Sultan Haitham bin Tariq became the country’s monarch after his cousin and predecessor—Sultan Qaboos bin Said, who had reigned since 1970—died in January 2020. Sultan Haitham delegated to his cabinet ministers some of the responsibilities that Sultan Qaboos had formally retained for himself, including by appointing a foreign minister, though Haitham continued to serve as prime minister. A new basic law published in 2021 created the position of crown prince; the sultan’s eldest son, Dhi Yazan bin Haitham, received the title.

A 1996 basic law, promulgated by decree, created a bicameral body consisting of an appointed Council of State (Majlis al-Dawla) and a wholly elected Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shura). Citizens elect the Consultative Council for four-year terms, but the chamber has no legislative powers and can only recommend changes to new laws.

Consultative Council elections were held in 2019, with 637 nonpartisan candidates, including 40 women, competing for the council’s 86 seats. Two women were elected. Also that year, the sultan appointed the 86 members of the Council of State for a four-year term, including 15 women.

The municipal council elections due in 2020 were postponed in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, with the existing councils remaining in place. The elections were ultimately held in December 2022, with a final list of 727 nonpartisan candidates, including 27 women, registered to compete for 126 council seats. For the first time, citizens cast their votes via a digital application called Intakhib, which was launched by the Interior Ministry. Turnout for the elections was about 39 percent of eligible voters.

The electoral framework allows all citizens over the age of 21 to vote unless they are in the military or security forces. However, the framework applies only to the Consultative Council and municipal councils, which serve largely as advisory bodies. Elections are administered by the Interior Ministry rather than by an independent commission.

Political parties are not permitted, and the authorities do not tolerate other forms of organized political opposition. A 2014 law allows the revocation of citizenship for Omanis who join organizations deemed harmful to national interests.

The sultan maintains a monopoly on political power. The structure of the constitutional system excludes the possibility of a change in government through elections.

The nonpartisan nature of Oman’s limited elections, the overwhelming dominance of the sultan in Omani society, and the authorities’ suppression of dissent leave voters and candidates with little autonomy in their political choices.

Noncitizens, who make up about 46 percent of the population, have no political rights or electoral opportunities. Citizenship is generally transmitted from Omani fathers. Foreign residents must live legally in the country for 20 years to qualify for citizenship, or 15 and 10 years for foreign husbands and wives of Omani citizens, respectively, if they have a son. These and other conditions make naturalizations relatively rare.

Omani women can legally vote and run for office, but they have few practical opportunities to organize independently and advance their interests in the political system. Two women were elected to the Consultative Council in 2019, up from one in 2015. Fifteen women serve on the appointed Council of State.

Government policy is set by the sultan and an inner circle of advisers and senior ministers. The Council of State and the Consultative Council are advisory bodies with no lawmaking powers.

Oman’s legal code does not provide an effective framework for the prevention, exposure, and impartial prosecution of corruption. However, government officials are required to declare their assets and sources of wealth, and several high-profile corruption cases involving government officials and executives from Oman’s oil industry have resulted in convictions and prison terms in recent years.

The law does not provide freedom of information guarantees. Openness and transparency are limited in practice by the concentration of power and authority in a small inner circle around the sultan. The State Audit Institution monitors ministerial spending, conflicts of interest, and state-owned companies, but its findings are not released to the public, and it does not cover the sultan’s court or the military.

The media are constrained by legal limits on freedom of expression, including a ban on criticism of the sultan. There are private media outlets in addition to those run by the state, but they typically accept government subsidies, practice self-censorship, and face punishment if they cross political redlines. Media outlets were reportedly told to avoid reporting on demonstrations that were held in several cities in 2021.

The government has broad authority to close outlets, block websites, revoke licenses, and prosecute journalists for content violations, and it has used this authority on multiple occasions in recent years. The government’s efforts to suppress critical news and commentary regularly include arrests and prosecutions of prominent individuals who are active on social media.

Islam is the state religion. Non-Muslims have the right to worship, but they are banned from proselytizing. Religious organizations must register with the government. The Ministry of Awqaf (religious charitable bequests) and Religious Affairs distributes standardized texts for mosque sermons, and imams are expected to stay within the content outlines of these texts.

Blasphemy is a criminal offense, and the law is actively enforced. In June 2022, a court imposed prison sentences of three and five years, respectively, on activists Maryam al-Nuaimi and Ali al-Ghafri for participation in online conversations about freedom of thought, religion, and atheism.

The government restricts academic freedom by preventing the publication of material on politically sensitive topics and placing controls on contacts between Omani universities and foreign institutions.

The authorities reportedly monitor personal communications, and the growing number of arrests, interrogations, and jail terms related to criticism of the government on social media has encouraged self-censorship among ordinary citizens in recent years. The 2018 penal code increased the maximum penalties for slander of the sultan and blasphemy to seven and 10 years in prison, respectively, from three years for both under the old code. In October 2022, the government issued a decree that added slander of the sultan’s wife or children to the penal code, with the same maximum penalty of seven years in prison.

