

Since the Russian invasion, budgets have supported local self-government, primarily because the personal income tax (PIT) of servicemen remained within the communities where the military units were stationed. Local authorities spent much of this revenue on the military, but also used some of it to fund infrastructure projects. This sparked a wave of protests throughout Ukraine, with locals demanding that authorities prioritize military spending. After heated debates, the central government deprived local governments of the military PIT, transferring the tax revenues to the state budget, which used them exclusively for military expenses. Local governments criticized the decision as an attack on their financial sustainability. In the long run, redistributive decisions of this kind may seriously undermine financial decentralization, one of the pillars of the broader decentralization reform, and substantially weaken local government.

Despite the public’s strong distrust of the judiciary, international and domestic experts praised a series of personnel appointments and institutional changes. For instance, when the government allowed the High Council of Justice to resume its work and then established the High Qualification Commission of Judges, officials were able to begin the process of filling more than 2,500 vacant judgeships. The adoption of the new procedure to appoint Constitutional Court judges was another long-awaited achievement. The arrest of the head of the Supreme Court for accepting a bribe highlighted the fragility of the judiciary and its vulnerability to external influences, but also underscored the government's efforts to uncover and prosecute high-level corruption within the judiciary.

Since the EU prioritized anticorruption efforts as a prerequisite to initiate Ukraine’s accession process, the government implemented a series of institutional and personnel decisions to meet the EU’s anticorruption requirements. These included the appointments of the head of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the head of the Higher Anti-Corruption Court, reinstating requirements that politicians provide electronic declarations of their assets, and the adoption of the Anti-Corruption Program. The Program stressed on eliminating corruption risks in state policies in fifteen areas where Ukrainian citizens encountered corruption most frequently. The Program stressed on eliminating corruption risks in state policies in fifteen areas where Ukrainian citizens encountered corruption most frequently.26 Nevertheless, corruption has remained endemic in Ukraine and it metastasized within the army in 2023, especially in military procurement and mobilization. In response, he government conducted audits and opened investigations at both the top and bottom levels of the Ministry of Defense. These efforts to combat corruption put the government in an ambivalent situation, as more light was shed on the scale of corruption with each case it uncovered. It is too early to credit the government for successfully fighting corruption, but it should be acknowledged for taking some substantive steps to combat the problem, even at the potential expense of public support.

In 2023, the government’s efforts to meet the criteria for initiating accession negotiations with the EU was the primary driver of democratization and reform. The most significant progress with the positive and measurable outcomes was reached in the fields of combating corruption and reforming the judiciary.

At a Glance

Despite the government’s significant progress in implementing the reforms needed to start accession negotiations with the EU, citizens’ trust in government institutions decreased in 2023. Although the parliamentary elections were postponed due to the war, key stakeholders developed the legal framework for holding the first postwar elections. Civil society remained vibrant and effectively addressed the challenges of wartime, while organizing protests for the first time since the war began to influence local and central authorities. The government continued to financially support the national telethon, while local media experienced difficulties, including a lack of resources. Judicial institutions filled many empty judgeships, but the judiciary remained prone to corruption. The government revealed corruption’s frightening scale by opening major investigations into graft at all levels of the military.

 
National Democratic Governance 1.00-7.00 pts
Considers the democratic character of the governmental system; and the independence, effectiveness, and accountability of the legislative and executive branches. 2.50 / 7.00
  • In 2023, the government maintained control over the country and its institutions functioned, despite the challenges of the war. The president, parliament, and cabinet fulfilled their respective responsibilities, avoided open conflicts, and acted decisively. As in 2022, many high-level personnel left the government at both the national and local levels. The president replaced five ministers during the year, including Oleksiy Reznikov as the minister of defense with Rustem Umerov.27 28 29 30 31 Additionally, President Zelensky dismissed the heads of 11 regional (oblast) administrations.
  • Since 2020, political parties have not been required to submit quarterly financial reports due to the COVID-19 pandemic and then the Russian invasion. Domestic experts and international partners called for the reinstatement of these financial reporting requirements.32 In August, the parliament voted to restore mandatory financial reporting for political parties.33 According to the law, parties eligible for state financing must provide all previously unsubmitted financial reports since 2020 within 90 days of the law’s implementation in December. The 2024 budget allocates 840 million hryvnia ($22.6 million) for the public financing of political parties.34
  • At the beginning of 2023, the Eighth Appellate Administrative Court banned the “Party of Regions” and ordered all of its assets transferred to the government due to the party’s active support for Russia and public justification of the Russian occupation in eastern Ukraine.35 In March, a group of deputies in the parliament proposed a draft law that would forbid individuals associated with banned political parties from running for office for 10 years after the end of martial law.36 According to estimates, more than 3,000 deputies in local councils from pro-Russia parties could be barred from holding office if the law passes.37 In an October opinion on the legislation, the Venice Commission said the proposed ban was too broad and could strip political rights from people who pose no threat to stability or democracy.38 The commission recommended that the bill’s drafters narrow the scope of the ban so it would affect only core members of banned parties who actively threatened Ukraine’s democracy, rather than all individuals who have any affiliation with a banned party and may be unaware of the party’s policies and activities.39
  • In 2023, surveys indicated that the public’s trust in the government declined. According to one survey, trust in the president decreased from 84 percent to 62 percent, trust in the cabinet dropped from 52 percent to 26 percent, and trust in the parliament declined from 35 percent to 15 percent.40 The number of Ukrainians who believed that there were conflicts between the political leadership and army command increased from 14 percent in 2022 to 32 percent in 2023.41
Electoral Process 1.00-7.00 pts
Examines national executive and legislative elections, the electoral framework, the functioning of multiparty systems, and popular participation in the political process. 4.50 / 7.00
  • The most recent presidential and parliamentary elections took place in 2019. According to the Constitution, the parliamentary elections should have occurred in October and the presidential election should be held in March 2024. However, Ukrainian law prohibits conducting national elections until after the martial law regime ends and both elections were postponed indefinitely.42 Addressing calls for Ukraine to hold wartime elections from some international allies,43 44 45 President Zelensky said the country could carefully proceed with the elections, even while at war.46 However, he underscored the critical importance of meticulously evaluating safety risks,47 the legal nuances,48 and financial considerations49 before reaching any decisions. The Central Election Commission estimated that holding the presidential election would cost nearly 5.5 billion hryvnia ($148 million).50 However, the 2024 budget did not allocate any funds for the election.51 A strong public consensus has emerged that conducting elections during the war is not feasible. According to one survey, 62 percent of Ukrainians wanted elections to occur after the war rather than during it.52 53 54 In November, the parties in the parliament signed an agreement stating that no elections should be conducted until the end of the war and the termination martial law.55 The discourse then focused on the challenges that Ukraine must overcome to successfully conduct the first postwar elections. Ensuring that millions of refugees and internally displaced persons can vote, providing military personnel with access to ballot boxes, updating the national register of voters, and rebuilding the election administration infrastructure are just a few of the significant challenges that the government must address.56
  • By the end of 2023, there were only 401 members of parliament in office, leaving 49 of the 450 seats in the parliament unfilled.57 There were three reasons for this shortage. First, in 2019, there were no elections in single-seat districts (SSD) in Crimea and some parts of the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts due to the Russian occupation. Second, the SSDs that lost their deputies over the last five years due to resignation,58 59 loss of Ukrainian citizenship,60 or death61 62 remained vacant because by-elections were prohibited under martial law. Six deputies in SSDs left office and their seats were left unfilled in 2023. Finally, seven deputies from the banned Opposition Platform – For Life (OPZH) party were dismissed from the parliament in 2023 and their seats went unfilled. 63 64 65 66
  • In September, Russia conducted local elections in the occupied territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia, as well as by-elections to the State Duma in a district of the occupied city of Simferopol, Crimea. By organizing these illegal elections, Russia aimed to further integrate the occupied territories into its political system. The Central Election Commission of Ukraine adopted a resolution recognizing the elections “as a continuation of Russia's cynical encroachment on the state sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, its constitutional system, as enshrined in the Constitution of Ukraine.”67 Corresponding statements were issued by the Ukrainian Parliament68 and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.69 The European Union70 71 and the United States72 also condemned these sham elections.
Civil Society 1.00-7.00 pts
Assesses the organizational capacity and financial sustainability of the civic sector; the legal and political environment in which it operates; the functioning of trade unions; interest group participation in the policy process; and the threat posed by antidemocratic extremist groups. 5.25 / 7.00
  • In 2023, Ukrainians organized protests for the first time since the war began. Two waves of protests occurred during the year. The first protests were held to demand the government to establish set terms for military service and rotations in the military, as well as the adoption of a law allowing soldiers to demobilize after 18 months of service.73 74 The families of active-duty soldiers largely organized these demonstrations, which attracted between 30 and 100 participants, depending on the city.75 76 During the second wave of protests, citizens urged local governments to prioritize military expenses over infrastructure projects.77 78 79 80 81 The number of participants at these meetings ranged from 20 to 1,000.82 The government did not interfere with these events despite the martial law regime in place. Moreover, it considered some of the protesters’ demands and took steps to fulfill them.83
  • Since February 2022, volunteerism has become much more structured and professional. Volunteer groups now compete for resources, media attention, and qualified volunteers.84 From January until October, the three largest volunteer groups—United24, Come Back Alive, and the Serhiy Prytula Charity Foundation—generated 12.5 billion hryvnia ($335 million) in donations.85 According to surveys, Come Back Alive and the Serhiy Prytula Charity Foundation are among the most trusted volunteer organizations in Ukraine, with 43 percent and 42 percent of respondents ready to donate to them, respectively.86 Ukrainians trust volunteer groups at a much higher rate than other social institutions. In 2023, surveys showed that at least 80 percent of respondents trusted volunteer groups, a rate 20 percent higher than trust in other civil society organizations (CSOs).87 88 At the beginning of 2023, 61 percent of Ukrainians volunteered in support of the military or their fellow citizens.89
  • In January, President Zelensky issued a decree that imposed economic sanctions on the top clergy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), previously known as the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP).90 91 And in April, the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) charged UOC leader Metropolitan Pavlo with “justification, recognition as lawful, denial of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, glorification of its participants.”92 The SSU reported that since the beginning of the Russian invasion it had criminally charged 68 representatives the UOC, including 14 metropolitans of the church, over their alleged support for Russia’s invasion.93 In 2023, several local councils banned the UOC-MP from operating in their communities.94 95 96 97 In October, a bill that would ban religious organizations associated with the Russian Orthodox Church passed a first reading in the parliament.98 The percentage of Ukrainians supporting a complete ban of the UOC-MP in Ukraine increased from 54 percent in 2022 to 66 percent in 2023.99
  • In July, the Law On National Minorities, which the parliament passed at the end of 2022, was enacted.100 However, a June Venice Commission opinion criticized the law for restricting the use of the languages of the national minorities, including Russian, in media, schooling, and publishing.101 102 103 In response, the government revised the law and considered some of the commission’s recommendations.104 Nevertheless, the commission issued a follow-up opinion that said a number of key recommendations had either not been implemented or were partially implemented.105 The government then further revised the law, but faced sharp criticism from Ukrainian activists who argued that the proposed revisions could enable the “extensive Russification” of television, radio broadcasting, audio and video advertising, book publishing, and other industries after a five-year transitional period.106 107 In response, the government further revised the law to exclude “Russification norms.”108 In December, the parliament passed the revised law and President Zelenksy signed it into law, which the European Commission positively accessed.109 110
  • On multiple occasions in 2023, representatives of the Territorial Supply Centers (TSC), the institutions responsible for military mobilization, illegally detained draft-age men on the streets of Ukrainian cities.111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 These actions revealed the challenges Ukraine faces with mobilization, but TSC management and law enforcement reacted appropriately. In some cases, the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) opens criminal cases for instances of military personnel exceeding official powers, while in others, TSCs conduct official checks themselves.119 120
Independent Media 1.00-7.00 pts
Examines the current state of press freedom, including libel laws, harassment of journalists, and editorial independence; the operation of a financially viable and independent private press; and the functioning of the public media. 3.25 / 7.00
  • In March, a controversial media law adopted at the end of 2022 came into force. Its implementation was one of the EU's requirements for Ukraine to become an EU candidate country. The National Union of Journalists of Ukraine, the Independent Media Trade Union of Ukraine, and the International and European Federations of Journalists warned that the law unduly expands the powers of the state media regulator, the National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council, which lacks independence because the president appoints half of its members and the parliament appoints the other half.121 The law enabled the regulator to fine media outlets, revoke their licenses, and temporarily block certain publications without a court decision.122 On the other hand, Reporters Without Borders praised the law for harmonizing Ukrainian legislation with European law and making it easier to identify the real owners of media outlets.123 The Council of Europe said the law generally met its standards.124
  • In 2023, the united telethon broadcast by the largest television networks since 2022 remained a significant source of news and information. Four out of five Ukrainians were aware of the “united news” at the telethon, and one in three watched the news at least once a week.125 However, the share of daily viewers of the telethon decreased by 10 percent in 2023,126 127 and the level of trust in the telethon dropped from 69 percent to 43 percent.128 Monitors said that the telethon programs disproportionately aired positive coverage of Preseident Zelensky’s Servant of the People party.129 130 131 By the end of the year, 43 percent of Ukrainians agreed that the telethon had lost its relevance, while only 21 percent said it remained relevant.132 In 2024, the government will spend 1.7 billion hryvnia ($46 million) on the telethon.133
  • In 2023, regional media encountered substantial wartime challenges, mainly due to the loss of personnel resulting from emigration and military service.134 While editorial teams adapted to wartime conditions, they faced safety risks, financial difficulties, a shrinking advertising market, and mental health challenges from the stress of reporting on the war. The financial sustainability of regional media outlets was closely tied to their fundraising capabilities, especially their ability to craft competitive grant proposals.
