04.08.2005 - Source: International Crisis Group

Report on implications of Ahmadinejad's victory in presidential elections ("Iran: What Does Ahmadi-Nejad's Victory Mean?; Middle East Briefing No. 18") [#34813],  [ID 8259]

Document(s): Open document

08.2005 - Source: Freedom House

Political developments from the past until today ("Freedom in the World 2005") [#41317],  [ID 8260]

For details see "Freedom in the World 2005" by Freedom House, pages 299-302

Document(s): Open document

03.03.2004 - Source: EurasiaNet

Conservative takeover of legislature is setback for politcal reforms; commentary on consequences of elections ("Iran’s conservative agenda: build "an Islamic Japan"") [#20118],  [ID 8261]

Document(s): Open document

25.02.2004 - Source: US Department of State

USDOS: The Islamic Republic of Iran is a constitutional, theocratic republic dominated by Shi'a clergy/The right of citizens to change their government is restricted significantly ("Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2003") [#19737],  [ID 8262]

"The Islamic Republic of Iran [note 1] is a constitutional, theocratic republic in which Shi'a Muslim clergy dominate the key power structures. The Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i, dominates a tri-cameral division of power among legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Khamene'i directly controls the armed forces and exercises indirect control over the internal security forces, the judiciary, and other key institutions. The executive branch was headed by President Mohammad Khatami, who won a second 4-year term in June 2001, with 77 percent of the popular vote in a multiparty election. The legislative branch featured a popularly elected 290-seat Islamic Consultative Assembly, Majlis, which develops and passes legislation. Reformist and moderate candidates won a landslide victory for 4-year terms in the 2000 Majlis election, gaining a clear majority of that body. However, the 12-member Guardian Council, which reviews all legislation passed by the Majlis for adherence to Islamic and constitutional principles, blocked much of the reform legislation. The 34-member Expediency Council is empowered to resolve legislative impasses between the Guardian Council and the Majlis. The Constitution provides that "the judiciary is an independent power"; however, the judicial branch is widely perceived as heavily biased against pro-Khatami reformist forces. [...]

An intense political struggle continued during the year between a broad popular movement favoring greater liberalization in government policies, particularly in the area of human rights, and certain hard-line elements in the Government and society, which viewed such reforms as a threat to the survival of the Islamic Republic. In many cases, this struggle was played out within the Government itself, with reformists and hard-liners squaring off in divisive internal debates. As in the past, reformist members of parliament were harassed, prosecuted, and threatened with jail for statements made under parliamentary immunity. [...]

The right of citizens to change their government is restricted significantly. The Supreme Leader, the recognized Head of State, is elected by the Assembly of Experts, and can only be removed by a vote of this same Assembly. The Assembly itself is restricted to clerics, who serve an 8-year term and are chosen by popular vote from a list approved by the Government. There is no separation of state and religion, and clerical influence pervades the Government, especially in appointed, rather than elected, positions. The Government effectively controlled the selection of candidates for elections. The Council of Guardians, which reviews all laws for consistency with Islamic law and the Constitution, also screens candidates for election for ideological, political, and religious suitability. It accepts only candidates who support a theocratic state; clerics who disagree with government policies or with a conservative view of the Islamic state also have been disqualified. Two bills approved by the Majlis in late 2002 to expand presidential power and limit the Council of Guardian's ability to disqualify candidates were rejected by the Council of Guardians at mid-year. [...]

Regularly scheduled elections are held for the Presidency, the Majlis, and the Assembly of Experts."

Document(s): Open document

02.02.2004 - Source: Washington Post

More than one-third of the members of Iran's parliament resigned in a mass protest against efforts by a council of hard-line clerics to fix an upcoming election ("Iranian Legislators Quit in Mass Protest") [#19140],  [ID 8263]

Document(s): Open document

15.10.2003 - Source: International Crisis Group

15.10.2003 - ICG: Khatami’s reform initiative “twin bills” – designed to transfer important responsibilities from the unelected factions of the Islamic Republic to its elected representatives – rejected by Guardian Council ("Iran: Discontent and Disarray") [#16759],  [ID 8264]

"After five years of unsuccessfully trying to work within the confines of the constitution, in the summer of 2002 President Khatami presented to the
parliament two measures – known as the “twin bills” – designed to transfer important responsibilities from the unelected factions of the Islamic Republic to its elected representatives. The bills would have
significantly enhanced the constitutional authority of the presidency while stripping the Guardian Council of its ability to disqualify electoral candidates and veto parliamentary decisions. Khatami suggested
on various occasions he might resign if the Guardian Council rejected the bills, saying “these two are the minimum requirements necessary for running the country's affairs”.

