06.2007 - Source: Freedom House

Annual report on political rights and civil liberties in Chechnya in 2006 ("Freedom in the World 2007") [ID 20657]

Document(s): Open document

04.10.2006 - Source: Institute for War and Peace Reporting

Pro-Moscow Chechen prime minister Ramzan Kadyrov turns 30 and runs for Chechen presidency ("Kadyrov Stakes Leadership Claim") [ID 17536]

"Ramzan Kadyrov turns 30 on October 5, an age at which he is constitutionally entitled to stand for the presidency of the Chechen Republic. He has already eclipsed the man formally elected president in 2004, Alu Alkhanov, and several Russian analysts have predicted that the Chechen parliament will soon propose a vote of no-confidence in Alkhanov and then nominate Kadyrov to replace him. Under current Russian legislation, all that would then need to happen was for Putin to confirm the nomination.
That his candidacy should be discussed seriously is a sign of how the younger Kadyrov has changed in the past two years. He has been written about extensively in the Russian and foreign media as a brutal warlord, but now he is making an effort to project a different image. Kadyrov has started befriending the media and now willingly gives interviews, even letting journalists stay with him for several days. He now even has an English-speaking press secretary from Moscow, Tatyana Georgieva. (...) Human rights activist and analyst Tatyana Lokshina warns that this style of rule may prove very damaging for Chechnya in the future. “Kadyrov is bad for Chechnya not only because his security agencies resort to violence and because abductions and torture are continuing, but also because he is completely depriving the republic of the space in which the law operates,” said Lokshina."

Document(s): Open document

06.09.2006 - Source: Freedom House

No democratic rule in Chechnya; since democratically elected parliament ceased to function in 1999 with resumption of war, all subsequent presidential and parliamentary elections were held under undemocratic conditions ("The Worst of the Worst: The World's Most Repressive Societies 2006") [ID 17255]

"Residents of Chechnya cannot change their government democratically. While the 1997 presidential elections—conducted by the region’s separatist authorities—were characterized by international observers as reasonably free and fair, the resumption of war in the republic in 1999 led to the total evisceration of the political rights of Chechens. President Aslan Maskhadov fled the capital city in December 1999, and the parliament elected in 1997 ceased to function. In June 2000, Russian president Vladimir Putin enacted a decree establishing direct presidential rule over Chechnya. Claims by the Russian government that they were returning the region to democratic rule by means of a March 2003 referendum lacked credibility. The referendum was orchestrated by the Kremlin, with no opportunity for debate, widespread vote rigging, and official results that indicated a voter turnout of 85 percent and nearly unanimous support for a new constitution. In the subsequent presidential and parliamentary elections of October 5, 2003, candidates representing a genuine alternative were not on the ballot and real debate was stifled in an atmosphere of repression and censorship. After the assassination of the newly elected president, Akhmad Kadyrov, in May 2004, a new election was conducted under similarly undemocratic circumstances. Under the authoritarian rule of President Alu Alkhanov, as under Kadyrov, there is no party pluralism and politicians who advocate Chechen state independence are unable to work openly and freely. The current regime, which includes Ramzan Kadyrov, son of the assassinated president, is linked to a network of criminal Chechen groups and is denounced by separatist Chechens as traitorous. Putin proclaimed Kadyrov a Hero of Russia in January 2005, an act that shocked the human rights community."

Document(s): Open document

07.11.2005 - Source: Schweizerische Flüchtlingshilfe

Responsibility for counter-terrorist-operations transferred to Chechens by Russian authorities ("Chechenization") ("Tschetschenien: Update: Entwicklungen in Tschetschenien, Inguschetien, Dagestan und anderen Teilen der Russischen Föderation") [#38928],  [ID 15932]

