11.03.2008 - Source: US Department of State

Death sentence for 6 Ahvazi Arabs after reportedly unfair trails ("Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007") [ID 22872]

"The government also continued to sentence individuals to execution after reportedly unfair trials. During the year six Ahvazi Arabs were scheduled for execution after trials not considered fair, one of whom was granted refugee status by UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)."

Document(s): Open document

08.11.2007 - Source: Amnesty International

Tehran: Social worker Delaram Ali has been told to present herself to court in order to start serving a prison sentence; the Revolutionary Court which found her guilty of "participation in an illegal gathering", "propaganda against the system" and "disrupting public order and peace" sentenced her to 34 months imprisonment and 10 lashes ("Urgent Action 298/07 [MDE 13/131/2007]") [ID 21686]

Document(s): Open document

06.03.2007 - Source: US Department of State

Trial system and administration of justice do not comply with international standards ("Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2006") [ID 19594]

"Many aspects of the prerevolutionary judicial system survive in the civil and criminal courts. For example, in theorydefendants have the right to a public trial, a lawyer of their choice, and right of appeal. Panels of judges adjudicate trials. There is no jury system in the civil and criminal courts; however, in the press court a council of 11 persons specifically selected by the court adjudicates the case. If postrevolutionary statutes do not address a situation, the government advises judges to give precedence to their knowledge and interpretation of Islamic law.

According to the law, defendants are entitled to a presumption of innocence, but this often does not occur in practice. Trials are supposed to be open to the public; however, frequently they are closed without access to a lawyer. The right to appeal is often denied.

UN representatives, including the UNSR, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, and independent human rights organizations noted the absence of procedural safeguards in criminal trials. The December 19 UNGA resolution on the country's human rights expressed serious concern about "the persistent failure to comply fully with international standards in the administration of justice…."

Trials in the revolutionary courts were notorious for their disregard of international standards of fairness. Revolutionary court judges were chosen in part due to their ideological commitment to the system. Pretrial detention often was prolonged, and defendants lacked access to attorneys. Authorities often charged individuals with relatively undefined crimes, such as "anti-revolutionary behavior," "moral corruption," and "siding with global arrogance." Defendants did not have the right to confront their accusers. Secret or summary trials of five minutes' duration occurred frequently. Other trials were deliberately designed to publicize a coerced confession, and there were allegations of corruption."

Document(s): Open document

23.05.2006 - Source: Amnesty International

Human rights defender Abdolfattah Soltani accused of espionage and remained in detention without access to his lawyer ("Annual Report 2006") [ID 18884]

"The registration process for independent non-governmental organizations remained a barrier to their effective operation, and individual human rights defenders remained at risk of reprisal for their work.

In July, Abdolfattah Soltani, a lawyer and co-founder of the Centre for Defenders of Human Rights, was detained. He was reportedly accused of releasing “secret and classified national intelligence” in connection with his work defending an espionage case. He remained in detention at the end of the year with limited access to his family and no access to his lawyer."

Document(s): Open document

08.03.2006 - Source: US Department of State

General information on the judiciary system ("Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2005") [#46058], [ID 18486]

"The constitution provides that the judiciary is "an independent power"; however, in practice the court system was subject to government and religious influence. After the 1979 revolution, the judicial system was revised to conform to an Islamic canon based on the Koran, Sunna, and other Islamic sources. The constitution provides that the head of the judiciary shall be a cleric chosen by the supreme leader. The head of the supreme court and prosecutor general also must be clerics.Women are barred from serving as certain types of judges.

There are several court systems. The two most active are the traditional courts, which adjudicate civil and criminal offenses, and the Islamic revolutionary courts. The latter try offenses viewed as potentially threatening to the Islamic Republic, including threats to internal or external security, narcotics and economic crimes, and official corruption. A special clerical court examines alleged transgressions within the clerical establishment, and a military court investigates crimes committed in connection with military or security duties. A press court hears complaints against publishers, editors, and writers in the media. The supreme court has limited review authority.

HRW noted in a 2004 report that the judiciary was at the core of suppressing political dissent and that, in practice, it violated due process rights at every level, including the right to be promptly charged; have access to legal counsel; be tried before a competent, independent, and impartial court in a public hearing; and have right of appeal. Detainees were often not clear of their legal status. Numerous observers considered Tehran Public Prosecutor Mortazavi the most notorious persecutor of political dissidents and critics."

Document(s): Open document

08.03.2006 - Source: US Department of State

Prosecution of persons under 18 years ("Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2005") [#46058], [ID 18487]

"According to the civil code, persons under 18 years of age may be prosecuted for crimes as adults, without special procedures, and may be imprisoned with adults. The age of criminal responsibility is set at 15 years for males and 9 years for females. As a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the country is obligated not to execute persons for crimes committed when they were younger than 18.

In January government officials told the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child that for many years there had been a moratorium in place on the death penalty for minors under 18. The same day, however, a man was executed for a crime committed when he was 17, and credible reports corroborated such action. AI cited a domestic press report that at least 30 minors sentenced to death were detained in juvenile detention centers in Tehran and Rajai'i Shahr. It was widely reported in the press that 2 teenage boys were hanged in public on July 19 in Mashhad, charged with raping a 13-year-old boy. Their ages differed in press reports, but apparently at least one was a minor at the time of the offense. In this case, some international observers claimed the two were executed for homosexual behavior; however, it was not possible to verify this allegation [see section 5 of the Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2005].

In October 2004 20 local human rights groups called on the judiciary not to sentence minors to death. Nobel Peace Prize laureate Shirin Ebadi called for a demonstration, but the authorities denied the request. During the year the UNGA adopted a resolution denouncing the country's practice of executing minors, and the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child urged the country to suspend execution of juvenile offenders."

Document(s): Open document

08.03.2006 - Source: US Department of State

Disregard of international standards in trials before the revolutionary courts ("Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2005") [#46058], [ID 18488]

"Trials in the revolutionary courts were notorious for their disregard of international standards of fairness. Revolutionary court judges were chosen in part based on their ideological commitment to the system. Pretrial detention often was prolonged, and defendants lacked access to attorneys. Charges were often undefined such as "anti-revolutionary behavior," "moral corruption," and "siding with global arrogance." Defendants did not have the right to confront their accusers. Secret or summary trials of five minutes' duration occurred. Others were show trials intended to publicize a coerced confession."

