08.2005 - Source: Freedom House

Abkhasia: Defence Minister Raul Khajimba was named to succeed Gagulia as prime minister ("Freedom in the World 2005") [#41618],  [ID 5521]

"On April 22, Defense Minister Raul Khajimba was named to succeed Gagulia as prime minister. Subsequently, Amtsakhara also called on Ardzinba to resign as president because of his poor health; Ardzinba, who was undergoing medical treatment in Moscow for an undisclosed illness and who was no longer actively involved in the daily running of the government, insisted that he had no intention of stepping down before the next presidential election, on October 3, 2004."

Document(s): Open document

08.2005 - Source: Freedom House

Abkhasia: Government of Prime minister Gagulia resigned ("Freedom in the World 2005") [#41618],  [ID 5524]

"On April 8, 2003, after just four months in office, the government of Prime Minister Gennady Gagulia, who had developed a reputation for political weakness and inefficiency, resigned. Gagulia stepped down following pressure from Amtsakhara, an increasingly powerful opposition political movement representing primarily veterans of the 1992-1993 war, which had threatened to organize a mass rally if he remained in office."

Document(s): Open document

17.10.2003 - Source: UN Security Council

Abchazia: Report focused on political process, operational activities, humanitarian and human rights situation ("Report of the Secretary General on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia") [#17265],  [ID 5514]

Document(s): Open document

21.07.2003 - Source: UN Security Council

Abkhazia: Report focused on political process, human rights and humanitarian situation ("Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia S/2003/751") [#14606],  [ID 5515]

Document(s): Open document

19.07.2003 - Source: Institute for War and Peace Reporting

Abkhazia: Amtsakhara, the largest political group in Abkhazia consisting of the veterans of the Abkhaz-Georgian war is urging president Vladislav Ardzinba to step down ("Abkhazia: Veterans Challenge President") [#15664],  [ID 5516]

Document(s): Open document

11.07.2003 - Source: Prima News

Abkhazia: Georgian guerilla group, the White Legion, operating in Abkhazia, declared his readiness to support Georgia’s armed forces if Georgia decides to use force to restore Abkhazia to its control ("Abkhazia: Georgian guerilla group, the White Legion, operating in Abkhazia, declared his readiness to support Georgia’s armed forces if Georgia decides to use force to restore Abkhazia to its control") [#15861],  [ID 5517]

Document(s): Open document

01.07.2003 - Source: ReliefWeb

Tbilisi-based Abkhazia government-in-exile protested against continued deployment of Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia ("Russian peacekeepers stay in Abkhazia (UNAG)") [#15892],  [ID 5518]

"President Eduard Shevardnadze said at the news briefing on June 30 that he supports continued deployment of the Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia. He also said the troops would be withdrawn immediately should one of the sides (Georgian or the Abkhaz) demand it.
Georgian Foreign Ministry has already sent to Moscow a draft agreement concerning the issue. The Russian peacekeepers' mandate expired on June 30.

Head of the Tbilisi-based Abkhazia government-in-exile Tamaz Nadareishvili is categorically against of this decision and demands immediate withdrawal of the Russian peacekeepers from Abkhazia"

Document(s): Open document

02.06.2003 - Source: Caucasus Times

Abkhazia: state language bill was debated and its initial version received favorable majority vote of deputies; Russian language as well as Abkhazian received the state status language to be in official use in governmental organizations ("Abkhazia’s State Language Bill Received Favorable Majority Vote in Parliament") [#15223],  [ID 5519]

Document(s): Open document

06.05.2003 - Source: Caucasus Times

Abkhazia: President Vladislav Ardzinba appoints a few ministers and a chairman of the state customs committee; 7 of 8 appointed ministers ran the same ministries in the former government ("The president of Abkhazia appointed several high officials") [#15227],  [ID 5520]

Document(s): Open document

17.04.2003 - Source: Institute for War and Peace Reporting

Abkhazia: Prime Minister and his cabinet forced to resign by pressure from the public/ no candidates for the post of prime minister have been named ("Out with the Government in Abkhazia") [#13332],  [ID 5522]

"Everything else seems to have been put on hold indefinitely after Prime Minister Gennady Gagulia and his cabinet resigned on April 8, after only four months in power.

The resignation itself was nothing new. Abkhazia has seen seven cabinets come and go in the decade since it gained a precarious form of independence. But this is the first time the government was forced to resign by pressure from the public, rather than an arbitrary decision by the president, Vladislav Ardzinba.

