Anfragebeantwortung zu Afghanistan: Information zur Situation von Minderjährigen, insbesondere zu Rekrutierung durch diverse Gruppierungen und den Staat [a-9525-1]

24. Februar 2016

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Die internationale Menschenrechtsorganisation Human Rights Watch (HRW) erwähnt in ihrem World Report vom Jänner 2016 (Berichtszeitraum 2015), dass Präsident Ghani am 2. Februar 2015 ein Gesetz zur Kriminalisierung der Rekrutierung von Minderjährigen durch die afghanischen Sicherheitskräfte unterzeichnet habe. Die lokale afghanische Polizei (ALP) und regierungstreue Milizen würden jedoch in manchen Provinzen nach wie vor Kinder rekrutieren. Die Taliban würden sogar 14-jährige Burschen für den Kampf und die Durchführung von Selbstmordanschlägen rekrutieren. Die UNO habe über einen deutlichen Anstieg von Angriffen auf Schulen, vor allem durch die Taliban, im Zeitraum April bis Juni 2015 berichtet. Drohungen von regierungstreuen Milizen und Aufständischen hätten zur Schließung von Schulen in Kunduz, Ghor und Nuristan geführt. Im Mai sei Afghanistan der globalen Safe Schools Declaration beigetreten und habe sich damit verpflichtet, mehr zum Schutz von Studierenden, Lehrenden und Schulen während eines bewaffneten Konflikts zu unternehmen:

„On February 2, Ghani signed into law a decree criminalizing recruitment by Afghan security forces of soldiers less than 18 years old. However, Afghan Local Police (ALP) and pro-government militias in some provinces continued to recruit children. The Taliban recruited boys as young as 14 to fight and carry out suicide bombings.

The UN also reported a significant increase in attacks against schools between April and June, mostly by the Taliban. Threats from both pro-government militias and insurgents led to school closures in Kunduz, Ghor, and Nuristan. In May, Afghanistan endorsed the global Safe Schools Declaration, thus committing to do more to protect students, teachers, and schools during times of armed conflict, including through implementing the Guidelines on Protecting Schools from Military Use.” (HRW, Jänner 2016)

Der UNO-Generalsekretär erwähnt in seinem im Juni 2015 veröffentlichten Bericht an die UNO-Generalversammlung (UN General Assembly) zu Kindern in bewaffneten Konflikten (Berichtszeitraum: 2014), dass die Vereinten Nationen 68 Fälle dokumentiert hätten, bei denen Kinder rekrutiert worden seien. 22 davon seien verifiziert worden, wobei je ein Fall die afghanische nationale Polizei und die afghanische lokale Polizei und 20 Fälle die Taliban oder andere bewaffnete Gruppen betroffen hätten. Dies stelle im Vergleich zu 2013 einen Rückgang bei der Rekrutierung von Kindern dar. Dennoch würden diese Zahlen aufgrund von Untererfassung die Situation nicht korrekt widerspiegeln. Die Taliban würden weiterhin Kinder für Selbstmordattentate, für das Anbringen von Sprengvorrichtungen, zu Kampf- und Spionagezwecken einsetzen.

Einheiten zum Kinderschutz in der nationalen Polizei in vier Provinzen, hätten Berichten zufolge 156 Kinder davor bewahrt, für den Polizeidienst rekrutiert zu werden. Zusätzlich habe die lokale Polizei von 55 Fällen berichtet, in denen minderjährige Bewerber für den Polizeidienst zurückgewiesen worden seien:

27. The United Nations documented the recruitment and use of 68 children (65 boys, 3 girls) of which 22 were verified (all boys), one each by the Afghan National Police and the Afghan local police and 20 associated with the Taliban and other armed groups. This marks a decrease in child recruitment and use in Afghanistan compared with 2013, when 97 children were reportedly recruited and used. However, owing to widespread underreporting, these figures do not accurately reflect the situation. In a worrisome trend, the Taliban continued to recruit children to carry out suicide attacks and to plant improvised explosive devices, and used them in active combat and as spies. For example, on 9 February, a 14-year-old suicide bomber detonated explosives near an Afghan National Security Forces checkpoint in Sharan district, injuring six civilians and five national police officers. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack.

