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Source: Russian Supreme Court - Official site

Overview over Russia's judiciary ("Verchovnyi Sud Rossiyskoy Federacii, Oficial'nyi Sait") [ID 11123]

Document(s): Verchovnyi Sud Rossiyskoy Federacii, Oficial'nyi Sait

Source: Russian Supreme Court - Official site

Judicial System of the Russian Federation and the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation ("Judge's Status Law of the Russian Federation") [ID 11132]

Document(s): Judge's Status Law of the Russian Federation

Source: Russian Supreme Court - Official site

Judicial System of the Russian Federation and the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation ("On Judicial System of the Russian Federation") [ID 11132]

Document(s): On Judicial System of the Russian Federation

Source: Russian Supreme Court - Official site

Judicial System of the Russian Federation and the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation ("Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Official site") [ID 11132]

Document(s): Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Official site

Source:

Judicial independence and fair trial ("Link to chapter Human Rights Issues - Fair Trial") [ID 20449]

For information on judicial independence, corruption of judiciary and possibility of receiving fair trial please refer to the chapter "Human Rights Issues - Fair Trial"

Document(s): Link to chapter Human Rights Issues - Fair Trial

06.03.2007 - Source: US Department of State

Background on trial procedures and jury trials; law provides for jury trials for ‘especially grave’ crimes such as murder; by January 1 2006 all regions except Chechnya implemented jury trials; professional competence of jury trial participants remained issue of serious concern ("Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2006") [ID 19301]

"Trial Procedures: Trials typically are conducted before a judge without a jury. The defendant is presumed innocent. The defense is not required to present evidence and is given an opportunity to cross examine witnesses and call defense witnesses. Defendants who are in custody during the trial are confined to a caged area and must quietly consult with their attorneys through the bars. Defendants have the right of appeal. According to Supreme Court statistics, in 2005 the number of convictions decreased by 1.3 percent and made up 71 percent of all criminal cases heard by courts; the acquittal rate stayed at 0.7 percent; courts dismissed 27.3 percent of criminal cases during trial for various legal reasons. According to Supreme Court statistics, during the first six months of the year, the percentage of convictions in criminal cases increased by approximately 4.7 percent in comparison to the same period in 2005. The percentage of cases dismissed also increased by approximately 2 percent. The law provides for the nationwide use of jury trials for a limited category of "especially grave" crimes, such as murder, in higher level regional courts. In 2005, out of 1,263,000 persons tried by criminal courts, 1,389 persons were tried by jury. By January 1, all regions except Chechnya implemented jury trials, as a result of a law passed by the State Duma during the year. In contrast to trials conducted by a judge, 0.7 percent of which ended in acquittal in 2005, approximately 15 percent of cases tried by juries ended in acquittals, although one third of those acquittals were later reversed on appeal by the Supreme Court. The professional competence of jury trial participants, including both parties and, to some extent, judges, remained an issue of serious concern to domestic and international observers. In a speech in November, President Putin stated that the problem with jury trials was not the jurors, but poorly trained prosecutors and investigators."

Document(s): Open document

29.06.2006 - Source: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

According to political analyst, appointment of Justice Minister Yury Chaika as prosecutor-general tightens bonds between prosecutor-general and President Putin ("Analyst Discusses New Prosecutor-General") [ID 15401]

Document(s): Open document

08.03.2006 - Source: US Department of State

Division of the judiciary ("Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2005") [#46144][ID 11109]

"The judiciary is divided into three branches. The courts of general jurisdiction, including military courts, are subordinated to the Supreme Court. These courts hear civil and criminal cases and include district courts, which serve every urban and rural district, regional courts, and the Supreme Court. Decisions of the lower trial courts can be appealed only to the immediately superior court unless a constitutional issue is involved. An arbitration (commercial) court system under the High Court of Arbitration constitutes a second branch of the judicial system. Arbitration courts hear cases involving business disputes between legal entities and between legal entities and the State. The federal constitutional court (as well as constitutional courts in a number of administrative entities of the Russian Federation) constitutes the third branch.

