Document #2107350

Freedom House (Author)

Nations in Transit 2024 - Belarus

CONSOLIDATED AUTHORITARIAN REGIME
2
/ 100
Democracy Percentage 1.79 / 100
Democracy Score 1.11 / 7
LAST YEAR'S DEMOCRACY PERCENTAGE & STATUS
2 / 100 Consolidated Authoritarian Regime
The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 1 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. The Democracy Percentage, introduced in 2020, is a translation of the Democracy Score to the 0-100 scale, where 0 equals least democratic and 100 equals most democratic. See the methodology.
 

Authors

  • Tatsiana Ziniakova and Artyom Shraibman

Score changes in 2024

  • No score changes in 2024.

Executive Summary

The political and human rights crisis in Belarus worsened in 2023. The authorities continued to stifle civil society voices that have demanded democracy. Under President Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s authoritarian rule, arbitrary arrests, politically motivated prosecutions, surveillance, censorship, and intimidation have become the new reality. Some of the violations committed in the years since the government’s 2020 crackdown on protests against Lukashenka’s continued rule, including in 2023, could be considered crimes against humanity.1

Since 2020, the number of political prisoners has been on the rise, reaching 1,441 people by the end of December 2023.2 Some political prisoners were released in 2023 after serving their sentences in full,3 but others were rearrested after their initial prison terms ended.4 Released political prisoners who avoided rearrest reported torturous conditions in prison and difficulties reintegrating into Belarusian society.5

The regime enjoys largely unfettered discretion in implementing new repressive measures against its population. The government’s toolbox of repressive techniques to silence dissenters continues to grow and targets Belarusians both at home and abroad.

Authorities use “anti-extremism” laws to systematically persecute political opponents.6 According to the prosecutor general, the government has registered 16,000 crimes of “an extremist nature” since 2020.7 The government designated the Viasna Human Rights Center,8 the Belarusian Association of Journalists,9 and the Union of Belarusian Mothers antiwar movement “extremist formations” in 2023,10 effectively criminalizing any cooperation with such organizations as “aiding extremism.” Antiwar activism and speech, such as informing independent sources on the movement of Russian military equipment,11 donating to the Ukrainian army and/or the Kalinousky regiment of Belarusian volunteer combatants,12 or posting online comments critical of the Russian military,13 are regularly prosecuted on “anti-extremism” grounds. Engaging with “extremist” content online is increasingly risky and has cost Belarusians their liberty.14 Under the newly amended citizenship law, Belarusians can lose their citizenship for “extremist activities” or “otherwise harming national security.”15

The pressure on Belarusians in exile exponentially increased in 2023. Lukashenka’s September presidential edict stating that Belarusian consulates would no longer issue passports, instead requiring citizens to return to Belarus to renew their passports, threatened to cause a freedom of movement crisis.16 Belarusians who remain abroad without renewing their passports risk being stranded and their children could become undocumented. Citizens who return to Belarus to renew their passports risk losing their freedom, especially as the frequency of searches, interrogations, and arrests at the border increases.17

A wave of searches at the apartments of democracy activists in November,18 as well as pressure on their relatives,19 illustrates the authorities’ incessant intimidation of dissidents, whose political activism threatens the regime’s stability. The crackdown came amid preparations for 2024 parliamentary elections, which also prompted the authorities to adopt a law that required political parties to re-register and established stringent registration requirements.20 The law threatened the continued existence of Belarus’s remaining opposition parties.

Incommunicado detentions of high-profile political prisoners are a source of growing concern.21 By cutting off prisoners’ communication with family and lawyers and withholding information about their health, the authorities create a sense of isolation and powerlessness for prominent dissidents behind bars. When information about Viktar Babaryka’s alleged physical assault in prison surfaced, five doctors from the hospital treating him were detained, arrested, fined, and subsequently dismissed.22 Two political prisoners died in Belarusian prisons in 2023—blogger Mikalai Klimovich23 and artist Ales Pushkin.24

Belarus has assisted Russia in the ongoing Ukraine war, which further tied Lukashenka’s regime to Putin’s. Belarus increasingly requires the vocal or tacit approval of Russia for its foreign policy decisions and antiwar speech remains one of the most common grounds for political persecution.25

