11.03.2008 - Source: US Department of State

The village guards and human rights abuses ("Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007") [ID 22808]

"A civil defense force known as the village guards, concentrated in the southeast, was less professional and disciplined than other security forces. The village guards were accused repeatedly of drug trafficking, corruption, theft, and rape and other human rights abuses. Inadequate oversight and compensation contributed to this problem, and in many cases Jandarma allegedly protected village guards from prosecution. Although the security forces were generally considered effective, the village guards, Jandarma, and police special forces were viewed as those most responsible for abuses. Corruption and impunity from prosecution remained serious problems.

On May 27, parliament passed a law overhauling the village guard system. The law limits the total number of village guards under normal circumstances to 40,000; provides that the Council of Ministers may increase this number by up to 50 percent; provides continued employment for current guards; establishes a mandatory 55-year retirement age; provides a partial salary for early retirement; provides for a pension to guards who served more than 15 years; and requires the Ministry of the Interior to establish procedures for hiring, firing, training and otherwise regulating the guard system. According to government officials, the law is intended to gradually phase out the system while providing social support for the 63,000 current village guards.

Human rights organizations maintained that developments in the 2005 Semdinli bombing trial demonstrated the serious obstacles to bringing to justice senior members of the security forces. The trial court had convicted Jandarma officers Ali Kaya and Ozcan Ildeniz for the bombing, and observed that the two men could not have acted without the knowledge and involvement of their superiors. The Court of Appeals overturned the conviction, ruling that the investigation was flawed and that the proper venue was a military court. On December 14, the military court released the suspects pending trial.

Courts investigated many allegations of abuse and torture by security forces during the year; however, they rarely convicted or punished offenders. When courts did convict offenders, punishment generally was minimal and sentences were often suspended. Authorities typically allowed officers accused of abuse to remain on duty and, in occasional cases, promoted them during their trials, which often took years.

On September 12, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled that Turkey violated the European Convention on Human Rights by failing to implement the 1997 conviction of two Jandarma officers for torturing Cengiz Aksakal in 1980. The ECHR noted that the two officers were allowed to continue their military jobs until retirement.
"

Document(s): Open document

06.11.2007 - Source: European Commission

Village guards ("Turkey 2007 Progress Report [SEC(2007) 1436]") [ID 22479]

"No progress has been made towards abolishing the system of village guards12. On the contrary, amendments were adopted by Parliament in May 2007 to facilitate recruitment of village guards at the request of a provincial governor and with the approval of the Ministry of the Interior. The Law also improves the social rights and pensions of the village guards. There were cases of the hiring of new voluntary village guards, who are not paid but are armed by the state."

Document(s): Open document

12.04.2006 - Source: Human Rights Watch

Southeastern Turkey: Human Rights Watch researcher detained by police while carrying out research in predominately Kurdish region into abuses allegedly involving Turkish gendarmerie and government-armed local defense units called "village guards" ("Turkey: Human Rights Watch Researcher Detained in Kurdish Area") [#49038],  [ID 15599]

Document(s): Open document

10.2005 - Source: UK Home Office

Village Guards ("Country Report - October 2005") [#40563],  [ID 14456]

"5.104 As noted in the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2002:

“When the state of emergency was declared in 1985 [in some of the provinces] a system of village guards was also established in the south-east whereby villages, though not forcibly, supplied adult men to guard the villages and provide general assistance and information. Village guards were thus supposed to work together with the army and Jandarma in their fight against the PKK. The willingness of the local population to take part in the village guard system has always largely depended on tribal loyalties. Some Kurdish tribes voluntarily supplied village guards while other tribes have constantly refused to participate because of their PKK sympathies. This has led to entire villages refusing requests to supply village guards while others voluntarily co-operate.” [2a] (p136)

5.105 The Netherlands report continued:

“The village guard system has always been highly controversial. Not infrequently villages which had shown reluctance to become involved in the conflict have suffered reprisals, including the burning of villages. The village guard system also makes for abuses of power. Many village guards have been involved in crimes ranging from murder, supporting the PKK, and drug smuggling, to bride abduction. Thousands of proceedings are pending against village guards, with almost 24,000 having been dismissed since the system was introduced in 1985.” [2a] (p136)

