10.03.2008 - Source: Civil Georgia

Lawmakers from New Rights Party go on hunger strike to demand that authorities meet opposition demands and secure free and fair parliamentary elections ("New Rights Go on Hunger Strike") [ID 22565]

Document(s): Open document

24.11.2007 - Source: Civil Georgia

Davit Gamkrelidze, presidency candidate of New Rights Party, lays out priorities in case of being elected president of Georgia (independent judiciary, reform in interior ministry, etc) ("New Rights Presidential Candidate Lays Out Priorities") [ID 21766]

Document(s): Open document

28.09.2007 - Source: Civil Georgia

Calls for mass protest rallies against the arrest of ex-Defense Minister Okruashvili were challenged by opposition New Rights Party, which said that it would not participate ("New Rights Challenge Calls for Rallies") [ID 21249]

Document(s): Open document

21.01.2003 - Source: EurasiaNet

Eurasianet: Characteristics of the New Rights Party ("Georgia`s mounting opposition") [#10573],  [ID 4706]

"The New Rights Party has a number of characteristics that set it apart from other Georgian political forces. First, it is the only party that lacks a clear leader, being run collectively by a group of prominent individuals. Second, it is the only party in Georgia’s history, excepting the NDP, to take a strictly center-right stance on policy issues. Finally, the group is extremely well financed, as its supporters include many of Georgia’s most successful businessmen.

These unique characteristics represent specific benefits and challenges for the party. Its pluralistic leadership model has proven problematic in the past. The group lacks a charismatic leading personality with whom the public can relate, and is sometimes slow to reach policy decisions due to its reliance on consensus. Similarly, while the party benefits from its financial strength, New Rights leaders suffer at the polls due to their image as "oligarchs" who benefited unfairly from the economic chaos of the early years of independence. In its favor, the party’s image makes it especially popular with younger voters and Georgia’s business class.

Key party leaders include David Gamkrelidze, longtime head and founder of Aldagi, an insurance company that grew to be one of Georgia’s biggest businesses. Gamkrelidze is viewed as the ideological inspiration of the party and serves as its leader in parliament. Levan Gachechiladze, the party’s chairman and head of the successful exporter Georgian Wine and Spirits, is probably the most popular politician among the group. Other prominent figures include Pikria Chikhradze, who alongside Parliamentary Speaker Nino Burdjanadze is one of Georgia’s few influential female legislators.

A number of influential politicians looked poised to join the New Rights Party in early 2003. Soon after the New Year, Niko Lekishvili, the chairman of the Taxpayers Union of Georgia and a former state minister, announced that he had switched his allegiance. In addition, there were indications that Giorgi Targamadze, leader of a 10-person parliamentary faction and former head of the Revival Party’s Tbilisi branch, would be joining the party as well. Finally, Tbilisi newspapers printed a number of stories on Parliamentary Speaker Burjanadze’s alleged interest in the New Rights Party.

From its inception, the party has been strongly pro-Western in its rhetoric, a stance that has won it some significant support in parliament. (Recently, legislators unanimously endorsed Gamkrelidze’s plan to make a bid for eventual NATO membership the main priority of Georgian foreign policy for the next decade.) On the domestic front, the party calls for a flat tax and other economic reforms."

Document(s): Open document

12.06.2002 - Source:

Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology, and Policy: New Rights ("Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology, and Policy: New Rights") [ID 4707]

"Unlike the other parties, New Rights is not positioning itself against Shevardnadze but against his loudest critics, Zhvania and Saakashvili. Levan Gachelizade, one of the founders of the party, is the arch rival to Saakashvili. The most bitter personal attacks were exchanged between the leaders of New Rights, National Movement, and Zhvania's team. The New Rights party is by no means a presidential party, but it has maneuvered successfully to pick up deputies from the nearly defunct Citizen's Union of Georgia to establish itself firmly in the Georgian parliament. The leader of the parliamentary fraction is David Gamkrelidze, while Levan Gachelizade is expected to make a bid for the speakership of the Tbilisi City Council. (Irakly Areshidze and Paata Chakhnashivili, "Georgian Local Elections Will Reshape Country's Political Landscape," EURASIANET, 6 Jun 02)"

Document(s): Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology, and Policy: New Rights

06.2002 - Source: British Helsinki Human Rights Group

BHHRG: "New Rightists" had split away from Mr. Shevardnadze’s Citizens’ Union several months before the 2002 election ("Report: Georgia 2002") [#8566],  [ID 4708]

"BHHRG also spoke to Tea Kentchadze, chief of the “New Rightists” Party’s department of foreign relations, and learned that this new opposition party – like Mikheil Saakashvili’s National Movement and “Zhvania’s Team” – had split away from Mr. Shevardnadze’s Citizens’ Union several months before the 2002 election. Ms. Kentchadze described the party as a “constructive opposition.”

