Source:

Amnesty International-Urgent Action: [ID 9491]

Source:

Federation of American Scientists (FAS): Iran Intelligence Agencies ("Federation of American Scientists (FAS): Iran Intelligence Agencies") [ID 9493]

"Ministry of Security [SAVAK]

Joint Committee for Special Operations

Ministry of Intelligence and Security [MOIS] (Vezarat-e Ettela'at va Amniat-e Keshvar, VEVAK)

Jerusalem Force, Guardians of the Islamic Revolution (Qods, Pasdaran- e Enghelab-e Islami)

Military Intelligence"

Document(s): Federation of American Scientists (FAS): Iran Intelligence Agencies

06.09.2005 - Source: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

Hardline legislators promote bill reducing parliamentary oversight of Intelligence and Security Ministry; ministry personnel was involved in serial murders of dissidents ("Iran: Who Watches The Watchers?") [#36457],  [ID 9487]

Document(s): Open document

20.05.2004 - Source: BBC News

The trial of an Iranian intelligence agent charged with beating to death a Canadian journalist will resume in July after a long delay ("Kazemi trial to resume in July") [#22475],  [ID 9488]

Document(s): Open document

11.12.2003 - Source:

IranMania: Interview with Iran's Minister of Intelligence ("IranMania: Extraordinary Q & A: Iran's Intelligence Minister") [ID 9489]

"A rare chance interview took place between reporters and Iran’s normally silent Minister of Intelligence on Wednesday [10 Dec 2003]. [...] the presence of Iran’s Minister of Intelligence, Ali Younesi was quite startling, for he rarely responds to reporters’ questions. [...]

Q - Mr. Younesi, recently some have violently attacked MPs or certain gatherings. Have you identified the perpetrators?
A - I don’t have a clear-cut list of them in my mind. The role of the Ministry of Intelligence is to identify and report the perpetrators. Such ‘pressure groups’ can be found in other countries as well. [...]
Q - If they were being countered, they wouldn’t have beaten up the head of National Security Commission?
A - Of course, such incidents are dangerous and have to be prevented. I am sure that the recent decisions made by the Judiciary will decrease the rate of this kind of incident. [...]
Q - Mr. Younesi, officials have been claiming to counter such attacks for four years, but so far no serious measures seem to have been taken.
A - If we hadn’t been dealing with, there wouldn’t be such relative tranquility in society.
Q - If this issue had been dealt with then the president wouldn’t have issued an order to deal with it [referring to Khatami’s letter to the Intelligence and Interior Ministry on the 8th of December]
A - You think it hasn’t been dealt with, it has.
Q - Who have you penalized so far?
A - Many of these groups have been eradicated. No trace of the pressure groups which were active in the past can be found today. [...]
Q - What can be said about the cases in which the Ministry of Intelligence is accused?
A - Such as?
Q - Zahra Kazemi [Referring to the Iranian/Canadian photo-journalist killed while in Iranian custody]
A - We have repeatedly announced that the ministry is blameless in this regard. Fortunately a committee has been set up by the Judiciary to look into the case and I can’t comment on the issue prior to their decision.
Q - You mean, the case is being reviewed?
A - Exactly.
Q - Would you please comment on the ‘parallel intelligence networks’ which seem to be active? [referring to ‘shadowy’ security organization not under the control of the government]
A - As the minister of intelligence I have always been again such parallel activity. I believe that the administration of the intelligence affairs is only the duty of the Ministry of Intelligence.
Q - The administration has ratified a bill on countering such bodies. Has the government taken any serious step toward this end?
A - We have not ratified any such bill.
Q - But that’s what Mr. Ramezanzadeh announced [The Government spokesman]
A - So you should ask him
Q - Recently the Judiciary has taken measures to provide education for prisoners. What’s your opinion?
A - We warmly welcome the Judiciary’s new initiative to adhere to ‘human issues’ and we ourselves are ready for all the
prisoners we take to be subject to inspections to determine whether they have been abused in anyway.
Q - What is the viewpoint of the ministry on the criticisms against your ministry’s officials?
A - I personally confirm it. Unfortunately this kind of violation has always existed. Defendants have certain legal rights and these rights must be respected.
Q - An Evin Prison Interrogator is said to have been recently arrested in connection with Zahra Kazemi’s case?
A - You should ask the Judiciary and not me. I have no knowledge of this.
Q - In response to ‘parallel organizations to the ministry’ you said that there haven’t been any discussions in the Government?
A - No, there has been much discussion on this issue. But the Government is not authorized to penalize such activity.
Q - No, but it can counter it in other ways. It can issue a bill to counter it or come up with other strategies?
A - Yes, we are in favour of such a move.
Q - Have you devised any strategies?
A - Yes we have.
Q - And, what is it?
A - I can’t tell you right now. The government is only a ratifier. The implementer is another institution.
Q - So why has the Government taken back the ‘Centralizing Intelligence Bill’ from the Parliament? This is not clear.
A - It has been wrongly referred to as the ‘Centralizing Intelligence Bill’. It was merely a bill dealing with some of the
legal difficulties and limitations of the Ministry of Intelligence.
Q - So what’s now referred to as parallel intelligence networks…
A - We already have a law which centralizes intelligence activity in one organ, we have no need for a new law. This bill was
mistakenly dubbed as the ‘Centralizing Intelligence Bill’ by the media. It was merely going to fill some gaps in the
Intelligence Ministry’s role and it was delayed due to ‘created circumstances’.
Q - Are you in favour of the bill being pursued?
A - Yes this will be done. Even if not in our time, it will be carried out next time. [referring to the next government]
Q - These parallel intelligence networks are they part of the ‘governing regime’ or outside of the ‘governing regime’?
A - It is obvious that they are part of the governing regime."

