11.03.2008 - Source: US Department of State

Kadyrov abolished Antiterrorist Center and reorganized its forces into two police battalions; human rights activists contended that these forces maintained loyalty to Kadyrov ("Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007") [ID 22607]

"In April Kadyrov and other officials announced that steps had been taken to remove units from Kadyrov's direct oversight. Kadyrov abolished the Chechen Republic's Antiterrorist Center and reorganized its forces into two police battalions and subordinated them to the federal Ministry of Internal Affairs. Human rights activists contended, however, that these forces maintained their loyalty to Kadyrov, and that he continued to exert control over them.
According to human rights observers, government forces responding to Chechen attacks at times engaged in indiscriminate reprisals against combatants and noncombatants."

Document(s): Open document

19.11.2006 - Source: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

Movladi Baisarov, who was wanted on charges of murder, shot dead by police in Moscow; he had refused to swear allegiance to Chechen Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov ("Rival Of Chechen Prime Minister Killed") [ID 17711]

Document(s): Open document

15.11.2006 - Source: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

Disbandad Goretz unit has laid down arms after President Alkhanov promised they would not be arrested; unit, formerly under command of Baisarov, has been involved in showdowns with Kadyrovcy ("Disbanded Chechen Unit Lays Down Arms") [ID 17622]

Document(s): Open document

06.09.2006 - Source: Freedom House

New police and security structures, that are partly recruited from private armies and militarized gangs, engaged in criminal activities and rights violations ("The Worst of the Worst: The World's Most Repressive Societies 2006") [ID 17263]

"The new police and security structures—some of them created by recruitment from private armies and militarized gangs loyal to Alkhanov’s regime—are engaged in criminal activities and rights violations. Particularly notorious is the former Presidential Security Service—renamed the Akhmad Kadyrov Special Purpose Regiment in 2004—which is reportedly involved in extortion, abductions, trading in contraband, and the maintenance of unsanctioned prisons and torture chambers. Occasional protests are held by family members pressing for action on the abduction and murder of their relatives."

Document(s): Open document

28.04.2006 - Source: Guardian

Chechnya: 2 men killed in gun battle between security forces loyal to prime minister, Ramzan Kadyrov, and bodyguards of pro-Russian president, Alu Alkhanov; stability of republic threatened ("Leaders' gun battle threatens Chechen stability") [#50422],  [ID 16528]

Document(s): Open document

01.2006 - Source: Human Rights Watch

In 2004 and 2005 pro-Russian Chechen forces under command of Ramzan Kadyrov became main perpetrators of "disappearances" ("World Report 2006") [#42318],  [ID 16529]

"As part of Russia’s policy of “Chechenization” of the conflict, pro-Moscow Chechen forces under the command of Ramzan Kadyrov have played an increasingly active role in the conflict. In 2004 and 2005, they gradually replaced federal troops as the main perpetrators of “disappearances.” They run their own prisons—entirely outside any official penitentiary structure—where they detain, and often ill-treat, hundreds of people. These troops are also responsible for the reprehensible practice of taking hostages among relatives of rebel leaders as a way of forcing the latter to surrender. The Kremlin not only tolerates these practices but has effectively endorsed them by naming Ramzan Kadyrov deputy prime minister of Chechnya and bestowing a Hero of Russia award on him."

Document(s): Open document

07.11.2005 - Source: Schweizerische Flüchtlingshilfe

Composition of the pro-Russian Chechen security forces ("Tschetschenien: Update: Entwicklungen in Tschetschenien, Inguschetien, Dagestan und anderen Teilen der Russischen Föderation") [#38928],  [ID 16530]

