10.2005 - Source: UK Home Office

UK Home Office: Historical Overview October 2005 ("Country Report - October 2005") [#40563], [ID 13195]

Document(s): Open document

04.2005 - Source: UK Home Office

History overview ("Country Report - April 2005") [#31987], [ID 13196]

Document(s): Open document

10.2002 - Source: UK Home Office

UK Home Office: History - Overview ("Country Assessment - October 2002") [#9887], [ID 13197]

Document(s): Open document

10.2002 - Source: UK Home Office

UK Home Office: History - Overview ("Country Assessment - October 2002") [#9887], [ID 13197]

Document(s): Open document

15.04.2002 - Source: Council of the European Union

Netherlands delegation to CIREA: History ("Note from the Netherlands delegation to CIREA: Official general report on Turkey, January 2002" Rf. 7838/02") [#7991], [ID 13198]

"After some 700 years as an Ottoman sultanate, on 29 October 1923 Turkey became a western-style republic, led by Mustafa Kemal, who came to be known by the surname Atatürk. The Treaty of Lausanne, concluded with the western powers (on 24 July 1923), recognised and guaranteed the independence, integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Turkey. The borders established in that treaty almost entirely match Turkey's present borders. The treaty also includes safeguards for three (non-Islamic) minorities living in Turkey: the Jews, Greeks and Armenians. Western-inspired reforms were carried out in the fledgling republic. Turkey's leaders at the time made a radical break with Islamic-based rule, officially separating religion and state. The Arabic
alphabet was abolished and replaced by a Latin script specially adapted to Turkish. Islamic laws were superseded by legislation along European (e.g. Italian, French and Swiss) lines. Dress regarded as religious-based was banned and replaced by western dress. Women working in public service were not allowed to wear headscarves. Use of western technology was also encouraged, as was female emancipation. The Turkish army, seeing itself as the guardian of the Turkish state, has up until the present kept a strict watch over full adherence to Atatürk's basic principles concerning the secular, unitary nature of the republic.
On 12 September 1980, a military coup took place, led by General Kenan Evren. The new regime managed to curb the political violence which had already been raging for about ten years, but at the cost of established democratic rights. The adoption of a new, far tougher constitution in a 1982 referendum was followed a year later by the restoration of civilian rule.
During the 1995 elections the pro-Islamic Refah Partisi (Welfare Party), led by Necmettin Erbakan, was returned as the largest party, with nearly 25% of the votes cast. On 25 June 1996 a coalition was formed between the Refah Partisi and the DYP (Dogru Yol Partisi - the True Path Party) led by Tansu Ciller, with an arrangement that the leaders of the two parties would each hold the post of
Prime Minister in turn. The first turn fell to Erbakan, the Welfare Party leader, with the result that Turkey then had its first pro-Islamic Prime Minister.
Pro-Islamic government was not to last long. Not only did the coalition have to cope with a great deal of infighting, but the army also took a hand. Through the National Security Council, in which it has a very large say, the army forced Prime Minister Erbakan to sign, on 28 February 1997, a memorandum containing recommendations designed to safeguard the secular nature of the
Turkish state. While he signed it, Erbakan was not subsequently as prompt as the army leadership would have liked in implementing it. A growing number of members of parliament from the Welfare Party's DYP coalition partner responded by putting an end to their cooperation with Welfare, with the result that on 30 May 1997 the coalition lost its parliamentary majority and Erbakan tendered his resignation under pressure from the army.
At the elections on 18 April 1999 the DSP (Demokratik Sol Partisi – the Democratic Left Party) came first, with 22,1% of the votes. The ultra-nationalist MHP came a surprisingly strong second, with 18,1%. The FP (Fazilet Partisi – Virtue Party), a pro-Islamic party established immediately after the Welfare Party was banned in January 1998, took third place (15,2%). The other big parties lost votes.
Six weeks after the elections of 18 April 1999 following what were by Turkish standards protracted negotiations, agreement was reached on a new coalition, led by Prime Minister Ecevit, which, in addition to the DSP, was composed of the MHP and the ANAP (Anavatan Partisi – Motherland Party). Both the MHP and the ANAP provided a deputy prime minister. Despite various internal
wrangling, the coalition has so far held together. On 10 December 1999, at the Helsinki summit, the European Union finally confirmed Turkey to be a candidate for EU membership. There can be no opening of accession negotiations until Turkey fulfils the political criteria for membership, as established in Copenhagen in 1993. On 8 November 2000 the European Commission published reports assessing Turkey's progress in the light of the Copenhagen criteria. The EU summit in Nice in December 2000 approved an accession partnership listing specific targets to be met by Turkey in the short or medium term. In this way, Europe is increasingly making its mark on Turkish politics. On 19 March 2001, under the accession 2000 partnership, Turkey submitted its national programme, stating what it means to do over the years ahead in order to fulfil the conditions. On 5 May 2000, after three rounds of voting in parliament, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the 58-year old head of the Constitutional Court, was elected as Turkey's tenth President. Up to then, Sezer had never taken any active part in politics. In his position as head of the Constitutional Court, he had issued strongly worded calls for respect for human rights and for constitutional reform. Sezer was sworn in on 16 May 2000, since when he has already crossed swords with the government on a number of occasions, refusing to sign certain decisions which he considered unconstitutional."

