Document #2107359

Freedom House (Author)

Nations in Transit 2024 - Slovakia

CONSOLIDATED DEMOCRACY
70
/ 100
Democracy Percentage 70.24 / 100
Democracy Score 5.21 / 7
LAST YEAR'S DEMOCRACY PERCENTAGE & STATUS
70 / 100 Consolidated Democracy
The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 1 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. The Democracy Percentage, introduced in 2020, is a translation of the Democracy Score to the 0-100 scale, where 0 equals least democratic and 100 equals most democratic. See the methodology.
 

Author

  • Roman Hlatky

Score changes in 2024

  • No score changes in 2024.

Executive Summary

Volatility continued to characterize Slovak politics in 2023. Prime Minister Eduard Heger’s minority government collapsed after losing the parliament’s confidence in December 2022.1 A month later—after a contentious debate—members of parliament passed a constitutional amendment that allowed for early elections on September 30, 2023.2 The parliament later passed another constitutional amendment in January that requires a constitutional – rather than simple – majority of parliamentarians to vote in favor of any resolution to hold early elections in the future.3 The amendment also enshrined proportional representation and a single, countrywide electoral district in the constitution.4

Heger’s cabinet governed in demission until May, when two further ministerial resignations led President Zuzana Čaputová to name a caretaker government headed by Interim Prime Minister Ľudovít Ódor, former deputy governor of the National Bank of Slovakia.5

Key campaign issues leading up to the September elections included healthcare, pensions, the budget deficit, corruption, LGBT+ rights, migration, and Slovak military support for Ukraine. Debates over the Ukraine war brought heightened international attention to the elections. Due to the anti-Ukraine rhetoric of Robert Fico and his party, Direction – Social Democracy (Smer-SD), commentators feared that a Smer victory could politically shift Slovakia away from Europe and towards Russia.6 The campaign revealed two drastically different choices to voters. Smer and its supporters promised a return to stability, order, and a strong social state. On the other hand, Progressive Slovakia (PS) promised substantive change spearheaded by new leaders who were not part of the old political establishment.

The campaign was marred by incivility. Smer repeatedly criticized President Čaputová as an “American agent” and defender of “foreign interests” controlled by the “American Embassy.”7 President Čaputová responded by filing a civil defamation lawsuit against Robert Fico, who called the suit electoral interference. Smer repeatedly attacked PS as inexperienced, pro-West, and a creation of NGOs.8 The degradation of civil political culture came to a head when former prime minister Igor Matovič interrupted a Smer press conference, which resulted in a physical altercation between Matovič and former Smer interior minister Robert Kaliňák (as well as another Smer candidate).9

Disinformation and foreign influence also marred the campaign. During the campaign moratorium (the 48-hour period before the election when campaigning and media commentary on the campaign is barred), the director of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia, Sergey Naryshkin, publicly criticized PS for its pro-American stance.10 Similarly, Hungarian state media (widely followed by the Hungarian minority in Slovakia) aired an interview with Robert Fico during the moratorium, which gave the candidate a platform to reach out to voters.11 The government also expelled a Russian citizen with diplomatic credentials for attempting to create a network to influence public opinion during the campaign.12 A deepfake video of PS leader Michal Šimečka discussing electoral manipulation went viral on Telegram before spreading to other social media channels.13 State institutions quickly debunked the video. While these incidents likely had a marginal impact on the election, they are a reminder of the threat that disinformation and Russian influence continue to pose.

Turnout on election day was nearly 69 percent, the highest since 2002. The elections were free and fair, with minimal irregularities reported on election day.14 Smer won with almost 23 percent of the vote and received a mandate to form a government from President Čaputová. PS came in second and Voice – Social Democracy (Hlas-SD), led by former Smer prime minister Peter Pellegrini, finished third. The Republic Movement, a splinter party from the extremist People’s Party Our Slovakia (L’SNS), failed to cross the threshold for representation. The Slovak National Party (SNS) and the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) returned to the parliament, while the Hungarian parties failed to gain parliamentary representation for Slovakia’s largest minority group. Four candidates under formal criminal investigation were elected to parliament, and the government had recently dropped charges against several other elected candidates, including Fico and Kaliňák, under Article 363 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Article 363 states that the prosecutor general may annul the decisions of other prosecutors and the police if any procedural steps leading to that decision occur illegally

In coalition negotiations, Hlas assumed the role of “kingmaker,” with the power to determine whether Smer or PS would lead Slovakia’s next government.15 Government formation was largely free of major controversy. Although PS offered the premiership and several other key offices to Hlas,16 Hlas chose to form a coalition government with Smer and SNS. Robert Fico (Smer) leads the new government as prime minister and Peter Pellegrini (Hlas) is speaker of the parliament.17 President Čaputová approved the government’s list of ministers with one exception: the nomination of Rudolf Huliak (SNS) as minister of the environment. Čaputová said that Huliak’s record as a climate change denier who had a contentious relationship with environmental advocates disqualified him.18 Huliak threatened legal action but SNS eventually relented and nominated another candidate.19