Prime Minister Gagulia - who replaced the charismatic Anri Jergenia after his unexpected sacking in December - quickly became notorious for his inefficiency, and public anger came to a head in late March at the congress of Amtsakhara, a political movement that unites Georgian-Abkhazian war veterans.

Veterans who were previously loyal to the government lashed out at its inefficient economic policy, weak political stance and lack of resolve in fighting crime. They demanded that the president dismiss the government and reform the whole system of power - and said that if this did not happen the Amtsakhara movement would organise a national rally.

It was a potent threat. In Abkhazia, a national rally is the traditional equivalent of a popular referendum, only to be called in times of emergency. National rallies have historically been convened around once every ten years. Even in Soviet times, participants voiced opinions and demands that contradicted official policy. The authorities have never been able to completely ignore the resolutions passed at these popular assemblies, and have been forced to make concessions.

So it was on this occasion, too. At first President Ardzinba complained that the move "threatened constitutional integrity".

"This is an attempt to reduce Abkhazia's political system to a primitive level when presidents and ministers are elected at popular congregations," he said.

But in the end he had no choice but to accept the cabinet's resignation.

Neither side has made a decisive move since the government stepped down. No one seems to be in a hurry to fill the vacuum. The most likely candidates for the post of prime minister, defence minister Raul Khajimba and the chief executive of the Chernomorenergo power company, Sergei Bagapsh, have publicly turned the job down.

No other candidates have been named, and there is speculation that the president may revisit the previous cabinet line-up and ask Gagulia to form a new government."

Document(s): Open document

09.04.2003 - Source: UN Security Council

Report focused on political process, human rights and the humanitarian situation in Abkhazia ("Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia S/2003/412") [#12153],  [ID 5523]

Document(s): Open document
Open document

04.04.2003 - Source: European Parliament

Status of Abkhazia in the future ("Ad-Hoc-Delegation In Abchasien, Georgien 23. - 28. Februar 2003") [#14725],  [ID 5525]

"Wie die georgische Seite wiederholt feststellte, würde Abchasien innerhalb eines föderalen Georgien größtmögliche Autonomie genießen, und die Rechte der Abchasen sollten institutionalisiert werden. Ein solcher Vorschlag könnte eine doppelte abchasisch-georgische Staatsbürgerschaft beinhalten, die ausschließlich von Bewohnern der Region in Anspruch genommen werden könnte. Damit wären ihrer Ansicht nach die besten Möglichkeiten für die Abchasen gegeben, ihre Sprache und Kultur zu bewahren, während sie, wenn sie ein Teil von Russland würden, mit Sicherheit untergehen würden (so berichtete ein georgischer Sprecher, dass sich derzeit viele Russen in Abchasien niederließen). Die Georgier verwiesen auf die Zusammensetzung des Parlaments von 1991, in dem die Abchasen eine im Vergleich zu ihrer Bevölkerungszahl überproportional hohe Zahl von Sitzen hatten – 28 von insgesamt 65 Sitzen bei einem Bevölkerungsanteil von 18%. Die Sprecher erwähnten die Åland-Inseln, Südtirol und einige spanische Regionen, denen innerhalb eines Staates größtmögliche Autonomie zugestanden wird, als mögliche Modelle. Unter Berufung auf das Abkommen von Helsinki von 1975, das die Unverletzlichkeit der Grenzen in Europa garantieren soll, unterstützten die westlichen Sprecher
mehrheitlich diesen Standpunkt.
Die abchasische Seite beklagte sich darüber, dass sie nie richtig Gelegenheit gehabt hätten, der internationalen Gemeinschaft ihren Standpunkt darzulegen. Die Abchasen verglichen ihren Kampf um Unabhängigkeit mit der Situation in Tschetschenien. Sie wiesen darauf hin, dass Abchasien in seiner Geschichte unter unterschiedlicher (zaristischer wie georgischer) Fremdherrschaft gelitten hat. Sie beklagten, dass Stalin („der Georgier“) ihre Autonomie 1931 aufgehoben hat, was zu der Zeit Massenaufstände auslöste. Im Gegensatz zu den Georgiern vertraten sie die Ansicht, dass sie eine von Georgien verschiedene eigene Geschichte haben und dass es nur wenige Mischehen zwischen Abchasen und Georgiern gibt. Die abchasischen Gesprächspartner betonten, dass sie vor dem Krieg eine „föderative“ Struktur akzeptiert hätten, und auch in den Jahren nach dem Konflikt bereit gewesen seien, der einen oder anderen Form der Konföderation mit Georgien zuzustimmen. Sie erklärten jedoch, dass sich die Kluft zwischen den beiden Seiten besonders infolge der „Terrorakte“ der Georgier in der Region Gali vertieft hätte, und dass es nun nicht mehr möglich sei, in einem gemeinsamen Staat mit Georgien zusammenzuleben. Sie vertrauten nicht darauf, dass die Georgier ihre Rechte als Minderheit anerkennen würden, und verwiesen auf die Situation anderer Minderheiten in Georgien wie der Kurden und Mescheten. Die Abchasen vertraten die Ansicht, dass zwei unabhängige Staaten weniger Probleme bereiten würden. Das Problem sei mit dem Referendum von 1999, bei dem 90% für die Unabhängigkeit gestimmt hätten, zufriedenstellend gelöst worden. Sie betonten, dass sie keinen ihrer Nachbarn bedrohten, und dass sie demokratische Werte, ein Mehrparteiensystem, eine freie Presse und eine Marktwirtschaft hätten. Ihr Ziel sei es, einen demokratischen Staat aufzubauen, der die internationale Gemeinschaft dazu bewegen würde, ihre Meinung zu ändern. Sie erklärten, dass Unabhängigkeit kein Ziel an sich sei, sondern ein Mittel zur Bewahrung ihrer
Gesellschaft. Sie stellten die Frage, warum sie gezwungen sein sollten, ein Teil Georgiens zu sein, und stellten fest, dies sei schlicht ein Erbe der Sowjetunion. Sie zitierten die Beispiele anderer Länder, die ihre Unabhängigkeit erlangt haben, wie Ost-Timor, die Slowakei, die Teilrepubliken Jugoslawiens und die Baltischen Staaten. Sie wiesen auch darauf hin, dass es kleinere Länder als Abchasien gibt, die internationale Anerkennung genießen."