Document(s): Open document

08.03.2006 - Source: US Department of State

Unclear legitimacy of special clerical court system ("Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2005") [#46058], [ID 18489]

"The legitimacy of the special clerical court system continued to be subject to debate. The clerical courts, which investigate offenses and crimes committed by clerics and which are overseen directly by the supreme leader, are not provided by the constitution and operated outside the domain of the judiciary. In particular critics alleged the clerical courts were used to prosecute clerics for expressing controversial ideas and participating in activities outside the sphere of religion, such as journalism. The recommendations of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention included a call to abolish both the special clerical courts and the revolutionary courts."

Document(s): Open document

08.03.2006 - Source: US Department of State

While working as attorney on espionage case, Abdol Fattah Soltani arrested and also accused of espionage; Human Rights Watch believes that reason for arrest was his work in the investigation into Zahra Kazemi's death ("Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2005") [#46058], [ID 18589]

"In 2004 the government said it detained several citizens accused of transferring nuclear secrets to Western states. The suspects were tried, but the verdict remained secret. On July 30, while acting as an attorney for the accused, Abdol Fattah Soltani also was accused of espionage. Soltani's lawyer, human rights specialist Mohammad Dadkhah, and HRW claimed the reason for his arrest was his work in the investigation into the death of Zahra Kazemi. Despite calls for his release from almost 200 members of the national bar association, he remained in jail at year's end; his bail was set at $800 thousand (700 million toman)."

Document(s): Open document

08.03.2006 - Source: US Department of State

Trial against journalist Siamak Pourzand behind closed doors; he was denied access to lawyer of his choice ("Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2005") [#46058], [ID 18592]

"Police arrested journalist Siamak Pourzand in 2001 and tried him in March 2002 behind closed doors. He was denied free access to a lawyer of his choice and was sentenced to 11 years in prison for "undermining state security through his links with monarchists and counterrevolutionaries." He was kept in solitary confinement for months and physically and psychologically tortured to force him to make a televised confession. He was reportedly urged to implicate others, refused, was released but then returned a month later to Evin prison. In March 2004 Pourzand suffered a heart attack that left him in a coma. After repeated hospitalizations and reimprisonment, Pourzand was furloughed again in 2004 but kept under house arrest, not allowed to leave the country, and could be returned to prison at any time. His wife, Mehrangiz Kar, a human rights defender residing outside the country who face charges in connection with her participation in a 2000 conference in Berlin, was formerly a political prisoner."

Document(s): Open document

12.09.2005 - Source: Amnesty International

22-year-old man scheduled to be executed in Ahvaz on or around 18 September after his sentence was upheld by supreme Court in Tehran; it is believed that he was not granted access to legal representation, and was not able to appeal against his sentence ("Iran - UA 236/05") [#36517], [ID 8649]

Document(s): Open document

12.08.2005 - Source: Reporters Sans Frontières

Sanandaj: 3 journalists arrested at start of August for covering disturbances of past few weeks in Kurdish-dominated northwestern region, ordered to be kept in custody for 2 months ("Crackdown on journalists continues in Iran's Kurdish-dominated northwest") [#35314], [ID 8650]

Document(s): Open document

03.08.2005 - Source: Human Rights Watch

Teheran: Prominent lawyer arrested by authorities for “revealing secrets relating to the case of nuclear spies.”; Nobel laureate was also threatened ("Iran: Harassment of Rights Defenders Escalates") [#35019], [ID 8651]

Document(s): Open document

02.08.2005 - Source: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

Judge, trying case of dissident journalist Ganji, killed by unidentified gunmen in Tehran ("Iranian Judge In Journalist's Trial Assassinated") [#34715], [ID 8652]

Document(s): Open document

02.08.2005 - Source: BBC News

Tehran: Judge involved in several high-profile political cases, killed by gunman ("Prominent Iranian judge shot dead") [#34757], [ID 8653]

Document(s): Open document

08.2005 - Source: Freedom House

Annual survey of political rights and civil liberties 2004 ("Freedom in the World 2005") [#41317], [ID 8654]

"[...]In July, an Iranian court acquitted a government intelligence agent on charges of beating Canadian-Iranian freelance photographer Zahra Kazemi to death in July 2003 after she was detained while taking photos of Evin prison. The court refused to call to the witness stand six senior judicial officials present during Kazemi’s interrogation.[...]"

Document(s): Open document

25.07.2005 - Source: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

Government report acknowledges widespread violations of prisoners' rights (torture, detention without trial, undeclared detention centres) ("Iran: Government Report Acknowledges Torture In Prisons") [#34472], [ID 8657]

Document(s): Open document

25.05.2005 - Source: Amnesty International

Impunity ("Annual Report 2005") [#32306], [ID 8658]

"[...]
Impunity for human rights violations resulted in political instability and mistrust of the judiciary, which was perceived by many human rights activists as unwilling to uphold the law in an impartial manner.
In July, Mohammad Reza Aqdam Ahmadi, a Ministry of Intelligence official, went on trial for participating in the “quasi-intentional murder” of Zahra Kazemi, a photojournalist who died in custody in 2003. He was acquitted following a two-day trial. Following his acquittal, a spokesperson for the judiciary stated that Zahra Kazemi’s death must have been an accident, despite forensic reports prepared following her death which indicated that she was murdered. International observers – including UN Special Rapporteurs on freedom of opinion and expression; on the independence of judges and lawyers; and on torture – condemned the flagrantly flawed proceedings. The court ordered the state to pay the family of the deceased the legally required monetary compensation as no culprit had been found. The family lodged an appeal which was pending at the end of the year.
Brothers Manuchehr and Akbar Mohammadi, and Ahmadi Batebi, who were among the students detained, tortured and sentenced after unfair trials following student demonstrations in 1999, continued to face violence while in custody. The brothers required medical treatment in the course of the year for their injuries. No investigations were carried out into their allegations of ill-treatment in custody.
Six years after the murders of two political activists and three writers – a case known in Iran as the “Serial Murders” – no steps had been taken to bring those who ordered the killings to justice. In 1999 it had been acknowledged that the killings had been committed by state officials. During the year, former Intelligence Minister Qorbanali Dorri Nafafabadi, who had been “excused” from taking part in earlier hearings in the case, was reportedly appointed state prosecutor. Nasser Zarafshan, a human rights defender and the lawyer for the families of the two political activists, remained incarcerated following an unfair trial in 2002. [...]"