Document(s): IranMania: Extraordinary Q & A: Iran's Intelligence Minister

10.2003 - Source: UK Home Office

UK Home Office: In 1998 several political dissidents, writers and intellectuals were killed by agents of the Ministry of Intelligence; 15 persons were convicted in connection with the killings, but the trial did not clarify who ordered the murders ("Country Report - October 2003") [#17327],  [ID 9490]

"5.14. Prominent political dissidents who disappeared in 1998 were Pirouz Davani in August and Javad Sharif in November. A spate of disappearances in late 1998 also included prominent writers and intellectuals, with Mohammad Mokhtari and Mohammad Jafar Pouyandeh later found dead. Several senior figures of the leadership blamed the disappearances and murders on “foreign hands,” but it was revealed that active-duty agents of the Ministry of Intelligence had carried out the killings. Minister of Intelligence Qorban Ali Dori-Najafabadi and several of his senior deputies resigned their posts following these revelations. In June 1999 the Military Prosecutor's Office released an initial report on the investigation, identifying a cell from within the Ministry of Intelligence led by four “main agents” as responsible for the murders. The leader among the agents reportedly was a former Deputy Minister of Intelligence, Saeed Emami, who, the Government stated, had committed suicide in prison by drinking a toxic hair removal solution several days prior to release of the report. The report also indicated that 23 persons had been arrested in association with the murders and that a further 33 were summoned for interrogation. In the early part of the year 2000, the Government announced that 18 men would stand trial in connection with the killings. The trial began in late December in a military court. The proceedings were closed. The identity of the defendants is still unknown, but former Minister of Intelligence Dori-Najafabadi had not been charged.

