04.09.2003 - Source: Prima News

Human rights movement failed to challenge the legality of the constitutional referendum in Chechnya held on March 23 ("Supreme Court refuses to inquire into Chechen referendum") [#15779],  [ID 15941]

Document(s): Open document

06.2003 - Source: Defence Academy of the United Kingdom - Advanced Research and Assessment Group

Outline of chapters of Chechen constitution ("Chechnya: Normalisation (by C. W. Blandy)") [#20017],  [ID 15942]

"An earlier constitution of the Chechen Republic dated from 2 March 1992,25 resulting from the declaration of independence in the autumn of 1991, with amendments on 11 November 1996 and 3 February 1997; other drafts of treaties and proposals could also have had a bearing on the wording of the draft constitution.26 Apart from the Khasavyurt Accords of 30/31 August 1996, the most important documents are the Russian Federation – Tatarstan Treaty of 15 February 1994, the ‘Bashlam’ draft proposal of 24 July 1996, and the separate draft treaties produced by Russian and Chechen delegations in August 1997. Table 2 - Outline Of Chechen Constitution Chapter Articles Section 1: 1 Basis of Constitutional Order 1 to 13 2 Rights & Freedoms of People and Citizens 14 to 57 3 State Structure of the Chechen Republic 58 to 62 4 President of the Chechen Republic 63 to77 5 Parliament of the Chechen Republic 78 to 91 6 Organs of Executive Power 92 to 95 7 Judicial Authority, Procuracy, Advocacy & Notary 96 to 106 8 Local Self-Government 107 to 111 9 Constitutional Amendments 12 Section 2: - Concluding & Transitional Positions"

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14.05.2003 - Source: Council of Europe - Secretary General

Political situation after the Referendum ("Twenty-seventh interim report by the Secretary General on the presence of the Council of Europe’s experts in the Office of the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for ensuring Human Rights and Civil Rights and Freedoms in the Chechen Republic – period from 19 February to 13 May 2003 [SG/Inf(2003) 23]") [#14573],  [ID 15943]

"24. The staff members of the Office informed the experts about the following percentage of participation in the referendum: i) 96% in Achkhoy-Martan District, 70.6% in the city of Argun, 97% in Nadterechnyi District, 90% in Naur District, 97% in Shali District, 96% in Shelkovskoy District, 96% in Urus-Martan District, 100% in Vedeno District. Several interlocutors stated that the main reason why people voted in the mountainous districts was out of fear of retaliation by federal forces. 25. According to information made available to the experts, the percentage of participation in the city of Grozny varies. According to the human rights centre “Memorial”, 312 persons were counted to have physically voted at a specific polling station during the day; in the same polling station the chairman of the local electoral commission stated that by 11.00 a.m. 1,400 voters had cast their votes. Most of the voters apparently came to the urban polling stations late afternoon, reassured by the absence of any terrorist attack or military action. 26. Many people explained to the experts that the Chechens had taken part in the referendum to reject the conflict and hoping for a return to “normal life”. Nevertheless, the recent upsurge of violence from both sides has already raised disappointment amongst the people. Expectations were very high for a quick return to a peaceful life, and a step backwards could deeply affect their behaviour and possibly radicalise the attitude of citizens who opposed the present Chechen authorities but were ready to co-operate in building new democratic institutions."

Document(s): Open document
Addendum

04.03.2003 - Source: Council of Europe - Secretary General

Council of Europe: The majority of the Chechen population considers the adoption of a Chechen Constitution as essential and will be participating in the referendum ("Twenty-sixth interim report by the Secretary General on the presence of the Council of Europe’s experts in the Office of the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for ensuring Human Rights and Civil Rights and Freedoms in the Chechen Republic [SG/Inf(2003) 7]") [#11304],  [ID 15944]

"20. As far as the referendum is concerned, people are not yet well informed on its scope and content. The referendum is seen as a plebiscite for or against a political solution and not for or against the proposed constitutional and legal texts. The only alternative for the population to express itself against the draft texts – which might be interpreted by the authorities as a “NO” to a political settlement as a whole – is to call a “hotline” set up by the Initiative Group created to promote the idea of a referendum (IG) and to make proposals for amendments. It should be recalled that, according to the draft text of the Constitution, the latter cannot be amended for one year following its adoption by referendum. Moreover, very few people have access to telephone lines. If they do, they are unlikely to call the IG to voice objections to the project as members of the IG are very often members of the Chechen Administration who have temporarily given up their function and may go back to their original place of work after the referendum. 21. Human rights remain the first priority for the local population. In this regard, Chechen inhabitants hope that the referendum will lead to the setting up of a legal framework and democratic institutions that will first of all allow them to find their missing relatives and avoid further disappearances and, at last, bring political, social and economic stability in the Republic. 22. According to the information provided by staff members of the Office, the majority of the Chechen population considers the adoption of a Chechen Constitution as essential and will be participating in the referendum. It is, however, unclear to what extent they genuinely feel the need for the adoption of a Chechen Constitution at this particular moment. 23. Lord Judd’s recommendation to postpone the date of the referendum was met with rather negative reactions from the official authorities but also from traditional structures (Councils of Elders) and religious authorities. They saw it as an attempt to slow down the process for a political solution. However, the Chechen population is also convinced that no adequate conditions – in particular in terms of security - are yet met."

Document(s): Open document
Addendum