  • By November, Russia had killed 25 journalists in Ukraine, including two who died while working.135 136 Four journalists were injured while working on the frontline.137 138 139 In 2023, monitors reported 150 freedom of speech violations, with 45 percent attributed to Russia and 55 percent to Ukrainian citizens.140
  • In November, two respected media organizations, the Institute of Mass Media (IMI) and Detector Media (DM), reported on an organized campaign to discredit both organizations using fake news spread on anonymous Telegram channels.141 The campaign was initiated by a Telegram channel that IMI and DM had previously monitored.142 The Telegram posts alleged that IMI and DM were “paying with rubles” to the analytical services allowing gathering and the analysis of statistics on Telegram channels that were developed by Russians, and therefore “sponsoring the war.” Another Telegram channel under monitoring then conducted a survey that asked followers to choose the type of punishment IMI and DM should endure. The attack on these organizations was condemned by the EU office in Ukraine.143 144
Local Democratic Governance 1.00-7.00 pts
Considers the decentralization of power; the responsibilities, election, and capacity of local governmental bodies; and the transparency and accountability of local authorities. 3.50 / 7.00
  • As of September, 2,804 settlements in 144 territorial communities remained under Russian occupation, while 687 settlements in 87 communities had been liberated.145 To reintegrate these liberated communities, officials must address a number of issues including transitional justice, lustration (dealing with collaborators and Russian associates in temporarily occupied territories), restoring public administration and social services, demining, and environmental issues.146 147 148
  • In 2023, the president established military administrations (MAs) in 49 territorial units. The government created 16 MAs in cities and towns and 33 in villages. Most of the MAs were set up in the frontline oblasts: Luhansk (3), Zaporizhzhia (19), Donetsk (9), Kherson (4), and Kharkiv (1).149 The MAs are temporary governing institutions that either replaced or worked in parallel with the self-governing bodies. The MAs will remain until martial law ends. MAs are tasked with helping to govern territories that lack the capacity to govern themselves. The president appoints the heads of the MAs and they are directly accountable to Zelensky. This arrangement could threaten local autonomy by establishing central control over local governance.150 Analysts have recommended that local self-government be restored as soon as possible if conditions allow for it.151
  • In November, the parliament passed and President Zelensky signed a military bill that affected local self-governance.152 153 The law transfers income tax revenues allocated for the military from local budgets to the governmental budget. According to expert estimates, during the first half of 2023, the “military” income tax contributed 50 billion hryvnias ($1.3 billion) to local budgets, accounting for 15 percent of all local budget revenues.154 Under the new law, from October 1 until the end of 2023, revenues from the military income tax were equally distributed to the State Special Communications and Information Protection Service for drones and the Ministry of Defense for the purchase of artillery systems.155 In 2024, the military tax will be allocated to ammunition and military units.156 The law sparked heated debates. Proponents argued that local authorities had spent money that should have gone to the military on urban projects.157 Opponents contended that local authorities had addressed many military needs in their territories. These changes undermine the financial capacity of local self-governance by reducing localities’ finances by 25 percent.158 The financial sustainability of local self-governance in Ukraine has been a crucial aspect of decentralization reform, which was widely regarded as one of Ukraine’s most successful reforms.
  • In 2023, the mayors of the oblast centers of Poltava,159 Chernihiv,160 Rivne,161 and Sumy162 were convicted of corruption and removed from office. The mayors of Poltava and Sumy were convicted of misusing budget funds and accepting a bribe, respectively, and the mayors of Chernihiv and Rivne were convicted of corruption-related administrative offenses. While council secretaries replaced the mayors of Poltava and Rivne, President Zelensky established MAs in Chernihiv and Sumy and appointed their heads.163 164 Despite the court decisions, some interest groups, including the Association of Cities of Ukraine, thought the mayors’ dismissals were politically motivated and undermined local self-government.165 166 167
  • In 2023, Ukrainians’ trust in local self-government decreased slightly. In March, 56 percent of respondents trusted their local councils and 62 percent trusted their mayors. By October, these figures had decreased to 49 percent and 54 percent, respectively.168 169
Judicial Framework and Independence 1.00-7.00 pts
Assesses constitutional and human rights protections, judicial independence, the status of ethnic minority rights, guarantees of equality before the law, treatment of suspects and prisoners, and compliance with judicial decisions. 2.50 / 7.00
  • In January, the Congress of Judges elected eight members of the High Council of Justice (HCJ), granting it authorized status.170 The HCJ has the power to appoint and dismiss judges.171 The reformed HCJ re-established the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQC), which then vetted and appointed 2,500 judges to fill longstanding vacancies.172 173 The reboot of the HCJ and HQC was a top priority for the judiciary and allowed Ukraine to initiate negotiations to enter the EU.174
  • At the end of 2022, the parliament approved and the president signed a controversial law on the selection of judges for the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU). Passing and implementing the law was a key factor for Ukraine to initiate negotiations to join the EU. Among others, it would enable the filling of five vacant positions for judges in the current composition of the CCU. The law envisaged the creation of a special body, the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE), to check the backgrounds of the candidates for the CCU, but the Venice Commission declined to nominate its representative to the Group unless the law was revised. After several rounds of negotiations, the new version of the law incorporated the commission's technical recommendation, which made it impossible to further consider candidates for the CCU identified by the AGE as “not suitable.” However, a significant commission recommendation to increase the size of the AGE from six to seven members by adding one more representative from international organizations, in an effort to avoid deadlocks in decision-making, was not implemented. Nevertheless, the law specified that the AGE's international members would cast a tie-breaking vote. In November, the government determined the AGE’s composition. The president, the parliament, and the Council of Judges each delegated one AGE member, while the cabinet approved three more members that international organizations proposed. Despite Ukrainian experts’ recommendation that the international quota include at least one Ukrainian expert, all three selections were foreigners. The AGE then held its inaugural meeting and began formulating the methodology to select candidates. Simultaneously, the parliament and the Council of Judges submitted their lists of candidates to the CCU for the AGE’s review.175
  • In August, CSO representatives formed the third composition of the Public Integrity Council (PIC). The PIC plays a crucial role in helping the HQC to ensure the integrity of the judiciary.176 The PIC collects information and draws conclusions on judges’ professional ethics and integrity.177 However, in November, a bill that would significantly restrict the powers of the PIC passed the first reading in the parliament. The bill would limit civil society involvement in evaluating current judges and selecting new ones. It would also empower the HQC to terminate the mandates of PIC members, prohibit PIC members from giving a public assessment of judges, and establish tight timeframes for assessments that may compromise their quality.178 179
  • In May, authorities arrested the head of the Supreme Court of Ukraine (SCU), Vsevolod Knyazev, for receiving a bribe of $3 million in exchange for a court decision favoring the corporate interests of one of the Ukrainian oligarchs.180 Simultaneously, authorities searched the homes of 18 other SCU judges who heard the mentioned case.181 The plenum of the SCU described the event as a “black day in the history of the Court,” the director of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) said it was the most resonant case in the bureau’s history, and experts concluded that efforts to reform the SCU had “miserably failed.”182 183 184 The plenum subsequently held a vote of no confidence in Knyazev and stripped him of his powers.185
  • In 2023, the courts were among the least trusted institutions in Ukraine. The trend throughout the year was consistently negative. According to surveys, between February and September, public trust in the courts fell from 25 percent to 18 percent, while distrust rose from 59 percent to 70 percent.186 187 The proportion of individuals expressing “no trust at all” surged from 20 percent to 32 percent.
Corruption 1.00-7.00 pts
Looks at public perceptions of corruption, the business interests of top policymakers, laws on financial disclosure and conflict of interest, and the efficacy of anticorruption initiatives. 2.50 / 7.00
  • In March, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted the Anti-Corruption Program that was a key instrument for the Anti-Corruption Strategy 2021-2025.188 The EU had urged Ukraine to adopt the law. The National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NAZK) had warned that internal resistance to the Anti-Corruption Program from the most corrupt institutions could threaten the law’s passage.189
  • After the Russian invasion, NAZK suspended the asset declaration requirements for politicians and high-ranking civil servants until the end of the martial law regime.190 However, in January, Oleksiy Grytsenko, politician and activist, started an online petition to reinstate asset declarations.191 Within a few days, the petition gathered the necessary 25,000 signatures, prompting an official response from President Zelensky, who voiced his support for it.192 Additionally, the IMF said it would withhold further financial support until the government brought back asset declarations, a stance that the EU and G7 backed.193 194 195 Following attempts to undermine the bill to restore asset declarations in the parliament, deputies eventually supported a version that would require officials to submit their assets one year from the bill’s implementation.196 Pressure from the Ukrainian public and the international community compelled the president to veto the law with a call to require asset declarations by the end of September.197 198 199 200 In September, the parliament supported the revision and President Zelensky signed a revised law in October that restored electronic declarations and made them public immediately.201
  • In March, the cabinet appointed Semen Kryvonos as the head of NABU.202 After his appointment, investigative journalists revealed corruption allegations against Kryvonos, stemming from his time as the head of the registration service in the local department of justice.203
  • In June, the Venice Commission issued an opinion on a law meant to control Ukraine’s powerful oligarchs, whose implementation was one of the conditions for Ukraine to become an EU candidate country.204 205 The commission concluded that the law emphasized a “personal” approach (“identifying the persons who are considered to wield negative influence on the state through specific criteria, such as wealth, media ownership, etc.”) rather than a “systematic” strategy (“adoption and strengthening of legal tools in many fields of law … with a view to preventing the destructive influence of oligarchy in a comprehensive and coordinated manner”) to fight the corrupt influence of many oligarchs.206 The chosen approach may threaten the rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights for those investigated under the law. Moreover, it may empower the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) to make arbitrary decisions on who is an oligarch to benefit the president, who heads the NSDC. The commission also acknowledged that the war had diminished the oligarchs’ power and reduced their political influence.207 As a result, the Venice Commission suggested postponing the law’s implementation until the end of the war. The register of oligarchs, which should include individuals meeting certain criteria, was scheduled to be launched within three months of the commission’s opinion.208 However, given the commission's negative conclusion on the law, the government postponed the launch of the register until the end of the martial law regime.209
  • In early 2023, investigative journalist Yuriy Nikolov publicized a 13.16 billion hryvnia ($353 million) Ministry of Defense contract for food that inflated the prices for the most popular products by two to three times.210 211 The Ministry of Defense accused the journalist of manipulation and asked the SSU to investigate the published material.212 However, anticorruption institutions confirmed that they had opened investigations into the contract before the article’s publication.213 Officials then dismissed the deputy minister of defense who oversaw military logistics and the Ministry of Defense’s procurement director.214 215 Shortly afterward, authorities arrested both officials for corruption, executing contracts for military products at inflated prices, and procuring low-quality military equipment.216 217 The contracts for military food procurement were then revised with reduced prices.218 An audit conducted by the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine confirmed the inflated prices.219 This case of high-level corruption in the Ministry of Defense was not isolated.. Other cases of corruption in the ministry have cost millions220 221 and billions of hryvnia.222 223 224 These cases did not appear to involve US aid.225 226
  • Multiple reports of draft evasion pointed to systemic corruption within the Territorial Supply Centers (TSC) and Military Medical Commissions (MMC). One of the most prevalent corruption schemes involved officials from the MMCs accepting bribes from conscription-age individuals to fabricate documents stating that the individuals were unfit for service due to a medical condition. This led to their removal from military registration at the TSC.227 228 229 MMC officials received between $1,000 and $15,000 for the false reports, allowing thousands of conscripts to flee the country.230 The investigations demonstrated that TSC heads who were responsible for mobilizing conscripts bought property in Ukraine and abroad that cost millions of dollars.231 232 233 234 Many similar cases of corruption were uncovered across Ukraine.235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 The scale of the phenomenon and its public resonance led to the dismissals and arrests of some officials accused of egregious corruption.245 246 Anticorruption bodies conducted audits that scrutinized the lifestyles of military commissars247 and functioning of military institutions.248 249 250 The results of the audits brought numerous abuses of power to light.251 252 All oblast-level military commissars were dismissed as a result of the audits.253
  • Ukrainians considered the parliament the most corrupt institution, while they viewed the presidency and anticorruption NGOs as the least corrupt institutions.254 In general, Ukrainians believed that the government performed poorly in fighting corruption.255 More than half of Ukrainians considered corrupt government officials as the country’s major internal enemy.256 And almost four out of five citizens believed that the president was directly accountable for the corruption in government and the military.257 While accountability was not synonymous with involvement, public opinion sends a strong signal that Ukrainians expect the president to show strength in fighting corruption.258

Author: Nazar Boyko is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at West Virginia University. He is a founder and chief executive at CIFRA Group, a Ukrainian NGO that studies and observes elections in Ukraine and abroad. Since the early 2000s, he has observed all national and local elections in Ukraine, and organized and participated in more than 20 international election observation missions in Albania, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Lithuania, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Footnotes

  • 1Krzysztof Janowski, “Civilian Deaths In Ukraine War Top 10,000, UN Says,” United Nations Ukraine, 21 November 2023, https://ukraine.un.org/en/253322-civilian-deaths-ukraine-war-top-10000-….
