12.08.2008 - Source: World Organisation Against Torture

Death penalty imposed on 30 individuals, including a minor, for alleged involvement in Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) ("Death penalty imposed on 30 individuals, including a minor [SDN 120808/ SDN 120808.CC]") [ID 24371]

Document(s): Open document

26.11.2007 - Source: International Crisis Group

Darfur: NCP and its use of the local security apparatus: Deployment of Abbala militias, Janjaweed, Baggara tribes and smaller Arab tribes to assist and aid the army ("Darfur's New Security Reality") [ID 22317]

"The NCP relies heavily on the military might of the Abbala militias (including the Janjaweed), their foreign tribal relations and ex-convicts (the Taaebeen, "penitents").

These partnerships have endured because of mutual interest; the Abbala used the crisis in Darfur to gain land and regional power. Many recruits were tempted by money and weapons and were glad to have their grievances over access to usable land acknowledged.

The Arab tribe most associated with the Janjaweed counter-insurgency is the Abbala Northern Rizeigat, particularly the Mahamid branch of Musa Hilal.

Smaller Arab tribes such as the Taalba, Hotiya, Al Rawas, Bahadi, Saada and part of the Salamat from around Jebel Marra, as well as the Misserya of Neteiga and the Fallata, also have been involved in the Janjaweed incursions.

The actions and atrocities of these groups have been both steered and covered up by the NCP, which has supported the militias despite national and international criticism.

It can afford to lose the support of virtually all Darfur tribes except these Abbala, who are vital to its military strategy.

Though several UN Security Council resolutions have demanded Janjaweed disarmament, and the NCP has committed to it on multiple occasions, it has made no attempt to alter its use of the proxy militias.

To prevent disarmament while avoiding accountability, it maintains that the Janjaweed are little more than thugs and thieves, whom it is not capable of disarming.

In response to international pressure, it has instead integrated much of the Janjaweed into various official organs, giving them more advanced training and better weapons, including vehicle-mounted heavy machine-guns and mortars.

In North Darfur they are now predominantly the Border Guards; in West Darfur they are also the Popular Defence Forces; in South Darfur they are the Nomadic Transhumance Routes Police (Al Shurta al Zaeina) of the Fallata and other Baggara tribes. Other tribal militias have been incorporated into the Central Contingency Forces, created from the Abbala and some Baggara tribes.

Janjaweed who have not been integrated (and have not turned against the NCP) still closely coordinate with the official security structures.

For example, the Border Guards are commanded by Brigadier General Al-Hadi Adam Hamid, who also directs the well-known Janjaweed leader Musa Hilal, as well as, until his death, Mohamed Hadai Omer ("Dekersho").

Both Musa Hilal and Dekersho's groups are organised, highly trained, well-supplied with weapons, cars and money and operate under the command of top NCP policy-makers in Khartoum.

The groups are divided within operational sectors in Darfur.

The senior commanders take orders from Khartoum, through security interlocutors within the three states, enjoy considerable autonomy from the official security apparatus and are not accountable to local or regional authority, such as the police, governor, or state security committee.

The NCP deploys all these forces to assist and aid the army (the SAF).

For example, during clashes in July and August 2007 between the SLA, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Mahalia, in and around Adila and parts of Southern Kordofan, the heavily-armed Border Guards were ordered to move from South and West Darfur to fight with the Mahalia against the rebels.

Some units have also been sent to assist the army in protecting routes to the petroleum areas of Sharief and the oil pipeline in Southern Kordofan."

Document(s): Open document

26.11.2007 - Source: International Crisis Group

Rebel strategies and fragmentation in Darfur: Cracks within rebel groups widened by peace talks' failure; groups lack unification, strong leadership, are weakened by internal power struggles ("Darfur's New Security Reality") [ID 22524]

"The post-DPA period has been most notable for the increasing fragmentation among the non-signatory rebels.

