Democracy Percentage | 35.71 / 100 |
Democracy Score | 3.14 / 7 |
- Electoral Process rating decreased from 4.00 to 3.75 due to the influence of illegal financing on the electoral process in 2023, as well as nontransparent changes in electoral legislation which were implemented right before the local elections (despite being deemed unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court), restricted candidates’ right to be elected, and effectively disenfranchised some voters.
- Corruption rating improved from 2.25 to 2.50 due to law enforcement actions countering illegal party financing by the Ilan Shor group, which is considered to be a “criminal group” by the authorities.
- As a result, Moldova’s Democracy Score remains at 3.14.
In 2023, Moldova experienced complicated, and to some extent controversial, political developments marked by a number of radical measures adopted under the justification of external threats. The political process was heavily influenced by the urgency to implement the reform agenda driven by the imperative to open European accession negotiations and the persisting geopolitical crisis in the region stemming from Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.
The first signs of declining public approval for the ruling Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) became evident with the results of the November 5 local elections. PAS obtained 32.8 percent of the votes at the level of the 32 rayons (territorial districts), a worse result than either PAS candidate Maia Sandu achieved in the second round of the 2020 presidential elections or the party won in early parliamentary elections in 2021.1 PAS also did not win the mayoralty of any central city of the 11 municipalities and lost the capital, Chișinău.2 Furthermore, despite accusations of vote buying, the government failed to prevent the victory of fugitive businessman Ilan Șor’s proxy, Evghenia Guțul, as governor of the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia (ATUG); Guțul was sworn in on July 19.3
Moldova’s government institutions continued to be influenced politically by the Party of Action and Solidarity that holds 63 out of 101 seats in the legislature, ensuring a linear legislative process, without disruptions or infightings within the ruling party in the law-making process. However, civil society organizations highlighted significant deviations from legislative procedures within the parliamentary majority, including concerns related to agenda setting, public consultations, and overall transparency.4 These shortcomings undermined the country’s system of checks and balances, affecting democratic control over decision-making and eroding public trust in the institutions. Nevertheless, polls indicated a gradual increase in trust in the office of the president, the government, and Parliament in 2023 compared to the previous year.5 President Maia Sandu of PAS remained a driving political force during this period.6 This strengthened the perception that, due to her political affiliation, she is influencing the decision-making process in favor of her party beyond the president’s limited constitutional mandate in Moldova’s semiparliamentary system of government.
Accountability in the governance process lacked strong, unconditional, and depoliticized enforcement, particularly concerning personnel decisions related to top positions in state institutions. Both the president and the government shielded members of the administration who faced criticism for poor or controversial decisions.7 Instead of receiving sanctions and being excluded from future government positions, these officials were often reassigned or retained their roles. For instance, the former minister of energy and infrastructure, Andrei Spânu,8 who was accused of carrying out natural gas purchases under non-transparent conditions at high prices, returned to the government in July 2023 under Prime Minister Dorin Recean as the new minister of infrastructure and regional development. Additionally, in the aftermath of a shooting that took place at Chișinău International Airport in June, several officials were able to keep their post or move offices despite severe criticism from the public. 9 10 11
In July 2023, Parliament approved the modifications to the budget proposed by the government, which included significant salary increases—in some cases almost doubling their monthly pay—for government officials.12 About 1,300 public servants in the central government will receive raises, costing a total sum of about 80 million Moldovan lei ($4.3 million). This followed another 8,000-lei ($414) increase in ministers’ monthly salaries that came into effect in January 2023, which together with the newest increase would bring them up to 50,000 Moldovan lei ($2,590)13 from 19,520 Moldovan lei ($1,570) in 2022. The government’s decision faced criticism from some public employees, such as the prosecutors, who said the pay raises were unfair,14 as well as from the opposition.15 Less than two weeks prior to the commencement of the electoral campaign for the local elections in November, the government adopted the “Bonus for Moldova” package, which included salary hikes for public sector workers, including doctors, police officers, and teachers, alongside one-time payments for various social groups.16 These moves raised concerns that the PAS might be using the grants to sway the electorate in its favor during the November local elections. On top of this, PAS received somewhat favorable media coverage on many channels that had been perceived as unbiased in the past, including the public broadcaster TeleRadio-Moldova (TRM).
Justice reforms remained a focal point for the government, with continuous efforts to vet judges and prosecutors and eliminate corruption from the judicial sector. However, the vetting process yielded mixed results, with a pass rate below 50 percent.17 The credibility of the vetting process was marred by a scandal involving Iulian Muntean,18 who, despite being implicated in corruption cases from 2018,19 passed his assessment by the Independent Evaluation Commission, an independent judicial body commonly known as the Pre-Vetting Commission, and was appointed as member of the Superior Council of Magistracy (CSM) by the PAS-dominated Parliament.20 Complicating matters, the Supreme Court of Justice overturned 21 decisions made by the Pre-Vetting Commission, necessitating a reevaluation of those cases. Subsequently, the government, backed by President Sandu, made a controversial decision allowing future vetting commissions to disregard SCJ decisions if reasonable suspicions about the candidates’ integrity exist. This development threatens to cast a shadow over the justice reforms and President Sandu herself, who was criticized21 for saying that the SCJ’s decisions were “illegal” and “almost random.”22 This raised concern about potential breaches of the constitution by her government, particularly Article 120, which designates decisions by the highest court as binding.23
The case of former prosecutor general Alexandr Stoyanoglo, who was dismissed by Sandu in September 2023,24 resurfaced following the October decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)25 that Moldova was guilty of breaching the European Convention on Human Rights (ECtHR),26 specifically the right to access effective judicial remedy, regarding Stoyanoglo’s suspension from the position of prosecutor general in October 2021.27
The government’s focus on security and the prevention of interference by criminal groups associated with oligarch Ilan Șor28 —who is under international sanctions and was sentenced in absentia by the Chișinău Court of Appeal in April 2023 for involvement in a 2014 banking fraud case29 —led to the implementation of strict measures restricting the right of some candidates to stand for election.30 To pass the measures, the ruling party invoked the state of emergency through the Committee for Exceptional Situations (CSE), which had been extended ten times since October 2021. These measures were criticized by the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Promo-LEX’s Election Monitoring Mission, which said the restrictive mechanisms set a “dangerous precedent.”31 Promo-LEX also argued that these restrictions are “broad and insensitive to individual circumstances.”32 The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) assessed that, although the November elections were peaceful and efficiently managed, they were negatively impacted by restrictions applied by the government to address external interference and security concerns.33 The government has actively employed security arguments to justify disproportionate bans on participating in elections against political parties associated with Șor, such as the Chance Political Party.
Another of the PAS majority’s controversial decision linked to elections is a proposal, presented at the end of December 2023, to modify the electoral code to allow referendums to be held on the same day as elections.34 Likewise, it was proposed to move forward the date by which Parliament was required to set election dates, from 60 days before the president’s term expired to 90 days. Both amendments were approved in early 2024 and are likely to be used by PAS to increase Sandu’s chances of reelection.
The local elections in November were significantly shaped by the political influence of the ruling party on the one hand and the mobilization efforts of Șor’s allies on the other. President Sandu, in several television appearances, tied future access to European and public funds to voting for “European mayors,”35 intending to discourage support for candidates associated with criminal groups linked to Șor that express anti-Western views.36 Before the most recent elections, considerable numbers of mayors had defected from political parties and migrated to new ones in the 2019 local elections, with 36 percent of those who migrated to new parties choosing PAS. Based on the assessment of Promo-LEX, 65 percent of independent candidates running in the November 2023 elections support the government.37 Conversely, Șor affiliates efficiently mobilized a significant number of local candidates, even in major cities such as Bălți.38 Known political affiliates of Șor included the Chance Political Party, formerly the “Ours” Party,39 and another older political party, the Revival Party. Șor was alleged to be financing vote-buying operations,40 which investigations by anticorruption agencies and intelligence have been uncovering. Additionally, a considerable factor contributing to Șor’s popularity lies in his narrative of personal victimization due to the legal prosecution against him and his group, as well as his populist rhetoric.
Throughout the year, the Moldovan authorities remained vigilant regarding the high risks associated with Russian hybrid interference in the country. In July, intelligence and law enforcement agencies revealed that they had uncovered a spy network comprising three individuals, one of whom is a Moldovan national. The network’s activities were aimed at subverting social and political processes in Moldova and fostering dependence on Russia through the manipulation of public opinion.41 To counter the spread of disinformation, including false narratives related to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, the Security and Intelligence Service (SIS) blocked dozens of webpages in 2023, many linked directly to Russia.42 The CSE had also temporarily suspended the licenses of 12 television channels, some of them controlled or heavily used by opposition forces, since December 2022, and discussions over the suspensions’ legitimacy and efficiency persisted throughout 2023.43
Support from the European Union (EU) and other Western partners in 2023 proved vital to the government’s ability to manage the security crisis and external interference, preserve domestic legitimacy, and compensate for difficulties in implementing the reform agenda. The approval in December of the opening of accession negotiations with the EU, following the granting of candidate country status in June 2022, creates new opportunities for reforms and transformations in Moldova. Additionally, the EU initiated a new Civilian Mission for Partnership in Moldova,44 focusing on providing support for crisis management capacity building and enhancing resilience against hybrid warfare.
While certain aspects of human rights are not respected, such as the use of the Russian language in elections, the situation on the ground is quite stable and manageable in Moldova. However, the human rights situation remains complicated in the breakaway region of Transnistria, which is internationally recognized as part of Moldova but which has operated with de facto independence since a brief military conflict in 1992. Civil society activists urged that the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) make the organization of soccer games in Transnistria contingent on improvements in human rights,45 including an international investigation into the murder of opposition leader Oleg Horjan.46
Moldova remained governed by a comfortable parliamentary majority led by the Party of Action and Solidarity, which is committed to Western values and actively engaged in reforms aimed at promoting European integration. However, the quality of reforms in key sectors of the rule of law remained somewhat modest throughout 2023, with negative precedents regarding the right of candidates to be elected and the irrevocability of decisions made by the court. There were two important electoral exercises—the election of the executive in the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia and the Moldovan local elections—whose results were undermined by cases of illegal or nontransparent financing, mainly involving the political allies of the fugitive Ilan Șor. The result of the local elections showed the ruling party underperforming in large cities, including the capital, Chișinău, while showing political will to create local coalitions with the Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM), which it accuses of being pro-Russian. Civil society organizations benefited from government openness and greater participation in the decision-making process, but faced criticism and reluctance from the opposition, especially in cases where they were perceived as progovernment. Media legislation related to advertising has improved, with clearer powers to fight monopolies in the Competition Council and the Audiovisual Council. Despite criticism from a number of civil society organizations, the government suspended the licenses of six television channels on charges of involvement in Russian disinformation operations, after the new audiovisual media services code defined “disinformation” and Parliament approved the creation of the Center for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation. disinformation. The criminalization of separatism has influenced the government’s relations with Transnistria, while changes to the tax code relating to value-added tax (VAT) refunds, on the other, have altered the dynamics between the central government and Gagauzia. Meanwhile, positive signs were observed in public administration reform as the government adopted a new strategy for 2023–30. Justice reform continued with vetting, which, however, faced challenges in the Supreme Court of Justice, leading to repeated evaluations of magistrates and prosecutors by the Pre-Vetting Commission. The highlight of the anticorruption policies was the Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office assuming control over high-level corruption cases with the aim of making the fight against corruption more efficient.
Considers the democratic character of the governmental system; and the independence, effectiveness, and accountability of the legislative and executive branches. | 2.75 / 7.00 |
- Despite having a majority of 63 out of 101 members in the legislature, the ruling Party of Action and Solidarity appointed Dorin Recean, who is not a PAS member, as the new prime minister in February.47 After about five months, Recean reshuffled his cabinet, appointing Andrei Spînu to head the Ministry of Infrastructure and Regional Development, Dan Perciun to the Ministry of Education and Research, and Adrian Efros to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Despite these changes, the government maintained a solid political position by relying on the strong majority of PAS in Parliament. The opposition’s attempt to censure Recean’s government over deepening poverty and inflation failed in September.48
- The Commission for Exceptional Situations continued to control decision-making processes. The government, together with Parliament, has extended the state of emergency 10 times since October 2021, citing an “imminent threat to national security” due to the implications of Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent war.49 The last extension pushed the state of emergency’s expiration date from October 2 to the end of December. The Moldovan think tank Expert-Grup explained that although the state of emergency allowed the government to expedite decision-making, its all-but-automatic continuation, as well as the expanded scope of its application, allowed the government to avoid engaging with other political and institutional interests. The state of emergency gave the government considerable room for maneuver, which led to deviations from transparency procedures and public consultations.50
- On March 16, 10 mayors affiliated with the PSRM declared their intention to join the “Movement for the People,” a platform established in February51 by Șor’s allies that was supported by the pro-Russian Șor Party. (The Șor Party was subsequently declared unconstitutional in June,52 and began the process of dissolution in August.53 ) This platform has been designed to attract fringe political entities that opposed the government. The Socialists attributed the mayors’ defection to political corruption and urged the Office of the Prosecutor General to investigate and prevent such cases.54
- Over the 12 months ending in June 2023, there was a notable increase in the travels of members of Parliament (MPs) abroad.55 Traveling legislators incurred per diem and other costs amounting to 2.3 million lei ($128,000) over that period, approximately one-third more than their 1.8 million lei in expenses over the similar period of 2021–22.56 These trips were predominantly undertaken by PAS members, accounting for 65 percent of the costs, while 27 percent of the costs were incurred by staff members of the Secretariat of the Parliament, and only 8 percent by representatives of the Electoral Bloc of Communists and Socialists, which included the PSRM.57
- Throughout 2023, the legislative process during parliamentary sessions lacked predictability concerning agenda setting,58 which was frequently modified in a radical manner without prior notice.59 Parliamentary regulations, especially provisions related to the drafting of the agenda, were frequently disregarded by PAS.60 Draft laws were only sporadically accompanied by opinions from parliamentary standing committees, the General Legal Directorate,61 or the National Anticorruption Center, which sometimes were published during or even after voting procedures.62 These practices contradict good governance principles.
- On June 19,63 the Constitutional Court ruled that the Șor Party had violated constitutional provisions related to the rule of law, citing actions taken by the party that the court said affect the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Moldova, as well as attempts to gain political power through undemocratic means such as nontransparent party financing.64 Based on the Constitutional Court’s conclusions and those of law enforcement agencies, the court decided to approve the dissolution of the Șor Party, with three of the court’s five judges signing onto the decision to declare it unconstitutional.65 The court-ordered process of dissolving a political party has never before been carried out in Moldova. Two of the court’s five judges, Serghei Țurcan and Vladimir Țurcan, issued separate dissenting opinions.66 The dissenting judges wrote that, based on the evidence presented, the government’s argument against the constitutionality of the Șor Party should be rejected, for reasons including that other authorities are responsible for determining the legality of the Șor Party’s actions. Representatives of the Șor Party rejected accusations that the party had attempted to overthrow Moldova’s democratic order.67
- On October 11,68 the government approved a law mandating that all airlines operating in Moldova provide passenger data of travelers arriving in the country.69 Airlines must submit the information between 24 and 48 hours before flights, and the Ministry of the Interior’s Unit for Passenger Data will store the personal data for five years. This measure aims to align with the provisions outlined in the EU’s 2016 Passenger Name Record (PNR) Directive70 and is intended as a preventive security action in the face of “hybrid threats.”71 The measure was prompted by a June incident at Chișinău International Airport in which a Tajik citizen seized a gun from a border police officer and tragically killed two security staff members.72
Examines national executive and legislative elections, the electoral framework, the functioning of multiparty systems, and popular participation in the political process. | 3.75 / 7.00 |
- During 2023, important elections took place in May in the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia to choose its new executive, and throughout Moldova in November to elect mayors and members of the local and municipal councils. These elections have shown both the level of influence of Șor’s politicial allies and the political support for PAS and the government.
- In April and May,73 during two rounds of elections in Gagauzia, the population elected Evghenia Guțul, an ally of Ilan Șor’s, to the executive position of bashkan (governor), with 52.34 percent of the 53,500 people who voted.74 In the second round on May 14, Guțul secured 27,376 votes, narrowly defeating her rival Grigorii Uzun, who ran as an independent with support from the PSRM, by about 2,500 votes. Guțul’s supporters made up less than one-third of the 92,505 people in Gagauzia who had the right to vote.75 In the second round, participation reached 54.46 percent, surpassing the turnout recorded in 2019, when the incumbent bashkan at the time, Irina Vlah, secured victory with 91.2 percent of the votes in the initial round and a turnout of 50.3 percent.76 Guțul belonged to the Șor Party at the time of her election, but, after the party was banned, she announced in June that she would become a political independent.77
- On May 13, one day before the second round of the elections in Gagauzia, Moldova’s Central Electoral Commission (CEC) opened proceedings against eight candidates related to noncompliant campaign financing.78 Based on its evaluation of campaign finance reports published on the website of the Central Electoral Council of Gagauzia, the CEC in Chișinău found that the candidates had all received donations exceeding the 11,700-lei ($651) legal maximum. The largest discrepancies were reported in the cases of Guțul, who had received donations from 65 people that surpassed the allowed limit by a combined 458,000 lei ($25,472), and Victor Petrov, the founder of the pro-Russian populist People’s Movement of Gagauzia, who had donations from 21 people surpassing the limit by a combined 436,800 lei. Other candidates found in violation of the financing regulations were Uzun, whose donations exceeded legal limits by a total 184,800 lei; Serghei Cimpoieș, 148,300 lei; Dmitrii Croitor, 102,100 lei; Nicolae Dudoglo, 59,090 lei; Mihail Formuzal, 18,600 lei; and Gheorghii Pavlioglo, 15,600 lei.79 These noncompliance findings raised the potential of illegal financing, with consequent repercussions on the quality of the region’s Bashkan elections. Moldova’s Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office reportedly was focusing investigations on the victorious Guțul.80
- The voter list for Moldova’s local elections includes 2,761,954 voters, about 6,000 less than in the last national elections in 2021.