At-A-Glance

National governance in Belarus remains autocratic, with the president’s powers effectively unchecked by other branches. As evidenced from mandating by the law requiring political parties to re-register in the run up to 2024 parliamentary elections, the authorities have made the continued existence of opposition parties impossible and further reduced political competition. State-sponsored crackdowns on civil society persist, with activists prosecuted on criminal and administrative grounds under a host of “anti-extremism” laws. Many organizations have been outlawed and the government has rooted out individuals perceived to be disloyal from professional communities to reduce opposition to the regime’s policies. Attacks on independent media persist. The government brands independent journalism “extremism” and engaging with “extremist” outlets or content poses immediate risks for journalists, readers, and informants. Local government remains subordinate to the central authorities and often receives direct orders from the executive branch. The judiciary in Belarus is routinely used to implement repressive policies and fails to guarantee fair trials. Available public data is shrinking, making the country less transparent. Authorities often extract payment from people to avoid criminal prosecution, effectively normalizing corruption as state policy.

 
National Democratic Governance 1.00-7.00 pts
Considers the democratic character of the governmental system; and the independence, effectiveness, and accountability of the legislative and executive branches. 1.00 / 7.00
  • Authoritarianism persisted, with no meaningful checks and balances and government intolerance of any dissent. In the run up to 2024 parliamentary elections, the government further consolidated power and eliminated even formal opposition. A new law adopted in 2023 required political parties, which already operated under state control and had little independence, to re-register.26 The registration requirements were so strict that the authorities disbanded 12 parties (including every opposition party), with only four left at the end of 2023.27
  • Widescale political repression and the suppression of dissent persisted in 2023. According to the Viasna Human Rights Center, the number of political prisoners only slightly decreased from 1,448 in January28 to 1,441 in December.29 The government prosecuted at least 6,386 people for administrative “minor” offences in 2023 for protest related activities.30
  • In June, President Lukashenka issued a decree on the “concept of legal policy,” which stated that the government’s legal policies would be based on a “strong president, influential parliament, and proactive government, with the overarching role of the ABPA [All Belarusian People’s Assembly].”31 This approach, which, according to human rights defenders, provides “the ideological foundations of lawlessness,” 32 retains the effectively unlimited executive power of Lukashenka.
  • Separation of powers in Belarus is symbolic. In Lukashenka’s autocratic regime, the president controls all major political decisions. Despite ample evidence of election fraud,33 Lukashenka has remained president since 1994. The constitutional amendments adopted after the 2022 referendum34 and the law passed in February that established the ABPA have further strengthened Lukashenka. As the ABPA chairman (a role reserved for Lukashenka according to the constitutional exception allowing him to occupy this post together with the presidency), he is poised to assume control over the powerful body. The ABPA will have the authority to elect Supreme Court and Constitutional Court chairs and judges, declare a nationwide state of emergency, and cancel the results of presidential elections, among other powers.35
  • Parliamentary and local elections were planned for February 2024, followed by the selection of ABPA delegates. The ABPA will have 1,200 seats, including all newly elected members of parliament, all senior government officials, and nominees from new local councils and several progovernment “civil society organizations” (CSOs).36 The authorities’ rhetoric suggests that the ABPA and the parliament will be comprised of the regime’s supporters and exclude any dissenters.37 In preparation for the election, Lukashenka noted that while “there will be different points of view . . . there will be no enemies” in the APBA.38
  • While Lukashenka acts as an autocrat and almost exclusively determines the country’s repressive domestic policies, Russia significantly influences Belarus’s foreign policy decisions. Belarus remains complicit in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. While most Russian troops have withdrawn from Belarus,39 in 2023 the country became the base for Russian tactical nuclear weapons40 and Wagner mercenaries.41
Electoral Process 1.00-7.00 pts
Examines national executive and legislative elections, the electoral framework, the functioning of multiparty systems, and popular participation in the political process. 1.00 / 7.00