Document(s): Open document

04.04.2003 - Source: European Parliament

Legitimacy of the government in Abkhazia ("Ad-Hoc-Delegation In Abchasien, Georgien 23. - 28. Februar 2003") [#14725],  [ID 5526]

"Die Georgier betonten, dass die abchasische „de facto“ Regierung in Sukhumi
illegitim sei, da die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung der Vorkriegszeit nicht an den Wahlen
teilnehmen konnte. Die internationale Gemeinschaft hat die Wahlen in Abchasien
nicht anerkannt (siehe oben).
Die Abchasen wiesen auf ein Referendum von 1999 hin, in dem mehr als 90% der zu
der Zeit in Abchasien lebenden Bevölkerung für die Unabhängigkeit gestimmt hätten
(Dies wurde jedoch von der internationalen Gemeinschaft nicht anerkannt, da die
300.000 außerhalb Abchasien lebenden Flüchtlinge nicht an der Abstimmung
teilnehmen konnten). Sie erklärten, dass viele der ethnischen Georgier, die vor dem
Krieg in Abchasien gelebt hätten, einer relativ neuen Einwanderergeneration angehört
hätten, die sich in der sowjetischen Periode angesiedelt hätten, und dass dies zur
Unterminierung und Verletzung der Rechte der ethnischen Abchasen geführt habe.
Die Abchasen stellten fest, dass alle ethnischen Gruppen im Parlament mit seinen 35
Sitzen vertreten seien und dass es drei georgische Mitglieder, drei armenische
Mitglieder und drei russische Mitglieder gebe. Sie bedauerten, dass die EU ihr
Parlament nicht anerkennt und betonten ihren Wunsch, Verbindungen zur EU zu
knüpfen."

Document(s): Open document

13.01.2003 - Source: UN Security Council

Political developments, security and human rights situation in Abkhazia ("Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia S/2003/39") [#10459],  [ID 5527]

Document(s): Open document
00976geo.pdf

14.10.2002 - Source: UN Security Council

Report on human rights and security situation in Abkhazia ("Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia S/2002/1141") [#9455],  [ID 5528]

Document(s): Open document
00914geo.pdf

24.09.2002 - Source: Council of Europe - Parliamentary Assembly

Council of Europe: Cease-fire agreement provides for the deployment of the Commonwealth of Independent States’ Peacekeeping Forces (CIS PKF) and unarmed UN observers (UNOMIG) ("Situation in Georgia and the consequences for the stability of the Caucasus region [Doc. 9564]") [#10596],  [ID 5529]

"16. The armed conflict between the Abkhaz separatists and the Georgian authorities broke out in 1992. A cease-fire was signed in May 1994. The agreement provides for the deployment of the Commonwealth of Independent States’ Peacekeeping Forces (CIS PKF) in the conflict area and for that of unarmed UN observers (UNOMIG). As a result of the conflict, around 250.000 people, mostly of Georgian origin, have been driven out of Abkhazia.

