06.2007 - Source: Freedom House

Report on democratisation (electoral process, civil society, independent media, governance) and rule of law (corruption) ("Nations in Transit 2007") [ID 20438]

Document(s): Open document

06.2007 - Source: Freedom House

Russian political system seems stable in short term, but stability is subject to number of unanswered questions, as question of presidential succession in 2008 ("Nations in Transit 2007") [ID 20439]

"While the Russian Constitution enshrines the principles of democracy, the trend line for practices has drifted in an authoritarian direction. Decision-making power is increasingly concentrated in the presidential administration, which is difficult for ordinary citizens to access but often seems to work in favor of powerful private interests. Nevertheless, President Vladimir Putin retains high levels of personal popularity because, in the general Russian view, he has managed to stabilize the Russian political system during an era of extensive economic growth that has somewhat improved the living standards of ordinary citizens. (...) The Russian political system seems stable in the short term, with no obvious extra-systemic opposition groups poised to make trouble. However, this stability is subject to a number of unanswered questions. The most important is the presidential succession in 2008. While Putin has clearly stated that he will step down at the end of his second term, he has also dropped hints that he will continue to play an undefined role in the political system after his constitutional term ends. There appears to be little consensus around the idea of simply allowing the voters to decide after a campaign among a variety of candidates. Individuals who have announced that they are running for president, such as former prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov and chess champion Garry Kasparov, face intimidation at each stop of their regional campaigns. 2 How he would interact with the next leader remains unclear. Fearing potential instability, and currying favor with the current incumbent, many political leaders have suggested that Putin find a way to remain in office, either by transforming Russia into a parliamentary democracy or by merging with Belarus to create a new country."

Document(s): Open document

06.2007 - Source: Freedom House

New law stripped legislators of their seats if they changed parties and prohibited parties from supporting other parties during elections; provisions weakened opposition parties ("Freedom in the World 2007") [ID 20514]

"The Kremlin that year also continued efforts to fine-tune Russia’s electoral legislation in advance of the 2007 parliamentary and 2008 presidential elections to ensure a favorable outcome. One new law stripped legislators of their seats if they changed parties and prohibited parties from supporting other parties during elections. Those provisions weakened opposition parties by preventing them from setting up informal coalitions; previous changes had banned formal electoral blocs. In addition, the authorities removed the option of voting “against all” from the ballot. While this option is not usually available in democratic systems, voters used it to express frustration with elections that provide no real choices, particularly when there has been extensive official interference. An election was declared invalid if “against all” won the most votes. Officials removed minimum turnout requirements from the ballot, a practice also not widely used elsewhere, but seen by the opposition as a way of preventing the election of unpopular candidates through a boycott. Other legislation banned critical comments in television ads, a move to spare incumbents from the barbs of their opponents."

Document(s): Open document

01.2007 - Source: Schweizerische Flüchtlingshilfe

Demographic and cultural derussification in the whole North Caucasus region is followed by increasing process of islamisation ("Nordkaukasus; Entwicklungen in Tschetschenien sowie in Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkarien, Inguschetien und Nordossetien") [ID 18717]

"Demografisch und kulturell hat im gesamten Nordkaukasus eine wachsende Entrussifizierung eingesetzt: Viele ethnische Russen haben seit dem Zusammenbruch der Sowjetunion den Nordkaukasus verlassen. Die Folge ist eine zunehmende Islamisierung. Bereits vor Jahren wurde in der Region die Legalisierung der Polygamie gefordert. Inzwischen gibt es Stimmen, die Elemente der Scharia in die lokale Rechtsprechung einführen wollen. So verbot beispielsweise die inguschetische Regierung für die Dauer des islamischen Fastenmonats Ramadan den Alkoholverkauf, während zum Beispiel die Sicherheitskräfte Kabardino-Balkariens, wie erwähnt, sehr hart gegen Muslime vorgehen."

Document(s): Open document

13.12.2006 - Source: BBC News

Secret service influence in politics and business has expanded in recent years, according to research; many officials with security service background appointed under President Putin ("KGB influence 'soars under Putin'") [ID 17968]

Document(s): Open document

07.2006 - Source: Freedom House

Russia's rating for national democratic governance worsens from 5.75 to 6.00; centralisation of power and strengthening of bureaucracy by electoral reforms ("Nations in Transit 2006") [ID 15810]

"Political power is becoming increasingly concentrated in the hands of the Russian president. Accordingly, the question of whether Vladimir Putin will actually step down when his term ends in 2008 is growing more pressing. While this top-heavy system may remain in place for the foreseeable future, it is becoming increasingly fragile, since it has less capacity to respond to public demands. At the same time, the violence of the Chechen conflict is spreading far beyond the borders of the rebellious republic. Desperate young men, suffering from police repression and a lack of jobs, are joining the extremist cause, bringing new recruits to the long-simmering conflict. Russia's rating for national democratic governance worsens from 5.75 to 6.00. Numerous problems are accumulating that could push the country further away from democracy. They include a ruling elite that claims a commitment to democratic values but violates them in its behavior and extensive reliance on the use of force against segments of the population that are becoming increasingly radicalized, particularly in the North Caucasus.