5.15. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that in January 2001, the court convicted fifteen out of the eighteen defendants for the killings. However, HRW also reported that the trial did not clarify who actually ordered the murders. Several Ministry of Intelligence officials were mentioned as possible suspects in the press, but they were not charged, and the trial did not produce any incriminating information regarding their involvement. In August 2001, the Supreme Court reversed the convictions of the fifteen officials and sent the case back to the Judicial Organization of the Armed Forces (JOAF) for further review. In May 2002, the JOAF withdrew two of the three death sentences after the families of the victims pardoned the murderers. However, the court sentenced them to ten years in prison and banned them from service in the Intelligence Ministry. The court reduced the prison sentences of several other defendants believed to be complicit in the case while leaving the rest intact. None of the original fifteen were pardoned or set free by year's end (2002). It is probable that all of the defendants will appeal the May 2002 verdicts. Reform-oriented journalists and prominent cultural figures declared publicly their demands for a full accounting in the case and speculated that responsibility for ordering the murders lay at the highest level of the Government. Several citizens, including prominent investigative journalist Akbar Ganji, were arrested in connection with statements they have made about the case. Five of the interrogators have been jailed on charges of mis-treatment of the accused. The lawyer representing some of the victims, Naser Zarafshan, has also been given a prison sentence on charges of exposing state secrets."

Document(s): Open document

04.03.2002 - Source: US Department of State

US State Department: Responsibility for internal security shared by several agencies ("Annual report 2001") [#5823],  [ID 9492]

"Several agencies share responsibility for internal security, including the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, the Ministry of Interior, and the Revolutionary Guards, a military force that was established after the revolution. Paramilitary volunteer forces known as Basijis, and gangs of thugs known as the Ansar-e Hezbollah (Helpers of the Party of God), act as vigilantes, and intimidate and threaten physically demonstrators, journalists, and individuals suspected of counterrevolutionary activities. The Ansar-e Hezbollah often are aligned with particular members of the leadership. Both the regular and the paramilitary security forces committed numerous serious human rights abuses."

Document(s): Open document

11.2001 - Source: Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation

00.11.2001 – ACCORD: Serial murders in 1998: 15 secret service agents convicted; the masterminds of the operation went unpunished ("7th European Country of Origin Information Seminar Berlin, 11 - 12 June 2001: Final Report - Iran") [#7661],  [ID 9494]

"Although in the trial of those who carried out the serial murders in 1998 15 secret service agents were convicted the masterminds of the operation went unpunished. When the Head of the Ministry of Intelligence was summoned by the prosecution, the judiciary rejected the motion, arguing that they had already taken his statement and since the Minister was a cleric he spoke the truth and did not need to come to court."

Document(s): cois2001-irn.pdf

11.2001 - Source: Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation

00.11.2001 – ACCORD: Assassination attempt on Saeed Hajjarian, one of the leaders of Islamic Iran Participation Front ("7th European Country of Origin Information Seminar Berlin, 11 - 12 June 2001: Final Report - Iran") [#7661],  [ID 9495]

"One of the most prominent cases was the assassination attempt on Saeed Hajjarian, one of the leaders of the largest reformist faction, the Islamic Iran Participation Front (IIPF). He was shot at in central Tehran on 12 March by two men on a 1000 ccm motorcycle. He was rushed to hospital in a coma but is now able to speak and walk again and to continue to work as city councillor. In Iran there is a general ban on
motorcycles over 200 ccm. Large motorcycles are known to be reserved for members of the Ministry of Intelligence and the armed forces. Eight people were tried, and after three hearings one received a 15-year sentence, four were sentenced to between 3 and 10 years for their role in the attack, three of the accused were acquitted. The trial was rushed, with the intention – according to some newspapers – to allow those who masterminded the operation to escape."

Document(s): cois2001-irn.pdf

08.12.1997 - Source:

Federation of American Scientists (FAS): The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (VEVAK) is one of the most powerful ministries in the Iranian government ("Federation of American Scientists (FAS): Operations - Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) - Vezarat-e Ettela'at va Amniat-e Keshvar VEVAK") [ID 9496]

"With a large budget and extensive organization, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security is of the most powerful ministries in the Iranian government. The ministry has traditionally operated under the guidance of the Velayat-e Faqih apparatus of Ali Khamenei.
Ministry of Security and Intelligence personnel are either attached as diplomats in Iranian embassies and consulate offices or as Ministry of Guidance and Propaganda representatives. Non-official covers include Iran Air [the official airline of Iran] or as students, merchants, mechanics, shopkeepers, bank clerks, as well as members of opposition groups. VEVAK has frequently relied on the foreign branches of Iranian state-controlled banks to place intelligence agents and to finance terrorist operations. In Germany, for instance, the most prominent is Bank Melli, which maintains branches in Hamburg, Frankfurt, and Dusseldorf."

