Source:

Africa South of the Sahara: National Democratic Alliance (NDA) [ID 12121]

"A numer of opposition movements are grouped together in the Asmara-based National Democratic Alliance (NDA) (Chair. Osman al-Mirghani; Sec.Gen. Joseph Okelu). These include the Beja Congress, the Legitimate Command (LC), the Sudan Alliance Forces (SAF) (internet www.safsudan.com; f.1994; Cmmdr-in-Chief Brig. Abd el-Aziz Khalid Osman), the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA) (f. 1994, advocates a decentralized, federal structure for Sudan; Chair. Ahmad Dreige), the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) (Leader Dr Mansur Khalid) and its mil. wing, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) (Leader Col John Garang; Sec. Gen. James Wangi Igga)."

14.09.2007 - Source: US Department of State

The role of religious identity in Sudan's political divisions: Religious groups in support of political parties ("International Religious Freedom Report 2007") [ID 21238]

"Religious identity plays a role in the country's political divisions.

Northern Muslims have dominated the country's political and economic system since independence.

The NCP draws much of its support from Islamists, Salafis/Wahhabis, and other conservative Arab Muslims in the North.

The Umma Party has traditionally attracted Arab followers of the Ansar Sect of Sufism as well as non-Arab Muslims from Darfur and Kordofan.

The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) includes both Arab and non-Arab Muslims in the North and East, especially those in the Khatmia Sufi brotherhood, as well as some northern Arabic-speaking Christians.

Southern Christians generally support the SPLM or one of the smaller southern parties."

Document(s): Open document

10.2003 - Source: UK Home Office

ANNEX B: List of the main political parties [ID 12119]

includes: Alliance of the People's Working Forces Democratic Unionist Party (DUP/DUP-Mirghani) Democratic Unionist Party (DUP/DUP-Hindi) - (registered) Splinter group from Mirghani's DUP, pro-Government and not a member of the NDA. Free Sudanese National Party (FSNP) Independent Democrats Islamic-Christian Solidarity Islamic Revival Movement Islamic Socialist Party Islamic Ummah Party (IUP) Justice Party Moderate Trend Party National Democratic Party Nile Valley Conference Popular Masses' Alliance Popular National Congress Party Socialist Popular Party Sudanese Central Movement Sudanese Communist Party Sudanese Green Party Sudanese Initiative Party Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army Sudanese National Party (SNP) Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) Umma Party (UP/"mainstream UP") Umma Party (registered) United Democratic Salvation Front (USDF) National Democratic Allicance (NDA) The opposition movements that are members of the NDA include: The Beja Congress (BC) The Baa'th Party (pro-Iraq) The Baa'th Party (pro-Syria) The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP - Mirghani faction and its groupings) The Legitimate Command (LC) - formed from dissident military officers from Sudan The Sudan Alliance Forces (SAF) - founded in 1994 by Cmmdr-in-Chief Brig. Abd el-Aziz Khalid Osman) Sudan African National Union (SANU) The Sudanese Communist Party (SCP - Nogud faction) The Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA) The Sudanese National Party (SNP) The Sudan People's Democratic Front (SPDF) The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) Three Lions (TL)

Document(s): Open document

18.12.2002 - Source: International Crisis Group

The NDA, Umma Party and other Opposition ("Power and Wealth Sharing: Make or Break Time in Sudan’s Peace Process") [#10032],  [ID 12120]

"While the government continued to downplay its significance, the NDA intensified its political and diplomatic thrust for inclusion in the peace process and subsequent transitional arrangements. The prospect of being left out after the Machakos Protocol was signed in July 2002 jolted the NDA, its former member the Umma Party, the DUP, the PNC and the newly founded Justice Party (another splinter from the ruling party), a plethora of leftist
parties, and other northern opposition groups into unprecedented activism, forcing them to overcome their differences and focus on coordinating political and diplomatic steps.