Document(s): Open document
Open document

04.2005 - Source: UK Home Office

Human rights abuses ("Country Report - April 2005") [#31980], [ID 8655]

"[...]The report continued, "Continuing serious abuses included: summary executions; disappearances; torture and other degrading treatment, reportedly including severe punishments such as beheading and flogging; poor prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; lack of habeas corpus or access to counsel and prolonged and incommunicado detention. Citizens often did not receive due process or fair trials. The Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights, and restricted freedom of speech, press, assembly, association and religion". [4n](pg4) [...]
6.9 According to AI throughout 2001,
"Scores of political prisoners, including prisoners of conscience, were arrested and others continued to be held in prolonged detention without trial or following unfair trials. Some had no access to lawyers or family. In a continuing clamp-down on freedom of expression and association, led by the judiciary, scores of students, journalists and intellectuals were detained. At least 139 people, including one minor, were executed and 285 flogged, many in public". [9q](pg1)[...]"

Document(s): Open document

29.03.2005 - Source: Reporters Sans Frontières

Woman, who was arrested for defending her detained husband, fellow blogger, released after 24 days in detention; she said her husband is in good health ("Pregnant blogger Najmeh Oumidparvar freed after 24 days in prison") [#30734], [ID 8661]

Document(s): Open document

10.03.2005 - Source: Human Rights Watch

Absence of due process ("Iran: Human Rights Concerns for the 61st Session of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights") [#29917], [ID 8662]

"The Office of the Chief Prosecutor, led by Saeed Mortazavi, routinely ignored Iranian and international law by ordering the arrest of journalists, students, and writers who criticized government policies. Few of those formally charged or tried had access to an attorney. Human Rights Watch is especially alarmed by the routine use of prolonged solitary confinement in combination with forced confessions. Some political prisoners, including Taqi Rahmani, Hoda Saber and Reza Alijani, have been in detention without charge for at least eighteen months, much of it incommunicado.

Heshmatallah Tabarzadi, a student leader, was sentenced by Tehran’s revolutionary court on December 26 to sixteen years in prison for “propaganda against the regime” and acting against national security. His trial was held behind closed doors and in the absence of his lawyer. The judge’s final ruling cites “interviews with foreign radio,” “writing letters to the Leader,” and “disseminating statements against the regime” as the basis for the harsh sentence.

The murder of Canadian-Iranian photojournalist Zahra Kazemi while in custody in July 2003 remains unresolved. In October 2003, the Article 90 Commission of the Parliament presented a public report that placed responsibility for Kazemi’s death squarely on agents of the judiciary. The judiciary accused a low-ranking official of the Intelligence Ministry, Reza Ahmadi, of killing Kazemi and proceeded with a hastily organized trial held in May 2004 which cleared Ahmadi of the charges. The judiciary has taken no further steps to identify or prosecute those responsible for Kazemi’s death."

Document(s): Open document

08.03.2005 - Source: UN Human Rights Council (formerly UN Commission on Human Rights)

Lawyers & trials ("Civil and political rights [E/CN.4/2005/NGO/310]") [#30293], [ID 8656]

"[...]According to a recent statement by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Shirin Ebadi, Iran’s hardline judiciary is doing all it can to prevent human rights lawyers from defending political prisoners. “Judge and lawyer are each one wing of the angel of justice, but one of them has been amputated,” said Ebadi, who heads a group of Iranian human rights lawyers. “Lawyers have been in and out of jail. I have also been in prison. They keep summoning me here and there. I have been subject to threats for 10 years.” Ebadi recently received a summons and “the judge himself did not know why.” Ebadi spent 25 days in solitary confinement in 1999 and was denied access to lawyers, radio and newspapers.
Those detained by the legal authorities face an impossible task in choosing a human rights lawyer to defend them. Roozbeh Mir-Ebrahimi was arrested last autumn in a crackdown on journalists and freed at the end of 2004. His family asked Ebadi and Mohammad Seifzadeh to defend him. However, “I was told in prison that with the charge against me I risked 15 years in prison, and that with these lawyers I would receive 25 years. My interrogator forced me to reject them and said that they were only serving their own interests.”[...]"

Document(s): Open document

28.02.2005 - Source: US Department of State

Fair trials & arbitrary detention ("Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2004") [#29525], [ID 8659]

"[...]e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution provides that the judiciary is "an independent power"; however, in practice the court system was subject to government and religious influence. It served as the principal vehicle of the Government to restrict freedom and reform in the society. U.N. representatives, including the UNSR, the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, and independent human rights organizations noted the absence of procedural safeguards in criminal trials. Trials are supposed to be open to the public; however, frequently they are held in closed sessions without access to a lawyer; the right to appeal often is not honored.
[...]
In its 2003 report, the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention noted failures of due process in the court system caused by the absence of a "culture of counsel" and the previous concentration of authority in the hands of a judge who prosecuted, investigated, and decides cases. The Working Group called for active involvement of counsel in cases, from the custody and investigation phase through the trial and appeals phases. The Working Group welcomed the December 2002 reinstatement of prosecution services, after a 7-year suspension, but noted that this reform had thus far had been applied unevenly, with the judge still having major investigative responsibilities in many jurisdictions.

Trials in the Revolutionary Courts, in which crimes against national security and other principal offenses are heard, were notorious for their disregard of international standards of fairness. Revolutionary Court judges were chosen in part based on their ideological commitment to the system. Pretrial detention often was prolonged, and defendants lacked access to attorneys. Indictments often lacked clarity and included undefined offenses such as "anti-revolutionary behavior," "moral corruption," and "siding with global arrogance." Defendants did not have the right to confront their accusers. Secret or summary trials of 5 minutes' duration occurred. Others were show trials that were intended merely to highlight a coerced public confession.