Document(s): Open document

05.2001 - Source: Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs: ("Official General Report on Turkey") [#5270], [ID 13199]

Document(s): neth-tur0501.pdf

03.1996 - Source:

Library of Congress: Country Study Turkey - Introduction, Historical Setting ("Library of Congress: Country Study Turkey - Introduction, Historical Setting") [ID 13200]

"Introduction
THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti) was established on October 29, 1923, under the firm control and leadership of Mustafa Kemal, better known as Kemal Atatürk. The new state was at once the successor to and victor over the Ottoman Empire, long a major power in the European states system. The creation of the modern Turkish polity reflected not only a successful struggle against external enemies but also a triumph over deeply rooted domestic traditions. The republic deliberately rejected important elements of Turkey's Ottoman past, especially the Ottoman dynasty's claim to spiritual leadership of Muslims worldwide. However, the official disestablishment of Islam as the state religion in 1924 did not result in the creation of a fully secular society as Atatürk and his colleagues had hoped.

Although a commitment to secularism has continued to be almost a prerequisite for membership in the country's political elite, Turkey has experienced several popular movements of Islamic political activism. The most recent movement, which began in the mid-1980s and is continuing, has threatened secularism in ways the republic's founders could not have imagined in the 1920s and 1930s.

Although the republic emerged through the work and effort of many people, it bore the indelible imprint of Atatürk. During World War I, the Ottoman Empire had been an ally of Germany, and in the chaos that accompanied the empire's defeat by the Allied powers, Atatürk, as the victor over Australian and British forces at Gallipoli, emerged as one of the few national heroes. His military reputation was enhanced further during the four-year War of Independence, when he led the forces that expelled the Greek invading army from the country. Of even greater long-term importance, Atatürk was a pragmatic political leader with a penchant for social reform. In keeping with long-standing Ottoman concepts of government, however, he was also an elitist; his reforms did not change significantly the relationship of the privileged governing stratum with the masses, although they did alter to some extent the nature of the elite. By the mid-1990s, the continuing impact of Atatürk and his precepts in shaping the form and nature of Turkish society were being challenged by Turkey's diverse ethnic, religious, and social groups.

Atatürk's avowed goal was to create from the Anatolian remnant of the Ottoman Empire a new society patterned directly on the societies of Western Europe. In pursuit of this goal, he tolerated only token opposition. Turkey's president from 1923 until his death in 1938, he apparently was persuaded that the masses needed a period of tutelage. Although the presidency technically possessed relatively few constitutional powers, Atatürk ruled for fifteen years as charismatic governor and teacher--training, cajoling, and forcing the government, his political party, the bureaucracy, the military, and the masses to behave in the manner he thought appropriate. Atatürk's "Six Arrows"--secularism, republicanism, etatism (see Glossary), populism, nationalism, and reformism--were incorporated into the constitutions of 1924, 1961, and 1982. In a general sense, Atatürkism (also known as Kemalism) has been accepted by the Turkish political elite but has been contested by various organized groups. [...]

Although Atatürk believed that the secularist campaign made a period of authoritarian government necessary, his successors wanted to establish a democratic government. Thus, Ismet Inönü, who had become president after Atatürk's death in 1938, permitted the creation of a multiparty political system following World War II. In the first contested election in 1946, the ruling Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi--CHP) retained its majority in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, although opposition candidates accused the CHP of electoral irregularities. When the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti--DP) subsequently won a majority in the 1950 election, Inönü voluntarily relinquished power, despite offers from elements of the armed forces to stage a coup. Thus began Turkey's experiment in democracy: the military-bureaucratic elite that had established the republican order gradually turned over its power to an elected parliament, which reflected the interests and desires of broader sectors of society.

Although the Kemalists have made compromises with traditional forces in Turkish society, they never have abandoned the main tenets of the secularist program. By the end of the 1950s, the armed forces had assumed a role as guardians, not only of national security, but also of Atatürk's legacy. On three occasions, in 1960, 1971, and 1980, the senior military intervened to safeguard Turkey's political development from forces that the military believed threatened the integrity of the state. In each case, civilian leaders had proved unable or unwilling to deliver policies acceptable to the military. In both 1960 and 1980, a military junta took over the government, and rule by martial law included widespread suppression of civil rights and purges of the political class. On both occasions, after a period of direct military rule the military restored civilian government, but only after implementing constitutional changes, social reforms, and economic policies designed to put Turkey back on the path of achieving Atatürk's goal: a modern, secular republic. [...]

Following the September 1980 coup, the military made the restoration of political stability its main priority. The commanders of the armed forces formed the National Security Council (NSC--see Glossary), which ruled the country until November 1983. The NSC ordered the arrest and imprisonment of thousands of militants, political leaders, and trade unionists; it also imposed widespread censorship and purged the armed forces, the bureaucracy, and the universities. These and other measures effectively suppressed both violence and normal political life. The NSC's objective was to eliminate leftist, nationalist, Islamic, and ethnic organizations that contested Atatürk's political legacy. The NSC retained Turgut Özal, an economist who had served in Süleyman Demirel's civilian cabinet ousted by the coup and who enjoyed the confidence of the international financial community, and gave him responsibility for economic policy. Although Özal's austerity package brought immediate hardship for many Turks, it ended the balance of payments crisis and contributed to an economic recovery.