Document(s): Federation of American Scientists (FAS): Operations - Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) - Vezarat-e Ettela'at va Amniat-e Keshvar VEVAK

08.12.1997 - Source:

Federation of American Scientists (FAS): The Ministry of Intelligence and Security is responsbile for intelligence collection to support terrorist operations and for liaison activities with supported terrorist groups and Islamic fundamentalist movements ("Operations - Ministry of Intelligence and Security [MOIS] - Vezarat-e Ettela'at va Amniat-e Keshvar VEVAK") [ID 9497]

"Iran is the most active sponsor of terrorism in the world. Since the inception of the Islamic state in 1979, the country has used terrorism as an integral part of its foreign and military policies. Iranian leaders view terrorism as a valid tool to accomplish their political objectives. Terrorist operations are reviewed and approved at the highest levels of the Iranian government, and the President of Iran is involved in the approval process of all major terrorist operations. Iranian-sponsored terrorism has had two major goals: Punishing opponents of the Islamic regime and expanding the Islamic movement throughout the Persian Gulf region.

Iranian-backed political violence has killed more than 1,000 people in over 200 terrorist attacks since the 1979 revolution, including some 80 assassinations of Iranian dissidents around the world. Major attacks include the suicide bombings of American and French military barracks in Beirut in 1983 which killed 299, a series of bombings in Paris in September 1986 which killed 12, attacks on the Israeli embassy and a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994 which killed 125, and the bombing that killed 19 Americans in Dhahran in June 1995.

The Ministry of Intelligence and Security is responsible for intelligence collection to support terrorist operations. The ministry is also responsible for liaison activities with supported terrorist groups and Islamic fundamentalist movements. VEVAK has also conducted terrorist operations in support of Iranian objectives. Most of these activities have focused on attacks on Iranian dissidents.

On 17 September 1992 Sadegh Sharaf-Kindi, leader of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI), was gunned down along with 3 colleagues at the Mykonos, a Greek restaurant in Berlin. An Iranian and four Lebanese were soon arrested and charged, and in March 1996 the German Federal Prosecutor issued an international arrest warrant for Iranian intelligence Minister Ali Fallahian for having ordered the killings. In final statements in late November 1996, German prosecutors charged Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei and Iranian President Rafsanjani with approving the operation. Guilty verdicts for four of the accused were announced in April 1997."

Document(s): Operations - Ministry of Intelligence and Security [MOIS] - Vezarat-e Ettela'at va Amniat-e Keshvar VEVAK

08.12.1997 - Source:

Federation of American Scientists (FAS): History of the Ministry of Intelligence and Security ("History - Ministry of Intelligence and Security [MOIS] - Vezarat-e Ettela'at va Amniat-e Keshvar VEVAK") [ID 9498]

"Little public information exists on SAVAK's successor agency, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security [Vezarat-e Ettela'at va Amniat-e Keshvar - VEVAK ], initially known by the acronym SAVAMA. The agency's first director was Major General Fardust, who was arrested in December 1985 for being a "Soviet informer." But after this major arrest the revolutionary government's keen desire to gain an upper hand over leftist guerrilla organizations may have influenced certain IRP leaders to relax their previously unrelenting pursuit of military intelligence personnel.