17. For the time being, discussions on the political settlement seem to be in a deadlock. They take place in a so called “UN led Geneva peace process”. The UN has now prepared a proposal on the distribution of competences between Abkhazia and the central authorities. The latter hope that this document will provide a basis for the settlement, but the Abkhaz side does not seem to abandon its position of principle that the reunification is only possible if Georgia and Abkhazia are treated as equal entities. Lately, Abkhazia has renewed its insistence on the independence, while the international community has not recognised such an attempt.

18. The below-described events of last autumn in the Kodori valley nearly ruined the peace process and even threatened to lead to the resumption of the armed conflict.

19. It is claimed that, last autumn, the Georgian authorities deployed or, at least, facilitated the deployment of anti-Abkhaz fighters in the Kodori valley in Abkhazia, which gives direct access to Sukhoumi, capital of Abkhazia. Abkhazia called it a breach of the 1994 cease-fire agreement. The UNOMIG demanded the withdrawal of these fighters.

20. In April 2002, the Georgian authorities declared that the fighters had left the valley. A subsequent unannounced deployment of the CIS peacekeeping forces in Kodori, whose alleged intention was to check if the withdrawal had effectively taken place, led to a serious deterioration in the relations between Russia and Georgia. At the end of April, the joint UNOMIG/CIS PKF resumed patrolling in Kodori. In August, land mines were installed in the upper Kodori valley by some 400 fighters. It seems that meanwhile the situation has deteriorated severely in the Kodori valley and UNOMIG issued a statement on 11 September 2002 expressing serious concern in this respect and calling on both sides to return to the status quo of before the fights of last summer as well as to refrain from unilateral actions and inflammatory rhetoric which would further exacerbate the situation.

21. Tensions still persist between Russia and Georgia regarding the role of the CIS PKF. The Georgian side is proposing a change in their mandate, which the Abkhaz side refuses. It should be mentioned that the Georgian Parliament asked, last autumn, for an immediate withdrawal of these forces. Nevertheless, the UNOMIG says that as its own observers are unarmed, the joint patrol with the CIS PCK is a necessary condition for the UNOMIG’s observers to function. Meanwhile, Georgia agreed to an extension of the CIS PCK mandate until 31 December 2002, which allowed the UN Security Council to extend accordingly the UNOMIG mandate.

22. Mr Aslan Abashidze, representative of the President of Georgia (at the same time the President of Adjara, a Georgian autonomous region) declared on 20 June 2002 that the settlement of the conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia is impossible without Russia. He welcomed the role of the Russian forces deployed in Abkhazia under a CIS mandate and considered that Tbilissi and Sukhoumi should agree on a new status for Abkhazia.

23. As a result of the above events, perspectives for a settlement seem to be more remote now than at the beginning of 2002. A lot of energy had to be devoted to the crisis management rather than to the process of seeking a political settlement."

Document(s): Open document

10.07.2002 - Source: UN Security Council

Report on human rights and security situation in Abkhazia ("Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia (Rf. S/2002/742)") [#8776],  [ID 5530]

Document(s): Open document
00895geo.pdf

19.04.2002 - Source: UN Security Council

Report on human rights and security situation in Abkhazia ("Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia S/2002/469") [#6636],  [ID 5531]

Document(s): Open document
02254geo.pdf

05.03.2002 - Source: Schweizerische Flüchtlingshilfe

SFH: Background information on the conflict in Abkhazia ("Lageanalyse Februar 2002") [#8057],  [ID 5532]