"Auf Grund der oben beschriebenen «Tschetschenisierung» des Konflikts scheint es angebracht, pro-russische tschetschenische Kräfte und die russischen Streitkräfte zusammenfassend zu behandeln. Die russischen Streitkräfte selbst sind nach wie vor in einem erbärmlichen Zustand.21 Rund 80'000 Soldaten und Offiziere sollen nach wie vor in der Kaukasus-Region stationiert sein. In Tschetschenien selbst treten sie nach verschiedenen Berichten in letzter Zeit weniger oft in Erscheinung, sondern überlassen das Feld ihren tschetschenischen Verbündeten. Gemäss einem Entscheid des russischen Verteidigungsministeriums dürfen seit dem 1. Januar 2005 keine Dienstpflichtigen mehr in Tschetschenien eingesetzt werden. Sie wurden nach offiziellen Angaben alle durch freiwillige Vertragssoldaten –so genannte Kontraktniki– ersetzt. Die pro-russischen tschetschenischen Kräfte bestehen aus den Truppen des tschetschenischen Innenministeriums, den Spezialeinheiten «Vostok» (Ost) und «Zapad» (West), sowie dem Sicherheitsdienst des tschetschenischen Präsidenten unter dem Kommando des ermordeten Präsidenten Achmed Kadyrow und Vize-Präsidenten Ramzan Kadyrov. Die soziale Zusammensetzung dieser Formationen variiert gemäss einem Bericht von «Memorial» stark. Die Einheit «Zapad» steht unter dem Kommando von Said-Magomed Kakiev und besteht hauptsächlich aus Männern, die bereits im ersten Tschetschenienkrieg (1994-1996) auf Seiten der Russischen Armee gekämpft haben. In der Einheit «Vostok» unter Sulim Jamadaev hingegen dienen Männer, die damals auf der Seite des Widerstandes gekämpft und erst 1999 die Seite gewechselt haben. Am stärksten sind jedoch die so genannten «Kadyrovci». Unter ihnen befinden sich viele, die auch den Zweiten Tschetschenienkrieg auf Seiten des Widerstandes begonnen haben, die jedoch gegen persönliche Garantien Achmed Kadyrows die Seite gewechselt haben. Neben den eigentlichen «Kadyrovci» bestehen Gruppen bewaffneter Männer in den Dörfern, die angeblich ebenfalls direkt Ramzan Kadyrows Befehlen Folge leisten. In letzter Zeit scheinen die tschetschenischen Sicherheitskräfte erfolgreich junge Männer zu rekrutieren. Angesichts der desolaten wirtschaftlichen Lage und der unvorstellbar hohen Arbeitslosigkeit in der Republik ist dies für viele Männer die einzige Möglichkeit, sich ein regelmässiges Einkommen zu verschaffen."

Document(s): Open document

11.2005 - Source: International Federation for Human Rights

"Chechenization" of conflict by Moscow brought transfer of functions to republican institutions and delegated local security units right to illegal violance ("In a Climate of Fear; "Political Process" and Parliamentary Elections in Chechnya (IHF, FIDH, NHC, Demos, Memorial)") [#39859],  [ID 16531]

"The formation of security services consisting of ethnic Chechens, which function on the territory of the Chechen Republic had been completed by 2004. “Chechenization” brought about significant changes in the republic, not only in the methods of carrying out of the so-called ‘anti-terrorist operation’, but also in social relations within the Chechen society. The federal troops remain in Chechnya: without these forces the local security agencies would be unable to resist their antagonists from armed units of Ichkeria. At the same time, the republican ministry of internal affairs was created, which subordinates the police, numbering 14,000 men. The majority of the policemen, however, are involved in ensuring public order and protection of various state institutions. Usually they do not directly participate in carrying out raids against Chechen fighters. This task is implemented by special units consisting of ethnic Chechens which either formally belong to the Ministries of Interior and Defense, or function outside the official ministries. In the process of Chechenization of conflict the federal center, on the one hand, transferred the functions of government to the republican institutions and, on the other, delegated these local security units the right to illegal violence. In 2004-2005 the local security agencies, functioning under control, with administrative, political and financial support of the federal center were responsible for the absolute majority of grave human rights abuses committed in Chechnya on behalf of the state."