Among other cases involving reprisals for online speech during the year, security forces in February arrested Abdulmajeed al-Rawahi and detained him for four days after he posted comments on social media that were deemed critical of the ruling family. In December, the Internal Security Service reportedly abducted online activist Majid bin Abdullah al-Ruhaili and held him incommunicado in response to social media posts that were critical of the government.

A limited right to peaceful assembly is provided for in Oman’s basic law. However, all public gatherings require official permission, and the government has the authority to prevent organized public meetings without any appeals process. The 2018 penal code prescribes prison terms and fines for individuals who initiate or participate in a gathering of more than 10 people that threatens security or public order, or who fail to comply with an official order to disperse.

While demonstrations are rare in practice, protests against unemployment and the imposition of a value-added tax were held in several cities in May 2021. Overall, security forces mounted a relatively mild response, with some arrests, brief detentions, and use of tear gas reported; by comparison, the authorities had forcibly dispersed demonstrations that broke out in 2011 and used lethal violence in at least one incident during that period.

Oman’s basic law allows for the formation of nongovernmental organizations, but civic life remains limited in practice. The government has not permitted the establishment of independent human rights organizations and generally uses its registration and licensing process to block the formation of groups it sees as a threat to stability. The 2018 penal code includes vague clauses that allow prison terms for individuals who establish, operate, or finance an organization aimed at challenging the “political, economic, social, or security principles of the state.”

Individual activists focusing on issues including the economy, labor rights, the environment, and internet freedom risk arrest. In August 2022, for example, the Internal Security Service arrested and temporarily detained well-known environmental activist Ahmed Issa Qatan after he used social media posts to call for greater political accountability. Hani al-Sarhani, who had advocated on behalf of small businesses facing economic hardship, was arrested multiple times during 2022 and sentenced to one year in prison in October.

Omani workers are legally able to organize unions, bargain collectively, and strike. However, there is only one authorized trade union federation, and neither government employees nor household workers are permitted to join unions. Strikes, which are banned in the oil and gas industry, are rare in practice, partly because disputes are often resolved through employer concessions or government mediation.

The judiciary is not independent and remains subordinate to the sultan, who is empowered to appoint and remove senior judges. The sultan also chairs the Supreme Judicial Council, which nominates judges and oversees the judicial system, though a 2012 reform replaced the justice minister with the head of the Supreme Court as the council’s deputy chair.

Arbitrary arrest is formally prohibited, but suspects arrested in vaguely defined security cases can be held for up to 30 days before being charged, and security forces do not always adhere to other rules on arrest and pretrial detention. Ordinary detainees are generally provided with access to legal representation. Defendants in politically sensitive cases may face harsher treatment from the justice system.

The country is generally free from armed conflict, and violent street crime is relatively rare. However, prisons are not accessible in practice to independent monitors, and former detainees have reported beatings and other abuse in custody. Activists and dissidents sometimes face forcible disappearance and degrading conditions of confinement in addition to formal criminal penalties.

The 2021 basic law banned discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, ethnicity, and social class, but noncitizens are not protected from discrimination in practice. Women face disparate treatment under personal status laws and de facto bias in employment and other matters. Men are legally recognized as the heads of their households. Same-sex sexual relations are punishable with up to three years in prison, and LGBT+ people face societal discrimination.

Most Omani citizens enjoy freedom of movement, but travel bans are often imposed on political dissidents. Foreign workers cannot change jobs or leave the country without permission from their current employer, unless they demonstrate that they have completed the term of their contract; contracts with new employers must be approved by the authorities.

While the legal framework protects property rights, state-owned companies and the ruling family are dominant forces in the economy, limiting the role and autonomy of small and other private businesses. Women generally receive less property than men under inheritance laws.

Omani citizens require permission from the Interior Ministry to marry noncitizens from countries outside the Gulf Cooperation Council. Omani women who marry foreigners cannot transmit citizenship to their spouses or children. Omani law does not specifically address domestic violence and sexual harassment or criminalize spousal rape, while extramarital sex is criminalized. Women who report rape have at times been prosecuted for engaging in extramarital sex, if authorities do not believe they were assaulted. A woman must have a male guardian—usually a father—to contract her into marriage, and women are at disadvantage under laws governing matters such as divorce and child custody. The 2018 penal code included a new provision that criminalized the wearing of women’s clothing by men.

Oman’s labor policies put migrant workers at a severe disadvantage and effectively encourage exploitation. Household workers, who are not covered by the labor law, are especially at risk of abuse by employers. The government has pursued an “Omanization” process to replace foreign workers with native Omanis. Among other tactics, temporary visa bans for foreign workers in various professions have been issued or extended since 2013. In 2021, the Ministry of Labor announced plans to bar expatriates from certain private-sector occupations, which would only be open to Omani citizens.

Despite a 2008 antitrafficking law and some recent efforts to improve enforcement, authorities have not always proactively identified or protected human trafficking victims, particularly among migrant and household workers. The US State Department’s 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report noted that authorities had failed to secure any convictions for forced labor involving migrant workers for four consecutive years.