  • Amendments to the Electoral Code passed in February made the possibility of free and fair elections even more remote. According to the amendments, Belarusians who hold dual citizenship or receive benefits from another country based on political, religious, or national factors cannot stand as candidates in elections.42 This rule may especially affect the many Belarusians holding a “Pole's Card,” a document provided by the Polish government that certifies the Polish origin of its holder.43 The Pole’s Card is not equivalent to a passport or residence permit.44 The new code also bans photographing ballot papers, a tactic widely used during the 2020 presidential election to ensure transparency and identify state-coordinated electoral fraud.45
  • The new rules also prevent Belarusians living abroad from voting—there will be no polling stations at Belarusian embassies.46 According to estimates, between 200,000 and 500,000 Belarusians living abroad were forced into exile in the aftermath of the 2020 election for fear of persecution.47 Denying the vote to Belarusians abroad therefore prevents dissenters from participating in the political process.
  • The parliament passed a new law regulating political parties in February, which also affected the electoral process. According to the law, at least 5,000 founders are required to create a political party, with at least 100 from each region and the city of Minsk.48 The law also required political parties to re-register.49 Although political parties lacked independence before the law passed,50 the legislation more strictly controls them and further erodes political opposition. Lukashenka said he was convinced that “new patriotic parties will appear” because of the law, while “accidental companions” (political parties that would fail to satisfy the new registration criteria) would be eliminated to avoid “turbulence in the society” and ensure that party functionaries followed the ABPA course.51
  • Over the next two years, Belarus faces parliamentary and local elections, the selection of ABPA delegates, and a presidential election in 2025. The Lukashenka administration’s near-total control of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC), which organizes all elections and referenda, was on display as the government began preparations for the upcoming elections. In June, the chairman of the CEC provided a written report on preparations for the 2024 elections directly to Lukashenka for his approval.52 State media attended the meeting between Lukashenka and the CEC chairman and reported on it, illustrating the CEC’s complete subordination to Lukashenka.53
  • It is uncertain whether independent observers will be allowed during the upcoming elections, given the official rhetoric. In a March address to citizens and the parliament, Lukashenka stated that members of parliament and the ABPA would be chosen by the Belarusian people and not by “mythical OSCE observers.”54
  • Government propaganda is prevalent in the run-up to elections. The CEC chairman said the commission regularly conducts regional workshops for representatives of “ideological structures” that are directly involved in administering the elections.55
Civil Society 1.00-7.00 pts
Assesses the organizational capacity and financial sustainability of the civic sector; the legal and political environment in which it operates; the functioning of trade unions; interest group participation in the policy process; and the threat posed by antidemocratic extremist groups. 1.25 / 7.00
  • Civil society has faced intense repression since the 2020 protests and continued to endure incessant state pressure in 2023. Mass repression has led to the “destruction of institutionalized civil society in Belarus,” according to the Observatory of Human Rights Defenders, a global coalition of human rights NGOs.56 By the end of 2023, the NGO Lawtrend had documented at least 960 nonprofit organizations that had undergone forced liquidation, in which the government denies an organization it’s official registration and it is no longer a legal entity.57 Lawtrend also found that 549 organizations were in the process of self-liquidation due to government pressure on the sector.58 Authorities even crack down on small acts of solidarity. For instance, the organizer of a neighborhood meeting about establishing a shelter for stray cats was sentenced to 15 days in jail in February for an “unsanctioned mass gathering.”59 With civic space shrinking, civil resistance movements have been forced underground or into exile, allowing them to operate in a safer manner and remain resilient.60
  • In February, Lukashenka signed the Law on the Foundations of Civil Society, which defines civil society as “citizens . . . expressing their civic stance by taking part in communities and institutions not prohibited by the law.”61 This definition excludes criminalized CSOs and activists.62 The newly re-introduced Article 193-1 of the Criminal Code continues to criminalize working on behalf of “unregistered or liquidated organization” and may apply to unregistered CSOs.63
  • In March, Nobel laureate and head of Viasna Human Rights Center Ales Bialiatski was sentenced to 10 years in prison for alleged “smuggling” and “financing group actions grossly violating public order.”64 In June, prominent human rights defender Nasta Lojka was sentenced to seven years in prison on politically motivated charges of “inciting hatred.”65 Also in June, fellow human rights defender Leanid Sudalenka was released from prison after serving his three-year prison sentence.66 Political prisoners who stay in Belarus after their release continue to face discrimination when reintegrating into society.67
