31.08.2007 - Source: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

Query response on the activities of the O'odua People's Congress ("Activities of both factions of the O'odua People's Congress (OPC) since 2006; treatment of OPC members by the Nigerian authorities [NGA102592.E]") [ID 24514]

Document(s): Open document

06.03.2007 - Source: US Department of State

Unlike in the previous year, there were no politically motivated arrests of OPC members; some are still detained on charges stemming from 2005 clashes between rival OPC factions ("Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2006") [ID 19652]

"Unlike in the previous year, there were no politically motivated arrests of members of the Oodua People's Congress (OPC), a militant Yoruba group operating in the southwest that claims its objective is to protect the collective rights of the Yoruba within the federation. Several OPC members continued to be detained for most of the year on charges stemming from October 2005 clashes between rival OPC factions, but OPC leader Fredrick Fasehun was released in April on bail for medical reasons. In December charges were dismissed against Fasehun, Gani Adams, and four others, and all of those who had been detained were released from prison."

Document(s): Open document

03.2007 - Source: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity

Objectives of the OPC according to its constitution ("Who Joins Ethnic Militias? A Survey of the Oodua People's Congress in Southwestern Nigeria") [ID 19428]

"The Oodua People’s Congress, named after the mythological ancestor of the Yoruba, is one of the largest ethnic militias in today’s Nigeria. It is very influential in the states demographically dominated by the Yoruba in the Southwest. The OPC’s official objectives are set out in its constitution. The OPC’s objectives are “to identify with our historical and cultural origin with a view to re-living the glory of our past for the purpose of posterity; to educate and mobilize the descendants of Oduduwa for the purpose of the above; to integrate the aspirations and values of all the descendants of Oduduwa into a collective platform of an Oodua entity; to monitor the various interests of descendants of Oduduwa […] and struggle for the protection of these interests; […] to further the progress of Oodua civilization by protection and promoting our value, mores and the inter-generational transmission of same” (quoted in Human Rights Watch (2003), p. 4). One of OPC’s main claims is the organisation of a Sovereign National Conference designed to redraw the rules of the Federation."

Document(s): Open document

03.2007 - Source: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity

OPC calims to have several million members spread worldwide ("Who Joins Ethnic Militias? A Survey of the Oodua People's Congress in Southwestern Nigeria") [ID 19429]

"Today’s OPC claims to have several millions members spread worldwide14. The main bulk of these supporters obviously concentrate in the heart of the Yorubaland, mainly consisting of the six states of the former South-western region (Lagos, Edo, Ekiti, Ogun, Osun, Oyo, Ondo) plus the States of Kwara and Kogi. Other supporters live in the Yoruba part of the Republic of Bénin or belong to the Diaspora in North America or Europe. Whether these members are card-carrying members regularly attending meetings or mere sympathisers occasionally contributing to the activities of the group is unverifiable as is the relative weights of each faction and the proportion of "esos" (i.e. its best trained "soldiers") in the groups15. What is sure however is that OPC can be labelled a mass movement, known by everyone in Nigeria."

Document(s): Open document

03.2007 - Source: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity

After OPC founder was thrown into detention in 1996 the OPC became a violent organisation ("Who Joins Ethnic Militias? A Survey of the Oodua People's Congress in Southwestern Nigeria") [ID 19430]

"The OPC was created in August 1994, apparently godfathered by prominent Yoruba political and cultural figures16. In December 1996, Fasehun was incarcerated. This changed the nature of the movement: « OPC became a violent organisation in 1996 after its founder […] was thrown into detention by the Abacha military junta. This incident made the OPC members feel that the Nigerian problems could not be solved peacefully » (Albert (2001), p. 282). Three more years were needed to actually witness serious violence perpetrated by the OPC, during which the organisation managed to rally troops with a remarkable rapidity. By itself, this sudden success tells a lot: it wouldn’t have been possible without the activation of already existing networks and social structures: those organised around the initial prominent godfathers but also more official ones such as professional associations (e.g. transport workers unions). The OPC did not emerge ex nihilo, but was built up on firm social grounds present in the Yoruba society17."

Document(s): Open document

03.2007 - Source: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity

In 1999 the OPC broke up in 2 fractions ("Who Joins Ethnic Militias? A Survey of the Oodua People's Congress in Southwestern Nigeria") [ID 19431]

"Most of the observers and actors of the OPC (Akinyele (2001), Human Rights Watch (2003) and personal communications with OPC leaders and sympathisers) consider that the year 1999 was a turning point in the history of the movement: the OPC became involved in multiple gruesome clashes against other ethnic groups, the police or alleged criminal gangs (Human Rights Watch (2003); Okechukwu (2000); Akinyele (2001)). The various confrontations are said to have claimed hundreds of lives. This shift in OPC’s attitude coincides with i) the end of the military regime and the appointment of a Yoruba President certainly weakening the legitimacy of OPC’s core argument of Yoruba marginalisation; ii) an alleged upsurge of criminal violence progressively transforming the OPC into a self-defence movement and, crucially, iii) the rise of young and charismatic challenger to Fasehun’s hold on the OPC: Gani Adams. The OPC broke up into two factions in the beginning of 199918. Gani Adams became the radical flag bearer of a generation which was largely denied the chance of pursuing much education, a role that Fasehun could not hold19."