The legitimacy of the Special Clerical Court system continued to be a subject of debate. The clerical courts, which investigate offenses and crimes committed by clerics and which are overseen directly by the Supreme Leader, are not provided for in the Constitution and operated outside the domain of the judiciary. In particular, critics alleged that the clerical courts were used to prosecute clerics for expressing controversial ideas and for participating in activities outside the sphere of religion, such as journalism. The recommendations of the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention included a call to abolish both the Special Clerical Courts and the Revolutionary Courts, which were described as "responsible for many of the cases of arbitrary detention for crimes of opinion." [...]"

Document(s): Open document

28.02.2005 - Source: US Department of State

Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2004 ("Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2004") [#29525], [ID 8660]

"[...]The trials in 2000 and 2001 of 13 Jewish citizens on charges related to espionage for Israel were marked by a lack of due process. Ten of the original 13 were sentenced to jail terms ranging from 4 to 13 years. The last five in prison were released in April 2003 (see Section 2.c.). [...]"

Document(s): Open document

28.02.2005 - Source: US Department of State

Arbitrary arrest or detention ("Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2004") [#29525], [ID 8663]

"[...]There were reports of political killings. The Government was responsible for numerous killings during the year, including executions following trials that lacked due process. The law criminalized dissent and applied the death penalty to offenses such as "attempts against the security of the State, outrage against high-ranking officials, and insults against the memory of Imam Khomeini and against the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic." Citizens continued to be tried and sentenced to death in the absence of sufficient procedural safeguards. Exiles and human rights monitors alleged that many of those supposedly executed for criminal offenses in the past, such as narcotics trafficking, actually were political dissidents. Supporters of outlawed political groups, or in the case of the Mujahedin-e Khalq, a terrorist organization, were believed to constitute a number of those executed each year.
[...]
The Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, these practices remained common. In practice, there is no legal time limit for incommunicado detention nor any judicial means to determine the legality of detention. In the period immediately following detention or arrest, many detainees were held incommunicado and denied access to lawyers and family members. Suspects may be held for questioning in jails or in local Revolutionary Guard offices. There also are numerous detention centers not under the control of the NPO, reportedly run by "plainclothes" officers of various security and intelligence agencies, elements of the judiciary, and state-sponsored vigilante groups.

The security forces often did not inform family members of a prisoner's welfare and location. Authorities often denied visits by family members and legal counsel. In addition, families of executed prisoners did not always receive notification of the prisoners' deaths. Those who received such information reportedly were forced on occasion to pay the Government to retrieve the body of their relative.

Security forces often targeted family members of political prisoners for harassment. In April, a court sentenced student activist Payman Piran, detained since February on charges of acting against national security, contacting foreigners, disturbing public opinion, and behaving insultingly, to 10 years in prison. In July, security forces forcibly evicted retired teacher Mostafa Piran, father of Peyman Piran, and his family from their apartment, confiscated their goods, and sealed the apartment. They beat Mostafa Piran and then detained him in Evin Prison. He was not informed of any charges against him nor allowed to see a lawyer. Subsequently, family members who saw him said that he had been mistreated during lengthy interrogation sessions and badly bruised. Also in July, Simin Mohammadi and her father Mohammad Mohammadi, sister and father respectively of jailed student activists Manuchehr and Akbar Mohammadi, were arrested, reportedly for "acts against state security." Simin was released after posting bail following 2 weeks' imprisonment in solitary confinement; her father also was released on bail after having had a heart attack in solitary confinement.

According to the media, in November, Mohammad Reza Aghapour, former editor-in-chief of the banned magazine, Asan, was arrested upon his return from London where he reportedly attended seminars on the circumstances of the country's Turkish population. At year's end, there was no information on whether Aghapour was imprisoned or if charges were brought against him.

According to the media, in September, authorities arrested and held for 11 days Soeed Matalebi, the father of Sinn Motalebi, a political opponent of the regime who helped to operate an Internet opposition website.

In January 2003, the Government released Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, amid reports of health problems after 5 years of house arrest. Montazeri was formerly the designated successor of the late Spiritual Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, who subsequently became an outspoken critic of the Supreme Leader (see Section 2.a.). In recent years, the Government has used the practice of house arrest to restrict the movements and ability to communicate of senior Shi'a religious leaders whose views regarding political and governance issues were at variance with the ruling orthodoxy; however, there was no information on current practice.

In July 2003, the press credibly reported that Iranian-American academic Dariush Zahedi was detained during a private visit to the country and reportedly held in solitary confinement in Evin prison. Majlis officials noted that Zahedi was held on suspicion of espionage but, after a 40-day investigation, was cleared by the Ministry of Intelligence. However, Zahedi remained in detention after the case was transferred to the judiciary, reportedly at the intervention of Tehran's chief prosecutor. Zahedi was released on approximately $250,000 (200 million Tomans) bail in November 2003 and, although technically free to leave the country, is still subject to criminal prosecution. As of February, Zahedi had left the country; the charges against him were still pending.

In November 2003, security agents briefly arrested two sons of Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, the dissident cleric released from house arrest in January (see Section 1.d. above). The arrests reportedly were in response to the sons' attempts to refurbish a building purchased by the family for use as a teaching facility. The Qom mosque and Koranic school at which Montazeri formerly taught has remained closed since 1997, when comments by the cleric questioning the authority of the Supreme Leader sparked attacks on the school and his home by Ansar-e Hezbollah mobs.

In November 2003, student activist Ahmed Batebi met with the UNSR for the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, while on medical leave from prison where he is serving a 15-year sentence for participating in the 1999 student demonstrations. He was re-arrested shortly afterward; however, he was temporarily released in late April, but he was re-incarcerated and, again, temporarily released on May 3. Subsequently, he was returned to prison, and his 10-year sentence remained in place.

AI reported that in October 2003, Arzhang Davoodi was arrested for assisting in making a television documentary criticizing the authorities. Reportedly, he was kept in solitary confinement for over 3 months and extensively beaten during the period. According to AI, he has not been charged and, although having paid bail in March, has not been released.