The president approves judges after they have been nominated by the qualifying collegia, which are assemblies of judges (including some public members). After a three-year trial period, the president must reconfirm the judges. Judicial watchers have alleged that the executive's role in approving and reconfirming judges has ensured an increasingly pro-Kremlin judiciary. The collegia also have the authority to remove judges for misbehavior and to approve prosecutors' requests to prosecute judges.

Justices of the peace deal with criminal cases involving maximum sentences of less than three years and with some civil cases. In some regions where the system has been fully implemented, justices of the peace assumed 65 percent of federal judges' civil cases and up to 32 percent of their criminal matters. Justices of the peace worked in all regions except Chechnya and Nenetskiy Autonomous Okrug."

Document(s): Open document

08.2005 - Source: Freedom House

Property rights legally strengthened; in practice the rule of law is subordinated to political considerations ("Freedom in the World 2005") [#41473][ID 11111]

"In recent years, property rights have been legally strengthened. A land code that established the legal framework for buying and selling nonagricultural land was adopted in late 2001. In June 2002, parliament passed a law allowing the sale of agricultural land to Russian citizens; such sales had been severely restricted since the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. However, recent prosecutions of economic magnates that have criticized government policies and backed opposition politicians, coupled with large tax liens on select companies, have reinforced perceptions that property rights are being eroded and that the rule of law is subordinated to political considerations."

Document(s): Open document

03.06.2005 - Source: Council of Europe - Parliamentary Assembly

Judicial reform: Developments in court system ("Honouring of obligations and commitments by the Russian Federation [Doc. 10568]") [#32710][ID 11112]

"141. The Russian Federation is pursuing its ambitious programme of judicial reform but has decided to adopt a step-by step approach in order to take into account the size of the country, its decentralised territorial organisation, its limited budgetary resources and the need to adapt procedural rules to the functioning of new courts. The general trend is towards greater specialisation of courts, either by setting up new specialised courts or by creating specialised departments within existing courts.

142. Major reforms affecting all areas of Russia's judicial and legal systems have taken place over the last decade, having a significant impact on the laws and institutions responsible for the administration of justice. In the area of criminal law, the reforms have been particularly dramatic as a result of a new Federal criminal procedure code put in place between 1 July 2002 and 1 January 2004. This will require new procedural institutions to be adopted, skills to be developed, and obligations to be fulfilled. However, in its Resolution 1418 (2005), adopted on 25 January 2005, the Assembly, stressing the importance of the independence of the judiciary and independent status of judges in particular, regretted that legislative reforms introduced in the Russian Federation in December 2001 and March 2002 have not protected judges better from undue influence from the executive and have even made them more vulnerable. Recent studies and highly publicised cases have shown that the courts are still highly susceptible to undue influences.

Magistrates' courts

143. Magistrates' courts, introduced beginning of 1998, deal with criminal cases involving maximum sentences of less than 3 years and some civil cases81. There were 5,576 justices of the peace throughout the country, although there remained many vacancies in this system. These judges handle a variety of civil cases as well as criminal cases. In those areas where the system of magistrates' courts has been implemented completely, backlogs and delays in trial proceedings decreased significantly, both among those cases referred to magistrates' courts and in the courts of general jurisdiction, because dockets were freed to accept more serious cases more rapidly.

144. Magistrates' courts are in various stages of development according to region, but were functioning nationwide (except in Karelyia and Chechnya). In some regions, magistrates' courts assumed 65% of federal judges' civil cases and up to 25% of their criminal matters, which may have contributed to easing overcrowding in pre-trial detention facilities (see below, in the section on the penitentiary system).

Suppression of courts with lay judges

145. The Criminal Procedure Code, which entered into force on 1 July 2002, repealed the Lay Judges Act of 10 January 2000, but in accordance with the transitional provisions of the new Code, lay judges could sit in criminal cases until 1 January 2004. The appointment procedure for such lay judges was at issue in the case of Posakhov v. Russia where the Court found on 4 March 2003 that the applicant's right to a court "established by law" had been violated82. In civil cases, according to the Law on the Implementation of the Civil Procedure Code (14 November 2002), lay Judges were abolished as of 1 February 2003.

