• On February 4, 2022, the non-party government of former prime minister Zdravko Krivokapić lost a no-confidence motion. MPs from the “In Black and White” coalition led the ouster of Montenegro’s 42nd government by justifying that the country must have political consensus on key issues that hold back its EU path. More than two months later, the 43rd government was formed by gathering small parties from different sides of the political spectrum.1 Former deputy prime minister Dritan Abazović, leader of United Reform Action (URA) and In Black and White, was elected prime minister and pledged to advance Montenegro’s EU integration. The new government also significantly increased in size compared to its predecessor, enlarging from 12 to 18 ministries and adding 2 ministers without portfolio.2
• PM Abazović’s government characterized itself as having a reconciliatory role, bringing in parties of national minorities. Nonetheless, its move to sign the Fundamental Agreement with the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) in early August triggered dissatisfaction from the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS). Consequently, the 43rd government lost a no-confidence motion in mid-August—but as of year’s end, it continued to perform its functions in a caretaker government mandate, notwithstanding ongoing frictions.3
• Following this second no-confidence vote in just half a year, the anti-DPS parties tried to form a new majority despite deteriorating relations among the leaders. They agreed to propose Miodrag Lekić, leader of the minor party Demos, as prime minister. However, instead of exercising his presidential competence to nominate a prime minister designate, President Milo Đukanović (DPS) suggested that Parliament dissolve itself in a separate vote, justifying his move by the lack of proof of a viable majority backing Lekić’s nomination. Parliament refused to even put Đukanović’s proposal on its agenda. These political machinations created an unprecedented legal situation. Experts interpreted Đukanović’s move not to propose a prime minister designate in varying ways,4 but many believed that he had violated the constitution.5
• Following the August no-confidence vote, PM Abazović and the SDP ministers exchanged grave accusations of cigarette smuggling.6 Throughout its mandate, the 43rd government has seen continuous dismissals and resignations, including dismissals of the chief of the National Security Agency (NSA) and two SDP ministers, with one minister from Croatian Civic Initiative also resigning. The frequent reorganization of ministries has added to the already high turnover of senior staff in public administration, severely hampering its capacities and operation.
• In November, parliamentarians from anti-DPS parties voted on amendments to the Law on the President of Montenegro, which would impose an obligation on President Đukanović to accept Lekić’s nomination as prime minister designate while stripping the president of certain other constitutional competences.7 These amendments, claimed by their proponents to resolve the crisis, were severely criticized by the DPS and its partners, civil society, and the international community, adding to the existing legal uncertainties in the absence of a functional Constitutional Court (see “Judicial Framework and Independence”). Đukanović returned the law to Parliament, stating that the controversial amendments went against basic principles of separation of powers.8 Although the amendments were confirmed in the second reading, they were not effectively implemented due to disagreements among the parties, which allegedly backed Lekić but could not agree on the composition and mandate of the future government.
• The political crisis also caused a blockade of plenary legislative work, with MPs fighting over the convening of Parliament and lodging constitutional appeals against the process.9 The weak performance of parliamentary committees continued, with the Security and Defense Committee considering only one of seven reports submitted by police directors from 2018 to October 2022.10
• Work on the Law on Parliament restarted in July but was still incomplete at year’s end. This attempt at a new draft law was presented as a significant step towards strengthening the legislative and supervisory functions of Montenegro’s unicameral, 81-seat Parliament.11 Likewise, the government failed to make progress on the draft Law on Government, which aims to limit the government’s competence to reorganize ministries.12
• Most of the bills proposed in 2022 lacked fiscal impact assessments and verification of conformity with the EU acquis. Notable examples are amendments to the Law on Local Self-Government Financing13 and repeated changes to the Law on Wages of Public Sector Employees.14
• Throughout the year, the National Security Agency (NSA) was in the spotlight for alleged connections between agency leadership and various crime cases, sparking additional conflict between PM Abazović and the governing parties.15 In November, Milan Knežević, an MP from Democratic Front (DF), reopened accusations of illegal NSA wiretapping of the State Audit Institution (SAI), the central bank, the president, and others.