Document(s): Open document

03.2007 - Source: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity

OPC members take an oath when recruited; they rely on magial techniques and beliefs ("Who Joins Ethnic Militias? A Survey of the Oodua People's Congress in Southwestern Nigeria") [ID 19432]

"In 1999, vigilantism became one of OPC’s main activities22. OPC’s reliance on magical techniques and beliefs, deeply entrenched in Yoruba society (Nolte (2004); Williams (1980)) gave them a substantial comparative advantage for this kind of activity23. Importantly, OPC’s services, primarily targeted at poor communities are also more affordable than formal private security outfits. When recruited, new OPC members take an oath making them bullet-proof and compelling them not to commit any criminal offence. Apart from raising self-confidence among the members, these techniques certainly ensure cohesiveness within the group as violating the oath may have very serious consequences for the culprit. Simultaneously, the alleged command of OPC of magical practices provokes fear in OPC’s potential enemies’ minds and renders its actions credible within the population they are supposed to serve. This magical equipment is complemented by more “classical” weaponry: some OPC members (certainly not all) carry guns, locally produced, smuggled or robbedfrom police stores. Retired policemen or militaries offer them training sessions in “self-defence”, “in the bush” (Akinyele (2001), Human Rights Watch (2003))."

Document(s): Open document

03.2007 - Source: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity

Vigilantism, a main OPC activity, is a lucrative business ("Who Joins Ethnic Militias? A Survey of the Oodua People's Congress in Southwestern Nigeria") [ID 19433]

"Criminality was and is a huge concern in many parts of the Yorubaland. The police are highly distrusted, for their passiveness, their corruption24 and propensity to overreact when they actually intervene (Albert, Awe, Hérault, and Omitoogun (1995)). In cities, the proliferation of gated communities (Fabiyi (2004)) makes the security business extremely lucrative. The OPC has established strong positions in this sector, probably to improve its image,25 but certainly also to address a genuine demand expressed by the population. To a certain extent, the OPC is the police that poor people can rely on. Vigilantism is combined with crime-fighting activities. OPC members claim to chase armed robbers in zones that policemen are scared to enter. Whether they systematically hand over the suspects to the police is unclear."

Document(s): Open document

03.2007 - Source: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity

When it comes to dispute settling people often rather rely on OPC than on the judiciary ("Who Joins Ethnic Militias? A Survey of the Oodua People's Congress in Southwestern Nigeria") [ID 19434]

"The judiciary’s reputation is not better than the police’s. Long written formal procedures are another obstacle leading often illiterate people to prefer alternative “traditional” routes of dispute settling. OPC has gained some legitimacy in this sector too. It intervenes probably at a level where existing informal mechanisms27 have failed. The OPC can arbitrate landlord/tenants issues (Okechukwu (2000)) or operate as a debt collector (especially when one of the parties is non-Yoruba). It has also been reported to defend the interests of workers threatened by dismissal (Omole (2005)). One of our informants, known for his substantial knowledge of magic (juju), has been appointed by his group as a “patron” in charge of mediating in conflicts in the Ibadan-North local government. Importantly, the insertion of the OPC as an informal actor regulating Yoruba society has been facilitated by the identity of its local leaders who generally share many other affiliations as members of traditional secret societies called oro (Nolte, I. (2004)), or members of labour unions28. Through the personal networks of its members, the OPC is enmeshed with many other organisations of informal social regulation. Locally, its success certainly lies in its ability to bridge gaps between these organisations and to ensure the delivery of “public services” in areas completely abandoned by formal institutions. In this respect, OPC might simply be a modern version of old community self-defence practices that emerged long ago following Nigeria’s urbanisation (Fourchard (2006); Sesay, Ukeje, Aina, and Odebiyi (2003)). 26 Mob justice is by no means the monopoly of the OPC. It is a widespread phenomenon in Nigeria and elsewhere in West Africa (on Nigeria, see Harnischfeger (2003); Human Rights Watch (2002)). 27 In the Yoruba society, a whole hierarchy of informal dispute settling mechanisms can be seized by conflicting parties, from the household level to the city level (Albert, Awe, Hérault, and Omitoogun (1995)). 28 In Ibadan, the headquarters of the OPC are located in the same building as the National Union of Transport Workers and the leaders of the two groups are close relatives. Nolte (2004) notes a similar proximity between the two organisations in another Yoruba town, Remo."

Document(s): Open document

03.2007 - Source: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity

The “services” offered by the OPC are not free, but prices are not formally set ("Who Joins Ethnic Militias? A Survey of the Oodua People's Congress in Southwestern Nigeria") [ID 19435]

"The “services” offered by the OPC are not free. But quantifying their “prices” is a difficult task. Transfers sometimes happen in kind and transactions may occur in bulk. Moreover the payment and the delivery of “services” don’t necessarily coincide temporally. The OPC “recommends” vigilantes in its areas of influence, hands back to his/her owner the loot of apprehended robbers or arbitrates local disputes. Prices may not be systematically formally set for these services; they may also depend on the social status of the parties to the transaction. But the beneficiaries are certainly willing to pay something to the OPC, not only for the delivery of services but also for the fear of reprisal if they fail to do so. The OPC’s protective and stabilising role roots its success in the capacity of the organisation to maintain a certain degree of distrust and instability within the communities where it operates, as shown in other contexts by Gambetta (2000)."

