IRAN
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- Country Background, Politics & Law
- Human Rights Issues
- Security, Humanitarian Issues and Protection Related Issues
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Security
Humanitarian issues
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Social Security |
Internal displacement |
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Food |
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Health |
Protection-related issues
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Internal protection alternative |
Third countries |
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Return/repatriation |
Source:
Amnesty International-Urgent Action: [ID 9479]
11.03.2008 - Source: US Department of State
Security forces often do not inform family members of a prisoner's welfare and location ("Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007") [ID 22868]
"Security forces often did not inform family members of a prisoner's welfare and location. Authorities often denied visits by family members and legal counsel. Prisoners released on bail did not always know how long their property would be retained or when their trials would be held.
Families of executed prisoners did not always receive notification of their deaths. Unlike previous years, there were no reports of the government forcing family members to pay to retrieve the body of their relative."
Document(s):
Open document
08.2005 - Source: Freedom House
Security forces ("Freedom in the World 2005") [#41317], [ID 9467]
"[...]Iranian security forces subjected hundreds of citizens to arbitrary arrest and incommunicado detention in 2004. Suspected dissidents are often held in unofficial, illegal detention centers, and allegations of torture are commonplace. Although legislation banning the use of torture in interrogations was approved by parliament and the Council of Guardians in May, allegations of torture persisted throughout the year. In August, according to local human rights groups, a prisoner who had been left hanging by his wrists had to have his hands amputated.[...]"
Document(s):
Open document
04.2005 - Source: UK Home Office
Internal security ("Country Report - April 2005") [#31980], [ID 9468]
"[...]5.41 The Constitution says that reputation; life, property and dwellings are protected from trespass except as “provided by law”. This is used to enable security forces to enter homes and offices, monitor telephone conversations and open mail without court authorisation. [4f](pg6) [...]"
Document(s):
Open document
28.02.2005 - Source: US Department of State
Security forces ("Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2004") [#29525], [ID 9469]
"[...]In January, security forces killed four persons and injured many others when they attacked striking copper factory workers in the Khatunabad village near Shahr-i Babak (see Section 6.b.). [...]
In February, security forces killed seven persons in post-Majlis election violence in the towns of Andimeshk and Izeh in Khuzestan Province and the town of Firuzabad in the Fars Province. [...]"
Document(s):
Open document
13.01.2005 - Source: Human Rights Watch
Parallel Institutions ("World report 2005") [#28233], [ID 9470]
"[...]“Parallel institutions” (nahad-e movazi) is how Iranians refer to the quasi-official organs of repression that have become increasingly open in crushing student protests, detaining activists, writers, and journalists in secret prisons, and threatening pro-democracy speakers and audiences at public events. These groups have carried out brutal assaults against students, writers, and reformist politicians, and have set up arbitrary checkpoints around Tehran. Groups such as Ansar-e Hizbollah and the Basij work under the control of the Office of the Supreme Leader, and there are many reports that the uniformed police are often afraid to directly confront these plainclothes agents. Illegal prisons, which are outside of the oversight of the National Prisons Office, are sites where political prisoners are abused, intimidated, and tortured with impunity. Over the past year politically active individuals have been summoned to a detention center controlled by the Department of Public Places (Edareh Amaken Umumi) for questioning by “parallel” intelligence services. According to journalists and student activists who have undergone such interrogations but not been arrested or detained, these sessions are intended to intimidate and threaten students and others.[...]"
Document(s):
Open document
25.02.2004 - Source: US Department of State
The Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i, directly controls the armed forces and exercises indirect control over internal security forces/The executive branch was headed by President Mohammad Khatami/Security forces committed numerous, serious human rights abuses ("Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2003") [#19747], [ID 9471]
"Khamene'i directly controls the armed forces and exercises indirect control over the internal security forces, the judiciary, and other key institutions. The executive branch was headed by President Mohammad Khatami [...]
Several agencies share responsibility for law enforcement and maintenance of order, including the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, the Ministry of Interior, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp, a military force established after the revolution. Paramilitary volunteer forces known as Basijis, and various gangs of men known as the Ansar-e Hezbollah (Helpers of the Party of God), or more simply "plain clothes," acted as vigilantes aligned with extreme conservative members of the leadership. Civilian authorities did not fully maintain effective control of the security forces and there were instances in which elements of the security forces acted independently of government authority. The regular and the paramilitary security forces both committed numerous, serious human rights abuses."