"Die blutigen militärischen Auseinandersetzungen nach der Unabhängigkeitserklärung von
1992 endeten 1993 mit einer Niederlage der georgischen Armee und der Vertreibung von
250'000 GeorgierInnen. Der Waffenstillstand vom 14. Mai 1994 wird von einer GUS-Friedenstruppe,
der ausschliesslich Russen (rund 1500 Mann) angehören, und etwa 100 UNMilitärbeobachtern
(UNOMIG) überwacht, die des öfteren Ziel von Entführungen sind, zuletzt
im Dezember 2000. Der UN-Sicherheitsrat verlängerte mehrmals das Mandat der
UNOMIG um sechs Monate und forderte gleichzeitig die Führungen Georgiens und Abchasiens
auf, die bisher ergebnislosen Verhandlungen wieder aufzunehmen.
Die Spuren des Krieges sind in Abchasien überall sichtbar. Niemand wagt in der gegenwärtigen
Situation einen Wiederaufbau. Bisher ist es – auch der UNO – nicht gelungen, die Standpunkte beider Seiten einander anzunähern. Der abchasische Ministerpräsident Anri
Dschergenija würde persönlich einer mit der Russischen Föderation assoziierten Republik
den Vorzug geben. Er ist sich aber der Tatsache bewusst, dass ohne die Unterstützung
Russlands die Unabhängigkeit seines Landes keine Chance hat, und dass sich Russland
eher gegenüber Georgien konzessionsbereit zeigen könnte.
Der UNO-Sicherheitsrat verlängerte in der ersten Februarwoche 2002 das Mandat der
UNO-Truppen in Abchasien bis Ende Juni 2002 und rief erstmals die abchasischen VertreterInnen
dazu auf, Verhandlungen über den Status Abchasiens im Rahmen eines georgischen
Staatenbundes aufzunehmen."

Document(s): Open document

21.02.2002 - Source: Institute for War and Peace Reporting

IWPR: A number of potential flashpoints could destabilise the precarious Georgia-Abkhazia peace process ("Abkhazia: A Long Bridge to Cross") [#10564],  [ID 5535]

"Georgia is home to an estimated 200,000 Georgian refugees who fled the fighting in Abkhazia in 1992-3. They have their own "government in exile" and hundreds of them have turned into partisans, who cross the Inguri river into Gali and attack Russian peacekeepers and Abkhaz officials. The refugees are a growing factor in domestic Georgian politics.

Several opposition leaders, including the flamboyant former justice minister, Mikhail Saakishvili, gave their support to the picket on the Inguri bridge. The colourful governor of the western Imereti region, Temur Shashiashvili, has gone one step further, saying that if there is no progress on the Abkhazia issue by St George's Day, May 6, this year the Georgian government should give its full support to the partisans and move back into the region.

Against this background, Shevardnadze, under pressure from the United Nations, gave his approval on January 31 to an extension of the Russian (formally Commonwealth of Independent States, CIS) peacekeeping mandate in Abkhazia.

International officials say that no one else is currently prepared to take on the burden of policing the border zone, and that the Russians also provide security for the UN monitoring force, UNOMIG. The peacekeeping mandate is due to be renewed at the upcoming CIS meeting in Kazakstan on March 1.

But the Russian military is deeply unpopular in Georgia because of the assistance it gave to the Abkhazians during the war. Even relatively loyal politicians, such as the deputy speaker of the Georgian parliament, a former Abkhaz deputy, Vakhtang Kolbaia, are pressing for the peacekeepers to be pulled out or at least to have their mandate changed. "While they are there, the conflict will not be fully resolved," Kolbaia said.
Shevardnadze is also feeling the heat from the UN to stick to the terms of a 1994 agreement and pull Georgian troops out of the upper part of the Kodori Gorge. Dozens died in skirmishes in this mountainous region, scene last October in the worst violence in Abkhazia for years. The Georgians have agreed to withdraw their soldiers from the gorge and allow UN patrols in, but they may try to send border guards into the region, arguing that they technically do not count as "troops".

Abkhazia itself also faces a year of uncertainty. The elected president of the unrecognised state, Vladislav Ardzinba, is sick in hospital in Moscow. The authorities refuse to disclose what is the source of his ill health, but he has not spoken in public since last autumn and many speculate that he will be forced to step down by the end of the year.

Abkhazia's de facto leader in Ardzinba's absence is the prime minister Anri Djergenia, a grey and sombre bureaucrat. Djergenia lacks Ardzinba's popularity and now also faces a new problem in the shape of a well-organised and articulate political movement, called Aitaira or Revival, which is contesting the breakaway republic's parliamentary elections on March 2.

Revivial has picked up support amidst an atmosphere of general depression prevalent in Abkhazia, eight years after the breakaway republic emerged from the war with Georgia. Many buildings in the Abkhazian capital Sukhumi are still in ruins. Pensions are worth a symbolic one US dollar a month. International observers say the population of the republic, 530,000 in the late Soviet period, has sunk to around 200,000.

Revival's leaders do not dissent from the official position that Abkhazia should strive for full independence, but accuse the authorities of being undemocratic and inflexible.