Document(s): Open document

03.2007 - Source: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity

Several instances of the manipulation of the OPC for political purposes were observed at different political levels ("Who Joins Ethnic Militias? A Survey of the Oodua People's Congress in Southwestern Nigeria") [ID 19436]

"A final but crucial aspect of the OPC’s multifaceted activities is its instrumentalisation by local politicians resulting in new potential for tensions and a rise of economic opportunities29. The OPC is popular among the youths and inspires fear among local communities. Consequently, it becomes the perfect mobilising tool for local politicians. Several instances of the manipulation of the OPC for political purposes have been observed at different political levels (Human Rights Watch (2003); Okechukwu (2000)). This is neither particularly recent nor exceptional in the Nigerian and African) political landscape where the youths have regularly been used as a strong tool for rallying electoral troops (Gore and Pratten (2003); Nolte (2004); Anderson (2002))."

Document(s): Open document

03.2007 - Source: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity

Socio-economic profile of OPC militants ("Who Joins Ethnic Militias? A Survey of the Oodua People's Congress in Southwestern Nigeria") [ID 19437]

"The OPC members surveyed are 31 years old on average. They are overwhelmingly male (90 per cent). Women are welcome however. They are granted a specific role in the internal division of labour: they are prohibited from performing ldquo;night operations” (like vigilantism) but serve as privileged informants or “spies” in the struggle against crime. 80 per cent of the militia members that were interviewed were Muslims. This figure is surprisingly high as the Southwest of Nigeria is said to be predominantly Christian30. It shows however that the fight against the Northerners’ alleged hegemonic ambitions is deployed along ethnic lines only. It is orthogonal to religious affiliations as “Northerners” are almost exclusively Muslims, too. [...] OPC members are relatively well-educated people; their educational achievement is slightly above that of the general South-western male population surveyed in National Population Commission and Macro (2004). In addition, almost none of them are jobless and they earn on average USD 27 (far above the absolute poverty line). If not extremely deprived economically however, OPC rank and file militants face the typical economic vulnerability inherent with informal sector activities where more than 80 per cent of them operate. In terms of social integration, OPC members definitely do not look like faithless and lawless individuals. A vast majority of them are married, have children (sometimes out of wedlock) and are settled in places they rent31. Members don’t hide their affiliation to OPC. It is public knowledge in the neighbourhood where they live for almost 70 per cent of them. Both in economic and social terms, OPC members have rather ordinary people profiles. Their opportunity cost of joining is far from nil – even if it is lessened by the fact that being a militia member is not a full-time activity (see table 2 above). As a result, the militia rank and file members we interviewed shouldn’t be theoretically particularly motivated to join for purely economic motives."

Document(s): Open document

03.2007 - Source: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity

Actual gains obtained through militia membership ("Who Joins Ethnic Militias? A Survey of the Oodua People's Congress in Southwestern Nigeria") [ID 19438]

"A look at the immediate actual gains obtained through militia membership (table 6) confirms the above results. It shows that protection and assistance are provided in effect by the OPC. This protection is symbolic or spiritual (jujus) and material (cash in case of injury, illness or other unfortunate personal event). Along with this temporary kind of assistance when members suffer unexpected shocks, militia rank and file benefits from more regular assistance through continuous business relations. Therefore, the OPC is not only an informal insurance mechanism protecting against idiosyncratic risks, it is also a protected sphere of continuous economic exchanges. Importantly, as shown in the table, to respondents this does not necessarily result in a tangible improvement of their economic situation but in a dramatic improvement of their sentiment of protection and psychological comfort. “Peace of mind”, “rest of mind”, “confidence” are very often quoted as major changes induced by membership."

Document(s): Open document

03.2007 - Source: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity

Motives for joining the OPC: The desire for protection ("Who Joins Ethnic Militias? A Survey of the Oodua People's Congress in Southwestern Nigeria") [ID 19439]

"Immediate economic reasons (access to cash, better job) are expressed in less than one case out of five. The most frequent answer overwhelmingly refers to the desire of protection. As mentioned above, the OPC is reputed to have command of magical practices, able to secure economic prosperity, good health, social success and, maybe above all, protection against enemies. In short, what makes people apply to OPC membership is the perception of a risk on their life or property. This is confirmed by individual reports, mentioning, for example, the “fear of unknown future” as an impetus for affiliation. The anxiety motivating the enlistment is also somehow present in the respondents’ justifications of their choice of group to belong to: a large majority of them acclaim OPC’s “neat behaviour”, i.e. the fact that, unlike political parties, the organisation “doesn’t cheat” its members. OPC is viewed as a caring group for its rank and file, ready to help if there is any problem. It is expected to have a direct and immediate local beneficial impact on its members’ well-being. Among the many positive characteristics of OPC quoted by respondents are: “solidarity32”, “oneness”, ldquo;togetherness” etc. All these expressions carry a heavy connotation of protection."