Jury trials

146. Modern83 Russia decided to re-introduce trial by jury in 1991. Prior to this decision, the 1978 Constitution of the RSFSR as amended, provided for consideration of civil and criminal cases to be carried collectively or individually; in courts of first instance – with participation of jurors, lay judges or by a college of three judges, or by an individual judge. In 1991, after the amendment of the relevant legislation (Criminal Procedure Code, Criminal Code, Law on Judiciary, and Code on Administrative Offences) jury courts were established by law but implemented step-by-step. In 1993 jury courts were created in 9 subjects of the Federation on an experimental basis.

147. The new Criminal Procedures Code that entered into force between 1 July 2002 and 1 January 2004 specified the introduction of jury trials to the rest of the country for crimes punishable by more than 10 years' imprisonment. By the end of 2003, 83 of the 89 regions had implemented jury trials. On 1 January 2004 five of the remaining six regions, including St. Petersburg, were scheduled to implement jury trials, leaving only Chechnya, which is scheduled to begin jury trials on 1 January 2007. The new Criminal Procedure Code includes a formal procedure for pleading guilty and includes incentives such as shorter sentences and shorter trials for certain classes of crimes. In the first 6 months that this provision was implemented, it applied only to crimes punishable by less than 3 years' imprisonment. In that period, 100,400 criminal defendants made use of the new procedure. In July 2003, the Code was amended to simplify the procedure and expand its availability to defendants facing up to 10 years' imprisonment.

148. According to observers, a majority of defence attorneys, defendants84, and the public are in favour of jury trials and an adversarial approach to criminal justice. However, trial by jury is available for only a small number of the most serious offences. The remaining criminal cases are tried by professional judges, since the two "peoples assessors" who sat with a judge before the introduction of the reforms have been removed. According to the Supreme Court, there were 496 jury trials involving approximately 1,000 defendants during the year 200385. Approximately 21% of these trials resulted in acquittals (compared to 0.5% of bench trials). As there is no double jeopardy bar to seeking review of acquittals, approximately one-quarter of these acquittals were overturned on appeal86.

149. The high percentage of acquittals by jury courts is generally explained by the violations of the procedural legislation in the course of evidence collecting by inquiry bodies and investigators.

150. According to the Federal Ombudsman87, Mr Lukin, a number of problems will nevertheless have to be addressed in the near future to make the system of jury courts fully operational. In particular the system of election of the jurors needs to improve. Currently lists of possible jurors are produced on the basis of election rolls. Then a randomised selection is carried out by computer. The law doesn't exclude automatically from possible jurors the heads or deputy heads of legislative or executive bodies, army servicemen, judges, prosecutors, attorneys, officers of law enforcement bodies. Only upon their request can they be relieved of their duty. If no request was made a judge can dismiss them if s/he has grounded doubts on their impartiality.

151. Mr Lukin suggested that the law should ban participation of such persons in the juries and that the system of selection should be reformed to exclude any possibility for arbitrary selection. He proposed to create special Commissions on compiling jurors' lists in each region which would deal with compiling such lists, their updating, verification, sending out summons to jurors, controlling jurors' appearance in the courts, and preparing materials on jurors' responsibility.

Juvenile courts

152. Another proposed reform concerns the introduction of specialised juvenile courts. The Presidential Council for Reforming the Judiciary has submitted a proposal to this effect. According to PGO's data the number of homeless children or children without any parental care equals 3 million. Many of them become criminals. At present, the courts consider the juvenile crimes cases with ordinary, "grown-up" rules. As a result of criminal procedures 23-24% of young criminals receive prison terms. Hence, Russia has one of the highest numbers of imprisoned minors in the world – 17 persons per 100,000 of population or about 25,000 as of the beginning of 2004. Juvenile courts are supposed to view children not as an object of repression but rather a subject of rehabilitation."