"Revival is more flexible, more pragmatic," said Natela Akaba, one of the leaders of the movement. "We want more room for manoeuvre. We ought to do what the population wants. The style of Ardzinba and Djergenia is very closed."

The prime minister dismissed Revival as a group of intellectuals who were ready to sell out to Georgia. "We just have to be patient and wait a month and discover that [Revival] has no role to play in our state," he said.

Perhaps to buttress his uncertain domestic position, Djergenia takes an implacable line on Abkhazia's proclamation of independence from Georgia. He rejected outright a framework document on "the distribution of competencies between Tbilisi and Sukhumi" drawn up by the United Nations envoy for Abkhazia, Dieter Boden, because it stipulates that Abkhazia is part of Georgia.

To the Abkhazians' discomfort, their biggest friends, the Russians, have given their assent to Boden's document, thereby confirming their support for Georgia's territorial integrity. This is one element in a modest New Year thaw in Russian-Georgian relations.

Analysts agree that the key to progress in the Abkhazia dispute may lie in Moscow. But Russian approval of the UN document is only a small step down a very long road.

"It's an encouraging step that Russia has agreed to these general principles," said David Darchiashvili, a specialist with the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development in Tbilisi. "The pragmatic part of Russia understands that you can't keep this conflict going forever. There is a need for real negotiations, but real negotiations can also inflame the situation inside Georgia. And Russia is always able to raise new questions, like military bases and energy supplies."

Darchiashvili said that the fundamental problem was that the Georgian authorities had still not come up with a "defined position" on Abkhazia, beyond a general offer of "high autonomy". That in turn gave the Russians room to meddle, if they wished to

"If Georgian policy was based on sounder principles, it would help Russia to define its position," he said."

Document(s): Open document

02.2002 - Source:

Central Asia and the Caucasus, Journal for Social and Political Studies: The Special Features of Forming a Multiparty System in Abkhazia (No 2 (14) 2002) ("Central Asia and the Caucasus, Journal for Social and Political Studies") [ID 5534]

Report on political parties in Abkhazia: The People's Party of Abkhazia, the Communist Party (CPRA), Republic Party Apsny, Sociopolitical Movement Aitaria (SPM Revival), the Sociopolitical Movement Amtsakhara

"A multiparty system became a reality of Abkhazia’s political life relatively quickly. Its special feature is the proximity or complete coincidence of the tasks declared by the pro-government and opposition parties alike. All the movements and parties (like the current authorities) are in favor of political independence and reject the possibility of Abkhazia’s return to Georgia. There are some differences in the approach to the resolution of economic problems, but they are very insignificant. The pro-government parties are in favor of a mixed, socially oriented economy regulated by the state, whereas the opposition prefers a market social economy.

Without a doubt, the political polarization in Abkhazian society does not have any underlying ideological motive. It is based primarily on a different attitude toward the authorities and toward the first president of the unrecognized state. As V. Sharia justifiably noted (Ekho Abkhazii, 5 November, 2000), society is divided into those who “adore the president, believing that Abkhazia has had unprecedented luck with its leader, those who actively do not accept his policy and personal qualities, and those who sympathize with him and say that he is the hostage of his clan.”

There has essentially been no ideological demarcation of political forces in Abkhazia, which is characteristic of all democratic societies, but division according to the principle: “We love the president,” or “We do not love the president.” Therefore, the debate between the authorities and the pro-government parties, on the one hand, and the opposition, on the other, is not ideological, rather it boils down to inundating society with compromises and attacks against certain personalities and extreme forms of dislike for each other.

The hyperbolic nature of the personal factor in political life is preventing the establishment of constructive relations between the authorities and the opposition. The opposition leaders and publications are competing to see who can criticize the authorities and pro-government parties the most. In response, the latter are essentially accusing the opposition of national treason and alliance with those people in Georgia who are striving to use the standoff and internal struggle within Abkhazia to return the lost territory by force.48

Of course, in a very short time, the Abkhazian opposition has managed to achieve great success and turned into an impressive component of the country’s political life. But its real influence will not become clear until after the parliamentary elections scheduled for the spring of 2002."