5.106 According to the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2002:

“The abolition of the village guard system has been contemplated at government level for some time now. A few small-scale retraining projects for village guards have recently been announced. However, the village guard system generates a steady income equivalent to EUR 300, which people will not always be keen to give up. Furthermore, disarmament will give rise to problems since village guards come from different tribes, which not infrequently have difficult or poor relations with each other. It is assumed that none of the tribes will want to be the first or only ones to surrender their weapons.” [2a] (p137)

5.107 The Netherlands report 2002 continued:

“In the past individuals recruited as village guards have sometimes been caught in the crossfire. On the one hand their refusal to serve as village guards could be interpreted as implicit support for the PKK, while on the other hand their acceptance of the office could make them PKK targets…In the past refusal to serve as village guard never used to lead to sanctions from the national authority. Pressure from local authorities following refusal to serve as a village guard can be avoided by settling elsewhere, for instance in one of the major cities outside south-east Turkey. This also applies to persons who are under pressure from the local community because they agreed in the past to serve as a village guard.” [2a] (p137)

5.108 The USSD 2004 reported that:

“The Government continued to organize, arm, and pay a civil defense force of approximately 58,000, mostly in the southeast region. This force, known as the village guards, was reputed to be the least disciplined of the security forces and continued to be accused repeatedly of drug trafficking, rape, corruption, theft, and other human rights abuses. Inadequate oversight and compensation contributed to this problem, and in some cases Jandarma allegedly protected village guards from prosecution. In addition to the village guards, Jandarma and police special teams were viewed as those most responsible for abuses.” [5c] (Section 1c)

5.109 The Norwegian Country of Origin Information Centre ‘Report of fact-finding mission to Turkey (7-17 October 2004)’ noted that:

“The legal basis for the Village Guard-system in the Southeast was given in law No. 3175, dated 26.3.1985, which was amended in 1990 by law No. 3612. In contrast to law No. 442, dated 1924, the newer law only refers to so-called ‘temporary’ village guards (gecici köy korucular), and not to other types of village guards.) Its main task is to support the Gendarmerie and the Army in their fight against the Kurdish rebels. According to diplomatic sources the bulk of the village guards (köy korucusu) is presently located in the provinces of Van, Bingöl, Siirt, Hakkari and Ş irnak. During the Iraq-war in 2003, some Village-Guards were relocated to the border in order to prevent PKK/Konra-Gel-militants from entering Turkey. The same source estimated that the number of village guards currently is at about 60,000.” [16] (p29)

5.110 The Norwegian report continued:

“Mr. Selahattin Demirta, head of Human Rights Association in Diyarbakir, told me that the number of village guards had decreased from about 150,000 in the year 2000 to 56,000 in 2004. The head of DEHAP in the province of Diyarbakir, Birtane, estimated that the present number of village guards was about 50,000. According to the newspaper Yeni Şafak [of 20 July 2004] the Turkish General Staff numbered the total village guard force at 87,296. However, in contrast to the sources consulted during my trip, the General Staff distinguished between 28,754 so-called volunteer village guards (gönüllü korucular) and 58,542 “temporary” Village Guards (gecici köy korucular).” [16] (p29)

5.111 The Norwegian report continued:

“Mr. Celahettin Birtane, head of DEHAP in Diyarbakýr province, was the only source consulted who claimed that the authorities still recruit village guards, although in much smaller numbers than it was the case before the year 2000. He told me that the authorities had recently recruited some village guards in the provinces Hakkari and Şirnak. None of the other sources could confirm that recruitment to the Village Guard-force is still going on. Neither could any of the persons I talked to confirm that any cases of forced recruitment had occurred in recent years. However, all sources consulted claimed that forced recruitment had been practiced before the end of the state of emergency, and in particular in the 1990’s. Mr. Birtane told me that he personally knew cases of forced recruitment from his home-village close to the city of Diyarbakýr. The other sources did not give any concrete examples of that kind.” [16] (p29-30)

5.112 As noted in the Human Rights Watch document ‘Still critical. Prospects in 2005 for Internally Displaced Kurds in Turkey’, dated March 2005:

“The continuing presence of village guards in some communities constitutes a major impediment to improved security and confidence among displaced villagers. This in turn has a major impact on their willingness to return…Displaced persons are understandably reluctant to return to remote rural areas where their neighbors, sometimes from a rival clan, are licensed to carry arms, as members of the village guard. Many villagers were originally displaced precisely because they refused to become village guards. Most village guards, like the displaced, are Kurds…Village guards were involved in the original displacement, and in the intervening years have continued to commit extrajudicial executions and abductions. In some cases, village guards are now occupying properties from which villagers were forcibly evicted. They are sometimes prepared to use violence to protect their illegal gains. The failure of successive Turkish governments to hold accountable members of the security forces and village guard for abuses has created a climate of impunity.” [9g] (p9)