  • “Anti-extremism” laws are routinely used to persecute civil society,68 even to acts that were conducted before they were formally criminalized.69 Citizens face persecution for antiwar speech70 or intending to join Belarusian volunteers fighting on the side of the Ukrainian army.71 The Prosecutor General’s Office has documented 16,000 crimes of an “extremist nature” since 2020.72 Criminal and administrative rules, as well as and several “extremist” lists,73 are increasingly used to curb civic activism online, such as giving interviews to media outlets recognized as “extremist,”74 leaving online comments,75 administering Telegram channels,76 or making donations to “extremist” solidarity funds or organizations.77 Law enforcement publicizes coerced “confession videos” of detainees to intimidate and humiliate them.78 The practice has notably spread from police stations to university classrooms. Among many examples,79 in May, Belarusian State University posted a video on its official Instagram page of a student who “confessed” to spreading “discrediting information” about the university’s administration.80
  • In June, the Prosecutor General’s Office initiated the process of introducing administrative accountability for the “propaganda of nontraditional sexual relations, sex change, pedophilia, and child-free,” citing the interests of children as a rationale.81 LGBTQ+ people are at higher risk of torture, sexualized violence, and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in detention.82
  • Multiple professional communities are affected by the ongoing repression. Lawyers continued to be disbarred or otherwise deprived of the right to practice law,83 culture workers reported unprecedented censorship and multiple dismissals from cultural institutions,84 and personal trainers are barred from working if they are found guilty of protest-related crimes.85 Artists and entertainers face enormous pressure from the regime and operate under strict censorship and intimidation. Artists have stated that “deterioration is simply galloping” and “repressions are becoming increasingly extensive.”86
  • In December, President Lukashenka signed a law that amended the Law on the Freedom of Conscience. 87 Under the new law, only organizations registered as legal entities can acquire official “religious organization” status under the law, while others may be liquidated for “discrediting the Republic of Belarus” or “undermining its sovereignty.”88 New Life Church was the first target for liquidation under the new law and a court ordered it disbanded in October.89 Disloyal religious figures are also targeted using other methods. In November, the rector of a Catholic church in Volozhin was arrested on high treason charges.90 The authorities detained at least 10 priests in Belarus in 2023.91
  • Legislative amendments announced in 2023 will make it mandatory for university and trade school graduates to work in Belarus for two years, often at a job mandated by the state. 92 The law curtails graduates’ freedom of movement and denies them the liberty to choose their own career path.93 The education system is increasingly influenced by state ideology. Historical perspectives are distorted by anti-Western ideology, while students are mandated to learn state-dominated narratives about the 2020 elections, 2022 referendum, and the role of ABPA.94
Independent Media 1.00-7.00 pts
Examines the current state of press freedom, including libel laws, harassment of journalists, and editorial independence; the operation of a financially viable and independent private press; and the functioning of the public media. 1.00 / 7.00
  • The government’s crackdown on independent media continued in Belarus throughout 2023.95 The authorities frequently use “anti-extremism” laws to curb media freedoms. Newspaper articles can be labeled “extremist materials,” while media outlets can be dubbed “extremist organizations” or “extremist formations.” The Belarusian Association of Journalists, a key defender of press freedom, was declared an “extremism formation” in March 2023.96 The organization was liquidated in 2021, but the “extremist” designation poses new risks. Any of the organization’s 1,300 members can now be held criminally liable for “aiding extremist activities” under Article 361-4 of the Criminal Code.97
  • As of October, the security agencies declared 18 media outlets as “extremist formations” and one outlet— Tut.by—was designated an “extremist organization.” The former designation implies higher risks for anyone communicating with the representatives of an outlet.
  • Journalists continued to face prosecution for their work in 2023. In March, a court sentenced Editor-in-Chief Maryna Zolatava and CEO Ludmila Chekina of Tut.by, the largest Belarusian media outlet, to 12 years in prison after they were convicted on charges ranging from tax evasion to harming national security.98 In June, authorities detained eight journalists from Ranak—a television channel in Svetlahorsk—for distributing “extremist” materials under Article 19.11 of the Code of Administrative Offenses.99 In September, Vyachaslau Lazarau, a freelance videographer from Vitebsk, and his wife Tatsiana Pytsko, who assisted him with video production, were sentenced to 5.5 and 3 years of imprisonment, respectively, on charges of “participating in an extremist formation.”100 In total, 34 members of the media remained behind bars at the end of the year.101