Document(s): Open document

03.2007 - Source: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity

Motives for joining the OPC varied between those who joined the OPC under the military regime and those who joined the OPC after the inception of democracy in 1999 ("Who Joins Ethnic Militias? A Survey of the Oodua People's Congress in Southwestern Nigeria") [ID 19442]

"Unsurprisingly, the political context and the course of events at the moment of enlistment is more crucial for pre-democracy joiners. Particularly, the “June, 12” annulment, as referred to verbally by the respondents, has been a major trigger of the early wave of joiners. Similar mechanisms haven’t been at play in the post-democracy era. Postdemocracy enlistments don’t seem to be attached to such a sudden event. Rather, they appear to be motivated by more self-interested considerations: post-democracy members mention direct or indirect material benefits (cash, jobs) as part of their motives in significantly higher proportions than their pre-democracy counterparts. They also tend to consider relatively more often that their membership had a positive impact on their economic situation - a dimension of membership which is almost absent from the reports of the pre-democracy joiners. The latter highlight their greater feeling of protection as a result of their membership. A final significant difference between the two strata of the OPC members of our sample can be observed: the participation in crime-fighting operations is more frequent among the early joiners. This might be explained by the hierarchical division of labour within the movement, likely to vary with seniority. The most senior members are perhaps more prone and more skilled to engage into this kind of activities. Although interpreting this last observation is not straightforward, the broad evidence shown by table 8 is unambiguous: profiles of militants change over time; the political shock of the inception of democracy introduced a cleavage among the followers. As early recruits instinctively joined after the “June, 12” annulment, those who got enlisted under the democratic regime pursued more explicitly self-interested goals."

Document(s): Open document

08.03.2006 - Source: US Department of State

High Court denied bail to 6 members of the Oodua People's Congress (OPC) on 21 December 2005 ("Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2005") [#46036],  [ID 17074]

"Members of the Oodua People's Congress (OPC), a militant Yoruba group operating in the southwest that claims its objective is to protect the collective rights of the Yoruba within the federation, continued to be arrested. Following several fatal October altercations between OPC factions, rival OPC leaders Dr. Fredrick Fasheun and Chief Gani Adams were detained and charged with managing an illegal organization and abetting mayhem.On December 1, Fasheun, Adams, and four others were charged with treason, illegal weapons possession, and membership in an illegal organization. An Abuja high court denied them bail on December 21, and all six remained in custody at year's end."

Document(s): Open document

10.2005 - Source: UK Border Agency (Home Office)

Nigeria: Country Report - Background information to the Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC) ("Country Report - October 2005") [#39647],  [ID 14657]

"Nigeria has witnessed an increase in the activities of ethnic and regional militia, vigilantes, and other armed groups in the last few years. One of the better-known of these groups is the O’odua People’s Congress (OPC), an organization active in the southwest of Nigeria which campaigns to protect the interests of the Yoruba ethnic group and seeks autonomy for the Yoruba people. The OPC is a complex organization, which has taken on several different roles as it has adapted to the changing political and security environment in Nigeria. One of several Yoruba self-determination groups, it was established in 1994 with the aim of overcoming what it alleged was the political marginalization of the Yoruba. It has since evolved in several different directions. Its activities have ranged from political agitation for Yoruba autonomy and promotion of Yoruba culture to violent confrontation with members of other ethnic groups, and, more recently, vigilantism – the OPC has been responsible for numerous human rights abuses and acts of violence, and its members have killed or injured hundreds of unarmed civilians. However, OPC members have been victims as well as perpetrators of human rights abuses. Hundreds of real or suspected OPC members have been killed by the police; many others have been arbitrarily arrested, tortured, and detained without trial for extended periods.

Part self-determination organization, part vigilante group, the OPC has defied easy classification. The usual description of the OPC as an ethnic militia, while accurate, is also misleading, in that not all the acts of violence committed by its members have been ethnically motivated. Many of the conflicts in which the OPC has got involved have been among Yoruba, and consequently victims of OPC violence have included Yoruba….In a sense, the OPC combines aspects of two distinct types of organizations which have emerged in Nigeria: those which advocate for the specific interests of their particular ethnic, regional or religious group in a broadly political context, and those which have taken on the task of fighting crime, without an explicit political agenda of their own. In addition, OPC members frequently carry out acts of intimidation and violence which appear to be motivated more by a desire to rob their victims of money or possessions, than by any ideological objective.

The OPC claims to have more than five million members, spread over the whole of Nigeria. The greatest concentration of members are in the southwestern states commonly referred to as Yorubaland, including Lagos, Ogun, Osun, Ondo, and Oyo, as well as Ekiti, Kwara, and Kogi. It also claims to have members in several West African countries, including Benin, Ghana, Liberia, and Sierra Leone; as well as Brazil, Germany, Jamaica, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.