5.113 The EC 2005 report recorded that:

“No progress has been made in addressing the problem of village guards. Reports indicate that village guards have on occasion attacked returning IDPs. Official figures state that 57 601 village guards are still on duty (as opposed to 58 551 last year). Moreover, although the Turkish authorities state that no village guards have been appointed since 2000, NGOs suggest that new village guards have been recruited in response to the increasing number of clashes between security forces and illegal armed groups. Reportedly, authorisation to return to villages is sometimes only granted if returnees are willing to serve as village guards.” [71e] (p39)"

Document(s): Open document

26.05.2005 - Source: Schweizerische Flüchtlingshilfe

Information as to threats of Turkish citizens of Kurdish origins when filing suits against the Turkish State ("Gefährdungsprofil für türkische Staatsangehörige kurdischer Herkunft bei Klagen gegen den türkischen Staat") [#33210],  [ID 14457]

Document(s): Open document

07.03.2005 - Source: Human Rights Watch

Village guards have not been disarmed ("“Still critical”: Prospects in 2005 for Internally Displaced Kurds in Turkey") [#29758],  [ID 14458]

"Village guards—paramilitaries, usually Kurdish, armed and paid by the government to fight the PKK (Kurdish Workers’ Party, now known as Kongra Gel)—have not been disarmed, and are implicated in attacks on returning IDPs. Regular security forces have also committed extrajudicial executions of IDPs."

Document(s): Open document

07.03.2005 - Source: Human Rights Watch

Continuing presence of village guards in some communities constitutes a major impediment to improved security and confidence among displaced villagers ("“Still critical”: Prospects in 2005 for Internally Displaced Kurds in Turkey") [#29758],  [ID 14459]

"The continuing presence of village guards in some communities constitutes a major impediment to improved security and confidence among displaced villagers. This in turn has a major impact on their willingness to return. In Sirnak province, for example, where the village guard system is particularly strong, the government’s own statistics indicate that returns are running at less than half the rate of the best-performing province.

Displaced persons are understandably reluctant to return to remote rural areas where their neighbors, sometimes from a rival clan, are licensed to carry arms, as members of the village guard. Many villagers were originally displaced precisely because they refused to become village guards. Most village guards, like the displaced, are Kurds. As of August 2004, there were 58,416 village guards in Turkey. Village guards were involved in the original displacement, and in the intervening years have continued to commit extrajudicial executions and abductions. In some cases, village guards are now occupying properties from which villagers were forcibly evicted. They are sometimes prepared to use violence to protect their illegal gains. The failure of successive Turkish governments to hold accountable members of the security forces and village guard for abuses has created a climate of impunity.

In 2002, village guards allegedly killed three villagers who returned to Nureddin village, in Muş province. In June 2004, village guards were implicated in killing of five villagers in pastures near Akpazar village, near Diyadin, in Ağrı province. On September 25, 2004, a village guard in Tellikaya village in Diyarbakır province allegedly shot and killed Mustafa Koyun, a returnee villager. On or about October 7, 2004, villager İshak Tekin was wounded in an attack by village guards at his home in the settlement of Axçana, near Varto in Muş province. He was shot at close quarters, and lost an eye in the attack.

The October 6, 2004 European Commission Regular Report on Turkey describes the village guard system as one of the “major outstanding obstacles” to the safe return of IDPs. There have been repeated calls for the abolition of the village guard system both inside and outside Turkey. Those recommending the abolition of the system include: the Turkish Grand National Assembly’s parliamentary commission on political killings in its 1995 report, the Turkish Grand National Assembly’s parliamentary commission on internal migration in its 1998 report, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions in her 2002 report on her visit to Turkey, the UN Special Representative on Internal Displacement in his 2002 report on his visit to Turkey, and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in its resolution on Turkey of June 2004. Returns will continue to be slow unless and until the village guard system is dismantled and its members disarmed."

Document(s): Open document

28.02.2005 - Source: US Department of State

Government continues to organize, arm, and pay village guards ("Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2004") [#29519],  [ID 14460]

"The Government continued to organize, arm, and pay a civil defense force of approximately 58,000, mostly in the southeast region. This force, known as the village guards, was reputed to be the least disciplined of the security forces and continued to be accused repeatedly of drug trafficking, rape, corruption, theft, and other human rights abuses. Inadequate oversight and compensation contributed to this problem, and in some cases Jandarma allegedly protected village guards from prosecution. In addition to the village guards, Jandarma and police special teams were viewed as those most responsible for abuses."