After restoring public order and overcoming the most pressing economic problems, the NSC supervised the drafting of a new constitution and electoral laws designed to rectify the perceived defects of the 1961 constitution by limiting the role of smaller parties and strengthening the powers of the president, the prime minister, and the party that won a majority in parliamentary elections. However, the new constitution also curtailed political rights, thus arousing sharp criticism both in Turkey and abroad. Particularly controversial was a ten-year ban on the political activities of about 200 leading politicians, including former prime ministers Bülent Ecevit and Demirel. The NSC sought to maintain its role by means of a clause under which the NSC chairman, General Kenan Evren, was named president for a six-year term.

Having established a new political framework, the NSC gradually relaxed restrictions on political life and arranged a return to civilian government after a parliamentary election held in November 1983. The NSC strictly supervised this election; it allowed only three parties to present candidates, and President Evren blatantly intervened on behalf of the NSC's favorite, the Nationalist Democracy Party (Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi--MDP). Nevertheless, Özal's Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi--ANAP), the only independently established party that had been tolerated by the NSC, achieved a strong majority, an outcome that was widely interpreted as a sign of the electorate's disapproval of military rule.

Özal, whose primary goal was economic liberalization, claimed that his triumph represented a mandate for sweeping changes in the economy. In power from November 1983 to November 1989, he sought to limit state intervention in the economy. Rejecting protectionism and import substitution, he opened the economy to international markets, arguing that economic growth and technical modernization would do more than traditional social policies to ease the country's problems. His package of economic reforms aimed to make Turkey economically similar to the countries of the European Union (EU--see Glossary), a body that Özal hoped Turkey could join. The package of reforms included reduction of government price-setting, positive real interest rates, devaluation and floating of the Turkish lira (TL; for value of the lira--see Glossary), liberalization of import regulations, and export subsidies. [...]

The government's troubled relations with its Kurdish minority reveal the limits of social integration. Beginning in 1984, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkere Kurdistan--PKK) launched guerrilla attacks on government personnel and installations in the predominantly Kurdish-populated provinces of southeastern Turkey. The PKK's announced objective was the establishment of a separate state of Kurdistan. PKK guerrillas have evoked some sympathy among Kurds in the southeast, a region characterized by endemic poverty, lack of jobs, inadequate schools and health care facilities, and severe underdevelopment of basic infrastructure such as electricity, piped water, and sewerage systems. The Özal government sought to counter the appeal of the PKK by making government aid to the long-neglected southeast a priority, and it invested large sums to extend electricity, telephones, and roads to the region. Özal envisioned the major southeastern Anatolia irrigation and power project as a program to provide the basis for real economic development that eventually would assuage local resentments of the central government. In the short run, however, the government has continued to depend on police actions to suppress the activities of Kurdish insurgents. Nevertheless, the armed forces have been unable to maintain order in the region, despite the deployment of large military and paramilitary forces, and the southeastern provinces remain under de facto martial law.

Turkey also has experienced a revival of religiously motivated political activity since the early 1980s. Veteran Islamist activist Necmettin Erbakan organized the new Welfare Party (Refah Partisi--RP; also seen as Prosperity Party) in 1983, but the military prohibited it from participating in the parliamentary elections held in the fall of that year. Subsequently, the new civilian government under Özal relaxed restrictions on avowedly religious parties, thus enabling the Welfare Party to organize freely and compete in local and national elections. With the notable exception of Erbakan, the Welfare Party's leaders represent a new generation that has grown up and been educated in a secular Turkey but professes a commitment to Islamic values. The Welfare Party rejects the use of political violence and seeks to propagate its political message through example. Working at the grassroots level in Turkey's cities and towns, the party's strongest appeal has been in lower-middle-class neighborhoods. However, the Welfare Party also has attracted support among some upper-middle-class professionals and ethnic Kurds. Although the Welfare Party calls for the application of Islamic principles in relations between government agencies and the people, its primary appeal seems to derive from its advocacy of economic reform policies designed to control inflation and limit the amount of interest banks may charge on loans.

The Welfare Party's popularity has grown gradually but steadily. In the 1991 parliamentary elections, it obtained more than 10 percent of the vote, thus surpassing the minimum threshold for winning seats in the National Assembly. Its electoral performance in the 1994 municipal elections was even better: the party won 19 percent of the total vote and control of the government of several large cities, including both Ankara and Istanbul. In the December 1995 National Assembly elections, the Welfare Party won 21 percent of the vote and the largest number of seats of any party--158. [...]

The November 1987 parliamentary elections were a turning point in the democratization process in Turkey inasmuch as these were the first genuinely free elections since the 1980 coup. All political parties were permitted to take part. In addition, the ban on political activities of 200 senior political leaders had been lifted as a result of a popular referendum held earlier in September 1987. Consequently, former prime ministers Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit campaigned actively, the former as head of the True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi--DYP) and the latter as head of the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Partisi--DSP). Although Özal's Motherland Party retained its parliamentary majority (292 of 450 seats), the True Path Party obtained fifty-nine seats, thus gaining for Demirel an important national political platform. During the next four years, Demirel used his organizing and persuasive skills to rebuild the True Path Party with the objective of attracting enough Motherland voters to propel his party to the leading position. Within eighteen months, Demirel's persistent criticisms of Özal administration policies brought initial political dividends for the True Path Party. As a result of the March 1989 municipal council elections, the Motherland Party suffered a major setback; it received only 26 percent of the total vote nationwide and ranked third behind the Social Democratic Populist Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçi Parti--SHP) and the True Path Party.