- Between September 30 and October 13, the 60 political parties81 registered for the local elections collectively spent 9.1 million lei ($497,000) on their campaigns.82
- Prime Minister Recean, while not a member of PAS, was reported to have engaged in several activities promoting the party. These activities included personally distributing party newspapers in March83 and July,84 participating in the PAS’s National Congress, and kicking off the PAS campaign for the local elections during working hours.85 Other minor cases of the misuse of administrative resources were observed in the case of Chișinău.86
- During at least one TV appearance, in September as the local elections were about one month away, President Sandu warned voters that if they cast ballots for “representatives of criminal groups” and not “European mayors,” their localities could lose future access to European and central government funds.87 This message was amplified by other government actors and was aimed at discouraging voter support for candidates associated with Șor’s affiliates and with other political parties that are perceived as pro-Russian.88 Sandu’s statement was criticized by opposition representatives, mainly those who advocate friendly relations with Russia.89
- On September 25, just 12 days prior to the electoral campaign’s start, Recean unveiled a 1.65-billion-lei ($90 million) government spending package dubbed “Bonus for Moldova” (“Spor pentru Moldova”). This initiative included salary hikes for public sector workers such as doctors, police officers, and teachers, alongside one-time payments for various social groups.90 Civil society organizations monitoring the elections labeled this move an “abuse of administrative resources,”91 while the opposition accused the government of engaging in “electoral bribing.”92
- On October 4, the PAS parliamentary majority adopted changes to Article 16 of the electoral law93 enabling the exclusion of individuals from elections based on a new set of criteria, in an effort to root out Șor influence.94 Parliament passed the changes without seeking expert legal advice or holding public consultations. President Sandu promulgated the new changes while she was out of the country attending the summit of the European Political Community in Granada, raising legality questions.95 Earlier October 4, the government also enforced comparable restrictions within the framework of the CSE,96 though the commission appeared to be exceeding the mandates offered by the state of emergency or existing legislation.97 The PAS majority adopted the new law in the second reading, despite a ruling by the Constitutional Court on October 3 concluding that the new electoral code provisions98 were “unconstitutional” because they conflict with the “right to be elected” as outlined in Articles 38 and 5499 of Moldova’s constitution.100 The CEC subsequently said that it had drawn up a list of 102 people who were ineligible to participate in the local elections, based on information from law enforcement agencies.101 The CEC added that it needed to keep the list confidential to protect personal data and respect the listed people’s presumptive innocence.102 The government moved aggressively against Șor’s affiliates on the premise that they are pro-Russian actors, substantiated mainly by international sanctions adopted in 2022 and 2023 against Șor and some of his affiliates, who, according to the United States103 and the EU,104 are destabilizing to Moldova within the larger context of malign Russian interference.105
- For the local elections on November 5, the CEC registered 3,900 individuals vying for the existing 898 mayoral positions, along with 11,085 candidates competing for over 56,000 councilor seats. 106 Out of the total 3,900 registered mayoral candidates for the position of mayor, more than half represent PAS, the Șor-linked Chance Party, and PSRM. The percentage of independent candidates for mayor slightly decreased from the last local elections in 2019, falling from 10 percent to 8 percent. Meanwhile, the representation of women increased from 27 percent of mayoral candidates to 30 percent.107
- In December, three opposition parties not currently represented in Parliament—the Change Party, the League of Cities and Communes (LOC) and the Dignity and Truth Platform Party (Plataforma DA, or PPDA)—announced the creation of a bloc for the next presidential elections, scheduled to be held in late 2024, and the parliamentary elections due by mid-2025.108 Their intention is to serve as a pro-EU alternative to PAS.
Assesses the organizational capacity and financial sustainability of the civic sector; the legal and political environment in which it operates; the functioning of trade unions; interest group participation in the policy process; and the threat posed by antidemocratic extremist groups. | 4.75 / 7.00 |
- During the evaluated period, the government showed openness towards civil society organizations. In its 2023 report on Moldova, the EU assessed that the financial and legal environment of Moldova allows the functioning of civil society.109
- Throughout the year, civil society organizations published reactions regarding hate speech during the local elections, numerous cases of electoral legislation violations, the cancellation of the selection process for a director of the national energy regulator, and instances of intimidation against NGO representatives. 110 111 112 113 At the same time, civil society organizations faced continuous attacks from opposition politicians and even judges, who accused international114 and national NGOs of having close links with the government and conducting “espionage” 115 in favor of the ruling party.116
- On January 26, Moldova’s Institute for European Policies and Reforms (IPRE) condemned what it said were attempts to intimidate its Executive Director, Iulian Groza. Eugen Rurac, the interim head of the General Directorate of Criminal Prosecution within the National Anticorruption Center, had filed a criminal complaint against Groza charging that he had illegally accessed personal data, including real estate records.117 IPRE asserted that these alleged attempts at intimidation118 were a consequence of Groza’s involvement in the preselection process for the chief prosecutor position at the Prosecutor’s Office Combating Organized Crime and Special Cases (PCCOCCS), in which Rurac was one of the contenders.119 In response to the complaint, the organization explained that between May and August 2022, it had engaged a group of experts to evaluate candidates for positions in the Superior Council of Magistracy and the Superior Council of Prosecutors (CSP). As part of this evaluation, the hired experts examined the accuracy of candidates’ declarations of immovable assets, mentioned as part of their required declarations of wealth and personal interests over the past five years. To conduct this research, IPRE signed a contract with the Public Services Agency to access Moldova’s real estate cadastre web service. However, one unnamed expert mistakenly accessed information beyond the scope of the research, an action not authorized by IPRE. In his criminal complaint, Rurac interpreted the unauthorized accessing of private data as a breach of Law No. 133/2011 on the Protection of Personal Data.
- On May 9, Socialists, Communists, and Șor political affiliates organized a march to commemorate Victory Day, which marked the anniversary of Nazi Germany’s surrender to the Soviet Union in World War II.” 120 Some participants were reported to be wearing controversial pro-Russian insignia such as the St. George’s ribbon, which was banned in 2022 as a provocation in the context of the Russia’s then-recent invasion of Ukraine. However, on April 11, upon referral by PSRM deputies, the Constitutional Court had declared this ban unconstitutional, except in cases where the symbol is used to promote war crimes or crimes against humanity.121 The Socialists reported that they transported participants from the region with party money.
- On May 21, at the request of President Sandu, the government organized a pro-EU rally called the European National Assembly of Moldova.122 The event cost 4.7 million lei ($260,000)123 in public money and brought together about 75,000 people from all over the country in Chișinău.124 At the same time, small groups of Moldovan diaspora representatives organized meetings in different European capitals. The PSRM boycotted the event and condemned its organization during the state of emergency and under conditions of socioeconomic difficulties, alleging that the government planned to transport participants to the event by bus from territories outside the capital using public funds.125
- May and June were engulfed in scandal surrounding legislative attempts of legislative modifications to change Victory Day’s name to Day of Commemoration and Reconciliation in Memory of Those Who Fell in World War II, and move its official celebration one day earlier, from May 9 to May 8. PAS deputies put forward the proposal on May 24.126 The moves to rename the holiday sparked protests from the Șor-affiliated Revival Party127 and resistance in the parliament from a combined bloc of deputies from PSRM and the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM),128 . Bowing to public pressure, PAS shelved the name-change proposal and focused solely on changing the day of the celebration.129 However, the moves to change the holiday were ultimately abandoned altogether.130
- LGBT+ people and their supporters held a Pride March took place on June 18 in Chișinău, for the first time without the need for heavy police protection.131 The event was assessed as one of the most peaceful since 2013,132 when the first march was allowed. There were counter-protests by about 100 clerics advocating for the “traditional family.” The mayor of Chișinău, Ion Ceban of the National Alternative Movement (MAN), opposed the organization of the Pride March, arguing that what he called “propaganda to children” was not “reasonable.”133 The LGBT+ rights advocacy organization ILGA-Europe’s 2023 ranking of 49 countries’ protection of LGBT+ rights put Moldova in 24th place in 2023, higher than its neighbors Ukraine and Romania, which are ranked 39th and 41st, respectively.134
- In June, Marina Tauber, an independent MP who had previously been affiliated with the Șor Party and was Jewish, made comments comparing criminal proceedings being brought against her to the Holocaust. Tauber, who faced charges related to accepting illegal financing from criminal groups and falsifying party finances, accused Sandu and the EU of committing “a new genocide” against the Jewish people, herself, and Șor, who was also Jewish and was living in exile in Israel. The Israeli ambassador to Moldova, Joel Lyon, objected to the inappropriate use of the term “Holocaust” and urged Moldovan authorities to counter any distortion or denial of the Holocaust, particularly when coming from members of the Moldovan Parliament.135
- On August 7,136 Promo-LEX appealed to UEFA president Aleksander Čeferin, and the soccer union’s Executive Committee, urging them to consider the human rights situation in the Transnistrian region, particularly in light of the murder of opposition leader Oleg Horjan, as a condition for the organization of soccer games in the breakaway region.
- In November, during the 12th meeting of the EU-Moldova Civil Society Platform, it was reiterated that civil society organizations will continue to monitor the implementation of Moldovan authorities’ commitments towards the EU and support reform processes.137
- On September 19, 35 representatives of civil society organizations met in a hybrid format for a fourth round of consultations as the Moldovan government developed a Civil Society Organizations Development Program for 2024–27.138 The program is aimed at improving involvement in government decision-making processes and consolidating civil society organizations’ activities.
- On October 30, six media outlets and human rights NGOs expressed concern about the CSE’s continued withholding of television broadcast licenses, as six more television channels had their licenses suspended over accusations of Russian disinformation. The media outlets and NGOs questioned the restrictions’ proportionality, transparency, and compatibility with the values of a democratic state.139
Examines the current state of press freedom, including libel laws, harassment of journalists, and editorial independence; the operation of a financially viable and independent private press; and the functioning of the public media. | 3.00 / 7.00 |
- New legislation on advertising took effect starting on January 8.140 Under the new legislation, the responsibility for supervising the advertising market was assigned to the Competition Council and the Audiovisual Council, while the police were responsible for supervising advertisements involving vehicles.
- On January 27,141 the Audiovisual Council adopted142 a list of “must-carry” TV channels143 that television service providers are required to broadcast.144 . On August 11, the modifications adding the must-carry list to the audiovisual media services code were published in the Official Gazette.145 Broadcasting obligations entered into force on September 11.146 The criteria for listing, developed by the Audiovisual Council in 2022, includes factors such as public financing and the inclusion of local content. However, the final list included several channels that, according to an independent assessment, showed media coverage that somewhat favored the government.147 The modifications to the audiovisual media services code also introduced a legal definition for the concept of “disinformation.”148
- On July 31, the Parliament approved the establishment of the Center for Strategic Communication and Combating Disinformation, a legislative initiative of President Sandu.149 This is the first agency in the history of Moldova established to counter disinformation. Former interior minister Ana Revenco was appointed its director with a five-year mandate. As of the end of 2023, the center was still a work in progress.
- On September 18, the Audiovisual Council adopted a methodology for the detection and evaluation of disinformation in audiovisual content,150 focusing on cases of disinformation that endanger national security. The authors stated that the methodology was adopted following good practices as defined by the EU and in line with the principles outlined in the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the document lacks specificity regarding the legal basis for the defining threats to national security.151
- In 2023, the Audiovisual Council implemented sanctions for various violations of the Audiovisual Code, including the use of unverified information,152 carrying too small a proportion of Romanian-language content,153 noncompliance with the must-carry list of TV channels,154 discriminatory or personal attacks on journalists,155 electoral campaigning,156 and the retransmission of Russian TV channels.157
- In March, Chișinău mayor Ceban alleged that certain media outlets, including publicly funded outlets, had engaged in manipulation and the dissemination of misinformation158 in their negative coverage of city hall’s activities.
- Throughout 2023, there were several cases of personal verbal attacks and denigration against journalists, usually towards those covering the activities of elected officials. The Association of Independent Press (API), a Moldovan press freedom NGO, reacted strongly against these cases.159 In one example, on February 7, local journalist Mihail Sirkeli,160 editor in chief of online portal Nokta.md, was denigrated during the talk show Let’s Discuss Together161 on Gagauziya Radio Televizionu (GRT TV).162
- On September 14, during a press conference, Minister of Agriculture and Food Industry Vladimir Bolea used coarse language against a journalist, mistakenly thinking that the microphone was off. Some media NGOs condemned the minister’s language,163 while others said that it did not rise to the level of a direct attack.164 Some NGOs demanded that Prime Minister Recean165 penalize Bolea in accordance with the Law regarding the Government, but the administration did not take any actions against the minister.166 .
- In 2023, both public and private media outlets demonstrated political partisanship in their coverage of public events.167 In May, media institutions reported on the simultaneous pro- and antigovernment protests taking place surrounding the European National Assembly of Moldova called by President Sandu. According to an evaluation published by Moldova’s Independent Journalism Center (IJC) NGO,168 the pro–Șor Party television stations Primul în Moldova and Orizont TV/TV6 portrayed the progovernment protests in a negative light but favored the antigovernment protests. In contrast, the national broadcaster Moldova 1 and private TV channels such as Vocea Basarabiei, TVR Moldova, Jurnal TV, Pro TV Chișinău, and TV8 depicted the pro-government protests in a manner that was “slightly” favorable to the government, often with a “triumphalist tone.”
- In June, the API condemned the obstruction of access to information of public interest by the mayor of Costești village, Vasile Borta, who did not allow journalists access to drafts of decisions being considered by the village’s council.169
- On September 21, photojournalist Elena Covalenco announced170 that she had been banned for three years from entering the Transnistria region following her coverage of the situation in the region in July.171 On September 22, the Moldovan government’s Bureau of Reintegration, which deals with Transnistria conflict resolution issues, condemned the ban as an abuse and promised to take appropriate legal actions, although it did not detail specific measures.172
- In October, at the request of the Security and Intelligence Service, the CSE decided to suspend the operation of six television channels (Orizont TV, Prime TV, Publika TV, ITV, Canal 2, and Canal 3) and 30 websites. These media outlets were accused of being part of Russia's disinformation campaign and hybrid operations173 to derail local elections on November 5.174 ITV, Orizont TV,175 Prime TV, and Publika TV all released denials of the allegations.176
Considers the decentralization of power; the responsibilities, election, and capacity of local governmental bodies; and the transparency and accountability of local authorities. | 2.50 / 7.00 |
- Throughout the year, relations between the central and local authorities were influenced by the organization of the local elections in November. The central government’s had a working relationship with the Gagauz autonomous region that was tense or at times entirely absent, especially after the May elections for the Gagauz executive, and had similar relations with the region of Transnistria after Moldova’s Parliament criminalized separatism in amendments to the penal code at the beginning of the year.
- On February 2, Parliament voted in the second reading to modify the penal code,177 introducing penalties for carrying out, instigation, or financing separatist actions. The bill was initiated in December 2022, and authorizes prison sentences of two to five years in the case of separatist actions, up to three years for instigation, and up to 10 years for financing separatist actions.178 On January 9, before the law was adopted the following month, the separatist administration of the Transnistrian region had condemned the law then under consideration as being detrimental to negotiations for the resolution of the conflict.179 Russian authorities have also criticized the law.180
- On March 15, the government adopted the Public Administration Reform Strategy for the years 2023–30, concentrating on civil servant management, institutional framework, strategic planning, reducing bureaucracy, and improving electronic services.181 A significant feature of the strategy is the potential for the “voluntary amalgamation” of territories around highly populated localities in order to increase the effectiveness of local government, subject to requirements for territorial continuity and maximum distances from administrative centers.182
- On July 19,183 Guțul was appointed as bashkan by the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia, the legislative body of the autonomy. No representative of the central authorities was present at the inauguration. While the Assembly approved Guțul’s proposed structure for her administration, it requested that she revise its composition by November 15, 184 urging her to reduce the number of organizational units in the proposed organigram and replace non–Gagauz-speaking individuals within the team.185 On September 20, after multiple attempts, the People’s Assembly approved the composition of Guțul’s executive committee, allowing the heads of the Departments of Interior Affairs, Information and Security, and Construction and Infrastructure to be appointed.186
- President Sandu has been delaying the signing of the decree that would allow Guțul to join the executive, invoking suspicions regarding Guțul’s affiliation with a “criminal group” or her acting in the interest of another country without providing a clear timeline for making a final decision.187 The Presidential Office and other institutions have not replied to Guțul’s request188 to be included in the composition of the government, despite their legal obligation to do so under Law No. 344 of December 23, 1994.189
- On July 17,190 the head of the Russian Communist Party announced at a press conference in Moscow that Oleg Horjan, the leader of the political opposition in Transnistria and head of the Transnistrian Communist Party, had been found dead in his home the previous night, in an apparent murder.191 Moldova’s Parliament organized hearings on this case,192 while the Moldovan government proposed initiating an international investigation under the auspices of the OSCE,193 but this proposal was ignored by the Transnistrian administration in Tiraspol. Horjan had faced political persecution for criticizing Transnistria’s de facto administration, as well as the Sheriff Holding.194 In November 2018, he was sentenced to four and a half years in prison for committing violent actions against the authorities. He was released in December 2022. On July 23, the Supreme Court of Justice in Moldova declared Horjan’s previous sentencing illegal.195
- On October 5, Parliament passed in the second reading a law amending Article 6 (11) of the tax code to require the executive of Gagauzia to refund VAT to registered businesses and other economic operators in the autonomous region from the local budget, not the national one as it had before.196 The PAS deputies who pushed the law argued that in the last five years, 640 million lei ($34.7 million) had been allocated from the national budget to refund VAT to economic operators in Gagauzia and that the new law would be fairer to Moldova’s other territorial units.197 VAT payments collected by Gagauz economic operators were contributed to the national budget, meaning that if reimbursements do not likewise come from the national budget, Gagauzia has to use local funds and reduce expenditures on other local needs. The law was signed into law by President Sandu on October 21, and entered into force on November 1. The People’ Assembly of Gagauzia brought the case to the Constitutional Court, but the court declined to examine it in a November 30 decision.198 The legal changes were not followed by the establishment of a mechanism clarifying when the central authorities should intervene to support Gagauzia’s budget to refund VAT to local businesses. In protest of the VAT changes, the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia voted in December to abandon the mixed working group it had established in 2015 with the deputies of the Parliament of Moldova as a common platform for dialogue.199 Representatives of the Gagauz People’s Assembly had last left the mixed group in 2019 due the Moldovan Parliament’s lack of support for three bills proposed by Gagauz legislators in 2016 aimed at improving the status of the autonomous region.200
- As a result of the Moldovan local elections on November 5, PAS won mayoral races in 291 of 895 localities201 with 32.5 percent of the overall vote nationwide. PSRM elected mayors in 144 localities with 16 percent of the vote, followed by the European Social Democratic Party (PSDE) with 103 mayors and 11.5 percent of the vote. The only party openly associated with Șor, the Revival Party, won in 27 localities, collecting 3 percent of the vote). The number of independent candidates elected as mayor rose to 116. In the votes for local councils, PAS won the majority, with 357 councilors elected out of a total 1086 nationwide, followed by PSRM with 256 and PSDE with 88 mandates. PAS majorities on the councils of 19 out of 32 territorial units.202 Where PAS did not elect enough councilors to appoint the president of town councils, the party’s councilors were open to creating coalitions even with the Socialists, for example in the territorial units of Căușeni203 , Șoldănești, Dubăsari, and Ștefan-Vodă.204 The ability to create coalitions between PAS and the Socialists illustrates a capacity for cooperation at the local level, despite political rivalry at the central level in Parliament.