Though there have been cracks within the SLA and JEM since the conflict began, they have been widened by the Abuja peace talks' failure, NCP tactics, poor leadership, desire of regional powers to gain influence, tribal animosities, internal power struggles and the lack of a unifying leader.

In spite of renewed efforts in Juba, unification remains lacking, though the chairs have been slightly reshuffled. Despite ample rhetoric, previous international efforts to support a unification process failed because they were never prioritised and tended to be part-time or sub-contracted to third parties, with regional and donor country efforts often competing and contradictory.

While some internationals tried to create SLA unity, others sought at the same time to promote umbrella organisations bringing together SLA, JEM and other groups.

Khartoum sabotaged many of the attempts, several times even bombing Um Rei, the location of some of the meetings."

Document(s): Open document

26.11.2007 - Source: International Crisis Group

Rebel strategies and political developments in Darfur: Weapon deliveries to rebel groups; fail of peace talks; factionalism along ethnic and tribal lines; lack of common vision that people of Darfur can rally behind in order to reach political goals ("Darfur's New Security Reality") [ID 22525]

"Even with these divisions, the general strategies of the movements have remained consistent.

Despite greater claims, each controls a relatively limited geographical area. They are dependent on raids of government forces - mostly hit and run and many, they say, retaliatory or defensive - and alliances with Chad, Libya or Eritrea for weapons, vehicles and supplies. [...]

Rebel factionalism along ethnic and tribal lines remains a major obstacle to a sustainable settlement.

The AU/UN mediation team has been challenged in the run-up to the peace talks to determine which of the multitude of rebel movements to invite.

Neither the Arusha, N'Djamena, nor Juba meetings provided an answer.

Invitations were distributed only days before the talks were to begin, and the larger rebel factions were upset at the inclusion of smaller groups.

The SPLM decision to suspend its participation in the national unity government in Khartoum reinforced rebel reticence to negotiate with the NCP. [...]

In any case, the factions need to formulate a common vision that the people of Darfur can rally behind.

While all agree on Khartoum's responsibility for Darfur's marginalisation, opinions diverge about how best to change this."

Document(s): Open document

06.03.2007 - Source: US Department of State

Darfur: In July 2006, government launched major assault on National Redemption Front (NRF), a coalition of rebel groups that rejected the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) ("Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2006") [ID 19270]

"In July the government launched a major assault on the National Redemption Front (NRF), a coalition of rebel groups that rejected the DPA, following an NRF attack on civilians in the area. The government also attacked civilians in areas believed to support the NRF, and was responsible for numerous killings."

Document(s): Open document

20.04.2006 - Source: Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation

Overview on activities of Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) within last years ("10th European Country of Origin Infomation Seminar Budapest, 1 - 2 December 2005: Final Report on Sudan") [#49770],  [ID 19059]

"Recently, there was an incursion of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) which killed many Sudanese and also some foreign humanitarian workers. As a result, the UN had to evacuate from the whole border area with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Uganda, which has now been declared as a no-go area.
The LRA, which came from Uganda, has been in the South of Sudan for a couple of years and was supported by the Sudanese government. As a result of the peace accord, government support decreased and the LRA became threatened by the SPLM. The LRA started moving in the direction of the DRC. The UN troops and the DRC, however, pushed them back into Sudan. An estimated 4.000 fighters of the LRA, including their leadership, are now roaming this area and they also block many supply routes in the South."

Document(s): Open document

01.2006 - Source: Human Rights Watch

Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement responsible for numerous abuses ("World Report 2006") [#42306],  [ID 15613]

"The two main rebel movements—the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement—were responsible for numerous abuses, including attacks on civilians, commercial vehicles and aid workers, abductions of civilians, looting of livestock and the use of child soldiers. A splinter faction of the JEM captured more than thirty ceasefire monitors from the African Union Mission in Sudan in October then released them after a few days. As the year wore on, the rebel movements were increasingly plagued by internal splits, partly on an ethnic basis, and with increasing fragmentation. Reports of abuses by certain rebel factions grew, particularly by those factions controlling the Jebel Marra region."

Document(s): Open document