 Electoral Process. During 2005, Russia adopted a package of electoral reforms that make it easier for incumbents to preserve their power. Elections are becoming more controlled and less decisive in determining the national and regional leadership. By replacing votes for individual representatives with party lists, the Kremlin helped to strengthen the bureaucracy and its political party appendage, United Russia. The latest round of amendments makes it much harder for the opposition to win representation in the State Duma, easier for the powers that be to remove candidates they do not like, and more difficult for independent observers to monitor the elections. There is little political opposition left in the country, and what remains is under constant attack by federal and regional officials. Russia's rating for electoral process worsens from 6.00 to 6.25. The newly adopted provisions in the electoral law hand considerable power to the federal authorities and are likely to be abused in the upcoming round of national elections."

Document(s): Open document

07.2006 - Source: Freedom House

Electoral reforms since 2004 make it easier to control who wins elections; 7% of vote needed to enter Duma; possibility for formation of regional parties removed ("Nations in Transit 2006") [ID 15815]

"The electoral reforms proposed and adopted since the fall of 2004 make it harder for opposition parties to win representation in the federal legislature. With the selective application of these provisions, the authorities will be in an even stronger position. The 2005 reform continues a long-term trend in Russia in which the authorities "fine-tune" the electoral system after each voting cycle to make it more responsive to their needs.The reforms bring a number of changes to the Russian legislature’s lower house, the State Duma. All seats will now be filled through party lists, replacing a system in which half were filled by party lists and half by single-member districts. This system does not build up broad-based political parties but rather concentrates power in the hands of a few kingmakers able to determine who will become legislators. Where party list voting took place at the regional level in recent elections, local businessmen were able to buy spots on the lists and win election to regional legislatures, according to sociologist Alla Chirikova. These new legislators have no real political or ideological ambitions and little interest in forming a political opposition; they are mainly concerned with pursuing their business goals, which generally means working closely with the governor. It will likely be even easier for the Kremlin to work with these people than members of previous legislatures.Additionally, parties now need to win 7 percent of the vote to enter the Parliament and are not allowed to form electoral blocs. In the past, the electoral blocs did well against United Russia in regional legislative elections. Also, there must be at least two parties in the Duma, representing not less than 50 percent of the vote. In the past, the Duma had to have a minimum of four parties. To win registration, parties must have at least 50,000 members and organizations in at least half the Russian regions, a provision that sets the bar very high in areas where political parties still have not earned widespread trust. This provision also removes the possibility for the formation of regional parties. "

Document(s): Open document

01.2006 - Source: Human Rights Watch

In 2005, the government pushed through a package of political changes that increased President Putin’s power ("World Report 2006") [#42318], [ID 11056]

"In 2005, the government pushed through a package of political changes that increased President Putin’s power. New legislation abolished direct elections for governors, ended single constituency voting in parliamentary elections, established new membership requirements for political parties seeking to participate in parliamentary elections, and raised the minimum threshold for entry of these parties into the State Duma from 5 to 7 percent.
Under the new legislation, Russia’s president nominates candidates for all regional governorships. Regional parliaments have the right to reject these candidates but if they do so three times, the president can dissolve the parliament. In 2005, President Putin nominated candidates for more than thirty governorships, all of whom were rapidly approved by the regional parliaments.
The changes to election laws are likely to make the next State Duma even more monolithic than today’s. The end of single constituency voting will cost most independent deputies their seats. The new rules also require that political parties have at least fifty thousand members in order to be able to compete in parliamentary elections.
When Mikhail Kasyanov, a former prime minister, hinted he might run for president in 2008, law enforcement bodies suddenly opened investigations into alleged wrongdoing during his term in office. The prosecution of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev, the former head and a key shareholder of the Yukos oil company, ended in guilty verdicts and an eight-year prison term for each. Many observers believe the men were prosecuted primarily because the Kremlin perceived them as a political threat."