Document(s): Open document

11.2005 - Source: International Federation for Human Rights

Several smaller "kadyrovtsy"-units set up in 2004-2005; new umbrella formation called Anti-Terrorist Center (ATC), created in 2005, unites "kadyrovtsy" and previously quasi-autonomous military units ("In a Climate of Fear; "Political Process" and Parliamentary Elections in Chechnya (IHF, FIDH, NHC, Demos, Memorial)") [#39859],  [ID 16532]

"The process of reorganization of the existing structure Ramzan Kadyrov continued to actively recruit new people. In 2004-2005 smaller “kadyrovtsy”-units were set up in the town of Argun, villages of Geldagan, Avtury, Kurchaloy, Majrtup, Makhety, Shali, Achkhoi-Martan, Gikalovksy, Novye Atagi. In virtually all of the newly created units there are people with the criminal past. Thus, in the village of Prigorodnoje and Gikalovsky, Groznensky (Selsky) district in 2004 was created an armed formation under command of Sultan Patsaev, who in between wars was prosecuted for stealing oil products and kidnapping people for ransom. In 2005 the process of merging these disperses groups into one units was launched a new umbrella formation created, called the Anti-Terrorist Center (ATC). The ATC united not only “kadyrovtsy” units but also some previously quasi-autonomous military units, such as, for example, the group of Movladi Baysarov, numbering over 100 men. The overall number of the “kadyrovtsy” personnel is unknown. The estimates range from 4, 000 to 12,000 (the latter must be exaggerated). It is not possible to establish the precise figure, primarily since part of the service is legalized as specialized structures of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and parts still function in the capacity of paramilitary units."

Document(s): Open document

11.2005 - Source: International Federation for Human Rights

Active pro-Russian military groups in Chechnya besides "kadyrovtsy" : Battalions "Vostok" ("yamadaevtsy") and "Zapad" ("kakievtsy") ("In a Climate of Fear; "Political Process" and Parliamentary Elections in Chechnya (IHF, FIDH, NHC, Demos, Memorial)") [#39859],  [ID 16533]

"Apart from the “kadyrovtsy”, there are other military groups active in Chechnya, such as the Battalions of the Main Investigating Department “Vostok” and “Zapad”, subordinated to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. The battalion “Vostok” -- the “yamadaevtsy” -- is part of the 42d motor-riflemen division of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. The core of the group is consists by several dozen of former rebels of the National Guard of the Ichkeria who changed sides in the beginning of the second war. The commander of the battalion is Sulim Yamadaev. During the first war brothers Yamadaev, Sulim, Khalid (Ruslan) and Dzabrail fought against the federal forces; after the war the family de facto controlled in city of Gudermes. In the beginning of the second Chechen War thanks to them the town surrendered to the federal forces virtually without resistance. Ruslan and Sulim Yamadaev were appointed deputies of the military commandant of the Chechen Republic, while Dzabrail Yamadaev headed the company of special significance consisting of ethnic Chechens. Subsequently, Ruslan Yamadaev made a career in politics – he headed the localdivision of the pro-government party “United Russia” and was “elected” the MP of the Russian State Duma. In March 2003 Dzabrail Yamadaev was killed in a bomb blast by the fighters in the village of Dyshne-Vedeno; after his death the special company was headed by Sulim Yamadaev (in the fall of 2004 the company was upgraded to a battalion). Sulim, Dzabrail and Ruslan Yamadaev were in different times awarded the “Heroes of Russia” The battalion “Vostok” is manned by up to 470 men. They reside on the bases in the city of Gudermes, some of them together with families. The Battalion “Vostok” is responsible for combating Chechen resistance in the mountainous Vedensky and Nozaj-Yurtovsky districts and on the parts of the plain adjacent to them. HRC “Memorial” has documented evidence that the personnel of this battalion participated in the abductions of people. The battalion “Zapad” – the “kakievtsy” -- is part of the 42 motor-riflemen division of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. It is headed by a “Hero of Russia” Said-Magomed Kakiev, resident of the village Ken’-Yurt, Groznensky (Selsky) district of Chechnya. The core of this battalion are the Chechens who initially opposed the idea of independence from Russia and supported the federal forces even before the first war. Said-Magomed Kakiev as an officer of intelligence of the 58th army took a training course on diversion operations in a special training center and received serous injuries as a result of unsuccessful attempt on the life of Dzokhar Dudaev. During the first and the second Chechen wars the military units under command of Kakiev acted in the rear of the Chechen fighters targeting artillery and aerial attacks on their groups. The battalion, which allegedly numbers up to 400 people was formed in early 2005 and is based in the Staropromyslovsky district of Grozny on the territory of the “Trasmash” factory. Their areas of control are the mountainous Shatoi and Itum-Kalinsky districts and the adjacent western part of lowland Chechnya."