In July 2002, the Government permanently dissolved the Freedom Movement, the country's oldest opposition party, and sentenced over 30 of its members to jail terms ranging from 4 months to 10 years on charges of trying to overthrow the Islamic system. Other members were barred from political activity for up to 10 years and ordered to pay fines up to more than approximately $6,000 (currently 48 million tomans)(see Sections 2.b. and 3).

Numerous publishers, editors, and journalists (including those working on Internet sites) were either detained, jailed, and fined, or they were prohibited from publishing their writings during the year (see Section 2.a.).

Adherents of the Baha'i faith continued to face arbitrary arrest and detention. According to Baha'i sources, four Baha'is remained in prison for practicing their faith at year's end, one facing a life sentence, two facing sentences of 15 years, and the fourth a 4-year sentence. A small number of Baha'is were detained at any given time. Sources claimed that such arrests were carried out to "terrorize" the community and to disrupt the lives of its members. Others were arrested, charged, and then quickly released. However, the charges against them often were not dropped (see Section 2.c.).

During 2003, the Government continued to exchange with Iraq prisoners of war (POWs) and the remains of deceased fighters from the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war. In March 2003, the Government said it released 888 Iraqi POWs in exchange for 351 Iranian prisoners that the Government claimed were not POWs, but religious pilgrims, university students, tour guides, farmers and villagers from the border regions, and border guards). In April and August, the Government claimed that it held no more Iraqi POWs.
[...]"

Document(s): Open document

23.02.2005 - Source: BBC News

Nobel Peace Prize laureate and human rights lawyer, Shirin Ebadi, defied an order by the Tehran judiciary to appear in court because she was not told the charges against her ("Ebadi defies Iranian court order") [#29226], [ID 8664]

Document(s): Open document

05.11.2004 - Source: Reporters Sans Frontières

2 Iranian women journalists arrested in connection with their work for pro-reform websites ("Women's media, rights groups urged to take action after second woman journalist arrested on Internet-related charges") [#26857], [ID 8665]

Document(s): Open document

20.05.2004 - Source: BBC News

The trial of an Iranian intelligence agent charged with beating to death a Canadian journalist will resume in July after a long delay ("Kazemi trial to resume in July") [#22475], [ID 8666]

Document(s): Open document

13.05.2004 - Source: Amnesty International

Head of the Tehran Artistic and Cultural Centre and an occasional newspaper correspondent, is a prisoner of conscience, serving an 11 year sentence imposed after an unfair and politically motivated trial ("Siamak Pourzand: a case study of flagrant human rights violations") [#22273], [ID 8667]

Document(s): Open document
Open document

13.04.2004 - Source: Amnesty International

On unfair trials, e.g. denial to pass on written court decisions following sentence; cases of arrests by members of security forces in plain clothes (expert opinion, in German) ("Stellungnahme vom 13.4.2004 an VG Arnsberg - 12 K 5035/01.A -") [#22492], [ID 8668]

Document(s): Open document

02.03.2004 - Source: Amnesty International

Arzhang Davoodi, who was arrested after he criticised the Iranian authorities in a TV documentary, was severely beaten in detention/ there are fears that he may be at risk of further ill-treatment or torture ("Iran - UA 87/04") [#19994], [ID 8669]

Document(s): Open document
Open document

27.02.2004 - Source: Amnesty International

Mohsen Mofidi, charged with possessing the illegal satellite dish, alcohol and with fostering the corruption of his younger sisters, died after flogging while in detention ("Iran: Justice denied to man who died after flogging") [#19821], [ID 8670]

Document(s): Open document

17.02.2004 - Source: Amnesty International

Freelance journalist is reportedly held at a detention centre under the control of the Ministry of Intelligence/ he is at serious risk of ill-treatment ("Iran - Further Information on UA 25/04") [#19418], [ID 8671]

Document(s): Open document
Open document

08.12.2003 - Source: Reporters Sans Frontières

One-year suspended sentence passed on journalist who worked for Neshat, a daily closed down by the authorities ("One-year suspended sentence passed on journalist Emadoldin Baghi") [#18033], [ID 8672]

""I was unable to defend myself in this travesty of a trial which last only a few minutes, and I was barely able to speak," Baghi told Reporters Without Borders. "What kind of trial is it where there is neither lawyer nor judge, or where the judge is prosecutor at the same time and where the defendant is not even told of the charges against him ?""

Document(s): Open document

31.03.2003 - Source: US Department of State

The court system was not independent and was subject to government and religious influence ("Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2002") [#11869], [ID 8673]

"The court system was not independent and was subject to government and religious influence. It served as the principal vehicle of the Government to restrict freedom and reform in the society. U.N. representatives, including the UNSR, and independent human rights organizations continued to note the absence of procedural safeguards in criminal trials.
There are several different court systems. The two most active are the traditional courts, which adjudicate civil and criminal offenses, and the Islamic Revolutionary Courts. The latter were established in 1979 to try offenses viewed as potentially threatening to the Islamic Republic, including threats to internal or external security, narcotics crimes, economic crimes (including hoarding and overpricing), and official corruption. A special clerical court examines alleged transgressions within the clerical establishment, and a military court investigates crimes committed in connection with military or security duties by members of the army, police, and the Revolutionary Guards. A press court hears complaints against publishers, editors, and writers in the media. The Supreme Court has limited authority to review cases.

The judicial system was designed to conform, where possible, to an Islamic canon based on the Koran, Sunna, and other Islamic sources. Article 157 provides that the head of the judiciary shall be a cleric chosen by the Supreme Leader. Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi resigned as the head of the judiciary in August 1999, and was replaced by Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahrudi. The head of the Supreme Court and Prosecutor General also must be clerics.

Many aspects of the prerevolutionary judicial system survived in the civil and criminal courts. For example, defendants have the right to a public trial, may choose their own lawyer, and have the right of appeal. Trials are adjudicated by panels of judges. There is no jury system in the civil and criminal courts. If a situation was not addressed by statutes enacted after the 1979 revolution, the Government advised judges to give precedence to their own knowledge and interpretation of Islamic law, rather than rely on statutes enacted during the Pahlavi monarchy."