  • 2“Мер Маріуполя назвав дані про загиблих у місті” [The mayor of Mariupol disclosed the data on casualties in the city], Radio Liberty, 14 April 2023, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-mariupol-zahybli/32363334.html The total amount of damage caused to the infrastructure of Ukraine due to the war reaches $151.2 billion — estimate as of September 1, 2023,” Kyiv School of Economics, 3 October 2023, https://kse.ua/about-the-school/news/the-total-amount-of-damage-caused-…
  • 3Kyiv School of Economics, “The total amount of damage caused to the infrastructure of Ukraine due to the war reaches $151.2 billion — estimate as of September 1, 2023,” Kyiv School of Economics website , 3 October 2023, https://kse.ua/about-the-school/news/the-total-amount-of-damage-caused-…
  • 4“Україні потрібно 411 мільярдів доларів на відновлення – Світовий банк” [Ukraine needs 411 billion dollars for recovery, according to the World Bank], Economic Truth, 23 March 2023,
  • 5“Ukraine: War’s Toll on Schools, Children’s Future,” Human Rights Watch, 9 November 2023, https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/11/09/ukraine-wars-toll-schools-childrens…
  • 6“За понад 20 місяців війни рф вже пошкодила 1468 об’єктів медзакладів та ще 193 зруйнувала вщент” [Over more than 20 months of the war, Russia has already damaged 1468 medical facilities and completely destroyed another 193], Ministry of Health of Ukraine, 7 November 2023, https://moz.gov.ua/article/news/za-ponad-20-misjaciv-vijni-rf-vzhe-posh…-
  • 7Eve Sampson, Samuel Granados, “Ukraine is now the most mined country. It will take decades to make safe,” Washington Post, 22 July 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/07/22/ukraine-is-now-most-min…
  • 8Samya Kullab, Illia Novikov, “Russia covered up and undercounted true human cost of floodings after dam explosion, AP investigation finds,” Associated Press, 28 December 2023, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-dam-collapse-kakhovka-khe…
  • 9James Glanz, Marc Santora, Pablo Robles, Haley Willis, Lauren Leatherby, Christoph Koettl, Dmitriy Khavin, “Why the Evidence Suggests Russia Blew Up the Kakhovka Dam,” New York Times, 16 June 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/06/16/world/europe/ukraine-kak…
  • 10Iulia-Sabina Joja, “Disease, destruction, flooded fields, and hunger: The far-reaching consequence of the Kakhovka dam collapse in Ukraine,” Middle East Institute, 19 June 2023, https://www.mei.edu/publications/disease-destruction-flooded-fields-and…
  • 11Iryna Balachuk, “У Київстар − масштабний збій: компанія каже, що вже вирішує проблему” [At Kyivstar - a massive failure: the company says it is already resolving the issue], Ukrainian Truth, 12 December 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2023/12/12/7432668/
  • 12Liuba Balashova, Taisa Melnyk, “Привіт від NotPetya. Атаку на «Київстар» здійснило угруповання російського ГРУ Sandworm. Шість років тому воно поклало енергетику і банки України вірусом NotPetya” [Greetings from NotPetya. The attack on Kyivstar was carried out by the Russian GRU Sandworm group. Six years ago, it paralyzed the energy and banking sectors of Ukraine with the NotPetya virus], Forbes Ukraine, 14 December 2023, https://forbes.ua/innovations/ataku-na-kiivstar-zdiysnilo-khakerske-ugr…
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  • 14Lia Ilchenko, “Київстар" відновив 100% послуг - президент компанії” [Kyivstar has restored 100% of its services, announced the company's president], Economic Truth, 20 December 2023, https://www.epravda.com.ua/news/2023/12/20/707935/
  • 15Iryna Balachuk, “Наймасованіша атака з повітря: летіло 158 цілей, збили 27 ‘Шахедів’ і 87 ракет” [Most massive air attack: 158 targets were hit, 27 ‘Shahed’ drones were shot down, and 87 missiles intercepted], Ukrainian Truth, 29 December 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2023/12/29/7435056/
  • 16Roman Petrenko, “Зеленський: Від ракетного удару 29 грудня загинули 39 людей” [Zelensky: 39 people died from the missile strike on December 29], Ukrainian Truth, 30 December 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2023/12/30/7435214/
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  • 19Andrew E. Kramer, Maria Varenikova, Constant Méheut, “Zelensky Rebuke of Top General Signals Rift in Ukrainian Leadership,” New York Times, 4 November 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/04/world/europe/zelensky-rebuke-general…
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  • 21James Jordan, Samya Kullab, Illia Novikov, “The AP Interview: Ukraine’s Zelenskyy says the war with Russia is in a new phase as winter looms,” Associated Press, 1 December 2023, https://apnews.com/article/zelenskyy-ukraine-russia-war-interview-winte…
  • 22Roman Romaniuk, Roman Kravets, “Війна проти політики. Що насправді відбувається між Зеленським і Залужним” [The war against politics: What is really happening between Zelensky and Zaluzhny], Ukrainian Truth, 4 December 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2023/12/4/7431489/
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  • 24Sergiy Sydorenko, “Шлях до ЄС. Що має зробити Україна, щоби почати переговори про членство” [The path to the EU: What Ukraine needs to do to start membership negotiation], European Truth, 22 August 2022, https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2022/08/22/7145358/
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  • 26Radio Liberty, “Державну антикорупційну програму на 2023-2025 роки презентували в Києві” [The State Anti-Corruption Program for 2023-2025 was presented in Kyiv], Radio Liberty website, 5 April 2023, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-derzhavna-antykoruptsiina-prohrama-…
  • 27Kateryna Tyshchenko, “Зеленський оголосив про рішення замінити Резнікова на Умєрова: Потрібні нові підходи” [Zelensky announced the decision to replace Reznikov with Umerov: New approaches are needed], Ukrainian Truth, 3 September 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2023/09/3/7418280/
  • 28Valentyna Romanenko, “Нардепи проголосували за нового очільника МВС” [Deputies voted for a new head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs], Ukrainian Truth, 7 February 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2023/02/7/7388270/
  • 29Valentyna Romanenko, “Верховна Рада призначила двох міністрів і віцепрем'єра” [Verkhovna Rada appointed two ministers and a vice-premier], Ukrainian Truth, 21 March 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2023/03/21/7394383/
  • 30Valentyna Romanenko, “Рада призначила Умєрова міністром оборони” [The Rada appointed Umierov as the Minister of Defense], Ukrainian Truth, 6 September 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2023/09/6/7418668/
  • 31Oleksandr Shumilin, “Рада звільнила міністра Гутцайта” [The Rada dismissed Minister Hutsait], Ukrainian Truth, 9 November 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2023/11/9/7427979/
  • 32Oksana Zabolotna, “Звіти з нюансами. Чому ухвалений закон про відновлення звітування політичних партій не вирішує проблеми?” [Reports with Nuances. Why the Adopted Law on the Restoration of Reporting by Political Parties Does Not Solve the Problems?], Mirror Weekly, 12 September 2023, https://zn.ua/ukr/POLITICS/zviti-z-njuansami-chomu-ukhvalenij-zakon-pro…
  • 33"Проект Закону про внесення змін до деяких законодавчих актів України щодо мінімізації потенційного олігархічного впливу на політичні партії, удосконалення механізмів державного фінансування та державного контролю за діяльністю політичних партій” [Draft Law on Amendments to Some Legislative Acts of Ukraine to Minimize Potential Oligarchic Influence on Political Parties, Improve Mechanisms of State Financing, and State Control over the Activities of Political Parties], Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 26 September 2023, https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/42290
  • 34Anna Steshenko, “Бюджет-2024: без військового ПДФО на місцях, коштів на ремонт доріг і ДФРР” [Budget-2024: Without Local Military Tax, Funds for Road Repairs, and DFRP], Left Bank, 20 September 2023, https://lb.ua/news/2023/09/20/575743_byudzhet2024_bez_viyskovogo_pdfo.h…
  • 35Nadia Sobenko, “В Україні заборонили діяльність "Партії регіонів" [In Ukraine, the activities of the 'Party of Regions' have been banned], Suspilne News, 21 February 2023, https://suspilne.media/392699-v-ukraini-zaboronili-dialnist-partii-regi…
  • 36“Проект Закону про внесення змін до деяких законів України (щодо обмеження участі осіб, пов’язаних з політичними партіями, діяльність яких заборонена, в управлінні державою)” [Draft Law on Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine (on restricting the participation of persons associated with political parties, the activities of which are prohibited, in state management)], Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 28 September 2023, https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/41482
  • 37Nadia Sobenko, Iryna Ganakova, “У "Слузі народу" сказали, скількох депутатів місцевих рад від проросійських партій можуть позбавити мандата” [In 'Servant of the People,' they said how many local council deputies from pro-Russian parties could be deprived of their mandates], Suspilne News, 10 March 2023, https://suspilne.media/410688-u-sluzi-narodu-skazali-skilkoh-deputativ-…
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  • 39“Ukraine - Joint opinion of the Venice Commission,” https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2023)025-e
  • 40“Всеукраїнське опитування громадської думки “Омнібус” [All-Ukrainian public opinion survey 'Omnibus'], Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 18 December 2023, https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1335&page=1
  • 41“Зросла кількість українців, які вірять у конфлікт у владі та втому Заходу від України” [The number of Ukrainians who believe in the conflict within the government and fatigue from the West's attitude towards Ukraine has increased], Ukrinform, 16 October 2023, https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-society/3774581-zrosla-kilkist-ukrainci…
  • 42“Закон України від 12.05.2015 № 389-VIII "Про правовий режим воєнного стану" (із змінами)” [Law of Ukraine dated May 12, 2015 № 389-VIII "On the legal regime of martial law" (with amendments)], Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 12 May 2015, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/389-19#Text
  • 43Sergiy Sydorenko, "Nobody Will Blame Ukraine If Post-War Elections Are Not Perfect," European Pravda, 16 May 2023, https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/interview/2023/05/16/7161793/
  • 44Вибори в Україні наступного року мають відбутися, навіть в умовах війни – сенатор США” [Elections in Ukraine next year should take place, even in wartime – U.S. Senator], Radio Liberty, 13 August 2023, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-vybory-ukrayina-usa/32561994.html
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  • 50“Про затвердження обсягу видатків для включення до бюджетного запиту за бюджетною програмою 6741020 “Субвенція з державного бюджету місцевим бюджетам на проведення виборів депутатів місцевих рад та сільських, селищних, міських голів” до проєкту Державного бюджету України на 2024 рік, орієнтовних обсягів видатків, необхідних для проведення виборів народних депутатів України, Президента України та додаткового обсягу видатків для проведення місцевих виборів у 2024 році” [On the approval of the expenditure volume for inclusion in the budget request under budget program 6741020 'Subvention from the state budget to local budgets for the conduct of elections of deputies of local councils and rural, settlement, city heads' to the draft State Budget of Ukraine for 2024, indicative expenditure volumes necessary for the conduct of elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine, the President of Ukraine, and additional expenditure volume for the conduct of local elections in 2024], Central Election Commission of Ukraine, 15 August 2023, https://act.cvk.gov.ua/acts/pro-zatverdzhennya-obsyagu-vidatkiv-dlya-vk…
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  • 52“Оцінка громадянами ситуації в країні. Довіра до соціальних інститутів, політиків, посадовців та громадських діячів. Ставлення до проведення загальнонаціональних виборів в Україні до завершення війни (вересень 2023р.)” [Citizens' assessment of the situation in the country. Trust in social institutions, politicians, officials and public figures. Attitudes toward the conduct of nationwide elections in Ukraine before the end of the war (September 2023)], Razumkov Center, 11 October 2023, https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/otsinka-…
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  • 55“За участю керівництва Верховної Ради України вдев’яте відбулася зустріч у форматі “Діалогу Жана Моне” [A meeting in the format of the 'Jean Monnet Dialogue' took place for the ninth time with the participation of the leadership of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine], Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 13 November 2023, https://www.rada.gov.ua/news/Top-novyna/243634.html?search=%D0%B6%D0%B0…
  • 56“Вибори після Перемоги: що може змінитися” [Elections after Victory: what can change], Central Election Commission of Ukraine, 2 March 2023, https://cvk.gov.ua/zmi-pro-tsvk/vibori-pislya-peremogi-shho-mozhe-zmini…
  • 57“Управління кадрів Апарату Верховної Ради України [Personnel Department of the Apparatus of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine],” Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 1 November 2023, https://vrkadry.rada.gov.ua/news/dijalnist/kadr_zab_dep/72929.html