"Gemäss einem Bericht der russischen Menschenrechtsorganisation «Memorial» brachte das Jahr 2004 dem Nordkaukasus zwei entscheidende Wendungen: Erstens schwappte der blutige Konflikt definitiv nach Inguschetien, Dagestan und Nordossetien über (siehe dazu Kapitel 9) und zweitens veränderte sich Moskaus Strategie der «Terrorbekämpfung».12 Konkret setzen die Sicherheitskräfte immer systematischer Angehörige potentieller Widerstandskämpfer unter Druck, entführen sie und zerstören ihr Eigentum, um die Widerstandskämpfer selbst zur Aufgabe zu zwingen. In dieser Beziehungen haben sich vor allem die Truppen Vizepräsident Ramzan Kadyrows, des Sohns des ermordeten Präsidenten, die so genannte «Kadyrowtsi» einen zweifelhaften Ruf zugelegt. Die Methoden des Staates haben in diesem Bereich terroristische Züge angenommen. Gleichzeitig ist die angetönte «Tschetschenisierung» des Konflikts praktisch abgeschlossen. Die Routinearbeit der so genannten «Anti-terroristischen Operation» ist jetzt fast ganz in den Händen ethnischer Tschetschenen. Deren Einheiten müssen versuchen, die Rebellennetzwerke in der Ebene zu eliminieren und die Kämpfer in den Bergen zur Aufgabe zwingen. Moskau bietet ihnen im Gegenzug die nötigen finanziellen Ressourcen, administrative und politische Unterstützung und vor allem Straflosigkeit.13 Die tschetschenische Regierung hat sich in diesem Umfeld zunehmend etabliert und versucht teils auf brutale Art und Weise jede Opposition im Keim zu ersticken. Die «Tschetschenisierung» hat strategische und propagandistische Vorteile: Erstens wird der Konflikt dank ihr zu einer internen Auseinandersetzung und verliert den Charakter des Separatistischen. Zweitens kann so die eine loyale Seite als legitimer und einziger Verhandlungspartner angesehen werden. Die Kritik am Vorgehen der Sicherheitskräfte wird so zunehmend auf letztere gelenkt. Und schliesslich erscheinen dank der «Tschetschenisierung» Widerstandskämpfer in der Gesellschaft künf-tig nicht als Märtyrer, die sich gegen fremde Invasoren gewehrt haben, sondern sie können als «Terroristen» abgestempelt werden."

Document(s): Open document

11.2005 - Source: Gesellschaft für Bedrohte Völker

Political situation: "Chechenization" of conflict, roles of Kadyrov and Sadullaev ("Schleichender Völkermord in Tschetschenien") [#41300],  [ID 15931]

"Am 9.5.2004 fiel der pro-russische tschetschenische Präsident Achmed Kadyrow während Feierlichkeiten zum Tag des Sieges einem Sprengstoffanschlag zum Opfer. Auch danach hielt die russische Regierung an ihrer Strategie der so genannten Tschetschenisierung fest. Dies bedeutet offiziell die Übergabe von Verantwortung in moskaufreundliche tschetschenische Hände. Seit Ende 2002 verfolgt die russische Regierung diesen auch nach außen als politische Lösung propagierten Kurs. Im Zuge dessen wurde am 29.8.2004 Alu Alchanov, der bisherige Innenminister,zum Präsidenten gewählt. Auch bei dieser Wahl kam es nach Angaben von unabhängigen Wahlbeobachtern zu massivem Wahlbetrug, so dass nach offiziellen Angaben bei 85%iger Wahlbeteiligung 74% der Stimmen auf Alchanov fielen. Wichtigster Mann in Tschetschenien ist jedoch der Sohn des ehemaligen Präsidenten, der 29-jährige Ramzan Kadyrow. Er ist Vizepremier und befehligt die ehemalige Leibgarde des Präsidenten, die er stark ausgebaut hat. Diese so genannten Kadyrowzy sind heute für etwa zwei Drittel der Menschenrechtsverletzungen gegen tschetschenische Zivilisten verantwortlich. In seiner Rede zum 25. Bestehen der polnischen Solidarnocz Bewegung sagte der bekannte russische Menschenrechtler Sergej Kowaljow, der Kreml habe Gangster an die Spitze Tschetscheniens befördert und betreibe Wahlfälschung (BBC Monitoring, 29.8.2005). Kadyrow ist zu jung für den Präsidentenposten, hat aber Ansprüche auf das Amt angemeldet. Dies wurde im Rahmen einer Pressekonferenz in seinem Heimatort Gudermes am 23.9. deutlich, wo er den jetzigen Präsidenten Alchanov scharf angriff und ihn aufforderte,seine Minister zu entlassen. „Niemand zweifelt daran, dass Ramsan Kadyrow im nächsten Jahr Präsident werden wird“, zitiert die Zeitung Kommersant eine Quelle aus der tschetschenischen Regierung (Kommersant, 23.9.2005).Nach dem Tod von Aslan Maschadow, dem letzten frei gewählten Präsidenten Tschetscheniens, am 8.3.2005, übernahm der designierte Nachfolger und ehemaliger Scharia-Richter, Abdul-Chalim Sadullaev das Amt. Dieser hat im Sommer 2005 die Auslandsvertretungen seiner Regierung neu geordnet und auch den notorischen Terroristen und Verbrecher Schamil Bassajew wieder in seine Regierung aufgenommen. Die Begründung hierfür ist, dass Sadullaev ihn kontrollieren und so Terrorakte gegen Zivilisten verhindern wolle."