Document(s): Open document

03.06.2005 - Source: Council of Europe - Parliamentary Assembly

The functioning of the judiciary ("Honouring of obligations and commitments by the Russian Federation [Doc. 10568]") [#32710][ID 11113]

"153. According to the Federal constitutional law on the judicial system of the Russian Federation88, the judiciary is divided into three branches. The courts of general jurisdiction, including military courts, are subordinated to the Supreme Court89. These courts hear civil and criminal cases and include district courts, which serve every urban and rural district, regional courts, and the Supreme Court. Decisions of the lower trial courts can be appealed only to the immediately superior court unless a constitutional issue is involved. The arbitration (commercial) court system under the Supreme Court of Arbitration90 constitutes a second branch of the judicial system. Arbitration courts hear cases involving business disputes between legal entities, and between legal entities and the state. The Constitutional Court91 (as well as constitutional courts in a number of regions of the Russian Federation) constitutes the third branch.

154. Although all the legal prerequisites for an effective judiciary system are now in place, the judiciary is still today perceived as weak, inefficient, partial, and corrupt. Corruption is the most frequent complaint and is acknowledged by all top officials in the country. Allegations of corruption of course need to be investigated; some of our interlocutors mentioned however that these allegations were possibly also put forward, in particular by the media, in order to discredit a judiciary which in recent years had acquired more prestige and authority.

155. Accusations of "telephone justice" are frequent as well: many judges allegedly prefer to get instructions from the Prokuratura or the appeal court rather than risk having their judgment overturned. This is apparently due to the fact that the appraisal system of judges is based on the number of judgments they deliver which are or are not quashed.

156. It is to be noted in this connection that the judiciary already had a bad reputation in Soviet times, perhaps due to the fact that when a citizen was invoking a "right", he was more often calling upon authority, in most cases the Prokuratura, imploring it to correct injustice and not on an independent tribunal, which would engage in an utilitarian calculus to measure his claim against a hierarchy of competing rights."

Document(s): Open document

03.06.2005 - Source: Council of Europe - Parliamentary Assembly

Proposed law would give the President and the Federation Council the power to hire and fire judges ("Honouring of obligations and commitments by the Russian Federation [Doc. 10568]") [#32710][ID 11115]

"163. In September 2004, upon an initiative by its Speaker, Mr Mironov, the Federation Council approved a bill that would give President Putin and the Federation Council the power to hire and fire judges (draft law no. 93807-4 submitted to the State Duma on 30.09.2004). The bill changes the structure and selection process for the Supreme Qualification Board, which up to now played an important role in appointing Federal court judges, including Supreme Court justices. This Board is also the only body that can dismiss judges or lift their immunity.

164. Currently, 18 of the Board's 29 members are elected by secret ballot by the All-Russia Congress of Judges. The Federation Council appoints ten lay members, and the President appoints one member. Under the bill, the Board's membership would decrease to 21 members with 10 members nominated by the President and confirmed by the Federation Council. The Council speaker would appoint ten lay members, and one member would continue to be directly appointed by the President98. Along with the transferral of the power to control the Board to the President, the bill also would expand the Board's remit by authorising it to review decisions of the qualification boards in the Federation subjects on dismissal of or disciplinary measures against judges. The bill still faces approval by the lower house, the State Duma, which is controlled by pro-Kremlin parties.

165. The bill is supplemented by an explanatory note which states that the implementation practice of the Law on the Bodies of the Judicial Community showed that the "problem of judges' responsibility before society for accomplishment of their duty is not fully solved". It goes further and states that the bill aims at the "expansion of public control over the assessment of the judge candidates' professional qualifications, observance by judges of the ethics code, deciding on their recruitment, dismissal, and disciplinary responsibility". It is difficult to understand how the concentration of control powers in the hands of the President can contribute to the improvement of public control and whether limiting the judges' participation in their recruitment and dismissal procedures is an adequate solution to force judges to do their duty.

166. Two former senior judges who were allegedly fired99 after refusing to obey informal orders from the executive branch have criticised the bill as bringing the judiciary, which they stated is already under the influence of the executive branch, fully under the Kremlin's control. The Chairman of the Judiciary Council of the Russian Federation Yuri Sidorenko at a 28 October 2004 hearing in the Federation Council also criticised the proposed changes as encroaching on the independence of the judiciary. In its Resolution 1418 (2005), the Assembly expressed its "particular concern" about proposals to increase further the influence of the President's administration over the judges' qualification commission.