- In the Chișinău Municipal Council, PAS and reelected mayor Ceban’s MAN party won 20 seats each, of 51 total. PSRM came in third with six seats, and MAN will need its support to assemble a majority.205
Assesses constitutional and human rights protections, judicial independence, the status of ethnic minority rights, guarantees of equality before the law, treatment of suspects and prisoners, and compliance with judicial decisions. | 2.75 / 7.00 |
- In 2023, the Pre-Vetting Commission continued evaluating candidates for the Superior Council of Magistracy and the Superior Council of Prosecutors. A total of 67 judges and prosecutors had undergone the evaluation process, which started in July 2022 for the CSM and in February 2023 for the CSP.206 The results showed that less than 25 percent of the CSM candidates passed the evaluation. Meanwhile, approximately 44 percent of CSP candidates—8 out of 17—passed the evaluation process.207 Twenty-one candidates who did not pass the evaluation appealed the decisions of the Pre-Vetting Commission to the Supreme Court of Justice, and the court overturned those decisions.208
- On August 1, the Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ) adopted 21 separate decisions concluding that the evaluations carried out by the Pre-Vetting Commission of 21 candidates for positions in the CSM and the CSP were affected by “serious problems” of legality in terms of substance and procedural aspects. The court asked the Pre-Vetting Commission to repeat the investigation process of the 21 candidates.209 The Pre-Vetting Commission started evaluating the 21 candidates again in September,210 with procedures based on the SCJ rulings and the Pre-Vetting Law.211 In the repeated evaluation process, three candidates competing for seats in the CSP again failed.212 However, another candidate previously rejected for a position in the CSM passed the repeated vetting procedure.213 The latter case is a clear demonstration that the vetting process can be flawed and therefore needs scrutiny and guaranteed opportunities for magistrates and prosecutors to challenge the decisions of the Pre-Vetting Commission in the Supreme Court of Justice.
- In an interview published on August 10, President Maia Sandu characterized the decisions of the SCJ to regarding these appeals as “illegal” and indicative of resistance within the system against judicial reforms.214 In response, the Association of Judges of the Republic of Moldova pointed to the constitution’s Article 120, which said that the SCJ’s decisions were irrevocable,215 and condemned the president's statement as “generalized and defamatory.”216 Additionally, in August, Anticorruption Prosecutor Veronica Drăgălin stressed the importance of respecting the SCJ’s decisions in the spirit of the rule of law.217 In October, the judicial inspectorate of the CSM announced its intention to verify the decisions made by the SCJ.218
- The Supreme Court of Justice’s decisions demanding the Pre-Vetting Commission to repeat the evaluation for the 21 candidates were criticized by the Ministry of Justice, which said they were “ignoring the legislative power and the integrity vetting mechanism,” as well as a “dangerous precedent for the fight against corruption.”219
- On August 18,220 Parliament voted in favor of changes to the Pre-Vetting Law proposed by Sandu.221 The modifications allow future vetting commissions to ignore the decisions of the SCJ if they are deemed “arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable.” 222 These modifications contradict Article 120 of the constitution.223
- On October 6, Vitalie Miron, a member of the Pre-Vetting Commission appointed by PAS, resigned224 in protest of the new legal modifications to the Pre-Vetting Law.225 The Pre-Vetting Commission asserted that Miron’s resignation of Vitalie Miron will not negatively influence its activity or the vetting process.226
- In 2023, out of the 12 available seats on the CSM, only nine were filled following the pre-vetting and parliamentary appointment processes.227 One of the appointed CSM members, Iulian Muntean,228 who had been positively evaluated by the Pre-Vetting Committee229 and approved by the PAS parliamentary majority,230 resigned due to an ongoing corruption investigation involving bribes from students dating to 2018 (see Corruption).231 On September 21, the Pre-Vetting Commission published a disclaimer that, during its evaluation of Muntean, no information was provided regarding the corruption allegations against him.232
- On August 2,233 President Sandu submitted a request for an opinion from the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission on the draft Law on the Anticorruption Judicial System and Amendments to Some Normative Acts, which aimed to establish an anticorruption court.234 The Venice Commission recommended establishing an anticorruption chamber within the SCJ, and offered several other improvements to the draft.235 Parliament approved a version of the law reflecting those recommendations in the first reading on November 30. The future court authorized by the legislation will be part of a broader anticorruption system consisting of three components: the Anticorruption Court, the Anticorruption Board of the Chișinău Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Justice. The judges of the Anticorruption Court and the members of the Anticorruption Board will be preselected by three international experts nominated by the development partners and three representatives of civil society organizations nominated by the CSM.236 Given the negative situations linked to the Pre-Vetting Commission, it is necessary to ensure that neither the international experts nor the civil society organizations involved in the selection have links with the government to avoid politicization.
- On September 26, President Sandu signed a decree dismissing General Prosecutor Stoyanoglo, almost two years after his suspension.237 His dismissal came a couple of weeks before the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Moldova had violated Stoyanoglo’s right to legal remedies, as set out in Article Six of the European Convention on Human Rights. Therefore, he was not able to bring a challenge in the Moldovan judicial system against the CSP’s decision to suspend him in 2021.238 Sandu argued that her decision to dismiss Stoyanoglo239 was based on the recommendation of the EU, in alignment with the conditions set for implementing EU accession negotiations.240 The presidential decree was examined by the CSP, paving the way for the launch of a new contest to select the next prosecutor general.241 The candidates for the position were required to submit their forms by November 22, although the selection process was still ongoing as of the end of 2023.242 The ECtHR ruling improved Stoyanoglo’s chances of being reinstated to his former position, a process that would require the annulment of President Sandu’s decree on his dismissal,243 and may consequently destabilize the position of a newly appointed prosecutor general.244
Looks at public perceptions of corruption, the business interests of top policymakers, laws on financial disclosure and conflict of interest, and the efficacy of anticorruption initiatives. | 2.50 / 7.00 |
- On January 15, the Chișinău Court of Appeal revised the restrictions placed on Marina Tauber, then the deputy chair of the Șor Party, removing her house arrest and allowing her release under judicial control. Tauber has been under investigation since 2022 on charges related to accepting money from an organized crime group and falsifying financing reports submitted to the Central Electoral Commission. According to the National Anticorruption Center’s investigations, in the first half of 2022, the Șor Party incurred expenses totaling 600,000 euros ($668,000). However, the party had reported only 228,000 lei ($12,500), raising suspicions of financial irregularities and potential discrepancies in its financial reporting.245 On May 1, as she was attempting to travel to Israel, Tauber246 was once again detained at the request of the Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office.247
- On May 16, ahead of the runoff in the elections for the executive of Gagauzia, anticorruption officers carried out unannounced searches at the Central Electoral Committee of Gagauzia on charges of corruption. On the same day, Moldova’s CEC announced that initiated proceedings three days earlier against eight candidates in the Gagauz elections for accepting donations exceeding the legal limit of 11,700 lei per donor, from a total of 106 donors across all of the candidates. The central CEC said it had notified Gagauzia’s separate CEC of the violations, but no action had been taken.248
- In 2023, the idea of merging the Anticorruption Center and the Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office was abandoned based on advice from experts representing the Consultative Independent Anticorruption Committee, a joint independent international and national body established by Sandu.249 According to a law modifying the criminal procedure code that was adopted in July 2023, the Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office will be focused solely on combating grand corruption, while the Anticorruption Center will handle other corruption cases. Olesea Stamate, a PAS deputy who heads the parliamentary Committee on Legal Affairs, Appointments, and Immunities, explained that maintaining this division prevents the shifting of responsibilities and potential blockages in corruption cases.250 The approved changes will take effect in January 2024. Anticorruption prosecutors have expressed dissatisfaction with being limited to high-level corruption cases.251 On various occasions, Stamate also raised concerns about the existing interinstitutional conflicts between the two anticorruption agencies.252
- In July, the Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office announced that Evghenia Guțul has the status of accused in the dossier regarding illegal financing by the Șor Party. Guțul claimed that the Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office had attempted to blackmail her by proposing to close the case against her if she gave up the bashkan position in Gagauzia and testified against other members of the former Șor Party.253 On July 18, interim general prosecutor Ion Munteanu declared that if it is proven that the elections in Gagauzia were fraudulent, the results would be annulled and new elections might be organized, but Guțul rejected this proposition before her appointment as bashkan on July 19.254
- Starting in September, the National Anticorruption Center and the Anticorruption Prosecutor Office have opened criminal investigations against several candidates in the local elections on charges of illegal financing in relation to Șor affiliates. The candidates under investigation were Mihail Bagas,255 Alexander Nesterovschi,256 and Irina Lozovan.257 In the case of Bagas, a childhood friend of Șor’s, the anticorruption agencies were prompted to act by public statements made by Arina Spătaru, the leader of Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), who claims to have worked as an undercover agent to collect information about Șor’s political proxies in Moldova.258 Spătaru was reportedly involved in conversations with Nesterovschi, a Șor affiliate, between April and September, when she publicly revealed the operation.259 According to the Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office, Spătaru received $50,000 from Nesterovschi in Moldova after visiting Israel, where she met with Șor to discuss how she could take over pro-EU political parties.260 Bargas’s LOC party denied the allegations, but investigations are ongoing.261
- In September, the Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office initiated a criminal investigation262 against two officers of the National Anticorruption Center—Iurie Gațcan and Arcadie Rotaru—regarding the Pre-Vetting Commission’s positive evaluation of Iulian Muntean despite the open corruption cases against him.263 The Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office is investigating allegations that Gațcan and Rotaru failed to gather, analyze, and provide the commission with the necessary information about Munteanu. Gațcan was appointed to the Pre-Vetting Commission in June after being put forward by PAS. Two weeks after the scandal involving Muntean, the head of the Anticorruption Center, Iulian Rusu, who was appointed for a five-year term in February 2022, submitted his resignation request in October.264
- In October, two weeks after Muntean scandal hit, the director of the National Anticorruption Center, Iulian Rusu, resigned.265 The resignation appeared to signal an end to the rivalry over the distribution of interinstitutional anticorruption responsibilities between him and the head of the Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office, Veronica Dragălin. On May 12, Rusu had admitted that cooperation between the two anticorruption bodies was poor and that anticorruption prosecutors are not receptive to the requests coming from anticorruption inspectors to initiate criminal cases.
Author: Denis Cenusa is an Associate expert at the Eastern European Studies Centre (Lithuania) and the think tank “Expert-Group” (Moldova). Mr. Cenusa has a Master’s degree in European Interdisciplinary Studies from the College of Europe in Poland (2013) and alumnus of the Advanced Program in EU Law and Economics at Riga Graduate School of Law (2014). He is currently based in Germany, where he is pursuing his doctoral studies at the Justus-Liebig University of Giessen. Mr. Cenusa provides consultancy on risk and crisis management, critical infrastructure, energy security, geopolitics in the post-Soviet space, and geostrategy at the intersection of Russia, China, and the Global South.
Footnotes
- 1“Rezultatele alegerilor din 5 noiembrie 2023” [Results of the elections of November 5, 2023], Alegeri.md, updated November 29, 2023, https://alegeri.md/w/Alegeri_locale_generale_din_2023_%C3%AEn_Republica….
- 2“Partidul pro-european al Maiei Sandu nu a câștigat niciun mandat de primar în municipiile din Republica Moldova” [El partido proeuropeo de Maia Sandu no obtuvo ningún mandato de alcalde en los municipios de la República de Moldavia], HotNews.ro, November 20, 2023, https://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-international-26696410-partidul-maiei-sand….
- 3“Evghenia Guțul revine în vizor. În 19 iulie va avea loc ceremonia de învestire a noului bașkan” [Evghenia Guțul returns to the spotlight. On July 19, the investiture ceremony of the new baskan will take place], Vocea Basarabiei, July 7, 2023, https://voceabasarabiei.md/evghenia-gutul-revine-in-vizor-in-19-iulie-v….
- 4“#101. Parlamentul lucrează pentru tine?! Monitorizarea civică a ședinței plenare din 2 februarie 2023” [#101. Parliament works for you?! Civic monitoring of the plenary session of February 2, 2023], Promo-LEX, February 2, 2023, https://promolex.md/23186-101-parlamentul-lucreaza-pentru-tine-monitori…; “#101. Parlamentul lucrează pentru tine?! Monitorizarea civică a ședinței plenare din 30–31 martie 2023” [#101. Parliament works for you?! Civic monitoring of the plenary session of March 30–31, 2023], Promo-LEX, April 1, 2023, https://promolex.md/23280-101-parlamentul-lucreaza-pentru-tine-monitori…; “#101. Parlamentul lucrează pentru tine?! Monitorizarea civică a ședinței plenare din 25–26 mai 2023” [#101. Parliament works for you?! Civic monitoring of the plenary session of May 25–26, 2023], Promo-LEX, May 29, 2023, https://promolex.md/23520-101-parlamentul-lucreaza-pentru-tine-monitori…; “#101. Parlamentul lucrează pentru tine?! Monitorizarea civică a ședinței plenare din 22–23 iunie 2023” [#101. Parliament works for you?! Civic monitoring of the plenary session of June 22–23, 2023], Promo-LEX, June 25, 2023, https://promolex.md/23685-101-parlamentul-lucreaza-pentru-tine-monitori…; “#101. Parlamentul lucrează pentru tine?! Monitorizarea civică a ședinței plenare din 20 iulie 2023” [#101. Parliament works for you?! Civic monitoring of the plenary session of July 20, 2023], Promo-LEX, July 22, 2023, https://promolex.md/23901-101-parlamentul-lucreaza-pentru-tine-monitori….
- 5Barometer of Public Opinion: Republic of Moldova, August 2023, http://bop.ipp.md/ro.
- 6Barometer of Public Opinion: Republic of Moldova, August 2023, http://bop.ipp.md/ro.
- 7Mihaela Conovali, “PAS îl apără pe Spînu: «A fost supus unor falsuri din partea fugarilor și grupărilor criminale afiliate Kremlinului»” [PAS defends Spînu: “He was subjected to falsifications by fugitives and criminal groups affiliated with the Kremlin”], NewsMaker, April 7, 2023, https://newsmaker.md/ro/pas-il-apara-pe-spinu-a-fost-supus-unor-falsuri….
- 8Irina Miron-Țîbuleac, “Remanierile din Guvernul Recean, între dezamăgiri și critici. «Denotă criza de idei și de cadre»” [Reshuffles in the Recean Government, between disappointments and criticism. “It denotes the crisis of ideas and cadres”], TV8, July 17, 2023, https://tv8.md/ru/2023/17/07/remanierile-din-guvernul-recean-intre-deza….
- 9“Înregistrarea video cu discuția dintre atacatorul de la aeroportul din Chișinău și mama lui, în care acesta îi mărturisește că a împușcat doi oameni, anexată la cauza penală de la PG” [The video recording of the conversation between the attacker at the airport in Chisinau and his mother, in which he confesses that he shot two people, attached to the criminal case from PG], Ziarul de Gardă, 10.07.2023, https://www.zdg.md/stiri/stiri-justitie/inregistrarea-video-cu-discutia…
- 10“Ana Revenco a fost numită în funcția de directoare a Centrului pentru Comunicare Strategică și Combatere a Dezinformării” [Ana Revenco was appointed to the position of director of the Center for Strategic Communication and Combating Disinformation.], The Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, 19.10.2023, https://multimedia.parlament.md/ana-revenco-a-fost-numita-in-functia-de…
- 11“Ultima oră! Rosian Vasiloi, mustrat aspru după tragedia de la Aeroport: Un secretar de stat va fi demis” [Last hour! Rosian Vasiloi, harshly reprimanded after the tragedy at the Airport: A state secretary will be dismissed], Unimedia, 4.09.2023, https://unimedia.info/ro/news/a118374d0a777844/ultima-ora-rosian-vasilo…
- 12Virginia Nica, “Salariile miniștrilor vor ajunge la 50.000 de lei după o nouă majorare” [Ministers’ salaries will reach 50,000 lei after a new increase], Radio Europe Liberă, 31.05.2023, https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/salariile-ministrilor-vor-ajunge-la-…
- 13“Ministra Finanțelor: După majorare, salariul unui ministru va fi de 50 de mii de lei” [Ministry of Finance: After the increase, the salary of a minister will be 50 thousand lei], Noi.md, 31.05.2023, https://noi.md/md/societate/ministra-finantelor-dupa-majorare-salariul-…
- 14Tatiana Gherța, “Din 1 iulie, miniștrii și alți angajați din guvern vor ridica salarii mai mari. Decizia a stârnit nemulțumiri în rândul procurorilor” [From July 1, ministers and other government employees will receive higher salaries. The decision sparked outrage among prosecutors], Anticoruptie.md, 31.05.2023, https://anticoruptie.md/ro/stiri/din-1-iulie-ministrii-si-alti-angajati….