28. The pilot child protection units in the national police in four provinces reportedly prevented 156 children from enlisting, indicating a potential for a large and beneficial impact if such units are replicated across the country. In addition, the local police reported 55 cases of rejected underage applicants.“ (UN General Assembly, 5. Juni 2015, S. 6)

Weiters erwähnt der UNO-Generalsekretär in seinem Bericht, dass 258 Burschen wegen Anklagen in Zusammenhang mit der nationalen Sicherheit in Rehabilitationszentren für Jugendliche festgehalten würden, darunter auch wegen Zugehörigkeit zu bewaffneten Gruppen. Von 105 inhaftierten Kindern, die von der UNO zwischen Februar 2013 und Dezember 2014 befragt worden seien, hätten 44 von Misshandlungen oder Folter berichtet.

Die Anzahl von Kindern als Opfer sei angestiegen, es habe mindestens 710 getötete und 1792 verletzte Kinder bei 1091 verschiedenen Vorfällen gegeben:

29. As at December, according to the Ministry of Justice, 258 boys were held in juvenile rehabilitation centres across the country on national security-related charges, including association with armed groups. Of 105 child detainees interviewed by the United Nations between February 2013 and December 2014, 44 reported having been subjected to ill-treatment or torture.

30. The increase in child casualties included at least 710 children killed and 1,792 injured in 1,091 separate incidents. Armed groups, including the Taliban and the Hizb-e-Islami, were responsible for 1,343 child casualties (392 killed, 951 injured), Afghan national security forces for 396 (126 killed, 270 injured), and international military forces for 38 (24 killed, 14 injured). Cross-border shelling from Pakistan resulted in 57 child casualties (5 killed, 52 injured). The United Nations was unable to attribute 668 child casualties (163 killed, 505 injured), particularly in incidents of crossfire.“ (UN General Assembly, 5. Juni 2015, S. 6)

Der UNO-Generalsekretär nennt in seinem Bericht als positive Entwicklung, dass die Regierung im Juli 2014 einen Aktionsplan angenommen habe, um die Rekrutierung von Kindern für die Sicherheitskräfte zu beenden und zu verhindern. Es habe deutliche Fortschritte in drei von fünf Maßnahmenbereichen („priority actions“) gegeben, speziell ein Präsidentendekret vom 2. Februar 2015, das die Rekrutierung von Kindern verbiete. Es gebe jedoch trotz der erzielten Fortschritte einen Bedarf nach deutlichen Anstrengungen aller Akteure, den Aktionsplan umzusetzen:

38. In a welcome development, in July, the Government officially endorsed a road map for compliance with the action plan to end and prevent child recruitment into its security forces. Significant progress was made on three of five priority actions, in particular the adoption of a presidential decree criminalizing child recruitment by Government security forces, which came into effect on 2 February 2015. Furthermore, the Ministry of the Interior issued and disseminated a directive prohibiting the use of children at national police and local police checkpoints, including in support roles, stating that the perpetrators would be sanctioned. Efforts also continued to strengthen age assessment procedures and disseminate guidance to recruitment units.

39. Despite the progress achieved, significant efforts are needed by all actors to fully implement the action plan. The lack of services for children rejected from recruitment or released from active service remained a significant concern. Moreover, I urge the Government of Afghanistan to address widespread impunity for violations of children’s rights, particularly within the national police and local police, and investigate the allegations of torture. I condemn the grave violations committed against children by armed groups, including the Taliban, the Haqqani Network and Hezb-i-Islami and urge them to immediately end all grave violations against children.“ (UN General Assembly, 5. Juni 2015, S. 7)

Das US-Außenministerium (US Department of State, USDOS) schreibt in seinem Menschenrechtsbericht vom Juni 2015 (Berichtszeitraum 2014) unter anderem, dass die Taliban Kinder als Selbstmordattentäter einsetzen würden:

„The Taliban and other insurgents continued to kill civilians and security force personnel using indiscriminate tactics such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), car bombs, suicide attacks, rocket attacks, and armed attacks. The Taliban used children as suicide bombers. Antigovernment elements also threatened, robbed, and attacked villagers, foreigners, civil servants, and medical and nongovernmental organization (NGO) workers. Authorities did not investigate or prosecute most of these abuses. (USDOS, Juni 2015, Executive Summary)