Document(s): Open document

11.2005 - Source: International Federation for Human Rights

Political process needed in Chechnya, but cannot be implemented in conditions of continuous state terror and climate of fear ("In a Climate of Fear; "Political Process" and Parliamentary Elections in Chechnya (IHF, FIDH, NHC, Demos, Memorial)") [#39859],  [ID 15933]

"It is necessary to start an authentic political process in Chechnya. Until now instead of this process there has been a charade. In fact there were no referendum or elections. There were large-scale falsifications instead. The net result of the current political process is the establishment of a criminal local elite in Chechnya, who, for lack of public legitimacy, depend on violence and fear to stay in power. Conflict resolution in Chechnya stipulates the creation of authorities at all levels, who would be accepted by the majority of people. Such authorities can only emerge as a result of free and fair elections, which would invite participation by a wide spectrum of the political forces in Chechnya. However, such authorities can only emerge when Chechnya itself emerges from the climate of fear that today extinguishes meaningful public debate in the republic and reduces the political space to practically nothing. This implies the emergence of authentic dialogue among all the political forces, including supporters of Chechen independence. As a result of this peace process, ”the rules of the game” could be developed, which would determine the future of this republic. It is necessary to allow the separatists who condemn terrorism as a method for achieving political ends, to form a political wing that could participate in the elections and continue its struggle by political methods. The political process in Chechnya cannot be sustainable without the inclusion of these forces. Separatism as such, when it is not linked to violence and propagation of national and religious hatred, should not be considered a crime. Besides, obviously a political process cannot be implemented in the conditions of continuous state terror. Endless violence in Chechnya does not leave any chances for the upcoming elections to be free and fair. Having analyzed the situation in the Chechen Republic today, we regretfully state that the republican parliamentary elections appointed for November 27 2005, and advertised by the federal center as the crucial element of the political settlement, are unlikely to become a step towards peace in the North Caucasus."

Document(s): Open document

11.2005 - Source: International Federation for Human Rights

"Chechenization" has not brought peace; stabilization and minimum of security is precondition for investment in economy and creating jobs ("In a Climate of Fear; "Political Process" and Parliamentary Elections in Chechnya (IHF, FIDH, NHC, Demos, Memorial)") [#39859],  [ID 15934]

"The “Chechenization” – i.e. the handing over of responsibility, including for the conduct of “antiterrorist” operations, from the federal to the local authorities – of the conflict has not brought peace to the Chechen Republic. It has resulted in the brutalization of the warring sides and pervasive fear and insecurity for the civilians. The conflict has acquired another internal Chechen dimension, more difficult to resolve than the Russian–Chechen conflict. Moreover, the emergence of pro-Kremlin armed groups, which are only partly controlled by the government/federal authorities, creates preconditions for new spirals of violence in the future. The emergence of security forces numbering thousands added to the remaining high numbers of Chechen fighters result in mass militarization of the male population, a situation where thousands of young men in Chechnya do not know how to win their bread in a way other than with their guns. Many representatives of local security agencies are simply not interested in ending the low intensity warfare – otherwise they risk joining the army of the unemployed. At the same time, it is obvious that investment in the economy and creating jobs are not possible without general stabilization and at least minimal security guarantees for the invested capital. A vicious circle emerges, with one possible way out – the reduction of confrontation, transformation of the conflict from armed to political, and implementation of programs for reintegrating former rebel fighters into the peaceful labor and life."