Prosecutor General Maroš Žilinka generated controversy when he continued to use Article 363 to dismiss criminal charges against high-ranking political officials, while efforts to amend the article lacked political support.20 President Čaputová requested documentation from the Prosecutor General’s Office that would help her assess the handling of these cases. Žilinka refused the request on the grounds that the president lacks the constitutional authority to make such demands.21 President Čaputová appealed to the Constitutional Court in September to compel Žilinka to provide the documentation, but the court had not yet ruled on the matter by the end of the year.22 However, in June, the Constitutional Court ruled in a separate case that Article 363 itself is not unconstitutional.23

The “police war” between different elements of Slovakia’s security services continued in 2023. In August, the National Criminal Agency (NAKA) charged the head of the Slovak Information Service (SIS), Michal Aláč, and several others of forming a criminal organization and abusing their power.24 As a result of the charges, Aláč was fired.25 As part of a recurring pattern, several politicians suggested that these actions were politically motivated (Fico even labelled them a “coup.”)26 Once in office, Fico’s government quickly replaced several members of the Slovak security apparatus, including the police president and vice president, several officers investigating corruption cases,27 and the chief of NAKA, Ľubomír Daňko.28 The new interior minister justified these removals by suggesting that officers under investigation – for abuse of power – should not be in active service.29 However, the Office of Whistleblower Protection had granted protected status to many of these investigators, which required the office’s approval before they could be removed. In the resulting legal disputes, judges have ruled in favor of the removed investigators in four of seven cases.30

Slovak society remains highly polarized. During the campaign, political elites exploited sociocultural cleavages and divisions around the country’s geopolitical orientation.31 To an extent, Fico’s coalition has reaffirmed Slovakia’s commitments to the EU and NATO, walking back some of its controversial campaign rhetoric.32 Fico has supported the sale of munitions to Ukraine by Slovak manufacturers, the €50 billion EU financial assistance package for Ukraine, and Ukraine’s membership in the EU.33 However, in November, the new government rejected the delivery of a €40 million military aid package to Ukraine approved by the former government.34

At home, Fico’s government has threatened to label foreign-funded NGOs foreign agents.35 Observers also expressed concern that a proposed tax reform allowing citizens to donate 2 percent of their tax payments to their parents’ pensions may harm NGO financing, since this 2 percent has historically been allocated to various civil society initiatives.36 The proposal was tabled following public pressure.37 Nonetheless, the government maintains a hostile relationship with civil society.38 The government also has an adversarial relationship with some members of the media. Fico has threatened to ban several news outlets from accessing the Office of the Government. Although the government has not yet instituted any bans, Fico and his office have refused to answer questions posed by media he considers adversarial.39

In 2023, the government passed one law and proposed another that threaten democratic governance. In December, the parliament overrode a presidential veto to pass the “competence law.” The law creates a new Ministry of Tourism and Sport, strips the president of the power to appoint the heads of independent state offices, and gives this appointment power to the government.40 The government has also proposed substantial changes to the criminal code. The proposal would abolish the Office of the Special Prosecutor and change the statute of limitations, criminal thresholds, and sentences for various economic and property crimes. These changes would make it more difficult to hold officials accused of corruption and other forms of misconduct criminally accountable.41 Importantly, the proposal would benefit several individuals with ties to Smer and other coalition parties who currently stand accused of corruption.42

Criticism was directed not only at the substance of the reforms, but also the way they were proposed and passed. The new government has relied extensively on the “shortened legislative procedure,” which limits consultation and debate on proposed legislation.43 Critics suggested

that such significant reforms warranted extended discussion rather than an abbreviated process. The proposed reforms have led to sustained, mass demonstrations and civil society mobilization against the government.44

At-A-Glance

National governance is democratic in Slovakia, though elite and institutional conflicts often lead to polarization, inefficiency, instability, and public mistrust. Slovak elections are free and fair. The 2023 parliamentary elections occurred without major irregularities, but disinformation and declining political civility remain concerns. Civil society organizations (CSOs), particularly LGBT+ advocacy groups, face hostility from the new government and underfunding. Important reforms passed in 2022 increased transparency around media outlets’ ownership and protected journalists’ sources. However, disinformation, low public trust in the mainstream media, and the refusal of the prime minister’s office to answer questions from some media sources remain concerns. Conflicts between the central government and local governments over public financing—particularly for education and healthcare—remain salient. In June, Slovakia implemented, with some challenges, a controversial judicial reform that the previous government had passed. The government’s anticorruption efforts continued in 2023 and yielded several notable indictments and convictions. The fight against corruption remains politicized. The new government of Prime Minister Robert Fico has replaced several officials known for aggressively tackling corruption and proposed legislation that would decrease criminal penalties for corruption.