While these forces are divided in their assessment of the Machakos process, they all agree that their exclusion would condemn any accord to failure. Their rallying cry is "inclusion" by which they say they mean not only that they should be allowed to participate in the Machakos negotiations but also that the current approach to peace generally has relegated democratisation and human rights to secondary positions. Umma Party leader and deposed Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi suggested that Afghanistan's Loya Jirga was a model for
broader consultations on post-conflict transitional arrangements. He subsequently formulated an elaborate rationale for including the northern opposition in the government team at the talks.
The collapse of the Democratic Unionist Party's (DUP) restraining influence made possible
reactivation of the northeastern front. The offensive in the East in early October initially
produced serious strains within the NDA. DUP and NDA leader Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani denounced the offensive and denied involvement. That position encouraged some moderate members of the internal branch of the DUP to call on their leader to return to Sudan and join the government. The ruling party actively encouraged this and co- opted fringe groups that defected from the DUP. However, al-Mirghani appears to have ridden the
crisis deftly, remaining at the helm and in exile.

The NDA's coordination with opposition parties operating inside Sudan, the aim of which was to increase pressures on the government, has improved considerably in recent months. However, the government seems to have gained the upper hand during this round through the use of political repression."

Document(s): Open document
02403sud.pdf

03.04.2002 - Source: International Crisis Group

SPLA-SAF Alliance ("Capturing the moment: Sudan`s peace process in the balance") [#6388],  [ID 12122]

"Uniting with the SPDF is one of a number of actions taken by Garang as a consequence of which his position is stronger than it has been in years.19 He has also moved to address Bahr al-Ghazal communities’ vulnerability to militia raids20 and to bring northern Sudanese elements on board with the SPLA’s program. The latter efforts include separate political agreements with the Umma Party and Hassan al-Turabi’s Popular National Congress (PNC) party21, continuing membership in the National Democratic Alliance, and most importantly, a strategic partnership with the Sudan Alliance Forces (SAF), the largest armed opposition force in the North.
The SPLA and SAF agreed to merge into one organisation under Garang’s leadership with the aim of creating a united “New Sudan”. There is an understanding that the basic principles behind the concept of a “New Sudan” will be further elaborated between the two organisations in the coming months. In the meantime, their military wings, including logistics and communications, are being integrated. The combined structure is appealing to government officers to defect. The northern Muslim identity of SAF reinforces the SPLA’s claim that it is not limited by region, race, or religion. This accord further bolsters the SPLA’s military position, re-energises the eastern front, and emphasises the SPLA’s commitment to a
united Sudan if the self-determination issue can be addressed at the national level. In addition, it forces the government to stretch its troops along two fronts at a time when it is having extreme difficulties drafting soldiers.22 Unlike in southern Sudan, the drier climate in the east is conducive to conventional warfare. Thus, the Sudanese armed forces will try to rely on their superior weapons (i.e., tanks and helicopter gunships) to maintain the upper hand in the region.23
The SPLA-SAF alliance was signed immediately before Garang embarked in March 2002 on visits to the UK and U.S. While in London, Garang addressed the southern Sudanese diaspora that was generating criticism of his leadership, particularly his ambiguity over self-determination. These moves – to open the movement to public discussion and to appeal to long-time critics of Garang’s leadership – are meant to rally broadbased backing for the SPLA as it targets the oilfields, revives the eastern front, and ultimately tries to strengthen its bargaining position in future negotiations.
Other Northern political organisations are considering following in the SAF’s footsteps and joining the SPLA. Although this would bolster the SPLA’s national credentials further, it would also create complications. Southerners emboldened by what they consider to be clarified SPLA support for self-determination for the South will be concerned by the emphasis on alliance-building with Northern forces. Perhaps more damaging, the deals struck between individual Northern entities and the SPLA will likely erode the NDA coalition and increase pressure on its key Northern component, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), to return to the government, as did its main rival, the Umma Party.
Such a split in the NDA has appeared inevitable for years, as the newer, more progressive regional groups grew closer to the SPLA while the older traditional parties – the Umma Party and the DUP – remained largely static. If the DUP leader, Mohamed Osman al-Mirgani, decides to return to Khartoum, the NDA may cease to exist for all practical purposes. However, if efforts to revitalise the NDA succeed, and al-Mirgani remains in exile, the coalition will continue as an important forum for opposition negotiation over the future of Sudan."

Document(s): 02245sud.pdf
Open document