Iran’s reform-minded parliament easily approved these bills in late 2002, but the Guardian Council rejected them in May 2003. Reformists reacted
angrily but remained divided over how best to respond. Some suggested resorting to a popular referendum, others to civil disobedience and still
others to mass resignations from parliament. To date, no action has been taken. “There’s really not much the majles [parliament] can do”, said Mehrdad Serjooie, who covers it for the daily Iran News. “They don’t have the authority to call for a referendum, and they are reluctant to resign and leave the conservatives in power”.

According to the constitution, stalemates between parliament and the Guardian Council are to be resolved by the Expediency Council, a 31-member council appointed from among the different ideological currents in the leadership elite by the Supreme Leader and currently headed by former President Hashemi Rafsanjani. The Expediency Council has broad powers to supercede both the constitution and even shari’a law to “preserve the interests” of the Islamic state. Khatami refused to send the bills to the Expediency Council on the grounds that his proposed legislation was neither unconstitutional nor un-Islamic, and instead urged the Guardian Council and the parliament to resolve the issue on their own. On 14 August 2003, the Guardian Council again rejected the resubmitted bills. The president continues to maintain his public stance, vowing again on 20 September 2003 to the bills “one way or another”, despite these reversals and the shrinking options available to him.

Although disappointed by the outcome, few Iranians seemed surprised. For many it was simply a reaffirmation of political realities and a reminder of the impotence of their elected officials. Sensing widespread disillusionment, Khatami continued to hint at resignation, saying in a 10 June 2003 speech, “If this nation says we don't want you, we will go…that is the way a society should be”. While such a speech might have been enough to rally support around the besieged president two years ago this time Iranians reacted with barely a shrug."

Document(s): Open document

15.10.2003 - Source: International Crisis Group

15.10.2003 - ICG: Dramatically declining voter turnout rates ("Iran: Discontent and Disarray") [#16759],  [ID 8265]

"The most revealing barometer of public disaffection with the political process can be found in dramatically declining voter turnout rates. For a country whose voter participation had been consistently high over the past six years, the snubbing of polls represents a major turnaround.
Whereas 60 per cent of the electorate voted in the 1999 municipal elections, the number plummeted to 28.7 per cent in February 2003. In Tehran, the drop was more precipitous still: a mere 12 per cent bothered to vote in 2003, resulting in a conservative victory in all fifteen of the available city council seats and dealing a sharp blow to reformists, who had won twelve of fifteen possible seats in 1999. Morad Saghafi, editor of the well-regarded political journal Goft-o-Gu, interpreted this as “a political act, not a sign of apathy” – a clear rejection by the public of the candidates they were presented and of the system that produced them."

Document(s): Open document

15.10.2003 - Source: International Crisis Group

15.10.2003 - ICG: Pragmatic conservatives inspired by former President Rafsanjani aim for reforms - especially in the economic field - in order to safeguard the conservative regime ("Iran: Discontent and Disarray") [#16759],  [ID 8266]

"Public hostility toward the conservatives’ socially regressive agenda, impatience with the reformists’ failures, civic apathy and the absence of an organised opposition have left Iranians in a virtual political cul-de-sac, with dim prospects for genuine transformation in the short run. With obstacles at practically every corner, Iranians may simply settle by default for modest change through a new breed of pragmatic conservatism inspired by former President Rafsanjani.

Taken aback by the electoral successes of the reform movement and their own obvious lack of public backing, a small but growing number of such pragmatic conservatives have begun to chart their reemergence. They belong both to the relatively young and university-educated class and to the older clerical establishment who have become convinced that reforming the system is necessary in order to safeguard it. [...]

For many Iranian conservatives, the public’s exit from politics and boycott of voting booths presents an opportunity. As noted, when a mere 12 per cent turned out for municipal elections in Tehran, conservative candidates enjoyed their first success since Khatami’s election in 1997. [...]