Document(s): Open document

20.10.2003 - Source: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (formerly Global IDP Project)

Report focussed on internal displacement as a major concern in the OSCE area/ 3 million people who were forced to leave their homes as a result of armed conflict or human rights violations still wait for durable solutions to their plight ("Protecting internally displaced persons in the OSCE area: A neglected commitment") [#17054],  [ID 14461]

"The most common form of displacement was the forced eviction of entire villages by Turkish security forces. The Government justified this practice as a means of protecting civilians and depriving the PKK of logistical support. Another factor leading to displacement has been the "village guard" system. Village guards, comprised of villagers pressured to join, and their families have been the target of deliberate and arbitrary killing by the PKK. The refusal of villagers to join the guard has often been followed by the evacuation of their villages by Turkish security forces, carried out in the most brutal ways, with reports of property destruction, rape, torture and extra-judicial executions. The European Court of Human Rights has found Turkey responsible for violations of the European Human Rights Conventions in numerous cases of arbitrary evictions, property destruction, disappearances and torture. [...]

However, a number of serious impediments to return remain. According to Human Rights Watch, inadequate government assistance and continued violence and harassment by security forces and village guards discourage returns or even cause returnees to flee again. The Government's return plans have failed to meet international standards and have therefore not attracted international funding. With regard to the `Back to the Villages' programme, only a few villagers have in fact been given permission to return to their homes. Moreover, "authorised" returnees have often not been allowed to enter their villages by the local military, or have been forced to sign forms stating that they were displaced due to terrorism. HRW has criticised the programme as being largely fictional with most abandoned settlements remaining no-go areas."

Document(s): Open document

30.09.2003 - Source: International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights

Report focused on latest human rights developments in the member states of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) ("Interventions and Recommendations by the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF) on the Occasion of the OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting Warsaw, 6-17 October 2003") [#16408],  [ID 14462]

"In addition to the above, there has been poor progress in the return of the estimated 380,000 to one million people who had been internally displaced from the south-eastern regions. According to Human Rights Watch, the Turkish government, security forces and paramilitaries were obstructing the return although active hostilities ceased in 1999. As a result, it appears that no more than 10% had ventured home by late 2002. In some cases local authorities forbid people to return, in others return is officially permitted but returning villagers are greeted with harassment, detention and attacks by the gendarmerie and village guards. Some have to flee a second time."

Document(s): Open document

18.07.2003 - Source: Amnesty International

Past refusal to serve as village guard does not automatically result in repressive measures; in combination with other factors (e. g. former recognition of asylum application in Germany) it may lead to pressure; dismantling of village guard system is under discussion, but the Turkish government does not seem to initiate such measures (German) ("Stellungnahme vom 18.7.2003 an VG Frankfurt a. M. - 10 E 2567/01.A (4)") [#14937],  [ID 14463]

Document(s): Open document

21.06.2003 - Source: Schweizerische Flüchtlingshilfe

Laut EU, gibt es in den kurdischen Provinzen der Türkei zwischen 30,000 und 40,000 Dorfmilizionäre; andere Quellen sprechen von 77,000 ("Zur aktuellen Situation - Juni 2003 ") [#14557],  [ID 14464]

"Laut Informationen der EU, gibt es in den kurdischen Provinzen der Türkei zwischen 30 40'000 Dorfmilizionäre. Nach anderen Quellen sollen es bis zu 77'000 sein. Es ist uns bekannt, dass die AKP-Regierung nach Lösungen sucht, um diese Dorfmilizionäre zu de-mobilisieren. Dies ist allerdings aufgrund der grossen Anzahl und der Privilegien, über die die Milizionäre während Jahren verfügten, keine einfache Angelegenheit. Die aktuelle Ten-denz scheint zu sein, für sie neue Aufgaben zu finden. Es wird unter anderem darüber dis-kutiert, ob sie als Waldwächter eingesetzt werden können. Ungefähr 2000 Dorfmilizionäre sind für einen Einsatz im Nordirak aus ihren Dörfern abgezogen, schliesslich aber nicht ein-gesetzt worden, weil sich die USA dem türkischen Einmarsch entgegengesetzt hatte. Eine Befriedung der kurdischen Provinzen benötigt zweifellos auch die Aufhebung dieses Insti-tuts, denn die Dorfmilizionäre benutzen ihre Funktion zu oft, um sich gegenüber anderen KurdInnen Vorteile zu erwirtschaften. Es gibt heute sowieso keine Gründe mehr, dieses Institut aufrecht zu erhalten."