• Despite OSCE/ODIHR recommendations after the August 2020 parliamentary elections, Montenegro made no progress on electoral reform in 2022. The parliamentary committee for comprehensive electoral reform ended its mandate in July, holding only two sessions in 2022 and reaching no concrete conclusions or agreements between parties on specific reforms.16
• The State Electoral Commission (SEC) adopted bylaws clarifying electoral procedures in line with OSCE/ODIHR recommendations. In January 2022, it opened its sessions to the public and abolished attendance fees.17
• In March, local elections took place in Berane and Ulcinj. Election day was orderly, for the most part, but there were complaints of alleged undue pressure on voters. In both municipalities, power changed hands to new parties, with the Socialist People’s Party (SNP) losing its hold on Berane, and DPS (with coalition partners) losing Ulcinj.18
• MPs adopted amendments to the Law on Local Self-Government in April, extending the mandate of local councilors beyond the constitutional term of four years.19 In July, the Constitutional Court assessed these amendments as unconstitutional in a response to initiatives formally filed by political groups and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).20 However, this changed little on the ground since local assemblies adopted new decisions extending their mandates, and elections were held as planned.
• In preparation for the October local elections, Parliament passed a law changing the territorial organization of Montenegro, creating a new municipality, Zeta.21 This move was seen as electoral engineering by some parties, as it created a new electoral unit.22 Appeals were made to the Constitutional Court, but no ruling was passed due to the lack of a court quorum (see “Local Democratic Governance”).
• The government submitted documentation of the 2021 acquisition of the Meljine-Petijevići road23 to prosecutors to investigate potential criminal wrongdoing. This move was criticized as interfering in local election campaigns since it implied the abolishment of a toll for passengers, prompting the private company to sue the state for lost anticipated profits.24
• During the election in the Šavnik municipality, several local party branches prevented “new residents” from voting, denouncing them as working for the incumbent DPS.25 The elections had to be repeated nine times between October and the end of the year, and as a result, some political activists were charged by the prosecution with denying citizens their right to vote.
• In the wake of the incumbent government’s defeat in the capital Podgorica, several appeals were submitted to the Constitutional Court by a minor party that failed to pass the electoral threshold. The appeals concerned minor alleged irregularities but were rejected by the SEC.26 Since the Constitutional Court had no quorum to decide upon the appeals, the declaration of final results and transfer of power was effectively blocked, with the incumbent government continuing to work in full capacity. In response, in December, MPs attempted to amend the Law on Local Self-Government (see “Local Democratic Governance”) to enable the new local government to be formed. After the changes were adopted by MPs, the president deemed them unconstitutional and returned the bill to Parliament for ongoing debate in 2023.
• Spikes in party spending noticed in previous elections were again observed in the run-up to the October 23 elections in 14 municipalities.27 The CEO of the state-owned coal mine in Pljevlja reportedly gave away employment contracts as wedding gifts, which led to an increase of almost 200 workers.28 Although he later defended his strategy as acting in jest, the incident raised concerns about potential misuse of state resources for political gain.
• The participation of women in politics in Montenegro remained low in 2022, with 9 of the 14 municipal electoral lists failing to ensure the legally binding quota of 30 percent women candidates.29

• Civil society and nongovernmental organizations (CSOs and NGOs) in Montenegro were not effectively included in policymaking by government ministries in 2022, a trend that continued from the previous year. Political instability also caused delays in public competitions for funding NGO projects from the state budget, affecting the civic sector.
• The position of religious organizations in the country—namely, the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC)—continued to cause friction among political parties and the public. In June, the government published a draft agreement with the SOC despite opposition from the minority coalition members SDP and DPS. The agreement covered issues of legal subjectivity and continuity of the SOC, as well as the mutual rights and duties of State and Church.30 The NGO Human Rights Action warned that the draft agreement should be amended to strip the SOC from public authorities, to allow application of security measures without prior consent of church authorities, and to revise provisions on religious education and appeals for disciplinary decisions.31 Despite protests and loss of confidence, the agreement was signed on August 3 without the media present, amidst allegations of undue influence by the SOC in society and politics.32
• On July 13, Montenegro’s Statehood Day, opposing groups of pro-Serbian and Montenegrin activists clashed in Nikšić. While protests throughout the year were largely tolerated, police were accused by activists of mismanaging the demonstrations by using teargas against protesters. However, an internal investigation did not determine any culpability by officers.33
• In December, the “Ima nas” (We Are Many) protest movement was announced by the NGO Luča following the controversial vote on the Law on the President. There were several mass gatherings and road blockades, and 13 people were suspected of assaulting officers at one protest.34 Two MPs from Albanian and Bosniak national parties claimed they were also assaulted by protesters. The demonstration was supported and attended by officials from DPS and its partners, although they denied any connection to the incidents.35
• In September and December, attacks occurred on an apartment building inhabited by LGBT+ activists as well as at an LGBT+ community center in Podgorica. The police identified the perpetrators of the center attack, who included two minors.36 The LGBT+ Pride Parade in the capital on October 8 had a massive turnout and no incidents, but organizers warned of the government’s stalled strategy for improving the quality of life for LGBT+ persons. Before the parade, the SOC organized a gathering for the “preservation of marriage and family,” attended by current and former officials, which drew criticisms.37
• Despite the rise in salaries due to the new tax reform, demands for better working conditions from trade unions and the public sector persisted during the year.38 In late December, trade unions and employer associations signed a new General Collective Agreement with the government to regulate the rights and duties of employers and workers. For the first time, the new agreement did not diminish employee rights.39
• The government’s decision in November not to increase salaries of instructors at the Faculty for Montenegrin Language and Literature was met with public criticism due to possible discrimination.40 In response, officials eventually adjusted the salaries but not retroactively.