Document(s): Open document

01.2006 - Source: Human Rights Watch

Russia slipped deeper into authoritarianism in 2005 ("World Report 2006") [#42318], [ID 11181]

"Russia slipped deeper into authoritarianism in 2005, as a series of political changes that President Vladimir Putin proposed in the aftermath of the September 2004 Beslan massacre became law. In November, the State Duma took the first step toward approving a draconian law that, if enacted, would substantially curtail the activities of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Russia. The armed conflict in Chechnya continues unabated. In March 2005, Human Rights Watch concluded that enforced disappearances by Russian forces and their proxies in Chechnya are so widespread and systematic that they constitute crimes against humanity. The government took modest but important steps in 2005 to resolve some of the country’s entrenched human rights problems, including the brutal hazing of conscripts in the armed forces that has claimed dozens of lives and contributed to hundreds of suicides in recent years."

Document(s): Open document

08.2005 - Source: Freedom House

Putin takes steps towards consolidating his power; according to Putin’s plan governors will be appointed by the president ("Freedom in the World 2005") [#41473], [ID 11057]

"After taking office, Putin moved to consolidate his power, including implementing legislation removing Russia’s 89 governors from positions in the upper house of parliament (the Federation Council) and allowing the president to suspend them from office if they violated federal law. Putin also created seven new “super regions” headed by Kremlin appointees and introduced personnel changes that have considerably altered the composition of the ruling elite through the influx of personnel from the security and military services; they now represent more than 25 percent of the country’s ministers, deputy ministers, legislators, governors, and “super governors.” Putin also challenged the political clout of some economic magnates—through criminal investigations and legal proceedings claimed to be part of an anticorruption campaign, but which critics say are selective political persecutions.[…]
Using the Beslan tragedy as a pretext, Putin publicly put forward a plan, already long discussed in the upper reaches of government, to further centralize control over Russia’s oblasts (regions) and affect the hiring and dismissal of judges. Proposed constitutional reforms will make the post of governor appointed by the president rather than elected. In the face of Putin’s growing power, most governors publicly endorsed the curtailment of their autonomy despite well-known private unhappiness with the plan. The Duma, where Putin’s Unity Party commands more than a two-thirds constitutional majority, is expected to vote in favor of these changes that reduce public voice."

Document(s): Open document

15.06.2005 - Source: Freedom House

Russia’s political party system is in trouble; weakening position of the opposition parties ("Nations in Transit 2005") [#32939], [ID 11058]

"The presidential elections show that Putin was not willing to tolerate the existence of an opposition. Even though his victory was assured long before election day, his team worked hard to guarantee that no other candidate registered a significant protest vote, noted Transitions Online. As a result, Russia's political party system is in trouble. After the December 2003 State Duma elections, essentially no important parties represented the liberal end of the political spectrum. The two major parties that support this ideology, the Union of Right Forces (SPS) and Yabloko, have largely collapsed. Former presidential candidate and SPS leader Irina Khakamada set up a new party called Our Choice on November 1, hoping to unify liberal voters, but its initial prospects are not bright. On the other end of the spectrum, the Communist Party is growing increasingly weaker. Without a major overhaul of personnel and policies, it will continue to decline.
Given the Kremlin's crackdown on media, business, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), there are few opportunities for an opposition leader to emerge. Unfortunately, the opposition failed to capitalize even on the openings it did have. During 2004, it did not spell out an articulate alternative to Putin's policies that resonated with the population, nor did it effectively mobilize support.
Only parties set up by the Kremlin seem to be advancing. United Russia is not a party in the traditional sense, but a collection of powerful government officials that attracts new members who are interested in access to state resources. On October 27, the Federation Council approved revisions to the Law on the Russian Government that make it possible for government officials to be the leaders of political parties, further boosting United Russia's prospects.
Rodina also has strong Kremlin ties since the authorities set it up as a "constructive opposition" designed to take votes from the Left. Since it has evolved toward nationalist issues, however, Rodina has become more independent."

Document(s): Open document

15.06.2005 - Source: Freedom House

Moving to exclusive party list voting is expected to bring major benefits to the Kremlin ("Nations in Transit 2005") [#32939], [ID 11059]

"Putin used the shock of the Beslan attack to propose major changes in the way State Duma deputies are elected to the Parliament's lower house. Instead of the current method, in which voters choose half of their representatives by party list and half through single-member districts, Putin seeks to change the system so that all deputies are elected on the basis of party lists. Legislation was still under consideration on this issue at the beginning of 2005. Additionally, the Kremlin secured legislative approval to increase from 10,000 to 50,000 the number of members a party needs to register.
Moving to exclusive party list voting is expected to bring major benefits to the Kremlin. Under the old system, governors often controlled who was elected from single-member districts. Even though many governor-sponsored State Duma candidates ran under the United Russia label, their first loyalty was often to the governor and they represented regional interests in the lower house of the Parliament. The new system would break the connection between State Duma members and the regions. The political parties will be based in Moscow, making it easier for the Kremlin to influence whom they select for their party lists. Since the Kremlin already has extensive control over the current Duma, this reform seems designed to ensure that the Russian president is able to keep the Duma under his thumb."