Document(s): Open document

11.2005 - Source: International Federation for Human Rights

"Chechenization" leads to social change in Chechnya, no mechanisms of protection left for people, because customary law is deteriorating and protection within legal framework of Russian Federation fully dysfunctional ("In a Climate of Fear; "Political Process" and Parliamentary Elections in Chechnya (IHF, FIDH, NHC, Demos, Memorial)") [#39859],  [ID 16534]

"Such actions of the security agencies produce major social change in the republic. Deep penetration of the state repressive machine into the social texture through criminalized military groups and their agent networks; lack of state mechanisms for protection and justice, abuse of customary law by people with guns drag the society into a pathological state of fear. As a result there are no mechanisms of protection left in Chechnya – on the one hand, the regulating function of traditional customary law is rapidly deteriorating, on the other – the mechanisms for the protection of rights and freedoms within the legal framework of the Russian Federation are fully dysfunctional. Personal survival strategies vary from joining Chechen fighters to joining pro-federal security agencies and state authorities in order to ensure one’s own protection and the protection of one’s family. The appearance of a man in military uniform at the door of one’s house is perceived by a citizen as direct threat to his life or the lives of his family members. (...) According to “Memorial” monitors, only 30% of the victims who agreed to provide details of crimes committed against them by security services subsequently turned to law enforcement agencies and courts. The rest abstained from efforts to gain redress, being afraid of reprisals by representatives of security agencies whose actions have been highly evaluated by the President of the Russian Federation and whose leaders awarded the highest decorations of the Russian state. After the parliamentary elections of 27 November 2005 these structures have full chances to strengthen their positions, now also in the legislative power."

Document(s): Open document

11.2005 - Source: Gesellschaft für Bedrohte Völker

About 30 000 Chechens part of pro-Russian forces ("Schleichender Völkermord in Tschetschenien") [#41300],  [ID 16535]

"In Tschetschenien sollen im Moment etwa 80.000 Mann des Verteidigungs- und des Innenministeriums stationiert sein. Insgesamt stehen im Nordkaukasus 250.000 Angehörige der russischen Armee. Dazu kommen 30.000 Tschetschenen in pro-russischen Einheiten. Wie der pro-russische tschetschenische Präsident Alu Alchanov am 21.10. mitteilte, sind 7.000 der insgesamt 16.000 tschetschenischen Milizionäre ehemalige Angehörige der tschetschenischen Kämpfer."

Document(s): Open document

30.03.2005 - Source: International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights

Kadyrovtsy feared the most by Chechnya’s civilian population ("Chechnya: More of the Same. Extrajudicial Killings, 'Disappearances', Illegal Arrest, Torture") [#30700],  [ID 16536]