Former president Rafsanjani, the unofficial leader of the conservative pragmatist camp, is described by one observer as a “wily, seasoned, street-wise politician – probably the shrewdest and least dogmatic cleric in the Islamic Republic”. For Rafsanjani as for his followers, strategic and
economic concerns ultimately must take precedence over ideological ones. [...]

Nonetheless, the conservative pragmatists face high hurdles. For now, they lack any genuine popular support and have been tainted with allegations of corruption. [...]

What pragmatic conservatism would mean for Iran remains relatively unclear. Domestically, the favoured model appears to be China: economic liberalisation coupled with political repression and
only gradual cultural loosening."

Document(s): Open document

10.2002 - Source: UK Home Office

The political system of Iran ("Country Assessment - October 2002") [#9556],  [ID 8267]

"4.2. The Constitution provides for a President to act as chief executive. The President is elected by universal adult suffrage for a term of 4 years. President Khatami was elected to his post in May 1997, after ex-President Rafsanjani completed the maximum permitted two terms. Legislative power is vested in the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis) with 290 members (increased from 270 members) who are similarly elected for a four-year term. Provision is made for the representation of Zoroastrians (1), Jews (1) and Christians (2). A 12 member Council of Guardians was established in 1980 and supervises elections and ensures that legislation is in accordance with the Constitution and Islamic precepts. 6 clerical members are appointed by the Supreme Leader, with 6 lay jurists appointed by the head of the judiciary and approved by the Majlis. The Council of Guardians has been criticised for allegedly using its power of veto to exclude candidates for all elections (Presidential, Majles, Assembly of Experts, Local Councils) on the basis of discriminatory and arbitrary criteria.

4.3. The executive, legislative and judicial wings of state power are subject to the authority of the Wali Faqih (supreme religious/spiritual leader) who, in the absence of the Imam Mehdi (the hidden Twelfth Imam), carries the burden of leadership. All legislation passed by the Majlis must be sent to the Council for the Protection of the Constitution, which will ensure that it is in accordance with the Constitution and Islamic legislation.

4.4. On 29 November 1997 President Khatami ordered the establishment of the “Committee for Inspection and Supervision on the Implementation of the Constitution”. The aim was to regulate policy, give preference to articles relating to the individual and social rights, and improve communication of the legal rights of the individual. The text of the order, forwarded to the UNHCR in September 1998, depicts the strong mandate of the Committee as one which could go a long way towards resolving many of the existing discrepancies between the Constitution and actual laws and practices within Iran. Suffrage is universal at 15.

4.5. In September 2002 Iran's frustrated reformist President Mohammed Khatami has presented a new bill to parliament aimed at enhancing his powers. It is the second of two proposals which reformists hope will clear the way for the enactment of changes which have been largely blocked by the entrenched hardline minority still holding positions of power."

Document(s): Open document

2002 - Source:

University of Pittsburg/Law School: The Leader ("2002 - University of Pittsburg/Law School: The Leader") [ID 8272]

"The Leader

The Leader is the highest official state authority (Article 113). He is chosen by the Leadership Experts (LE) or leadership Khobregan, a division of the Faqihs (juristcounsults on religious law). All members of LE must be clergymen and are required to supervise the Leader.

The crucial functions and authorities of the Leader as set forth in Article 110 are:

A) To determine the general policy of the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
B) To supervise and ensure good performance of the system's general policy.
C) To decree referendum.
D) To hold the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (including Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Armed Forces and Police Forces).
E) To declare war and peace, and mobilize the armed forces.
F) To appoint, dismiss, or accept resignations of:
- The Faqihs of the Guard Concil (GC).
- The highest authority of the Judiciary.
- The head of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting Corporation.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Chief Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
- Chief Commander of the Armed Forces and Police Forces.
G) To resolve disputes and coordinate relations between the three branches of government (i.e. Executive, Legislature, and Judiciary).
H) To sign the order of appointment of the President of the Republic following his election by the people.
I) To dismiss the President of the Republic.
J) To pardon or mitigate the sentences of condemned persons

It is evident from the above list that the leader's authority encompasses as vast array of functions. Articles 110 and 113 illustrate the problems differentiating between the authority of the Leader and the powers granted to the President. According to Article 113 the President is responsible for the implementation of the Constitution, except those matters that directly relate to the Leader. In fact, it seems as if the Leader, not the President, should have been the authority who is responsible for the implementation of the Constitution. The Constitution grants the Leader special authority and high level power which supercedes all three branches (i.e. the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary).