Document(s): Open document

03.06.2005 - Source: Council of Europe - Parliamentary Assembly

The impact of the reforms of the law on political parties and on the package of changes reinforcing the "vertical of power" on the functioning of democratic institutions ("Honouring of obligations and commitments by the Russian Federation [Doc. 10568]") [#32710], [ID 11061]

"41. The new presidential role in the appointments of regional governments will considerably diminish any influence regional authorities may have in the system of democratic checks and balances of the federal powers and notably the President of the Russian Federation. It is true that, in the past, the autonomous powers have often been abused, but this should be a reason to improve regional autonomy and not to virtually abolish it. Moreover, the consequences for the composition of the Council of the Federation would seriously undermine the principle of separation of powers and consequently the functioning of democratic institutions in Russia. As to the changes of the electoral system, the cumulative effects of the reduction of the number of the parties and the introduction of a fully proportional system will consolidate the position of the governing political forces which overwhelmingly dominate the State Duma. Any chances for an outside challenge to their hold on power will be significantly reduced. While future elections can certainly lead to a redistribution of votes among the four parties presently represented in the State Duma, it is questionable whether such redistribution would be enough to guarantee the normal functioning of political institutions in the country in accordance with Council of Europe principles and standards. A government cannot be democratically accountable if it is virtually protected from the threat of being voted out of office regardless of what it does.

42. The cumulative effect of the package of changes reinforcing the "vertical of power" of the President of the Russian Federation is therefore a reason for concern. While we fully understand and support President Putin's efforts to succeed in the fight against terrorism and to increase the efficiency of Russia's political and administrative system, such efficiency should not be – and does not have to be – achieved at the expense of democracy. For the latter to function properly, power must not only be vertically reinforced, but also horizontally shared."

Document(s): Open document

2004 - Source: Universität Bremen - Forschungsstelle Osteuropa

Russia's system of government ("Russlandanalysen: Russia's system of government") [ID 11062]

"Russland bzw. die Russländische Föderation – beide Bezeichnungen nach der Verfassung gleichwertig –steht in der Nachfolge der Russischen Sozialistischen Föderativen Sowjetrepublik (RSFSR), der größten Teilrepublik der UdSSR. Die RSFSR erklärte sich am 12. Juni 1990 für souverän. Nach der Auflösung der UdSSR am 31. Dezember 1991 erlangte sie die volle Unabhängigkeit. Durch Volksabstimmung wurde am 12. Dezember 1993 eine neue Verfassung eingeführt.

Laut Verfassung ist Russland ein demokratischer, föderaler Rechtsstaat mit republikanischer Regierungsform. Die Verfassung schreibt einen Grundrechtekatalog fest, der u.a. Gleichheit, Recht auf Leben, Menschenwürde, politische und persönliche Freiheitsrechte (u.a. Reisefreiheit, Informationsfreiheit, Versammlungsfreiheit), Mitwirkungsrechte (einschließlich das aktive und passive Wahlrecht), Gewerbefreiheit und Recht auf Eigentum, Recht auf Arbeit, Wohnung, auf Alterssicherung, Gesundheitsversorgung und eine gesunde Umwelt aufführt.

Russland hat ein präsidiales Regierungssystem mit einem starken Präsidenten und einem vergleichsweise schwachen Parlament. [...]

Russland besteht aus 89 Föderationssubjekten und zwar 21 Republiken, 6 Regionalbezirken, 49 Gebieten, zwei Städten von föderaler Bedeutung (Moskau und St. Petersburg, einem Autonomen Gebiet und zehn Autonomen Bezirke (Avtonomnye okrugi). Jedes Föderationssubjekt verfügt über eine eigene Exekutive, an deren Spitze je nach regionaler Verfassung ein Gouverneur, Präsident usw. steht, und eine gewählte Vertretungskörperschaft. Seit dem Jahre 2000 sind die 89 Föderationssubjekte in sieben Föderalbezirken zusammengefaßt, denen jeweils ein Beauftragter des Präsidenten vorsteht."

Document(s): Russlandanalysen: Russia's system of government