• The government began a media legislation reform in 2022 but had not completed it by year’s end, despite appeals from CSOs to speed up the process.41
• New rules for registering online media significantly downsized the number of outlets, from 104 in 2021 to 65 by mid-June 2022.42 Online content remained loosely regulated, and CSOs warned that portals were not adhering to their legal obligation to remove hate speech.43
• In June, the government reported that only 37 percent of media and 9 percent of public institutions had complied with new legal provisions obliging them to report funds from public sources allocated for media advertisements.44
• In January and September, the Council of the Electronic Media Agency limited the rebroadcasting of the Serbian TV channels Happy and Pink because of their offensive speech towards Montenegrins and specific political figures in the country, and inappropriate reporting about the mass shooting in Cetinje.45
• PM Abazović called for a harsher penal policy towards media who publish disinformation, claiming that domestic broadcasters were not much better than Serbian television outlets, whose broadcasting was suspended.46 He claimed that some domestic media have a fascist touch and alleged there were connections between DPS-oriented media and organized crime—statements that were harshly criticized given the threats that ensued against the outlets he called out by name.47
• Journalists in Montenegro received numerous threats in 2022, and physical attacks occurred throughout the year. Jadranka Ćetković, a reporter at the daily Vijesti, was physically attacked while covering a trial in Bijelo Polje.48 Reporters of Gradska TV were physically prevented from covering an incident in Budva.49 The NGO Centre for Civic Education reported 19 attacks on media during the year.50 Formed in 2021, a government commission for monitoring investigations into these threats stated that there was no effective oversight of prosecutors in cases of attacks on journalists and the media, no binding instructions issued to such prosecutors, and no disciplinary action taken against prosecutors despite litigation in some cases.51

• Decentralization and reorganization of cities and municipalities were among PM Abazović’s priorities in 2022.52 However, the government made no progress in enacting these changes, except for forming a working group to prepare an analysis of the functioning of local self-governments.53
• During 2022, political instability also affected the local level. The local governments in two municipalities, Budva54 and Tivat,55 were replaced by a board of trustees imposed by the central government due to the local parliament’s inactivity for six months. The same scenario was averted in Kotor, where after months of political crisis and parliamentary blockade, three local MPs from DPS switched sides and provided the quorum to hold a session.56
• The newly established municipality of Zeta was met with controversy over electoral concerns (see “Electoral Process”) and questions about the relevant feasibility study. Three ministries found the study to be incomplete and misleading since it left out key data in order to convey a positive perspective.57
• In July, Parliament adopted amendments to the Law on Local Self-Government Financing. These changes improved the financial status of municipalities by devolving a higher percentage of centrally collected taxes to the local level, increasing local revenues.58
• Parliament adopted changes to the Law on Local Self-Government59 that aim to ease employment requirements in local government institutions and remove the rule that acting officials are appointed from among current public servants. The president vetoed the bill60 due to concerns over the independence and professionalism of civil servants in Montenegro, views shared by the civic sector61 and the European Commission.
• The number of employees at the local level seemed to be on an upsurge during the year, according to the ministries of finance and public administration. However, no optimization measures were undertaken in 2022, and the Revenue and Customs Administration repeatedly rejected requests to disclose the data.62