It would appear that people have joined the OPC for a variety of different reasons, some because they specifically identify with their political ideology and the Yoruba self-determination agenda, others because they may feel they need a form of protection against what they perceive as political, economic or social discrimination and may have been impressed by the image of the organization. Others, mainly the mass of young, unemployed men, have simply taken advantage of the organization as a channel for venting their general frustration."

Document(s): Open document

09.06.2005 - Source: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

Query response on the methods of recruitment and the selection of members of the O'odua People's Congress ("Information on the O'odua People's Congress (OPC), including the methods of recruitment and the selection of members; implications of being a member and the consequences of refusing to join (2003-May 2005) [NGA100078.E]") [ID 24515]

Document(s): Open document

03.03.2005 - Source: Schweizerische Flüchtlingshilfe

Nigerian identity documents within the context of the OPC ("Identitätsdokumente in ausgewählten afrikanischen Flüchtlings-Herkunftsländern") [#32441],  [ID 14658]

"Die Sektion des OPC-Vorsitzenden Dr. Frederick Fasehun der Widerstandsbewegung Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) stellt Mitgliederkarten aus. Diese sind vom Vorsitzenden des OPC, Dr. Fasehu, unterzeichnet. Die Karten beinhalten ein Foto, Identifikationsnummer, Name, Unterschrift, Adresse, Position des Inhabers sowie das Ausstellungsdatum."

Document(s): Open document

08.2004 - Source: Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation

OPC members - who are they and where are they from? ("Nigeria - Länderbericht") [#28135],  [ID 14659]

"Der OPC sieht sich als grassroots Organisation. Seine Mitglieder sind meist wenig ausgebildet, ihm gehören viele junge, arbeitslose und aus ländlichen Regionen stammende Leute an. Nach Angaben des OPC verfügt er über mehr als 5 Millionen Mitglieder, vor allem verteilt über ganz Nigeria, aber auch in anderen Staaten der Welt. Die höchste Konzentration von OPC-Mitgliedern innerhalb Nigerias findet sich in folgenden Gliedstaaten: Lagos, Ogun, Osun, Ondo, Oyo, Ekiti, Kwara und Kogi. Die Zahl der registrierten Mitglieder mit entsprechenden Ausweisen beläuft sich auf etwa eine Million. Die Mitgliedschaft erfolgt aus unterschiedlichen Gründen: entweder weil man sich mit dem Yoruba-Nationalismus identifiziert oder weil man Schutz vor politischer, ökonomischer oder sozialer Diskriminierung sucht. Die meisten Jugendlichen scheinen sich dem OPC jedoch angeschlossen zu haben, um ihrer Frustration Luft zu verschaffen. Jedes Mitglied legt bei der Einführung in die Organisation einen Eid ab und entrichtet den Mitgliedsbeitrag (Sesay et alia 2003, S. 37). Ob die Mitglieder eine Art von Ausbildung erhielten, konnte nicht eindeutig belegt werden.

Zur Frage, ob auch Nicht-Yoruba Mitglieder in der Organisation werden können, meint eine Expertin von Human Rights Watch, sie hätte nie davon gehört, dass auch Nicht-Yoruba dem OPC beitreten würden und könnte sich das auch nicht vorstellen, da der OPC klar durch seine Ethnizität definiert wäre. Laut der Verfassung des OPC stünde die Mitgliedschaft jedoch auch anderen ethnischen Gruppen, die sich mit dem Volk der Yoruba und ihrem Kampf identifizierten, offen. Sie hätte weiters von Fällen erfahren, in denen
Nicht-Yoruba von der Polizei fälschlicherweise beschuldigt worden waren, OPC-Mitglieder zu sein (IRB 22. Februar 2003).

Johannes Harnischfeger meint zur Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Mitgliedschaft von Nicht-Yoruba beim OPC, dass diesem nur Nachfahren des legendären Königs Oduduwa, also Angehörige des Yoruba-Volkes, beitreten könnten. Bei der Initiation in die Gruppe müssten die künftigen Mitglieder einen Eid auf Ogun oder eine der anderen Yoruba-Gottheiten ablegen."

Document(s): Open document

01.07.2004 - Source: BBC News

Nigeria's police have announced that they will no longer tolerate the country's ethnic militias ("Crackdown on Nigeria's militias") [#23738],  [ID 14660]

Document(s): Open document

10.2003 - Source: UK Border Agency (Home Office)

The OPC has been targeted by the nigerian government ("Country Report - October 2003") [#17332],  [ID 14661]

"6.54 [...] The present Nigerian government has taken action against groups thought to be pursuing an agenda of independence for their particular ethnic group. The O'odua People's Congress (OPC) is a Yoruba group, led by Dr Frederick Fasheun. The OPC is widely believed to advocate an independent Yoruba State; although Dr Fasheun has denied this. In Lagos State, the OPC clashed repeatedly with the police during 2002, over their protection of Yoruba neighbourhoods, and other political issues. The OPC continued to function as a vigilante anti-crime force. During 2001, there were fewer OPC vigilante killings than in previous years; however, on 16 August 2001, the OPC reportedly beheaded four suspected robbers and set their bodies on fire in Lagos State. The OPC also reportedly crucified a man in the Surelere district of Lagos. In 2000 the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights reported that 302 OPC members were arrested following clashes with the police in Lagos. Of those detainees, 95 were released in 2000. The remaining detainees were not able to obtain legal representation and either could not make bail or were not eligible for bail due to the charges brought against them.

