• The Ukraine war absorbed much of the government’s attention in 2023. To finance the protracted war, the government dedicated substantial economic resources to military endeavors. In order to prevent any domestic political dissent, the government necessitated adjustments within law enforcement agencies.24 Concurrently, the government attempted to portray political normality and reassure citizens that the government remained in full control25 . Authoritarianism persisted in the form of wartime censorship, the enactment of stringent laws curbing political pluralism, and increased repression and violence.26
• The mutiny led by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a former Putin ally who headed the notorious private military company the Wagner Group (which participated in the Ukraine War), undermined government stability. The mutiny commenced with the seizure of the army headquarters in Rostov-on-Don and progressed towards Moscow. This uprising emerged from a prolonged rivalry between Prigozhin and Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu as they competed for both resources and the president's favor.27 During the march towards Moscow, clashes between Prighozin’s soldiers and the Russian army resulted in 13 casualties.28 The march ended following negotiations mediated by Alexander Lukashenko, the president of Belarus, who persuaded the Wagner Group to abandon the mutiny and withdraw to Belarus.29 However, within four weeks of the deal, a plane crash killed Prigozhin and another Wagner member, Dmitrii Utkin.30 Russian officials said an onboard explosion brought down the plane.31
• The Russian economy faced unprecedented international sanctions, which targeted approximately 70 percent of Russia’s banking assets. Fossil fuel revenues steadily declined and trade contracted.32 However, contrary to expectations, the economy grew by 2 percent due to increased public spending and a low reference base.33 This unexpected resilience demonstrated how international sanctions have so far failed to achieve their objectives, as the Russian economy remained afloat.
• Ukrainian incursions into the border regions of Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk persisted, characterized by shelling, drone attacks, and the infiltration of military units purporting to be Russian but allegedly fighting on the Ukrainian side.34
• The government continued to crack down on a wide range of opposition figures, including academics, artists, and members of radical patriotic groups. For example, left-wing sociologist Boris Kagarlitsky faced up to seven years in prison for Telegram posts about the 2022 attack on the Kerch Bridge in Crimea.35 Ultrapatriot Igor Girkin, better known as Strelkov, faced charges of extremism.36 Prominent opposition leader Alexei Navalny remained incarcerated in harsh conditions.37 In October, his entire legal team was arrested and accused of forming an extremist community, effectively cutting off his last means of communication with allies and supporters.38 In August, Navalny was handed an additional 19-year sentence on multiple charges related to “extremist activity,” extending his total prison term to over 30 years.39 Furthermore, in April 2023, a court sentenced prominent political activist and journalist Vladimir Kara-Murza to 25 years in prison for his criticism of the Ukraine war.40
• In March, the ICC in the Hague issued arrest warrants against President Putin and Commissioner for Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova for the alleged unlawful deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia.41 In response, Russia reportedly issued arrest warrants for ICC prosecutor Karim Khan and three ICC judges.42
• The Kremlin adapted and optimized military and police units through the establishment of volunteer forces in collaboration with the Russian Guard, and by advocating for a new law that would allow governors to establish their own armies.43 Additionally, the government implemented a law that introduced electronic summonses for conscripts, streamlining the conscription process.44 Furthermore, the government worked to bolster Russia’s military capabilities and adapt to evolving security needs by increasing the age limit for compulsory military service from 27 to 30.45

• In Russia does not meet international standards for free and fair elections. The 2023 regional and local elections were marred by omnipresent fraud, public sector employees forced to vote for the United Russia party, and the exclusion of credible opposition candidates. Electoral integrity has declined in Russia since at least 2008 and elections are often viewed as a tool to sustain Putin’s regime. From September 8-10, Russia held 41 regional elections and numerous local electoral contests, including in the annexed territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia in Ukraine.46 These elections served as a test to determine whether the system could deliver results for the incumbent, ahead of the upcoming presidential election scheduled for March 2024. Gubernatorial elections were held in 21 regions, including Moscow, and there were 20 regional legislative elections, including in the annexed territories. Additionally, 12 city council elections occurred in Donetsk, Luhansk, and Melitopol. There were more than 50 million eligible voters during these elections, representing approximately 50 percent of the Russian electorate.47 Widespread electronic voting further reduced transparency for election observers and facilitated fraud.48
• In all regions except Khakassia, where the communist governor retained power, the ruling United Russia party emerged victorious, capturing more than 70 percent of the vote49 . Moreover, United Russia also triumphed in the party lists across all regions’ regional parliaments, with the exception of Khakassia, the Nenets Autonomous District, and Yaroslavl Oblast, where United Russia won in single-mandate districts.50
• Opposition parties performed worse than in previous elections. The Communist Party saw its support drop in most regions, despite retaining governorships in Khakassia and the Oryol region.51 Yabloko was the only political party that ran on an antiwar platform, although it communicated its opposition cautiously.52
• Little information was available regarding the voting process in the occupied territories of Ukraine. Hundreds of State Duma (Russia’s lower house of parliament) members, many who were not locals, were elected in these regions. Notably, despite a “passportization” campaign intended to compel citizens of the occupied territories to obtain Russian passports, residents were permitted to vote using Ukrainian documents.53 Additionally, some polling stations faced drone attacks and closed prematurely.54
• Widespread reports of carousel voting, ballot box stuffing, voter coercion, and dead people in the voter rolls marred the elections. Observers characterized these elections as the worst in the past 23 years.55
• On the eve of the elections, authorities cracked down on Golos, Russia’s most reputable election monitoring organization. Golos’s co-chair, Grigory Melkonyants, was detained three weeks prior to the elections on allegations of cooperating with an “undesirable organization,” the European Network of Election Monitoring Organisations.56 If convicted, Melkonyants could face up to six years in prison.57
• Parties and candidates are no longer permitted to send representatives to election commissions as observers. Freelance journalists and candidates’ proxies are barred from polling stations. This preventive repression also serves as a stark reminder of the risks involved in election observation.58