  • 58“Про розгляд питання призначення проміжних виборів народних депутатів України в одномандатних виборчих округах № 40 (Дніпропетровська область) та № 47 (Донецька область)” [The consideration of the issue of holding interim elections for the Members of Parliament of Ukraine in single-seat electoral districts № 40 (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast) and № 47 (Donetsk Oblast)], Central Election Commission of Ukraine, 2 March 2023, https://act.cvk.gov.ua/acts/pro-rozglyad-pitannya-priznachennya-promizh…
  • 59“Про питання проміжних виборів народних депутатів України в одномандатних виборчих округах № 37 (Дніпропетровська область) та № 48 (Донецька область)” [On the issue of by-elections for members of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in single-member electoral districts No. 37 (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast) and No. 48 (Donetsk Oblast)], Central Election Commission of Ukraine, 13 December 2023, https://act.cvk.gov.ua/acts/pro-pitannya-promizhnih-viboriv-narodnih-de…
  • 60“Про розгляд питання призначення проміжних виборів народних депутатів України в одномандатних виборчих округах № 50 (Донецька область) та № 159 (Сумська область)” [The consideration of the issue of scheduling interim elections for Members of Parliament of Ukraine in single-seat electoral districts № 50 (Donetsk Oblast) and № 159 (Sumy Oblast)], Central Election Commission of Ukraine, 19 January 2023, https://act.cvk.gov.ua/acts/pro-rozglyad-pitannya-priznachennya-promizh…
  • 61“​​Про розгляд питання призначення проміжних виборів народного депутата України в одномандатному виборчому окрузі № 186 (Херсонська область)” [The consideration of the issue of scheduling interim elections for the Member of Parliament of Ukraine in the single-seat electoral district № 186 (Kherson Oblast)], Central Election Commission of Ukraine, 1 February 2023, https://act.cvk.gov.ua/acts/pro-rozglyad-pitannya-priznachennya-promizh…
  • 62“Про питання проміжних виборів народного депутата України в одномандатному виборчому окрузі № 88 (Івано-Франківська область)” [Regarding the matter of scheduling interim elections for the Member of Parliament of Ukraine in the single-seat electoral district № 88 (Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast)], Central Election Commission of Ukraine, 4 October 2023, https://act.cvk.gov.ua/acts/pro-pitannya-promizhnih-viboriv-narodnogo-d…
  • 63“Про питання визнання обраними народними депутатами України на позачергових виборах народних депутатів України 21 липня 2019 року в загальнодержавному багатомандатному виборчому окрузі наступних за черговістю кандидатів у народні депутати України у виборчому списку Політичної партії ‘ОПОЗИЦІЙНА ПЛАТФОРМА – ЗА ЖИТТЯ,’” [Regarding the matter of recognizing as elected Members of Parliament of Ukraine in the extraordinary elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine on July 21, 2019, in the nationwide multi-member electoral district, the following candidates in the list of the Political Party ‘OPPOSITION PLATFORM - FOR LIFE’ in order of priority], Central Election Commission of Ukraine, 19 January 2023, https://act.cvk.gov.ua/acts/pro-pitannya-viznannya-obranimi-narodnimi-d…
  • 64[Regarding the matter of recognizing as elected Members of Parliament of Ukraine in the extraordinary elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine on July 21, 2019, in the nationwide multi-member electoral district, the following candidates in the list of the Political Party ‘OPPOSITION PLATFORM - FOR LIFE’ in order of priority], https://act.cvk.gov.ua/acts/pro-pitannya-viznannya-obranimi-narodnimi-d…
  • 65“Про питання визнання обраними народними депутатами України на позачергових виборах народних депутатів України 21 липня 2019 року в загальнодержавному багатомандатному виборчому окрузі наступних за черговістю кандидатів у народні депутати України у виборчому списку Політичної партії “ОПОЗИЦІЙНА ПЛАТФОРМА – ЗА ЖИТТЯ””, [Regarding the matter of recognizing as elected Members of Parliament of Ukraine in the extraordinary elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine on July 21, 2019, in the nationwide multi-member electoral district, the following candidates in the list of the Political Party "OPPOSITION PLATFORM - FOR LIFE" in order of priority], Central Election Commission of Ukraine, 2 March 2023, https://act.cvk.gov.ua/acts/pro-pitannya-viznannya-obranimi-narodnimi-d…
  • 66“Про питання визнання обраними народними депутатами України на позачергових виборах народних депутатів України 21 липня 2019 року в загальнодержавному багатомандатному виборчому окрузі наступних за черговістю кандидатів у народні депутати України у виборчому списку Політичної партії “ОПОЗИЦІЙНА ПЛАТФОРМА – ЗА ЖИТТЯ””, [Regarding the matter of recognizing as elected Members of Parliament of Ukraine in the extraordinary elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine on July 21, 2019, in the nationwide multi-member electoral district, the following candidates in the list of the Political Party "OPPOSITION PLATFORM - FOR LIFE" in order of priority], Central Election Commission of Ukraine, 20 July 2023, https://act.cvk.gov.ua/acts/pro-pitannya-viznannya-obranim-narodnim-dep…
  • 67“ЦВК заявляє про нелегітимність організації підготовки та проведення рф будь-яких виборів на тимчасово окупованих територіях України” [The CEC declares the illegitimacy of the organization of preparation and conduct of any elections by the Russian Federation in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine], Central Election Commission of Ukraine, 7 July 2023, https://www.cvk.gov.ua/novini/tsvk-zayavlyaie-pro-nelegitimnist-organiz…
  • 68“Верховна Рада України звернулася до парламентів та урядів іноземних держав щодо намірів російської федерації провести незаконні вибори на тимчасово окупованих територіях України” [Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine has appealed to the parliaments and governments of foreign states regarding the intentions of the Russian Federation to conduct illegal elections in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine], Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 9 August 2023, https://www.rada.gov.ua/news/razom/239964.html
  • 69“Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine regarding Russia's illegal elections in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, 8 September 2023, https://mfa.gov.ua/en/news/statement-ministry-foreign-affairs-ukraine-r…
  • 70“Russia: Statement by the Spokesperson on intentions to hold ‘elections’ in occupied territories of Ukraine,” Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine, 17 June 2023, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/russia-statement-spokesperson-intention…
  • 71“EU condemns Russian sham elections in Ukraine's occupied territories,” European Pravda, 2 September 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/09/2/7418113/
  • 72“Russia’s Sham Elections in Ukraine’s Sovereign Territory,” U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Russia, 7 September 2023, https://ru.usembassy.gov/russias-sham-elections-in-ukraines-sovereign-t…
  • 73Tetiana Lozovenko, “‘Настав час інших’: в Україні пройшли мітинги на підтримку демобілізації” [‘Time for others’: rallies in support of demobilization took place in Ukraine], Ukrainian Truth, 27 October 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2023/10/27/7426002/
  • 74Oksana Ivanytska, “‘Вимагаємо строків демобілізації’. Рідні військових вийшли на мітинг у Києві” [‘We demand the terms of demobilization.’ Relatives of military personnel went to a rally in Kyiv], Hromadska, 12 November 2023, https://hromadske.ua/posts/vimagayemo-strokiv-demobilizaciyi-ridni-vijs…
  • 75Palvo Ivanov, Anastasiia Kraitor, “Право на демобілізацію. Кропивничани втретє долучились до всеукраїнської акції” [The right to demobilization: Kropyvnytskyi residents joined the all-Ukrainian action for the third time], Suspilne News, 2 December 2023, https://suspilne.media/630578-pravo-na-demobilizaciu-kropivnicani-vtret…
  • 76Nataliia Baliukh, Anna Sergiets, "Виснажене військо не здатне захистити країну": у Києві родичі військових мітингували на підтримку демобілізації” ["Exhausted army is unable to defend the country": In Kyiv, relatives of servicemen held a rally in support of demobilization], Suspilne News, 2 December 2023, https://suspilne.media/630530-visnazene-vijsko-ne-zdatne-zahistiti-krai…
  • 77Snizhana Kaliuzhna, Oksana Shved, "Моїм дітям потрібен живий батько": у Черкасах відбулася акція протесту” ["My children need a living father": a protest took place in Cherkasy], Suspilne News, 21 October 2023, https://suspilne.media/599117-viddajte-grosi-na-zsu-u-cerkasah-vidbulas…
  • 78Olena Parai, “Акція, пропозиція військових і 500 мільйонів на ЗСУ: як минула сесія Луцької міської ради” [Action, soldiers' proposal, and 500 million for the Armed Forces: how the session of Lutsk City Council went], Suspilne News, 29 November 2023, https://suspilne.media/628098-akcia-propozicia-vijskovih-i-500-na-zsu-a…
  • 79Ihor Izotov, Ella Trubienko, “Мільйони гривень не на комунальну техніку, а на ЗСУ: хто зібрався на акцію у Полтаві” [Millions of hryvnias not for communal equipment but for the Armed Forces: who gathered for the rally in Poltava], Suspilne News, 24 November 2023, https://suspilne.media/624757-miljoni-griven-ne-na-komunalnu-tehniku-a-…
  • 80Nataliia Karnauch, Olga Ivashchuk, “У Львові вдванадцяте відбувся мітинг ‘Спочатку дрони, потім стадіони’” [In Lviv, for the twelfth time, the rally 'First drones, then stadiums' took place], Suspilne News, 17 November 2023, https://suspilne.media/619783-u-lvovi-vdvanadcate-vidbuvsa-miting-spoca…
  • 81Denys Bulavin, Yulia Ponomarenko, “‘Гроші на ЗСУ’. Під стінами Київради люди знову протестували через бюджет на 2024 рік (ФОТО)” [‘Money for the Armed Forces.’ People protested again under the walls of Kyivrada over the budget for 2024 (PHOTOS)”], Hromadske, 14 December 2023, https://hromadske.ua/posts/groshi-na-zsu-pid-stinami-kiyivradi-lyudi-zn…
  • 82Yelezaveta Krotyk, Maksym Misailov, “‘Замість асфальту — дрони’. У Миколаєві люди вимагали спрямувати гроші на ЗСУ” [‘Instead of asphalt – drones.’ In Mykolaiv, people demanded to allocate money to the Armed Forces of Ukraine], Suspilne News, 4 November 2023, https://suspilne.media/609755-zamist-asfaltu-droni-u-mikolaevi-ludi-vim…
  • 83Vitaliy Saienko, “Україна змінює закон про мобілізацію: що нового пропонує Рада” [Ukraine is changing the law on mobilization: what the Rada proposes], UNIAN, 4 December 2023, https://www.unian.ua/war/ukrajina-zminyuye-zakon-pro-mobilizaciyu-shcho…
  • 84Oleksandra Glizhynska, Iryna Makarova, Andriy Yeremenko, “Цінності волонтерів” [Values of volunteers], Active Group, June 2023, https://activegroup.com.ua/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/230602-%D1%86%D1%…
  • 85Yurii Tarasovskiy, “Як донатять українці. З початку року три найбільші фонди зібрали 12,5 млрд грн” [How Ukrainians donate. Three largest funds raised UAH 12.5 billion since the beginning of the year], Forbes Ukraine, 26 October 2023, https://forbes.ua/news/yak-donatyat-ukraintsi-z-pochatku-roku-tri-naybi…
  • 86Anastasiia Poia, “Яким благодійним фондам найбільше довіряють українці і на що готові донатити – опитування” [Which charitable funds do Ukrainians trust the most and what are they willing to donate to – survey], Ukrainian Truth Life, 12 May 2023, https://life.pravda.com.ua/society/2023/05/12/254264/
  • 87“Динаміка сприйняття напрямку справ в Україні та довіри до окремих інституцій між травнем 2022 року та жовтнем 2023 року” [The dynamics of perception of the state of affairs in Ukraine and trust in specific institutions between May 2022 and October 2023], Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 31 October 2023, https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1321&page=1
  • 88“Оцінка громадянами ситуації в країні, довіра до соціальних інститутів, політиків, посадовців та громадських діячів, ставлення до окремих ініціатив органів влади (липень 2023р.)” [Citizens' assessment of the situation in the country, trust in social institutions, politicians, officials, and public figures, as well as attitudes towards specific initiatives of the authorities (July 2023)], Razumkov Center, 26 July 2023, https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/otsinka-…
  • 89“Опір агресору, волонтерство, обстріли інфраструктури: як повномасштабна війна вплинула на життя українців” [Resistance to the aggressor, volunteering, shelling of infrastructure: how a full-scale war affected the lives of Ukrainians], Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, 24 February 2023, https://dif.org.ua/article/opir-agresoru-volonterstvo-obstrili-infrastr…
  • 90“Указ Президента України №43/2023 Про рішення Ради національної безпеки і оборони України від 24 січня 2023 року ‘Про внесення змін до персональних спеціальних економічних та інших обмежувальних заходів (санкцій)’ [Decree of the President of Ukraine № 43/2023 On the decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine dated January 24, 2023, ‘On amending personal special economic and other restrictive measures (sanctions).’], Office of the President of Ukraine, 24 January 2023, https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/432023-45661?fbclid=IwAR2oYnZGVF…
  • 91Nazar Boyko, “Ukraine: Nations in Transit 2023 Country Report”, Freedom House website, https://freedomhouse.org/country/ukraine/nations-transit/2023