 
National Democratic Governance 1.00-7.00 pts
Considers the democratic character of the governmental system; and the independence, effectiveness, and accountability of the legislative and executive branches. 4.50 / 7.00
  • After Prime Minister Heger’s government lost a vote of no confidence in December 2022, the parliament voted in January to hold early elections. The initial plan, endorsed by President Čaputová, was for Heger’s cabinet to govern in demission until the elections45 . However, in May, the resignations of Agriculture Minister Samuel Vlčan, over allegations of nepotism in public procurement, and Foreign Affairs Minister Rastislav Káčer, in protest of government dysfunction, led to Heger’s resignation.46
  • In May, President Čaputová appointed a caretaker government headed by Ľudovít Ódor, former vice governor of the Slovak National Bank. Both Heger’s cabinet and the caretaker cabinet governed without the confidence of the parliament.47 Nonetheless, the government made several notable policy decisions and judicial reform and anticorruption efforts continued. For example, Heger’s government approved the delivery of MiG fighter jets to Ukraine in March, despite the opposition criticizing the move as unconstitutional due to the cabinet’s demission status. 48
  • Smer emerged victorious after the early elections held on September 30. Within three weeks of the election, Smer signed a coalition agreement with Hlas and SNS, which finished in second and sixth place, respectively. The campaign centered around the standard of living, military support for Ukraine, migration, and LGBT+ rights. Political elites and the media depicted the election as a choice between a return to stability with Smer or moving in a new, more modern direction with PS.49
  • Deteriorating healthcare and education systems, the rising cost of living, and the instability of the previous government bolstered the appeal of parties like Hlas and Smer. These parties offered voters a strong social state and financial stability in the face of adverse economic conditions.50
  • Foreign policy also divided the electorate. Military support for Ukraine was a particularly contentious issue. Smer and several other parties promised to end all military aid for Ukraine, while PS and most members of the previous government argued that support for Ukraine was in Slovakia’s foreign policy interest.51
  • Two social issues featured prominently in the campaign. First, parties from across the political spectrum rejected proposals to legalize registered domestic partnerships for LGBT+ couples. Rival parties often attacked PS over its support for greater LGBT+ equality.52 Second, migration was a key issue, especially after a sudden increase in the number of illegal border crossings from Hungary over the summer.53 While the Ministry of Interior does not provide statistics on these border crossings, Robert Fico claimed in October that 46,000 migrants had entered Slovakia so far in 2023.54
  • Government formation in the fall was largely free of suspense and controversy, with one exception. In October, President Čaputová rejected the nomination of SNS nominee Rudolf Huliak as minister of the environment. The president determined that Huliak could not effectively lead the Ministry of the Environment or uphold Slovakia’s international environmental commitments due to his record of climate change denial, anti-environmental stances, and contentious relationships with environmental advocates.55 Though Huliak threatened legal action, eventually SNS relented and appointed Tomáš Taraba to the post.56
  • Robert Fico became prime minister with the formation of the new government and Smer now heads six ministries: agriculture, defense, finance, foreign affairs, justice, and transport. Hlas heads seven ministries: economy, education, European funds (a vice premiership, not an official ministry), health, interior, investment, and labor. SNS heads three ministries: culture, environment, and sport and tourism (a new ministry that will be established in 2024).57
  • Various conflicts between government institutions continued throughout 2023 and affected government stability. The prosecutor general and the president clashed over the appropriate use of Article 363 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.58 As in previous years, the prosecutor general used Article 363 to drop corruption charges against several high-ranking political officials. Robert Fico has also accused the head of the public television network RTVS,59 the former police president, and various members of the judiciary of political bias.60
  • In December, the parliament overruled a presidential veto to pass the “competence law.” In addition to establishing the new Ministry of Tourism and Sport, the law threatens the independence of several state offices and reduces the president’s power. The law shifted the power to appoint and recall the heads of the Healthcare Surveillance Authority and the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic from the president to the government.61 President Čaputová had not signed the law by the end of the year and said she would appeal to the Constitutional Court to challenge the law’s constitutionality, as well as the legality of the “shortened legislative procedure” that the government used to pass the law.62
  • The shortened legislative procedure was a source of controversy in 2023. Under standard procedure, all relevant ministries must have a chance to comment on proposed legislation, which also undergoes three “readings” (presentations and discussions) in the parliament. Moreover, both experts and the wider public can comment on the proposed legislation. The shortened legislative procedure reduces the allotted time for each of these key stages in the legislative process. While previous governments used the shortened legislative procedure to pass laws,63 critics argued that the substantial changes proposed in the competence law necessitated extended discussion.