• Civil society organizations continue to operate under intense state pressure and control. The government and its associated agencies remain the primary source of funding for the nonprofit sector, given legal restrictions on foreign funding, which is outright banned in the case of organizations deemed undesirable.59
• In July, the State Duma approved a bill that would prohibit collaboration with unregistered foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).60 The bill is in line with existing legislation on “undesirable organizations” and “foreign agents.” The proposed changes to the Code of Administrative Offenses and the Criminal Code introduce both administrative and criminal penalties.61 Individuals participating in the activities of an unregistered foreign NGO in Russia may face fines for the first offense, with the possibility of criminal prosecution and a potential prison sentence of up to two years for three offenses within a year.62 Organizing the activities of an unregistered foreign group could result in a prison term of up to three years.63 Furthermore, the bill grants authorities the power to deport foreign nationals from Russia for noncompliance.64
• New legislation that prohibits individuals from officially or medically altering their gender marked another significant setback for Russia's LGBT+ community.65 The bill not only forbids the alteration of a person’s gender on official documents and public records, but also annuls marriages in which one spouse has undergone a gender transition.66 Additionally, it prohibits transgender individuals from becoming foster or adoptive parents.67 Russia's crackdown on LGBT+ rights began a decade ago, with the state's initial emphasis on “traditional family values.”68 In November, the Supreme Court banned LGBT+ activities as an “international public movement” and therefore extremist.69 This milestone decision further criminalizes and jeopardizes the LGBT+ community in Russia.70
• The list of undesirable organizations has been expanded to include the Central European University (CEU) and the Centre for East European and International Studies (ZoiS).71 As of October, the number of entities categorized as undesirable has grown to 116.72 The list of foreign agents amounts to 96 organizations, 74 media outlets, 299 persons who are acting as media outlets, 62 persons, and 22 unregistered organizations.73
• The Russian judicial system has increasingly employed allegations of extremism to target political opponents and exert additional pressure on the opposition. In a notable example, three lawyers from Alexei Navalny's legal team were apprehended in October for affiliating with an “extremist group.” Another member of Navalny's legal team reportedly fled the country, illustrating how extremism allegations stifle dissent and hinder the legal defense of political opponents.74
• Several changes to the educational system helped perpetuate state propaganda in schools and universities. New high school history textbooks have been criticized for bias and distorting historical events.75 The classes known as “Discussions of Importance” have become a primary vehicle for instilling a militaristic ideology founded on “traditional spiritual and moral values.”76 Public education authorities advocate for patriotic education through militarized extracurricular activities.77
• In April, President Putin approved two repressive laws. One of them increased penalties under several articles of the Criminal Code.78 The law also banned collaboration with unregistered international NGOs and foreign government agencies.79 The second law, “On Citizenship,” permits the revocation of acquired citizenship for individuals facing criminal charges for discrediting the Russian army and collaborating with “undesirable” organizations.80
• The government continued to target performing artists. In November, prominent musician and antiwar activist Aleksandra Skochilenko was sentenced to seven years in a penal colony for replacing supermarket price tags with antiwar messages.81 While detained, Skochilenko was reportedly denied her medicines for celiac disease and other health conditions in an effort to pressure her.82 Notably, theater director Yevgenia Berkovich and playwright Svetlana Petriichuk were arrested on charges of extremism, stemming from their theater production Finist, the brave Falcon, which explores the stories of Russian women who married Muslim men and relocated to Syria.83 If found guilty, they could face up to five years in prison.84