- 15“Majorarea salariilor miniștrilor la 50.000 de lei, aprobată în Parlament” [The increase in ministers' salaries to 50,000 lei, approved in Parliament], Stiri.md, 9.07.2023, https://stiri.md/article/economic/majorarea-salariilor-ministrilor-la-5…
- 16“Prim-Ministrul a anunțat Pachetul „Spor Pentru Moldova”, care include majorarea salariilor, plăți unice și finanțarea unor proiecte prioritare. Dorin Recean: „Suntem alături de cetățeni și avem un plan concret pe dimensiunea socială și economică”” [The Prime Minister announced the “Bonus for Moldova” Package, which includes salary increases, one-time payments and the financing of some priority projects. Dorin Recean: “We are with the citizens and we have a concrete plan on the social and economic dimension”], The Government of the Republic of Moldova, 25.09.2023, https://gov.md/ro/content/prim-ministrul-anuntat-pachetul-spor-pentru-m…
- 17“Preliminary data on the extraordinary evaluation of SCM and SCP candidates after 90 % of the decisions were issued by the Pre-Vetting Commission”, Pre-Vetting Commission, 27.07.2023, https://vetting.md/en/preliminary-data-on-the-extraordinary-evaluation-…
- 18“Declarațiile lui Iulian Muntean, membru recent numit la CSM, despre dosarul de corupție din 2018 în care a fost vizat” [The statements of Iulian Muntean, recently appointed member of the CSM, about the 2018 corruption case in which he was targeted], Ziarul de Gardă, 20.08.2023, https://www.zdg.md/stiri/declaratiile-lui-iulian-muntean-membru-recent-…
- 19“Declarațiile lui Iulian Muntean, membru recent numit la CSM, despre dosarul de corupție din 2018 în care a fost vizat” [The statements of Iulian Muntean, recently appointed member of the CSM, about the 2018 corruption case in which he was targeted], Ziarul de Gardă, 20.10.2023, https://www.zdg.md/stiri/declaratiile-lui-iulian-muntean-membru-recent-…
- 20“EXCLUSIV! Membru proaspăt-numit la CSM și trecut de pre-vetting, învinuit într-un dosar de corupție” [EXCLUSIVE! Newly appointed member of the CSM and passed pre-vetting, accused in a corruption case], Realitatea, 20.09.2023, https://realitatea.md/exclusiv-membru-proaspat-numit-la-csm-si-trecut-d…
- 21“Judecătorii reacționează la declarațiile Maiei Sandu privind deciziile CSJ” [Judges react to Maia Sandu’s statements regarding SCJ decisions], Europa Liberă Moldova, 10.08.2023, https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/judecatorii-reactioneaza-la-declarat….
- 22“Asociația Judecătorilor, nemulțumită de declarațiile Maiei Sandu la adresa judecătorilor de la CSJ, care au anulat 21 de decizii ale Comisiei „pre-vetting”: „Un atac la principiile fundamentale ale statului de drept și independenței justiției”” [The Association of Judges, dissatisfied with Maia Sandu’s statements to the SCJ judges, who annulled 21 decisions of the “pre-vetting” Commission: "An attack on the fundamental principles of the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary”], Ziarul Național, 11.08.2023, https://www.ziarulnational.md/asociatia-judecatorilor-nemultumita-de-de….
- 23[The Association of Judges, dissatisfied with Maia Sandu’s statements to the SCJ judges, who annulled 21 decisions of the “pre-vetting” Commission: "An attack on the fundamental principles of the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary”], https://www.ziarulnational.md/asociatia-judecatorilor-nemultumita-de-de…
- 24“A fost semnat decretul: Maia Sandu l-a eliberat din funcția de procuror general pe Alexandr Stoianoglo” [The decree was signed: Maia Sandu released Alexandr Stoianoglo from the position of general prosecutor], Radio Moldova, 26.09.2023, https://radiomoldova.md/p/21681/a-fost-semnat-decretul-maia-sandu-l-a-e…
- 25“Ministerul Justiției vine cu precizări, după decizia CEDO în privința lui Alexandr Stoianoglo în care statul este obligat să-i achite 3.600 euro drept prejudiciu moral” [The Ministry of Justice comes with clarifications, after the ECtHR decision regarding Alexandr Stoianoglo in which the state is obliged to pay him 3,600 euros as moral damage], ProTV Chișinău, 24.10.2023, https://protv.md/actualitate/ministerul-justitiei-vine-cu-precizari-dup…
- 26„Alexandr Stoiangolo după decizia CEDO: Voi depune o solicitare de suspendare a decretului Președintelui Sandu” [Alexandr Stoiangolo after the ECtHR decision: I will file a request to suspend President Sandu's decree], ProTV Chișinău, 24.10.2023, https://protv.md/actualitate/alexandr-stoianoglo-dupa-decizia-cedo-voi-…
- 27“CEDO// Dreptul de acces la o instanță, încălcat în cazul procurorului general demis, Alexandr Stoianoglo” [ECtHR// The right of access to a court, violated in the case of the dismissed general prosecutor, Alexandr Stoianoglo], Anticoruptie.md, 24.10.2023, https://anticoruptie.md/ro/dosare-de-coruptie/dreptul-de-acces-la-o-ins…; Iurii Botnarenco, “Stoianoglo va merge la CEDO: „Aici parcă toţi ar fi zombaţi. Aşa justiţie nu are viitor” VIDEO” [Stoyanoglo will go to the ECtHR: "It's as if everyone is mocked here. Such justice has no future" VIDEO], 17.11.2021, https://adevarul.ro/stiri-externe/republica-moldova/stoianoglo-va-merge…; Petru Beregoi, “Stoianoglo, cu „un picior afară din Procuratură”. Deputații au modificat legea ca procurorul general să poată fi demis” [Stoianoglo, with “one foot out of the Prosecutor’s Office”. Deputies amended the law so that the general prosecutor can be dismissed], Realitatea.md, 13.08.2021, https://realitatea.md/stoianoglo-cu-un-picior-afara-din-procuratura-dep…
- 28“Prima reacție a lui Ilan Șor, după ce a fost condamnat definitiv la 15 ani de închisoare. „Cei trei judecători și-au scris sentința. Această hotărâre va fi anulată a doua zi după ce va fi dat jos acest regim”” [The first reaction of Ilan Şor, after he was finally sentenced to 15 years in prison. “The three judges wrote their sentence. This decision will be canceled the day after this regime is lifted.”], Ziarul Național, 13.04.2023, https://www.ziarulnational.md/ultima-ora-prima-reactie-a-lui-ilan-sor-d….
- 29Ecaterina Arvintii, “Ilan Șor a rămas fără mandatul de deputat” [Ilan Şor lost his deputy mandate], NewsMaker, 27.04.2023, https://newsmaker.md/ro/ilan-sor-a-ramas-fara-mandatul-de-deputat/
- 30The changes made on October 4 to Article 16 of the Electoral Code pertain to the following four principles: 1) individuals suspected, accused, or indicted of committing crimes mentioned as arguments for declaring the political party unconstitutional; 2) individuals directly involved in actions cited as arguments in the Constitutional Court's decision declaring the political party unconstitutional; 3) individuals excluded from previous electoral polls due to violations of transparent financing principles, which served as arguments for declaring the political party unconstitutional; and 3) individuals included in international sanctions outlined in the Constitutional Court's decision declaring the political party unconstitutional. https://newsmaker.md/ro/deputatii-au-aprobat-si-in-a-doua-lectura-modif…
- 31“Misiunea de Observare Promo-LEX constată tendințe îngrijorătoare care pot afecta organizarea și desfășurarea procesului electoral și rezultatele scrutinului local” [The Promo-LEX Observation Mission notes worrying trends that may affect the organization and conduct of the electoral process and the results of local elections], Promolex, 5.10.2023, https://promolex.md/24229-misiunea-de-observare-promo-lex-constata-tend…
- 32“Observation Mission: General Local Elections 5 November 2023. Report no. 2. Observation period: 5 September – 3 October 2023”, Promolex, 5.10.2023, https://promolex.md/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Report-nr.2_OM_2023_comp…
- 33“International Election Observation Mission: Republic of Moldova – Local Elections, 5 November 2023”, OSCE/ODHR, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/d/2/557406.pdf
- 34Ecaterina Arvintii, “Prezidențiale la pachet cu referendum. PAS a înregistrat un amendament la Codul electoral” [Presidential package with referendum. PAS registered an amendment to the Electoral Code], 27.12.2023, https://newsmaker.md/ro/prezidentiale-la-pachet-cu-referedum-pas-a-inre….
- 35“VIDEO ”Banii europeni n-o să vină pentru reprezentanți ai grupărilor criminale!” Mesaj dur de la Maia Sandu” [VIDEO “European money will not come for representatives of criminal groups!” Tough message from Maia Sandu], Realitatea, 12.09.2023, https://realitatea.md/video-banii-europeni-n-o-sa-vina-pentru-reprezent…
- 36Mihaela Conovali, “VIDEO „Bani europeni nu o să vină pentru grupările criminale”. Dodon o acuză pe Sandu de șantaj, după ce președinta a comentat alegerile locale” [VIDEO “European money will not come for criminal groups”. Dodon accuses Sandu of blackmail, after the president commented on the local elections], Newsmaker, 12.09.2023, https://newsmaker.md/ro/video-bani-europeni-nu-o-sa-vina-pentru-grupari…
- 37“Raportul nr. 3 | Misiunea Promo-LEX de Observare a Alegerilor Locale Generale din 5 noiembrie 2023” [Report no. 3| The Promo-LEX Mission to Observe the General Local Elections of November 5, 2023], Promolex, 20.10.2023, https://promolex.md/24334-raportul-nr-3-misiunea-promo-lex-de-observare…
- 38Out of the total 3,900 registered candidates for the position of mayor, more than half, or 1,867 candidates, represent PAS, the Chance Party (linked to Ilan Șor), and PSRM: 698 candidates from PAS, 649 from the Chance Party, and 520 from PSRM. “Raportul nr. 3 | Misiunea Promo-LEX de Observare a Alegerilor Locale Generale din 5 noiembrie 2023” [Report no. 3| The Promo-LEX Mission to Observe the General Local Elections of November 5, 2023], Promolex, 20.10.2023, https://promolex.md/24334-raportul-nr-3-misiunea-promo-lex-de-observare…
- 39Denis Dermenji, “„Șansa” lui Șor. Un nou-vechi partid, pe orbita oligarhului” [„Șansa” lui Șor. A new departure, pe orbita oligarhulu], Radio Free Europe Moldova, 8.08.2023, https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/sansa-lui-sor-un-nou-vechi-partid-pe…
- 40“International Election Observation Mission: Republic of Moldova – Local Elections, 5 November 2023”, OSCE/ODHR, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/d/2/557406.pdf
- 41“Briefingul de presă, susținut de directorul SIS, privind destructurarea unei rețeli de agentură implicată în acțiuni de trădare de Patrie și spionaj” [The press briefing, held by the director of SIS, regarding the destruction of an agency network involved in actions of treason and espionage], The Service of Information and Security of the Republic of Moldova, 10.07.2023, https://sis.md/ro/content/briefingul-de-pres%C4%83-sus%C8%9Binut-de-dir…
- 42“SIS a blocat două pagini web care promovează războiul” [SIS blocked two web pages promoting war], IPN News Agency, 19.01.2023, https://www.ipn.md/ro/sis-a-blocat-doua-pagini-web-care-promoveaza-razb…; “SIS solicită blocarea mai multor site-uri care alterează spațiul informational” [SIS requests the blocking of several sites that alter the information space], The Service of Information and Security of the Republic of Moldova, 24.10.2023, https://sis.md/ro/content/sis-solicit%C4%83-blocarea-mai-multor-site-ur….
- 43Măriuța Nistor, “Frecvențe TV „în chirie”. Ce se întâmplă cu cele 12 posturi TV cu licența suspendată și ce urmează după ce starea de urgență nu va mai fi prelungită?” ["Rented" TV frequencies. What happens to the 12 TV stations with suspended licenses and what happens after the state of emergency is no longer extended?], Ziarul de Gardă, 28.12.2023, https://www.zdg.md/investigatii/ancheta/frecvente-tv-in-chirie-ce-se-in…
- 44“About EU Partnership Mission in the Republic of Moldova”, EUPM, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eupm-moldova/about-eu-partnership-mission-re…
- 45“Promo-LEX solicită UEFA să nu admită desfășurarea meciurilor de fotbal la Tiraspol, până când nu va fi asigurată respectarea drepturilor omului în stânga Nistrului” [Promo-LEX asks UEFA not to allow football matches to be held in Tiraspol, until the respect of human rights on the left side of the Dniester is ensured], Promolex, 10.08.2023, https://promolex.md/24012-promo-lex-solicita-uefa-sa-nu-admita-desfasur…
- 46“Promo-LEX solicită UEFA să nu admită desfășurarea meciurilor de fotbal la Tiraspol, până când nu va fi asigurată respectarea drepturilor omului în stânga Nistrului” [Promo-LEX asks UEFA not to allow football matches to be held in Tiraspol, until the respect of human rights on the left side of the Dniester is ensured], Promolex, 10.08.2023, https://promolex.md/24012-promo-lex-solicita-uefa-sa-nu-admita-desfasur…
- 47„R. Moldova are un nou Guvern. Membrii Cabinetului Recean au depus jurământul” [The Republic of Moldova has a new Government. The members of the Recean Cabinet took the oath], Europa Liberă România, 16.02.2023, https://romania.europalibera.org/a/guvernul-recean-vot-parlament-republ…
- 48Ecaterina Arventii, “Comuniștii și socialiștii au înaintat moțiunea de cenzură asupra activității Guvernului Recean” [The Communists and socialists submitted the motion of censure on the activity of the Recean Government], Newsmaker, 5.10.2023, https://newsmaker.md/ro/rus/novosti/comunistii-si-socialistii-au-inaint…
- 49“Starea de urgență a fost prelungită cu 60 de zile” [The state of emergency was extended for 60 days], The Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, 21.09.2023, https://multimedia.parlament.md/starea-de-urgenta-a-fost-prelungita-cu-….
- 50“State of the Country Report,” Expert-Grup, 2023, https://www.expert-grup.org/ro/biblioteca/item/2619-raportul-de-stare-a…
- 51Stela Untila, “Tauber, Roșca, Laguta și alți politicieni au lansat „Mișcarea Pentru Popor”. Vor să adune 1 milion de semnături” [Tauber, Roșca, Laguta, and other politicians launched the "Movement for the People”. They want to collect 1 million signatures], Newsmaker, 3.02.2023, https://newsmaker.md/ro/tauber-rosca-laguta-si-alti-politicieni-au-lans…
- 52“Hotărârea nr. 10 din 19 iunie 2023 privind controlul constituționalității Partidului Politic „Șor”” [Decision no. 10 of June 19, 2023 regarding the control of the constitutionality of the "Sor" Political Party], Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova, 19.06.2023, https://www.constcourt.md/ccdocview.php?tip=hotariri&docid=828&l=ro
- 53“Comisia de lichidare a Partidului Politic „Șor” a fost constituită” [The liquidation commission of the "Sor" Political Party was established], 29.08.2023,
- 54Radiomoldova, “După deputatul Nesterovschi, 10 primari au anunțat că pleacă din PSRM” [After MP Nesterovschi, 10 mayors announced that they were leaving PSRM], Radiomoldova, Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Moldova, 16.03.2023, https://radiomoldova.md/p/8266/dupa-deputatul-nesterovschi-10-primari-a…
- 55“Deplasările de serviciu în țară ale deputaților au rămas netransparente, iar cele în străinătate au crescut semnificativ” [The business trips of the members of the parliament in the country remained non-transparent, and those abroad increased significantly], Promolex, 25.07.2023, https://promolex.md/24063-deplasarile-de-serviciu-in-tara-ale-deputatil…
- 56According to Promolex, the average salary of parliamentarians in 2022-23 was approximately 19,000 Moldovan lei or 991 euros. Additionally, they received up to 13,000 Moldovan lei (678 euros) in non-taxed payments for work-related activities. https://promolex.md/24073-veniturile-bugetare-ale-deputatilor-la-limita…
- 57Notably, 9 out of 10 parliamentarians incurring the highest travel expenses are from PAS. The top three spenders are PAS parliamentarians. https://promolex.md/24063-deplasarile-de-serviciu-in-tara-ale-deputatil…
- 58Mihaela Conovali, “Ambasadorul UE la Chișinău critică PAS? „Vedem anumite probleme legate de modul în care agenda Parlamentului este formată și ajustată chiar înainte de ședințe” [Does the EU ambassador in Chisinau criticize PAS? “We see certain problems related to the way the agenda of the Parliament is formed and adjusted even before the meetings”], Newsmaker, 17.08.2023, https://newsmaker.md/ro/ambasadorul-ue-la-chisinau-critica-pas-vedem-an…
- 59“#101. Parlamentul lucrează pentru tine?! Monitorizarea civică a ședinței plenare din 20 iulie 2023” [#101. Parliament works for you?! Civic monitoring of the plenary session of July 20, 2023], Promolex, 22.07.2023, https://promolex.md/23901-101-parlamentul-lucreaza-pentru-tine-monitori…
- 60“#101. Parlamentul lucrează pentru tine?! Monitorizarea civică a ședinței plenare din 2 februarie 2023” [#101. Parliament works for you?! Civic monitoring of the plenary session of February 2, 2023], Promolex, 4.02.2023, https://promolex.md/23186-101-parlamentul-lucreaza-pentru-tine-monitori…
- 61“#101. Parlamentul lucrează pentru tine?! Monitorizarea civică a ședinței plenare din 22-23 iunie 2023” [#101. Parliament works for you?! Civic monitoring of the plenary session of June 22-23, 2023], Promolex, 25.06.2023, https://promolex.md/23685-101-parlamentul-lucreaza-pentru-tine-monitori…
- 62“#101. Parlamentul lucrează pentru tine?! Monitorizarea civică a ședinței plenare din 25-26 mai 2023” [#101. Parliament works for you?! Civic monitoring of the plenary session of May 25-26, 2023], Promolex, 29.05.2023, https://promolex.md/23520-101-parlamentul-lucreaza-pentru-tine-monitori…
- 63“Textul Briefing-ului susținut de doamna judecător constituțional Domnica Manole, pe 19 iunie 2023 (verificarea constituționalității Partidului Politic “Șor”)” [The text of the Briefing held by Ms. Constitutional Judge Domnica Manole, on June 19, 2023 (verification of the constitutionality of the "Sor" Political Party)], The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova, 19.06.2023, https://www.constcourt.md/libview.php?l=ro&idc=7&id=2619&t=/Media/Nouta…
- 64Article 1 point (3) provides the following: (3) The Republic of Moldova is a state of law, democratic, in which human dignity, rights and his freedoms, the free development of the personality human, justice and political pluralism represent supreme values and are guaranteed. Article 41 point (4) stipulated the following: Parties and other social-political organizations which, through their goals or activity, militate against political pluralism, a the principles of the rule of law, of sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity the Republic of Moldova is unconstitutional. https://presedinte.md/app/webroot/Constitutia_RM/Constitutia_RM_RO.pdf; the ruling was based on the party’s practice of non-transparent party financing on a systematic, continuous, and significant scale, including the use of illegal funds for organizing anti-government protests.