Neither Demirel nor other True Path leaders considered the opportunity to share responsibility for local government to be equivalent to the control of the national government, which remained in the hands of Özal's Motherland Party. However, they appreciated the significance of their increased share of the popular vote and the fact that they had party cadres in positions to dispense some city and town patronage. Capitalizing on the momentum of the victories, the True Path Party intensified its organizing efforts in anticipation of the next parliamentary elections. These elections, which were held in October 1991, proved to be both sweet and sour for Demirel. The True Path Party defeated its rival, the Motherland Party, by edging it out in the popular vote, 27 to 24 percent. Although Demirel could draw satisfaction from the True Path's emergence from the elections as the largest party in parliament with 178 seats, he simultaneously was disappointed that it had not won the absolute majority--226 seats--required to form a government. After weeks of negotiations, Demirel and SHP leader Erdal Inönü--the son of Ismet Inönü--reached agreement on the formation of a True Path-SHP coalition government. Thus, Demirel, whom the military had overthrown in 1980, once again became prime minister of Turkey.

Demirel's victory was not at the expense of Özal. Two years earlier, Özal had been elected president to replace General Evren, whose constitutionally mandated seven-year term had concluded at the end of 1989. The 1982 constitution provides for the president to be elected by the parliament. Because the Motherland Party still held a majority of parliamentary seats in 1989, Özal's election seemed assured once he announced his candidacy. Nevertheless, Demirel and other politicians refused to support Özal's bid for the presidency, and their tactics prevented his confirmation until the third ballot. Demirel's own opposition to Özal seemed to be more personal than ideological. Prior to the 1980 coup, Özal had been a member of Demirel's Justice Party (Adalet Partisi--AP) and had held a junior ministerial post in the Demirel cabinet. Demirel apparently never forgave Özal for joining the military government following the coup. Thus, when Demirel became prime minister, Turkish politicians had reservations as to whether he and President Özal would be able to cooperate. Indeed, as leader of an opposition party in parliament during 1990 and 1991, Demirel had expressed frequent criticism of Özal's role in foreign policy, especially the latter's decisions to align Turkey on the side of the United States-led coalition against Iraq during the Kuwait crisis and Persian Gulf War of 1990-91. Nevertheless, once Demirel became prime minister, he and Özal did cooperate.

Demirel had served as prime minister for less than eighteen months when the unexpected death of Özal in April 1993 provided the opportunity for him to succeed to the presidency. During his tenure as head of government, Demirel had been preoccupied with both domestic and international challenges. Within Turkey, the PKK had intensified its attacks on Turkish security and civilian personnel in southeastern Anatolia. The PKK's insurgency had received an unexpected boost from the 1991 collapse of central government authority in northern Iraq's Kurdish region, which borders southeastern Turkey. Since the mid-1980s, the PKK had established in this territory clandestine bases from which it carried out some of its operations. By the end of 1991, the absence of any security on the Iraqi side of the border had enabled the PKK both to expand its network of bases and to use them as sanctuaries. One of Demirel's most important policy decisions was to approve in October 1992 a plan by the Turkish military to attack PKK bases in northern Iraq. This plan was particularly controversial because three of Turkey's NATO allies--Britain, France, and the United States--were enforcing a ban on any Iraqi military presence in northern Iraq in order to protect Iraqi Kurds from being attacked by their own government. [...]

Demirel had to give up his leadership of the True Path Party when the National Assembly elected him president. The DYP deputies in the assembly subsequently chose Tansu Çiller as their leader--the first woman to head a political party--and in June 1993 she became Turkey's first woman prime minister. Under Çiller's administration, the status of Turkey's Kurdish minority continued to be the country's most serious domestic problem, one that had multiple international repercussions. Although the PKK had renounced its goal of a separate Kurdish state in 1993, reaching a political compromise proved difficult because the Turkish military insisted on a military solution. Because both Çiller and Demirel were sensitive about past military interventions in domestic politics, neither was prepared to risk a civilian-military confrontation by challenging the military's assumption of almost a free hand in dealing with the security situation in southeastern Turkey. By 1995 more than 220,000 soldiers, in addition to 50,000 gendarmerie and other security forces, were stationed in the southeast. Nevertheless, the progressive intensification of the military offensive against the PKK failed to repress the PKK's ability to mount deadly assaults.

The military campaign provoked criticism from Kurdish and Turkish politicians, and in response the military resurrected the Prevention of Terrorism Law, which criminalized any activity--including speech--that threatened the integrity of the state. This law was used in 1994 and 1995 to arrest journalists and elected members of the National Assembly, who were tried in special state security courts that are under the jurisdiction of the military. [...]

Because joining the EU was as important an economic goal for the Çiller administration as it had been for her predecessors, Çiller sought to dampen European criticisms in January 1995 by proposing to repeal those clauses of the Prevention of Terrorism Law that criminalized speech and publications. Her objective was to obtain enough support to win EU approval of an agreement that accepted Turkey into a customs union with the EU. The EU voted in March 1995 to accept Turkey into a customs union on condition that the Council of Europe (the European parliament) certify that the country had made progress in the institutionalization of democratic practices.

