16.07.2008 - Source: BBC News

Thousends flee from the Delta region after militants threaten to 'behead' all non-natives ("Thousands flee Nigerian militants") [ID 24059]

Document(s): Open document

28.05.2008 - Source: Amnesty International

Clashes between gangs and military lead to over 30 deaths in Port Harcourt ("Annual Report 2008") [ID 24164]

"In August, rival gangs clashed in the streets of Port Harcourt, killing at least 30 people and injuring many more, including bystanders. More died when the Joint Military Taskforce (JTF) intervened using helicopters and machine-guns – at least 32 gang members, members of the security forces and bystanders were killed. Following the clashes, a curfew was imposed. Many people with no connection to the gangs were reportedly arrested, although the commander of the JTF denied this. The violence continued and intensified towards the end of the year. By the end of 2007 the JTF was still deployed in the city and the curfew was still in place."

Document(s): Open document

11.03.2008 - Source: US Department of State

Vigilante groups continue to detain and kill suspected criminals ("Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007") [ID 22775]

"Other organized vigilante groups continued to detain and kill suspected criminals. Police generally did not have a significant impact upon vigilante groups. They sometimes detained members of these groups during the year, but those arrests were sporadic, and none was known to result in prosecution. Initiatives announced in 2006 to control the vigilante groups were not successful during the year."

Document(s): Open document

01.02.2008 - Source: Integrated Regional Information Network

Niger Delta region: Article on militant groups and conflicts between them and the military; recruitment of children and youths by the militias ("No shortage of Niger Delta youth ready to join militias") [ID 22640]

Document(s): Open document

05.12.2007 - Source: ReliefWeb

Definition of terms "ethnic militias", "confraternities and cults", "vigilante groups" and "criminal gangs"; distinction between terms ("Small arms, armed violence, and insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger Delta in perspective"), Autor: Small Arms Survey [ID 21908]

"Given the diversity of the armed groups, it is difficult to generate a simple typology (see Table 5.1). Such groups are often characterized by observers as (ethnic) militias,66 confraternities or cults, vigilante groups,67 or (criminal) gangs, but these terms have often been used interchangeably, creating confusion as to the distinctions among the various categories. Some groups fall into more than one type, further blurring the distinctions. The definitions below provide a starting point for delineating the differences among the armed group classifications. Regardless of their motivations or activities, many members of armed groups preferred to be called ‘freedom fighters’ as opposed to any other label, suggesting a strong belief in the reasons why they fight (AAPW, 2006).68 Ethnic militias are defined as youth groups formed to promote and protect the interests of a specific ethnic group, and therefore operate across the territory of that ethnic group (Adejumobi, 2003). They are not rebel movements, and are not seeking to capture territory or political power; instead, they serve as a pressure group on government. Confraternities and cults are similar in their origins, but differ in their areas of operation. These are small groups that originate in tertiary academic institutions. Their origins are in fraternities, initially comprising groups of men with similar interests, but they have since developed over the past few decades into armed groups that are often involved in criminal activities. Confraternities operate on campus, while their affiliated cults operate in off-campus locations. Their activities tend to be localized in proximity to the tertiary institution. Vigilante groups are community groups created to fill a security gap and provide protection from violent crime and armed robbery to a specific community (AI, 2002, p. 6). They consist of community members and are extremely localized in their area of operation. Criminal gangs tend to be groups of unemployed, poor, and illiterate youths who engage in small-scale crime and offer their services for hire to politicians and others (ICG, 2007a, p. 11). These gangs go by various local names, such as ‘area boys’ in Lagos or yandaba in the north. They are small groups with little organization, locally formed, and operating in small areas."

Document(s): Open document

05.12.2007 - Source: ReliefWeb

Typology of armed groups in Nigeria ("Small arms, armed violence, and insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger Delta in perspective"), Autor: Small Arms Survey [ID 21909]

"Ethnic Militias

• Purpose: Aims are to redress grievances and injustices and protect and defend the rights of the ethnic group
• Membership: Ethnic group; other sympathetic ethnic groups
• Support base: Typically grassroots organizations receiving widespread support; able to mobilize more widely
• Area of operations: Communities of ethnic group; also across states where ethnic group is dominant
• Main activities: Defence of ethnic group rights might include: political protest, attacks on politicians, attacks on oil pipelines, kidnapping, oil bunkering
• Arms: Paramilitary groups; of all armed groups, best trained, armed, organized; usually armed with sophisticated weapons
• Examples: NDPVF MEND Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC)

• Purpose: Self-enrichment and defending territory
• Membership: Confraternities: students Cults: unemployed youth
• Support base: Members; alliances with other armed groups; politicians
• Area of operations: Confraternities tend to be on campus, similar to US fraternities; cults operate off campus, tend to be the more violent of the two; localized area of operations
• Main activities: Control and defend territory; drug trafficking; oil bunkering; reputation for being brutal and secretive, with elaborate rituals for initiation
• Arms: Not all are violent, but most are armed; prospective members must demonstrate bravery and ability to use weapons
• Examples: NDVS/Icelander Deebam Deewell Greenlander Outlaws