- 65The Ministry of Justice was tasked with establishing a special mechanism to dissolve the Șor Party and remove it from the State Register of Legal Entities. https://www.constcourt.md/libview.php?l=ro&idc=7&id=2619&t=/Media/Nouta…
- 66Serghei Țurcan, “OPINIE DISIDENTĂ, expusă în temeiul articolului 27 alin. (5) din Legea cu privire la Curtea Constituţională nr. 317 din 13 decembrie 1994 şi al articolului 67 din Codul jurisdicţiei constituţionale nr. 502 din 16 iunie 1995” [DISSENTING OPINION, presented pursuant to Article 27 para. (5) from the Law on the Constitutional Court no. 317 of December 13, 1994 and Article 67 of the Code of Constitutional Jurisdiction no. 502 of June 16, 1995], Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova, 19.06.2023, https://www.constcourt.md/public/ccdoc/opinii/opinia_separata_Serghei_T…; Vladimir Țurcan, “Opinie separată, prezentată pe baza articolului 27 alin. (5) din Legea cu privire la Curtea Constituțională și a articolului 67 din Codul jurisdicției constituționale” [Separate opinion, presented on the basis of article 27 para. (5) of the Law on the Constitutional Court and Article 67 of the Code of Constitutional Jurisdiction], Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova, 19.06.2023, https://www.constcourt.md/public/ccdoc/opinii/Opinia_separata_184h_V_Tu….
- 67The decision of the Constitutional Court stemmed from a request filed by the Government in November 2022. https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/guvernul-cere-cur%C8%9Bii-constitu%C….
- 68“Guvernul sporește nivelul de siguranță a cetățenilor: companiile aeriene vor transmite datele pasagerilor până la efectuarea zborului” [The government increases the level of safety of citizens: airlines will transmit passenger data until the flight takes place], The Government of the Republic of Moldova, 11.10.2023, https://gov.md/ro/content/guvernul-sporeste-nivelul-de-siguranta-cetate….
- 69“Proiectul de lege privind utilizarea datelor din registrul cu numele pasagerilor” [The draft law on the use of passenger name register data], The Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, 12.10.2023, https://www.parlament.md/ProcesulLegislativ/Proiectedeactelegislative/t….
- 70“Directive (EU) 2016/681 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime,” European Union, 27.04.2016, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/681/oj
- 71Silvia Pusca, “Adrian Efros: Lista pasagerilor care urmează să aterizeze în R. Moldova va fi examinată de către reprezentanții MAI” [Adrian Efros: The list of passengers who are going to land in the Republic of Moldova will be examined by the MAI representatives], Vocea Basarabiei, 13.10.2023, https://voceabasarabiei.md/adrian-efros-lista-pasagerilor-care-urmeaza-… ‘
- 72“Dublă crimă la Aeroportul Chișinău // Cine sunt cei doi bărbați împușcați de cetățeanul tadjik, căruia nu i s-a permis intrarea în Republica Moldova” [Double murder at Chisinau Airport // Who are the two men shot by the Tajik citizen, who was not allowed to enter the Republic of Moldova], Anticoruptie.md, 1.07.2023, https://anticoruptie.md/ro/stiri/dubla-crima-la-aeroportul-chisinau-cin….
- 73“Alegeri în Găgăuzia. În cursa pentru funcția de bașcan sunt înregistrați opt candidați” [Elections in Gagauzia. Eight candidates are registered in the race for the position of mayor], TVR Moldova, 1.04.2023, https://tvrmoldova.md/article/8abd281331e24af9/alegeri-in-gagauzia-in-c…
- 74“Rezultate finale în Găgăuzia: Evghenia Guțul - 52,34%, Grigorii Uzun - 47,66%” [Final results in Gagauzia: Evghenia Guțul - 52.34%, Grigorii Uzun - 47.66%], Tribuna.md, 16.05.2023, https://tribuna.md/2023/05/16/rezultate-finale-in-gagauzia-evghenia-gut…
- 75“Rezultatele preliminare ale alegerilor din Găgăuzia: Candidata Partidului Șor – cele mai multe voturi” [Preliminary results of the elections in Gagauzia: Candidate of the Şor Party - the most votes], Cotidianul, 15.05.2023, https://web.archive.org/web/20231207055926/https://cotidianul.md/2023/0….
- 76“Alegerile din 2019 a guvernatorului Găgăuziei” [The 2019 elections of the governor of Gagauzia], Alegeri.md, https://alegeri.md/w/Alegerile_din_2019_a_guvernatorului_G%C4%83g%C4%83….
- 77Radu Pop ed., “Găgăuzia nu mai are guvernator de la Șor: Evghenia Guțul va fi bașcan independent” [Gagauzia no longer has a governor from Șor: Evghenia Guțul will be an independent bashkan], Stiri pe surse, 19.6.2023, https://www.stiripesurse.ro/gagauzia-nu-mai-are-guvernator-de-la-or-evg….
- 78“CEC inițiază 8 procese contravenționale în cazul finanțării ilegale, în cadrul campaniei electorale pentru alegerile desfășurate în UTA Găgăuzia” [The CEC initiates 8 contravention procedures in the case of illegal financing, within the electoral campaign for the elections held in UTA Gagauzia], Ziarul de Gardă, 16.05.2023, https://www.zdg.md/stiri/politic/ultima-ora-cec-initiaza-8-procese-cont…
- 79“CEC inițiază 8 procese contravenționale în cazul finanțării ilegale, în cadrul campaniei electorale pentru alegerile desfășurate în UTA Găgăuzia” [CEC inițiază 8 procese contravenționale în cazul finanțării ilegale, în cadrul campaniei electorale pentru alegerile desfășurate în UTA Găgăuzia], Ziarul de Gardă, 16.05.2023, https://www.zdg.md/stiri/politic/ultima-ora-cec-initiaza-8-procese-cont…; “Poziția Coaliției Civice pentru Alegeri Libere și Corecte față de alegerile Guvernatorului Găgăuziei 2023” [The position of the Civic Coalition for Free and Fair Elections regarding the 2023 Gagauzia Governor's elections], Independent Press Association, 26.05.2023, https://www.api.md/ro/pozitia-coalitiei-civice-pentru-alegeri-libere-si….
- 80Nadejda Coptu, “Evghenia Guțul a fost pusă sub învinuire în dosarul finanțării ilegale a Partidului Șor” [Evghenia Guțul was accused in the file of illegal financing of the Şor Party], Radio Free Europe Moldova, 12.07.2023, https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/evghenia-gutul-a-fost-pusa-sub-invin….
- 81Central Electoral Committee of the Republic of Moldova, “Lista partidelor politice, înregistrate de Agenția Servicii Publice, care au dreptul de a participa la alegerile locale generale din 5 noiembrie 2023” [List of political parties, registered by the Public Services Agency, which have the right to participate in the general local elections of November 5, 2023], 18.10.2023, https://a.cec.md/ro/lista-partidelor-politice-care-au-dreptul-de-a-part…
- 82Anna Vypritskih, “Сколько денег тратят политические партии на избирательную кампанию в Молдове” [How much money do political parties spend on election campaigns in Moldova?], Newsmaker, 18.10.2023, https://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/skolko-deneg-tratyat-politicheskie-par…
- 83Stela Untila, “„Astfel de evenimente vor fi organizate și pe viitor”. Cum explică Guvernul faptul că Recean a împărțit ziare de promovare a PAS?” [“Such events will be organized in the future.” How does the Government explain the fact that Recean distributed newspapers promoting PAS?], Newsmaker, 29.03.2023, https://newsmaker.md/ro/astfel-de-evenimente-vor-fi-organizate-si-pe-vi…
- 84“Premierul, campanie de promovare pentru PAS! Dorin Recean a împărțit ziare în orașul Cimișlia” [The Prime Minister, promotion campaign for PAS! Dorin Recean distributed newspapers in the city of Cimișlia], Ziua.md, 17.7.2023, https://ziua.md/premierul-campanie-de-promovare-pentru-pas-dorin-recean…
- 85Ana-Maria Dolghii, “Dorin Recean va susține partidul de guvernare în campania electorală pentru locale: „O să mă întâlnesc cu cetățenii, împreună cu echipa PAS” [Dorin Recean will support the governing party in the local electoral campaign: “I will meet with the citizens, together with the PAS team”], Newsmaker, 7.10.2023, https://newsmaker.md/ro/dorin-recean-va-sustine-partidul-de-guvernare-i…
- 86“Misiunea de Observare Promo-LEX constată tendințe îngrijorătoare care pot afecta organizarea și desfășurarea procesului electoral și rezultatele scrutinului local” [The Promo-LEX Observation Mission notes worrying trends that may affect the organization and conduct of the electoral process and the results of local elections], Promolex, 5.10.2023, https://promolex.md/24229-misiunea-de-observare-promo-lex-constata-tend…
- 87“VIDEO ”Banii europeni n-o să vină pentru reprezentanți ai grupărilor criminale!” Mesaj dur de la Maia Sandu” [VIDEO "European money will not come for representatives of criminal groups!" Tough message from Maia Sandu], Realitatea, 12.09.2023, https://realitatea.md/video-banii-europeni-n-o-sa-vina-pentru-reprezent…
- 88“Verdictul guvernării: Un primar antieuropean este împotriva dezvoltării localității și nu va primi fonduri UE” [The government’s verdict: An anti-European mayor is against the development of the locality and will not receive EU funds], Vocea Basarabiei, 28.09.2023, https://voceabasarabiei.md/verdictul-guvernarii-un-primar-antieuropean-… Ana-Maria Dolghii, “VIDEO „Să întoarcem Chișinăul oamenilor”. PAS și-a lansat candidatul în alegerile locale pentru capitală” [VIDEO “Let's return Chisinau to the people”. PAS launched its candidate in the local elections for the capital], Newsmaker, 6.10.2023, https://newsmaker.md/ro/video-sa-intoarcem-chisinaul-oamenilor-pas-si-a…
- 89Mihaela Conovali, “VIDEO „ Bani europeni nu o să vină pentru grupările criminale”. Dodon o acuză pe Sandu de șantaj, după ce președinta a comentat alegerile locale” [VIDEO “European money will not come for criminal groups”. Dodon accuses Sandu of blackmail, after the president commented on the local elections], Newsmaker, 12.09.2023, https://newsmaker.md/ro/video-bani-europeni-nu-o-sa-vina-pentru-grupari…
- 90“Prim-Ministrul a anunțat Pachetul «Spor Pentru Moldova», care include majorarea salariilor, plăți unice și finanțarea unor proiecte prioritare. Dorin Recean: «Suntem alături de cetățeni și avem un plan concret pe dimensiunea socială și economică»” [The Prime Minister announced the “Bonus for Moldova” Package, which includes salary increases, one-time payments and the financing of some priority projects. Dorin Recean: “We are with the citizens and we have a concrete plan on the social and economic dimension”], Government of the Republic of Moldova, 25.9.2023, https://gov.md/ro/content/prim-ministrul-anuntat-pachetul-spor-pentru-m….
- 91“Misiunea de Observare Promo-LEX constată tendințe îngrijorătoare care pot afecta organizarea și desfășurarea procesului electoral și rezultatele scrutinului local” [The Promo-LEX Observation Mission notes worrying trends that may affect the organization and conduct of the electoral process and the results of local elections], Promolex, 5.10.2023, https://promolex.md/24229-misiunea-de-observare-promo-lex-constata-tend…
- 92“Fost președinte CEC: Pachetul „Spor pentru Moldova”, adoptat de Parlament în prag de alegeri locale – o pomană electorală” [Former CEC president: The “Bonus for Moldova” package, adopted by the Parliament on the eve of local elections - an electoral handout], TV6, 6.10.2023, https://tv6.md/ro/2023/10/06/fost-presedinte-cec-pachetul-spor-pentru-m…
- 93Mihael Conovali, “Deputații au aprobat, și în a doua lectură, modificările la Codul electoral: foștii membri „Șor” nu pot candida la alegeri” [Members of the parliamenrt approved, also in the second reading, the amendments to the Electoral Code: former “Șor” members cannot run for elections], Newsmaker, 4.10.2023, https://newsmaker.md/ro/deputatii-au-aprobat-si-in-a-doua-lectura-modif…
- 94The changes made on October 4 to Article 16 of the electoral code enable the exclusion of candidates who meet any of the following criteria: “1) individuals suspected, accused, or indicted of committing crimes mentioned as arguments for declaring the political party unconstitutional; 2) individuals directly involved in actions cited as arguments in the Constitutional Court’s decision declaring the political party unconstitutional; 3) individuals excluded from previous electoral polls due to violations of transparent financing principles, which served as arguments for declaring the political party unconstitutional; and 4) individuals included in international sanctions outlined in the Constitutional Court’s decision declaring the political party unconstitutional.” These restrictions apply for three years from the date the Constitutional Court deemed a political party unconstitutional. See: https://newsmaker.md/ro/deputatii-au-aprobat-si-in-a-doua-lectura-modif….
- 95“Șefa statului a promulgat legea privind modificarea Codului Electoral: Avocatul lui Șor anunță că se va adresa la CC” [The head of state promulgated the law on the amendment of the Electoral Code: Șor's lawyer announces that he will address the CC], TV8, 5.10.2023, https://tv8.md/2023/05/10/sefa-statului-a-promulgat-legea-privind-modif…
- 96Nadejda Coptu, “CSE le interzice unor foști membri ai Partidului Șor să participe la alegerile locale” [CSE forbids some former members of the Shor Party to participate in local elections], Radio Free Europe Moldova, 4.10.2023, https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/cse-le-interzice-unor-fosti-membri-a….
- 97“Un nou refuz pentru Marina Tauber: Recursul împotriva CECE privind neadmiterea în alegerile din Bălți, respins de Curtea de Apel” [A new refusal for Marina Tauber: The appeal against the CECE regarding the non-admission in the elections in Balti, rejected by the Court of Appeal], TV8, 12.10.2023, https://tv8.md/2023/12/10/un-nou-refuz-pentru-marina-tauber-recursul-im….
- 98“Curtea a declarat neconstituțională interdicția de a candida la alegeri, aplicată unor persoane asociate partidelor politice declarate neconstituționale” [The Court declared unconstitutional the ban on running for elections, applied to persons associated with political parties declared unconstitutional], The Constitutional Court, 3.10.2023, https://www.constcourt.md/libview.php?l=ro&idc=7&id=2680&t=/Media/Nouta…
- 99The Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, https://presedinte.md/app/webroot/Constitutia_RM/Constitutia_RM_RO.pdf
- 100“Republic of Moldova - Joint Opinion of the Venice Commission and ODIHR on amendments to the Electoral Code and other related laws concerning ineligibility of persons connected to political parties declared unconstitutional, approved by the Council for Democratic Elections at its 78th meeting (Venice, 5 October 2023) and adopted by the Venice Commission at its 136th Plenary Session (Venice, 6-7 October 2023)”, Venice Commission,6.10.2023, https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-…
- 101“CEC a întocmit lista celor care nu pot fi înregistrați în alegerile locale” [The CEC has drawn up the list of those who cannot be registered in the local elections], IPN News Agency, 5.10.2023, https://www.ipn.md/ro/cec-a-intocmit-lista-celor-care-nu-pot-fi-8012_10…
- 102[The CEC has drawn up the list of those who cannot be registered in the local elections], https://www.ipn.md/ro/cec-a-intocmit-lista-celor-care-nu-pot-fi-8012_10…
- 103“Treasury Targets Corruption and the Kremlin’s Malign Influence Operations in Moldova”, U.S. Department of the Treasury, 26.10.2022, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1049
- 104“Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1045 of 30 May 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/888 concerning restrictive measures in view of actions destabilising the Republic of Moldova”, Official Journal of the European Union, 30.05.2023, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32023R1045
- 105“Treasury Sanctions Russian Intelligence-Linked Malign Influence Actors Targeting Moldova”, U.S. Department of the Treasury, 5.06.2023, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1522
- 106“Peste 60 de mii de candidați au fost înregistrați la alegerile locale generale din 5 noiembrie 2023” [Over 60 thousand candidates were registered for the general local elections of November 5, 2023], Central Electoral Committee, 17.10.2023, https://a.cec.md/ro/peste-60-de-mii-de-candidati-au-fost-inregistrati-2…
- 107“Raportul nr. 3 | Misiunea Promo-LEX de Observare a Alegerilor Locale Generale din 5 noiembrie 2023” [Report no. 3| The Promo-LEX Mission to Observe the General Local Elections of November 5, 2023], Promolex, 20.10.2023, https://promolex.md/24334-raportul-nr-3-misiunea-promo-lex-de-observare…
- 108Anișoara Mîțu, "Trei partide din Moldova au creat o coaliție pentru viitoarele alegeri” [Three parties from Moldova have created a coalition for the upcoming elections], Vocea Basarabiei, 20.12.2023, https://voceabasarabiei.md/trei-partide-din-moldova-au-creat-o-coalitie….
- 109"Key findings of the 2023 Report on the Republic of Moldova", European Commission, 8.11.2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_23_5629
- 110“APEL PUBLIC: Consiliul pentru egalitate, Oficiul Avocatului Poporului și organizațiile societății civile îndeamnă competitorii electorali să utilizeze un discurs public echilibrat” [PUBLIC APPEAL: The Council for Equality, the Office of the People’s Advocate and civil society organizations urge electoral competitors to use a balanced public discourse], Promolex, 6.10.2023, https://promolex.md/24247-apel-public-consiliul-pentru-egalitate-oficiu…
- 111“Apelul Coaliției Civice pentru Alegeri Libere și Corecte în contextul organizării alegerilor locale generale din 5 noiembrie 2023” [The Call of the Civic Coalition for Free and Fair Elections in the context of the organization of the general local elections of November 5, 2023], Promolex, 14.09.2023, https://promolex.md/24161-apelul-coalitiei-civice-pentru-alegeri-libere…
- 112“Candidatura lui Vasile Plămădeală va fi propusă plenului Parlamentului pentru numire în funcția de director al Consiliului de administrație al ANRE” [The candidacy of Vasile Plămădeală will be proposed to the plenary session of the Parliament for the appointment as director of the ANRE Board of Directors], The Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, 23.02.2023, https://www.parlament.md/Actualitate/Comunicatedepresa/tabid/90/Content…. The Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, “A fost lansat un nou concurs pentru funcția de director al ANRE” [A new competition for the position of director of ANRE was launched], 12.04.2023, https://multimedia.parlament.md/a-fost-lansat-un-nou-concurs-pentru-fun…
- 113“IPRE condamnă orice intimidare în privința directorului executiv, Iulian Groza și vine cu informație privind incidentul de accesare eronată a datelor privind bunurile imobile” [IPRE condemns any intimidation regarding the executive director, Iulian Groza, and provides information regarding the incident of erroneous access to real estate data], National Platform from Moldova, 26.01.2023, https://www.eap-csf.md/ipre-condamna-orice-intimidare-privinta-director…; Radio Europa Liberă Moldova, “Scandal în jurul concursului pentru funcția de șef al PCCOCS” [Scandal surrounding the competition for the position of head of PCCOCS], 27.01.2023, https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/scandal-%C3%AEn-jurul-concursului-pe….