Document(s): Open document

11.2005 - Source: International Federation for Human Rights

"Chechenization" of conflict by Moscow brought transfer of functions to republican institutions and delegated local security units right to illegal violance ("In a Climate of Fear; "Political Process" and Parliamentary Elections in Chechnya (IHF, FIDH, NHC, Demos, Memorial)") [#39859],  [ID 15935]

"The formation of security services consisting of ethnic Chechens, which function on the territory of the Chechen Republic had been completed by 2004. “Chechenization” brought about significant changes in the republic, not only in the methods of carrying out of the so-called ‘anti-terrorist operation’, but also in social relations within the Chechen society. The federal troops remain in Chechnya: without these forces the local security agencies would be unable to resist their antagonists from armed units of Ichkeria. At the same time, the republican ministry of internal affairs was created, which subordinates the police, numbering 14,000 men. The majority of the policemen, however, are involved in ensuring public order and protection of various state institutions. Usually they do not directly participate in carrying out raids against Chechen fighters. This task is implemented by special units consisting of ethnic Chechens which either formally belong to the Ministries of Interior and Defense, or function outside the official ministries. In the process of Chechenization of conflict the federal center, on the one hand, transferred the functions of government to the republican institutions and, on the other, delegated these local security units the right to illegal violence. In 2004-2005 the local security agencies, functioning under control, with administrative, political and financial support of the federal center were responsible for the absolute majority of grave human rights abuses committed in Chechnya on behalf of the state."

Document(s): Open document

08.2005 - Source: Freedom House

Since Second Chechen War political rights of Chechens destroyed, no means to change government democratically ("Freedom in the World 2005") [#41619],  [ID 15936]

"Residents of Chechnya do not have the means to change their government democratically. While the 1997 presidential elections - conducted by the region's separatist authorities - were characterized by international observers as reasonably free and fair, the resumption of war in the republic in 1999 led to the total evisceration of the political rights of Chechens. President Aslan Maskhadov fled the capital city in December 1999, and the parliament elected in 1997 ceased to function. In June 2000, Russian president Vladimir Putin enacted a decree establishing direct presidential rule over Chechnya. Claims by the Russian government that they were returning the region to democratic rule by means of a March 2003 referendum lacked credibility. The referendum was orchestrated by the Kremlin, with no opportunity for debate, widespread vote rigging, and official results that indicated a voter turnout of 85 percent and nearly unanimous support for a new constitution. In the subsequent presidential and parliamentary elections of October 5, 2003, candidates representing a genuine alternative were not on the ballot and real debate was stifled in an atmosphere of repression and censorship. After the assassination of the newly elected president, Akhmad Kadyrov, in May 2004, a new election was conducted under similarly undemocratic circumstances. Under the authoritarian rule of President Alu Alkhanov, as under Kadyrov, there is no party pluralism and politicians who advocate Chechen state independence are unable to work openly and freely. The current regime, which includes Ramzan Kadyrov, son of the assassinated president, is linked to a network of criminal Chechen groups and is denounced by Maskhadov and separatist Chechens as traitorous."

Document(s): Open document

11.02.2005 - Source: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

Chechnya: Analysis of Aslan Maskhadov's initiatives for peace negotiations with Russian Federation ("Analysis: Is It Too Late For Peace Talks In Chechnya?") [#29020],  [ID 15937]

Document(s): Open document

05.2004 - Source: Defence Academy of the United Kingdom - Advanced Research and Assessment Group

Chechnya: report focused on recent escalation of terrorist violence ("Chechnya: Centre of Unabated Instability & Conflict (by C W Blandy)") [#27845],  [ID 15938]

Document(s): Open document

03.10.2003 - Source: International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights

Chechnya: report in the run-up to the presidential elections on 5 October 2003 ("Außenansicht: Weiche Landung für Tschetschenien (von Yuri F. Orlov)") [#16482],  [ID 15939]

Document(s): Open document

06.2003 - Source: Defence Academy of the United Kingdom - Advanced Research and Assessment Group

Report on the political situation in Chechnya ("Chechnya: Normalisation (by C. W. Blandy)") [#20017],  [ID 15940]

Document(s): Open document