Das USDOS erwähnt auch, dass manche Kinder im System der Strafgerichtsbarkeit eher Opfer als Täter von Verbrechen seien. In manchen Fällen habe man gemeint, Missbrauchsopfer müssten bestraft werden, weil sie durch die Anzeige Schande über die Familie gebracht hätten, in einigen Fällen seien missbrauchte Kinder inhaftiert worden, weil es keine andere Unterbringungsmöglichkeit gegeben habe und sie nicht zu ihren Familien zurückkehren konnten:

„Some of the children in the criminal justice system were victims rather than perpetrators of crime. Some victims were perceived as in need of punishment because they brought shame on the family by reporting an abuse. In some cases authorities imprisoned abused children because they could not return to their families and shelter elsewhere was unavailable. Authorities allegedly imprisoned some children related to a perpetrator as a family proxy for the actual perpetrator.” (USDOS, Juni 2015, Section 1d)

Weiters enthält der USDOS-Bericht die folgenden Passagen zu den Themen Kindersoldaten, Ausbildung, Missbrauch von Kindern, Straßenkinder und Kinder in Einrichtungen:

„Child Soldiers: The government, with international assistance, officially vetted all recruits into the armed forces and police, rejecting applicants less than age 18. There were reports the ANSF (Afghan National Security Forces] and progovernment militias recruited and used children for military purposes. Under a government action plan, the ANP [Afghan National Police] took steps that included training 150 new staff on age-assessment procedures, launching an awareness campaign on underage recruitment, investigating alleged cases of underage recruitment, and establishing centers in some provincial recruitment centers to document cases of attempted enlistment by children. All recruits undergo an identity check, including a requirement that at least two community elders vouch that a recruit is 18 years old and is eligible to join the ANSF. The Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense also issued directives meant to prevent the recruitment and sexual abuse of children by the ANSF. The media reported in some cases ANSF units used children as personal servants or support staff, particularly for sexual purposes. UNAMA [UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan] also documented the recruitment of children by the Taliban and other antigovernment elements, although figures were unreliable and difficult to obtain. In some cases the Taliban and other antigovernment elements used children as suicide bombers and human shields and in other cases to assist with their work, such as placing IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices], particularly in southern provinces. The media, NGOs, and UN agencies reported the Taliban tricked children, promised them money, used false religious pretexts, or forced them to become suicide bombers. […] The Taliban continued to distribute threatening messages in attempts to curtail government and development activities. Insurgents used civilians, including children, as human shields, either by forcing them into the line of fire or by basing operations in civilian settings. […]The Taliban also continued to attack schools, radio stations, and government offices.” (USDOS, Juni 2015, Section 1g)

„Education: Education is mandatory up to the secondary level (six years for primary school and three years for lower secondary), and the law provides for free education up to and including the college level. Many children, however, did not attend school. According to the AIHRC, six million children worked instead of attending school.

[…] Violent attacks against schoolchildren, particularly girls, also hindered access to education. Violence impeded access to education in various sections of the country, particularly in areas controlled by the Taliban. The Taliban and other extremists threatened and attacked school officials, teachers, and students, particularly girls, and burned both boys’ and girls’ schools. In March insurgents attacked a primary school being used as a polling station for the elections. In May the head of the security detail for the minister of education was kidnapped and killed. The Ministry of Education reported a slight decrease in attacks on education employees through August, compared with the same period the previous year.

Insecurity, conservative attitudes, and poverty denied education to millions of school-age children, mainly in the southern and southeastern provinces. A representative from the Ministry of Education estimated in May approximately 150,000 schoolchildren in insecure areas did not have access to education. There were also reports of abduction and molestation. The lack of community-based, nearby schools was another factor inhibiting school attendance.