  • Consumers of independent media also faced prosecution in 2023. Sharing “extremist” content online can be considered “distribution of extremist materials” under Article 19.11 of the Code of Administrative Offenses. Since 2021, at least 2,540 individuals have faced legal consequences under this article.102 Merely following forbidden media outlets on social media can land subscribers in jail.103 For instance, authorities detained the chief veterinarian of the Miory region for three days for following Zerkalo (formerly Tut.by) on Instagram.104 Independent media outlets’ sources are also routinely prosecuted. Sending photographs or information to the media can be considered “aiding extremist activities” by the authorities, especially when the materials concern the movement of Russian military equipment on Belarusian territory.105
  • The government has passed increasingly restrictive laws that further constrain independent media. In July, the Law on Mass Media was again amended to allow authorities to limit or block access to news sites where the founders or editors are involved in “extremist or terrorist activities” or included in “extremist” or “terrorist” lists.106
Local Democratic Governance 1.00-7.00 pts
Considers the decentralization of power; the responsibilities, election, and capacity of local governmental bodies; and the transparency and accountability of local authorities. 1.25 / 7.00
  • With power concentrated in the executive branch, local authorities continued to enjoy little to no political independence. Lukashenka has power over local governance, from education107 to agriculture.108 Although they lack autonomy, the central government and Lukashenka use local functionaries as scapegoats to take the blame for economic or political problems in the regions.109 Lukashenka replaced the heads of three out of the country’s six regional centers (Hrodna, Brest, and Vitebsk) in 2023. Among his explanations for one of the removals, Lukashenka said superior executives110 who head the regional administrations requested it. Lukashenka made no reference to the opinions of local residents.
  • In a May address to regional officials regarding personnel decisions, Lukashenka said local leaders should “pay special attention to working with people” since the presidential election were approaching (scheduled for 2025). He highlighted that no one of the appointees would have an easy life during this responsible period.111 Such rhetoric illustrates the demand for complete loyalty from local officials who risk repercussions for deviating from the federal government’s policies.
  • At a September meeting with local officials to discuss the upcoming parliamentary elections, Lukashenka told them to support “patriotic candidates,” highlighting how local authorities are independent in name only and take direct orders from the president.112 In line with the policy of only allowing trusted and loyal candidates to run in local elections, in November, authorities arrested the head of a tech company who said he wanted to register as a candidate in Homiel, for following “extremist” pages on Facebook.113
Judicial Framework and Independence 1.00-7.00 pts
Assesses constitutional and human rights protections, judicial independence, the status of ethnic minority rights, guarantees of equality before the law, treatment of suspects and prisoners, and compliance with judicial decisions. 1.00 / 7.00
  • The rule of law continued to erode in 2023. The judiciary has long functioned to serve the president, who has had the power to appoint and dismiss judges and prosecutors since 1996. The human rights crisis that has persisted since 2020 has revealed the extent of Lukashenka’s power over the judiciary and how institutions meant to protect citizens against injustice can be manipulated to perpetuate it.
  • The authorities continue to find new ways to pressure independent lawyers and bar access to the profession. In 2023, the number of attorneys disbarred or otherwise barred from practicing reached 131, while 7 remained behind bars.114 While previous waves of repression mainly concerned licensed attorneys115 who were disbarred by the state, in 2023 the repressive practices spread to other law practitioners. New licensing rules that went into effect in January require all jurists and paralegals to pass an additional exam at the Ministry of Justice to practice. The exam’s questions are often so detailed and specific that the chance of failing increases exponentially. Most legal professionals reportedly failed the exam.116 The legal community suspects that the new rules, which the government adopted in one package that included new state-mandated ethical codes for legal practitioners,117 were intended to purge disloyal elements from the profession.118