Document(s):
Open document
05.12.2003 - Source: BBC News
Baluchistan province: 5 people killed in clashes between demonstrators and police ("'Five dead in Iran riot'") [#18109], [ID 9472]
Document(s):
Open document
22.09.2003 - Source: ReliefWeb
8 Iranians attempting to make an illegal pilgrimage to Iraqi holy Shiite Muslim shrines killed after walking through a minefield along the Iran-Iraq border ("Eight Iranians on illegal pilgrimage to Iraq die in minefield (AFP)") [#16192], [ID 9473]
Document(s):
Open document
20.06.2003 - Source: Human Rights Watch
Vigilante and paramilitary forces known as lebas shakhs-iha (those who wear plain clothes), assaulted demonstrators using batons, chains and knives, reportedly causing many injuries/ the demonstrations began on June 10 over government plans to privatize Iran's universities ("Iran: End Vigilante Attacks") [#13658], [ID 9474]
Document(s):
Open document
16.06.2003 - Source: BBC News
Vigilantes, loyal to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, attacked anti-government demonstrators ("Iran protests at US 'interference'") [#13588], [ID 9475]
Document(s):
Open document
10.2002 - Source: UK Home Office
UK Home Office: Security forces are enabled to enter homes and offices, monitor telephone conversations and open mail without court authorisation ("Country Assessment - October 2002") [#9556], [ID 9476]
"4.35. The Constitution says that reputation; life, property and dwellings are protected from trespass except as “provided by law”. This used to enable security forces to enter homes and offices, monitor telephone conversations and open mail without court authorisation. However in April 2000, the Supreme Court barred the security forces from seizing “illicit” materials from private homes such as tapes, CDs and videotapes.
4.36. There is shared responsibility for internal security. Agencies involved include the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, the Ministry of Interior and the Revolutionary Guards, a military force that was established after the revolution. Paramilitary volunteer forces known as Basijis, and gangs of thugs known as the Ansar-e Hezbollah (Helpers of the Party of God), act as vigilantes, and intimidate and threaten physically demonstrators, journalists, and individuals suspected of counterrevolutionary activities. The Ansar-e Hezbollah often are aligned with particular members of the leadership."
Document(s):
Open document
05.08.2002 - Source: International Crisis Group
International Crisis Group: ("Iran: The Struggle for the Revolution´s Soul") [#8214], [ID 9478]
Document(s):
Open document
00851irn.pdf
04.03.2002 - Source: US Department of State
US State Department: Responsibility for internal security shared by several agencies ("Annual report 2001") [#5823], [ID 9477]
"Several agencies share responsibility for internal security, including the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, the Ministry of Interior, and the Revolutionary Guards, a military force that was established after the revolution. Paramilitary volunteer forces known as Basijis, and gangs of thugs known as the Ansar-e Hezbollah (Helpers of the Party of God), act as vigilantes, and intimidate and threaten physically demonstrators, journalists, and individuals suspected of counterrevolutionary activities. The Ansar-e Hezbollah often are aligned with particular members of the leadership. Both the regular and the paramilitary security forces committed numerous serious human rights abuses."
Document(s):
Open document
11.2001 - Source: Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation
00.11.2001 – ACCORD: Assassination attempt on Saeed Hajjarian, one of the leaders of Islamic Iran Participation Front ("7th European Country of Origin Information Seminar Berlin, 11 - 12 June 2001: Final Report - Iran") [#7661], [ID 9481]
"One of the most prominent cases was the assassination attempt on Saeed Hajjarian, one of the leaders of the largest reformist faction, the Islamic Iran Participation Front (IIPF). He was shot at in central Tehran on 12 March by two men on a 1000 ccm motorcycle. He was rushed to hospital in a coma but is now able to speak and walk again and to continue to work as city councillor. In Iran there is a general ban on
motorcycles over 200 ccm. Large motorcycles are known to be reserved for members of the Ministry of Intelligence and the armed forces. Eight people were tried, and after three hearings one received a 15-year sentence, four were sentenced to between 3 and 10 years for their role in the attack, three of the accused were acquitted. The trial was rushed, with the intention – according to some newspapers – to allow those who masterminded the operation to escape."
Document(s):
cois2001-irn.pdf
03.2001 - Source: Middle East Review of International Affairs
Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA): ("The Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran: An Assessment (MERIA, Vol.5/No.1, March 2001)") [#7720], [ID 9480]
Document(s):
Open document
meria-irn032001.html
08.12.1997 - Source:
Federation of American Scientists (FAS): Joint Committee for Special Operations ("Federation of American Scientists (FAS): Joint Committee for Special Operations") [ID 9482]
"The Joint Committee for Special Operations consists of Iran’s president, its top religious authority, and other senior security officials, including representatives of the Pasdaran [Guardians of the Revolution], the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Security and Intelligence. It is responsible for coordinating activities devoted to gathering intelligence and special weapons technology abroad, as well as activities within the Iranian exile community."
Document(s):
Federation of American Scientists (FAS): Joint Committee for Special Operations
08.12.1997 - Source:
Federation of American Scientists (FAS): J2 Intelligence and Security ("Federation of American Scientists (FAS): J2 Intelligence and Security") [ID 9483]
"The Joint Staff of the armed forces, composed of officers assigned from the various services, the Pasdaran, the National Police, and the Gendarmerie, is responsible for all operational military matters. Its primary tasks included military planning and coordination and operational control over the regular services, combat units of the Pasdaran, and units of the Gendarmerie and National Police assigned to the war front. Joint Staff members are also empowered to integrate fully the regular and paramilitary forces in operational planning. The components of the armed forces Joint Staff were modeled on the United States joint and combined staff system.
Personnel of J2 Intelligence and Security carry out operational control for intelligence planning, intelligence operations, intelligence training, counterintelligence, and security for all elements of the armed forces. They also handle liaison with the komitehs (revolutionary committees) for internal security matters and with MOIS for foreign intelligence."
Document(s):
Federation of American Scientists (FAS): J2 Intelligence and Security