  • 92“СБУ повідомила про підозру митрополиту УПЦ (МП) Павлу (відео)” [The SSU reported that Metropolitan of the UOC-MP Pavlo has been charged with suspicion (video)], Security Service of Ukraine, 1 April 2023, https://ssu.gov.ua/novyny/sbu-povidomyla-pro-pidozru-mytropolytu-upts-m…
  • 93“З початку повномасштабної війни СБУ викрила понад 60 кліриків УПЦ (МП), які працювали на рф, продавали зброю і дитячу порнографію” [Since the beginning of the full-scale war, the SSU has exposed over 60 clerics of the UOC-MP who were working for the Russian Federation, engaging in arms trafficking and selling child pornography], Security Service of Ukraine, 4 October 2023, https://ssu.gov.ua/novyny/z-pochatku-povnomasshtabnoi-viiny-sbu-vykryla…
  • 94“Депутати Рівненської обласної ради одностайно заборонили діяльність УПЦ МП на території Рівненщини” [The deputies of the Rivne Regional Council unanimously banned the activities of the UOC-MP in the territory of Rivne region], Rivne Regional Council, 10 April 2023, https://ror.gov.ua/novyny/deputati-rivnenskoyi-oblasnoyi-radi-odnostain…
  • 95Maksym Kosiur, “​​На Волині заборонили «московський» патріархат (фото, відео)” [In Volyn, the "Moscow" Patriarchate has been prohibited (photo, video)], The Competitor Information Agency, 11 April 2023, https://konkurent.ua/publication/114780/na-volini-zaboronili-moskovskiy…
  • 96“У Житомирській області заборонили діяльність УПЦ МП” [In the Zhytomyr region, the activities of the UOC-MP have been prohibited], Ukrinform, 27 April 2023, https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-regions/3701447-u-zitomirskij-oblasti-z…
  • 97“На Закарпатті заборонили діяльність релігійних організацій, пов’язаних із РФ” [In Zakarpattia, the activities of religious organizations associated with the Russian Federation have been prohibited], Zakarpattia Regional Council, 1 June 2023, https://zakarpat-rada.gov.ua/na-zakarpatti-zaboronyly-diialnist-relihiy…
  • 98“Законопроєкт про заборону релігійних організацій, повʼязаних із РПЦ, пройшов перше читання у ВР” [The bill on the prohibition of religious organizations associated with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has passed the first reading in Verkhovna Rada], Ukrinform, 19 October 2023, https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-polytics/3775951-rada-pidtrimala-zakono…
  • 99“Якою має бути політика влади щодо Української Православної Церкви (Московського Патріархату): результати телефонного опитування, проведеного 26 травня - 5 червня 2023 року” [What should be the government's policy towards the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate): results of a telephone survey conducted from May 26 to June 5, 2023], Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 15 June 2023, https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1247&page=1
  • 100State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience, “Президент підписав закон, який регулює питання реалізації прав і свобод осіб, які належать до національних меншин (спільнот) України” [The President signed a law regulating the implementation of rights and freedoms of persons belonging to national minorities (communities) in Ukraine], State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience official website, 4 November 2023, https://dess.gov.ua/prezydent-pidpysav-zakon-iakyy-rehuliuie-pytannia-r…
  • 101“Opinion on the Law on National Minorities (communities),” European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), 12 June 2023, https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-…
  • 102Sergiy Sydorenko, “Венеційська комісія перейшла на російську. Як інституція Ради Європи підриває рух України до ЄС” [The Venice Commission has switched to Russian. How the institution of the Council of Europe undermines Ukraine's movement towards the EU], European Pravda, 15 June 2023, https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2023/06/15/7163709/
  • 103Detector Media, “Венеційська комісія розкритикувала закон про нацменшини. В'ятрович назвав висновок упередженим” [The Venice Commission criticized the law on national minorities. Vyatrovych called the conclusion biased], Detector Media website, 13 June 2023, https://detector.media/infospace/article/212418/2023-06-13-venetsiyska-…
  • 104“Проект Закону про внесення змін до Закону України “Про національні меншини (спільноти) України” щодо деяких питань реалізації прав і свобод осіб, які належать до національних меншин (спільнот) України” [The Draft Law on Amendments to the Law of Ukraine "On National Minorities (Communities) of Ukraine" Regarding Certain Issues of Implementation of the Rights and Freedoms of Persons Belonging to National Minorities (Communities) of Ukraine], Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 13 August 2023, https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/42516
  • 105“Follow-up opinion to the opinion on the law on national minorities (communities) (draft law № 9610),” European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), 9 October 2023, https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2023)028-e
  • 106“Ревізія законів про мову, освіту та медіа під приводом євроінтеграції є неприйнятною” [The revision of laws on language, education, and media under the pretext of European integration is unacceptable], Language Unites, 20 November 2023, https://www.facebook.com/zakonpromovu5670/posts/pfbid0q1TeiE2Dgd3r5LHBG…
  • 107Language Unites, “Євроінтеграція без русифікації!” [European integration without russification!], Facebook Post, 27 November 2023, https://www.facebook.com/zakonpromovu5670/posts/pfbid0359jz9JFb9rwdfwUu…
  • 108“У Верховній Раді зареєстрували євроінтеграційний законопроєкт про нацменшини, з якого вилучили всі ‘русифікаторські норми’, — В'ятрович” [In Verkhovna Rada, a Eurointegration bill concerning national minorities has been registered, from which all ‘Russification norms’ have been removed, according to Vyatrovych], Detector Media, 5 December 2023, https://detector.media/infospace/article/220231/2023-12-05-u-verkhovniy…
  • 109“Проект Закону про внесення змін до деяких законів України щодо врахування експертної оцінки Ради Європи та її органів щодо прав національних меншин (спільнот) в окремих сферах” [Draft Law on Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine regarding the consideration of the expert assessment of the Council of Europe and its bodies on the rights of national minorities (communities) in certain areas], Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 9 December 2023, https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/43338
  • 110“Єврокомісія позитивно оцінила український закон про нацменшини” [The European Commission has positively assessed the Ukrainian law on national minorities], European Truth, 13 December 2023, https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/news/2023/12/13/7175473/
  • 111“Люди в «пікселі» заштовхали чоловіка в швидку допомогу: в Одесі військові проводять перевірку (оновлено)” [People in "pixel" pushed a man into an ambulance: the military conducts a check in Odessa (updated)], Dumska, 21 December 2023, https://dumskaya.net/news/lyudi-v-piksele-zatolkali-muzhchinu-v-skoruyu…
  • 112Liudmyla Zhernovska, “У Чернівцях працівники ТЦК затримали біля храму священника: деталі” [In Chernivtsi, employees of the Territorial Defense Coordination Center (TDCC) detained a priest near the temple: details], UNIAN, 11 December 2023, https://www.unian.ua/society/tck-u-chernivcyah-na-vulici-zatrimali-svya…
  • 113Anastasia Gorbacheva, “У Львові розгорівся скандал через "викрадення" військкомами чоловіка: реакція ТЦК (відео)” [In Lviv, a scandal erupted over the "kidnapping" of a man by military personnel: TDCC's reaction (video)], UNIAN, 11 October 2023, https://www.unian.ua/incidents/u-lvovi-rozgorivsya-skandal-cherez-vikra…
  • 114Karina Yanina, “У Львові працівники ТЦК "запакували" чоловіка в авто — нове скандальне відео” [In Lviv, TDCC employees "packed" a man into a car — new scandalous video], News Live, 10 November 2023, https://lviv.novyny.live/u-lvovi-pratsivniki-ttsk-zapakuvali-cholovika-…
  • 115“Працівники військкомату в Одесі скрутили чоловіка посеред вулиці” [Employees of the military enlistment office in Odesa bundled up a man in the middle of the street], Suspilne Odesa, 14 February 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xE3PBsgripc
  • 116Dmytro Guliychuk, “Побиття працівниками ТЦК чоловіка у Черкасах: у військкоматі прокоментували гучний скандал” [The military enlistment office commented on the loud scandal of beating a man by TCC employees in Cherkasy], TSN, 27 April 2023, https://tsn.ua/ukrayina/pobittya-pracivnikami-tck-cholovika-u-cherkasah…
  • 117MUKACHEVO.NET, “Скандал у Хусті: Представники ТЦК витягли водія із вантажівки та відвезли на військові навчання” [The scandal in Khust: Representatives of the TCC pulled the driver out of the truck and took him to military training], MUKACHEVO.NET, 2 December 2023, http://www.mukachevo.net/ua/news/view/5849779
  • 118Iryna Vitko, “Скандал із працівниками ТЦК та військовозобов'язаним у лікарні на Хмельниччині: що відомо” [Scandal with TCC employees and conscript in the hospital in Khmelnytskyi region: what is known], Suspilne News, 5 November 2023, https://suspilne.media/610363-skandal-iz-pracivnikami-tck-ta-vijskovozo…
  • 119“ДБР розслідує насильницькі дії військових та правоохоронців під час вручення повістки чоловіку в Одесі” [The State Bureau of Investigations (DBR) is investigating violent actions by the military and law enforcement officers during the delivery of a conscription notice to a man in Odesa], State Bureau of Investigation, 15 November 2023, https://dbr.gov.ua/news/dbr-rozslidue-nasilnicki-dii-vijskovih-ta-pravo…
  • 120Bogdan Skavron, “Жорстке затримання чоловіка під час вручення повістки в Одесі: призначено службову перевірку (відео)” [Harsh detention of a man during the conscription notice delivery in Odesa: an review has been appointed (video)], TSN, 23 January 2023, https://tsn.ua/ukrayina/zhorstke-zatrimannya-viyskovozobov-yazanogo-v-o…
  • 121Igor Burdyga, “Новий закон про медіа: чи очікувати обмежень свободи ЗМІ?” [New media law: should we expect restrictions on media freedom?], Deutsche Welle, 20 December 2022, https://www.dw.com/uk/novij-zakon-pro-media-ci-ocikuvati-v-ukraini-obme…
  • 122“EFJ and IFJ call on the Ukrainian government to reform the media law,” European Federation of Journalists, 17 January 2023, https://europeanjournalists.org/blog/2023/01/17/efj-and-ifj-call-on-the…
  • 123“RSF hails Ukraine’s adoption of new media law, despite war with Russia,” Reporters Without Borders, 11 January 2023, https://rsf.org/en/rsf-hails-ukraine-s-adoption-new-media-law-despite-w…
  • 124“Opinion of the Directorate General Human Rights and Rule of Law Information Society and Action against Crime Directorate Information Society Department prepared on the basis of the expertise by Council of Europe experts: Eve Salomon and Tanja Kerševan ON The Law ‘On Media’ of Ukraine,” Council of Europe, 24 February 2023, https://rm.coe.int/dgi-2023-03-ukraine-tp-law-on-media-2751-9297-4855-1…
  • 125“Українські медіа, ставлення та довіра у 2023 р.” [Ukrainian media, attitudes, and trust in 2023], Internews, November 2023, https://internews.in.ua/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Ukrainski-media-stav…
  • 126“Українські медіа, ставлення та довіра у 2022 р.” [Ukrainian media, attitudes, and trust in 2022], Internews, November 2022, https://internews.in.ua/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Ukrainski-media-stav…
  • 127“Українські медіа, ставлення та довіра у 2023 р.” [Ukrainian media, attitudes, and trust in 2023], Internews, November 2023, https://internews.in.ua/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Ukrainski-media-stav…
  • 128“Всеукраїнське опитування громадської думки «Омнібус»” [All-Ukrainian public opinion survey 'Omnibus'], Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 28 December 2023, https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1347&page=1
  • 129Igor Kulias, “Підсумки моніторингу телемарафону «Єдині новини» за січень — березень 2023 року. Перша частина” [Results of the monitoring of the telethon 'Unified News' for January-March 2023. Part one], Detector Media, 4 April 2023, https://detector.media/shchodenni-telenovini/article/209719/2023-04-04-…
  • 130Igor Kulias, “Підсумки моніторингу телемарафону «Єдині новини» за квітень-червень 2023 року. Перша частина” [Results of the monitoring of the telethon 'Unified News' for April-June 2023. Part one], Detector Media, 2 July 2023, https://detector.media/shchodenni-telenovini/article/213646/2023-07-02-…
  • 131Igor Kulias, “Підсумки моніторингу телемарафону «Єдині новини» за липень — вересень 2023 року. Перша частина” [Results of the monitoring of the telethon 'Unified News' for July-September 2023. Part one], Detector Media, 28 September 2023, https://detector.media/shchodenni-telenovini/article/217396/2023-09-28-…
  • 132Yuliia Kuzmenko, “Третина українців вважає, що телемарафон уже не актуальний” [A third of Ukrainians believe that the telethon is no longer relevan], Suspilne News, 8 January 2024, https://suspilne.media/656594-tretina-ukrainciv-vvazae-so-telemarafon-u…
  • 133Anna Steshenko, “Бюджет-2024: гроші на оборону, марафон і серіали” [Budget-2024: Funds Allocated for Defense, Marathons, and TV Series], Left Bank, 10 November 2023, https://lb.ua/news/2023/11/10/583675_byudzhet2024_groshi_oboronu.html
  • 134“Стан українських регіональних медіа 2023 року” [The State of Ukrainian Regional Media in 2023], Media Development Foundation, https://research.mediadevelopmentfoundation.org/index.html