6.57 In August 2000, after a number of violent clashes, including attacks on the police, the Nigerian police announced a crackdown on OPC members involved in these crimes. The attitude of the public, in the Lagos area, to the OPC is ambivalent, as they are seen as attempting to impose order in areas where the police have been unsuccessful, and some Yorubas sympathise with their aims, if not their methods. The Nigerian police have targeted members of the OPC involved in violence, and ordinary members generally appear to be able to express their views without harassment."

Document(s): Open document

10.2003 - Source: UK Border Agency (Home Office)

The OPC has split into two factions ("Country Report - October 2003") [#17332],  [ID 14662]

"6.55 The OPC has split into two factions, one under the leadership of Dr Frederick Fasheun and the other under the leadership Mr Ganiyu Adams, and these factions clashed in January 2000, resulting in at least 6 deaths. In another incident in January 2000 a senior police officer in Lagos was kidnapped and killed by OPC members attempting to free a member accused of robbery. This incident resulted in a crackdown by the police in which 100 people were killed, and over 200 OPC members were detained on criminal charges.

6.56 The Adams faction has been identified as being involved in most of this criminal activity, and has also acted as a vigilante organisation in Lagos. The Nigerian government has set up an ad hoc Senate committee to investigate both factions of the OPC, and present proposals as to how this organisation should be dealt with in the future.

6.58 The OPC appears to be generally able to pursue its political objective without interference from the authorities. However, if any of its members are involved in violence, the authorities have acted to curb this violence, and bring those suspected of responsibility to trial. An example of the OPC freedom to operate is that Dr Fasheun is taking action against the Nigerian authorities over President Obasanjo's actions regarding the OPC, especially his directive that its members should be shot on sight. However, OPC members have been detained, where at all possible, but only when suspected of committing a crime."

Document(s): Open document

10.2003 - Source: UK Border Agency (Home Office)

The OPC continues to be involved in clasches with the police in and around Lagos ("Country Report - October 2003") [#17332],  [ID 14663]

"6.59 The OPC continues to be involved in clashes with the police, and contributes to the difficulties in law enforcement in and around Lagos. In August 2001, Ganiyu Adams was arrested, and has denied 23 charges against him, which included murder, robbery and illegal possession of arms. The case has since been adjourned. He had been on the run for 20 months, after police declared him wanted in November 1999, following the clashes, allegedly spearheaded by his group, between Yorubas and Hausas in Lagos. During this period he was able to hold rallies in several southwestern towns in a show of defiance and impunity. His faction of the OPC has stated that it will halt all vigilante activities. Adams was released on bail, but is now wanted in connection with other offences."

Document(s): Open document

22.04.2003 - Source: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

Query response on whether non-Yoruba can become members of the Oodua People's Congress (OPC); whether non-Yoruba are accused of or suspected by the police of being members of the OPC ("Whether non-Yoruba can become members of the Oodua People's Congress (OPC); whether non-Yoruba are accused of or suspected by the police of being members of the OPC [NGA40769.E]") [ID 24733]

Document(s): Open document

28.02.2003 - Source: Human Rights Watch

Detailed report on killings and other abuses by The O`odua Peopleś congress (OPC) since 1999 ("The O'odua people's congress: Fighting violence with violence") [#11082],  [ID 14664]

Document(s): Open document

28.02.2003 - Source: Human Rights Watch

HRW: Decrease of large-scale killing by OPC by 2003, OPC remains visible and active, with support among population and state government officials ("The O'odua people's congress: Fighting violence with violence") [#11082],  [ID 14665]

"The most widespread killings by the OPC took place in the context of clashes between Yoruba and other ethnic groups, which reached a peak during 2000; however, violence and human rights abuses continued in 2001 and 2002. There have also been numerous individual cases in which OPC members have killed or injured people, in the course of their vigilante work and in attempts to extort money. The OPC’s activities have led them into direct confrontation with the police: there have been repeated, violent clashes between the two, with casualties on both sides. OPC members have attacked police stations on many occasions, and have killed and injured several policemen.
[...]
Despite public statements by the federal government condemning ethnic and vigilante violence, little effective action has been taken to keep these groups in check or to enforce accountability; on the contrary, some of these groups have benefited from the financial and political support of influential political figures, including state government officials. Several government officials maintain close links with the OPC leadership, and OPC members have provided security arrangements at official and public functions, in the presence of government officials. Where action has been taken by the federal government to crack down on the violence, it has often resulted in further human rights violations by the police, including extrajudicial executions and arbitrary arrests. The weakness of the Nigerian police force, its apparent inability to maintain law and order, and the lack of public confidence in its effectiveness have aggravated the problem and have given many armed groups the freedom to operate according to their own rules, and to carry out serious human rights abuses with impunity.
[...]
By early 2003, incidents of large-scale killings by the OPC have decreased, but clashes between different ethnic groups, including the Yoruba, are still taking place, and ethnic tensions have not abated. The OPC remains active and visible. Its leaders have not accepted responsibility for the serious human rights abuses committed by their members, despite the fact that the organization has a clear structure, chain of command and disciplinary procedures. The OPC continues to enjoy significant support among sectors of the population in southwestern Nigeria and among state government officials. There could be a resurgence of violence at any time, and the OPC remains poised to intervene in the event of ethnic or political crises, which remain a common feature of the Nigerian landscape."