It is interesting to note that the office of the Leader was not contemplated in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, and that the highest state official planned was the President. When the Leader's office was created in the Constitution, harmony between the Articles was destroyed.

If the Leader violates the Constitution using Islamic issues for justification, no one is empowered oppose him. A recent example of this scenario occurred when the Leader wrote a letter to the members of Majlis prohibiting them from passing a new act concerning press regulations. This order fell outside the scope of the leader's authority and encroached on Majlis' function, but no one, not even the President, could do anything."

Document(s): 2002 - University of Pittsburg/Law School: The Leader

11.2001 - Source: Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation

ACCORD: Political power structure ("7th European Country of Origin Information Seminar Berlin, 11 - 12 June 2001: Final Report - Iran") [#7661],  [ID 8268]

"Leader of the Revolution (Rahbar)

Under Art. 110 of the Constitution, the Leader has the following functions:
1. Designate the general policies of the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran after
consultation with the Expediency Council.
2. Ensure the good execution of the general policies of the system.
3. Issue decrees for referenda.
4. As the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Chief of Joint Staff, Chief
Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, High Commander of the
Disciplinary Forces, declare war or peace and mobilize the military.
5. Appoint, dismiss and accept resignation of Jury members of the Guardian Council.
6. The Leader is the highest authority in the Judiciary and the head of IRIB radio and
TV organization.
7. Arbitrate and settle disputes and regulate relations among the three state powers.
8. Settle problems of the system through the Expediency Council that cannot be
solved through normal channels.
9. Sign the order of appointment of the President after election by the people. The
competence of Presidential candidates must be verified by the Guardian Council
prior to the election and in the first term by the Leader as to whether or not they
meet the qualifications set forth in this Law.
10. Dismiss the President, by taking the interests of the country into consideration after
the Supreme Court has given a verdict on the violation by the President of his
Legal functions or the disapproval of the President by the Islamic Consultative
Assembly on grounds of insufficiency according to Art. 89.
11. Pardon and/or mitigate the sentences of condemned persons within the scope of
Islamic precepts, upon the recommendation of the Head of the Judiciary.
The leader may delegate some of his functions and powers to another person.

Expediency Council (Majma-e Tashkhis-e Maslehat-e Nezam)

According to Art. 112 of the Constitution the Expediency Council is established upon
instruction of the Leader to look into the following:
1. If the Council of Guardians decides that a bill is contrary to Islamic law or to the
Constitution and if the Majles does not act accordingly the Expediency Council can
be asked to settle the matter.
2. It provides advice in matters referred to the Council by the Leader.
3. It consults with the Leader on policy matters.

Council of Guardians (Shora-e Negahban)

The 12-member Council of Guardians is established under Art. 91 of the Constitution:
1. It consists of 6 religious scholars appointed by the Leader and 6 Muslim jurists
presented by the Judiciary to the Majles and appointed by vote through the Majles.
Members serve a 6-year term.
2. All bills of the Majles need to be forwarded to the Council to decide on conformity of
the bill with the Constitution and Islamic principles.
3. It supervises the election of the Assembly of Experts, Presidential and Majles
elections and referenda.
4. It interprets the Constitution.

Committee for the Supervision of the implementation of the Constitution

This Committee was established by President Khatami to ensure that the Constitution
is properly implemented, i.e. to prevent conservative forces from abusing the
Constitution.

Assembly of Experts (Majles-e Khebregan)

The Assembly is elected by the people every eight years and meets once a year. It has
the right to discharge the Leader and to appoint a new Leader. It consists of 83 persons
and all candidates are cleared by the Council of Guardians. Another one of its tasks is
to supervise the work of the Leader."