A 1984 reorganization of the security organization led by Mohammadi Rayshahri, concurrently the head of the Army Military Revolutionary Tribunal, created the Ministry of Information and Security which assumed the role formerly played by SAVAMA. Key religious leaders, including Majlis speaker Hashemi-Rafsanjani, insisted on recalling former agents to help the regime eliminate domestic opposition. Consequently, some intelligence officers and low-ranking SAVAK and army intelligence officials were asked to return to government service because of their specialized knowledge of the Iranian left. Others had acquired in-depth knowledge of Iraq's Baath Party and proved to be invaluable in helping decision makers.

Although it was impossible to verify, observers speculated that some of SAVAK's intelligence-gathering operations were turned over to VEVAK. However, the ideological underpinnings of the new agency were radicallyl different from its Imperial predecessor. The Islamic Republic of Iran is Khomeini' philosophy of Velayat-e Faqih, or "Islamic Rule," which calls for imposing absolute authority over the populace, and on the other upon extending this authority to all Muslims, i.e. "exporting revolution.""

Document(s): History - Ministry of Intelligence and Security [MOIS] - Vezarat-e Ettela'at va Amniat-e Keshvar VEVAK

08.12.1997 - Source:

Federation of American Scientists (FAS): Joint Committee for Special Operations ("Federation of American Scientists (FAS): Joint Committee for Special Operations") [ID 9499]

"The Joint Committee for Special Operations consists of Iran’s president, its top religious authority, and other senior security officials, including representatives of the Pasdaran [Guardians of the Revolution], the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Security and Intelligence. It is responsible for coordinating activities devoted to gathering intelligence and special weapons technology abroad, as well as activities within the Iranian exile community.

One example of the coordinated efforts of Iranian intelligence is found in Iran's diplomatic mission in Bonn at Godesberger Allee 133-137, which is the headquarters of the Iranian intelligence services in Europe. Some 20 staff members work for the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, and representatives from other agencies also use the embassy's specially secured third floor, where six offices and a radio room are reserved for the agents. From the six-story building in the government district the services monitor the 100,000 Iranians living in Germany, harass undesirable opposition members, and attempt to procure technology in Germany for the production of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. In the German language area alone, there are as many as 100 firms allegedly under Iranian influence for the procurement of such sensitive technology. Other bases of operations include the consulates in Frankfurt and Hamburg, and the "Imam-Ali Mosque" in Hamburg, said to be the largest Muslim religious center outside the Islamic world.

Iran’s relations with Germany and to a larger extent with the EU have been strained by the trial starting in 1992, and, subsequently, the recent ruling by a German court regarding the Mykonos murders in Berlin. On 10 April 1997, a German court found Mr. Darabi and his chief accomplice, Abbas Rhayel, guilty of murder and and sentenced the two men to life in prison. Two other men, Youssef Amin and Mohammed Atris were given terms of 11 years and 5 years and three months. A fifth man, Atallah Ayad, was acquited. The German court also said that the highest levels of the Iranian government, through its Committee for Special Operations, had been involved in the slaying of three Kurdish dissidents and their translator at the Mykonos restaurant in Berlin."

Document(s): Federation of American Scientists (FAS): Joint Committee for Special Operations

08.12.1997 - Source:

Federation of American Scientists (FAS): J2 Intelligence and Security ("Federation of American Scientists (FAS): J2 Intelligence and Security") [ID 9500]

"The Joint Staff of the armed forces, composed of officers assigned from the various services, the Pasdaran, the National Police, and the Gendarmerie, is responsible for all operational military matters. Its primary tasks included military planning and coordination and operational control over the regular services, combat units of the Pasdaran, and units of the Gendarmerie and National Police assigned to the war front. Joint Staff members are also empowered to integrate fully the regular and paramilitary forces in operational planning. The components of the armed forces Joint Staff were modeled on the United States joint and combined staff system.

Personnel of J2 Intelligence and Security carry out operational control for intelligence planning, intelligence operations, intelligence training, counterintelligence, and security for all elements of the armed forces. They also handle liaison with the komitehs (revolutionary committees) for internal security matters and with MOIS for foreign intelligence."

Document(s): Federation of American Scientists (FAS): J2 Intelligence and Security