  • 135“Український продюсер La Repubblica Богдан Бітік загинув у Херсоні внаслідок російської атаки” [Ukrainian producer for La Repubblica, Bohdan Bitik, was killed in Kherson as a result of a Russian attack], Institute of Mass Information, 27 April 2023, https://imi.org.ua/news/ukrayinskyj-prodyuser-la-repubblica-bogdan-biti…
  • 136“На сході України загинув журналіст AFP Арман Солдін (оновлено)” [AFP journalist Arman Soltan was killed in Eastern Ukraine (updated)], Institute of Mass Information, 9 May 2023, https://imi.org.ua/news/na-shodi-ukrayiny-zagynuv-zhurnalist-afp-arman-…
  • 137Cassandra Vinograd, Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “A Russian missile hits a crowded restaurant in Kramatorsk, killing at least 4,” 27 June 2023, New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/06/27/world/russia-ukraine-news#missi…
  • 138Kateryna Diachuk, “Оператор DW отримав поранення російськими касетними боєприпасами на Донеччині” [A DW operator was injured by Russian cluster munitions in Donetsk region], Institute of Mass Information, 22 July 2023, https://imi.org.ua/news/operator-dw-otrymav-poranennya-rosijskymy-kaset…
  • 139Kateryna Diachuk, “Журналіст AFP отримав поранення внаслідок атаки безпілотника поблизу Бахмута” [An AFP journalist was injured due to a drone attack near Bakhmut], The Institute of Mass Information, 24 July 2023, https://imi.org.ua/news/zhurnalist-afp-otrymav-poranennya-unaslidok-ata…
  • 140“150 порушень свободи слова зафіксував ІМІ в Україні в 2023 році. Майже половину вчинила Росія” [In 2023, there were 150 cases of freedom of speech violations recorded in Ukraine, with nearly half of them committed by Russia], The Institute of Mass Information, 12 January 2024, https://imi.org.ua/articles/150-porushen-svobody-slova-zafiksuvav-imi-v…
  • 141“«ДМ» та ІМІ заявляють про організовану кампанію фейків і тиску з боку анонімних телеграм-каналів” [“DM” and IMI declare an organized campaign of fakes and pressure from anonymous Telegram channels], Detector Media, 28 November 2023, https://detector.media/infospace/article/219888/2023-11-28-dm-ta-imi-za…
  • 142[“DM” and IMI declare an organized campaign of fakes and pressure from anonymous Telegram channels], https://detector.media/infospace/article/219888/2023-11-28-dm-ta-imi-za…
  • 143Valeria Buniak, “Представництво ЄС в Україні засудило атаку анонімних телеграм-каналів на «Детектор медіа» та ІМІ” [The EU Delegation to Ukraine condemned the attack by anonymous Telegram channels on "Detector Media" and IMI (Institute of Mass Information)], Detector Media, 29 November 2023, https://detector.media/infospace/article/219964/2023-11-29-predstavnyts…
  • 144
  • 145“Близько трьох тис. населених пунктів України перебувають у тимчасовій окупації після 24 лютого 2022 року” [Approximately three thousand populated areas in Ukraine are currently under temporary occupation since February 24, 2022], Interfax-Ukraine Information Agency, 23 September 2023, https://interfax.com.ua/news/general/936826.html
  • 146Galyna Korba, “Якщо Україна повертає Крим і Донбас. 8 викликів, які доведеться подолати” [If Ukraine regains control over Crimea and Donbas. Eight challenges that need to be overcome], BBC News Ukraine, 3 July 2023, https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/articles/ce41d7lqy4vo
  • 147Olena Chorna, Olena Kucai, “Бізнес на деокупованих територіях. Життя чи виживання?” [Business in de-occupied territories. Life or survival?], Economic Truth, 7 April 2023, https://www.epravda.com.ua/columns/2023/04/7/698878/
  • 148Daria Sviridova, “Політика відновлення на деокупованих територіях: що держава має зробити вже зараз” [Politics of recovery in de-occupied territories: what the state should do right now], ZMINA, 12 June 2023, https://zmina.info/columns/polityka-vidnovlennya-na-deokupovanyh-teryto…
  • 149Calculations were made by the author based on the information from the official website of the President of Ukraine, https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/decrees
  • 150Maria Solodovnik, Roman Kryvko, “Що означає створення на Харківщині військових адміністрацій: пояснення експерта” [The creation of military administrations in Kharkiv region means the establishment of military administrative bodies: expert explanation], Suspilne News, 5 October 2022, https://suspilne.media/288762-so-oznacae-stvorenna-na-harkivsini-vijsko…
  • 151“Відновлення інститутів публічної влади на деокупованих територіях у 2014–2023 роках: аналіз досвіду та потреб громад” [The restoration of public institutions in the de-occupied territories in 2014–2023: an analysis of experience and community needs], Agency for Legislative Initiatives, https://parlament.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/zvit-vidnovlennya-p…
  • 152“Проект Закону про внесення змін до розділу VI Бюджетного кодексу України щодо забезпечення підтримки обороноздатності держави та розвитку оборонно-промислового комплексу України” [Draft Law on Amendments to Section VI of the Budget Code of Ukraine to Ensure Defense Capability and Development of the Defense Industry Complex of Ukraine], Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 17 November 2023, https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/42765
  • 153“Зеленський підписав закон про “військовий ПДФО” [Zelensky signed the law on the "military PDFO" (Personal Deposit Fund Obligations)], Radio Liberty, 17 November 2023, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-pdfo-podatok-zakonoproyekt-zelensky…
  • 154Yuriy Gaidai, “Питання на 120 мільярдів: що буде, якщо в місцевих громад забрати “військовий” ПДФО?” [Question for 120 billion: what will happen if the "military" PDFO is taken away from local communities?], Centre for Economic Strategy, 15 September 2023, https://ces.org.ua/120-billion-from-local-communities/
  • 155“Зеленський підписав закон про “військовий ПДФО” [Zelensky signed the law on the "military PDFO"], Radio Liberty, 17 November 2023, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-pdfo-podatok-zakonoproyekt-zelensky…
  • 156[Zelensky signed the law on the "military PDFO"], https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-pdfo-podatok-zakonoproyekt-zelensky… .
  • 157Daria Kinsha, “Перерозподіл ПДФО військових. Чому у місцевих бюджетів хочуть забрати цей податок” [Reallocation of the military PDFO. Why local budgets want to take away this tax], Suspilne News, 19 September 2023, https://suspilne.media/575631-pererozpodil-pdfo-vijskovih-comu-u-miscev…
  • 158Maksym Kozytskyi, “Доходи місцевих бюджетів скоротяться на чверть” [Local budgets' revenues will be reduced by a quarter], Economic Truth, 7 September 2023, https://www.epravda.com.ua/columns/2023/09/7/704024/
  • 159Lilia Parkhomenko, “У Полтавській міськраді звільнили Олександра Мамая” [Oleksandr Mamay has been dismissed from the Poltava City Council], Suspilne News, 12 April 2023, https://suspilne.media/443292-u-poltavskij-miskij-radi-gotuut-dokumenti…
  • 160Denys Shaposhnikov, “Владислава Атрошенка звільнили з посади міського голови Чернігова” [Vladislava Atroshenka has been dismissed from the position of the mayor of Chernihiv], Suspilne News, 8 June 2023, https://suspilne.media/500740-vladislava-atrosenka-zvilnili-z-posadi-mi…
  • 161Ivan Marchuk, “Мер Рівного Третяк — офіційно звільнений, секретар став виконувачем обов'язків” [Mayor of Rivne, Tretyak, has been ly dismissed, and the secretary has assumed the responsibilities in an acting capacity], Suspilne News, 1 September 2023, https://suspilne.media/563499-mer-rivnogo-tretak-oficijno-zvilnenij-sek…
  • 162Kateryna Vorona, Kateryna Gladenko, Andriy Kramchenkov, “Хто може виконувати обов'язки міського голови Сум у разі відсторонення Олександра Лисенка” [Who can perform the duties of the mayor of Sumy in case of Oleksandr Lysenko's suspension?], Suspilne News, 3 October 2023, https://suspilne.media/585515-hto-vikonuvatime-obovazki-sumskogo-miskog…
  • 163“Утворити Чернігівську міську військову адміністрацію Чернігівського району Чернігівської області” [Create the Chernihiv City Military Administration for the Chernihiv District of the Chernihiv Oblast], Office of the President of Ukraine, 7 February 2023, https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/692023-45769
  • 164“Призначити ДРОЗДЕНКА Олексія Олександровича начальником Сумської міської військової адміністрації Сумського району Сумської області” [Appoint Oleksiy Oleksandrovych Drozdenko as the Head of the Sumy City Military Administration for the Sumy District of the Sumy Oblast], Office of the President of Ukraine, 31 October 2023, https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/1842023-rp-48737
  • 165Viktor Bobyrenko, “Це наїзд на місцеве самоврядування: політолог Бобиренко про обшуки у в.о. мера Сум та в.о. мера Чернігова” [This is an encroachment on local self-government: political analyst Bobyrenko on searches in the acting mayor of Sumy and the acting mayor of Chernihiv], Espreso, 27 October 2023, https://espreso.tv/tse-naizd-na-mistseve-samovryaduvannya-politolog-bob…
  • 166Mykhailo Khomchenko, “Масове відсторонення мерів через суди – це тиск на самоврядування, - Оксана Продан” [Mass suspension of mayors through courts is pressure on self-government, - Oksana Prodaniuk], Depo.ua, 14 July 2023, https://www.depo.ua/ukr/politics/masove-vidstoronennya-meriv-cherez-sud…
  • 167Savuliak Ruslan, “В Асоціації міст України прокоментували відсторонення мера Рівного” [The Association of Ukrainian Cities commented on the suspension of the mayor of Rivne], Suspilne News, 25 August 2023, https://suspilne.media/558927-v-asociacii-mist-ukraini-prokomentuvali-v…
  • 168“Оцінка громадянами ситуації в країні та дій влади, довіра до соціальних інститутів (лютий–березень 2023р.)” [Citizens' assessment of the situation in the country, government actions, and trust in social institutions (February-March 2023)], Razumkov Centre, 15 March 2023, https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/otsinka-…
  • 169“Оцінка громадянами ситуації в країні. Довіра до соціальних інститутів, політиків, посадовців та громадських діячів. Ставлення до проведення загальнонаціональних виборів в Україні до завершення війни (вересень 2023р.)” [Citizens' assessment of the situation in the country, trust in social institutions, politicians, s, and public figures. Attitudes toward holding nationwide elections in Ukraine before the end of the war (September 2023)], Razumkov Centre, 11 October 2023, https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/otsinka-…
  • 170”The plenipotentiary composition of the High Council of Justice was restored,” The High Council of Justice, 13 January 2023, https://hcj.gov.ua/en/news/plenipotentiary-composition-high-council-jus…
  • 171“Місія” [The Mission], The High Council of Justice, https://hcj.gov.ua/page/misiya
  • 172“The High Council of Justice formed the new HQCJ,” Dejure Foundation, 1 June 2023, https://en.dejure.foundation/tpost/748m0hd2v1-the-high-council-of-justi…
  • 173Galyna Chyzhyk, “За крок від нової Вищої кваліфікаційної комісії суддів: чи справдяться очікування суспільства від судової реформи” [A step closer to the New Higher Qualification Commission of Judges: will society's expectations from the judicial reform be met?], Ukrainian Truth, 1 May 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2023/05/1/7399975/
  • 174Sergiy Sydorenko, “Майже готові" до переговорів про вступ: що показала оцінка України за 7 критеріями ЄС” [“Almost Ready” for Accession Talks: What the Evaluation of Ukraine Revealed Across 7 EU Criteria], European Pravda, 4 May 2023, https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2023/05/4/7161006/
  • 175“Кандидати на посаду судді Конституційного Суду України (оголошення оприлюднено 18 вересня 2023 року)” [Candidates for the position of judge of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (announcement published on September 18, 2023)], Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 27 September 2023, https://www.rada.gov.ua/documents/kand_na_pos/kand_na_konst_sud/241746…
  • 176“The third composition of the Public Integrity Council was elected,” Dejure Foundation, 14 August 2023, https://dejure.foundation/en/the-third-composition-of-the-public-integr…
  • 177“Про Громадську раду доброчесності” [On the Public Integrity Council], Public Integrity Council, https://grd.gov.ua/pro-hromads-ku-radu-dobrochesnosti/
  • 178“У річницю Майдану депутати хочуть зруйнувати Громадську раду доброчесності та оновлення судів” [On the anniversary of Maidan, deputies want to dismantle the Public Integrity Council and renew the judiciary], Dejure Foundation, 12 November 2023, https://dejure.foundation/tpost/o4vxntr1j1-u-rchnitsyu-maidanu-deputati…
  • 179Olga Piskunova, Yuliya Kyrychenko, Roman Smaliuk, Mykola Khavroniuk, “Експерти ЦППР підготували висновок щодо законопроєкту № 10140-д” [Experts of the Center for Public Policy Research have prepared a conclusion on bill № 10140-d], Centre of Policy and Legal Reform, 29 November 2023, https://pravo.org.ua/blogs/eksperty-tsppr-pidgotuvaly-vysnovok-shhodo-z…
  • 180National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, “НАБУ і САП викрили масштабну корупцію у Верховному Суді, а саме схему щодо одержання неправомірної вигоди керівництвом та суддями ВС” [NABU and SAP exposed extensive corruption in the Supreme Court, specifically a scheme involving the illicit gain by the leadership and judges of the SC], Facebook post, 15 May 2023, https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=641840067990461&set=a.295742552600…
  • 181“НАБУ затримало голову Верховного Суду Князєва на багатомільйонному хабарі за рішення на користь Жеваго” [NABU detained the head of the Supreme Court Knyazev on a multimillion-dollar bribe for a decision in favor of Zhevago], Weekly Mirror, 15 May 2023, https://zn.ua/ukr/war/nabu-vzjalo-holovu-verkhovnoho-sudu-knjazjeva-na-…