Immediately following the EU vote, a new crisis in Turkish-EU relations erupted when more than 35,000 Turkish troops invaded northern Iraq in yet another attempt to destroy suspected PKK bases. The military offensive in northern Iraq lasted for more than three months and reignited European criticisms of Turkish policies. Attention inevitably focused on the government of Turkey's relations with its Kurdish minority. Criticism of Turkey's human rights practices at an April 1995 meeting of the Council of Europe was so intense that the Turkish delegates walked out, partly in protest and partly to avoid the humiliation of being present for a vote against Turkey. To dilute European criticisms, Çiller proposed that the National Assembly adopt amendments to the 1982 constitution that would strengthen democratic procedures. For example, the amendments would end the ban on political activities by associations such as labor unions and professional groups, permit civil servants and university students to organize, and make it difficult for courts to strip parliamentary deputies of their immunity from prosecution. The National Assembly's adoption of the amendments in July 1995, coupled with the withdrawal of the last Turkish military units from Iraq, helped to ease some of the tension between Turkey and its erstwhile European friends.

The democratization process is not without controversy within Turkey. An influential minority of the political elite believe that the country's laws and institutions provide adequate protection of civil liberties and that EU pressures constitute unacceptable interference in Turkey's internal affairs. This view is particularly strong among some military officers, and their opposition to Çiller's proposal to repeal Article 8 of the Prevention of Terrorism Law was sufficient to persuade a majority of deputies in the National Assembly to vote against the bill.

The failure to win approval for repealing the controversial Article 8 of the Prevention of Terrorism Law had serious implications for the Çiller government. During the summer of 1995, the DYP coalition partner, the SHP, effectively dissolved itself by incorporating with the more liberal Republican People's Party (CHP), which, since its revival in 1992, had adopted a strong position in favor of abolishing Article 8. The merger necessitated party elections for a new leader, elections that resulted in Deniz Baykal's selection as head of the expanded CHP in September 1995. Baykal not only was opposed to Article 8, but also advocated civil rights legislation that would include punishment for security officials who abuse the rights of political detainees. Given his views, Baykal was not expected to keep the CHP in the coalition government, and, only ten days after his victory, he withdrew, causing the government's collapse. Çiller tried to form a minority government in October, but within ten days was forced to resign for the second time in less than one month when her DYP government failed to win a vote of confidence from the National Assembly. Baykal then agreed to join a new coalition government on two conditions: that the Article 8 amendments be resubmitted to the National Assembly and that new parliamentary elections be scheduled. Çiller imposed strict party discipline for the second vote, thus ensuring a majority favoring passage of the amendments to Article 8 of the Prevention of Terrorism Law, and she reluctantly called for new elections, to be held in December 1995.

The December 1995 elections represented a major setback for Çiller and her party, which came in third with 19 percent of the vote. The Welfare Party emerged in first place with 21 percent of the vote, followed by the Motherland Party with 19.6 percent. The failure of any party to win a majority of seats in the National Assembly mandated the formation of a coalition government. However, this task proved to be politically difficult because none of the secular parties was willing to participate in a Welfare-dominated government, and neither the DYP nor the Motherland Party was keen on cooperation. Finally, after more than ten weeks of sometimes tense political wrangling, Çiller and Motherland Party leader Mesut Yilmaz agreed to put aside their bitter rivalry and form a minority government with Yilmaz as prime minister for the first year and Çiller replacing him in 1997. This Motherland-DYP coalition won a vote of confidence in March 1996 because Ecevit's DSP, which had seventy-five National Assembly seats, agreed to abstain on confidence votes.

The performance of Turkey's economy was mixed during 1995. The monetary policies of the Çiller government included strict controls over public-sector expenditures, which contributed to an easing of the financial crisis that had developed in early 1994. Although exports rose steadily during the first two quarters of the year, imports increased at a faster rate, and this surge in imports added to the country's severe balance of payments deficit. In addition, inflation continued to be a major economic problem, totalling 78.9 percent for all of 1995. Several years of high inflation rates and low wage increases had aggravated employer-employee relations. The strain was reflected in the large number of strikes during 1995, including a crippling two-month-long strike by more than 350,000 public-sector workers in the autumn. Moreover, the privatization of state-owned enterprises--the principal feature of the Çiller administration's structural adjustment program--made little progress in 1995. Within the National Assembly, a majority of deputies opposed the sale of major public factories for ideological (the relevant industries were strategic) or political (fear that sales would lead to increased unemployment) reasons."

Document(s): Library of Congress: Country Study Turkey - Introduction, Historical Setting

03.1996 - Source:

Library of Congress: Country Study Turkey - Introduction, Historical Setting ("Library of Congress: Country Study Turkey - Introduction, Historical Setting") [ID 13201]

"Introduction
THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti) was established on October 29, 1923, under the firm control and leadership of Mustafa Kemal, better known as Kemal Atatürk. The new state was at once the successor to and victor over the Ottoman Empire, long a major power in the European states system. The creation of the modern Turkish polity reflected not only a successful struggle against external enemies but also a triumph over deeply rooted domestic traditions. The republic deliberately rejected important elements of Turkey's Ottoman past, especially the Ottoman dynasty's claim to spiritual leadership of Muslims worldwide. However, the official disestablishment of Islam as the state religion in 1924 did not result in the creation of a fully secular society as Atatürk and his colleagues had hoped.

Although a commitment to secularism has continued to be almost a prerequisite for membership in the country's political elite, Turkey has experienced several popular movements of Islamic political activism. The most recent movement, which began in the mid-1980s and is continuing, has threatened secularism in ways the republic's founders could not have imagined in the 1920s and 1930s.