Electoral Process 1.00-7.00 pts
Examines national executive and legislative elections, the electoral framework, the functioning of multiparty systems, and popular participation in the political process. 6.25 / 7.00
  • The 2022 vote of no confidence against Heger’s government spurred a constitutional majority (two-thirds of lawmakers) of National Council deputies to vote in January to amend the constitution to specify when early elections may occur.64 The amendment states that early elections can only happen when a constitutional majority of parliamentarians votes in favor of the resolution.65 The amendment emerged from a prolonged and politicized debate over opposition attempts since 2021 to unseat the Heger government.66 The amendment also enshrined proportional representation and a single, countrywide electoral district in the constitution. Changing these features of the electoral system now also requires approval by a constitutional majority of lawmakers. A simple majority can still approve other changes such as adjustments to the electoral formula.67
  • Early elections were held on September 30.68 Turnout was nearly 69 percent, the highest since 2002. Voting occurred without any notable irregularities.69
  • A record 59,000 voters cast their ballots from abroad by mail.70 PS captured around 62 percent of these votes.71
  • The government made two notable changes to election administration in 2023. First, the parliament passed a law requiring the government to publicize the minutes of electoral proceedings from each local election commission after the election.72 Second, election commissions submitted vote totals to the Central Statistical Office electronically for the first time. Observers expected faster reporting of results with the new process,73 but reports suggested that the new online system struggled to process the high volume of submitted results, causing delays in reporting.74
  • Russia and Hungary made some attempts to influence the election in favor of Smer, but these efforts had minimal impact. During the election moratorium, the director of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia, Sergey Naryshkin, publicized a statement criticizing PS for pursuing closer ties with the United States.75 Two weeks after the election, Slovakia expelled a Russian citizen with diplomatic credentials for attempting to create a network that would “influence public opinion before the election.”76
  • Hungarian state media (which the Hungarian minority in Slovakia widely follows) aired an interview with Robert Fico during the election moratorium.77 The Orbán regime supported both Smer and Alliance, a Hungarian minority party, throughout the campaign.
  • In some Roma localities, the Ordinary People and Independent Personalities Party (OĽaNO) received over 90 percent of the vote (the party received 9 percent nationally), raising suspicions of vote buying that prompted the Office of the Special Prosecutor to open an investigation in October.78 However, analysts suggested that strong Roma representation within the party, a sustained ground campaign in Roma localities, and a campaign promise of €500 to all voters could explain the results.79
  • KDH returned to the parliament for the first time since the 2012 election with a campaign platform focused on social conservatism and support for the poorer regions of Slovakia that resonated with some voters.80
  • Likewise, SNS returned to the parliament after failing to cross the electoral threshold in 2020. The unification of various smaller nationalist parties and several famous personalities from alternative media channels under the SNS ticket played a role in the party’s success. In fact, only one longstanding member of SNS, Party Chairman Andrej Danko, was elected to the parliament, raising questions about the stability of SNS’ parliamentary delegation.81 However, the government appointed many SNS candidates to high-ranking positions, allowing actual party members to join the parliamentary delegation, thereby increasing its stability.82
  • The election was also notable for the parties that did not cross the 5 percent threshold for representation in the parliament. The Republic Movement —a new far-right party that had split from the extremist L’SNS—did not cross the threshold because they failed to attract former ĽSNS supporters and because of Smer’s increased appeal to extremist voters.83 We Are Family, which had held representation in the parliament since 2016, also failed to cross the electoral threshold potentially because several of its members had been implicated in scandals prior to the elections.84 Finally, representatives of Slovakia’s Hungarian minority (about eight percent of the population and the largest minority in the country) did not gain representation in the parliament., Hungarian political parties have been fragmented since 2020 due to personal disputes between their leaders. The Orbán regime supported the Alliance, which came closest to parliamentary representation with just under five percent of the vote.85
Civil Society 1.00-7.00 pts
Assesses the organizational capacity and financial sustainability of the civic sector; the legal and political environment in which it operates; the functioning of trade unions; interest group participation in the policy process; and the threat posed by antidemocratic extremist groups. 6.00 / 7.00
  • LGBT+ individuals continue to face discrimination in Slovakia. In January, then justice minister Viliam Karas proposed a legal reform that would make it easier for those in same-sex relationships to co-own property, assign their partner responsibility for medical decisions, and inherit assets from their partner. 86 Civil society actors criticized the reform for not going far enough (LGBT+ activists have advocated for domestic partnerships for same-sex couples, which would afford them equal legal rights as those afforded to married heterosexual couples).87 In May, interim justice minister Jana Dubovcová scuttled the reform, suggesting that it did not adequately address the LGBT+ community’s problems.88
