Source:

Sudan.net: Major political parties of Sudan: The National Islamic Front (NIF) [ID 12405]

"The Muslim Brotherhood, which originated in Egypt, has been active in Sudan since its formation there in 1949. It emerged from Muslim student groups that first began organizing in the universities during the 1940s, and its main support base has remained the college educated. The Muslim Brotherhood's objective in Sudan has been to institutionalize Islamic law throughout the country. Hassan Abdallah al Turabi, former dean of the School of Law at the University of Khartoum, had been the Muslim Brotherhood's secretary general since 1964. He began working with Nimeiri in the mid-1970s, and, as his attorney general in 1983, played a key role in the controversial introduction of the sharia. After the overthrow of Nimeiri, Turabi was instrumental in setting up the NIF, a Brotherhood-dominated organization that included several other small Islamic parties. Following the 1989 coup, the RCC-NS arrested Turabi, as well as the leaders of other political parties, and held him in solitary confinement for several months. Nevertheless, this action failed to dispel a pervasive belief in Sudan that Turabi and the NIF actively collaborated with the RCC-NS. NIF influence within the government was evident in its policies and in the presence of several NIF members in the cabinet."

Document(s): Open document

21.10.2008 - Source: International Crisis Group

Report on Southern Kordofan state (Nuba, National Congress Party (NCP), Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR)) ("Sudan's Southern Kordofan Problem: The Next Darfur?") [ID 25144]

Document(s): Open document

26.11.2007 - Source: International Crisis Group

Darfur: NCP and its use of the local security apparatus: Deployment of Abbala militias, Janjaweed, Baggara tribes and smaller Arab tribes to assist and aid the army ("Darfur's New Security Reality") [ID 22317]

"The NCP relies heavily on the military might of the Abbala militias (including the Janjaweed), their foreign tribal relations and ex-convicts (the Taaebeen, "penitents").

These partnerships have endured because of mutual interest; the Abbala used the crisis in Darfur to gain land and regional power. Many recruits were tempted by money and weapons and were glad to have their grievances over access to usable land acknowledged.

The Arab tribe most associated with the Janjaweed counter-insurgency is the Abbala Northern Rizeigat, particularly the Mahamid branch of Musa Hilal.

Smaller Arab tribes such as the Taalba, Hotiya, Al Rawas, Bahadi, Saada and part of the Salamat from around Jebel Marra, as well as the Misserya of Neteiga and the Fallata, also have been involved in the Janjaweed incursions.

The actions and atrocities of these groups have been both steered and covered up by the NCP, which has supported the militias despite national and international criticism.

It can afford to lose the support of virtually all Darfur tribes except these Abbala, who are vital to its military strategy.

Though several UN Security Council resolutions have demanded Janjaweed disarmament, and the NCP has committed to it on multiple occasions, it has made no attempt to alter its use of the proxy militias.

To prevent disarmament while avoiding accountability, it maintains that the Janjaweed are little more than thugs and thieves, whom it is not capable of disarming.

In response to international pressure, it has instead integrated much of the Janjaweed into various official organs, giving them more advanced training and better weapons, including vehicle-mounted heavy machine-guns and mortars.

In North Darfur they are now predominantly the Border Guards; in West Darfur they are also the Popular Defence Forces; in South Darfur they are the Nomadic Transhumance Routes Police (Al Shurta al Zaeina) of the Fallata and other Baggara tribes. Other tribal militias have been incorporated into the Central Contingency Forces, created from the Abbala and some Baggara tribes.

Janjaweed who have not been integrated (and have not turned against the NCP) still closely coordinate with the official security structures.

For example, the Border Guards are commanded by Brigadier General Al-Hadi Adam Hamid, who also directs the well-known Janjaweed leader Musa Hilal, as well as, until his death, Mohamed Hadai Omer ("Dekersho").

Both Musa Hilal and Dekersho's groups are organised, highly trained, well-supplied with weapons, cars and money and operate under the command of top NCP policy-makers in Khartoum.

The groups are divided within operational sectors in Darfur.

The senior commanders take orders from Khartoum, through security interlocutors within the three states, enjoy considerable autonomy from the official security apparatus and are not accountable to local or regional authority, such as the police, governor, or state security committee.

The NCP deploys all these forces to assist and aid the army (the SAF).

For example, during clashes in July and August 2007 between the SLA, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Mahalia, in and around Adila and parts of Southern Kordofan, the heavily-armed Border Guards were ordered to move from South and West Darfur to fight with the Mahalia against the rebels.

Some units have also been sent to assist the army in protecting routes to the petroleum areas of Sharief and the oil pipeline in Southern Kordofan."

Document(s): Open document