  • 182“Пленум Верховного Суду затвердив заяву щодо інформації НАБУ та САП” [The Plenum of the Supreme Court approved a statement regarding the information from NABU and SAP], Supreme Court of Ukraine, 16 May 2023, https://supreme.court.gov.ua/supreme/pres-centr/news/1423654/
  • 183Olena Bogdanok, Nikita Galka, Karina Bugaichenko, “Найбільше викриття НАБУ і САП: що відомо про затримання голови Верховного Суду Князєва” [The most significant exposure by NABU and SAP: what is known about the detention of the head of the Supreme Court Knyazev], Suspilne News, 16 May 2023, https://suspilne.media/477601-golovu-verhovnogo-sudu-knazeva-zatrimali/
  • 184Mykhailo Zhernakov, “Останній шанс очистити Верховний Суд: як його не змарнувати?” [Last chance to cleanse the Supreme Court: how not to squander it?], Ukrainian Truth, 5 October 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2023/10/5/7422799/
  • 185“Пленум Верховного Суду достроково припинив повноваження Голови ВС Всеволода Князєва внаслідок висловлення йому недовіри” [The Plenum of the Supreme Court prematurely terminated the powers of the Head of the SC, Vsevolod Knyazev, due to expressing distrust in him], Supreme Court of Ukraine, 16 May 2023, https://supreme.court.gov.ua/supreme/pres-centr/news/1423797/
  • 186“Оцінка громадянами ситуації в країні. Довіра до соціальних інститутів, політиків, посадовців та громадських діячів. Ставлення до проведення загальнонаціональних виборів в Україні до завершення війни (вересень 2023р.)” [Citizens' assessment of the situation in the country. Trust in social institutions, politicians, s, and public figures. Attitudes towards holding nationwide elections in Ukraine until the end of the war (September 2023)], Razumkov Center, 11 October 2023, https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/otsinka-…
  • 187“Оцінка громадянами ситуації в країні та дій влади, довіра до соціальних інститутів (лютий–березень 2023р.)” [Citizens' assessment of the situation in the country and government actions, trust in social institutions (February-March 2023)], Razumkov Center, 15 March 2023, https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/otsinka-…
  • 188“Прем’єр-міністр: Уряд затвердив Антикорупційну програму на 2023-2025 роки” [Prime Minister: The Government has approved the Anti-Corruption Program for 2023-2025], Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 4 March 2023, https://www.kmu.gov.ua/news/premier-ministr-uriad-zatverdyv-antykorupts…
  • 189Tania Matiash, “Посли G7 та ЄС очікують від України відновлення е-декларування та антикорупційної програми” [G7 and EU ambassadors expect Ukraine to resume e-declaration and anti-corruption programs], LB.ua, 30 January 2023, https://lb.ua/world/2023/01/30/544153_posli_g7_ies_ochikuyut_vid_ukrain…
  • 190“Роз’яснення №4 від 07.03.2022 щодо застосування окремих положень Закону України «Про запобігання корупції» стосовно заходів фінансового контролю в умовах воєнного стану (подання декларації, повідомлення про суттєві зміни в майновому стані, повідомлення про відкриття валютного рахунка в установі банку-нерезидента, проведення перевірок)” [Clarification No. 4 dated March 7, 2022, regarding the application of certain provisions of the Law of Ukraine 'On Prevention of Corruption' concerning measures of financial control in the conditions of martial law (submission of declarations, notification of significant changes in property status, notification of opening a foreign currency account in a non-resident bank, conducting checks)], National Agency on Corruption Prevention, 7 March 2022, https://nazk.gov.ua/uk/documents/roz-yasnennya-4-vid-07-03-2022-shhodo-…
  • 191“Відновити декларування статків посадовців та депутатів” [Resume declaration of wealth of officials and deputies], Office of the President of Ukraine, 30 January 2023, https://petition.president.gov.ua/petition/177712
  • 192[Resume declaration of wealth of officials and deputies], https://petition.president.gov.ua/petition/177712
  • 193“Ukraine: Request for an Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility and Review of Program Monitoring with Board Involvement-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Ukraine,” International Monetary Fund, 31 March 2023, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2023/03/31/Ukraine-Reques…
  • 194EURACTIV, Aleksandra Brzhozovski, Sergiy Sydorenko, “Два бали з семи, прогноз позитивний: що думає ЄС про початок переговорів про вступ України у 2023 році” [Two out of seven points, the forecast is positive: what the EU thinks about the start of negotiations on Ukraine's accession in 2023], European Pravda, 21 June 2023, https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2023/06/21/7164104/
  • 195Italian Presidency of the G7 Ambassadors’ Support Group in #Ukraine, X (Formerly Twitter) Post, 3 September 2023, https://twitter.com/G7AmbReformUA/status/1698345353051799706
  • 196Anastasiia Zharykova, “Рада повернула обов’язкове декларування для чиновників, але реєстр відкриють за рік” [The Rada reintroduced mandatory declaration for s, but the register will be opened in a year], Economic Truth, 5 March 2023, https://www.epravda.com.ua/news/2023/09/5/703959/
  • 197“Накласти вето на законопроєкт №9534 та повернути його до парламенту з вимогою відкрити реєстр майнових декларацій чиновників” [Veto the bill № 9534 and return it to the parliament with a demand to open the register of property declarations for s], Office of the President of Ukraine, 6 October 2023, https://petition.president.gov.ua/petition/204906
  • 198Michael Gahler, Andrius Kubilius, et. al, “Joint Statement by the Members of the European Parliament on the on the adoption on the second reading of Draft Law no.9534 by Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine,“ X (Formerly Twitter) Post, 7 September 2023, https://twitter.com/gahler_michael/status/1699789219953356924?t=rGl8bEx…
  • 199Iryna Balachuk, “Зеленський ветував закон про декларації: Реєстр треба відкрити зараз” [Zelensky vetoed the law on declarations: The register must be opened now], Ukrainian Truth, 12 September 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2023/09/12/7419429/
  • 200“Вже у вересні має бути рішення щодо відкриття реєстру декларацій – Зеленський” [A decision on the opening of the declaration register should be made as early as September – Zelensky], Ukrainian Truth, 12 September 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2023/09/12/7419548/
  • 201“Пропозиції Президента України до Закону про внесення змін до деяких законів України про визначення порядку подання декларацій осіб, уповноважених на виконання функцій держави або місцевого самоврядування, в умовах воєнного стану” [Proposals of the President of Ukraine for the Law on Amendments to some Laws of Ukraine on Determining the Procedure for Submitting Declarations by Persons Authorized to Perform Functions of the State or Local Self-Government in the Conditions of Martial Law], Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 10 October 2023, https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/42379?fbclid=IwAR3t5t8fhlva…
  • 202Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, “Позачергове засідання Уряду” [Extraordinary Cabinet Meeting], YouTube Video, 6 March 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=61lx2chcCxw
  • 203Sergiy Andrushko, “Конкурс на директора НАБУ: хто очолить бюро на наступні 7 років?” [Competition for the Director of NABU: Who will lead the bureau for the next 7 years?], Radio Liberty, 16 February 2023, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/skhemy-khto-ocholyt-nabu/32274629.html
  • 204“Opinion on the law 'On the prevention of threats to national security related to the excessive influence of persons with significant economic and political weight in public life (oligarchs)'”, European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), 12 June 2023, https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-…
  • 205Sergiy Sydorenko, “Кінець закону про олігархів? Які претензії до нього підготувала "Венеційка"” [End of the law on oligarchs? What criticisms has the “Venice Commission” prepared for it?], European Pravda, 10 March 2023, https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2023/03/10/7157764/
  • 206“Opinion on the law 'On the prevention of threats to national security related to the excessive influence of persons with significant economic and political weight in public life (oligarchs)'”, European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), 12 June 2023, https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-…
  • 207“Opinion on the law 'On the prevention of threats to national security related to the excessive influence of persons with significant economic and political weight in public life (oligarchs)'”, https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-…
  • 208Nazar Boyko, “Ukraine: Nations in Transit 2023 Country Report”, Freedom House website, https://freedomhouse.org/country/ukraine/nations-transit/2023
  • 209Dmytro Mykhailov, “Уряд відклав запуск реєстру олігархів до закінчення війни” [The government has postponed the launch of the oligarch registry until the end of the war], Suspilne News, 22 September 2023, https://suspilne.media/578363-urad-vidklav-zapusk-reestru-oligarhiv-do-…
  • 210Yuriy Nikolov, “Тилові пацюки Міноборони під час війни «пиляють» на харчах для ЗСУ більше, ніж за мирного життя” [Rear Services of the Ministry of Defense During War 'Trimming' Expenses on Food for the Armed Forces More Than During Peacetime], Mirror Weekly, 21 January 2023, https://zn.ua/ukr/economic-security/tilovi-patsjuki-minoboroni-pid-chas…
  • 211Yevhen Plinskiy, “Одне яйце 17 гривень! Корупційні закупівлі продуктів для ЗСУ в Міноборони! ЕКСКЛЮЗИВ” [One egg for 17 hryvnias! Corrupt procurement of food for the Armed Forces by the Ministry of Defense! EXCLUSIVE], YouTube Video, 21 January 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8w1Eapk1bms
  • 212Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, “Коментар щодо закупівлі послуг харчування військовослужбовців” [Commentary on the procurement of catering services for military personnel], Facebook Post, 22 January 2023, ​​https://www.facebook.com/100069073844828/posts/pfbid02zYDhmdQJCMM4G6wAr…
  • 213Anastasiia Zharykova, “НАБУ та САП розслідують закупівлі для армії: справу порушили ще до публікації в медіа” [NABU and SAP are investigating military procurements: the case was initiated even before its publication in the media], Economic Pravda, 23 January 2023, https://www.epravda.com.ua/news/2023/01/23/696273/
  • 214“Міністр оборони України підтримав прохання В’ячеслава Шаповалова щодо його звільнення з посади заступника” [The Minister of Defense of Ukraine supported the request of Vyacheslav Shapovalov regarding his dismissal from the position of deputy], Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, 24 January 2023, https://www.mil.gov.ua/news/2023/01/24/ministr-oboroni-ukraini-pidtrima…
  • 215Anastasiia Radina, Facebook Post, 24 January 2023, https://www.facebook.com/anastasia.krasnosilska/posts/pfbid0nwAJBz4wHXE…
  • 216“За клопотанням ДБР колишньому заступнику Міністра оборони суд обрав запобіжний захід у вигляді тримання під вартою з можливістю внесення 400 млн грн застави” [At the request of the State Bureau of Investigation (DBR), the court ordered pre-trial detention with the possibility of posting bail set at 400 million hryvnias for the former Deputy Minister of Defense], State Bureau of Investigation, 2 February 2023, https://dbr.gov.ua/news/za-klopotannyam-dbr-kolishnomu-zastupniku-minis…
  • 217Sonia Lukashova, “Суд арештував закупівельника Міноборони, звільненого після скандалу” [The court arrested the procurement officer of the Ministry of Defense who was released after the scandal], Ukrainian Truth, 2 February 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2023/02/2/7387664/
  • 218“Заява пресслужби Міністерства оборони України” [Statement from the Press Service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine], Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, 28 February 2023, https://www.mil.gov.ua/news/2023/02/28/statement-of-the-press-service-m…
  • 219Yuriy Nikolov, “Рахункова палата підтвердила дані про розкрадання на харчах в Міноборони Резнікова” [The Accounting Chamber confirmed information about embezzlement in the Ministry of Defense related to food, as stated by Reznikov], Nashi Groshi, 31 March 2023, https://nashigroshi.org/2023/10/31/rakhunkova-palata-pidtverdyla-dani-p…
  • 220Yuriy Nikolov, Vitaliy Kononuchenko, “Хороша і погана новини про корупцію в міноборони” [Good and bad news regarding corruption in the ministry of defense], Mirror Weekly, 10 August 2023, https://zn.ua/ukr/anticorruption/khorosha-i-pohana-novini-pro-koruptsij…
  • 221“Зловживання на понад 62 млн грн при закупівлі продуктів: підозрюються перший заступник мінагрополітики та ексзаступник міністра економіки (ВІДЕО+СХЕМА)” [Abuse of over 62 million UAH in the procurement of products: the first deputy minister of agrarian policy and former deputy minister of economy are suspected (VIDEO + SCHEME)], National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, 24 August 2023, https://nabu.gov.ua/news/zlovzhivannia-na-ponad-62-mln-grn-pri-zakup-vl…
  • 222“Заволодіння понад 1,7 млрд грн, призначених на закупівлю товарів для ЗСУ – викрито радника заступника Міністра оборони” [Embezzlement of over 1.7 billion UAH allocated for the purchase of goods for the Armed Forces – an advisor to the deputy minister of defense has been exposed], Office of the Prosecutor General, 3 February 2023, https://gp.gov.ua/ua/posts/zavolodinnya-ponad-17-mlrd-grn-priznacenix-n…