167. Another contentious proposal of the Federal Council is to change the appointment of the head of the Judicial Department at the Federal Supreme Court (submitted in September 2004). The Department, which functions on the basis of the Law on the Judicial System and the Law on the Judicial Department, is a federal state body responsible for organisational provision of courts and judges (funding, logistical support, human resources, etc.). So far, the Department's head was appointed and dismissed by the President of the Supreme Court upon assent of the Russian Federation Judges' Council but the bill proposes to transfer this power to the Russian President who will appoint the Department's head "upon submission by the President of the Supreme Court and taking into account the opinion of the Judges' Council". The Judicial Department's (whose official name is Judicial Department at the Supreme Court) autonomy from the executive secures the separation of powers and independence of the judiciary itself. The power to decide on the allocation of funds and resources may become a leverage to control the courts.

168. We strongly urge the Russian authorities to abstain from any reform which would cast doubts on the impartiality and independence of the judiciary. We call on the Russian authorities to make sure that any reform is consistent with European standards and in particular with the European Charter on the statute for judges and Recommendation R (94) 12 on the independence, efficiency and role of judges."

Document(s): Open document

20.04.2005 - Source: Council of Europe - Commissioner for Human Rights

Changes in the Status of judges and the recruitment methods ("Report by Mr. Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner for Human Rights, on his visit to the Russian Federation, 15-30 July 2004 and 19-20 September 2004 [CommDH(2005) 2]") [#32581][ID 11116]

"32. The main purpose of the Bills tabled by the government and passed by Parliament, as it emerges from the legislation in question, is, firstly, to strengthen the independence of judges and the judiciary as a whole and, secondly, to make judges more responsible in order to encourage the proper administration of justice‘.

33. lt is clear from the new recruitment criteria and the regulations governing judges‘ careers that judges have been made more responsible.

34. Council of Europe experts have recently completed assessing the Code of Ethics for judges.

35. The method used to recruit judges has clearly evolved. A competitive examination has been partly introduced. Nowadays, in order to become a judge, it is not only necessary to fulfil the conditions laid down by law and pass the aptitude exam, but also to be recommended for a vacant post by the body responsible for assessing judges‘ eligibility, which makes a selection when there are several candidates. Article 119 of the Constitution, laying down the rules governing access to the judiciary, stipulates that “citizens of the Russian Federation aged 25 and older, holding a law degree and having worked in the law profession for at least five years, may become judges“. The last requirement was recently relaxed in order to attract the best students leaving university.

36. The reform also introduced provisions concerning judges‘ careers. Federal Court Judges are appointed by the President of the State on the recommendation of the Presidents of the Supreme Courts (ordinary and arbitration courts). There is no time limit to their term of office, except in the case ofjustices of the peace, who are elected for a period of five years. The age limit is 65 for investigating judges in the ordinary and arbitration courts and 70 for Constitutional Court judges. This rule is, however, destined to change rapidly and a common retirement age of 70 is to be introduced, apparently because of the considerable shortage of qualified judges and the large number of vacant posts in the judiciary."

Document(s): Open document

20.04.2005 - Source: Council of Europe - Commissioner for Human Rights

Reforms concerning the profession of bailiff; many problems remain unsolved ("Report by Mr. Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner for Human Rights, on his visit to the Russian Federation, 15-30 July 2004 and 19-20 September 2004 [CommDH(2005) 2]") [#32581][ID 11121]

"63. So it is no coincidence that, in the context of judicial reform in Russia, the profession of bailiff has been radically transformed, not to say reinvented. Prior to the introduction of the new Bailiffs Act of 21 September 1997, there were no bailiffs in the strict sense of the term. The tasks normally performed by bailiffs were carried out by court staff responsible for executing court decisions. They formed a profession that was not governed by any law and was looked down on. This state of affairs was a logical consequence of the Soviet dialectic described above. The situation needed to change in a society that had set itself the objective of introducing the rule of law.