Document(s): Central Asia and the Caucasus, Journal for Social and Political Studies

18.01.2002 - Source: UN Security Council

Report on human rights and security situation in Abkhazia ("Report of the Secretary-General concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia [S/2002/88]") [#5547],  [ID 5536]

Document(s): Open document

2002 - Source: Halbach, Uwe

Uwe Halbach: Rivalry between two political clans ("Erdöl und Identität im Kaukasus") [#10863],  [ID 5533]

"In Abchasien wird eine Konkurrenz zwischen dem „Otschamtschira-Klan“ mit dem Parlamentssprecher
Sokrat Dschindscholija an der Spitze und dem „Gudauta-Klan“, den Präsident
Ardzinba repräsentiert, beobachtet. Diese Konkurrenz beeinflusst auch die Haltung
beider Seiten zu einer möglichen Konfliktlösung. 13 Seit 2001 gewann in Abchasien die politische
Opposition an Zulauf: Die verheerende Wirtschaftslage und die Isolation der politischen
Führung unter Ardzinba und seinem weniger populären Statthalter, Regierungschef
Djergenia, hat eine politische Oppositionsbewegung namens „Aitara“ (Wiedergeburt) hervorgebracht.
Sie vertritt die gleichen Unabhängigkeitsforderungen wie die Führung, kritisiert
aber deren Inflexibilität. Die Regierung diffamiert die Opposition als Gruppe von Intellektuellen,
die Abchasien an Georgien verkaufen wollen, und nimmt in der Frage der Konfliktregelung
mit Tiflis eine harte Position ein, um dem erwarteten Vorwurf der „Kapitulation“
die Grundlage zu entziehen. 14 Eines der wenigen größeren Unternehmen des Landes,
die staatliche Holzfabrik AbchazLes, ist mit der Familie des Präsidenten Ardsinba verflochten.
Der Holzhandel – insbesondere mit türkischen Partnern und unter Umgehung der GUSBlockade
– ist eine der Haupteinnahmequellen Abchasiens."

Document(s): Open document
halbach2002.pdf

24.10.2001 - Source: UN Security Council

Report on political and humanitarian situation in Abkhazia ("Report of the Secretary-General concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, S/2001/1008") [#4482],  [ID 5537]

Document(s): geo.pdf
Open document

13.09.2001 - Source: Council of Europe - Parliamentary Assembly

Council of Europe: Since 1997, the Abkhaz side has refused to discuss the question of its status ("Honouring of obligations and commitments by Georgia [Doc. 9191]") [#10653],  [ID 5538]

"33. Regarding the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, we had the occasion, during our second visit to Georgia, to visit Sukhumi and witness for ourselves the devastation of a region which used to be the former Soviet Union’s Côte d’Azur. We are grateful to the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (Unomig) for having organised the programme of our visit and ensured our transport to and from Sukhumi in aircraft.

34. The helicopter flight from Senaki (Western Georgia) to Sukhumi allowed us to see the enormous number of roofless houses bearing witness of a conflict which, regardless of the responsibility for its origin, led to an ethnic cleansing resulting in the displacement of approximately 250 000 ethnic Georgians (out of a total pre-war population in Abkhazia of approximately 525 000 people).

35. In Sukhumi, we met the de facto Prime Minister and the de facto Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as a number of local non-governmental organisations. In their talks, the Abkhaz political leaders focused on the history of the Abkhaz people and the origin of the conflict.[3] They said that they would be ready to discuss with the Georgian leadership the building up of a “common state” (or “two states with common borders”) only if Abkhazia and Georgia were dealt with as equal entities. They also said that, for instance, Abkhazia needed its own army.

36. This position seems to be far from the “widest possible degree of political autonomy” within a single state that Georgia is ready to grant Abkhazia, according to recent statements by President Shevarnadze, which he reiterated to us.

37. In fact, since 1997, the Abkhaz side has refused to discuss the question of its status. As to the UN-led Geneva peace process, a draft proposal prepared earlier this year on the division of the constitutional powers between Abkhazia and the central Georgian Government has been blocked because of disagreements within the group of the friends of the Secretary General in Georgia (France, Germany, Russia, United Kingdom and United States).

38. Whereas the political positions were more or less as expected, we were especially impressed by the talks we had in Sukhumi with representatives of civil society. They were unanimously in favour of Abkhazia’s independence and told us that even if Abkhaz politicians were to come to an agreement with the Georgian central government, the people would not respect it. And this despite the current bad economic situation and the fact that their region was in a much worse position than the rest of Georgia. A reason for their reluctance to reach agreement with the Georgian central government was apparently their fear that Georgian IDPs would return to Akhazia, and claim their houses, now occupied by Abkhazi."