Although the republic emerged through the work and effort of many people, it bore the indelible imprint of Atatürk. During World War I, the Ottoman Empire had been an ally of Germany, and in the chaos that accompanied the empire's defeat by the Allied powers, Atatürk, as the victor over Australian and British forces at Gallipoli, emerged as one of the few national heroes. His military reputation was enhanced further during the four-year War of Independence, when he led the forces that expelled the Greek invading army from the country. Of even greater long-term importance, Atatürk was a pragmatic political leader with a penchant for social reform. In keeping with long-standing Ottoman concepts of government, however, he was also an elitist; his reforms did not change significantly the relationship of the privileged governing stratum with the masses, although they did alter to some extent the nature of the elite. By the mid-1990s, the continuing impact of Atatürk and his precepts in shaping the form and nature of Turkish society were being challenged by Turkey's diverse ethnic, religious, and social groups.

Atatürk's avowed goal was to create from the Anatolian remnant of the Ottoman Empire a new society patterned directly on the societies of Western Europe. In pursuit of this goal, he tolerated only token opposition. Turkey's president from 1923 until his death in 1938, he apparently was persuaded that the masses needed a period of tutelage. Although the presidency technically possessed relatively few constitutional powers, Atatürk ruled for fifteen years as charismatic governor and teacher--training, cajoling, and forcing the government, his political party, the bureaucracy, the military, and the masses to behave in the manner he thought appropriate. Atatürk's "Six Arrows"--secularism, republicanism, etatism (see Glossary), populism, nationalism, and reformism--were incorporated into the constitutions of 1924, 1961, and 1982. In a general sense, Atatürkism (also known as Kemalism) has been accepted by the Turkish political elite but has been contested by various organized groups. [...]

Although Atatürk believed that the secularist campaign made a period of authoritarian government necessary, his successors wanted to establish a democratic government. Thus, Ismet Inönü, who had become president after Atatürk's death in 1938, permitted the creation of a multiparty political system following World War II. In the first contested election in 1946, the ruling Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi--CHP) retained its majority in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, although opposition candidates accused the CHP of electoral irregularities. When the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti--DP) subsequently won a majority in the 1950 election, Inönü voluntarily relinquished power, despite offers from elements of the armed forces to stage a coup. Thus began Turkey's experiment in democracy: the military-bureaucratic elite that had established the republican order gradually turned over its power to an elected parliament, which reflected the interests and desires of broader sectors of society.

Although the Kemalists have made compromises with traditional forces in Turkish society, they never have abandoned the main tenets of the secularist program. By the end of the 1950s, the armed forces had assumed a role as guardians, not only of national security, but also of Atatürk's legacy. On three occasions, in 1960, 1971, and 1980, the senior military intervened to safeguard Turkey's political development from forces that the military believed threatened the integrity of the state. In each case, civilian leaders had proved unable or unwilling to deliver policies acceptable to the military. In both 1960 and 1980, a military junta took over the government, and rule by martial law included widespread suppression of civil rights and purges of the political class. On both occasions, after a period of direct military rule the military restored civilian government, but only after implementing constitutional changes, social reforms, and economic policies designed to put Turkey back on the path of achieving Atatürk's goal: a modern, secular republic. [...]

Following the September 1980 coup, the military made the restoration of political stability its main priority. The commanders of the armed forces formed the National Security Council (NSC--see Glossary), which ruled the country until November 1983. The NSC ordered the arrest and imprisonment of thousands of militants, political leaders, and trade unionists; it also imposed widespread censorship and purged the armed forces, the bureaucracy, and the universities. These and other measures effectively suppressed both violence and normal political life. The NSC's objective was to eliminate leftist, nationalist, Islamic, and ethnic organizations that contested Atatürk's political legacy. The NSC retained Turgut Özal, an economist who had served in Süleyman Demirel's civilian cabinet ousted by the coup and who enjoyed the confidence of the international financial community, and gave him responsibility for economic policy. Although Özal's austerity package brought immediate hardship for many Turks, it ended the balance of payments crisis and contributed to an economic recovery.

After restoring public order and overcoming the most pressing economic problems, the NSC supervised the drafting of a new constitution and electoral laws designed to rectify the perceived defects of the 1961 constitution by limiting the role of smaller parties and strengthening the powers of the president, the prime minister, and the party that won a majority in parliamentary elections. However, the new constitution also curtailed political rights, thus arousing sharp criticism both in Turkey and abroad. Particularly controversial was a ten-year ban on the political activities of about 200 leading politicians, including former prime ministers Bülent Ecevit and Demirel. The NSC sought to maintain its role by means of a clause under which the NSC chairman, General Kenan Evren, was named president for a six-year term.

Having established a new political framework, the NSC gradually relaxed restrictions on political life and arranged a return to civilian government after a parliamentary election held in November 1983. The NSC strictly supervised this election; it allowed only three parties to present candidates, and President Evren blatantly intervened on behalf of the NSC's favorite, the Nationalist Democracy Party (Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi--MDP). Nevertheless, Özal's Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi--ANAP), the only independently established party that had been tolerated by the NSC, achieved a strong majority, an outcome that was widely interpreted as a sign of the electorate's disapproval of military rule.

Özal, whose primary goal was economic liberalization, claimed that his triumph represented a mandate for sweeping changes in the economy. In power from November 1983 to November 1989, he sought to limit state intervention in the economy. Rejecting protectionism and import substitution, he opened the economy to international markets, arguing that economic growth and technical modernization would do more than traditional social policies to ease the country's problems. His package of economic reforms aimed to make Turkey economically similar to the countries of the European Union (EU--see Glossary), a body that Özal hoped Turkey could join. The package of reforms included reduction of government price-setting, positive real interest rates, devaluation and floating of the Turkish lira (TL; for value of the lira--see Glossary), liberalization of import regulations, and export subsidies. [...]