Document(s): cois2001-irn.pdf

09.2001 - Source: Middle East Review of International Affairs

Detailed analysis of the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran, its changing balance of power, debates, and wider meaning ("Transformation of the Iranian Political System: Towards a New Model? (MERIA, Vol.5, No.3, September 2001)") [#7727],  [ID 8269]

Document(s): Open document
meria-irn0901.html

09.2000 - Source: Middle East Review of International Affairs

Detailed analysis of factors affecting democratization and the development of civil society: internal power struggle, a relatively weak civil society, and persistent economic problems ("The Struggle for Democracy in the Islamic Republic of Iran (MERIA, Vol.4/No.3, September 2000)") [#7724],  [ID 8270]

Document(s): Open document
meria-irn092000.html

03.2000 - Source: Middle East Review of International Affairs

Detailed analysis of the February 2000 Iranian parliamentary elections: the existing political situation, the campaign, and the election itself, explaining the forces and factors involved, including the reason for the overwhelming victory for those supporting the president and domestic changes ("Iran's 2000 Elections (MERIA, Vol.4/No.1, March 2000)") [#7728],  [ID 8271]

Document(s): Open document
meria-irn032000.html

2000 - Source: BBC News

Iran's political system at a glance (clickable chart) ("Iran: who holds the power?") [#18240],  [ID 8273]

Document(s): Open document

1996 - Source:

Iran Yearbook (Netiran): Leadership ("Iran Yearbook (Netiran): Leadership") [ID 8274]

"The highest authority in the Islamic Republic is Leader - or alternatively the Leadership Council - who exercises the combined supreme political and religious power and, indeed, is a manifestation of the integration of politics with religion (Article 5 of the constitution).

Furthermore, the constitution has provided for the election of a Leader or a Leadership Council and the qualifications of the Leader or members of the Leadership Council (Article 107).

The first leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran Ayatollah Khomeini, assumed his position as the founder of the Islamic republic and the theological protector (vali-e-faqih). Duties, powers and qualifications of the leaders, or the Leadership Council, as the case may be, have been specified by the constitution (Article 109-111).

After demise of Ayatollah Khomeini on 3 June 1989 Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamanei was elected by the Assembly of Experts in May 1989 as the new leader of the Islamic Republic.

There are several institutions and agencies which are not accountable to any branch of state, and are overseen by the leader through his representatives. These include:

Panzdah Khordad Foundation (Bonyad-e Panzdah Khordad)
Martyr Foundation (Bonyad-e Shahid)
Housing Foundation (Bonyad-e Maskan)
Literacy Movement (Nehzat-e Savad-Amoozi)
Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution (Shoraye Aali Enqelab-e Farhangi)
Islamic Propaganda Organization (Sazeman-e Tablighat-e Islami)
Land Allocation Committees (Hay'athaye Vagozari Zamin)
Foundation of the Oppressed (bonyad-e Mostaz'afan)
The amendment of the constitution has modified the constitution as follows:

the Leadership Council has been removed and the Assembly of Experts for Leadership given the task of electing a single leader. The constitution originally provided for election of a leader either by the people, as in the case of Ayatollah Khomeini, or by the Assembly of Experts. The related amendment has removed the first option. The Assembly of Experts has also been given the task of dismissing the leader from his position if he is incapable of carrying out his duties, or if he loses the requirements of a leader, or if it becomes clear that he lacked some of them from the beginning;
The leader is no longer required to be a supreme theological authority (marja' taqlid) whom Shia Muslims follow. He should possess adequate knowledge to issue edicts on the basis of various chapters of the Islamic canon;
The powers and duties of the leader have been set as follows, although he may delegate them to his representatives:
Deciding the overall policies of the country after consultation with the Council for Determination of Exigencies - the leader has the final say;
Ordering referenda;
Designation of Islamic canonist members of the Guardian Council, head of the judiciary, director of the Radio and Television Organization, chief of army general staff, the commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, and the commanders of the armed and security forces;
General command of the armed forces;
Declaring war and peace and ordering mobilization of forces;
Resolving disputes between the heads of the three branches of the state and regulating the relationship between them;
Signing the decree endorsing the president on his election;
Dismissing the president in the national interest, should a ruling of the Supreme Court find him in breach of his duties, or a vote of Majlis disqualify him;
Pardoning prisoners or commuting their sentences at the recommendation of the head of the judiciary;
Solving those problems which cannot be solved by ordinary means, through the Council for Determination of Exigencies."

Document(s): Iran Yearbook (Netiran): Leadership