- 114“STOP CADRU Dodon îi transmite lui Soros „congratulations” și invită cetățenii: Veniți în ospeție” [STOP FRAME Dodon conveys “congratulations” to Soros and invites the citizens: Come to visit], Realitatea.md, 1.09.2023, https://realitatea.md/stop-cadru-dodon-ii-transmite-lui-soros-congratul…
- 115“Chicu îl acuză pe Groza că a accesat date cu caracter personal ale procurorilor. IPRE susține că a fost „o accesare din eroare”” [Chicu accuses Groza of having accessed personal data of the prosecutors. IPRE claims it was “access by mistake”], Unimedia, 26.01.2023, https://unimedia.info/ro/news/aa07998efdf4bb89/chicu-il-acuza-pe-groza-…
- 116“Avocat: „Un ONG a accesat baza de date a unor judecători și avocați. Aceste organizații sunt un fel de poliție secretă a guvernării”” [Lawyer: “An NGO accessed the database of some judges and lawyers. These organizations are a kind of secret police of the government”], Unimedia, 6.01.2023, https://unimedia.info/ro/news/9046dca961587923/avocat-un-ong-a-accesat-…
- 117“Accesarea datelor personale ale fostului ofițer SIS, candidat la șefia PCCOCS. IPRE „condamnă orice intimidare” în privința directorului executiv, Iulian Groza, și vine cu detalii despre „incidentul de accesare eronată” a datelor privind bunurile immobile” [Accessing the personal data of the former SIS officer, candidate for the headship of the PCCOCS. IPRE "condemns any intimidation" regarding the executive director, Iulian Groza, and comes with details about the "erroneous access incident" of real estate data], Ziarul de Gardă, 27.01.2023, https://www.zdg.md/stiri/stiri-sociale/accesarea-datelor-personale-ale-…
- 118“IPRE condamnă orice intimidare în privința directorului executiv, Iulian Groza și vine cu informație privind incidentul de accesare eronată a datelor privind bunurile imobile” [IPRE condemns any intimidation regarding the executive director, Iulian Groza, and provides information regarding the incident of erroneous access to real estate data], Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, 26.01.2023, https://www.eap-csf.md/ru/ipre-condamna-orice-intimidare-privinta-direc…
- 119“Jurist, despre cererea lui Groza de anularea a concursului pentru șefia PCCOCS: E periculoasă. Nu se face referință la vreun viciu a procesului de preselecție” [Jurist, about Groza's request to cancel the contest for PCCOCS chief: It's dangerous. No reference is made to any flaw in the preselection process], Unimedia, 26.11.2023, https://unimedia.info/ro/news/5cbba5477c6b78c7/jurist-despre-cererea-lu….
- 120Cristina Mirca, “Socialiștii, comuniştii și reprezentanții Partidului Politic Șor au organizat un marș şi au sărbătorit cu fanfară aşa zisa ''Ziua Victoriei''. Mulţi manifestanți au sfidat legea şi au purtat simboluri care promovează războiul” [The socialists, communists and representatives of the Political Party Şor organized a march and celebrated the so-called "Victory Day" with fanfare. Many demonstrators defied the law and carried symbols promoting war], TVR Moldova, 9.05.2023, https://tvrmoldova.md/article/93572b32fc30284d/socialistii-comunistii-s….
- 121Malvina Cojocari, “Panglica sfântului Gheorghe poate fi purtată deschis? Decizia Curții Constituțională” [Can the ribbon of Saint George be worn open? Decision of the Constitutional Court], 11.04.2023, https://newsmaker.md/ro/panglica-sfantului-gheorghe-va-putea-fi-purtata…
- 122"Tens of thousands rally in Moldova for EU membership", 21.05.2023, Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/21/pro-government-rally-in-moldov…
- 123Maxim Pistrui, “Guvernul a anunțat câți bani au fost cheltuiți pentru organizarea Adunării Naționale „Moldova Europeană”” [The government announced how much money was spent on organizing the "European Moldova" National Assembly], Diez.md, 24.05.2023, https://diez.md/2023/05/24/guvernul-a-anuntat-cati-bani-au-fost-cheltui…
- 124“Detalii despre adunarea „Moldova Europeană”: Securitatea - pe primul loc, „contabilitatea” - mai târziu” [Details about the "European Moldova" gathering: Security - first, "accountability" – later], Radio Free Europe Moldova, 16.05.2023, https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/detalii-despre-adunarea-moldova-euro…
- 125“Batrîncea: Cu resurse administrative oamenii vor fi aduși la Chișinău pentru a face audiență” [Batrîncea: With administrative resources, people will be brought to Chisinau to have an audience], Noi.md, 12.04.2023, https://noi.md/md/politica/batrincea-cu-resurse-administrative-oamenii-…
- 126Malvina Cojocari, “DOC „Ziua Victoriei”, marcată pe 9 mai, devine istorie în R. Moldova. PAS modifică legislația” [DOC "Victory Day", marked on May 9, becomes history in the Republic of Moldova. PAS amends the legislation], NewsMaker, 24.05.2023, https://newsmaker.md/ro/doc-ziua-victoriei-marcata-pe-9-mai-devine-isto….
- 127Cristian Sava, “O nouă manifestație a blocat astăzi circulația în centrul Chișinăului. Motivul nemulțumirii a fost noua denumire a aşa-zisei „Zile a Victoriei”” [A new demonstration blocked traffic in the center of Chisinau today. The reason for the dissatisfaction was the new name of the so-called "Victory Days”], TVR Moldova, 3.06.2023. https://tvrmoldova.md/article/cde07154abaf1bfa/o-noua-manifestatie-a-bl…; “(video) Protest la Parlament „în apărarea Zilei Victoriei”: „Rușine!”, „Jos Maia Sandu”” [(video) Protest in Parliament "in defense of Victory Day": "Shame!", "Leave Maia Sandu!"], Unimedia, 15.06.2023, https://unimedia.info/ro/news/39b4414cdd12ab37/live-sedinta-cu-miting-l….
- 128“Participanții la audierile publice au cerut PAS să retragă proiectul de lege privind redenumirea Zilei Victoriei” [Participants in the public hearings asked PAS to withdraw the draft law on renaming Victory Day], The Socialists Party, 7.06.2023, https://socialistii.md/participantii-la-audierile-publice-au-cerut-pas-…
- 129Denis Dermenji, “Deputații PAS s-au răzgândit. Ziua Victoriei nu va fi redenumită, dar va fi marcată pe 8 mai” [The PAS deputies changed their minds. Victory Day will not change its name, but will be celebrated on May 8.], Radio Free Europe Moldova, https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/deputatii-pas-s-au-razgandit-ziua-vi…
- 130Parliamentary Decision No. 433/1990 on commemorative days of holidays and days off in the Republic of Moldova, https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=137772&lang=ro.
- 131Moldova Holds First-Ever Peaceful Pride Parade”, Radio Free Europe, “18.06.2023, https://www.rferl.org/a/moldova-peaceful-pride-parade/32464734.html.
- 132Olga Soroceanu, “Istoria marșurilor LGBT din Moldova” [The history of LGBT marches in Moldova], Radio Free Europe Moldova, https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/istoria-mar%C8%99urilor-lgbt-din-mol…
- 133Mihaela Conovali, “Ceban a comentat marșul LGBT, planificat la Chișinău. Și-a schimbat primarul opinia?” [Ceban commented on the LGBT march planned in Chisinau. Has the mayor changed his mind?], Newsmaker, 21.04.2023, https://newsmaker.md/ro/ceban-a-comentat-marsul-lgbt-planificat-la-chis….
- 134“Rainbow Europe”, ILGA-Europe – the European Region of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association, https://rainbow-europe.org/country-ranking
- 135Anticoruptie.md, “Marina Tauber, luată în furci de comunitatea evreilor” [Marina Tauber, criticized by the Jewish community], 19.06.2023, https://anticoruptie.md/ro/dosare-de-coruptie/marina-tauber-luata-in-fu…
- 136“Promo-LEX solicită UEFA să nu admită desfășurarea meciurilor de fotbal la Tiraspol, până când nu va fi asigurată respectarea drepturilor omului în stânga Nistrului” [Promo-LEX asks UEFA not to allow football matches to be held in Tiraspol, until the respect of human rights on the left side of the Dniester is ensured], Promolex, 10.08.2023, https://promolex.md/24012-promo-lex-solicita-uefa-sa-nu-admita-desfasur…
- 137“Cea de-a douăsprezecea reuniune a Platformei Societății Civile Uniunea Europeană – Republica Moldova: progrese, angajamente, recomandări pentru lansarea negocierilor de aderare la Uniunea Europeană până la final de an” [The twelfth meeting of the Civil Society Platform European Union - Republic of Moldova: progress, commitments, recommendations for the launch of accession negotiations to the European Union by the end of the year], EU Delegation in Moldova, 6.11.2023, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/moldova/cea-de-dou%C4%83sprezece….
- 138“Programul de dezvoltare a organizațiilor societății civile, în proces de elaborare” [The Program for the development of civil society organizations, in the process of elaboration], State Chancellery of the Republic of Moldova, 19.09.2023, https://cancelaria.gov.md/ro/content/programul-de-dezvoltare-organizati….
- 139“CJI, APEL, RISE Moldova și Centrul „Acces-Info” își exprimă îngrijorarea în raport cu suspendarea licențelor posturilor TV, în condiții de lipsă de transparență” [CJI, APEL, RISE Moldova and the "Access-Info" Center express their concern in relation to the suspension of TV station licenses, in conditions of lack of transparency], Independent Journalism Center (IJC), 30.10.2023, https://cji.md/cji-apel-si-centrul-acces-info-isi-exprima-ingrijorarea-….
- 140“Lege Nr. 62 din 17-03-2022 cu privire la publicitate” [Law No. 62 of 17-03-2022 regarding advertising], The Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, 17.03.2022, https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=134924&lang=ro
- 141“Lista serviciilor media audiovizuale „must carry” – aprobată în ședință” [List of audiovisual media services “must carry” - approved in the meeting], The Audiovisual Council, 27.01.2023, https://consiliuaudiovizual.md/news/lista-serviciilor-media-audiovizual…
- 142“Proiectul deciziei referitor la aprobarea criteriilor privind stabilirea listei serviciilor media audiovizuale „must carry”” [The draft decision regarding the approval of the criteria regarding the establishment of the list of audiovisual media services “must carry”], The Audiovisual Council, 9.12.2022, https://consiliuaudiovizual.md/public-consultations/proiectul-regulamen…
- 143“Consiliul Audiovizualului a aprobat criteriile privind stabilirea listei serviciilor media audiovizuale „must carry”” [The Audiovisual Council approved the criteria for establishing the list of “must carry” audiovisual media services], The Audiovisual Council, 8.04.2022, https://consiliuaudiovizual.md/news/consiliul-audiovizualului-a-aprobat…
- 144“Lista serviciilor media audiovizuale „must carry” – aprobată în ședință” [List of audiovisual media services "must carry" - approved in the meeting], The Audiovisual Council, 27.01.2023, https://consiliuaudiovizual.md/news/lista-serviciilor-media-audiovizual…
- 145“Noi prevederi ale Codului serviciilor media audiovizuale au fost publicate în Monitorul Oficial” [New provisions of the Audiovisual Media Services Code were published in the Official Gazette], The Audiovisual Council, 11.08.2023, https://consiliuaudiovizual.md/news/noi-prevederi-ale-codului-serviciil…
- 146“De astăzi distribuitorii de servicii media sunt obligați să plaseze posturile TV din lista „must carry” în primele 20 de poziții” [From today media service distributors are obliged to place TV stations in the “must carry” list in the first 20 positions], The Audiovisual Council, 11.10.2023, https://consiliuaudiovizual.md/news/de-astazi-distribuitorii-de-servici…
- 147Bogdan Sîrbu, “Case Study. 10 TV Channels Covering the “European Moldova” National Assembly”, IJC, 31.05.2023, https://cji.md/en/case-study-10-tv-channels-covering-the-european-moldo…
- 148Disinformation was incorporated into the provisions on Notions, Article 1, and defined as follows: “intentional dissemination, by any means, in the public space, of information whose false or misleading nature can be verified and which is likely to harm national security.” “Noi prevederi ale Codului serviciilor media audiovizuale au fost publicate în Monitorul Oficial” [New provisions of the Audiovisual Media Services Code were published in the Official Gazette], The Audiovisual Council, 11.08.2023, https://consiliuaudiovizual.md/news/noi-prevederi-ale-codului-serviciil…
- 149“A fost instituit Centrul pentru Comunicare Strategică și Combatere a Dezinformării” [The Center for Strategic Communication and Combating Disinformation was established], APEL.md, 31.07.2023, https://apel.md/a-fost-instituit-centrul-pentru-comunicare-strategica-s….
- 150Decision No. 285 of 15.09.2023, “Metodologia privind constatarea și evaluarea cazurilor de dezinformare în conținuturile audiovizuale” [The methodology regarding the detection and evaluation of cases of misinformation in audiovisual content], The Audiovisual Council, 15.09.2023, https://consiliuaudiovizual.md/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Metodologia-p…
- 151“CA a aprobat Metodologia privind constatarea și evaluarea cazurilor de dezinformare în conținuturile audiovizuale” [CA approved the Methodology regarding the detection and evaluation of cases of misinformation in audiovisual content], The Audiovisual Council, 18.09.2023, https://consiliuaudiovizual.md/news/ca-a-aprobat-metodologia-privind-co…
- 152“ORIZONT TV amendat cu 8 000 de lei pentru prezentarea de informații neverificate și avertizat public pentru inexactitate în reflectarea știrilor” [ORIZONT TV fined 8,000 lei for presenting unverified information and publicly warned for inaccuracy in news reporting], The Audiovisual Council, 26.09.2023, https://consiliuaudiovizual.md/news/orizont-tv-amendat-cu-8-000-de-lei-…
- 153“„OLDIMA” SRL, „TV-BOX” SRL, „TVOTT” SRL și „TERINIS-PLUS” SRL sancționați pentru nerespectarea cotei de 50% în limba română, a drepturilor de autor sau a listei „must carry”” [“OLDIMA” SRL, “TV-BOX” SRL, “TVOTT” SRL and “TERINIS-PLUS” SRL sanctioned for non-compliance with the 50% quota in Romanian, copyright or the “must carry” list], The Audiovisual Council, 5.05.2023, https://consiliuaudiovizual.md/news/oldima-srl-tv-box-srl-tvott-srl-si-…
- 154“CA a sancționat 5 distribuitori de servicii pentru insuficiență de posturi TV în limba română, nerespectarea drepturilor de autor, a ofertei de servicii și a listei „must carry”” [CA sanctioned 5 service distributors for insufficient TV stations in Romanian, non-compliance with copyright, service offer and “must carry” list], The Audiovisual Council, 3.07.2023, https://consiliuaudiovizual.md/news/ca-a-sanctionat-5-distribuitori-de-…
- 155„TV-Găgăuzia” sancționată cu două avertizări publice pentru că a admis declarații ofensatoare, discriminatorii și atac la persoană față de jurnalistul Mihail Sirkeli [“TV-Găgăuzia” sanctioned with two public warnings for admitting offensive, discriminatory statements and personal attack against journalist Mihail Sirkeli], The Audiovisual Council, 17.03.2023, https://consiliuaudiovizual.md/news/tv-gagauzia-sanctionata-cu-doua-ave…
- 156“Amendă de 10 000 de lei pentru reflectarea unui candidat la alegeri în afara unui program electoral la Jurnal TV” [Fine of 10,000 lei for coverage of an election candidate outside of an election program on Jurnal TV], The Audiovisual Council, 13.10.2023, https://consiliuaudiovizual.md/news/amenda-de-10-000-de-lei-pentru-refl…
- 157“Amenzi în sumă de 160 000 de lei pentru 4 distribuitori de servicii de televiziune care nu au protejat spațiul audiovizual national” [Fines in the amount of 160,000 lei for 4 distributors of television services that did not protect the national audiovisual space], The Audiovisual Council, 25.09.2023, https://consiliuaudiovizual.md/news/amenzi-in-suma-de-160-000-de-lei-pe…
- 158“ONG-urile de media condamnă campania de intimidare, inițiată de primarul municipiului Chișinău, Ion Ceban, împotriva presei care abordează problemele Capitalei” [Media NGOs condemn the campaign of intimidation, initiated by the mayor of Chisinau, Ion Ceban, against the press that addresses the problems of the Capital], Independent Press Association, 20.03.2023, https://www.api.md/ro/ong-urile-de-media-condamna-campania-de-intimidar…
- 159The Independent Press Association, Attitudes, 2023, https://www.api.md/ro/2023/
- 160The discussion at the talk-show centered around a commentary by Mihail Sirkeli, posted on social media, where he expressed critical views on the February 2, 2014, referendum regarding the external orientation of the autonomy in the event of Moldova losing its independence. The participants of the talk-show “Let’s Discuss Together” condemned Sirkeli’s critical remarks, using derogatory terms such as “sneaky,” “dirty,” “bought,” and “fulfilling an order” against him.