• Purpose: Provide security to communities; provide law and order services in areas where police presence is minimal; provide economic opportunities to members
• Membership: Community organization
• Support base: Community support; community funding through dues; many receive government support
• Area of operations: Localized area of operations, usually at community level
• Main activities: Activities aimed at community security; sometimes administer physical punishments to suspects, or take the law into their own hands; some groups work with police to enforce law and order
• Arms: Not all are armed
• Examples: Bakassi Boys Anambra State Vigilante Service O’odua People’s Congress (OPC)

• Purpose: Economic gain
• Membership: Unemployed youth
• Support base: Members; politicians
• Area of operations: Dominate particular neighbourhoods; localized area of operations
• Main activities: Engage in armed robbery and other criminal activities
• Arms: Not all are armed
• Examples: Area boys Yandaba groups

Document(s): Open document

06.2007 - Source: Freedom House

As discrimination is widespread armed youth groups emerged to defend their economic and ethnic interests ("Freedom in the World 2007") [ID 20573]

"Although the constitution prohibits ethnic discrimination, societal discrimination is widely practiced, and clashes frequently erupt among the country’s many ethnic groups. A number of armed youth groups have emerged to defend their ethnic and economic interests."

Document(s): Open document

06.03.2007 - Source: US Department of State

Police generally do not have a significant impact upon vigilante groups ("Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2006") [ID 19472]

"Police generally did not have a significant impact upon vigilante groups. They sometimes detained members of these groups during the year, but those arrests were sporadic, and none was known to result in prosecution. Initiatives announced to control the vigilante groups were not successful during the year."

Document(s): Open document

03.2007 - Source: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity

Each of the 3 majoritiy ethnic groups (Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo) has its militia ("Who Joins Ethnic Militias? A Survey of the Oodua People's Congress in Southwestern Nigeria") [ID 19427]

"For decades now, Nigeria has been struggling with its “national question”, consisting of bringing together its extremely diverse linguistic, ethnic and religious constituents. Demographically, three “majority” groups account for 50 per cent of the country’s inhabitants: the Hausa-Fulani (mostly living in the North), the Yoruba (Southwest) and the Igbo (East). “Minority” groups are particularly present in the Middle Belt (like the Tiv) or in the coastal Niger Delta region (like the Ijaw). Despite this cultural diversity, “the tendency of many minority groups to cluster – politically, linguistically and culturally - round the big three, has given Nigeria a tripolar ethnic structure which forms the main context for ethnic mobilization and contestation” (Mustapha (2004), p. 4). [...] Actually, each of the three major ethnic groups has its militia, though varying in their respective history, goals and present actions: the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) is supposed to defend the interests of the Yoruba; the Arewa People’s Congress stands for the defence of the Hausa-Fulani and the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra demands secession for the Igboland11."

Document(s): Open document

29.01.2007 - Source: BBC News

A militant group storms through Port Harcourt and springs a gang leader from jail ("Nigerian militants in jail raid") [ID 18660]

Document(s): Open document

09.2006 - Source: Freedom House

Information on government crackdowns on ehnic militia in 2005 ("Freedom in the World 2006") [ID 18136]

"The government in 2005 cracked down harder on those it considered a threat to national unity or who might disrupt the country's oil output. Demonstrations and rallies held by the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) were broken up by security forces, and scores of people were detained, according to human rights groups. In October, authorities arrested a separatist ethnic militia leader in the volatile Niger Delta region and charged him with treason. Moujahid Dokubo-Asari, leader of the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force, was detained after he allegedly called for the breakup of Nigeria in a newspaper interview."

Document(s): Open document

09.2006 - Source: Freedom House

Niger Delta: Clashes between Ijaws and Itsekiris claimed hundreds of lives ("Freedom in the World 2006") [ID 18269]

"Militants loyal to Niger Delta ethnic militia leader Moujahid Dokubo-Asari claim to be fighting for political autonomy and a bigger slice of oil revenues for the Ijaw ethnic group, the largest in the Delta region. Clashes between the Ijaws and their rivals, the Itsekiris, have claimed hundreds of lives in the Delta. Threats by Dokubo-Asari's group to kill foreign oil workers in 2004 sent oil prices soaring. That same year, Dokubo-Asari agreed to disarm in exchange for cash and amnesty. The militants briefly took over a few oil facilities after Dokubo-Asari was arrested in 2005."