Child Abuse: NGOs reported increased numbers of child abuse victims during the year, and the problem remained endemic throughout the country. Such abuse included general neglect, physical abuse, sexual abuse, abandonment, and confined forced labor to pay off family debts. There were reports police beat and sexually abused children, including a case, verified by UNAMA, of an ALP member raping a girl in the Jazrez District of Maidan Wardak Province. NGOs reported a predominantly punitive and retributive approach to juvenile justice throughout the country. Although it was against the law, corporal punishment in schools, rehabilitation centers, and other public institutions remained common.

Sexual abuse of children remained pervasive. NGOs noted girls were abused by extended family members, while boys were more frequently abused by men outside their families. There were reports religious figures sexually abused both boys and girls. NGOs noted families often were complicit, allowing local strongmen to abuse their children in exchange for status or money. While the Ministry of Interior tracked cases of rape, most NGOs and observers estimated the official numbers significantly underreported the phenomenon. Many child sexual abusers were not arrested, and there were reports security officials and those connected to the ANP raped children with impunity. The practice continued of ‘bacha baazi’ (dancing boys), which involved powerful or wealthy local figures and businessmen sexually abusing young boys trained to dance in female clothes. Reports indicated the practice had increased since 2001. Media reports alleged local authorities, including police, were involved in the practice, but the government took few steps to discourage the abuse of boys or to prosecute or punish those involved. In August the AIHRC released its national inquiry on bacha baazi. The report asserted bacha baazi was a form of trafficking already criminalized and called on the government to enforce the law actively. It attributed the root causes of the practice to lack of rule of law, corruption, gaps in the law, poverty, insecurity, and the existence of armed insurgent groups. The report noted the serious psychological and physical harm victims faced and called on the government to provide protective services to victims.

[…] Child Soldiers: There were reports the ANSF and progovernment militias recruited children for military purposes and the Taliban and other antigovernment elements also recruited children (see section 1.g.). The Law on Prohibition of Children’s Recruitment in the Military was approved in November by the Lower House.

Displaced Children: The Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs, and Disabled (MoLSAMD) and the AIHRC [Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission] continued to estimate the number of street children in the country at six million, but the National Census Directorate had not conducted a recent survey. Street children had little or no access to government services, although several NGOs provided access to basic needs, such as shelter and food.

Institutionalized Children: Living conditions for children in orphanages were poor. The MoLSAMD oversaw 84 Child Protection Action Network centers and 78 residential orphanages, which were designed to provide vocational training to children from destitute families. Of these, 30 were privately funded orphanages and 48 were government-funded centers operated by NGOs by agreement with the ministry. NGOs reported up to 80 percent of children between ages four and 18 years in the orphanages were not orphans but were children whose families could not provide food, shelter, or schooling. Children in orphanages reported mental, physical, and sexual abuse; sometimes were trafficked and did not always have access to running water, winter heating, indoor plumbing, health services, recreational facilities, or education. (USDOS, Juni 2015, Section 6)

Bitte beachten Sie auch die Informationen zu Kindern in folgenden Berichten:

·      UNAMA - UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: Annual Report 2015; Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Februar 2016 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1455518569_unama-protection-of-civilians-annual-report-2015-final-0.pdf

·      UNHCR - UN High Commissioner for Refugees: UNHCR-Richtlinien zur Feststellung des Internationalen Schutzbedarfs afghanischer Asylsuchender [HCR/EG/AFG/13/01], 6. August 2013 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1386162591_afghanistan-richtlinien2013dt.pdf

 

image001.gifQuellen: (Zugriff auf alle Quellen am 24. Februar 2016)

·      HRW - Human Rights Watch: World Report 2016 - Afghanistan, 27. Jänner 2016 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/318331/457332_de.html

·      UN General Assembly: Children and armed conflict; Report of the Secretary-General [A /69/926 – S /2015/409], 5. Juni 2015 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1434368065_n1510923.pdf

·      UNAMA - UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: Annual Report 2015; Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Februar 2016 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1455518569_unama-protection-of-civilians-annual-report-2015-final-0.pdf

·      UNHCR - UN High Commissioner for Refugees: UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan [HCR/EG/AFG/13/01], 6. August 2013 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1386162591_afghanistan-richtlinien2013dt.pdf

·      USDOS - US Department of State: Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2014 - Afghanistan, 25. Juni 2015 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/306241/443515_de.html