• The state propaganda apparatus implemented new strategies to influence and garner the support of its citizens. In addition to overtly propagandistic television programs, websites, and progovernment social media channels, Russian propagandists created fake web pages that impersonate genuine media outlets and government websites.85 They also employed fraudulent social media accounts in an effort to shape public opinion.86 The death of Prigozhin, who owned troll farms and a media empire, did not affect the scale of propaganda.87
• As of October, the government labeled 74 media outlets as undesirable organizations.88 In January, TV Rain, Meduza, and Novaya Gazeta Europe were added to the list.89 Independent journalists face prosecution both domestically and internationally. In July, prominent Novaya Gazeta reporter Elena Milashina, who covered a crackdown on gay men in Chechnya, was assaulted alongside lawyer Alexander Nemov while visiting Grozny.90 Dissident journalists Elena Kostyuchenko (a former reporter for Novaya Gazeta) and Irina Babloyan (previously a journalist at the defunct radio station Ekho Moskvy) believe they were poisoned in Germany and Georgia respectively in October 2022.91 Independent Russian media outlets largely operate in exile in Western Europe.92 The regime also targets foreign journalists, particularly American reporters. As of December, Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich and Radio Free Europe journalist Alsu Kurmasheva remained in Russian prisons on charges of espionage.93
• In June, the government unsuccessfully attempted to isolate its internet infrastructure from the broader global web, testing its concept of a “sovereign Internet.”94 In 2022, Meta, the parent company of Facebook, was designated a terrorist organization in Russia.95 As a result, popular mobile apps like Facebook and Instagram have been banned.96 They are only accessible through virtual private networks (VPNs).97 However, even VPN services face frequent disruptions imposed by state regulators, further limiting access to these platforms.98 Telegram remains a major source of information that the state does not fully control.99
• Numerous media outlets and online resources face either blocking or slowdowns by the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor).100 Russia pursued import substitution to replace popular international platforms like YouTube.101 In September, the Russian tech company VK announced the creation of two distinct business groups.102 The first group comprises the Mail.ru email service, the Rustore app store, VK ID, and VK Pay.103 The second division includes the social networks Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki, as well as platforms like Zen, VK Video, VK Music, VK Clips, and VK Messenger, all categorized as the company’s “content projects.”104 The latter group has been placed under the supervision of 29-year-old Stepan Kovalchuk, the grandnephew of the banking oligarch Yuri Kovalchuk.105
• The environment for independent media remains far from secure. Stringent censorship laws, aimed at curbing the spread of disinformation and content critical of the government, effectively restrict media outlets from openly referring to the war in Ukraine as a war and providing balanced coverage.106

• Regional governments remain aligned with the Kremlin. In 2023, there were no major shifts or turnover among governors. Only four regional heads were replaced.107 In wartime, governors are charged with preventing civil unrest, monitoring public opinion, and dampening the effect of inflation and the war’s impact on the labor market.108
• Local government autonomy eroded after voters passed a constitutional referendum in 2020 which, among other major changes, formally integrated local government into the hierarchical structure of state power.109 The State Duma has also discussed a new municipal reform aimed at finalizing the changes outlined in the 2020 constitutional amendments.110 Municipalities in Russia lack financial independence, limiting their autonomy. Insufficient funds in municipal budgets are a recurring topic in government policy talks. In June, President Putin directed the cabinet to enhance municipal finances by altering tax revenue allocation methods.111 Municipalities have limited financial and political autonomy, but matter to both the Kremlin and the opposition. Municipalities influence regional elections via the municipal filter, eliminating unwanted candidates. Municipal councils serve as a training ground and information source for the opposition, offering exposure and access.
• In the September local elections, incumbent Sergei Sobyanin won the race for mayor of Moscow. The electronic vote played a noticeable role in the electoral outcomes. Nearly 4 million voters cast their ballots online, approximately 2.7 million in Moscow and around 1.2 million in other regions, including the occupied territories. Sobyanin captured more than 2 million electronic votes, while the runner-up received around 200,000 electronic votes112 . Electronic vote facilitates fraud.113
• Two branches of the Yabloko party, the only political party with a pro-peace platform, managed to secure reelection in city assemblies in Yekaterinburg and Novgorod. 114 Other municipal election bids brought victory for the incumbent or pro-United Russia candidates.115