  • 223“СБУ викрила посадовців Міноборони на розкраданні бюджетних грошей під час будівництва казарм для військових” [The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) exposed s from the Ministry of Defense involved in embezzlement of budget funds during the construction of barracks for the military], Security Service of Ukraine, 3 February 2023, https://ssu.gov.ua/novyny/sbu-vykryla-posadovtsiv-minoborony-na-rozkrad…
  • 224Tetiana Oliynuk, “Керівника управління Міноборони затримали через розкрадання 1,5 млрд грн на закупівлі снарядів” [The head of the Ministry of Defense's department was detained for embezzling 1.5 billion UAH in the procurement of projectiles], Ukrainian Truth, 22 December 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2023/12/22/7434255/
  • 225“The State Department says corruption cases in Ukraine don’t appear to involve U.S. aid”, The New York Times, 24 January 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/01/24/world/russia-ukraine-news#state…
  • 226“Посол США заявила, що вони не зафіксували випадків розкрадання військової допомоги в Україні” [The U.S. Ambassador stated that they have not recorded any cases of embezzlement of military aid in Ukraine], Ukrainian Truth, 2 November 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2023/11/2/7426960/
  • 227“СБУ викрила керівництво Центральної військово-лікарської комісії ЗСУ на одержанні хабарів від ухилянтів” [The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) exposed the leadership of the Central Military Medical Commission of the Armed Forces in receiving bribes from draft dodgers], Security Service of Ukraine, 3 February 2023, https://ssu.gov.ua/novyny/sbu-vykryla-kerivnytstvo-tsentralnoi-viiskovo…
  • 228“ДБР затримало посадовця Міноборони України, який за хабарі переправляв військовозобов’язаних за кордон (ВІДЕО)” [The State Bureau of Investigation (DBR) has detained an from the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine who, for a bribe, facilitated the transfer of conscripts abroad (VIDEO)], State Bureau of Investigation, 14 February 2023, https://dbr.gov.ua/news/dbr-zatrimalo-posadovcya-minoboroni-ukraini-yak…
  • 229Valentyna Romanenko, “Викрили велику схему ухилення від мобілізації: задіяно посадовців 9 військкоматів” [A large scheme of evasion from mobilization has been exposed, involving s from nine military commissariats], Ukrainian Truth, 1 November 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2023/11/1/7426713/
  • 230Iryna Balachuk, “Тисячі осіб виїхали за кордон через хабарі, посадовці будуть відповідати − Зеленський” [Thousands of people went abroad through bribes; officials will be held accountable − Zelensky], Ukrainian Truth, 30 August 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2023/08/30/7417798/
  • 231“НАЗК виявило ознаки незаконного збагачення у начальника районного ТЦК Одеси на майже 47 млн грн” [The National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NAZK) identified signs of illegal enrichment in the head of the district territorial community council (TCk) in Odessa, amounting to almost 47 million UAH], National Agency on Corruption Prevention, 19 October 2023, https://nazk.gov.ua/uk/novyny/nazk-vyyavylo-oznaky-nezakonnogo-zbagache…
  • 232Mykhailo Tkach, Aliona Mazurenko, “У родини одеського воєнкома майно в Іспанії на мільйони. Він каже, що не знає про це” [The family of the Odessa military commissar owns property in Spain worth millions. He claims to be unaware of it], Ukrainian Truth, 22 June 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2023/06/22/7407993/
  • 233Oleksandr Shumilin, “НАЗК: Одеський військком Борисов незаконно збагатився на 188 млн” [The National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NAZK): Odessa military commissar Borisov illegally enriched himself by 188 million], Ukrainian Truth, 19 July 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2023/07/19/7412026/
  • 234“ДБР повідомило ще одну підозру обласному воєнкому Рівненщини через 46 млн грн незадекларованих статків (ВІДЕО)” [The State Bureau of Investigation (DBR) has announced another suspicion to the regional military commissar of Rivne region over 46 million UAH of undeclared assets (VIDEO)], State Bureau of Investigation, 26 October 2023, https://dbr.gov.ua/news/dbr-povidomilo-shhe-odnu-pidozru-oblasnomu-voen…
  • 235“За час воєнного стану придбав майна на 350 000 доларів США: на Дніпропетровщині провели обшуки в обласного воєнкома” [During the state of war, he acquired property worth 350,000 US dollars: searches were conducted at the regional military commissar's residence in Dnipropetrovsk region], National Police of Ukraine, 1 August 2023, https://www.npu.gov.ua/news/za-chas-voiennoho-stanu-prydbav-maina-na-35…
  • 236“Посадовцю військкомату на Тернопільщині та чотирьом спільникам повідомили про підозру у переправленні військовозобов’язаних за кордон” [An from the military commissariat in Ternopil region and four accomplices have been informed about the suspicion of facilitating the transfer of conscripts abroad], Office of the Prosecutor General, 4 August 2023, https://www.gp.gov.ua/ua/posts/posadovcyu-viiskkomatu-na-ternopilshhini…
  • 237“ДБР затримало начальника одного з київських військкоматів - учасника масштабної схеми переправлення чоловіків за кордон” [The State Bureau of Investigation (DBR) has detained the head of one of the military commissariats in Kyiv, a participant in a large-scale scheme of transporting men abroad], State Bureau of Investigation, 5 August 2023, https://dbr.gov.ua/news/dbr-zatrimalo-nachalnika-odnogo-z-kiivskih-vijs…
  • 238“Голові столичної ВЛК повідомлено про підозру у підробленні довідок для виїзду військовозобов’язаних за кордон” [The head of the capital's military enlistment office has been notified of suspicion of forging certificates for the departure of conscripts abroad], Office of the Prosecutor General, 25 August 2023, https://www.gp.gov.ua/ua/posts/golovi-stolicnoyi-vlk-povidomleno-pro-pi…
  • 239“НАЗК виявило ознаки корупційного кримінального правопорушення на 14 млн грн у заступника одеського воєнкома” [The National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NAZK) identified signs of a corrupt criminal offense involving 14 million UAH in the deputy of the Odessa military commissar], National Agency on Corruption Prevention, 25 August 2023, https://nazk.gov.ua/uk/novyny/nazk-vyyavylo-oznaky-koruptsijnogo-krymin…
  • 240Olena Roshchina, “На Харківщині військком продавав ухилянтам фіктивні довідки про непридатність” [In Kharkiv region, the military commissar was selling fake certificates of unfitness to draft dodgers], Ukrainian Truth, 13 September 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2023/09/13/7419659/
  • 241“СБУ затримала заступника Херсонського воєнкому та голову ВЛК на Прикарпатті, які «заробляли» на ухилянтах” [The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) has detained the deputy of the Kherson military commissar and the head of the Military Medical Commission in Prykarpattia, who were 'earning' from draft dodgers], Security Service of Ukraine, 19 September 2023, https://ssu.gov.ua/novyny/sbu-zatrymala-zastupnyka-khersonskoho-voienko…
  • 242“У Вінниці ДБР викрило посадовців міського ТЦК, які допомагали ухилянтам уникнути мобілізації та виїхати за кордон (ВІДЕО)” [In Vinnytsia, the State Bureau of Investigation (DBR) exposed s from the city's Territorial Community Council (TCK) who were assisting draft dodgers in avoiding mobilization and leaving the country (VIDEO)], State Bureau of Investigation, 28 September 2023, https://dbr.gov.ua/news/u-vinnici-dbr-vikrilo-posadovciv-miskogo-tck-ya…
  • 243“СБУ ліквідувала нові «схеми ухилянтів»: серед затриманих – очільник військкомату та керівниця ВЛК” [The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) has dismantled new 'draft dodger schemes': among those detained are the head of the military commissariat and the head of the Medical Commission], Security Service of Ukraine, 24 October 2023, https://ssu.gov.ua/novyny/sbu-likviduvala-novi-skhemy-ukhyliantiv-sered…
  • 244“У Запоріжжі ДБР викрило схему ухилення від мобілізації, якою встигло скористатись щонайменше 300 осіб (ВІДЕО)” [In Zaporizhzhia, the State Bureau of Investigation has exposed a scheme of evasion from mobilization, which at least 300 individuals managed to take advantage of (VIDEO)], State Bureau of Investigation, 20 December 2023, https://dbr.gov.ua/news/u-zaporizhzhi-dbr-vikrilo-shemu-uhilennya-vid-m…
  • 245Yevhen Kizilov, “Одеського військкома з елітним майном в Іспанії звільнили — Гуменюк” [The Odessa military commissar with elite property in Spain has been dismissed, according to Humenyuk], Ukrainian Truth, 28 June 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2023/06/28/7408950/
  • 246“ДБР затримало колишнього одеського воєнкома (ВІДЕО)” [The State Bureau of Investigation (DBR) has detained the former Odessa military commissar (VIDEO)], State Bureau of Investigation, 24 July 2023, https://dbr.gov.ua/news/dbr-zatrimalo-kolishnogo-odeskogo-voenkoma
  • 247Oleksandr Shumilin, “НАЗК три місяці вивчатиме спосіб життя військкомів” [The National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NAZK) will study the lifestyle of military personnel for three months], Ukrainian Truth, 19 July 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2023/07/19/7412017/
  • 248“ДБР проводить слідчі дії у військкоматах та ВЛК для виявлення фактів корупції. Порушені кримінальні провадження (ВІДЕО)” [The State Bureau of Investigation (DBR) is conducting investigative actions in military commissariats and medical commissions to uncover instances of corruption. Criminal proceedings have been initiated (VIDEO)], State Bureau of Investigation, 22 August 2023, https://dbr.gov.ua/news/dbr-provodit-slidchi-dii-u-vijskkomatah-ta-vlk-…
  • 249“Понад 200 обшуків для документування корупційних схем ухилення від призову: Нацполіція вилучила більше 10 000 медичних справ” [Over 200 searches to document corruption schemes of evasion from conscription: National Police seized more than 10,000 medical records], National Police of Ukraine, 23 August 2023, https://www.npu.gov.ua/news/ponad-200-obshukiv-dlia-dokumentuvannia-kor…
  • 250Valentyna Romanenko, “Зеленський на РНБО доручив перевірити рішення ВЛК починаючи з 24 лютого 2022 року” [Zelensky instructed the National Security and Defense Council to review the decisions of the Medical Commissions starting from February 24, 2022], Ukrainian Truth, 30 August 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2023/08/30/7417763/
  • 251Stanislav Pogorilov, “Зеленському представили перевірку військкомів: невтішні результати” [Zelensky was presented with an audit of military commissars: the results are disappointing], Ukrainian Truth, 25 July 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2023/07/25/7412891/
  • 252Volodymyr Zelenskiy, [Untitled Video], Facebook Post, 3 August 2023, https://www.facebook.com/zelenskiy. /videos/693867409243057/?ref=embed_video&t=5
  • 253"Указ Президента України №491/2023 Про рішення Ради Національної Безпеки і Оборони України від 11 серпня 2023 року 'Про результати перевірки територіальних центрів комплектування та соціальної підтримки Збройних Сил України'" [Decree of the President of Ukraine № 491/2023 on the decision of the National Security and Defense council of Ukraine dated august 11, 2023, 'On the results of the audit of territorial centers for recruitment and social support of the armed forces of Ukraine], Office of the President of Ukraine, 17 August 2023, https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/4912023-47805
  • 254“Оцінка громадянами ситуації в країні та дій влади, довіра до соціальних інститутів (лютий–березень 2023р.)” [Citizens' assessment of the situation in the country and government actions, trust in social institutions (February-March 2023)], Razumkov Center, 15 March 2023, https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/otsinka-…
  • 255[Citizens' assessment of the situation in the country and government actions, trust in social institutions (February-March 2023)], https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/otsinka-…
  • 256Yuliya Samayeva, “Головні внутрішні вороги українців – корупціонери у владі. Банкова, спиш?” [The main internal enemies of Ukrainians are corrupt s in power. Bankova, are you sleeping?], Mirror Weekly, 15 May 2023, https://zn.ua/ukr/ECONOMICS/holovni-vnutrishni-vorohi-ukrajintsiv-korup…
  • 257“Сприйняття загрози корупції громадянами: оцінка влади та вимоги до змін під час війни” [Perception of the corruption threat by citizens: assessment of the government and demands for changes during the war], lko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, 11 September 2023, https://dif.org.ua/article/spriynyattya-zagrozi-koruptsii-gromadyanami-…
  • 258“Коментар КМІС щодо результатів опитування, проведеного на замовлення Фонду "Демократичні Ініціативи” [Commentary by KIIS on the results of the survey conducted on behalf of the "Democratic Initiatives" Foundation], Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 12 September 2023, https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1292&page=1
ecoi.net description:
Report on democratisation (electoral process, civil society, independent media, governance) and rule of law (corruption) in 2023
Country:
Ukraine
Source:
Freedom House (Author)
Original link:
https://freedomhouse.org/country/ukraine/nations-transit/2024
Document type:
Periodical Report
Language:
English
Published:
11 April 2024
Available on ecoi.net since:
18 April 2024
Document ID:
2107361

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