Document(s): Open document

19.07.2001 - Source: UN Security Council

Report concerning the situation in Abkhazia ("Report of the Secretary-General concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia/ S/2001/713") [#2952],  [ID 5540]

Document(s): Open document
01553abkh.pdf

07.2001 - Source: Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development

CIPDD: The legally autonomous region Abkhazia is under control of the secessionist government; the independence of Abkhazia is not recognized by any country ("Georgia's Membership in the Council of Europe, Achievements and Failures") [#10549],  [ID 5539]

"Abkhazia is legally an autonomous region in Georgia. As a result of the violent conflict in 1992-93, the territory of Abkhazia is under control of the secessionist government that has proclaimed independence of Abkhazia, though no country has recognized it. Most ethnic Georgian population and large part of other residents have left. Estimations of the current actual population of Abkhazia vary widely. Current Abkhazian authorities use the number of 300,000 people, other estimations oscillate between 120 to 240 thousand.
According the Ministry of Refugees and Settlement, some 240,000 IDPs from Abkhazia currently reside in Georgia, but this number may also be exaggerated as due to corruption refugees may register several times in order to get allowances. While economic situation in Georgia is bad enough, the population of Abkhazia is currently suffering from additional social and economic hardships and international isolation. The district of Gali in the southern part of Abkhazia is notable for frequent violent incidents between the Georgian partisans and the Abkhazian militia. The cease-fire is monitored by the Russian peacekeeping force under the aegis of the CIS, and a mission of the United Nations military observers. Settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia continues to be one of the most crucial problems of Georgia. The Georgian president underlined the priority of this problem by setting up the Ministry for Emergency
Affairs, which was created on July 21, 2000. The ministry is preoccupied with problems related to finding the solution in Abkhazia. Georgia’s official position on the principles of settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia may
be described as follows: territorial integrity and internationally approved borders of Georgia, as by December 21, 1991, should remain intact; all IDPs and refugees that had fled Abkhazia have the right to return and security
guarantees should be provided to them for safe return; Abkhazia has a right to become a unit within the Georgian federation and it may be entitled to most extensive competencies that exist in the international practice of federative arrangements. This also means that federal arrangement of Georgia may be asymmetrical. Federal status of Abkhazia shall be guaranteed by the Georgian constitution. At the same time, Georgia supports internationalization of the conflict and welcomes participation of the international community in its settlement. The Abkhaz side considers Abkhazia to be an independent state and demands building relations with Georgia as that of one independent state with the other. It recognizes the right of return of IDPs in principal, but this
prospect is extremely unpopular in the Abkhaz society. The Abkhaz authorities demand to solve the issue of the status before the IDPs actually return.
This leaves the positions of the parties too far apart. Their representatives meet frequently in different formats, including quite intense ‘popular diplomacy’. At the end of the Georgian-Abkhaz talks in Yalta, Ukraine
March 15-16, 2001), the parties signed a joint statement on collective efforts to gradually repatriate IDPs to Abkhazia. Mr. Dieter Boden, an envoy of the US Secretary General in Georgia, has prepared a project of the constitutional division of authorities between Georgia and Abkhazia that may serve as the basis for the settlement, and submitted it for consideration to the UN Security Council. The Georgian government accepts major provisions of the government, while the secessionist authorities reject it outright. Among the Security
Council members, Russia has serious objections. However, in general there is no progress to speak of. In private many politicians and international
diplomats concede that no solution is in sight, and the international community has concentrated its efforts in the region on the negotiation process between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the issue of Nagorny Karabagh that it
deems more promising at the moment. Deterioration of Georgia’s relations with Russia, the most important outside player in the conflict, is one of the key reasons why the prospects of a solution look so remote. Exemption of Abkhazia from the visa regime between the two countries constituted a clear encouraging signal to the secessionist regime. Recently, political tensions grew in Abkhazia in relation to Russia’s obligation to withdraw it base from Gudauta by July 2001. Russia took this obligation in the framework of the OSCE summit
in Istanbul (November 17, 1999). The Abkhaz authorities, however, strongly opposed the withdrawal of the base, and a number of protest rallies were held in Abkhazia in order to prevent the base closure. The outcome is, that Russia did not withdraw its base from Gudauta, in breach of the Istanbul summit resolution, and justified this by the opposition of the local public that would not let Russian soldiers and equipment leave Abkhazia. The next date for the withdrawal of the base is not set yet."

Document(s): cipdd-geo.pdf

09.1998 - Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies

Report focused on the conflict in Abkhazia ("Options for Resolution of the Conflict in Abkhazia") [#15920],  [ID 5541]

Document(s): Open document