  • Some candidates demonized the LGBT+ community during the campaign.89 In September, the chairman of KDH labeled LGBT+ a “plague,” later clarifying that he only meant LGBT+ registered partnerships and marriage.90 The new government has used anti-LGBT+ rhetoric and said repeatedly that keeping “gender ideology” out of Slovak schools was a priority.91 Minister of Culture Martina Šimkovičová, has also repeatedly stated that she will end all state financing for LGBT+ organizations.92
  • Numerous political parties, including Smer and SNS, attacked NGOs during the campaign.93 These attacks contributed to fears in the sector that the new government would have a hostile relationship with NGOs and reject civil society initiatives. After the election, Fico said the government may propose a new law that would designate foreign-funded NGOs as “foreign agents,” potentially shrinking the space for voices critical of the government.94
  • A proposed tax reform intended to generate revenue for the pension system threatened NGO financing. Currently, Slovaks can dedicate 2 percent of their tax payments to CSOs.95 The reform would have allowed taxpayers to allocate that 2 percent to their parents’ pension fund instead. As such, many smaller CSOs, often located in rural areas, would have lost much of their financing. However, after public pressure, the proposal was tabled.96
  • The NGO sector mobilized shortly after the election to protest two SNS ministerial nominations: Rudolf Huliak (environment) and Martina Šimkovičová (culture). Both candidates faced criticism for lacking relevant experience and voicing conspiratorial and inflammatory rhetoric.97 The president rejected Huliak’s nomination but allowed Šimkovičová’s appointment to go through.
  • Minister Šimkovičová has continued to face opposition from civil society. Civil society leaders have criticized Šimkovičová for continuing to host her television show, TV Slovan, after her appointment as minister of culture, potentially violating conflict of interest laws.98 By February 2024, nearly 190,000 people had signed a petition demanding Šimkovičová’s resignation. The petition condemns the minister for incompetence, lack of consultation, reopening cultural cooperation with Belarus and Russia, and anti-LGBT+ rhetoric.99
  • The new government has given little indication that it will support civil society and incorporate CSOs in the policymaking process, as the previous government attempted to do.100 Moreover, the government has announced no plans to help fund CSOs. Previously proposed solutions that involved finding new sources of state financing and simplifying the process of applying for EU funds are unlikely to be implemented.101 A lack of public consultation with civil society, despite repeated calls from activists, left little room for CSOs to organize in 2023.
  • A major initiative of Slovak labor unions in 2023 was raising the minimum wage. And while various strikes were threatened throughout the year,102 in August the caretaker cabinet, unions, and employers agreed to a new deal that increased the minimum wage from €700 to €750 per month.103
  • The healthcare sector has struggled with a shortage of doctors, the closing of outpatient clinics in smaller localities, and constructing larger hospitals.104 As a temporary solution, the caretaker cabinet passed a reform that would allocate up to €80,000 for doctors willing to open an outpatient clinic in certain vulnerable localities.105
  • The education sector also faced problems in 2023, including continued underfunding and a teacher shortage. Between 1,500 and 2,100 additional teachers are necessary to meet demand.106 During the election campaign, political parties promised to finance the education sector through EU funds and to raise teacher salaries, but no remedies were announced by the end of the year.107
Independent Media 1.00-7.00 pts
Examines the current state of press freedom, including libel laws, harassment of journalists, and editorial independence; the operation of a financially viable and independent private press; and the functioning of the public media. 5.00 / 7.00
  • The previous government prioritized protecting journalists and media reform,108 substantially changing several media-related laws in 2022.109 In 2023, the government passed several smaller reforms.
  • For example, in February, the parliament overruled a presidential veto to pass a law that allocated a percentage of the annual budget to directly fund the public television network RTVS – thereby lowering its overall financing. Prior to the reform, which went into effect in July, RTVS was funded through concessionary fees paid by individuals and businesses.110 The same law also limited the government’s ability to audit RTVS, nominally increasing its independence.111 However, in December, Fico’s government lowered the percentage of the budget allocated to RTVS, raising further concerns about the long-term sustainability of public broadcasting.112
  • In March, then minister of investment Veronika Remišová proposed a new law to combat disinformation. The law included a definition of disinformation, restrictions on anonymous comments and posts, and fines for social media companies that violated the law. Experts criticized both the vagueness of the law and the lack of consultation with other relevant actors during its formulation.113 The proposed law was abandoned after the government resigned in May.
  • Another law proposed in June would have required media outlets that report a politician’s claim about another party to verify said claim with an additional source. Moreover, media outlets would have been held liable for any unverified false claims.114 Given the clear shift of legal responsibility at the expense of the media, President Čaputová vetoed the law in July.115