64. The new institution of bailiff is governed by two basic laws: the above-mentioned Act and the Execution of Sentences Act (ob ispolnitel‘nom proizvodstve). These two laws establish a completely new profession within a judicial system where it was previously lacking. The court staff responsible for executing court decisions did not have the same powers as those now attributed to bailiffs. In particular, they were unable to execute court decisions forcibly. If forcible execution was required, the police alone were entitled to take action. Prior to the introduction ofthis new legislation, therefore, only 25 to 30% of court decisions were actually executed. Moreover, the state itself does not always set an example when it comes to respecting court decisions. The Russian Federation was sentenced by the European Court of Human Rights for the first time on 7 May 2002 in the case of Burdov against Russia (59498/00) for failing to enforce a final court decision. The reputation of the judicial system has been severely tarnished as a result.

65. There have been several recent developments. In particular, the new law has given bailiffs genuine power to execute court decisions, which strengthens the judicial system as a whole.

66. Russian bailiffs are in fact civil servants, unlike their French counterparts. They are answerable to the Bailiffs Directorate of the Ministry of Justice and are divided into two main groups. The first is responsible for enforcing court decisions, and the second for maintaining order in the courts. According to the people I spoke to from the Ministry of Justice, the services of the professionals in the first group are in great demand. They intervene in cases of various kinds, which suggests that they have become successfully established in Russian society. Indeed, the profession seems to be viewed increasingly as an emergency assistance service. Their help is required to enforce a very large majority of court decisions. For instance, they may intervene to help dismiss an employee guilty of misconduct, to force an employer to reinstate an employee who has been dismissed for no apparent reason, to evict a dishonest tenant or, on the contrary, to ensure that someone who has been wrongly evicted can return to his or her dwelling, or to ensure that maintenance is paid and that companies that fail to pay allowances or even salaries are forced to do so. Their duties also include winding up bankrupt companies.

67. We were also told about the many problems this apparent success has caused for bailiffs. lt seems that in some cases they cannot enforce a court decision because there are no laws or regulations authorising them to take action. In other cases, it may be impossible in practice for them to do so. These difficulties are being examined by the Ministry experts, who are working on amendments that could be made to the existing legislation in order to give bailiffs real powers in particular areas covered by specific laws.

68. In addition, according to the information I was given, it is essential to increase funding for the work of bailiffs, and particularly their operating budget, in order to cope with the growing number of cases in which they have to intervene. Bailiffs are financed from the federal budget through the Ministry that supervises their work. I understand that a considerable effort has been made to increase the federal budget appropriation for the Ministry of Justice, whose needs are enormous, as in most of the member states of our Organisation. The Ministry of Justice is, admittedly, required to provide funding for a number of purposes that are of prime importance – and in particular to improve the condition of the prisons for which it is responsible. This task should not, however, prompt it to neglect other important services that are being prevented from operating properly because of insufficient funding.

69. Furthermore, representatives of NGOs and the Bars told me that bailiffs were not as effective as they might be, for several reasons. First of all, they have a very heavy workload. lt would seem from the statistics with which I was provided that enforcing a court decision takes on average 31 hours‘ work, which represents roughly four working days. In theory, a bailiff can therefore deal with only five or six cases a month, yet the average workload assigned to bailiffs is 160 to 170 cases a month. The figure may be up to 500 in some regions. lt is therefore crucial to increase the number of bailiffs and the logistical and financial resources at their disposal. This would make it easier for the public to enforce their rights and would enable the new institution to become firmly established.

70. lt seems, moreover, that the establishment of this new profession has led to a certain tension amongst the legal professions. At Khabarovsk, for instance, the President of the Regional Court said he would have much preferred bailiffs to be answerable not to the Executive, but to the judiciary. This would suggest that the profession is yet to firmly establish its place and that further adjustments are necessary."