"But it is certainly the “Kadyrovtsy,” i.e. members of the so-called Security Service of the President of the Chechen Republic headed by the Chechen Vice-Premier Ramzan Kadyrov, son of the late President Akhmad Kadyrov, that are feared the most by Chechnya’s civilian population. The recent missions of the IHF researchers to the region clearly demonstrated that as far as Chechen civilians are concerned, today “Kadyrovtsi” are more dangerous to them than federal servicemen. It is worth noting that while some victims and their relatives are willing to elaborated on the violation of their rights by federal servicemen, they are far more reluctant to talk about the crimes of “Kadyrovtsi,” lowering their voice to a whisper and trying to avoid any concrete facts. In fact, when the Human Rights Center “Memorial” reports that the number of disappearances decreased by 17% in 2004 if compared to the previous year, the IHF researchers are convinced that one of the possible explanations behind this is that now a great portion of human abductions is perpetrated by “Kadyrovtsy” and in those cases relatives of the victims are afraid to complain due to possible repercussions against themselves or other members of their families."

Document(s): Open document

30.03.2005 - Source: International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights

Increasing “Chechenization” of the conflict with various local armed formations being engaged in the “fight against terrorism” along with the multi-thousand Russian forces ("Chechnya: More of the Same. Extrajudicial Killings, 'Disappearances', Illegal Arrest, Torture") [#30700],  [ID 16537]

"Another trait of today’s Chechnya is the increasing “Chechenization” of the conflict with various local armed formations being engaged in the “fight against terrorism” along with the multi-thousand Russian forces. These are not only “Kadyrovtsi” and “Yamadaevtsi” , but also “Baysarovtsi” , “Kakievtsi” , etc. Often it is impossible to understand who exactly conducted an operation of detention or abduction. These groups are autonomous (or semi-autonomous), and many of them have their own illegal places of detention, to which the prosecutor’s office, of course, has no access. People look for their missing relatives through arranged “black connections”. Hence, a time of “legal bandit formations” has come in Chechnya."

Document(s): Open document

17.03.2005 - Source: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

Alu Alkhanov, pro-Moscow Chechen administration head, says he will never negotiate with separatists ("Pro-Russian Chechen Leader Rules Out Separatist Talks") [#30380],  [ID 16538]

Document(s): Open document

26.07.2004 - Source: Guardian

Guardian: Chechnya: senior officer in a police unit fighting organised crime was killed in a car explosion in Grozny ("Chechen bomb kills policeman") [#24246],  [ID 16539]

"“A senior officer in a police unit fighting organised crime in Chechnya was killed by a car bomb yesterday, a year after his son was shot dead in the region, Interfax news agency reported. Yaragi Nikayev died when his car exploded after he turned on the ignition, Interfax reported. Mr Nikayev's wife, who had come out of their home to see him off, was also injured in the early morning blast in the Chechen capital, Grozny.”"

Document(s): Open document

23.07.2004 - Source: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

Chechnya: Russian authorities seek to undercut the authority of Kadyrov's son, Ramzan, by either abolishing his private army, the so called "presidential guard", or subsuming some of its members into a new Interior Ministry regiment ("Analysis: Chechen Strongman Fights To Preserve His Private Army") [#24224],  [ID 16540]

"n the run-up to the 29 August ballot to elect a successor to slain pro-Moscow Chechen leader Akhmed-hadji Kadyrov, the Russian leadership is apparently seeking to undercut the authority of Kadyrov's son, Ramzan, by either abolishing the "presidential guard" he commands or subsuming some of its members into a new crack Interior Ministry regiment. But a Chechen spokesman, Muslim Khuchiev, told Interfax on 22 July that the presidential guard will continue to exist despite the creation of the new regiment. Russian media consistently portray the 28-year-old Ramzan Kadyrov as a semi-literate thug whose private army, variously estimated to number between 2,000 and 6,000 men, has in recent years routinely engaged in the arbitrary abduction and murder of hundreds of Chechens. Ramzan Kadyrov thus became one of the most powerful and most feared men in Chechnya, which is presumably why he was named Chechen first deputy prime minister the day after his father's death (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 11 May 2004). But the Russian authorities drew the line at either violating or amending the Chechen Constitution to circumvent the requirement that candidates for the post of republican leader must be at least 30 years old, thus effectively barring him from becoming president for the time being."