  • In a positive step, former police president Štefan Hamran instituted a reform to better protect journalists. As of October, a new network of “contact points” located in each regional police headquarters now specifically investigates attacks and threats against journalists.116
  • Nonetheless, journalists are inadequately protected in Slovakia. According to a February survey, two-thirds of Slovak journalists said they faced attacks or threats in the previous year.117 In February, the five-year anniversary of the murder of Slovak investigative journalist Jan Kuciak was a somber reminder of the challenges journalists face in Slovakia and the need for additional legal protections.118
  • In October, Penta Investments, through its subsidiary News & Media Holding, purchased the daily tabloid Nový Čas. The purchase raised concerns about Penta’s growing influence in the media sector, as its portfolio now includes the top two most-read tabloids in Slovakia (Plus 1 deň is the other).119
  • Members of the incoming coalition government—particularly those from Smer and SNS—maintain a hostile relationship with journalists .120 Some members of these parties refused to talk to certain media outlets during the campaign.121 Several weeks after coming to power, Fico threatened to ban reporters from Aktuality.sk, Denník N, Markíza, and SME from the Office of the Government. These media outlets said any such ban would violate access to information laws. At the end of 2023, no formal ban had been instituted, but Fico and his office have refused to answer questions posed by journalists from these media outlets. 122
  • Given these increasingly hostile dynamics, independent media have expressed worry that the new coalition will continue to stall needed reforms that promote media independence and the protection of journalists.
  • Public trust in mainstream media remains a problem. According to one survey, only 27 percent of Slovaks trust media reporting, the third lowest figure among the 46 countries surveyed.123
  • Conspiracy theories often gain traction in Slovakia. Early in the campaign, conspiracies about manipulated election results spread on social media.124 More generally, disinformation spread through social media and some “alternative” news channels remains prevalent. The campaign and subsequent ministerial appointments also legitimized some of these channels, as several candidates gave interviews to media outlets accused of spreading disinformation and echoed their narratives.125
Local Democratic Governance 1.00-7.00 pts
Considers the decentralization of power; the responsibilities, election, and capacity of local governmental bodies; and the transparency and accountability of local authorities. 5.50 / 7.00
  • The public finances of local and regional governments remained a pressing issue in 2023.126 Self-governing regions had a budget deficit of nearly €246 million in 2022, a 105 percent increase from the prior year.127
  • Causes of the budget crisis include the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, rising energy costs, and limited autonomy for self-governing regions to make fiscal decisions without the approval of the national government.128
  • Analysts argue that former prime minister Matovič’s anti-inflation package passed in 2022 contributed to the budget problems. The package included a tax bonus for families that local and regional governments largely paid for.129
  • The former government promised localities more than €100 million to deal with rising energy costs.130 Frustration mounted when former prime minister Ódor’s caretaker cabinet indicated that the government could not provide the funding. Eventually, a deal was reached in September in which the central government agreed to forgive loans accrued by self-governing regions during the pandemic, give local and regional governments €54 million in direct support, and help the hardest-hit municipalities on a case-by-case basis.131
  • Hlas and Smer focused on these regional and local fiscal issues during the campaign, suggesting that both the previous government and the caretaker cabinet insufficiently supported localities.132 As a potential solution, several parties suggested that EU funds should be used to directly support local and regional governments.133 In October, the interim government increased the proportion of EU funds directly allocated to regions from 17 to 19 percent.134 The new government did not revisit the question before the end of the year.
  • Two other important areas of concern are education and healthcare. As a result of reforms passed in 2022, teachers’ salaries increased twice in 2023.135 A 2023 reform required preschool education to be available to all children when they turn three (starting in September 2025).136 Both reforms are expected to significantly raise costs for local governments. To support the healthcare sector, the interim government offered a financial incentive to doctors willing to open walk-in clinics in underserved regions.137
  • Both the interim government and numerous political parties have argued that greater decentralization is the long-term solution to the fiscal crisis.138 Proponents of decentralization argue that allowing local and regional governments more autonomy in generating revenue and explicitly delineating local, regional, and national competences and responsibilities would help avoid conflict between different levels of government. They also say decentralization would allow more flexibility to effectively address local and regional issues.139 However, little progress on this ambitious reform agenda occurred in 2023.
Judicial Framework and Independence 1.00-7.00 pts
Assesses constitutional and human rights protections, judicial independence, the status of ethnic minority rights, guarantees of equality before the law, treatment of suspects and prisoners, and compliance with judicial decisions. 5.25 / 7.00