Document(s): Open document

28.02.2003 - Source: Human Rights Watch

HRW: Despite ban of OPC and violent crackdown on its members, OPC has continued to function ("The O'odua people's congress: Fighting violence with violence") [#11082],  [ID 14666]

"In 1999, the federal government announced a ban on the OPC and gave the police orders to deal with the organization ruthlessly. Instructions to the police to “shoot on sight,” combined with the OPC’s defiance of the ban, provoked a heavy-handed and brutal response from the police. The police regularly raided and broke up OPC meetings; scores of OPC members were killed by the police and hundreds arrested. Few of the arrests have resulted in successful prosecution. In many cases, suspects were detained for a short period then released on bail; in others, they have remained in detention for prolonged periods awaiting trial. The actions of the Nigerian government and the police against the OPC have been in violation of Nigeria’s national and international human rights obligations.
Despite this crackdown, the OPC has continued to function, sometimes underground, but more often boldly and openly challenging the federal government’s and the police’s attempts to crush it. In some of the states where it operates in the southwest, it enjoys close relations with state government authorities and even the explicit support of governors—a support which, to some extent, may have provided it with a level of protection."

Document(s): Open document

07.06.2002 - Source: All Africa

This Day: Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC) yesterday vowed to resist any future clamp down on their organisation as part of the Government's desire to curb politically related violence [ID 14667]

"Members of the Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC) yesterday vowed to resist any future clamp down on their organisation as part of the Federal Government's desire to curb politically related violence.
Factional leader of the OPC, Ganiyu Adams gave this indication in an address delivered on his behalf at a press conference in Ibadan called to disown the activities of one of its members, Mr. Mohammed Alaka, who was announced expelled from the movement yesterday. (…) The OPC asserted that "if the security operatives have given them a free hand, they could have prevented the assassination of prominent Yoruba leaders including the late Attorney-General and Justice Minister, Chief Bola Ige, the late Chief Layi Balogun, the late Alhaja Suliat Adedeji among others.The organisation, however, pledged "to maintain the utmost calm" especially in Oyo State, in the interest of peace and security"

Document(s): Open document

28.05.2002 - Source: Amnesty International

AI: Leading members and supporters of the OPC were arrested on a regular basis, often to be released without trial ("Annual report 2002") [#7180],  [ID 14668]

"Leading members and supporters of the Oodua People's Congress and the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), two politically active groups campaigning for greater autonomy for their ethnic and territorial constituencies, were arrested on a regular basis, often to be released without trial. Neither organization has clarified its position on the use and advocacy of violence in their political campaigns. [...]

Frederick Fasehun and Ganiyu Adams, leaders of two factions of the Oodua People's Congress, were arrested on several occasions. Following the arrests of Frederick Fasehun in September and Ganiyu Adams in October, they were charged with unlawful possession of arms and instigating violence. Both were released on bail and charges were withdrawn in November."

Document(s): Open document

04.2002 - Source: UK Border Agency (Home Office)

UK Home Office: The O'odua people's Congress (OPC) are a Yoruba group, led by Dr Frederick Fasheun ("Country Assessment - April 2002") [#7103],  [ID 14669]

"8.4. However, the Nigerian government has taken action against groups thought to be pursuing an agenda of independence for their particular ethnic group. The O'odua people's Congress (OPC) are a Yoruba group, led by Dr Frederick Fasheun. It was affiliated to JACON and widely believed to advocate an independent Yoruba state (although Fasheun has denied this). In early November 1998 it was reported that 5 members of the OPC were killed by police in Lagos. They were allegedly attacked by the police after finishing a meeting. Further clashes between police and OPC youths took place in February and early March 1999 following attacks, by elements of the OPC, on police stations in Lagos and Ogun State.
8.5. The OPC are believed to have triggered riots in Lagos port, in which a number of people were reported to have been killed. On 9 September 1999 there was a serious riot at the port of Lagos, and it was reported that militants linked to the OPC were involved. The cause of this violence was an attempt by sacked workers to return to work, which was supported by the militants, but opposed by other workers. There was also an ethnic element to this violence as the rioters also sought to secure Yoruba domination over business conducted in the port. After several hours of fighting between the rival groups the police restored order, but it is reported that sixteen people were killed.
8.6. In November 1999 in and around Lagos there were clashed between the OPC and Hausas over market trading, which resulted in the deaths of at least twenty seven people, and a vigorous police response. On 25 November1999 President Obasanjo ordered that police shoot OPC members on sight if they did not surrender, as a result the police adopted a confrontational line with the OPC. There were also clashes between OPC and Ijaws in Lagos at around the same time.
8.7. The OPC has also split into two factions, one under the leadership of Dr Frederick Fasheun and the other under the leadership Mr Ganiyu Adams, and these factions clashed in January 2000, resulting in at least six deaths. In another incident in January 2000 a senior police officer in Lagos was kidnapped and killed by OPC members attempting to free a member accused of robbery. This incident resulted in a crackdown by the police in which one hundred people were killed, and over two hundred OPC members detained on criminal charges. The Adams faction has been identified as being involved in most of this criminal activity, and has also acted as a vigilante organisation in Lagos. On 13 January 2000 President Obasanjo complained about the Governor of Lagos Bola Tinubu's handling of these incidents in a letter. His comments were met with a robust defence from the Governor of his administration. The Nigerian government has set up an ad hoc Senate committee to investigate both factions of the OPC, and present proposals as to how this organisation should be dealt with in the future."