Document(s): Open document

24.05.2004 - Source: Schweizerische Flüchtlingshilfe

Since pro-Russian Chechen authorities haven taken over responsibilities, a special security apparat has been built; Chechn militia groups like the "Kadyrovtsi" are responsible for numerous human rights abuses ("Tschetschenien und die tschetschenische Bevölkerung in der Russischen Föderation ") [#23046],  [ID 16541]

"Seit der offiziellen Übertragung eines Teils der Macht an pro-russische tschetschenische Behörden, haben diese einen eigenen Sicherheitsapparat gebildet. Kadyrows Sohn Ramsan, der nach dem Tod seines Vaters zum Vize-Regierungschef ernannt wurde und bereits als möglicher nächster Präsident gehandelt wird, hat eine mehrere tausend Mann starke Miliz aufgebaut.40 Diese sogenannten "Kadyrowzi" sind laut Angaben von unabhängigen Beobachtern für unzählige Entführungen, Folterungen und Morde verantwortlich. Überwältigte echte oder vermeintliche Rebellen werden von den "Kadyrowzi" vor die Wahl gestellt, überzulaufen oder zu sterben. Die Bevölkerung fürchtet die "Kadyrowzi" stärker als die russischen Sicherheitskräfte."

Document(s): Open document

19.05.2004 - Source: Institute for War and Peace Reporting

Chechnya: the “Kadyrovtsy”, paramilitary forces now loyal to Ramzan Kadyrov, still in charge in Grozny, abusing residents ("Chechens Worried About Future Leader") [#22393],  [ID 16542]

Document(s): Open document

06.2003 - Source: Defence Academy of the United Kingdom - Advanced Research and Assessment Group

Bodyguards of Achmad Kadyrov came into being around March 2002; manpower recruited mainly from Kadyrov's relatives ("Chechnya: Normalisation (by C. W. Blandy)") [#20017],  [ID 16543]

"According to Politkovskaya’s calculations the punitive force known as the Kadyrovtsy came into being some time around March 2002. In a sense the Kadyrovtsy were not attached to any one side in the conflict but had an ideological gravitation towards the federaly. Nevertheless, it was an illegal bandit formation, which sought a figment of legitimacy by calling themselves Kadyrov’s bodyguards. However, for the bodyguard detachment to possess any form of legitimacy was a complete fiction, for the Chechen Ministry of Justice maintained Kadyrov’s bodyguard organisation had not been registered. In reality it was on a par with Basayev’s brigade or the remnants of the bandit formations belonging to Khattab or Arbi Barayev. The manpower for the bodyguard detachment is recruited in the main from his relatives. “Everything is changed according to the course of the business, degenerating into a snake-like hybrid combining the traditions of a tsarist bodyguard and Soviet NKVDKGB.”"

Document(s): Open document

04.03.2003 - Source: Council of Europe - Secretary General

Council of Europe: Tremendous lack of professionally skilled police staff in the Chechen Republic ("Twenty-sixth interim report by the Secretary General on the presence of the Council of Europe’s experts in the Office of the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for ensuring Human Rights and Civil Rights and Freedoms in the Chechen Republic [SG/Inf(2003) 7]") [#11304],  [ID 16544]

"“16. The Chechen Interior Vice-Minister, Mr Dakayev, informed the experts that 4,500 policemen of various ranks are currently operational. 30 percent of the Chechen Interior Ministry’s staff is to be recruited through contracts and will come from other entities of the Russian Federation, as there is a tremendous lack of professionally skilled police staff in the Chechen Republic. 13 districts out of 18 are now under the responsibility of the permanent police department of the police of the Chechen Interior Ministry. The five southern districts remain under the control of the federal temporary police. 17. Mr Dakayev confirmed that there is an urgent need to train new staff. 1,500 policemen should be trained in the Russian Federation in 2003. In this respect, the establishment of the Police Academy of the Chechen Republic contributes to increase the qualification of policemen, especially higher-ranking staff.”"

Document(s): Open document
Addendum