Document(s): Open document

20.04.2005 - Source: Council of Europe - Commissioner for Human Rights

New law governing the legal profession ("Report by Mr. Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner for Human Rights, on his visit to the Russian Federation, 15-30 July 2004 and 19-20 September 2004 [CommDH(2005) 2]") [#32581][ID 11122]

"74. Virtually all the people with whom I spoke thought that the new law governing the legal profession was a very welcome one that made it possible to organise the profession satisfactorily. The law defines the status of lawyers, lays down a legal and structural framework and provides the profession with genuine protection and the necessary professional conditions. lt now allows representatives of the profession to set up in private practice on their own or in partnership and to become members of existing law associations (kollegia). The law also provides for the establishment of a Bar Association, both to protect the independence of the profession and to guarantee that its members operate as a unified profession. The fact that the law protects the profession is a welcome development that will help to ensure that all members of the Russian public are properly represented in court.

75. The current situation is very different from that which preceded the above-mentioned law. Previously, there were several legal instruments governing the profession. The powers assigned to lawyers were vague, and this lessened their influence.

76. Among the most significant contributions of the law, attention should be drawn to the extension of the safeguards surrounding the practice of the profession. Lawyers are now entitled to collect evidence in the cases assigned to them, which is an improvement on the previous legislation. The law has introduced another important development: lawyers now enjoy protection in the practice of their profession. Neither the police nor the Prosecution Department can initiate an enquiry into the actions of a barrister without a prior court decision. In addition, the new law allows barristers unlimited access to their clients, even if the latter are in prison.

77. Furthermore, the profession of barrister has followed the general trend in Russian legislation and reflects the changes introduced in comparison with the situation under the Soviet regime, which have been described above. Russian law has been diversified and is no longer confined to criminal law, and this has been reflected in the reform of the profession. Barristers are now entitled to represent their clients‘ interests not only before a criminal or civil court but also in the case of disputes with the tax authorities or in connection with the enforcement of court decisions. This represents considerable and extremely beneficial progress, and is to be welcomed.

88. […] The barristers with whom I spoke expressed some concern over the sanctions they could incur in the performance of their duties. Section 33 of the law defines the circumstances in which sanctions can be imposed on lawyers. Such measures are taken by committees responsible for deciding on the eligibility of lawyers to practice, set up by the Bars in the subjects of the Federation. This is a classic procedure, which exists in many member states.

89. I was very surprised, however, by the membership of these committees. I learnt that, in addition to barristers, the committees include members representing the Ministry of Justice (or the Regional Justice Directorate), judges from the Supreme Court of the region concerned and members of the regional parliament. This strikes me as questionable in view of the need to preserve the independence of barristers. Moreover, I was told that very often complaints lodged against barristers come from representatives of the courts or the Regional Justice Directorates. This is tantamount to having barristers “tried“ by the very people who are accusing them, which by no means makes for an impartial procedure."

Document(s): Open document

03.2002 - Source: East European Constitutional Review

Judicial reforms under Putin: massive increase in budgetary support for the courts; new code of criminal procedure designed to give judges more power and improve the fairness of criminal justice; measures to enhance the accountability of judges ("Putin’s Judicial Reform: Making Judges Accountable as well as Independent") [#17794][ID 11128]

Document(s): Open document

03.2002 - Source: East European Constitutional Review

Report on the jury-trial system reintroduced 1993 (historical background, problems, financial issues) ("The Jury Is Still Out on the Future of Jury Trials in Russia") [#17795][ID 11129]

Document(s): Open document

03.2002 - Source: East European Constitutional Review

Changes to the Russian Constitutional Court statute, which clarify the procedures for implementing the Court’s decisions, shall ensure the enforcement of federal laws in the Russian regions ("Implementing Russian Constitutional Court Decisions") [#17796][ID 11130]

Document(s): Open document

03.2002 - Source: East European Constitutional Review

Survey of 500 firms assessing the perceived performance of arbitration courts shows that the work of arbitration courts in adjudicating conflicts with private entities is seen positively; little confidence that courts would protect the rights of private firms in conflicts with state officials ("The two faces of Russian courts: Evidence from a survey of company managers") [#17801][ID 11131]

Document(s): Open document