Document(s): Open document

04.03.2002 - Source: US Department of State

Activities of OPC and actions against OPC during 2001 ("Annual report 2001") [#5760],  [ID 14670]

"In Lagos State, the vigilante group known as the OPC clashed repeatedly with the police over their protection of Yoruba neighborhoods and over political issues. The OPC continued to function as a vigilante anticrime force despite President Obasanjo's "shoot-on-sight" order issued against them in 1999. During the year, there were fewer OPC vigilante killings than in previous years; however, on August 16, the OPC reportedly beheaded four suspected robbers and set their bodies on fire in Lagos State. The OPC also reportedly crucified a man in the Surelere district of Lagos.
In August Ganiyu Adams, a leader of the OPC, was arrested and charged in Lagos State with murder and robbery; Adams had been wanted by the police since the 1999 riots sparked by the OPC. In September the OPC announced that it would stop its vigilante activities. In October Adams again was arrested and charged with murder, stealing, robbery, and illegal possession of firearms; on October 30, he was released on bail.
There were no developments in the 2000 incident in which an OPC demonstration against Libya's expulsion of several Nigerian citizens resulted in a number of injuries and the death of a guard at a foreign embassy. There also were developments in the 2000 clashes between the OPC and police in Ilorin and Lagos in which more than 100 persons were killed, buildings in Lagos were destroyed, and the Government outlawed the OPC."

Document(s): Open document

05.02.2002 - Source: Integrated Regional Information Network

OPC has been blamed in the past for similar ethnic clashes in Nigeria’s southwest region ("Nigeria: Deaths rise in Lagos clashes, thousands flee") [#5478],  [ID 14671]

"Ethnic fighting in Lagos has killed dozens of people and forced thousands to seek refuge in military barracks and other safe places, witnesses said. The clashes pitted local Yorubas against Hausa-speakers from northern Nigeria.

The clashes, which broke out on Saturday at Idi Araba in the city's Mushin slum district following a minor dispute, continued until Monday despite the deployment of troops and policemen to quell the violence. "The police had told us to remain indoors, that there was a curfew on Sunday night but surprisingly that same night we were attacked," Salisu Abdulrahman, a Hausa resident of Idi Araba, told IRIN on Tuesday. "This morning I had to take my wife and children to the Abalti Barracks for safety."

Gangs of rival youths, armed with shotguns, swords, bottles, bows and arrows fought street battles on Monday morning in several northern suburbs of the city, still recovering from the devastating effects of explosions at an ammunitions dump that killed more than 1,000 a week before. Idi Araba and other areas including Fadeyi, Obanikoro and Yaba market, were littered with corpses. Several houses were burnt.

Joint police and military patrols restored a semblance of control by late Monday afternoon after shootouts with gangs of fighters. "I have counted no less than 50 dead bodies since we began our patrols this morning," one police sergeant told IRIN. "It’s really a bloody business."

Police sources said the situation worsened with the involvement of the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) militia, which purports to defend Yoruba interests. The OPC has been blamed in the past for similar ethnic clashes in Nigeria’s southwest region. Police said hoodlums also looted shops and robbed people."

Document(s): Open document

04.02.2002 - Source: Integrated Regional Information Network

Lagos: At least 20 people killed in clashes between local Yorubas and Hausa-speaking northerners ("Nigeria: Ethnic clashes in Lagos claim at least 20 lives") [#5479],  [ID 14672]

Document(s): Open document

16.01.2002 - Source: Human Rights Watch

The OPC is more explicitly political group claiming to advocate for the Yoruba cause and officially banned in 1999 ("World report 2002") [#5281],  [ID 14673]

"Members of the OPC, a more explicitly political group claiming to advocate for the Yoruba cause and officially banned in 1999, had many violent clashes with the police, attacking police stations and killing and injuring policemen. The police response, in turn, was heavy-handed. Many real or suspected OPC members were arrested and several killed. In August, prominent OPC leader Ganiyu Adams was arrested and charged with several offences including murder, torture, arson, and armed robbery; he was released in November."

Document(s): Open document

14.01.2002 - Source: Integrated Regional Information Network

At least 36 people killed in clashes between an ethic militia group, Oodua Peoples’ Congress (OPC), and security forces in the southwest ("Nigeria: At least 36 die in southwest militia clashes") [#5248],  [ID 14674]

Document(s): Open document