Document(s): Open document

09.10.2002 - Source: European Commission

European Commission: The “village guards” system acts as a disincentive for displaced persons to return to their villages ("2002 Regular Report on Turkey's Process Towards Accession") [#10217],  [ID 14465]

"The “village guards” system acts as a disincentive for displaced persons to return to their villages. There are currently 60000 – 70000 village guards in the area whose conduct is widely reported to be undisciplined and abusive. There are still landmines in the region and explosions are frequent. Civil society organisations active in the region are subject to considerable pressure from the authorities, facing judicial proceedings as well as temporary closures (see above on Civil and political rights). This is also the case in “adjacent provinces”, those bordering the provinces under the state of emergency, such as Van. Many of these restrictions on cultural rights and freedom of association are linked to the perceived need to protect the indivisibility of the State. The authorities justify the restrictions as being a part of the campaign against terrorism."

Document(s): Open document

15.04.2002 - Source: Council of the European Union

Netherlands delegation to CIREA: "Village guards" are recruited from among the local population ("Note from the Netherlands delegation to CIREA: Official general report on Turkey, January 2002" Rf. 7838/02") [#7991],  [ID 14466]

"For auxiliary tasks and provision of information, the security forces have made extensive use of
"village guards", recruited from among the local population."

Document(s): Open document

15.04.2002 - Source: Council of the European Union

Netherlands delegation to CIREA: Many village guards have been involved in crimes ranging from murder, supporting the PKK and drug smuggling to bride abduction ("Note from the Netherlands delegation to CIREA: Official general report on Turkey, January 2002" Rf. 7838/02") [#7991],  [ID 14467]

"When the state of emergency was declared in 1985 a system of village guards was also established in the south-east whereby villages, though not forcibly, supplied adult men to guard the villages and provide general assistance and information. Village guards were thus supposed to work together with the army and jandarma in their fight against the PKK. The willingness of the local population to take part in the village guard system has always largely depended on tribal loyalties. Some Kurdish tribes voluntarily supplied village guards while other tribes have constantly refused to participate because of their PKK sympathies. This has led to entire villages refusing requests to supply village guards while others voluntarily cooperate.
The village guard system has always been highly controversial. Not infrequently villages which had shown reluctance to become involved in the conflict have suffered reprisals, including the burning of villages. The village guard system also makes for abuses of power. Many village guards have been involved in crimes ranging from murder, supporting the PKK and drug smuggling to bride abduction. Thousands of proceedings are pending against village guards, with almost 24 000 having been dismissed since the system was introduced in 1985.
According to representatives of the Turkish human rights organisations TIHV and IHD as well as international observers, since the beginning of 2001 no more new village guards are being recruited to the existing ranks of approximately 70 000. However, according to an IHD spokesman, existing village guards who wish to end their activities sometimes meet with opposition from the (local) authorities. Those concerned are allegedly pressured to continue their activities.
The abolition of the village guard system has been contemplated at government level for some time now. A few small-scale retraining projects for village guards have recently been announced. However, the village guard system generates a steady income equivalent to some EUR 300, which people will not always be keen to give up. Furthermore, disarmament will give rise to problems since village guards come from different tribes which not infrequently have difficult or poor relations with each other. It is assumed that none of the tribes will want to be the first or only ones to surrender their weapons.
In the past individuals recruited as village guards have sometimes been caught in the crossfire. On the one hand their refusal to serve as village guards could be interpreted as implicit support for the PKK, while on the other hand their acceptance of the office could make them PKK targets. Since the withdrawal of PKK fighters from Turkey at the end of 1999 there has been practically no further pressure to speak of from the PKK. Now that the recruitment of village guards has ceased, this issue is no longer of any great importance. In fact, in the past refusal to serve as village guard never used to lead to sanctions from the national authority. Pressure from local authorities following refusal to serve as a village guard can be avoided by settling elsewhere, for instance in one of the major cities outside south-east Turkey. This also applies to persons who are under pressure from the local community because they agreed in the past to serve as a village guard."

Document(s): Open document