Document(s): Open document

10.2002 - Source: UK Home Office

UK Home Office: The court system is not independent and is subject to government and religious influence ("Country Assessment - October 2002") [#9556], [ID 8674]

""4.14. The traditional court system is not independent and is subject to government and religious influence. [4(k)] The judicial system has been designed to conform, where possible, to an Islamic canon based on the Koran, Sunna, and other Islamic sources. Article 157 provides that the head of the judiciary shall be a cleric chosen by the Supreme Leader. [...] Defendants have the right to a public trial, may choose their own lawyer, and have the right of appeal [4(g)]. Trials are adjudicated by panels of judges, advised by the government to base their decisions on Islamic law. [4(f)] The Revolutionary Courts may consider cases that are normally in the jurisdiction of the civil and criminal courts, and may also overturn their decisions. [4(a)]

4.15. Trials in the Revolutionary Courts, where crimes against national security and other principal offences are heard, have been notorious for their disregard of international standards of fairness. Revolutionary Court judges have acted as prosecutor and judge in the same case, and judges have been chosen for their ideological commitment to the system. Pre-trial detention often is prolonged and defendants lack access to attorneys. Indictments have often lacked clarity and included undefined offences such as “anti-revolutionary behaviour,” “moral corruption,” and “siding with global arrogance.” Defendants do not have the right to confront their accusers. Others have been show trials that are intended merely to emphasise a coerced public confession. In 1992 the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights concluded that “the chronic abuses associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Courts are so numerous and so entrenched as to be beyond reform.” The Government has undertaken no major reform of the Revolutionary Court system since that report. The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights then concluded that these courts were associated with abuses. [4(f)][4(g)]

4.16. The legitimacy of the Special Clerical Court (SCC) system has been a subject of wide debate. The clerical courts, which were established in 1987 to investigate offences and crimes that are committed by clerics, are overseen directly by the Supreme Leader, are not provided for in the Constitution, and operate outside the domain of the judiciary. In particular, critics alleged that the clerical courts were used to prosecute certain clerics for expressing controversial ideas and for participating in activities outside the area of religion, including journalism. According to the US State Department on Human Rights Practices for 1999 in November 1999, former Interior Minister and Vice President Abdollah Nouri was sentenced by a branch of the SCC to a 5-year prison term for allegedly publishing “anti-Islamic articles, insulting government officials, promoting friendly relations with the United States,” and providing illegal publicity to dissident cleric Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri in the pages of Khordad, a newspaper that was established by Nouri in late 1998 and closed at the time of his arrest. Nouri used the public trial to attack the legitimacy of the SCC.

4.17. In April 1999 a branch of the SCC convicted Hojjatoleslam Mohsen Kadivar, a Shi'a cleric and popular seminary lecturer, to 18 months in prison for “dissemination of lies and confusing public opinion” in a series of broadcast interviews and newspaper articles. Kadivar advocated political reform and greater intellectual freedom and criticised the misuse of religion to maintain power. In an interview published in a newspaper, Kadivar criticised certain government officials for turning criticism against them into alleged crimes against the State. He also observed that such leaders “mistake themselves with Islam, with national interests, or with the interests of the system, and in this way believe that they should be immune from criticism.” He also allegedly criticised former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini and demonstrated support for dissident cleric Ayatollah Montazeri. Kadivar's trial was not open to the public. [4(g)] [...]

4.19. Since May 1994, judges have been responsible for prosecution in public and revolutionary courts. [9(a)] Amnesty International has reported that trial hearings are often heard in camera and that political detainees have been denied access to legal counsel during judicial proceedings, despite official assurances to the contrary. [9(a)][4(b)][9(b)] Political trials which take place within prisons are sometimes conducted secretly. Where trials and summary proceedings of political prisoners deny the detainee access to legal counsel, they breach Iran's Constitution and also Article 14(D) of the ICCPR, to which Iran is a signatory. [9(c)] [9(a)][4(b)] Amnesty International cites detainees in Iran having described the use of ill treatment and torture to obtain forced confessions. [9(c)]"

Document(s): Open document

04.03.2002 - Source: US Department of State

US State Department: The court system is not independent and is subject to government and religious influence ("Annual report 2001") [#5823], [ID 8675]

""The court system is not independent and is subject to government and religious influence. It serves as the principal vehicle of the State to restrict freedom and reform in the society.

There are several different court systems. The two most active are the traditional courts, which adjudicate civil and criminal offenses, and the Islamic Revolutionary Courts. The latter were established in 1979 to try offenses viewed as potentially threatening to the Islamic Republic, including threats to internal or external security, narcotics crimes, economic crimes (including hoarding and overpricing), and official corruption. A special clerical court examines alleged transgressions within the clerical establishment, and a military court investigates crimes committed in connection with military or security duties by members of the army, police, and the Revolutionary Guards. A press court hears complaints against publishers, editors, and writers in the media. The Supreme Court has limited authority to review cases.

The judicial system has been designed to conform, where possible, to an Islamic canon based on the Koran, Sunna, and other Islamic sources. Article 157 provides that the head of the judiciary shall be a cleric chosen by the Supreme Leader. Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi resigned as the head of the judiciary in August 1999, and was replaced by Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahrudi. The head of the Supreme Court and Prosecutor General also must be clerics.

Many aspects of the prerevolutionary judicial system survive in the civil and criminal courts. For example, defendants have the right to a public trial, may choose their own lawyer, and have the right of appeal. Trials are adjudicated by panels of judges. There is no jury system in the civil and criminal courts. If a situation is not addressed by statutes enacted after the 1979 revolution, the Government advises judges to give precedence to their own knowledge and interpretation of Islamic law, rather than rely on statutes enacted during the Pahlavi monarchy.

Trials in the Revolutionary Courts, in which crimes against national security and other principal offenses are heard, are notorious for their disregard of international standards of fairness. Revolutionary Court judges act as both prosecutor and judge in the same case, and judges are chosen in part based on their ideological commitment to the system. Pretrial detention often is prolonged and defendants lack access to attorneys. Indictments often lack clarity and include undefined offenses such as "antirevolutionary behavior," "moral corruption," and "siding with global arrogance." Defendants do not have the right to confront their accusers. Secret or summary trials of 5 minutes duration occur. Others are show trials that are intended merely to highlight a coerced public confession.