Document(s): Open document

08.2006 - Source: Norwegian Country of Origin Information Center

Separatism: The Situation of MASSOB, MEND and POC ("Report on Fact-finding trip to Nigeria (Abuja, Lagos and Benin City) 12-26 March 2006") [ID 18794]

"Bukhari Bello (NHRC) emphasised the fact that separatism is against the Nigerian constitution (see quote in section 3.1 above). Thus organisations like MASSOB (Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra), MEND (Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta) and OPC (O'odua People's Congress) are illegal, but he also stated that there is also the question of the right to self-determination. The focus of the National Human Rights Commission regarding separatists was to make sure that they go through due process when they are taken to court."

Document(s): Open document

07.2006 - Source: Freedom House

Politics dominated by powerful mandarins; many of them cultivate personal militias ("Countries at the Crossroads 2006") [ID 18276]

"Yet the Nigerian government remains distant from serving the interests of its people. Politics at the federal, state, and local levels of the Nigerian federation are dominated by the powerful mandarins who built vast patronage networks during the military days and who now use political office to expand these networks and their personal fortunes. Moreover, many of these so-called godfathers have been cultivating personal militias to secure their positions, prompting a local arms race in some regions, particularly in the oil-producing Niger Delta."

Document(s): Open document

07.2006 - Source: Freedom House

Ethnic and religious militias, sometimes supported by state actors, use violence and torture ("Countries at the Crossroads 2006") [ID 18305]

"Ethnic and religious militias, sometimes supported by state actors, also engage in an array of torture and violent practices. State-sponsored enforcers of the Sharia criminal code, known as the Hisbah, are notorious for practicing summary justice that typically involves corporal punishment. Ethnic militias associated with oil smuggling networks are particularly violent and known to murder opponents both within and outside their ranks. The president spearheaded a successful disarmament and amnesty program in the Niger Delta in late 2004, but the program was allowed to lapse and the participating militias had largely rearmed with more modern equipment by late 2005."

Document(s): Open document

07.2006 - Source: Freedom House

Ethnic and religious militias, sometimes supported by state actors, use violence and torture ("Countries at the Crossroads 2006") [ID 18306]

"Ethnic and religious militias, sometimes supported by state actors, also engage in an array of torture and violent practices. State-sponsored enforcers of the Sharia criminal code, known as the Hisbah, are notorious for practicing summary justice that typically involves corporal punishment. Ethnic militias associated with oil smuggling networks are particularly violent and known to murder opponents both within and outside their ranks. The president spearheaded a successful disarmament and amnesty program in the Niger Delta in late 2004, but the program was allowed to lapse and the participating militias had largely rearmed with more modern equipment by late 2005."

Document(s): Open document

08.03.2006 - Source: US Department of State

Police has no significant impact upon vigilante groups ("Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2005") [#46036],  [ID 15686]

"Other organized vigilante groups continued to detain and kill suspected criminals. Police generally did not have a significant impact upon vigilante groups, and they infrequently detained members of these groups during the year."

Document(s): Open document

24.01.2006 - Source: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

Query response to the Niger Delta People's Liberation Front and the Niger Delta Youth of Nigeria ("The "Niger Delta People's Liberation Front" and the "Niger Delta Youth of Nigeria"; their location, their leaders, their goals/ideology, their activities, and the treatment of their members by the authorities [NGA100988.E]") [ID 24512]

Document(s): Open document

10.2005 - Source: UK Home Office

Increasing incidence of crime favoured the proliferation of heavily armed vigilante groups in Nigeria ("Country Report - October 2005") [#39647],  [ID 14618]

"The rise in crime and insecurity and the sense of low performance by the security forces has led to an expansion of vigilante groups at local and state level. Armed vigilante groups carry out law enforcement activities in an ever-growing number of states with the tacit, and sometimes explicit, endorsement from the state governments, especially in the south-east of Nigeria.

According to the AI Report on vigilantes:

“The increasing incidence of crime since the end of the military regime has favoured the proliferation of heavily armed vigilante groups of various conditions and interests in nearly every corner of Nigeria. There is no pattern to define who creates them, and what they fight for or the methods they employ, and most importantly, there is not a clear code of conduct binding them, nor an official register of legal vigilante groups.”

“In the majority of cases, vigilante groups have their origin in political or militant organizations designed to ensure that the interests of specific ethnic groups in different parts of the country prevail. Such is the case of OPC (O’odua People’s Congress) created to promote the interests of the Yoruba ethnic group in south-west Nigeria, MASSOB (Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra) which claims to represent the Igbo ethnic group in eastern Nigeria or Egbesu Boys, based in the oil-producing Delta region, to protect the rights of the Ijaw ethnic group. With the general concern over crime, most of these groups have extended their scope to vigilante actions. Although none of the above-mentioned armed groups have been expressly endorsed by state governments, some state governments have failed to condemn their existence. On several occasions governors have expressed the convenience of counting on the vigilante activities of these groups to combat crime in their states, despite the fact that the majority of these groups, based on ethnic, religion or political lines, clearly seek to protect these interests rather than those of the community as a whole.”"