• Russia’s judicial system has lacked transparency and autonomy for more than a decade, rendering it vulnerable to political persecution and repression. In 2023, 723 individuals were charged in the so-called “antiwar” case. Many of the accused received unusually lengthy prison sentences.116 Notably, politician and journalist Vladimir Kara-Murza was sentenced to 25 years in prison on charges of high treason, involvement in activities of an undesirable group, and discrediting Russia's armed forces.117
• Detained individuals endured harsh conditions. Rights groups have raised concerns about the treatment of inmates in pretrial detention centers, particularly in the case of Kaliningrad activist Igor Baryshnikov, who was sentenced to seven and a half years in a penal colony.118 Baryshnikov’s allies fear that the activist, who was living with cancer, would not live long enough to appeal his sentence.119 Similarly, municipal deputy Alexei Gorinov, serving nearly seven years in a penal colony for his antiwar stance, has endured harsh punishments such as being sent to a punishment cell multiple times.120 In October, Gorinov was transferred to a prison hospital.121 Additionally, the health of 17-year-old Yegor Balazeikin, who was sentenced to six years in prison for attempting to set fire to two military recruitment offices, continued to deteriorate in his pretrial detention center.122 Balazeikin suffers from progressive liver fibrosis, which has contributed to the teen’s worsening eyesight and infections in his legs due to inadequate medical care.123
• The Constitutional Court rejected challenges to the constitutionality of legislative provisions that criminalize any “public actions aimed at discrediting” the Russian Armed Forces.124 This decision effectively denies constitutional protection for freedom of expression, which prompted grave concerns from UN experts.125
• The government intensified its crackdown on independent lawyers who offer legal services to political dissidents in 2023. Notably, three lawyers from Alexei Navalny’s legal team were arrested in October for belonging to an “extremist group,” worsening the restrictive environment for attorneys who represent political dissidents.126 Numerous instances of pressure on lawyers defending individuals in politically motivated cases have been reported. In St. Petersburg, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against Yury Novolodsky, who represented Sasha Skochilenko in the “antiwar case.”127 Human rights lawyer Timur Idalov in Moscow faced threats after documenting an interview with former Wagner commander Andrei Medvedev, who exposed extrajudicial executions in Ukraine. Vadim Prokhorov, who represented Vladimir Kara-Murza, left Russia after being threatened with arrest and prosecution by the judge and prosecutor in Kara-Murza’s trial.128 In Ingushetia, the court refused to disqualify lawyers appointed to represent defendants in the 2019 Magas protests case, despite the lawyers’ own motion for disqualification.129
• Conditions for Russian political prisoners continued to deteriorate. Alexei Navalny could not be located for 20 days in 2023 after he was transferred from his previous prison to another prison in the Arctic Circle. Authorities did not notify Navalny’s family or his lawyers about the move.130 Gorinov also disappeared for ten days after his lawyer reported that he suffered severe health issues.131
• Reports of extrajudicial violence persisted in 2023. In September, a video emerged showing Chechen head Ramzan Kadyrov’s son, Adam, assaulting a man in police custody who had been accused of burning the Quran.132 Regrettably, the extrajudicial attack was disregarded by the prosecutor’s office and the ombudsman.133 In June, another antiwar activist, Anatoly Beryozikov, died after being tortured in police custody in the southwestern city of Rostov-on-Don.134

• The Corruption sustains Putin’s regime through the distribution of economic assets to the president’s allies.135 During the Ukraine war, maintaining access to public funds and assets for Putin’s allies has become crucial to sustaining loyalty and compensating for the financial losses caused by international sanctions. Information about officials’ incomes, including tax declarations, became increasingly less accessible. At the end of 2022, Putin issued a decree that exempted several categories of citizens from declaring their income and assets.136 Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov emphasized that this exception applied only to servicemen and employees of law enforcement agencies.137 Nevertheless, the decree pertains not only to the submission, but also to the publication of declarations.138
• Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index consistently finds high levels of corruption in Russia. Russia scored 28 points out of 100 in the 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index.139 The Russian Prosecutor-General’s Office announced in March that it had designated Transparency International an “undesirable organization.”140
• Alexei Navalny's Anti-Corruption Foundation has released a series of investigative reports that garnered significant attention on social media. One of these investigations focused on corruption allegations surrounding Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin and his allies. Notably, Alexei Venediktov, the editor-in-chief of the Ekho Moskvy radio station, allegedly received nearly 700 million rubles ($8 million) from Sobyanin's funds. The investigation also implicates Margarita Simonyan, Tigran Keosayan, and Ksenia Sobchak, as their respective companies also received funds from the same organization linked to Sobyanin.141
• The Anti-Corruption Foundation has unveiled three prominent investigations exposing corruption, embezzlement, and undisclosed assets, including opulent three-story villas in Spain owned by United Russia officials (Morozov, Matveichev, and Kostin), propagandists (Vladimir Solovyov), and high-ranking military officials (Surovikin and Patrushev) and their families.142 The latter have received state protection, which allows them to hide the illegal incomes of their relatives and friends.143 Relatives of Yevgeny Prigozhin possess a luxurious mansion in Italy valued at €3.5 million ($3.8 million). Prigozhin's identifiable assets are estimated to be worth at least 2 trillion rubles ($23 billion).144

AUTHOR: Margarita Zavadskaya is a senior research fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. She has extensively published in the realms of public opinion, democratization, elections, and post-election protest in Russia and beyond.