In November 2000, a Revolutionary Court began the trials of 17 writers, intellectuals, and political figures who took part in an April conference in Berlin regarding the implications of the February 2000 Majles elections (see Section 3). The 17 defendants included 12 persons who had attended the conference and who were arrested upon their return to Iran. They were charged with taking part in antigovernment and anti-Islamic activities, and included investigative journalist Akbar Ganji, newspaper editor Mohammed Reza Jalaipour, Member of Parliament Jamileh Kadivar, women's rights activists Mehrangiz Kar and Shahla Lahidji, opposition politician Ezzatollah Sahabi, student leader Ali Afshari, and others, including two translators for the German Embassy in Tehran. According to HRW, on January 13, the Court convicted seven of them on the vague charge of "having conspired to overthrow the system of the Islamic Republic." The Court convicted three other defendants on lesser charges, imposing fines and suspended sentences, and acquitted seven others. The trial reportedly was closed, and HRW claimed that it violated recognized international standards for free trial because several of the defendants were held for months without access to legal counsel.

According to HRW, the sentences handed down by the Court included: 10 years in prison and then 5 years of internal exile for journalist Ganji (his sentence was reduced to 6 months on appeal, but increased to the original 10 years by the Tehran Press Courts); 10 and 9 year sentences for the 2 translators employed by the German Embassy in Tehran; 5 years for student leader Afshari; 41/2 years for politician Ezzatollah Sahabi; and 4 years each for Lahidji and Kar. Sahibi's appeal of that verdict had not been heard by year's end. He was provisionally released but rearrested following public remarks he made in March, and remained in detention without new charges being filed against him at year's end. For a time, Kar was not allowed to travel abroad for medical treatment for breast cancer. Kar's husband Siamak Pourzand disappeared in late November and has not been heard from since (see Section 1.b.).

In late December 2000, a military court began the trials of 18 persons in connection with the killings of several prominent dissidents and intellectuals in late 1998 (see Section 1.a.). In January 15 of the defendants were convicted; however, the results were overturned by the Supreme Court in August.

The legitimacy of the Special Clerical Court (SCC) system continued to be a subject of debate. The clerical courts, which were established in 1987 to investigate offenses and crimes committed by clerics, and which are overseen directly by the Supreme Leader, are not provided for in the Constitution, and operate outside the domain of the judiciary. In particular, critics allege that the clerical courts are used to prosecute certain clerics for expressing controversial ideas and for participating in activities outside the sphere of religion, such as journalism.

During the latter part of 2000, an SCC began the trial of Hojatoleslam Hassan Yousefi Eshkevari, a cleric who participated in the Berlin conference, on charges of apostasy and "corruption on earth," which potentially carry the death penalty. Eshkevari had called for more liberal interpretations of Islamic law in certain areas. He was sentenced to death, but the sentence was overturned on appeal in May. He was permitted a 2-day furlough from prison in September.

In November 1999, former Interior Minister and Vice President Abdollah Nouri was sentenced by a branch of the SCC to a 5-year prison term for allegedly publishing "anti-Islamic articles, insulting government officials, promoting friendly relations with the United States," and providing illegal publicity to dissident cleric Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri in Khordad, a newspaper that was established by Nouri in late 1998 and closed at the time of his arrest. Nouri used the public trial to attack the legitimacy of the SCC (see Section 2.a.).

In April 1999, a branch of the SCC convicted Hojatoleslam Mohsen Kadivar, a Shi'a cleric and popular seminary lecturer, to 18 months in prison for "dissemination of lies and confusing public opinion" in a series of broadcast interviews and newspaper articles. Kadivar advocated political reform and greater intellectual freedom and criticized the misuse of religion to maintain power. In an interview published in a newspaper, Kadivar criticized certain government officials for turning criticism against them into alleged crimes against the State. He also observed that such leaders "mistake themselves with Islam, with national interests, or with the interests of the system, and in this way believe that they should be immune from criticism." He also allegedly criticized former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini and demonstrated support for dissident cleric Ayatollah Montazeri. Kadivar's trial was not open to the public.

It is difficult for women to obtain legal redress. A woman's testimony in court is worth only half that of a man's, making it difficult for a woman to prove a case against a male defendant.

The Government frequently charges members of religious minorities with crimes such as "confronting the regime" and apostasy, and conducts trials in these cases in the same manner as is reserved for threats to national security. Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, who resigned as head of the judiciary in August 2000, stated in 1996 that the Baha'i faith is an espionage organization. Trials against Baha'is have reflected this view (see Section 2.c.). The trial of 13 Iranian Jews on charges related to espionage for Israel was marked throughout by a lack of due process. The defendants were held for more than 1 year without being charged formally or given access to lawyers. The trial was closed, and the defendants were not allowed to choose their own lawyers. Following the trial, defense lawyers told news reporters that they were threatened by judiciary officials and pressured to admit their clients' guilt (see Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).

In December 1999, authorities rearrested former Deputy Prime Minister and longtime political dissident Abbas Amir-Entezam after an interview with him was published in an Iranian newspaper. Amir-Entezam has spent much of the past 20 years in and out of prison since being arrested on charges of collaboration with the United States following the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran by revolutionary militants in 1979. In his original trial, Amir-Entezam was denied defense counsel and access to the allegedly incriminating evidence that was gathered from the overtaken U.S. Embassy and used against him. Since then he has appealed for a fair and public trial, which has been denied to him. He has been a frequent victim of torture in prison; he suffered a ruptured eardrum due to repeated beatings, kidney failure resulting from denial of access to toilet facilities, and an untreated prostate condition. He reported having been taken on numerous occasions before a firing squad, told to prepare for death, only to be allowed to live. Amir-Entezam remained in prison at year's end (see Section 1.c.).

Independent legal scholar and member of the Islamic clergy Hojatoleslam Sayyid Mohsen Saidzadeh, who was convicted by the SCC in 1998 for his outspoken criticism of the treatment of women under the law, was released from prison in early in 1999; however, the Government banned him from performing any clerical duties for 5 years. Human rights groups outside the country noted reports that Saidzadeh's 1998 sentence also included a prohibition on publishing. He has ceased authoring monthly columns on legal issues, many focusing on the rights of women, since the time of his detention.