The government's troubled relations with its Kurdish minority reveal the limits of social integration. Beginning in 1984, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkere Kurdistan--PKK) launched guerrilla attacks on government personnel and installations in the predominantly Kurdish-populated provinces of southeastern Turkey. The PKK's announced objective was the establishment of a separate state of Kurdistan. PKK guerrillas have evoked some sympathy among Kurds in the southeast, a region characterized by endemic poverty, lack of jobs, inadequate schools and health care facilities, and severe underdevelopment of basic infrastructure such as electricity, piped water, and sewerage systems. The Özal government sought to counter the appeal of the PKK by making government aid to the long-neglected southeast a priority, and it invested large sums to extend electricity, telephones, and roads to the region. Özal envisioned the major southeastern Anatolia irrigation and power project as a program to provide the basis for real economic development that eventually would assuage local resentments of the central government. In the short run, however, the government has continued to depend on police actions to suppress the activities of Kurdish insurgents. Nevertheless, the armed forces have been unable to maintain order in the region, despite the deployment of large military and paramilitary forces, and the southeastern provinces remain under de facto martial law.

Turkey also has experienced a revival of religiously motivated political activity since the early 1980s. Veteran Islamist activist Necmettin Erbakan organized the new Welfare Party (Refah Partisi--RP; also seen as Prosperity Party) in 1983, but the military prohibited it from participating in the parliamentary elections held in the fall of that year. Subsequently, the new civilian government under Özal relaxed restrictions on avowedly religious parties, thus enabling the Welfare Party to organize freely and compete in local and national elections. With the notable exception of Erbakan, the Welfare Party's leaders represent a new generation that has grown up and been educated in a secular Turkey but professes a commitment to Islamic values. The Welfare Party rejects the use of political violence and seeks to propagate its political message through example. Working at the grassroots level in Turkey's cities and towns, the party's strongest appeal has been in lower-middle-class neighborhoods. However, the Welfare Party also has attracted support among some upper-middle-class professionals and ethnic Kurds. Although the Welfare Party calls for the application of Islamic principles in relations between government agencies and the people, its primary appeal seems to derive from its advocacy of economic reform policies designed to control inflation and limit the amount of interest banks may charge on loans.

The Welfare Party's popularity has grown gradually but steadily. In the 1991 parliamentary elections, it obtained more than 10 percent of the vote, thus surpassing the minimum threshold for winning seats in the National Assembly. Its electoral performance in the 1994 municipal elections was even better: the party won 19 percent of the total vote and control of the government of several large cities, including both Ankara and Istanbul. In the December 1995 National Assembly elections, the Welfare Party won 21 percent of the vote and the largest number of seats of any party--158. [...]

The November 1987 parliamentary elections were a turning point in the democratization process in Turkey inasmuch as these were the first genuinely free elections since the 1980 coup. All political parties were permitted to take part. In addition, the ban on political activities of 200 senior political leaders had been lifted as a result of a popular referendum held earlier in September 1987. Consequently, former prime ministers Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit campaigned actively, the former as head of the True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi--DYP) and the latter as head of the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Partisi--DSP). Although Özal's Motherland Party retained its parliamentary majority (292 of 450 seats), the True Path Party obtained fifty-nine seats, thus gaining for Demirel an important national political platform. During the next four years, Demirel used his organizing and persuasive skills to rebuild the True Path Party with the objective of attracting enough Motherland voters to propel his party to the leading position. Within eighteen months, Demirel's persistent criticisms of Özal administration policies brought initial political dividends for the True Path Party. As a result of the March 1989 municipal council elections, the Motherland Party suffered a major setback; it received only 26 percent of the total vote nationwide and ranked third behind the Social Democratic Populist Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçi Parti--SHP) and the True Path Party.

Neither Demirel nor other True Path leaders considered the opportunity to share responsibility for local government to be equivalent to the control of the national government, which remained in the hands of Özal's Motherland Party. However, they appreciated the significance of their increased share of the popular vote and the fact that they had party cadres in positions to dispense some city and town patronage. Capitalizing on the momentum of the victories, the True Path Party intensified its organizing efforts in anticipation of the next parliamentary elections. These elections, which were held in October 1991, proved to be both sweet and sour for Demirel. The True Path Party defeated its rival, the Motherland Party, by edging it out in the popular vote, 27 to 24 percent. Although Demirel could draw satisfaction from the True Path's emergence from the elections as the largest party in parliament with 178 seats, he simultaneously was disappointed that it had not won the absolute majority--226 seats--required to form a government. After weeks of negotiations, Demirel and SHP leader Erdal Inönü--the son of Ismet Inönü--reached agreement on the formation of a True Path-SHP coalition government. Thus, Demirel, whom the military had overthrown in 1980, once again became prime minister of Turkey.