  • Reforms passed in 2022 on the administrative-territorial structure of the court system came into effect in June.140 The reforms lowered the number of district courts from 54 to 36; consolidated cases related to commercial and family law in specific regional courts; created a new system of specialized administrative courts; and reorganized municipal courts, particularly in the two largest cities, Bratislava and Košice.141
  • Some legal experts criticized these reforms and their implementation was postponed several times.142 One major challenge during implementation was appointing enough judges to some of the specialized administrative courts. It may take up two years before there are enough specialized judges to fill all vacancies.143 The consolidation of courts also means that the public faces longer travel times to appear in court. However, more court proceedings can now occur online.144
  • Debates over the constitutionally appropriate use of Article 363 of the Code of Criminal Procedure continued in 2023. While most of the parties in the previous coalition government sought to pass legislation that would curtail its use, Sme Rodina (as well as opposition parties) opposed these changes.145 Article 363 has frequently benefited Sme Rodina political figures.146 In 2023, the Prosecutor General’s Office used Article 363 to end the investigations of several notable politicians, including Smer’s Robert Kaliňák and Martin Borguľa (former member of parliament from Sme Rodina). In total, the Prosecutor General’s Office has used Article 363 in more than two dozen cases that the Special Prosecutor’s Office has investigated.147
  • Given these dynamics, President Čaputová requested that the Prosecutor General’s Office provide her with materials related to all cases where Article 363 was used. Prosecutor General Maroš Žilinka refused the request, suggesting that the Constitution does not give the president the right to make such a demand. President Čaputová turned to the Constitutional Court to settle the dispute, though a final verdict had not been reached by the end of the year.148 Žilinka has also refused to appear in the parliament to discuss his use of the article.149 Earlier in the year, the Constitutional Court ruled that Article 363 is constitutional.150 The ruling was in response to a suit filed by President Čaputová and more than 40 members of parliament who claimed that the vagueness of Article 363 allows for too much individual discretion in its application.151
  • During the campaign, Hlas, Smer, and SNS all said they would either substantially reform or dissolve the Office of the Special Prosecutor if they won the election.152 The parties ramped up their rhetoric against the special prosecutor after they formed a governing coalition. Fico stated that Special Prosecutor Daniel Lipšic, was a “cheater” and should not head the office.153 The parties also debated dissolving the Specialized Criminal Court in January 2024.154
  • The new government has pursued major changes to the criminal code. The new bill to reform the criminal code would abolish the Office of the Special Prosecutor, which prosecutes high-level corruption cases. Under the proposed change, prosecutors and their cases would be reassigned to various regional offices and fall under the jurisdiction of the prosecutor general. Critics of the law argue that the government is attempting to dissolve the Office of the Special Prosecutor to limit anticorruption investigations. Advocates point to institutional redundancies and complexities that arise from the unclear hierarchy of the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Office of the Special Prosecutor.155
  • The law would also decrease the statute of limitations and shorten criminal sentences for various economic and property crimes. It would increase the financial damage thresholds that differentiate minor and major crimes. In general, the law would reduce criminal penalties for corruption (and other economic crimes) and make the crime harder to prosecute and punish.156 Critics say that the government wants these changes to benefit several political allies accused of corruption.157 Advocates contend that the reforms align Slovakia’s criminal code with European standards.158 The proposed changes have faced criticism from the European Commission, European Parliament, and European Prosecutor’s Office.159 The final vote on the law is scheduled for February 2024.
  • Fico’s government has also replaced several members of Slovakia’s Judicial Council and faced criticism for nominating a judge with close ties to Defense Minister Robert Kaliňák.160
  • Conflict between different arms of the Slovak security services continued in 2023. Most prominently, NAKA accused two former heads of SIS, Michal Aláč and his predecessor, Vladimír Pčolinský, as well as the head of the NBÚ, Roman Konečný, with interfering in investigations. They were charged with forming a criminal organization and abuse of power.161 Several politicians condemned the charges, including Robert Fico, who called them a “coup.”162
  • A final dispute in the “police war” concerned the Bureau of the Inspection Service’s indictment of several NAKA officers responsible for investigating corruption. NAKA investigators allegedly manipulated the testimony of witnesses. In turn, the Bureau of the Inspection Service has been accused of misrepresenting audio recordings to substantiate the charges.163
  • These conflicts reduce the public’s confidence in judicial independence. According to one survey, only 34 percent of the population said the independence of courts and judges was “fairly good” or “very good” in 2023.164 The lack of public trust was exacerbated throughout the year by the inflammatory rhetoric of political elites.165