  • Two political prisoners died in jail in 2023—blogger Mikalai Klimovich119 and artist Ales Pushkin.120 According to the May OSCE Moscow Mechanism report, conditions in Belarusian prisons amount to “inhumane and degrading treatment.”121 Torturous prison conditions are accompanied by “information isolation,” in which the authorities intentionally conceal information about the prisoners.122 Incommunicado detentions are used against high-profile political prisoners, including prominent politicians and bloggers Siarhei Tsikhanouski, Viktar Babaryka, Maksim Znak, Maria Kalesnikava, and Ihar Losik,123 whereby the public is denied information about their health and well-being.
  • Amendments to the Criminal Code that were implemented in March increased the number of crimes punishable by death. According to the amendments, state officials convicted of high treason could face the death penalty.124 Lukashenka said the amendments were intended to strengthen “measures against extremist (terrorist) and anti-state crimes.”125
  • Belarusians are frequently denied the right to a fair trial. Politically important hearings are often conducted behind closed doors, defendants’ access to lawyers is limited, and police reports alone are often sufficient for judges to convict defendants.126 The regime increasingly conducted in absentia trials in 2023, with some exiled figures tried in absentia twice.127 Victims of torture are still denied justice.128
  • The authorities continued to wage a silent war against the Belarusian diaspora.129 Exiled Belarusians are stripped of basic human rights and constitutional guarantees. In September, Lukashenka issued a decree that prohibited citizens from renewing their passports in Belarusian consulates abroad and limited other consular services,130 with dire consequences for exiled communities. When their passports expire, exiled Belarusians will have to return to Belarus to renew them and risk arrest,131 apply for short-term travel documents in their country of residence (where available), or become stranded with expired documents and no opportunity to move freely. Exiles cannot marry at the consulate, document children born abroad, exchange expired or fully stamped passports, sell their real estate, or receive documents confirming higher education132 without a power of attorney issued in Belarus.133 A new commission on the return of political émigrés was established in early 2023 to further intimidate and humiliate Belarusians in exile. The commission has forced citizens who want to return to Belarus to repent for their past political disloyalty.134
Corruption 1.00-7.00 pts
Looks at public perceptions of corruption, the business interests of top policymakers, laws on financial disclosure and conflict of interest, and the efficacy of anticorruption initiatives. 1.25 / 7.00
  • Authorities continued to limit public access to government data in 2023. In March, the National Statistical Committee (Belstat) further reduced transparency by issuing an order allowing the agency to conceal data from the population if it could harm national security, public order, or morals.135 While the agency already concealed information about foreign trade and the salaries of state officials, the order made the median salaries of tech specialists136 and the number of tech specialists who left the sector unavailable to the public. 137 .
  • Other state agencies also withhold data. The National Bank no longer displays the names of heads of state and commercial banks on its website, while the Ministry of Labor concealed data on Belarusians’ income and unemployment benefits.138
  • The government increasingly prosecuted individuals who donated to Belarusian solidarity foundations, such as BYSOL, in 2023. The authorities frequently demand payment from people who they threaten with prosecution for financing “extremist” or “terrorist” activities (crimes that carry lengthy prison terms) without presenting an actual criminal charge.139 The practice has become more brazen in recent years. In 2022, the standard payment people made to avoid prosecution was ten times the amount they had donated to the solidarity funds.140 In July, the State Security Committee (KGB) admitted that payments could range from ten times to a hundred times the original donation. 141
  • To bolster his long-standing reputation as a corruption fighter,142 Lukashenka began anticorruption crusades in the dairy and meat industry in November.143 Multiple businessmen and employees of state-owned companies were detained on bribery charges. The KGB reported detaining 26 people, 15 of whom were arrested on official charges.144 The regime’s approach to combating corruption remains selective. While some crimes are made public and prosecuted, other corruption practices flourish and officials convicted of corruption are allowed to take office again.145

Authors: Tatsiana Ziniakova is a legal analyst and human rights defender with Human Constanta. Artyom Shraibman is a political analyst and head of Sense Analytics consultancy, and a nonresident scholar with Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Footnotes

ecoi.net description:
Report on democratisation (electoral process, civil society, independent media, governance) and rule of law (corruption) in 2023
Country:
Belarus
Source:
Freedom House (Author)
Original link:
https://freedomhouse.org/country/belarus/nations-transit/2024
Document type:
Periodical Report
Language:
English
Published:
11 April 2024
Available on ecoi.net since:
18 April 2024
Document ID:
2107350

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