Document(s): Open document

18.11.2004 - Source: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

Query response on the question if Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF) and the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) are the same group ("Whether the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF) and the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) are the same organization or different organizations; the name or names of the leader or leaders of the group or groups (2002-2004) [NGA43130.E]") [ID 24519]

Document(s): Open document

08.2004 - Source: Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation

Country Report 2004 - Background information on vigilant groups in Nigeria ("Nigeria - Länderbericht") [#28135],  [ID 14619]

"Obwohl Vigilantengruppen auch in vorkolonialer Zeit in Nigeria operierten, ist das moderne Phänomen nicht als Fortsetzung dieser Entwicklung zu betrachten. Die heute aktiven Vigilantengruppen sind vielmehr auf das Unvermögen des nigerianischen Staates, Sicherheit im Landesinneren aufrecht zu erhalten, zurückzuführen.

Die Erhöhung der Kriminalitätsrate vor allem seit dem Ende der Militärdiktatur 1999, gegen welche die Polizei scheinbar machtlos war oder sein wollte, führte schließlich dazu, dass private Gruppen dieses Machtvakuum füllten. Erfolge dieser Gruppen wurden von der Bevölkerung begrüßt und lokale Politiker versuchten sogleich ihr Profil mit der (mehr oder minder öffentlichen) Unterstützung der Vigilanten aufzupolieren. Die Position der Zentralregierung bleibt bislang unklar. Obgleich die meisten ethnischen Milizen und auch die Bakassi Boys verboten sind, schreitet die der Zentralregierung unterstellte Polizei nicht systematisch gegen diese ein. Heute gibt es neben den bekannten und in diesem Bericht gesondert untersuchten Vigilantengruppen bzw. ethnischen Milizen auch eine Vielzahl anderer, kleinerer lokal aktiver Gruppen. Diese sind fast durchwegs bewaffnet und den meisten werden außergerichtliche Tötungen, Folterungen und andere Menschenrechtsverletzungen angelastet, und in vielen Fällen auch glaubhaft belegt.

Da die Öffentlichkeit das Vertrauen in die Polizei verloren habe, sei davon auszugehen, dass die Bakassi Boys in den drei Staaten Anambra, Imo und Abia in anderer Form wieder in Erscheinung treten würden, wie der vom IRB konsultierte geschäftsführende Direktor der nigerianischen NGO CLEEN ausführt."

Document(s): Open document

01.07.2004 - Source: BBC News

Nigeria's police have announced that they will no longer tolerate the country's ethnic militias ("Crackdown on Nigeria's militias") [#23738],  [ID 14620]

Document(s): Open document

01.07.2004 - Source: BBC News

Nigeria's police have announced that they will no longer tolerate the country's ethnic militias ("Crackdown on Nigeria's militias") [#23738],  [ID 15128]

Document(s): Open document

27.02.2004 - Source: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

Query response on a cult called the "Blood Brothers" and its relationship with the Bakassi Boys and the Oodua People's Congress (OPC); information on the Oodua Student Association and its links with the "Blood Brothers" and the OPC (1999-February 2004) ("A cult called the "Blood Brothers" and its relationship with the Bakassi Boys and the Oodua People's Congress (OPC); information on the Oodua Student Association and its links with the "Blood Brothers" and the OPC (1999-February 2004) [NGA42455.E]") [ID 24524]

Document(s): Open document

02.09.2003 - Source: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

Query response on whether the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF) has an office in Benin City and, if so, the number of members and the name of the office coordinator in 1999 and 2000; treatment by authorities (January 2000 - August 2003) ("Whether the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF) has an office in Benin City and, if so, the number of members and the name of the office coordinator in 1999 and 2000; treatment by authorities (January 2000 - August 2003) [NGA41795.E]") [ID 24533]

Document(s): Open document

05.2002 - Source: Human Rights Watch

HRW: Governors resort to vigilante groups to combat increasing crime ("The Bakassi Boys: The Legitimization of Murder and Torture") [#6968],  [ID 15310]

"In more recent years, mounting frustration with the steady increase in violent crime in Nigeria, exacerbated by the inefficiency and widespread corruption of the police force, has led to the formation of a new type of vigilante group, exemplified by the Bakassi Boys.5 These groups, while not entirely removed from the longstanding traditions of vigilantism in the region, differ from other forms of citizen involvement in policing in that they are usually not composed of members of the local community. They tend to be based in the large urban centers, rather than in the villages, although their operations are gradually extending into the rural communities. When they first set themselves up, they promised to deal with armed criminals ruthlessly and definitively. Within a short time, it appeared that they were no longer accountable to anybody and had become virtually impossible to control."

Document(s): Open document