Ms. Kentchadze said the party disliked the name “New Rightists” because it implied that the party was “right-wing,” which was not true. Since their policy program features several objectives that conflict from the standpoint of traditional ideas of “right” and “left” -- “establishment of a strict administrative control that provides for the legalization of the shadow economy,” “limited government,” “strengthening the Georgian state,” defending “the sanctity of private property,” increasing “spending on the armed forces,” “a reduction in taxes” – perhaps the party is a suitable example of how the terms “right-wing” and “left-wing” have become confused in the post-Soviet era.

The party has glitzy offices in central Tbilisi called “centres of social contact,” which citizens can walk into off the street to speak to party representatives about their problems. A representative in one such office told BHHRG that the party had been very active in providing aid to victims of a recent earthquake in Georgia, and had also materially assisted refugees and the dispossessed. The representative boasted that the party had afforded material assistance to over two hundred citizens since the centres were set up a few months earlier.

The party’s plush headquarters were located inside a walled compound on the outskirts of the centre, reminiscent of the wall in front of the US Embassy that has come to be colloquially labelled the “Berlin Wall” by many Tbilisi residents. Ms. Kentchadze refused BHHRG’s request to take a photograph of the interior of the building after the election, saying “I don’t think so” because party officials were “still working.” Her office featured a large poster of Cuban Communist revolutionary Che Guevara next to a poster produced by the International Republican Institute (IRI) and USAID."

Document(s): Internal affairs
Polling day Conclusion Open document

06.2002 - Source: British Helsinki Human Rights Group

BHHRG: Analysis of the opposition parties ("Report: Georgia 2002") [#8566],  [ID 4709]

"Some Georgians explained to BHHRG that the New Rightists was actually a party allied to President Shevardnadze, controlled by the president’s son Paata. Dismissing the New Rightists’ claims of opposition to the president, Levan Ramishvili of the USAID-funded Liberty Institute told BHHRG that the New Rightists only criticised the president because it was the “popular” thing to do, and that in fact the party served Mr. Shevardnadze’s interests.

Such reverse logic is troublesome for obvious reasons. Any party that publicly proclaims itself as in opposition to the incumbent authorities and purports to be garnering popular support on that basis must ultimately be considered “oppositionist.” Under Mr. Ramishvili’s reasoning, Mr. Shevardnadze has a hidden reason to facilitate the rise of a party critical of him. While it is impossible to disprove this theory, it is equally impossible to disprove the proposition that Mr. Shevardnadze in fact secretly supported the campaigns of Mr. Saakashvili and Mr. Zhvania. Indeed, many Georgians insisted to BHHRG that the “Young Reformers” were all part of the same “Shevardnadze clan.” Whatever the merit of such claims, since Mr. Shevardnadze has thus far consistently done the West’s bidding in Georgia’s domestic politics and geo-political orientation, is there any reason to believe that (by Mr. Ramishvili’s thinking) he would not assist Saakashvili’s National Movement and “Zhvania’s Team” during the election as part of his “latest assignment”? Is this not especially possible given the obvious preference the West has shown for these politicians?

Furthermore, in light of the ultimate election results in the republic as a whole and in Tbilisi, it seems unlikely that Mr. Ramishvili’s theories about the New Rightists enjoying the president’s favour hold much water. For one thing, the Labour Party ultimately allied with Saakashvili’s National Movement in the Sakrebulo, not with the New Rightists, as many had predicted. Secondly, the party that seems to have fared best in Georgia’s regions is the “Industry Will Save Georgia” Party of beer magnate Gogi Topadze. Thus, if the New Rightists did in fact enjoy presidential patronage, it was clearly ineffectual in this election.

In BHHRG’s observation, if any opposition parties were connived against, it was the so-called “pro-Russian” oppositionists. Regardless of what certain elements of the Georgian “intelligentsia” may claim about popular attitudes toward Russia in Georgia, BHHRG still finds more ordinary Georgians willing to express admiration and a positive attitude toward Ajarian President Aslan Abashidze than toward the “Young Reformers” or other pro-Western politicians in the republic. The Council of Europe will have been indifferent about the prospects of infringements against the parties of Abashidze, Patiashvili and Rcheulishvili, but – from BHHRG’s observations – if any forces could be identified as the “victims” of electoral chaos and underhandedness, it was these."

Document(s): Internal affairs
Polling day Conclusion Open document