In December 2000, Judiciary Chief Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi announced an initiative to reform the Iranian judicial system. He said that the country is "still a long way off from having a reformed and developed judicial organization." He also announced that 40 judges, clerks, and other officials had been arrested on corruption charges. Some sources outside the country claim that Shahroudi used this initiative to purge the judiciary of some of its more moderate elements in the guise of fighting corruption.

No estimates are available regarding the number of political prisoners. However, the Government often arrests, convicts, and sentences persons on questionable criminal charges, including drug trafficking, when their actual "offenses" are political.""

Document(s): Open document

11.2001 - Source: Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation

00.11.2001 - ACCORD: Minimum international legal obligations in regard to fair trial often violated in the Press Courts, the Revolutionary Courts and the Special Court for the Clergy ("7th European Country of Origin Information Seminar Berlin, 11 - 12 June 2001: Final Report - Iran") [#7661], [ID 8676]

"Art. 14 of the ICCPR sets out the minimum requirements for fair trial. In addition to a competent, independent and impartial court, these include prompt information of the individual about the charges against him; provision of adequate time for the preparation of his defence and communication with counsel of his own choosing, trial in a public hearing without undue delay, in the presence of the defendant and with assigned legal assistance in any case where the interests of justice so require. In addition, Art. 14 (5) of the ICCPR states that everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right that his conviction and sentence be reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law.

In practice, however, these minimum international legal obligations are often violated by procedural irregularities in the Press and ‘special’ courts, such as Islamic Revolutionary Courts and the Special Court for the Clergy. [...]

Art. 14 (5) of the ICCPR states that everyone convicted of a crime has the right to appeal the conviction and the sentence. Art. 44 of the Theologians’ Law, however, states that ”Verdicts of courts for theologians’ affairs shall be final...” and there is also only a limited scope for appeal in Islamic Revolutionary Courts which are based on the
defendant’s challenge of the competency of the judge or if the verdict deals with execution or corporal punishment. Such limitations do not conform to the internationally recognized right for a person convicted to challenge his or her conviction and sentence in a higher court.

In particular, the SCC is not subject to the jurisdiction of the judiciary. As it is an extraordinary court it violates international human rights standards which provide the right for people to be tried by ordinary courts using established judicial procedures."

Document(s): cois2001-irn.pdf

11.2001 - Source: Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation

00.11.2001 - ACCORD: Political influence in Iran's judicial system; no effective separation of powers ("7th European Country of Origin Information Seminar Berlin, 11 - 12 June 2001: Final Report - Iran") [#7661], [ID 8677]

"Amnesty International is concerned that the impact on the administration of justice of a system where the judiciary does not appear to be totally independent, where there is no effective separation of powers, where a judgment is required, yet where judges are personally liable is extremely grave.

The Head of the Judiciary is appointed by a political figure. A politically appointed figure makes appointments to all lower judicial posts, who owe their allegiance to the Head of the Judiciary. He in turn appoints circuit court judges or lower court judges. Those judges have to make prosecutions and deliver a judgment, no matter if it concerns divorce suits, disputes between neighbours, etc. From that point on, however, a person could be at risk of unfair trial and human rights violations. The task faced by lower and appeal court judges seems almost impossible. They must investigate and prosecute allegations, some of which may be brought by their superior, the region’s ‘chief prosecutor’. The head of the court to whom the charges were allocated by the same superior is likely to view such charges, which may have been laid in reference to extremely vague laws, favourably, precisely because they originate from his superior. However, the lower court judge also understands that he must give a ruling, even in the absence of codified law."

Document(s): cois2001-irn.pdf

11.2001 - Source: Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation

00.11.2001 - ACCORD: The functions of judge and prosecutor in Revolutionary and Public Courts were unified; an impartial court as required under international standards for fair trial is not guaranteed ("7th European Country of Origin Information Seminar Berlin, 11 - 12 June 2001: Final Report - Iran") [#7661], [ID 8678]

"In 1994, the functions of investigative judge and prosecutor in Revolutionary and Public Courts were vested in the presiding judge of the case under investigation, although this amendment was not extended to the Special Court for the Clergy. Art. 27 of the Criminal Procedure Code expressly requires that ”the head or the judge of every bench shall be duty bound to carry out investigations in person” while Art. 30 states that ”the judge of the court may personally attend preliminary investigation sessions in order to supervise the manner of the investigation.”

In other words, the functions of judge and prosecutor in Revolutionary and Public Courts were unified, i.e. a defendant’s judge is also his prosecutor. One incident that highlights this problem involved the Iranian journalist Akhbar Ganji, who was forced to wear prison garb like a common criminal in advance of a court hearing. When he initially refused,
prison officials made him wear this garb by eventually beating him. He launched a complaint against the head of the Tehran judiciary, Ali Razini, who would then have had to decide whether to prosecute himself or not. Not surprisingly, Ali Razini found Akhbar Ganjis allegations of being tortured in prison insufficient and would not prosecute himself.

As Judges are also prosecutors, they can file charges. Amnesty International believes that this structure creates a confusion of roles in which judges are likely to find it difficult to maintain the impartiality required under international standards.

This structure, which contravenes Guideline 10 of the UN Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, namely that ”The office of prosecutors shall be strictly separated from judicial functions.”, indicates that the structure of the Public and Revolutionary Courts does not guarantee an impartial court as required under international standards for fair trial, including the provisions set out in Art. 14 (1) of the ICCPR.

Amnesty International notes with interest recent reports which indicate that a bill to reestablish the role of prosecutors has been passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly (ICA). The draft reportedly provides for the separate hearing of civil and penal cases by suitably trained judges and provides for increased specialization in the investigation of crimes. Amnesty International has requested further information on the status of this bill."

Document(s): cois2001-irn.pdf

14.05.2000 - Source: Amnesty International

Amnesty International: ("Iran : More failures of Iranian justice") [#834], [ID 8680]

Document(s): Open document

12.05.2000 - Source: Amnesty International

Amnesty International: ("Iran: Amnesty International calls for fair and open trials in Iran") [#835], [ID 8679]

Document(s): Open document