- 161“Обсуждаем Вместе” [“Let’s Discuss Together”], Gagauziya Radio Televizionu (GTR), YouTube video, 7.02.2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bqfal75bRRo
- 162“ONG-urile de media se solidarizează cu Mihail Sirkeli și solicită politicienilor și altor activiști politici din UTA Găgăuzia să înceteze atacurile și intimidările jurnaliștilor incomozi” [Media NGOs stand in solidarity with Mihail Sirkeli and call on politicians and other political activists from UTA Gagauzia to stop attacks and intimidation of uncomfortable journalists], Independent Press Association, 14.02.2023, https://www.api.md/ro/ong-urile-de-media-se-solidarizeaza-cu-mihail-sir…
- 163“ONG-urile de media condamnă comportamentul inadecvat al ministrului Vladimir Bolea, care a utilizat expresii necenzurate la adresa unui jurnalist” [Media NGOs condemn the inappropriate behavior of Minister Vladimir Bolea, who used uncensored expressions towards a journalist], The Independent Press Association, 15.09.2023, https://www.api.md/ro/ong-urile-de-media-condamna-comportamentul-inadec…
- 164Irina Mardari, “Ars pe rug, dar fără pară? Vladimir Bolea, criticat de opinia publică, dar și scuzat, în același timp” [Burned at the stake, but without a pear? Vladimir Bolea, criticized by public opinion, but also excused, at the same time], Agora.md, https://agora.md/2023/09/15/ars-pe-rug-dar-fara-para-vladimir-bolea-cri…
- 165“Partidul PAS dezaprobă remarcile ministrului Vladimir Bolea care a înjurat un jurnalist la o conferință de presă” [The PAS party disapproves of the remarks of Minister Vladimir Bolea who swore at a journalist at a press conference], ProTV Chișinău, 15.09.2023, https://protv.md/politic/partidul-pas-dezaproba-remarcile-ministrului-v…
- 166Article 22, point (2) (j) of Law No. 136 of July 7, 2017, regarding the Government, which allows for the application of disciplinary sanctions without specifying their nature. The Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, “Legea Nr. 136 din 07-07-2017 cu privire la Guvern” [Law No. 136 of 7.07.2017 regarding the Government], https://gov.md/ro/content/legea-cu-privire-la-guvern/. https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=133423&lang=ro.
- 167Victor Gotișan, “Case Study. The Press from Chisinau, Tiraspol, and Comrat Covers the Sor Party Protests on March 12 and 16”, IJC, 31.03.2023, https://cji.md/en/case-study-the-press-from-chisinau-tiraspol-and-comra….
- 168Bogdan Sîrbu, “Case Study. 10 TV Channels Covering the “European Moldova” National Assembly”, IJC, 31.05.2023, https://cji.md/en/case-study-10-tv-channels-covering-the-european-moldo…
- 169“ONG-urile de media condamnă acțiunile primarului s. Costești de îngrădire abuzivă și nejustificată a accesului jurnaliștilor la informații de interes public” [Media NGOs condemn the actions of the mayor of Costești for abusive and unjustified restriction of journalists’ access to information of public interest], Independent Press Association, 29.06.2023, https://www.api.md/ro/ong-urile-de-media-condamna-actiunile-primarului-…
- 170Ecaterina Arvintii, “O fotojurnalistă de la Chișinău, declarată indezirabilă în Transnistria pentru 3 ani: „Pur și simplu mergeam la meci”” [A photojournalist from Chisinau, declared undesirable in Transnistria for 3 years: “I was simply going to the match”], Newsmaker, 21.09.2023, https://newsmaker.md/ro/doc-o-fotojurnalista-de-la-chisinau-declarata-i…
- 171“ONG-urile de media condamnă restricțiile ilegale impuse de Tiraspol în raport cu presa și solicită autorităților legitime ale statului să intervină” [Media NGOs condemn the illegal restrictions imposed by Tiraspol in relation to the press and call on the legitimate state authorities to intervene], The Independent Press Association, 22.09.2023, https://www.api.md/ro/ong-urile-de-media-condamna-restrictiile-ilegale-…
- 172Ecaterina Arvintii, “Chișinăul promite „măsuri legitime de răspuns”, după ce fotojurnalista Elena Covalenco a fost declarată indezirabilă în Transnistri” [Chisinau promises “legitimate response measures” after photojournalist Elena Covalenco was declared undesirable in Transnistria], https://newsmaker.md/ro/chisinaul-promite-masuri-legitime-de-raspuns-du….
- 173“Guvernul, despre închiderea a 6 posturi TV: „S-a demonstrat semnul de egalitate între grupările criminale Șor și Plahotniuc”” [The government, about the closure of 6 TV stations: "The sign of equality between the criminal groups Șor and Plahotniuc has been demonstrated"], TV8, 1.11.2023, https://tv8.md/2023/01/11/guvernul-despre-inchiderea-a-6-posturi-tv-s-a….
- 174Nadejda Coptu, “Guvernarea blochează șase posturi TV și 30 de site-uri prin care Rusia ar manipula alegerile din R. Moldova” [The government blocks six TV stations and 30 websites through which Russia allegedly manipulated the elections in the Republic of Moldova], Radio Free Europe Moldova, 30.10.2023, https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/sis-cere-sa-fie-sistata-licenta-a-sa…
- 175“Declarație publică, lansată de Orizont TV și ITV după ce CSE le-a suspendat licențele: Atac fără precedent asupra libertății mass-media în Republica Moldova” [Public statement, released by Orizont TV and ITV after the CSE suspended their licenses: Unprecedented attack on media freedom in the Republic of Moldova], OrizontTV, 30.10.2023, https://orizont.tv/ro/2023/10/30/declaratie-publica-lansata-de-orizont-…
- 176Nadejda Coptu, “Guvernarea blochează șase posturi TV și 30 de site-uri prin care Rusia ar manipula alegerile din R. Moldova” [The government blocks six TV stations and 30 websites through which Russia allegedly manipulated the elections in the Republic of Moldova], Radio Free Europe Moldova, 30.10.2023, https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/sis-cere-sa-fie-sistata-licenta-a-sa…
- 177“Lege Nr. 9 din 02-02-2023 pentru modificarea unor acte normative” [Law No. 9 of 02-02-2023 for the modification of some normative acts], Official Gazette, The Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, 18.02.2023, https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=135630&lang=ro
- 178Denis Dermenji, “Separatismul va fi pedepsit penal. Parlamentul a dat votul final” [Separatism will be punished criminally. Parliament gave the final vote], NewsMaker, 2.02.2023, https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/separatismul-va-fi-pedepsit-penal-pa….
- 179“Комментарий Министерства иностранных дел” [Comment from the “Ministry of Foreign Affairs”], “Ministry of Foreign Affairs” of the administration of the Transnistrian region, 9.01.2023, https://mid.gospmr.org/ru/node/9310
- 180“VIDEO Zaharova critică Legea separatismului: Cele două maluri ale Nistrului s-au înstrăinat și mai mult” [VIDEO Zaharova criticizes the Law of separatism: The two banks of the Dniester have become even more estranged], Realitatea.md, 10.01.2023, https://realitatea.md/video-zaharova-critica-legea-separatismului-cele-…
- 181“Strategia de reformă a administrației publice din republica moldova, pentru anii 2023-2030, aprobată de executiv” [The public administration reform strategy in the Republic of Moldova, for the years 2023-2030, approved by the executive], Government of the Republic of Moldova, 15.03.2023, https://gov.md/ro/content/strategia-de-reforma-administratiei-publice-d…
- 182“Reforma teritorial-administrativă, dur criticată, a primit undă verde de la deputații PAS: Legea de amalgamare voluntară, votată în lectură finală” [The territorial-administrative reform, harshly criticized, received the green light from PAS deputies: the Voluntary Amalgamation Law, voted in final reading], Unimedia, 31.06.2023, https://unimedia.info/ro/news/207cc51ee9589bcb/reforma-teritorial-admin….
- 183“Evghenia Guțul a fost învestită în funcția de bașcan al Găgăuziei” [Evghenia Guțul was invested in the position of Bascan of Gagauzia], Europa Liberă Moldova, 19.07.2023, https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/evghenia-gutul-a-fost-investita-in-f…
- 184Ecaterina Dubasova, “Гуцул «в шоке». Как гагаузские депутаты и башкан от Шора учили друг друга жить и не «обломать зубы»” [ Guțul is “shocked.” How Gagauz deputies and the governor from Shor taught each other to live and not “break their teeth”], NewsMaker, 25.08.2023, https://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/gutsul-v-shoke-kak-gagauzskie-deputaty…
- 185Ecaterina Dubasova, “Гуцул «в шоке». Как гагаузские депутаты и башкан от Шора учили друг друга жить и не «обломать зубы»” [ Guțul is “shocked.” How Gagauz deputies and the governor from Shor taught each other to live and not “break their teeth”], NewsMaker, 25.08.2023, https://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/gutsul-v-shoke-kak-gagauzskie-deputaty…
- 186Ecaterina Arvintii, “Comitetul Executiv propus de Evghenia Guțul a primit votul de încredere din partea Adunării Populare” [The Executive Committee proposed by Evghenia Guțul received the vote of confidence from the People’s Assembly], NewsMaker, 20.09.2023, https://newsmaker.md/ro/comitetul-executiv-propus-de-evghenia-gutul-a-p…
- 187“Maia Sandu explică de ce încă nu a semnat decretul de confirmare a Evgheniei Guțul în calitate de membră a Guvernului” [Maia Sandu explains why she has not yet signed the decree confirming Evghenia Guțul as a member of the Government], Ziardul de Gardă, 12.09.2023, https://www.zdg.md/stiri/maia-sandu-explica-de-ce-inca-nu-a-semnat-decr…
- 188“Bașcana Găgăuziei se autopropune în Guvernul de la Chişinău” [The Bashkan of Gagauzia proposes itself in the Chisinau Government], Stiripresurse.md, 5.09.2023, https://stiripesurse.md/evghenia-gutul-se-autopropune-in-guvernul-de-la…
- 189“Legea Nr. 344 din 23.12.1994 privind statutul juridic special al Găgăuziei (Gagauz-Yeri)” [Law No. 344 of 23 December 1994 on the special legal status of Gagauzia (Gagauz-Yeri)], The Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=86681&lang=ro
- 190“În Transnistria a fost omorât liderul opoziției Oleg Horjan” [Opposition leader Oleg Horjan was killed in Transnistria], Infotag, 17.07.2023, https://www.infotag.md/rebelion-ro/309137/
- 191“Партии из Молдовы и Приднестровья впервые выступили с совместной декларацией” [Parties from Moldova and Transnistria made a joint declaration for the first time], Omega, 9.07.2023, https://omg.md/43727-partii-iz-moldovy-i-pridnestrovja-vpervye-vystupil…
- 192Stela Untila, “Audieri la Parlament pe dosarul Horjan. Popșoi confirmă: suspectul numit de Tiraspol nu se afla în Moldova în momentul crimei” [Hearings at the Parliament on the Horjan file. Popșoi confirms: the suspect named by Tiraspol is not in Moldova at the time of the crime], Newsmaker, 25.07.2023, https://newsmaker.md/ro/audieri-la-parlament-pe-dosarul-horjan-popsoi-c…
- 193Ana-Maria Dolghii, “Omorul lui Horjan: Chișinăul propune o anchetă neutră, sub egida OSCE” [Horjan's murder: Chisinau proposes a neutral investigation, under the auspices of the OSCE], NewsMaker, 17.07.2023, https://newsmaker.md/ro/omorul-lui-horjan-chisinaul-propune-o-ancheta-n…
- 194Iulia Elikhina, «Они давно бы избавились от меня так же, как это делали со своими оппонентами в 90-е». Интервью NM с Олегом Хоржаном из приднестровской тюрьмы [“They would have gotten rid of me long ago just like they did with their opponents in the 90s.” NM interview with Oleg Khorzhan from a Transnistrian prison], NewsMaker, 26.08.2021, https://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/oni-davno-by-izbavilis-ot-menya-tak-zh…
- 195“Horjan Oleg a fost condamnat de „instanțele de judecată” din „autoproclamata r.m.n.” care în mod ilegal şi-au asumat atribuții de înfăptuire a justiției în regiunea transnistreană” [Horjan Oleg was convicted by the “courts” of the “self-proclaimed R.M.N.” which illegally assumed duties of administering justice in the Transnistrian region], Promolex, 23.07.2020, https://promolex.md/18297-curtea-suprema-de-justitie-a-constatat-ca-pre…
- 196“Lege Nr. 285 din 05-10-2023 pentru modificarea articolului 6 din Codul fiscal nr. 1163/1997” [Law No. 285 of 05-10-2023 for the amendment of article 6 of the Fiscal Code no. 1163/1997], Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, 21.10.2023, https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=139544&lang=ro
- 197“Parlamentarii au operat modificări la Codul fiscal” [Parliamentarians made changes to the Fiscal Code], Moldpres, 31.07.2023, https://www.moldpres.md/news/2023/07/31/23006101.
- 198“Eșec pentru deputații de la Comrat: Legea care obligă Găgăuzia să restituie TVA-ul din propriul buget rămâne în vigoare” [Failure for deputies from Comrat: The law that obliges Gagauzia to return VAT from its own budget remains in force], TV8, 2.02.2023, https://tv8.md/2023/02/12/esec-pentru-deputatii-de-la-comrat-legea-care….
- 199"Ședință extraordinară în UTA Găgăuzia. Deputații și-au suspendat participarea în platforma de dialog cu Chișinăul" [Extraordinary meeting in UTA Gagauzia. Deputies suspended their participation in the dialogue platform with Chisinau], Realitatea.md, 13.12.2023, https://realitatea.md/sedinta-extraordinara-in-uta-gagauzia-deputatii-s….
- 200Petr Garciu, “Гагаузия ставит на паузу. Гагаузские депутаты приостановили диалог с парламентом Молдовы” [Gagauzia pauses. Gagauz deputies suspended dialogue with the Parliament of Moldova], NewsMaker, 13.12.2019, https://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/gagauziya-stavit-na-pauzu-gagauzskie-d….
- 201Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, “Republic of Moldvoa: Local Elections 5 November 2023”, ODIHR Election Observation Mission, 18.03.2024, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/5/564925_0.pdf
- 202“Alegeri 2023: PAS va avea cea mai mare fracțiune în 19 consilii raionale” [2023 elections: PAS will have the largest fraction in 19 district councils], Stiri.md, 6.11.2023, https://stiri.md/article/social/alegeri-2023-pas-va-avea-cea-mai-mare-f…
- 203Irina Soltan, “PAS face „coaliție largă” la Căușeni, inclusiv cu socialiștii. Noul președinte de raion: „Nu am împărțit între ai noștri și ai voștri” [PAS forms a "broad coalition" in Căuşeni, including the socialists. The new district president: "We did not divide between ours and yours"], Agora.md, 4.12.2023, https://agora.md/2023/12/04/pas-face-coalitie-larga-la-causeni-inclusiv…
- 204“ /VIDEO/ PAS și PSRM fac sau nu coaliție? În Parlament se ceartă, dar în consiliile locale au găsit limbă comună" [/VIDEO/ PAS and PSRM form a coalition or not? They argue in the Parliament, but in the local councils they found a common language], TV8, 9.12.2023, https://tv8.md/2023/09/12/video-pas-si-psrm-fac-sau-nu-coalitie-in-parl…
- 205“Alegeri locale generale din 2023 în Republic Moldova” [Alegeri.md, “Alegeri locale generale din 2023 în Republic Moldova”], Alegeri.md, https://alegeri.md/w/Alegeri_locale_generale_din_2023_%C3%AEn_Republica…
- 206Alexandr Nugmanov, “Vetting în Moldova: la ce etapă este reforma justiției și de ce rezultatele întârzie să apară. Cronologie NM” [Vetting in Moldova: at what stage is the justice reform and why the results are delayed. Chronology NM], NewsMaker, 27.02.2024, https://newsmaker.md/ro/vetting-in-moldova-la-ce-etapa-este-reforma-jus…
- 207“Preliminary data on the extraordinary evaluation of SCM and SCP candidates after 90 % of the decisions were issued by the Pre-Vetting Commission”, Pre-Vetting Commission, 27.07.2023, https://vetting.md/en/preliminary-data-on-the-extraordinary-evaluation-….
- 208“Report on the Evaluation (pre-vetting) of candidates for the members of the Superior Council of Magistracy in Moldova”, OSCE, 1 June 2022 – 1 August 2023, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/9/3/553987.pdf.
- 209“CSJ a anunțat că a reținut probleme de legalitate în privința deciziilor Comisiei de Pre-Vetting” [The CSJ announced that it had retained legality issues regarding the decisions of the Pre-Vetting Commission], Moldpres, 2.08.2023, https://www.moldpres.md/news/2023/08/02/23006194
- 210“Pre-Vetting Commission resumes evaluation process for 21 candidates following the findings of the Supreme Court of Justice”, Pre-Vetting Commission, 8.09.2023, https://vetting.md/en/comisia-pre-vetting-reia-procedura-de-evaluarea-a…
- 211“Law No 26 of 10.03.2022 on measures related to the selection of candidates for the positions of members in the self-administration bodies of judges and prosecutors”, Pre-Vetting Commission, https://vetting.md/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Law-26-updated.pdf
- 212“Three SCP candidates failed the resumed evaluation completed by the Pre-Vetting”, Pre-Vetting Commission, 8.12.2023, https://vetting.md/en/three-scp-candidates-failed-the-resumed-evaluatio…
- 213“One SCM candidate has passed the resumed evaluation of the Pre-Vetting Commission”, Pre-Vetting Commission, 14.12.2023, https://vetting.md/en/one-scm-candidate-has-passed-the-resumed-evaluati…
- 214“„Deciziile pe bandă rulantă și aproape trase la indigo ale CSJ de anulare a hotărârilor Comisiei de evaluare externă a integrității judecătorilor sunt ilegale”. Președinta Maia Sandu despre deciziile CSJ în privința candidaților la funcția de membri ai CSM și CSP și despre ce urmează în reforma justiției” [“The decisions on the conveyor belt and almost shot in indigo of the SCJ to cancel the decisions of the Commission for the External Evaluation of the Integrity of Judges are illegal.” President Maia Sandu about the decisions of the SCJ regarding the candidates for the position of members of the CSM and CSP and about what is to come in the justice reform.], Ziarul de Gardă, 9.08.2023, https://www.zdg.md/stiri/stiri-justitie/deciziile-pe-banda-rulanta-si-a….