  • Despite extensive EU funding and various civil society initiatives aimed at integration, Roma still face widespread discrimination and poverty. While various small-scale projects have had success, systematic solutions are lacking.166 Discrimination continues to stymie integration.167 The new parliament has six Roma members, all from opposition parties.168 The new government has said it would improve the precarious situation of Roma.169 But discriminatory rhetoric and policy language on welfare misuse suggest a punitive approach, and that the government is unlikely to prioritize reforms to foster Roma inclusion and protect this vulnerable population.170
Corruption 1.00-7.00 pts
Looks at public perceptions of corruption, the business interests of top policymakers, laws on financial disclosure and conflict of interest, and the efficacy of anticorruption initiatives. 4.00 / 7.00
  • Efforts to combat corruption continued throughout 2023. As of August, more than 40 individuals, including judges, members of the security services, and other public officials had been convicted of corruption since the 2020 elections (when Smer last lost power).171
  • As in 2022, 2023 saw prominent political figures indicted, largely due to the cooperation and testimony of other indicted individuals.172 Many of the indicted, such as Robert Kaliňák and Tibor Gašpar, had also been indicted in 2022. However, prosecutions were hampered by the seemingly arbitrary use of Article 363, as well as inter-branch conflict within the Slovak security forces. Likewise, these disputes allowed political elites to continue politicizing anticorruption efforts.
  • Government mismanagement and political polarization undermined public trust in institutions. In January, surveys revealed historically low public trust in both the government and the parliament, with only 14 percent of the population indicating that they trusted either institution.173 While public trust rebounded under the Ódor and Fico governments, it remained low relative to the EU average.174 175
  • Since 2021, Article 363 has been used in more than two dozen cases. Proponents—including all parties in the new government coalition—say the article ensures that investigations are conducted properly and prevents politically motivated charges. However, many opponents of the article say the Prosecutor General uses it arbitrarily and that it acts as a major barrier to effective corruption prosecutions.176
  • In June, former SNS head Ján Slota was found guilty of influencing judicial proceedings. 177 Slota was also charged with bribery but was acquitted due to insufficient evidence.178 The case concerned a 2013 automobile accident in which an acquaintance of Slota’s killed another individual. Slota was accused of arranging a €15,000 bribe so that the court would rule in his acquaintance’s favor. 179
  • Another notable case is that of Peter Kažimír, the former Smer-appointed minister of finance and current governor of the National Bank of Slovakia. Kažimír is on trial for bribery stemming from his time as minister of finance. While Kažimír’s first indictment was annulled by the Prosecutor General’s Office, the police had sufficient evidence to bring new bribery charges in October.180
  • Following his 2022 indictment for organizing a criminal group, Robert Kaliňák was indicted in February for arranging bribes for the former head of the tax authority, František Imrecze. Kaliňák allegedly arranged €1 million euros in payments over five years. 181 The accusation was based on the testimony of Imrecze himself, who is cooperating as a state witness in various corruption cases.182 Just as in 2022, the Prosecutor General’s Office annulled the charges using Article 363 in August.183
  • NAKA also charged former police chief Tibor Gašpar with corruption in August. He is accused of creating a network of investigators that would choose which cases to pursue based on political requests.184 Unlike Gašpar’s 2022 charge of forming a criminal organization, this indictment was not annulled by the Prosecutor General’s Office. Gašpar is one of four indicted individuals elected to the parliament in 2023, and had not yet been tried by the end of the year.185
  • In an unprecedented move, the Office of Whistleblower Protection granted several police investigators protected whistleblower status in 2023. If the new government wanted to remove these investigators, they would have to receive permission from the Office of Whistleblower Protection.186
  • In one of his first acts as interior minister, Matúš Šutaj Eštok removed some of these protected investigators (as well as other members of the security services) from active duty without the required approval from the Office of Whistleblower Protection.187 He justified his decision by referencing the various accusations levied against the investigators by other branches of the security services.188 In the resulting legal disputes, judges have ruled in favor of the removed investigators in four of seven cases.189 In December, the government proposed a new law that would not allow police officers to receive any whistleblower protection.190
  • Amendments to the Whistleblower Law were also passed in October, which expanded the definition of a whistleblower, strengthened protection against retaliation, and redefined retaliation. The changes brought the law in line with EU standards, although Slovakia was one of the last member states to transpose the relevant 2019 directive.191

AUTHOR: Roman Hlatky is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of North Texas. His research focuses on links between identity and voting, and appears in journals such as the American Political Science Review, East European Politics, Electoral Studies, and Political Research Quarterly.

Footnotes

ecoi.net description:
Report on democratisation (electoral process, civil society, independent media, governance) and rule of law (corruption) in 2023
Country:
Slovakia
Source:
Freedom House (Author)
Original link:
https://freedomhouse.org/country/slovakia/nations-transit/2024
Document type:
Periodical Report
Language:
English
Published:
11 April 2024
Available on ecoi.net since:
18 April 2024
Document ID:
2107359

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