Demirel's victory was not at the expense of Özal. Two years earlier, Özal had been elected president to replace General Evren, whose constitutionally mandated seven-year term had concluded at the end of 1989. The 1982 constitution provides for the president to be elected by the parliament. Because the Motherland Party still held a majority of parliamentary seats in 1989, Özal's election seemed assured once he announced his candidacy. Nevertheless, Demirel and other politicians refused to support Özal's bid for the presidency, and their tactics prevented his confirmation until the third ballot. Demirel's own opposition to Özal seemed to be more personal than ideological. Prior to the 1980 coup, Özal had been a member of Demirel's Justice Party (Adalet Partisi--AP) and had held a junior ministerial post in the Demirel cabinet. Demirel apparently never forgave Özal for joining the military government following the coup. Thus, when Demirel became prime minister, Turkish politicians had reservations as to whether he and President Özal would be able to cooperate. Indeed, as leader of an opposition party in parliament during 1990 and 1991, Demirel had expressed frequent criticism of Özal's role in foreign policy, especially the latter's decisions to align Turkey on the side of the United States-led coalition against Iraq during the Kuwait crisis and Persian Gulf War of 1990-91. Nevertheless, once Demirel became prime minister, he and Özal did cooperate.

Demirel had served as prime minister for less than eighteen months when the unexpected death of Özal in April 1993 provided the opportunity for him to succeed to the presidency. During his tenure as head of government, Demirel had been preoccupied with both domestic and international challenges. Within Turkey, the PKK had intensified its attacks on Turkish security and civilian personnel in southeastern Anatolia. The PKK's insurgency had received an unexpected boost from the 1991 collapse of central government authority in northern Iraq's Kurdish region, which borders southeastern Turkey. Since the mid-1980s, the PKK had established in this territory clandestine bases from which it carried out some of its operations. By the end of 1991, the absence of any security on the Iraqi side of the border had enabled the PKK both to expand its network of bases and to use them as sanctuaries. One of Demirel's most important policy decisions was to approve in October 1992 a plan by the Turkish military to attack PKK bases in northern Iraq. This plan was particularly controversial because three of Turkey's NATO allies--Britain, France, and the United States--were enforcing a ban on any Iraqi military presence in northern Iraq in order to protect Iraqi Kurds from being attacked by their own government. [...]

Demirel had to give up his leadership of the True Path Party when the National Assembly elected him president. The DYP deputies in the assembly subsequently chose Tansu Çiller as their leader--the first woman to head a political party--and in June 1993 she became Turkey's first woman prime minister. Under Çiller's administration, the status of Turkey's Kurdish minority continued to be the country's most serious domestic problem, one that had multiple international repercussions. Although the PKK had renounced its goal of a separate Kurdish state in 1993, reaching a political compromise proved difficult because the Turkish military insisted on a military solution. Because both Çiller and Demirel were sensitive about past military interventions in domestic politics, neither was prepared to risk a civilian-military confrontation by challenging the military's assumption of almost a free hand in dealing with the security situation in southeastern Turkey. By 1995 more than 220,000 soldiers, in addition to 50,000 gendarmerie and other security forces, were stationed in the southeast. Nevertheless, the progressive intensification of the military offensive against the PKK failed to repress the PKK's ability to mount deadly assaults.

The military campaign provoked criticism from Kurdish and Turkish politicians, and in response the military resurrected the Prevention of Terrorism Law, which criminalized any activity--including speech--that threatened the integrity of the state. This law was used in 1994 and 1995 to arrest journalists and elected members of the National Assembly, who were tried in special state security courts that are under the jurisdiction of the military. [...]

Because joining the EU was as important an economic goal for the Çiller administration as it had been for her predecessors, Çiller sought to dampen European criticisms in January 1995 by proposing to repeal those clauses of the Prevention of Terrorism Law that criminalized speech and publications. Her objective was to obtain enough support to win EU approval of an agreement that accepted Turkey into a customs union with the EU. The EU voted in March 1995 to accept Turkey into a customs union on condition that the Council of Europe (the European parliament) certify that the country had made progress in the institutionalization of democratic practices.

Immediately following the EU vote, a new crisis in Turkish-EU relations erupted when more than 35,000 Turkish troops invaded northern Iraq in yet another attempt to destroy suspected PKK bases. The military offensive in northern Iraq lasted for more than three months and reignited European criticisms of Turkish policies. Attention inevitably focused on the government of Turkey's relations with its Kurdish minority. Criticism of Turkey's human rights practices at an April 1995 meeting of the Council of Europe was so intense that the Turkish delegates walked out, partly in protest and partly to avoid the humiliation of being present for a vote against Turkey. To dilute European criticisms, Çiller proposed that the National Assembly adopt amendments to the 1982 constitution that would strengthen democratic procedures. For example, the amendments would end the ban on political activities by associations such as labor unions and professional groups, permit civil servants and university students to organize, and make it difficult for courts to strip parliamentary deputies of their immunity from prosecution. The National Assembly's adoption of the amendments in July 1995, coupled with the withdrawal of the last Turkish military units from Iraq, helped to ease some of the tension between Turkey and its erstwhile European friends.

The democratization process is not without controversy within Turkey. An influential minority of the political elite believe that the country's laws and institutions provide adequate protection of civil liberties and that EU pressures constitute unacceptable interference in Turkey's internal affairs. This view is particularly strong among some military officers, and their opposition to Çiller's proposal to repeal Article 8 of the Prevention of Terrorism Law was sufficient to persuade a majority of deputies in the National Assembly to vote against the bill.

The failure to win approval for repealing the controversial Article 8 of the Prevention of Terrorism Law had serious implications for the Çiller government. During the summer of 1995, the DYP coalition partner, the SHP, effectively dissolved itself by incorporating with the more liberal Republican People's Party (CHP), which, since its revival in 1992, had adopted a strong positi"

Document(s): Library of Congress: Country Study Turkey - Introduction, Historical Setting