- 215“Asociația Judecătorilor, nemulțumită de declarațiile Maiei Sandu la adresa judecătorilor de la CSJ, care au anulat 21 de decizii ale Comisiei „aga”: „Un atac la principiile fundamentale ale statului de drept și independenței justiției”” [The Association of Judges, dissatisfied with Maia Sandu’s statements to the SCJ judges, who annulled 21 decisions of the “pre-vetting” Commission: "An attack on the fundamental principles of the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary”], Ziarul Național, 11.08.2023, https://www.ziarulnational.md/asociatia-judecatorilor-nemultumita-de-de…
- 216“Judecătorii reacționează la declarațiile Maiei Sandu privind deciziile CSJ” [Judges react to Maia Sandu’s statements regarding SCJ decisions], Europa Liberă Moldova, 10.08.2023, https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/judecatorii-reactioneaza-la-declarat…
- 217“CUB: Șefa Procuraturii Anticorupție o pune la punct pe Maia Sandu” [CUB: The head of the Anticorruption Prosecutor's Office sets up Maia Sandu], Tribuna.md, 22.08.2023, https://tribuna.md/2023/08/22/cub-sefa-procuraturii-anticoruptie-o-pune…
- 218“Inspecția judiciară va verifica deciziile CSJ. Cum vor afecta acestea pre-vetting-ul?” [The judicial inspection will verify the decisions of the SCJ. How will these affect pre-vetting?], Europa Liberă Moldova, 2.10.2023, https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/inspectia-judiciara-va-verifica-deci…
- 219“Comunicat de presă cu privire la Deciziile Curții Supreme de Justiție de anulare a deciziilor Comisiei de pre-vetting” [Press release regarding the Decisions of the Supreme Court of Justice annulling the decisions of the Pre-vetting Commission], The Ministry of Justice of Moldova, August 2023, https://www.justice.gov.md/ro/content/comunicat-de-presa-cu-privire-la-…
- 220Cristian Sava, “Modificările la Legea Vettingului, adoptate de Parlament la solicitarea Maiei Sandu, au fost criticate de opoziţie şi de societatea civilă” [The amendments to the Vetting Law, adopted by Parliament at the request of Maia Sandu, were criticized by the opposition and civil society], TVR Moldova, 18.09.2023, https://tvrmoldova.md/article/b0c0c4be9be0980b/modificarile-la-legea-ve…
- 221“Law No 26 of 10.03.2022 on measures related to the selection of candidates for the positions of members in the self-administration bodies of judges and prosecutors”, The Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, 10.03.2022, https://vetting.md/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Law-26-updated.pdf; Cristian Sava, “Modificările la Legea Vettingului, adoptate de Parlament la solicitarea Maiei Sandu, au fost criticate de opoziţie şi de societatea civilă” [The amendments to the Vetting Law, adopted by Parliament at the request of Maia Sandu, were criticized by the opposition and civil society], TVR Moldova,18.09.2023, https://tvrmoldova.md/article/b0c0c4be9be0980b/modificarile-la-legea-ve….
- 222[The amendments to the Vetting Law, adopted by Parliament at the request of Maia Sandu, were criticized by the opposition and civil society], https://tvrmoldova.md/article/b0c0c4be9be0980b/modificarile-la-legea-ve…; Nadejda Coptu, “Mai multe împuterniciri pentru comisia de evaluare a judecătorilor și procurorilor, la solicitarea Maiei Sandu” [More authorizations for the evaluation commission of judges and prosecutors, at the request of Maia Sandu], Radio Free Europe Moldova,18.08.2023, https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/mai-multe-imputerniciri-pentru-comis….
- 223The Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, https://presedinte.md/app/webroot/Constitutia_RM/Constitutia_RM_RO.pdf; Milena Onisim, „Se încalcă nu doar principiile dreptului, dar și regulile logicii elementare”. Juriștii acuză, președinta Comisiei juridice, numiri și imunități explică modificările la proiectul privind evaluarea externă a judecătorilor și procurorilor” [“Not only the principles of law are violated, but also the rules of elementary logic.” Lawyers accuse, the president of the Legal, Appointments and Immunities Commission explains the changes to the project on the external evaluation of judges and prosecutors], Ziarul de Gardă, 22.08.2023, https://www.zdg.md/stiri/stiri-justitie/se-incalca-nu-doar-principiile-….
- 224“Un membru al Comisiei Pre-vetting a demisionat: „Suntem în prezența unui absurd juridic”” [A Member of the Pre-vetting Commission resigned: “We are in the presence of a legal absurdity”], Tribuna.md, 6.10.2023, https://tribuna.md/2023/10/06/un-membru-al-comisiei-pre-vetting-a-demis…
- 225“Statement regarding the resignation of Commission member Vitalie Miron”, Pre-vetting Commission, 6.10.2023, https://vetting.md/en/statement-regarding-the-resignation-of-commission…
- 226“Statement regarding the resignation of Commission member Vitalie Miron”, https://vetting.md/en/statement-regarding-the-resignation-of-commission…
- 227Supreme Council of Magistracy, https://www.csm.md/ro/structura/membrii-csm.html
- 228“Declarațiile lui Iulian Muntean, membru recent numit la CSM, despre dosarul de corupție din 2018 în care a fost vizat” [The statements of Iulian Muntean, recently appointed member of the CSM, about the 2018 corruption case in which he was targeted], Ziarul de Gardă, 20.08.2023, https://www.zdg.md/stiri/declaratiile-lui-iulian-muntean-membru-recent-…
- 229“Ex-președintele Curții Constituționale, despre cazul Munteanu de la CSM: Lipsa unei reacții din partea Comisiei Pre-vetting în mod clar demonstrează o anumită complicitate în această situație” [The former president of the Constitutional Court, about the Munteanu case from the CSM: The lack of a reaction from the Pre-vetting Commission clearly demonstrates a certain complicity in this situation], TVR Moldova, 28.09.2023, https://tvrmoldova.md/article/def4e5f62e97a8dc/ex-presedintele-curtii-c…
- 230“EXCLUSIV! Membru proaspăt-numit la CSM și trecut de pre-vetting, învinuit într-un dosar de corupție” [EXCLUSIVE! Newly appointed member of the CSM and passed pre-vetting, accused in a corruption case], Realitatea, 20.09.2023, https://realitatea.md/exclusiv-membru-proaspat-numit-la-csm-si-trecut-d…
- 231“Declarațiile lui Iulian Muntean, membru recent numit la CSM, despre dosarul de corupție din 2018 în care a fost vizat” [The statements of Iulian Muntean, recently appointed member of the CSM, about the 2018 corruption case in which he was targeted], Ziarul de Gardă, 20.10.2023, https://www.zdg.md/stiri/declaratiile-lui-iulian-muntean-membru-recent-…
- 232“Public statement related to SCM member, Iulian Muntean”, Pre-Vetting Commission, 21.09.2023, https://vetting.md/en/public-statement/
- 233Mihaela Conovali, “DOC „Judecătoria Anticorupție” în loc de „Tribunalul Anticorupție”. Inițiativa Maiei Sandu ajunge în Parlament” [DOC “Anticorruption Court” instead of “Anticorruption Court”. Maia Sandu’s initiative reaches Parliament], Newsmaker, 29.07.2023, https://newsmaker.md/ro/doc-judecatoria-anticoruptie-in-loc-de-tribunal…
- 234Republic of Moldova - Joint opinion of the Venice Commission and the Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of Law (DGI) of the Council of Europe on the draft Law on the anticorruption judicial system and on amending some normative acts, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 136th Plenary Session (Venice, 6-7 October 2023), Venice Commission, 10.10.2023, https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-…
- 235These include: conducting data analysis of the number of judges capable of handling corruption-related cases, allowing the selection of anticorruption judges by the SCM through a selection board, outlining clear selection procedures, removing the provision for “control of lifestyle” by the SCM, and continuing efforts to vet judges, particularly those handling corruption cases.
- 236“Votat în prima lectură. Tot mai aproape de crearea unei instanțe de judecată specializate pe cauze de corupție” [Voted in first reading. Getting closer to the creation of a court specialized in corruption cases], Anticoruptie.md, 1.12.2023, https://anticoruptie.md/ro/stiri/votat-in-prima-lectura-tot-mai-aproape….
- 237“Va fi contestat în instanță decretul prin care Alexandr Stoianoglo a fost eliberat din funcție? Ce spun avocații fostului procuror general” [Will the decree by which Alexandr Stoianoglo was released from office be contested in court? What the former attorney general's lawyers say], Ziarul de Gardă, 26.09.2023, https://www.zdg.md/stiri/stiri-justitie/va-fi-contestat-in-instanta-dec…
- 238“Violation of right of access to a court for a Prosecutor General unable to challenge his suspension triggered by criminal proceedings brought against him”, European Court of Human Rights, 24.10.2023, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/?i=001-228367
- 239“Avocatul lui Alexandr Stoianolgo reacționează la eliberarea clientului său din funcția de Procuror General: Le sugerez autorilor textului decretului să citească modificările la Codul de procedură penală | VIDEO” [Alexandr Stoianolgo's lawyer reacts to the release of his client from the position of General Prosecutor: I suggest the authors of the text of the decree to read the amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure | VIDEO], TV6, 26.09.2023, https://tv6.md/ro/2023/09/26/avocatul-lui-alexandr-stoianolgo-reactione…
- 240“Alexandr Stoianoglo a fost demis din funcția de procuror general, după 2 ani de suspendare” [Alexandr Stoianoglo was dismissed from the position of general prosecutor, after 2 years of suspension], Europa Liberă Moldova, 26.09.2023, https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/alexandr-stoianoglo-a-fost-demis-din…
- 241“(video) CSP a luat act de decretul Maiei Sandu prin care l-a demis pe Stoianoglo de la șefia PG: Ce anunț a făcut” [(video) CSP took note of Maia Sandu’s decree by which he dismissed Stoianoglo from the head of PG: What announcement did he make], Unimedia, 6.10.2023, https://unimedia.info/ro/news/880b7d923321d878/video-csp-a-luat-act-de-…
- 242“CSP a anunțat concurs pentru ocuparea funcției de Procuror General. Cine poate candida” [CSP has announced a competition for the position of Prosecutor General. Who can apply?], TVR Moldova, 23.10.2023, https://tvrmoldova.md/article/71da587c47315820/csp-a-anuntat-concurs-pe….
- 243Irina Soltan, “Stoianoglo vrea să fie restabilit în funcție? Fostul procuror general va contesta decretul Maiei Sandu prin care a fost demis” [Does Stoianoglo want to be reinstated? The former general prosecutor will contest Maia Sandu's decree by which he was dismissed], Agora.md, 24.10.2023, .https://agora.md/2023/10/24/stoianoglo-vrea-sa-fie-restabilit-in-functi…
- 244“Legea Nr. 3 din 25-02-2016 cu privire la Procuratură” [Law No. 3 of 25.02.2016 regarding the Prosecutor's Office], The Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, 25.02.2016, https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=138407&lang=ro#
- 245“Curtea de Apel Chișinău a revocat măsurile stabilite în privința deputatei Marina Tauber, eliberată anterior sub control judiciar” [The Chisinau Court of Appeal revoked the measures established regarding the MP Marina Tauber, previously released under judicial control], Ziarul de Gardă, 23.02.2023, https://www.zdg.md/stiri/politic/curtea-de-apel-chisinau-a-revocat-masu…
- 246“Marina Tauber a primit din nou refuzul de a se înregistra pentru a candida la alegeri” [Marina Tauber was again refused to register to run in the elections], ESP.md, 5.10.2023, https://esp.md/ro/sobytiya/2023/10/05/marina-tauber-primit-din-nou-refu…; “Victoria Șapa: după victoria la alegeri, primul meu adjunct va deveni Marina Tauber” [Victoria Șapa: after the victory in the elections, my first deputy will become Marina Tauber], Sansa.md, 19.10.2023, https://sansa.md/victoria-sapa-dupa-victoria-la-alegeri-primul-meu-adju…
- 247“Deputata Marina Tauber, reținută la aeroport” [Deputy Marina Tauber, detained at the airport], IPN News Agency, 1.05.2023, https://www.ipn.md/ro/deputata-marina-tauber-retinuta-la-aeroport-7965_…
- 248“Moldovan electoral authority initiates eight contraventional suit for illegal financing at elections in Gagauz Autonomy”, Moldpres, 16.05.2023, https://www.moldpres.md/en/news/2023/05/16/23003899; “Percheziții la Comisia Electorală de la Comrat, înainte de validarea alegerilor bașcanului” [Searches at the Electoral Commission in Comrat, before the validation of the Bascan elections], Radio Europa Liberă Moldova, 16.05.2023, https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/perchezitii-la-comisia-electorala-de….
- 249Malvina Cojocari, “Maia Sandu a renunțat la comasarea CNA și PA? Precizările președintei” [Did Maia Sandu give up on the merger of CNA and PA? The president's statements], NewsMaker, 10.08.2023, https://newsmaker.md/ro/maia-sandu-a-renuntat-la-comasarea-cna-si-pa-pr…
- 250Nadejda Coptu, “Procuratura Anticorupție, nemulțumită că rămâne doar cu dosarele de corupție mare. Ce prevede amendamentul propus de PAS” [The Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office, unhappy that it remains only with the cases of major corruption. What does the amendment proposed by PAS provide], 28.07.2023, https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/procuratura-anticoruptie-nemultumita…
- 251Nadejda Coptu, “Procuratura Anticorupție, nemulțumită că rămâne doar cu dosarele de corupție mare. Ce prevede amendamentul propus de PAS” [The Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office, unhappy that it remains only with the cases of major corruption. What does the amendment proposed by PAS provide], Radio Europa Liberă Moldova, 28.07.2023, https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/procuratura-anticoruptie-nemultumita…
- 252“Olesea Stamate, despre investigația PA împotriva CNA: Caută vinovați” [Olesea Stamate, about the PA investigation against CNA: They are looking for culprits], Stiri.md, 26.09.2023, https://stiri.md/article/politica/olesea-stamate-despre-investigatia-pa….
- 253Nadejda Coptu, „Evghenia Guțul a fost pusă sub învinuire în dosarul finanțării ilegale a Partidului Șor” [Evghenia Guțul was accused in the file of illegal financing of the Şor Party], Radio Europa Liberă Moldova, 12.07.2023, https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/evghenia-gutul-a-fost-pusa-sub-invin…
- 254Svetlana Carțîn, “Procurorul general interimar, Ion Munteanu: În cazul în care se va constata că alegerile pentru funcţia de başcan al UTA Găgăuzia au fost fraudate, acestea ar putea fi anulate şi organizate repetat” [Acting General Prosecutor, Ion Munteanu: If it is found that the elections for the position of the head of the UTA Găgăuzia were fraudulent, they could be canceled and organized again], TVR Moldova, 18.07.2023, https://tvrmoldova.md/article/ad879ff60fbcfafb/procurorul-general-inter…
- 255“Un candidat la Primăria Chișinău, reținut într-un dosar de finanțare ilegală a partidului” [A candidate for Chisinau City Hall, detained in a case of illegal party financing], Radio Europa Liberă Moldova, 21.09.2023, https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/un-candidat-la-primaria-chisinau-ret…; “Un candidat la Primăria Chișinău, reținut într-un dosar de finanțare ilegală a partidului” [A candidate for Chisinau City Hall, detained in a case of illegal party financing], Radio Europa Liberă Moldova, 21.09.2023, https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/un-candidat-la-primaria-chisinau-ret…
- 256Constantin Uzdris, “Deputaţii Alexandr Nesterovschi şi Irina Lozovan, plasați în arest preventiv” [Deputies Alexandr Nesterovschi and Irina Lozovan, placed in preventive detention], TVR Romania, 23.09.2023, https://tvrmoldova.md/article/8b5b4abc5408e854/deputatii-alexandr-neste…
- 257“Deputaţii Alexandr Nesterovschi şi Irina Lozovan, plasați în arest preventiv” [Deputies Alexandr Nesterovschi and Irina Lozovan, placed in preventive detention], TVR Moldova, 23.09.2023, https://tvrmoldova.md/article/8b5b4abc5408e854/deputatii-alexandr-neste…
- 258Allegedly operating as undercover agents for the Security and Information Services, Arina Spătaru and her colleague Adrian Culai, Secretary General of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), reportedly gathered information about Ilan Șor's proxies. According to reports, she was recruited by Ilan Șor through Alexandr Nesterovschi, a former member of the Socialists Party in Parliament, in exchange for 55,000 dollars. Spătaru is said to have transmitted information acquired from Șor and his associates to law enforcement agencies over a period of 5 months, from April 15 to September 22. https://www.zdg.md/stiri/politic/video-sunt-victoria-bogatu-agent-sub-a…
- 259“Arina Spătaru cu nume de cod Victoria Bogatu. „Am fost la vila lui Șor. A crezut că sunt omul lui, am ascultat planuri malefice”” [Arina Spătaru with code name Victoria Bogatu. "I went to Şor's villa. He thought I was his man, I listened to evil plans"], TV8, 22.09.2023, https://tv8.md/2023/22/09/arina-spataru-cu-nume-de-cod-victoria-bogatu-….
- 260“Cauza penală de învinuire a deputatului în Parlamentul Republicii Moldova, Alexandr Nesterovschi, a ajuns pe masa magistraților” [The criminal case of accusing the deputy in the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, Alexandr Nesterovschi, reached the magistrates' table], Anticorruption Prosecutor Office, 8.12.2023, https://procuratura.md/anticoruptie/comunicate/comunicate-de-presa/cauz….
- 261“Partidul LOC a înaintat peste o mie de candidați la funcţiile de primar și consilier la alegerile din 5 noiembrie” [The LOC party submitted over a thousand candidates for the positions of mayor and councilor in the November 5 elections], Infotag, 17.10.2023, https://www.infotag.md/reportaje/779299/
- 262“Investigație inițiată pe furnizarea în adresa Comisiei Pre-vetting, a informațiilor incomplete în privința candidatului Iulian Muntean” [Investigation initiated on the provision to the Pre-vetting Commission of incomplete information regarding the candidate Iulian Muntean], The Anticorruption Prosecutor Office, 26.09.2023, https://procuratura.md/anticoruptie/comunicate/noutati/investigatie-ini…
- 263“Cine este angajatul din cadrul secretariatului Comisiei Pre-Vetting vizat în procesul penal privind furnizarea informațiilor incomplete în privința lui Iulian Muntean. A fost desemnat de PAS în Comisia de Vetting” [Who is the employee from the secretariat of the Pre-Vetting Commission targeted in the criminal process regarding the provision of incomplete information regarding Iulian Muntean. He was appointed by PAS in the Vetting Commission], Ziardul de Gardă, 26.09.2023, https://www.zdg.md/stiri/stiri-justitie/cine-este-angajatul-din-cadrul-….
- 264„Directorul CNA Iulian Rusu, a DEMISIONAT: „În timpul apropiat, vom veni cu propunerea pentru a numi un nou director al CNA”” [The director of CNA, Iulian Rusu, RESIGNED: „In the near future, we will come up with the proposal to appoint a new director of CNA”], 10.10.2023, Ziarul Național, https://www.ziarulnational.md/ultima-ora-directorul-cna-iulian-rusu-a-d….
- 265“Directorul CNA, Iulian Rusu, și-a dat demisia” [The director of CNA, Iulian Rusu, has resigned], Ziardul de Gardă, 10.10.2023, https://www.zdg.md/stiri/stiri-sociale/ultima-ora-directorul-cna-iulian…