• In 2022, the functioning of Montenegro’s judicial system was severely affected by the loss of a quorum on the Constitutional Court when a judge retired in mid-September, leaving only 3 out of 7 judges on the bench. Parliament had already failed to appoint the other vacancies, which require majority support, despite there being numerous candidates. Similarly, only one of the four non-lay members of the Judicial Council was appointed after MPs failed to reach consensus despite a highly competitive procedure with 35 applicants.63 The appointment of the Supreme Court president was still pending at year’s end, while the president of the Administrative Court was appointed in late October after this post had been vacant for more than a year.
• The judiciary’s backlog increased, with a total of 5,448 cases older than three years, up by over 1,500 cases since 2021.64
• In February, the Prosecutorial Council, appointed in late 2021, retired chief special prosecutor Milivoje Katnić. He disputed the decision before the Administrative Court, claiming that he was not consulted in the process.65 The case was still pending at year’s end.
• Several high-profile corruption and organized crime cases were initiated during the year, most notably against former longtime Supreme Court president Vesna Medenica. The indictment alleges that, in the period 2019–21, Medenica abused her position to influence decisions taken by several courts in favor of three companies, with the help of her son and 10 other suspects, for which all were paid bribes.66 The scandal came to light when their communications were intercepted by foreign intelligence services and subsequently leaked to the public. Another case that shook the country’s judiciary involved the Commercial Court president, Blažo Jovanić, who was indicted for illegally increasing the costs of bankruptcy proceedings and collecting unlawful payments for his participation.67
• In early December, Saša Čađenović, former special prosecutor and close associate of Katnić, was detained on suspicion of being a member of the “Kavački klan,” one of two major organized crime groups in the country. Čađenović was accused of deliberately avoiding initiating criminal proceedings against leaders of the organization to protect them from prosecution.68
• The 2022 arrest of the former director of the Revenue and Customs Administration, Rade Milošević, for his alleged role in cigarette smuggling, and cases against high-ranking police and NSA employees, further cast a shadow on the integrity and independence of the justice system.
• However, an OSCE survey conducted in September showed that over 40 percent of respondents had noticed positive changes in the work of the State Prosecution Service during the last 12 months, while 59.8 percent believed that the State Prosecution Service is generally efficient in its work.69 These results signal that high-profile cases initiated under the new state prosecution leadership have sparked some optimism among citizens. Nonetheless, watchdog CSOs have warned that sustainable results in the field will only come by completing criminal proceedings with justified outcomes.70

• In December, amendments to the “anti-mafia law” were submitted to Parliament and aimed at expediting the seizure of criminal assets, although the changes were met with severe criticism.71
• In the same month, Rade Milošević, former head of the Revenue and Customs Administration, was arrested for allegedly creating a criminal organization. He resigned in October amid an investigation into missing seized tobacco. The Special Prosecution alleged that 90 percent of seized and supposedly destroyed tobacco was actually later smuggled, and arrested several police and customs officers in the case. There were claims that higher levels of the URA were involved, but both Milošević and URA leadership denounced all allegations and accused private individuals and companies of being smugglers and orchestrating a political smear campaign against them, with the assistance of the NSA.72
• In May, Blažo Jovanić, the former longtime Commercial Court president, was arrested and detained on suspicion of organizing a criminal group, corruption, and embezzlement. The indictment against him and other members of the group, which states that they illegally damaged eight companies for hundreds of thousands of euros, had yet to be confirmed by the court at year’s end.73
• In July and August, former members of the board of the state-owned wine company Plantaže were arrested on the order of the Special State Prosecutor’s Office for allegedly abusing their official positions in the course of business operations.74 This came in the wake of significant financial problems at the company.
• In June, the Special State Prosecutor’s Office indicted Zoran Vukčević, former chairman of the state-owned Investment and Development Fund, and several other employees.75 The indictment alleges that they falsified employment contracts to secure severance pay for themselves in the event of termination.76
• In his first TV interview in December 2022, the new Special State Prosecutor, Vladimir Novović, appointed in March, revealed that his office lacks human and technical resources for more advanced investigation methods. He further exposed the lack of interconnectivity in state databases, along with insufficient cooperation among state authorities, especially the NSA.77
• Montenegro extended the duration of its investor citizenship program until the end of 2022 despite a request from the European Commission to end the program due to money laundering and corruption risks. Additional checks and conditions were introduced, particularly for applicants from Russia and Belarus. The top three countries of origin for new investor citizenship in this period were Russia (110), China (67), and the USA (24).78

Authors: Milena Muk and Marko Sošić are policy analysts at the Montenegrin think tank Institut Alternativa, where they study interrelated issues of rule of law and public administration reform, including monitoring of public finance and parliamentary oversight.